UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I LIBRARY

BEYOND THE SCl-llSM:

TEACHERS' UNIONS AND THE REVISION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF

EDUCATION IN JAPAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FUFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN

ASIAN STUDIES

AUGUST 2008

By Yoko I. Wang

Thesis Committee:

Patricia G. Steinhoff, Chairperson Lonny E. Carlile Petrice R. Flowers We certify that we have read this thesis and that, in our opinion. it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Asian Studies.

THESIS COMMITIEE

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my committee chair, Professor Patricia G. Steinhoff. Without her expertise and dedicated guidance this thesis would not have been possible. I admire her all-rounded scholarship and incomparable enthusiasm in teaching, as well as her warm support for her students. I am most privileged that I can continue my studies with her here at University ofHawai'i at Minoa, as a new doctorate student in Sociology. I would also like to thank my committee members, Professor Lonny E. Carlile and Professor Petrice R. Flowers. The courses provided by Professor Carlile have always been my inspiration, and his guidance based on his expertise in Japanese labor movement has been the greatest resource for my newly developing academic interest My first Political Science course with Professor Flowers challenged my view of Japanese politics intellectually, and it was one of my favorite classes in my Master's program. I would also like to thank Mr. ShOji Kitano, for sending me precious primary sources from Japan on his personal expenses. His generous support certainly enriched this Master's research, as it did not have the opportunity of fieldwork. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Mr. Hiroshi llda and Mrs. Emiko Iida. There is little doubt that my family environment has been the most determining factor in motivating me to study the subject of Japanese teachers' union movement

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements •...... •...... •...... ••.•...... •...•.•...... •....•...•...... •.•...... ••..•••.•..••.•••.... iii List of Tables ...... v List of Figures ...... vi

Chapter I: Introduction and Methods Unions in a Vertical Society?: Labor Movements in Post-WWTI Japan •.•.••.••. .1 Nikky6s0: Teachers' Union Movement in Post-WWTI Japan •••.•.••..•••••..••...•••••..••. 6 Analyzing Opposition Campaigns: Social Movement Theories and the ...... 14 FLE Revision Methods .•..••.•..•..••••...•..•.••.•...... •...... ••...... •...... •....•...... ••..... 20

Chapter 2: NikkyGso, 1947-1989 Fights between NikkyGso and the Conservatives ...... 22 Membership Decline and the Schism ofNikky6s0 ...... 30

Chapter 3: Reconstruction ofthe Union Identity Rengl): Characteristics and Orientation ...... •...... •...... ••..•••.. 38 Rengo: Unity or Division? ...... 41 Reconstruction of the Union Identity ...... 44

Chapter 4: Opposition Campaigns against the FLE Revision ...... 48 The Case: Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education ...... 50 Central Rallies Zenkyo and Nikkyoso 's Central Rallies ...... 54 Outside Network Groups and Their Central Rallies ...... 56 Joint Struggles at the Local Level...... 59 Hokkaido ...... 60 Tokyo ...... 6I Nagano ...... 62 Miyagi ...... 63 Caravan Campaign...... 64 Shared Views, Different Audiences ...... 65

Chapter 5: Conclusion Perpetual Factionalism in Japanese Labor Movement ...... 70 Contribution oflntemational Norms to the Process of the FLE Revision .•.....•... 72 Social Movement Theories and the Case of Japanese Teachers' Union ...... 74 Movement

Bibliography ...... 78

iv LIST OF TABLES

1. The Change of Teachers' Unions' Membership .•.•.•....••...... •..•..•...... 36

2. After the Schism: Teachers' Union Membership in 1992 ...... •...... •.... 37

3. Date and Size of Central Rallies held by Nikkyoso and Zenk:yo ...... •.... 55

4. Date & Size ofKyokiren's Central Events ...... 58

v LIST OF FIGURES

Figure ~

1. Offe's Model of Union Mobilization ...... •..•...... •...... •... 3

2. Evolution of Teachers' Unions in Post-WWII Japan ...••.•.....•...... 8

3. Evolution of Political Parties of Japan ...... 34

4. Evolution of National Union Federations in Post-WWII Japan ...... •.•.....•. 35

5. The Opposition Rally at the Meiji Park, Tokyo ...... •.....•..•...... •.•. 54

vi CHAPTERl INTRODUCTION AND MEmODS

Unions in a Vertical Sodety?: Labor Movements in Post-wwn Japan

Huw does inequality persist in a society where equality should have been institutionaliwl as an element of basic citizenship? To answer such a question, Claus

Offe argues, we must not be blinded by such popular concepts as "interest group" that

Instead, Offe suggests, we have to closely look at the reality of people's lives in the society in which they operate and see how the social structure allows inequality to persist.

1'bus. in hisessa.y "Two Logics of Collective Action." OtIe'sanalysis is fncngeA on the fundamentally different patterns of communication exercised by capital and labor.

According to Offe, becanse capital and labor have conflicting interests in iruJuslrial socictWs, they also have cOJ'l.tnrsting patterns ofc.mpmtmication tPrough which. they define their interests. While capital has rather self-evident interest and purpose and therefore only needs a "monological" communication process to define its interests, labor basmnltip1e. oftenooutlicting interestsamong itsgmup (presumably a union) membership and thus the members are required to have a "dialogical" communication process to define their interests in order to achieve consensus and unity.2 As an individual

his or her employer, moreover, maintaining unity is the only way for labor to be able to

1 Claus Offe. "Two logics of Collective Action," In Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary nU11O.fmmations ajWorktmdPri/itir:$. (Caillb,idge, Maslr.TheMffl'nlss, 19I5), t"ffl..22(t 2 ibid., 198 1 confront capital.

At the same time, Offe also points out, "for the sake of their power, unions are foroedto maintain a precarious balaooe bet!' : en znobjlkarion ofWSOU«leS and mobilization of activity, between size and collective identity, and between bureaucracy

(which allows them to accumulate power) and internal democracy (which allows them to exercise power)" {empbeSfl'l uumginatj. This me ns that the power of a union doesoot necessarily increase as its size does, because it is a 'union' of multiple interests, which has to maintain its membership's motivational power that tends to be weakened once it becomes too bureaucratic and thus internal democmcyis andu ired Consequently, whereas labor needs a union to represent their collective interest, a union has to maintain an appropriate size and internal dynamics. On the other hand, capital is simply stronger when it is Digger. Thus, in mauy iRdustriesunbpl'l"Ced power reIationsbetw«mcapitBl

3 and labor persist. (see Figure 1) :

3 Offe, 187 2 Figure 1. Offe's Model of Union Mobilization

Material resources (potential of power) , J''­ +/'1----__.. ' ' "'-, + .,. i M. Weber,

~/+'. DiVCISity of !....---+~E~~a§] c:'''~ Size r- interests I' - :Michels Power '------'\ ~I Democracy I / - \o\lson :lL,,/( Motivational resources ,/ , ,(Exercise of.powcr)

Source: Claus Offe. Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations ofWork and Politics. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1985, 187, Fugure 7.3.

In addition to such perpetual antagonism between capital and labor, Offe

continues, we must not forget the role that the state plays, mostly in favor of capital, as

.their ,interests are common in.maintaining the existing ·social.structurewhere·they·occupy

a privileged position economically and politically. This insight ofOffe is to be considered

when we examine labor movements in a particular country, in this present study, Japan.

In·her famous·book Japanese Society, Nakane·Chie·demonstrates·the ·vertical

social structure that penetrates Japanese society and argues that this social structure

makes it difficult for the Japanese people to organize horizontal relationships with those

3 who belong to other groups of same strata, and instead causes numerous vertical schisms within the society. 4 In comparison with the cases of other Asian countries such as China and India, Nakane claims that "the Japanese are virtually incapable of seeing society in terms of strata within which one may locate oneself, yet they will employ delicately graded criteria to distinguish the most minor relative differences between themselves and others."S

This argument seems convincing when we think of the limitations of such ideologies as socialism and communism, which advocate social equality as well as the necessity of unity of the working class in order to achieve such a society. Although these ideologies have been popular among intellectuals as well as labor leaders since the pre- war period, their ideals of horizontal class unity have had limited success. Japanese laborers were allowed to organize unions legally under the American Occupation after

World War II. However, even then, strong antagonism within the working class did not disappear. Inexorable chains of schisms that have been observed in the past fifty years rather support Nakane's argument about the incapability of Japanese to create horizontal unity. Nakane points out, moreover, "Competition and hostile relations between the civil powers facilitate the acceptance of state power and, in that group is organized vertically, once the state's administrative authority is accepted, it can be transmitted without obstruction down the vertical line of a group's internal organization." The history of the

Japanese labor movement does not easily escape this criticism. Nakane continues, "in this way the administrative web is woven more thoroughly into Japanese society than perhaps

4 Chie Nakane, Japanese society. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970) S Ibid., 93 4 any other in the world.',!; Thus, in order for the Japanese labor movement to achieve its goal-the fundamental change of the country's social structure to a more egalitarian one, competition and schisms over minor differences are the fIrst things it must overcome.

Thus, Nakane's model of the Japanese society also applies to the structure of

Japanese labor movement as well, contributing to its development mostly in a destructive way. In his study Enterprise Unionism in Japan, Kawanishi Hirosuke also utilizes

Nakane's concept ofvertical social structure to discuss Japanese enterprise unions. Based on the concept of ''vertical structure," Kawanishi points out that enterprise unionism embodies the difference between Japanese and AmericanJEuropean labor movements, as the latter seem to be more capable of building horizontal relationships beyond the border between fIrms, although the development of the world's labor movement is also a history of perpetual antagonism between slightly different ideologies.7 Nonetheless, Kawanishi claims that Japanese enterprise unions do not show collaborative actions even in Shunto, or the Spring Labor Offensive.8

Kawanishi also argues that previous studies of Japanese enterprise unionism are insufficient because they are static and treat Japanese enterprise unions as simply reflecting cultural and historical characteristics ofthe Japanese society. He points out that the increasingly positive evaluation of Japanese enterprise unionism that climaxed in the

1980s overlooked the actual complexity of enterprise unionism, emphasizing the achievement of the "one fIrm-one union" system and neglecting such cases as multiple

6 Ibid., 102 7 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years ofSocialism: the West European Left in the Twentieth Century. ~ew York: New Press 1996) Hirosuke Kawanishi, Enterprise Unionism in Japan. (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992), 12 5 unions existing in one fInn. Kawanishi thus proposes an alternative analysis to "develop a perspective for understanding the existence of structural contradictions or paradoxes within Japan's industrial relations.,,9

Kawanishi suggests that there are at least three types of enterprise unions in

Japan: one which incorporates all employees at a single fInn; one which shares the employees at a particular fInn with one or more other enterprise unions of this type; and new types of unions. lO Kawanishi then argues that the second type of enterprise union whose operational dynamics involves "minority unions" is particularly important in analyzing union movement in Japan, because these "minority unions" actually have constituted a significant percentage of existing enterprise unions in Japan since the 1950s.

He thus argues for the signifIcance of studies that examine multiple enterprise unions beyond the stage of schism, which involves close examination of 'after-schism' development of "minority unions. "II Indeed, such studies are particularly important in the case of the Japanese labor movement because it produces innumerable schisms as discussed previously.

Nikkyoso: Teachers' Union Movement in Post-WWII Japan

The present study will examine one such case in which a Japanese labor union encounters a major schism. This particular schism is of a teachers' union called Nikkyiiso

(Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, or Japan Teachers' Union), which was formed by fIfty thousand schoolteachers in 1947.

9 Ibid., 8 lO Ibid., 32-34 II Ibid., 59 6 Nikkyoso was the biggest and most powerful teachers' union that ever existed in

Japan. The union was famous for its active and often militant campaigns that exhibited the power to challenge and revise government proposals regarding Japan's educational system. It strove to preserve the democratic postwar education system that many educators desired, based on their serious reflection upon their wartime experiences. Its well-known slogan "Never send our students into the battlefield again" strongly motivated the union's activities and is still supported by its members today. 12 In 1989, however, this powerful teachers' union experienced a major schism. Throughout the

1980s, Nikkyoso suffered from a serious membership decline, which weakened its influence in the political arena. The decline occurred because of external attacks by the central goverrunent and local boards of education. Moreover, internal conflicts between the right-wing and the left-wing leaders within the union over affiliation with the anti-

Communist labor union federation Rengo finally led to the schism. 13 The schism produced the new Nikkyoso led by the right-wing leaders on the one side, and Zenkyo

(Zen'nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, or All Japan Teachers and Staff Union), which was formed by the left-wing leaders who broke away from the original Nikkyoso on the other side (see Figure 2):

12 Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, Official Website, htto:llwww.jtu-net.or.jpl 13 Robert Aspinall. Teachers' Unions and the Politics oj Education in Japan. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001),1 7 Figure 2. Evolution of Teachers' Unions in Post-WWII Japan

radical moderate

Source:AspHu ll. R (200 I) Teachers' Un,ons and [~ PoIlUO of EdLKODon In jopan. New York: Sote UniverSity of Ntw York Prtn

Source: Robert Aspinall, Teachers ' Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan. (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001)

8 It is interesting to note that there are only three book-length studies published on

Nikkyoso and all of them were written in English. The two earlier studies were written by

American scholars, Benjamin Duke and Donald Thurston,and both were coincidentally published in 1973.14 As of this writing, therefore, Robert Aspinall's Teachers' Unions and the Politics ofEducation in Japan published in 2001 is the most recent study on - - Nikkyoso, and, in fact, it is the only study that addresses Nikkyoso's schism. Before looking at Aspinall's study, however, let us see what Duke and Thurston have to say about the first twenty years ofNikkyoso's history.

Presumably because of his specialty as a scholar of comparative education,

Duke's study focuses its discussion on Nikkyoso's chronological development as well as

.its characteristics, particularly its "militancy." Duke argues that Nikkyoso's militancy was caused by the "peculiar" circumstances in which the union developed. IS In particular,

Duke fmds the reason for Nikkyoso's militant orientation in the union leadership'S personal background. In the pre-war normal schools, according to Duke, all of the first three presidents ofNikkyoso received strict, militaristic education and started their career as elementary school teachers in rural areas of Japan, where they and their students suffered from post-war poverty. Duke thus concludes that Nikkyoso's militancy is a result of such elements rather than the influence of communist ideology, although indeed most of the earlier leaders ofNikkyoso had become members of the Japan Communist

Party. Duke has the following to say:

14 Benjamin Duke, Japan's Militant Teachers. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973) Donald Thurston, Teachers and Politics in Japan. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973) 15 Duke, 189-202

9 In sum, communism as an ideology has not been the determining factor in the degree of . influence the Communist bloc has been able to attain in the historical development of Nikkyoso; communism as an ideology has not been one of the major causes underlying the militant policies of the union. Too many other conditions and factors unrelated to communism, as discussed previously, are more directly responsible for the militancy of the union. Support for this position can be made by concluding syllogism. If communism had not existed and there had been no Communist bloc within Nikkyoso, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine that the union would have developed its policies much differently in reaction to the prewar and postwar condition in Japan. However, if the prewar and .postwarconditions had been diametrically different; thatjs,ifth.ere had been no nationalistic normal school training, no Great Depression, no postwar poverty, and no conservative reforms of the American Occupation reforms, then the militancy of a teachers' union in contemporary Japan would have been significantly modemted regardless of the presence of communism. 16

As any human organization operates within a certain social environment, it is probably true that the leadership's individual background and the particular sociopolitical circumstances of the period had influenced Nikkyoso's political orientation.

Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the very idea of organizing a labor union-

"Workers, unite!"--comes from such political ideas as communism. Thus, it would be reasonable to understand Nikkyoso's character as the product of all these multi-layered factors.

Although Thurston's study approaches Nikkyoso "as the product Of 'peculiar' circumstances,,17 as Duke does, he looks at Nikkyoso as one of m~y "interest groups" 18 that had "come more to influence on public policy" by the time of his research. Through his analysis ofNikkyoso's influence on Japanese educational politics during the. 1950s through the early 1970s, Thurston concludes that Nikkyoso did not possess direct access to the central policy-making because it was fundamentally a leftist union which did not

16 Ibid" 202 17 Aspinall, 6 18 . Thurston,S 10 affiliate with a powerful political party such as the conservative Liberal Democratic

Party. More importantly, however, Thurston argues that Nikkyoso was nonetheless able to influence on the policy making process as it had the following channels of influences:

1) "indirect influence" through opposition activities

2) "united influence" through collective actions . 3) "implementation influence" through its ability to choose whether or not to

cooperate with the policy directed from the policy makers19

In Aspinall's view, the most important is in the third one:

Thurston's most important conclusion was that, although Nikkyiiso was almost completely excluded from national-level educational policy-making during the period in question, it was still able to have significant effect on policy by its influence at the implementation stage (at the school or genba) and by the awareness in the minds of policy makers of the enormous potential the union had for disrupting the smooth running of the school system if extreme policies were forced on it. The left-wing teachers' union was therefore an important counterbalance to the right-wing dominated government and Ministry of Education.20

Leonard Schoppa also discusses the influence ofNikkyoso on central policy- making in his book Education Reform in Japan, although his study was rather on Japan's educational reform during the 1970s through the 1980s in general than Nikkyoso in particular. Schoppa shares the same view with Thurston but he put more emphasis on the first point raised by Thurston-the significance ofNikkyoso's "indirect influence.'.:!1

Although it has apparently been taken for granted, I must point out here that

"united influence" is nevertheless the most important because it is the foundation for the

19 Ibid., 8 20 Aspinall, 4 21 Leonard James Schoppa, Education Reform in Japan. (London: Routledge, 1991)

11 t

other two channels of influences to actually function. Without unity, a union would

hardly be able to mobilize an opposition activity; furthermore, non-cooperation strategy

at the implementation level could easily be broken if the teachers at the genba were not

united. After all, the extent of unity controls the mobilization ability of a union. As we have discussed in the previous section, however, maintaining unity has been the hardest

. . - challenge for the Japanese as well as the international labor movement for well over a

century.

What happened then, when Nikkyoso split? Now we turn to discuss Aspinall's

study ofNikkyoso's schism. The major contribution of Aspinall's work is its detailed

examination of the change that was happening within Nikkyoso during the 1980s, which

resulted in the critical shift in its internal political power balance between the right-wing

and left-wing leadership. The shift of power from left-wing to right-wing leadership heavily influenced the union's organizational characteristics thereafter. Furthermore,

Aspinall emphasizes, the structural change in the broader labor movement of Japan,

namely the formation ofRengo (Nihon rodokumiai sorengokai), the new national labor federation, in 1989 was the fmal blow that disabled Nikkyoso from maintaining its status

as a unified national union. As we will discuss closely in Chapter 3, Aspinall argues that

the proclaimed anti-communism orientation of Rengo left Nikkyoso's left-wing

membership with no choice but to leave the union once its support for Rengo was

determined .

. Aspinall's study also explains the positions taken by Zenkyo and the new

Nikkyoso after the schism and their ideological antagonism at the level of leadership. It

thus brings up such broader issues as "whether or not Nikkyoso's schism and the

12 resultant ... decline in power of the teachers' union removed the main impediment to total right-wing control of education policy in Japan.'.:22 This discussion provides insights on the changing relationship between the new Nikkyoso and the state, and what role Zenkyo would possibly play in the new structure of Japanese educational politics. Moreover, using Thomas Rohlen's theory on politics in education in Japan, Aspinall carefully analyzes the different outcomes of the schism at the prefectural level. According to

Aspinall, Rohlen's major argument is that "the type of political conflict to be found in the

Japanese education system varied considerably, depending on which administrative level was being examined." "The three most important levels of the system" are:

1) the school level which is too locally distinct to be generalized

2) the prefectural level which has "considerable independence from national

authority"

3) the national level where conflict persists as there is less reason to compromise

at this level due to its freedom from daily responsibility of school operation. 23

Thus, Aspinall's study has examined many of the important aspects of the 1989 schism ofNikkyoso. As his discussion is focused on the schism and its outcomes, however, his study does not look at the actual activities of Zenkyii and Nikkyoso after the schism as two competing industrial federations. Moreover, after his book was published, another wave of drastic change arose in Japan's educational politics, presumably since when the Obuchi cabinet launched the National Convention of Educational Reform

22 Aspinall,S 23 Ibid., 70-71 13 (kyoiku kaikaku kokumin kaigi) in 2000. The series of government-led educational revisions were carried out since then, and in December 2006, the Abe cabinet fmally succeeded in revising the Fundamental Law of Education (kyoiku kihonho, hereafter ''the

FLE"), the supreme educational law that embodied the spirit of the country's post-war democratic education.

Analyzing Opposition Campaigns: Social Movement Theories and the FLE Revision

During 2002 through 2006, there was a widespread opposition movement in Japan to fight this revision of the FLE, and the teachers' unions played a central role in this movement. As this most recent and nation-wide movement involved numerous campaigns led by both Zenkyo and Nikkyoso, we have a great opportunity to look closely at the actual activities of these two unions and examine the extent of the central division between them.

Although labor unions have slightly different characteristics compared to 50- called "social movement organizations" (hereafter. "SMOs") that are analyzed in many sociological studies of social movements, in many ways their activities are similar. To closely study the actions of teachers' unions in actual opposition events such as the case we will examine here, therefore, it is appropriate to utilize concepts from social movement theories. Among those theories, Charles Tilly's concept of "contentious repertoire" and Hunt et ai's "identity fields" are particularly helpful in examining this particular series of carnpaigns.24

24 Charles Tilly, "Contentious Reoertiures in Great Britain, 1758-1834" In Traugott ed., Repertoires and Cycles o/Collective Action. 15-42 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995) 14 In his essay "Contentious repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834," Tilly examines

the development of a different "repertoire of tactics" betWeen the British people's

struggles in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century. He defines the concept of

"repertoire" as "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a

relatively deliberate process of choice." Through his comparative examination, he finds

. that these repertoires change over time; some routines or tactics die out and others

survive and develop, although "[a]t any particular point in history ... they learn only a

rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively." More importantly, according

to Tilly, these repertoires are not given but "emerge from struggle.,,25 In other words,

"each routine within an established repertoire actually consists of an interaction among

tWo or more parties" rather than "a single actor (individual or collective)" [emphasis in

original].26

In this essay Tilly also lists some of those routines that have survived and that we

still are able to observe in today's social movements. Among them is the street

demonstration, "a form of action crystallized in Western Europe and North America

between 1780 and 1850" mainly because of the expansion of electoral politics. According

to Tilly, this form involves at least four actors: demonstrators, objects of their claims,

specialists in official control (usually police), and spectators, and also other actors such as

mass media, counter demonstrators, politicians, researchers, and so on.27 Tilly notes that

Scott Hunt et al ed., "Identity Field: Framing Process and the Social Construction of Movement Identities," In Enrique ed., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. 185-208 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) 2S Tilly, 26 26 Ibid., 30 27 Ibid., 30-31 15 in France and Great Britain this form was developed through a similar process, although the timing was different. In both countries demonstrations "emerged from intense, continuous bargaining between various political' claimants and public authorities, especially police officials" and "the result was a dramatic narrowing and standardization of the actions that made up a demonstration, and increasing differentiation of - demonstrations from public meetings, processionS, parades, funerals, festivals, strikes, and insurrections." The other common tactics observed in today's social movements that are the inventions of British struggles are: coordinated marches, meetings, petitions, slogans, publications, and the development of "special-purpose associations into nationwide challenges to the existing distribution or use of state power." 28 We will see in Chapter 4 that these tactics can be observed in Japanese social movements as well.

In social movements, which Tilly defmes as .''the sustained, organized challenge to existing authorities in the name of a depriv~d, excluded, or wronged population,,,29

Hunt et al observe major collective actors that can be categorized into three interrelated

"identity fields": protagonist identity fields, antagonist identity fields, and audiences.3o

Hunt et al view these three sets of identities as a result of "interactional accomplishment" and thus they are socially constructed outcomes.31 Their study defines the three identity fields as follows:

1) protagonist identity fields include beneficiaries of movement action

2) antagonist identity fields oppose the protagonists' efforts

28 Ibid, 31 29 Ibid., 37 30 Hunt et aI., 186, 193 31 Ibid., 189

16 3) audiences are neutral, uncommitted observers (who are also potential .

beneficiaries and thus are often a mobilization target)

According to Hunt et ai, moreover, any SMO (a group of protagonists) must accomplish the following three core framing tasks "in order to affect consensus and action mobilizatio~':

1) diagnostic framing to identify the problem and antagonists

2) prognostic framing to identify solution, targets, strategies, and tactics

3} motivational framing to develop compelling reasons for carrying out what has.

been identified through the first and second framing processes32

Notice the supportive relation between this argument and Offe's study that explained the need oflabor unions to maintain "dialogical" internal communication pattern (framing process} in order to motivate its memberships, which falls into the category of protagonist identity fields. As labor unions and SMOs share such characteristics as high degree of internal diversity, both are forced to maintain

"dialogical" framing pattern.

Hunt et al also argues that it is essential for SMOs to maintain their collective identity (and membership'S personal identity) to "situate one's own organization in time and space in relation to· other groupS.,,33 In this "boundary framing" process, SMOs.make

32 Ibid., 191 TI Ibid., T94 17 claim about their antagonists to frame their own identities.34 Identifying and defining antagonists thus serves the protagonists' purpose of shaping and maintaining of their own identity.

As mentioned previously, audience identity fields are "capable of reacting and evaluating protagonist messages in afavorable light" [emphasis added] and thus are often - - potential protagonists. Therefore, according to Hunt et al,social movement organizations. need to appeal to the cultural and/or historical characteristics of the particular audiences whom they aim to mobilize.3S

Audiences-are also an important source of "imputations" that often influence protagonists' (re)identification. Hunt et allocate four typical patterns of imputation framings exercised by SMOs: 1) "incorrect" assessments to be denied; 2) reinforcing assessmentS-to be accepted and enhance the SMO's identity; 3) misunderstandingS-based on "flawed" impression management by the SMO, which motivates improvement of its. identity management; and 4) characterizations as accurate depictions of "actual" flawed identities, which. often "callfouadical.identity or frame transformation" of the SMO!6

Thus there is an important interaction between the audience's perception of an SMO and its own framing.

To snmmarize, this.study ofNikkyoso.andthe behavior ofthe two successor unions after the 1989 schism begins with Offe's concept of the internal dynamics oflabor unions, combined with the structural characteristics of labor unions in Japan that are prone.to factional schism because of the vertical structure of the society. Building on the

34 Ibid., 197 3S Ibid., 200 36 Ibid., 201-202 18 three earlier studies ofNikkyoso before and after the schism, it then uses social

movement concepts to examine the behavior of the two successor unions during the

campaign against changes-to the FLE.

In Chapter 2, I will first provide preliminary background on the issues that

Nikkyoso and the Japanese government fought each other over from the 1950s through

the 1980s,usingthe three previous studiesofNikkyoso and primary sources such as.

Nikkyoso yonjiinenshi (or Forty Years History ofNikkyoso). These cases demonstrate the

original Nikkyoso's Strong mobility as a united teachers' union, which in Offe's view

embodies the ideal balance of resources a union could possiblyrnaintain. The chapter

then explains the process of and reasons for the schism ofNikkyoso; describes the change

ofNikkyoso before and after the schism; and discusses the significance of this change for

the power relation between the state and the opposition forces.

Chapter 3 first examines what Rengo was by looking at its organizational

characteristics and orientation. It then discusses the different views of Nikkyoso's right­

wing and.left-wing \eaders.regarding the 1989.Rengo formation. My discussioll.here will

focus on Zenkyo's criticism ofNikkyoso leadership because doing so allows us to

understand the reasons based on which the left-wing leaders chose.to break away from

Nikkyoso..ln.short,affi\iation withRengornarkedNikkyoso'sdepartnrefromits.traditioll.

of unity. Since then, the two unions have adopted contrasting orientations and thus

reconstructed their union identities accordingly, as the new stage of the history of

Japanese teachers' union movement began.

Chapter 4 addresses the loci of the FLE revision issue and then examines the

campaigns held by Nikkyoso, Zenkyo, and the other major actors in the opposition

19 movement. It demonstrates how the structural division affected the two unions' central

campaigns; to what extent their activities shared similar goals and tactics; and how the

outside opposition network groups created by the prtrFLEIConstitution population in

Japan played an important role in uniting the two unions under a nation-wide opposition

movement. I will also present four case studies where the local teachers' unions mounted joint campaigns that surmounted the _tura1 division ofNikkyosoandZeDkyo.Finally, I will argue that the two unions' campaigns were directed at different audiences. The

results show that Zenkyo was more successful in creating a popular movement that

mobilized the general public, while NikkYOsooperated within its organizational

affiliations to mobilize support. The argument here is built on the theories of social

movements which were explained above.

Chapter 5 identifies-the major contributions of the study, relates. the study's

findings to the various theoretical concepts, and points to the study's implications for

further research and theoretical development.

Methods

This study is library and Internet based. In addition to the secondary sources

discussed above,. I consulted. primary sources such asNihnn riidii nenJr:an.NikkyoS() yonjiinenshi, Nikkyoso rokujiinenshi, Zenkyo jiinenshi, Kyoshdkuin kumiai undo no

rekishi, and most importantly the websites ofNikkyoso, Zenkyo, and the local teachers'

unions to. analyze .the opposition movement against theFLE revision withoutcondllcting

fieldwork. These sources provide the historical and also most current information about

20 these unions' organizational frameworks and activities. They are also useful to understand the ideological frames of the two unions' respective arguments.

The four cases,of the local joint struggles presented in Chapter Four were,selected based on the amount and quality ofinfonnation that the local unions' websites and Nihon rado nenkan provided. Since Nikkyoso and Zenkyo have been members of the two respective labor union federations Rengo and Zenrorensince 1989, I also referred to

English and Japanese language sources on Japanese labor movements in general. These studies were helpful to grasp the historical development of the leftist movements in Japan aswell asthe larger frames, ofthe Communist and the Socialist ideologies that quite directly influence the two unions' action policies. This thesis does not aim to discuss ideologies thorOl.lghly, but they are nonetheless a part of the literature.

21 CHAPTER 2 NIKKYOSO,1947-1989

This chapter will fIrst look at the issues thatNikkyoso and the Japanese government fought each other over from the-1950s through the- 1980s, using the three- previous studies ofNikkyoso as well as the historical accounts of the union which

Nikkyiiso itself published. These cases will demonstrate the original Nikkyiiso's strong , mobility asaunitedteachers' union. which in Offe's. view embodies the ideal balance of resources a union could possibly maintain, thus will prepare us to compare this original state ofNikkyoso and the activities and abilities of the two successor unions after the schism.. The chapter thenexplains the process ofand reasons for the schism ofNikkyoso; describes the change ofNikkyiiso before and after the schism; and discusses the significance of this change for the power relation between the state and the opposition forces.

Fights between Nikkyiiso and the Conservatives

In 1947, Nikkyoso was established with the aim of preserving the Occupation's education reform that made Japanese school education democratic and pacillst. Many of the conservative politicians, however, considered the Occupation reforms a "mistake" that had to be,corrected:37 Nikkyiisoand the Japanese central government that has been dominated by those conservatives therefore inevitably had opposite opinions and aims.

Thus, they have been in conflict since Nikkyoso's formation.

37 Schoppa, 203 22 The issues that caused the biggest controversy during the 1950s were the ones that still remain problematic in the current education reform. One of them was "moral education," which wasca1led shiishin kyoiku in the. pre- and mid-war Japan.. The. Japanese

Ministry of Education (hereafter "the MOE") used a new term "do(oku" for it but the content and purpose were nearly identical: reintroducing patriotism to the central focus of

~ the education for the children. Nikyyoso,concerned that a revival ofthe moral education would lead to reimplementation of the ultranationalistic "patriotism" of prewar education, fought against its reintroduction.

Another controversy was the textbook control. ,The MOE tried to allow only three different textbooks for each level of the school education and it caused a heated debate.

As we can see in many examples in the world history including Japan's, dictatorial governments have controlled textbooks because it allows them to control the way of thinking of the yoimg. Nikkyoso was keenly aware of such risk of letting the government take direct control over textbooks and vigorously opposed the proposal using Article 10 of the.ELE, which.forbids "unjustified control" over education.. In this b~Nikkyoso successfully prevented the MOE bill from passing the Diet.

The most important issues.Nikkyoso fought against at the time were the "teachers efficieru:yrating system" (kinmu hyoka seido [kinP,yo]) and "teacbers recruitment and training system (kyoin saiyo kenshii seido)." They were fust introduced in 1952 as part of the "Compulsory Education School Employee Law (gimukyoiku gakkOshokuinhO)." In

1956,thegovernment proposed policies thatairned to dismantle the postwar education system, including revision of the FLE. They were called kyiiiku sanhOcin: the local education policy law (chihO kyoiku gyoseihOan [chikyoho]) that included the basic idea of

23 kinpyo, establishment of the Ad-Hoc Council for Education law (rinkyoshin secchi Man),

and the textbook law (kyokasho hiian). In the face of inunediate protest from Nikkyiiso,

the government withdrew the latter two. However, the members of the Liberal

Democratic Party (hereafter "the LDP") in the Diet forcefully passed chikyohii by

mobilizing five hundred policemen on June 2, 1956. 38

Nikkyiisopointed out that the government's. intention in these new systems was to

monitor teachers with respect to what and how they teach. In other words, Nikkyiiso

regarded it as a critical step toward an approval of "thought check" of the teachers, whose freedom of speech should be guaranteed and protected. Nikkyiiso also was concerned that

a system like kinpyo would cause competition among teachers and their unity would be

damaged. To Nikkyiiso, such systems were nothing other than the revival of~e prewar

Japanese educational and political system. Even after,the law passed eventually,

therefore, Nikkyiiso did not give up fighting the system. The campaign against the

implementation of these new systems was the "strongest, most widespread and most

significant struggle of [Nikkyoso' s1 history" in the 1950s!9

In November 1956, convinced by the MOE, the local boards of education in Aichi

prefecture executed the first kinpyo by unilaterally abrogating the promise it had made

with Nikkyiiso.40 In.the.faceofsuc1Jabetrayal,Nikkyiiso.adoptedanextrememethod

from the start: it chose to call "absolute opposition by force.''''' In the following year,

38 Nihon kyoshokuin kumi.i, Nikkyoso yonjiinenshi. (Tokyo: Riidii kyoiku sent8, 1989),8 39 Donald Thurslon, Teachers and Politics in Japan. (princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973) (Quoted in Aspinall, 39) 40 Nihon kyoshokuin kumi.i, 8 41 Aspinall, 40

24 Nikkyoso held an ad-hoc rally in Tokyo calling "absolute opposition against kinpy6," and published the first "emergency proclamation (hij6jitai sengen).'.42

According to Nikky6so yonjwumshi,the case of Saga prefecture. was one of the. most heated battles during this period. After forced submission of the rating sheets

(kinpyosho), the Saga local boards of education advised salary reduction and demotion of union-associated principals and teachers. Saga teachers' union mounted an opposition campaign against the decision and rejected the counsel that demanded the members' retirement. It developed to a criminal case in which the Saga police arrested ten union leaders. and ordered two female members. to appear at the police station. Claiming their instigation of the opposition actions in Saga, the police also arrested the president and

Executive Committee chair of Fukuoka teachers' union. In the face of this pressure,

Nikkyiiso planned a national conference in Saga on May 5, 1958, and decided to. hold a nationwide rally on May 25. On May 12, Nikkyoso conducted a rally in front of the prefectural government mobilizing more than five thousand teachers (entire teaching personnel of the prefecture) in Saga.. Eifty.membersofKumamoto teachers' uninnand the representatives from every prefectural teacher's union also participated. It was the first and largest rally held in a local prefecture in Nikkyoso's history.43 The battle over kinpy6 implementation thus spread throughout the country. 61,840 unionmembers were subjected to it during 1956 to 1958. Nikky6so yonjiinenshi reads:

We lost this battle in a sense, in fact, the rating sheets were submitted ... however, through the three years from 1956 to 1958, we grew up as a union that is able to conduct strikes, act as one, and fight by individual education laborer's awareness ... Through this

42 Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, 9 43 1bid., 107-no 25 battle, we also built the local organizations that became the base of the movement opposing the Japan-US Security Treaty in the 1960s (rokujimen anpotoso).44

Although many of the resistances including trials regarding "unjustified

punishment" (huto shobun) were still continuing throughout the country, the 1960s seemed. to be a temporary suspension of the battle regarding the revision of postwar

education system.4S Most ofthe"left-wing activists i~ Japan devoted themselve~ to fight

the security issues in the 1960s, and Nikkyoso was not an exemption. With the

government's proposal on "the third education reform" in 1971, however; the battle fire

reignited. In the report, .the Central Education Committee recommended a wholesale

reorganization of the postwar education system. In collaboration with the govemment,

the business sector demanded the "education reform in accordance with the needs. of

labor force (riidiiryoku yiikyiini miau gakusei kaikaku no teigen)."

According to Nikkyiiso yonjunenshi, the first goal of ''the third education reform" was implementation of the "master-teacher system" (shu 'ninsei). The government's.

proposal requested to establish "new positions" under the school principal and vice

principal, the master-teachers. By designating master-teachers between principals and

regular teachers, the MOE and the 10caIboards of education aimed to use more direct

influence on the acts of regular teachers at the actual site of education, or in Japanese

"genba." In October 1975, the LDP declared that they would pass the shu'ninsei bill by

the end of the. year. Nikkyoso confronted the government by adopting "emergency

proclamation" for the first time since the battle over kinpyii. Nikkyoso conducted a

44 Ibid., 10 4l Ibid., no 26 general strike mobilizing the entire union membership on December 10, 1975; however, the bill passed on December 25, 1975. 46

In the-following month, the. MOE requested theimplementation of shu 'ninsei in every prefecture, city, and village; however, Nikkyoso and the local unions kept resisting it. Some of the local unions succeeded in reversing implementation of the law, the other succeeded in freezing it. Meanwhile, the government was trying to pass another law, "the third education salary law (dai sanji kyi5iku kyiiyo hiJan)," to establish a new salary rating system for the master-teachers. Confronted with the proposal, Nikkyoso conducted another general strike and the representatives. oithe Japan Socialist Party fought in the

Diet. On November 4,1976, the bill was withdrawn as the session period ended

(kaikigire haian). The bill was resubmitted to the next session in February 1977, but it was. withdrawn on May 26. In the face of the third submission of the bill, Nikky5s0 conducted another general strike on November 24, and on the same day, once again, succeeded to withdraw the bill. However, the LDPgovernment did not give up. It held an ad"hoc Diet from December 7. andforcefully.pass.ed the bill on December 241977}7

The passage of the master-teacher bonus system (shu 'nin teate seido) signified the actual fonnation of the master-teacher system.

OnJanuary ~ 197~theNational PersnnneiAuthority announced the 48 implementation of the master-teacher bonus system. Nikkyoso planned a strategy to make the system toothless at the local level and adopted "non-cooperation" strategy.49

46 Ibid., 20 47 Ibid., 22 48 Ibid., 23 49 Aspinall, 39 27 One of the major tactics Nikkyoso took here was "voluntary offering of master-teacher bonus for the union management. ,,50 Nikkyoso called for the newly designated "master- teachers" to offer their bonus for maintaining the local union activities. Thepw-pose.of the bonus was to encourage master-teachers to cany out the intentions of the MOE and the local boards of education, however, by using the extra income for the union's good,

Nikkyoso succeeded in weakening the system's effect. According to NikkyoSQ yonjiinenshi, the percentages of voluntary offering were 71.1 percent in the compulsory school division and 88 percent in the high school division in September 1978. The total amounted to more than thirteen billion Japanese yen. 51 It kept such high offering percentages for years, for instance, the statistic of December 1980 shows that it still kept

75.2 percent in the compulsory school division and 86.2 percent in the high school division at the time.52 Although the government succeeded in enacting the law, the strategy ofNikkyoso reduced its actual validity at the genba. Since this "non- cooperation" tactic turned out to be effective, it became one ofNikkyoso's major strategies thereafter.S3

Meanwhile, Nikkyoso also held campaigns in requesting the ''forty students per class system (yonjiinin gakkyiisei)" and increase of the number of schoolteachers.

Nikkyoso conducted centralrally onDecernber 18, I97S_Five thousand people participated. It urged the MOE and the Ministry of Finance with six million signatures collected from the local schools and their regions. Nikkyoso succeeded in this campaign

50 Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, 23.24 51 Ibid., 24 "52 Ibid., 25 53 Aspinall, 39 28" and yonjiinin gakkyiisei came into effect in April 1980. The MOE also requested the Diet to reform the "teachers' seats law (kyoshokuin teisiihO)." Nikkyoso yonjiinenshi shows that Nikkyoso gained such mobility through the protracted battle over the. Kinpyo system of the last twenty years.54

Nikkyoso's education movement and the battle with the LDP government shifted its stage to- the Ad-Hoc Council for Education (Ritifi kyOiku singikai [Rinkyoshin}) in the

1980s. In the Cabinet meeting held on January 17, 1984, proclaiming "the final accounts of the postwar politics," Prime Minister Nakasone proposed the formation of Rinkyoshin under the direct control ofhis Cabinet. In his report published on March 22, Nakasone declared that Rinkyoshin would discuss "the ideal way of carrying out education without being bound by the FLE or any particular view of education, and focuses the discussion on the necessity and problem of education reform." Nakasone at the same time proposed his policy that planned to "increase the diversity of and flexibility of management of school education system.,,55 Nakasone and his Rinkyoshin thus aimed to radically change postwar edl1CjJtion.systems; howev~ its primary focus was orU:he revision. of the teacher's license law (kyoin menkyo hoan). In the face ofNikkyoso's massive protest against the formation of Rinkyoshin and teachers' license law, it was practically impossible for the Council to discuss. the Ievision of the FLEai.this .point.. The formation of Rinkyoshin was approved on August 7; however, Nikkyoso's effort led to the withdrawal of the teachers' license bill from the Diet. Nikkyoso, heightening its concern regarding the government' s increasing.attack on the postwar education system,. formed.

54 Nihon kyoshokuin kumi.i., 26 55lbid.,32 29 the Executive Council of People's Education Movement (kyoiku kokumin undo tantosha kaig/) on September 19.56 The primary aim of this council was to invent a nation-wide movement against the revision of the. FLE.

Although its activities look "militant," Schoppa's analysis suggests that

Nikkyoso's influence on education policy has been "indirect" and ''unofficial'' in most cases. 57 Schop~ argues that the only thing that Nikkyoso and the other opposition force could have done in ~e face of government-led revisions was to prevent agreement among the conservatives--for instance, between the local boards of education and the MOE.

Once the conservatives.reached a consensus,theopposition forces were not able to stop' their policies. Schoppa concludes that such apparently passive strategies were nonetheless effective in many caseS.58 The instances introduced above were some of those cases where such strategy ofNikkyoso made a difference.

Membership Decline and the Schism ofNikkyoso

Just as Nikkyoso feared, the actualization of the above-discussed systems in schools ultimately encouraged competition and factional division among the teachers. as well as union members, and their unity was gradually weakened. As a result, Nikkyoso began to suffer from serious membership decline through the 1980s and gradually lost its voice in the education politics of Japan.

Aspinall suggests that the main reasons for Nikkyoso's membership decline are follows: the screening out of potential union members in the recruitment process;

56 Ibid., 493 57 Schopp .. 163 58 Ibid., 170 30 sustained disruption due to conflict between the union and the authorities; higher

teachers' salaries; heavy union dues; and lastly, the rise of an apolitical generation of

teachers who see Nikkyoso as irrelevant.s9 As previously pointed out, these can also be

seen as the result of the implementation of systems such as kinpyo, saiyo kenshii seido,

and shuninsei.Saiyo kenshii seido in particular seems to have directly contributed to the

first reason Aspinall- laid out.

Conflict between different factions within Nikkyoso itself was as important a

factor as the external conflicts between the union and its enemies. Previous studies

suggested that there was conflict between the Socialists and the Communists within the

union.60 When Nikkyoso faced common "enemies" like the conservatives of the MOE

.and thelocal boards of education,the internal conflict was. not obvious. However, once.it

came to the elections of the union leadership and the support for political parties, the

factional disagreement was inevitable.

In 1980, concerned with his succession turn, Nikkyoso'sright-wing president

Makieda Motofumi and his followers broke the succession precedent of its leadership.

According to the original precedent, Nakakoji Kiyoo, a left-wing leader who had been the

secretary general ofNikkyoso since 1971 w$thenextpresident. However, Makieda and

the right-wing members of Central Executive Committee irregularly promoted Tanaka

Ichiro, one of the most right-leaning leaders ofNikkyoso, to the post of vice president.

Because Tanaka previously had built contact with the members of the LDP's "education

tribe" (bunkyo-zoku), Nikkyoso's leftwing faction viewed Tanaka's promotion to the

S9 Aspinall, 48 601bid., SS 31 presidency in 1983 as extremely problematic. Although Nakakiiji remained in the post of

secretary general, the co11flict between the Right and the Left within the union thus , ,

became irreconcilable. During his. term, Tanaka had a decisive impact on the split by

attending a LDP meeting and also insisting on affiliation with Rengii, the corporatist,

anti-Communist labor union confederation, which was going to be formed in 1989.61

- ~- - ~ Asl willdiscussmore.c1osely in chapter two, affiliation with Rengo was

destructive for Nikkyiiso's unity, not only at the national level, but also at the local level.

Aspinall suggests that "the flexibility that allowed individual prefectural unions to follow

different courses of action .from the nationally decided one had often been one of

Nikkyiiso's strengths.'.62 Since affiliation with Rengii required each local union to choose

whether or not to follow the national leadership, however, the disagreement over the

affiliation caused splits between the local unions in a prefecture, and even among

membership within a local union. In the end, the Communist-sympathetic leaders chose

to break away from Nikkyiiso and formed Zenkyii. Since the Japan Communist Party

.(hereafter "the lCP"} considered it necessary to establ.i.slLan alternative uninnfederati.on

to Rengii, they organized a new federation called Zenriiren (Zen 'nihon r6d6 kumiai

s6reng6) (see Figure 3 and 4). Zenkyii inunediately affiliated with Zenriiren and Japan's

.higgest teachers' unions' schism was thus completed (see Table 1 and2)_63

Aspinall concludes, therefore, the affiliation with Rengii was the main cause of

Nikkyiiso's schism.64 The right-wing leaders thought it was important to work together

61 Ibid., 51-52 62 Ibid., 54-55 H Ibid., 60.61 '64 Ibid., 55 32 with the mainstream unions (mostly of the private sector) because it would needed to play

a significant role mthe policy-making process, otherwise Nikkyoso would be marginalized and weakened within the1abor union movement in Japan. On· the other hand, the left-wing leaders regarded such action as "selling out" and against the principles of the union's tradition.

As.discussed in Chapter lusing Offe'8concept, Nikkyoso' schange and its,

schism destroyed such an ideal balance that enabled the union to function as one of the

most powerful opposition forces that fight the govermnent-led restructuring of the post­

war education system of Japan. Before discussing the destructive change Nikkyoso's.

schism brought about, we now turn to look at Rengo-its characteristics and orientation

in particular, in order to understand the changing structure of Japanese labor movement in the late 19808.

33 Figure 3. Evolution of Political Parties of Japan

Political Parties of Japan

~ ~.~------

ra dical •

Source: Wikipedia, " List of Poli tical Parties in Japan" htto:llen.wikipedia.orG/wiki/List of political parties in Japan (accessed on November 25, 2007)

34 Figure 4. Evolution of National Union Federations in Post-WWII Japan

National Union Federations of Japan

radical ....,..-----...... moderate

Source: Kosei rodosho roshi kankei tanto sanjikanshitsu, Nihon no rod6kumiai: rekishi to soshiki (Tokyo:Nihon rodo kenkyii kika, 2002)

35 Table 1. The Change of Teachers' Unions' Membership (1958-2006)

The Change of Teachers' Unions' Membership (1958-2006) 100 .00% .-

90 .00% . Nlkky6so . Zenky6 80.00% --

70.00% ..• 60.00% ~•c 50.00% ~ , - ~ - ..• I 40.00% - ~ - r- 30.00% , , , I I ' 20.00% - ~ - I- I- - - ~ 1- - t- - ,~ - - 1.- I I 10.00% - - , 0.00% LLL[LLLLLLI 1958 1965 1975 1985 1989 1990 1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Year

Source: M inistry of Education. Nikkyoso no soshikirilsu no suii. Zenkyo no soshikiriis li no suii. http://www.mext.go.jp!b menu/houdou/ l 7/ 12/05 1

36 TableZ. After the Schism: Teachers' Union Membership in 1992 % % % Pre{i!cture Nikkyoso Zenkyo Other

Hokkaido 45 10 8 Aomori 4 15 5 elwate '55 eo TO Miyagi 32 0 5 Akita 38 \0 10 ¥.unagata 54 ·0 -.8. Fukushima 29 5 14 Ibaraki 52 5 6 Tochigi 0.5 I 93 'Gunma 16 11 'S. Saitama 3 20 I Chiba 41 3 9 Tokyo. •1.11 23 20. Kanagawa 68 0 9 Niigata 62 2 9 Toyama 37 20 9 Ishikawa 62 0 2 Fukui 85 0 0 Yamanashi 57 0 32 'Nagano '52' '21 ,. Gifu I 8 22 Shizuoka 51 3 2 Aichi. .49. 6 2- Mie 83 0 0 Shiga 23 25 9 Kyoto I 46 \I Osaka 30 28 13 Hyogo 43 .\1 8 Nara 26 28 7 Wakayama 2 -51 4 Tottori 62 0 0 Shimane 3 \3 28 .okayama 43 15 8 Hiroshima 48 6 12 Yamaguchi 3 16 35 Tokushima 4 0 67 Kagawa 0.5 3 62 Ehime I I 84 Kochi 7 21 15 cFukuoka 39 .() 18 Saga 33 22 9 Nagasaki 16 12 4 Kumamoto 29 0 9 Oita 64 0 21 Miyazaki 22 0 24 Kagoshima 31 0 6 Okinawa 61 0 1 National Figures 35% 11% 13% Source: Kyoiku iinkai geppo, June 1992. (Reproduced by Aspinall, Robert, in Teachers' Unions and the 'Politics ofEducation ·jn ;lapan, Albany, New York;·StateUniversity of New Yurk Press, Albany, 200 I)· 37 CHAPTER 3 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION IDENTITY

Rengo: CharacteriStics and Orientation

Ashieflyexplainedin the previous chapter, the disagreement between the right- wing and the left-wing leaders ofNikkyoso over affiliation with the hew labor union federation Rengo was the most significant cause of the schism ofNikkyoso. What was

R.engothen? What role ilidRengii's formation .play in the development ofthe Japanese labor movement? What was the disagreement between the two factions within NikkyiiSO over Rengo' s characteristics and orientation?

According to the.accounts written by Rengiileadership, .the,primary .ideaofits fonnation was to unite the divided labor unions and create a united labor front which· would be capable of promoting laborers' demands and rights in the policymaking

.process.6S .During ,the 19&os,.many,labor<-Wlions·in Japan.begantoadopt~moremoderate and corporatist orientation compared to what they were in the 1950s and the 1960s. As demonstrated in the case ofNikkyiiso, this was due to the changing internal

.dynamics--{heriseof,theright-wing,cCOrpor.atist.leadership.aswellastheextemal political climate that encouraged such orientation. Thus, the Japanese labor movement in general was once agam divided into the moderate and the radical factions by the end of

.. the1980s. The,fonnationof,R.engii was. primarily Jed by.those fUl)damentally.right- leaning corporatists. As a response to this move of the Right, the Left, or the

"Communist," faction formed another national federation, Zenriiren (Zenkoku

65 Seigo Yamada et al., Rengo no subete. Tokyo: Eideru i<.enkyQjo, 1990 .. 38. rodokumiai sorengo) in 1989. Kyogikai Zenkyo, the preparatory body ofZenkyo, and

Nihon kotOgakko kyoshokuin kumiai (Nikkokyo, or Japan Senior High School Teachers and Staff Union) played a <:entral role in· this movement to·eStablish·a "fighting national center" (tatakau nashonarn sentii).66

In sum, therefore, Rengo was an embodiment of the corporatist unionism, or

"Japanese style neo-corporatism," thatdeve!oped·throughouttbe 19!!Osin Japan. This labor federation intentionally excludes the antagonist, namely the "Communist" factions, within the labor populace from its membership.67 The "Orientation of Rengo" (Rengo no shinro) proclaims that Rengo "will confront with the self-righteous, egoistic influence within the labor with a resolute attitude and will remove such faction's maneuvering to cause a split." In his article on Rengo, Asami points out that the "self-righteous, egoistic inf1uence~' {dokuzenteki rikotekiseiryoku)means the· left-wing factionoflabor such as

Zenroren.68 Rengo requires approval ofthis manifesto "Orientation of Rengo" as the pre- condition of its membership, while Zenroren only requires approval of "the Statement of

Agreement" (kiyaku ni sando surukoto) to obtain its membership. Moreover, in the "Field of Movement and Action Policy" (Undo ry6iki to mtsudo no arimta), Rengo reiterates this policy by clearly stating it "does not pennit double membership with organizations that oppose Rengo" (Rengo.ni.hansuru soshiki tooo nijii. kameiha mitome 1U1l).69

According to Asami's study on Rengo's organizational system and its characteristics, one of Rengo's "major duties" is "active involvement into the system of

'66 Zen'nihon kyiishokuin kumiai. ZenkyoJiinenshi. (Tokyo: Junpiisha, 2002), 619 67 Hiiseidaigaku Ohara shakaimondai kenkylijo, Rengo jidoi no rOdD undo. (Tokyo: Siig5 rado kenkylijo), 120. -68 Ibid;, 118. 69 Ibid., 122. '39 'Japanese style neo corporatism.",7o Rengo believes that the improvement of the

"integrated life" (sogo seikalsu) of workers will be only possible when about 5% of the

"medium growth" (chiiseichO) of the country's economy is maintained. Rengo also claims that in order to preserve the equal distribution of this economic growth, it has to build a "multi-dimensional consultation system among the government, labor, and management at the center and local levels" {chu '0, chihO ni okeru tamentekina sei, ro, shi kyOgl_. no s h'lsulemu )71.

Along with this line, Rengo had established periodical consultations between the four opposition political parties, excluding the JCP, by 1992: the JSP, Komeitii,

Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and Social Democratic Party (SDP). As of this writing, the JSP and the DSP had already been dissolved and Reng5 now primarily affiliates with the Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter "the DPJ"), which was formed in 1998 (see

Diagram 2):

Rengo had also developed periodical consultations between the following ten ministries and agencies: Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of

International Trade and Industry, Economic Planning Agency, Management and

Coordination Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of

Construction, Ministry of Finance, and Environment Agency as of 1992.72 Moreover,

Rengo occasionally has held consultations with the ruling LDP.73 Asarru's study shows that 13% of the leadership ofRengo had served as committee members of different

70 Ibid., I 20. 71 Ibid., 120. 72 Ibid., 120. 73 Nihon rtidtikumiai sorengokai, Official Website, http://www.jtuc·rengo.or.jplindex.html 40 federal councils and 36% had served in local governments' councils.74 Periodic consultations with the management groups such as Keidanren, Japan Association of

Corporate 'Executives' (Keizai'doyiikai),and the Toky(}-CamberofCommerce and

Industry (Tokyo shOko kaigisho) have been continuing since when Rengo was 'still a federation of private enterprise unions.75 Given such characteristics and orientation of

Rengo, we now turn to discuss the disagreement between Nikky5so;srigbt"wing and left- wing factions over its affiliation with Rengo.

Rengii: Unity or Division?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was Nikkyoso's right-wing leader

Tanaka Ichirii's '~reactionary. personification" ,that brought ,about the, catastrophic damage on the relationship between the right-wing and the left-wing leaders of the union. Not only participating in the "Meeting to scold Nishioka Takeo" (Nishioka rakeD wo shikaru

-kOl} held by the-LDP, Tanaka at,the"meeting encouraged Nishioka, a well-known leader of the LDP "education tribe" who played a central role in drafting and enforcement of the master-teacher system. Tanaka continued to frustrate the left-wing faction of the union

-thereafter?6

On September 13~ 1986, the Nikkyoso 63rd Periodical Convention was scheduled.

However, as it was obvious that the ''Nishioka Incident" would be the target of a critical discussion, Tanaka waIkedoutofthe-Nikkyoso executive meeting'heId on the previous

night announcing his intention to adjourn the convention, stating, "under the president's

74 Hoseidaigaku Ohara shakaimondai kenkyiijo, 120. 7S Ibid., 121. 76 Zenkyo, Zenkyii Jiinensh,: (Tokyo: Junposha, 2002), 553. 41 responsibility, I will put off the convention because there might be a split ,.71 As the

convention was thus postponed indefInitely, Nikky6so fell into the condition of "no

budget, no plan" after October 1986. Thetension'between the'right-wing and the left-

wing leaders only heightened thereafter, without being able to respond to any of the

important problems that were piled up at the time as a union. Because Tanaka refused to

hold a convention wh~nitwaS' requested by the rePresentatives of the seventy unions on

September 9, 1987, those representatives held the 2nd representatives' meeting on

September 28 and decided to hold a convention in October, holding the vice president

Yamamoto Kazuo as the acting president. -8eventy-threeunionssupportedthis

convention. This struggle between Nikky6so leadership and its left-wing faction was later

called ''the 400 days struggle." Right after this development, however, "S6hy6 leadership.

·started intense intervention using the position of the JSP Membership Association

(Shat6ky6)." As the result, the 64th Periodical Convention held in February 1988 "turned

to be an opportunity for Shat6ky6 to press its 'agreement. '" Zenkyo jiinenshi states that

thiS'WllS:the "culmination of:the error of:the one-party support line" (tokutei serra shiji

rosen no ayamari no kyokuchI).78

According to Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai undo no rekishi, Zenky6 views Reng6

forrnationas a "right-leaning realignment of the labor front"(rOdosensen no uyoku teki

. saihenseI).79 As it describes the "humiliating" process of ''Nikky6so's total surrender to

Reng6" and the "rise of democratic teachers' union," Zenky6 repeatedly emphasizes that

·theforrnation'ofRengij,wasmeant to' lead, the Japanese labor movement to another

77 Ibid., 553 7& Ibid., 554 79 Zenkyo, Nihon kyoshokuin kumlai undo no rekishi. (Tokyo: ROdo junposha, 1997),622 42 division. Zenkyo also criticizes Nikkyoso for not being able to implement any of its ideas into Rengo's official policy, and accuses Nikkyoso leadership of an insincere attitude toward its membership. The. anger and frustration felt among those left-wing leaders. who later formed Zenkyo is clear in Nihon kyoshokuin kumiai undo no rekishi:

On March 9-10, 1989, Nikkyoso, which was urged to submit a'concrete response to the . quickly progressing right-leaning reallgiiment, held the '67th ad~hoc convention. it forcefully adopted the decision stating "we will participate in the' [Rengo formation] working committee' (sagyo iinka/), which will be fonned in March, with the other industrial unions in the Public-Sector Labor Union Association (kankOrokyo), and will strive to solve the important assignments such as general plan, agreements, and policies [ofRengo]," and thereby rejected all of the proposed revisions submitted by the 39 organizations including 26 unions of prefectures, government ordinance cities, high schools, schools forl\andicapped cliildren, univerSities, private schools ...Moreover, the "discussion resources" [called] "for the aim of total unification ofthe labor front beyond the border between the public and private sectors" (kanmin itlai no rodosensen no zenteki toitsu wo mezashite) submitted by the Nikkyoso leadersliip as the reason [for the rejection] was an incoherent thing filled with deceptions and contradictions. The "discussion resources" laid out the following problems to explain "the reasons why we need labor front unification now": the necessity ofptiblic-private [sectors] united actions to confront "the final settlement of the account of the post-war politics" line ("sengo seiji no sokessan" rosen) such as "ad-hoc adjustment policy refonn," "education adjustment," "militarization"; the importance of"obtairting unilerstanrung and cooperation from the private-sector labor" to fight "the attack to isolate Nikkyoso"; the importance of the all labor fight for the protection of Constitution, anti-nuclear, lIeniilitarization, anll peace [movements] in the face ofendangered peace and democracy caused by the revitalization of the Emperor system, the forced acceptance of"Hinomaru­ Kimigayo," official visit ofYasukuni Shrine by bureaucrats, maneuver of the two detention laws and the national secrets law;breaking ofGNP"I%limitforthe defense budget; and the importance of the public and private [sectors] labor's common understandings and collaboration to fight the crisis of democratic education based on the principles and spirits of the' Con stitution and the FLE under the education adjustment line. It was Nikkyiiso leadership's helpless corruption that they could calmly layout these problems while they were fully aware that the Rengii line was to go in a completely opposite direction ... it showed·that"Nikkyiisoleadership·had even abandoned1he minimum morality and reason of the labor union movement and teachers' union movement. 80

Contrary to Zenkyo's intense criticism ofNikkyoso's attitude based on its strong belief in its cause as the genuine successor of the original Nikkyoso, the new Nikkyoso

80,Ibid.;623-624 43 does not even claim the legitimacy of its position in its official historical account

Nikkyoso yonjunenshi, which covers the union's activity up to 1989. It flatly repeats the policies presented by Sohyo' s,pro-Rengo faction (which was in factledby.the. fonner

Nikkyoso president Makieda) and R,engo regarding what was to be done at the time of

Nikkyoso's Rengo affiliation.8l Just as Zenkyo pointed out, such attitude ofNikkyoso only emphasizes its "total.surrender" to Rengo.

Reconstruction ofthe Union Identity

After the new Nikkyoso dismissed its left-wing leaders, it quickly reconstructed

.itself asamoremoderateopposition.groupwith the primary objective. ofcgaining

influence in central govermnent policy_making.82 The right-wing leaders in the union expanded their power in the union and followed their belief of closely associating with

,the policy of the· central government as well'as·the boards Qfeducation .. Inthe·periodical convention held in June 1990, the new secretary general Oba Akitoshi announced

Nikkyoso's new line, which emphasized its will to "participate" in policy-makings rather than to "confront" or "oppose," and stated that this orientation was not ''the change of

[Nikkyoso's] traditional orientation but of the breadth of orientation.',s3 In 1994,

Nikkyoso's leadership organized The 21 st Century Vision Committee to investigate

"concrete ways in which the union should reform itself in 'order to put an end. to its

chronic decline and reinvent itself as an organization relevant to the new needs and

81 Nikkyiiso, 915-931 ,82. Aspma• II ,51-52 83 Nikkyoso, Nikkyoso rokujiinenshi. (Tokyo: Adobanwji saba, 2007), 30-31 44 challenges of the post Cold War era."S4 Aspinall points out, the report of the first meeting

of this committee held on April 27, 1994 shows many characteristics resembling the

-education-policy that Nakasone and his Rinkyiishin had-presentedearlier,ss Thismarked-a

radical change ofNikkyoso in character, and thus the union's departure from its

traditional role in Japan's education politics.

The newNikkyosothus hoped to eliminate its previous negativereputation,as,a

'militant' and 'always opposing' union since its militancy was often criticized for putting

'politics first and education and children second.' Therefore, their new motto was to

ronsider 'children and parents ·fust' rather than politics. :rhe newNikkyosothen accused

Zenkyo offailing to adapt to the new generation's needs and of sticking to an outmoded

tradition. Needless to reiterate, the external factors such as its affiliation with Rengo and

the new moderate opposition' party, the-DPJ,have significant influence on this new

identity ofNikkyoso. It is clear that, moreover, a "radical transformation"-the forth

pattern of Hunt et ai's "imputation framing" concepts laid out in Chapter I-had taken

place in.Nikkyoso's identity_as.a.union: theunion.characterized.itsantagonists'

imputation as "accurate depictions of 'actual' flawed identities" and thus chose to alter its

identity as an organization.

FprZenkyo, on the-ather hand, being apolitical was out of the question. Its

objective was to promote democratic education based on the Constitution and the original

FLE. With the government i~oring Japan's fundamental educational laws, the union felt

ithad to act.politica1ly to achieve its aim -afreaiizing a '~genuinely democratic education"

84 Aspinall, 118 lIS 1bid., 119 Nikkyoso, 31 45 which would benefit the entire nation.86 Thus, Zenkyo maintained the position it took when it was a left-wing faction within the old Nikkyoso. Contrasted to Nikkyoso, this position taken by Zenkyo fits the frrst'pattemofHunt et al's "imputation framing" concepts: the union denied its antagonist's criticism on its policy as "incorrect" assessment.

The two unions' organizational and political orientation is also influenced by their membership characteristics. While Nikkyoso's members are mostly elementary and junior highschool-teachers,Zenkyo'smembership.comes.mainly.from Nikkokyo,which is organized by high school teachers who often possess higher educational background and thus tend to be more liberal compare to those who in compulsory education. As shown.in.figure 2, Nikkokyowas fonnedin May .1 956.by .several.loca1highschool unions that broke away from Nikkyoso with the aim of establishing a union that reflected the increasing demand for better treatment of the teachers in high school education.87

:rherefore,.a1though Nikkokyomaintained acooperative.re1ationship. between Nikkyoso and collaborated in the major political struggles during the 1950s and the 1960s, the 1989 schism ofNikkyoso was not the only split that affected Nikkyoso's current organizational

·characteristics. As-the result·of,the ·1989 schism, the .two·groupsthatbrokeaway-from

Nikkyoso united into one national teachers' union, Zenkyo.

The contrasting view ofNikkyoso and Zenkyo regarding Rengo formation had essential impact on the two unions' re-identification processes. As it has clearly been

86 Zenkyo Official Website 87 Nihon ky6shokuin kumiai, Nikkyosoyonjunenshi. (Tokyo: ROdo kyoiku sentd, 1989),230·234. 46 reflected in their post-schism arguments, Nikkyoso and Zenkyo responded to Rengo formation by adopting contrasting standpoints, yet following the very patterns proposed

c in. Hunt et ai' s,theory of '~irnputation framing_"

To what extent, however, did this structural division penetrate the two unions' organizational operations? Is this division reflected in their activities at the genba? Now we turn to look at the campaigns held by Nikkyoso andZenkyoduring the actual

opposition movement to [rod out the reality of their union activities.

47 CHAPTER 4 OPPOSITION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE FLE REVISION

Although the official policies of the new Nikkyoso and Zenkyo reflect the orientation of theinespectivepolitical-allies after the schism, the twO' unions shared similar views toward major controversies duringthe.1990s. For example, they both criticized the 1989 governmental guideline of teaching as it was a further promotion of competition among $hldents but also schools, although the .guideline claimed to be nurturing ''the ability to live" (ikiru chikara) and completing "education that respects the , personality of each student" (kosei wo ikasu kyOiku). Moreover, in the case of the FLE revision which we willexaminein,thischapter,thetwounionssharedalmostidentical views.

Yet in any such controversy, the attitude of their allies toward the issue heavily

·influenced.the tw~uni~ns' actual ~p~ition.activities.lnthe.jssue~fthe FLE revision,

such difference became most clear in the two unions' campaign styles and the degree of success. The extent of support system provided by their political allies was especially

-crucial.

As we will see shortly, Zenkyo was able to mount campaigns nsing not only its

own membership but also the labor union network of Zenroren to create a larger

~ppositionf~r.ce againsttbeFLE -revision. Sharing the interest, .the JCPrepresentatives

fought in the Diet as well. Zenkyii argued that the original FLE embodied an ideal that

should be activated (ikasu heki) rather than altered, in order to realize "genuinely

48 democratic education."ss In contrast, Nikkyoso's affiliates, the OPJ and Rengo, did not

oppose a revision of the law in principle, even though the OPJ disagreed with the

governmental proposa1. Moreover, Rengo did not help Nikkyoso to'creatdarge"5cale

campaigns using its network, because Rengo as a whole was not able to achieve a

consensus regarding the FLE revision. Thus, while Zemiiren held opposition rallies in its

·name, Rengo·didnot have thechance to hold such an eventeven-once.S9

On August 29,2000, to respond to the LOP government's "Educational Reform

National Conference" formed by "Japan's reactionary influence," Zenkyoestablished the

"Struggle Headquarters to Fight the FLE Revision" and started·to hold its opposition

actions as early as 2001, even before the time when the fIrst Request for Advice for the

revision on FLE was submitted.90 With the support of its affiliated organizations, Zenkyo

held its campaigns centrally and locally, mobilizing the local self-governing

organizations as well as Zenrokyo, the third biggest labor union federation in Japan (see

Figure 3).91 In contrast, Nikkyoso had to carry out its campaigns without much assistance from.Rengii or the DPLHowever., since Nikkyoso was.the largestnational teachers'

union in Japan and possesses three times the membership of Zenkyo, it was also able to

hold a number of massive central rallies. Yet, overall, Zenkyo was more successful in

creating extensive networks in the opposition movement.

As the situation became more serious, however, the two unions began to show

their similarities and appeared to act in a manner that reflected their previous unifIed

'fi8 Zenkyo Official Website. 89 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyiijo, ed. Nihon riid6 nenlran. (Tokyo: Shunposha, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,2006, 2007). 90 Zenkyo, 2002, 338; Official Website. 91 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo (2007), 274-275. 49 form. In order to describe this process, this chapter will first explain what the loci of the issue were. It will then examine the two unions' central campaigns in Tokyo, and will also look at the central rallies held by those organizations which I call "outside network groups," which provided important opportunities for Nikkyoso and Zenkyo members to act as one.

The Case: Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education

The revision of the FLE has become one of the biggest controversies in the history of Japan' s educational politics. Despite the efforts of the teachers' unions and mass opposition campaigns from 2002 through 2006, the FLE was revised at the end of

2006. To the teachers' unions and many Japanese people concerned with the country's education, the orig·inal FLE was appreciated as the Education Constitution (kyoiku kenpo), an educational ideal that dovetailed with Japan's pacifist Constitution. In contrast, the LDP government and the MOE viewed the post-war democratization of education as a "mistake" and considered the FLE and the Constitution as objects that needed to be revised because they provided "some teachers' organizations" (ichibu kyoshokuin dan/ai) legal grounds to violate the authority granted to the principals and the local boards of education. Furthermore, it was claimed that the teachers' organizations made "misleading claims" (ayamaUa shuchO) regarding the original FLE that had to be removed.92 Thus, to the Japanese teachers' unions, the FLE revision was nothing more than a predictable and unacceptable attack by the state whose purpose was to dismantle

92 Liberal Democratic Party, Official Website, FLE Revision Q & A. http://www.jimin.jp/ j im in/seisaku!2006/kYou ikulq a index .hlm I

50 the democracy and autonomy of school education, which the unions had been striving to protect.

Among the controversial revisions made to the FLE was the reintroduction of patriotism (waga kuni to kyodo wo aisuru kokoro) that is based on the "respect of the country's tradition and culture" (Article 2). The revision emphasized the importance of

"public spirit" (kOkyo no seishin) while erasing the phrase ''values of individuals" (kojin no kochl) (preamble) and the supportive articles that ensured this orientation. The purpose of education was changed from ''the full development of personality" (jinkoku no kansel) to "nurturing a citizen who possesses the necessary qualities to be a member of the nation" (kokko oyobi shakoi no keiseisha to shite hitsuyii na shishitsu wo sonaeta ... kokumin) (Article 1). Furthermore, the revisions eliminated the nine years of compulsory education (Article 4) and coeducation (Article 5). This change challenges one of the most important purposes of the post-war Japanese education, the equality of educational opportunity.

Moreover, although the phrase ''unjust domination" (huto na shihai) in education remained in Article 16, its meaning was reversed. The prevention of unjust domination in education was included in the origihal FLE as a response to Japan's pre-war ultra­ nationalistic education system, which was dominated by the military government; therefore, the reversal of the context of this phrase implied a possible return to the pre­ war policy. As a whole, these revisions to the FLE aroused fears that the ruling govermnent could dominate the education system and intervene in school education by regulating the content of education programs as well as the attitudes of teachers. The new

51 FLE also simplified the law making process to enable the government to control education by establishing new laws very easily (Article 17 and 18).93

Besides sharing these views, Zenkyo and Nikkyoso agreed that the governmental proposal introduces the market theory to education and thus turns education into mere competition. Zenkyo' s "Special Resolution" (tokubetsu ketsugi) published on February

20, 2006 to oppose the submission of the governmental revision proposal to the Diet reads:

Another aim of the FLE revision is to bring "the stronger prey upon the weaker" principle orthe market into education, and to give the "structural reform" orientation legal grounds. This [problem] thus shares the common foundation with the struggle of the labor and the nation who do not give in to the "structural reform."

''Nikkyoso's View to Oppose the FLE Governmental Proposal" published on May 13,

2006 writes:

The governmental proposal. . .locates public education as a means orthe national strategy to survive the globalized era of massive competition. It brings the principle of market and competition to education, and aims to control the divided individuals using the national framework based on "public spirit" and "love of our country and the land." In such [a proposal], one can find neither a viewpoint that seeks cooperation and collaboration nor to nurture independent individuals who form a peaceful society. There is only increase of differentiation.

In addition to these changes, the revision removed a critical phrase in the

Preamble of the original FLE that clearly stated the tie between the original FLE and the

Constitution: "having established the Constitution of Japan . . . the realization of this ideal shall depend fundamentally on the power of education" (Warera wa saki ni nihonkoku kenpo wa kakutei shi ... kano riso no jilsugen wa konpon ni oile kyoiku no chikara ni

93 Kyoiku kihonho kaiaku wo tomeyou! zenkoku renrakukai, GenkiJ no kyi5ikukihonh6 1O seihu no kyi5ikukihonhOan no laish6hy6, httn ://www.kyokiren.net 52 matsubeki mono de aru). This revision reduced the supportive relationship between the

FLE and the Constitution. Many pointed out that this change exposed the government' s intention to take steps toward revising the pacifist Constitution of Japan.94

The pro-Constitution population in the country therefore became very concerned with the FLE revision issue as early as when the Request for Advice was submitted to the

MOE in November 2001 . The FLE issue also prompted intellectuals and cultural figures in 2002 to form three groups to combat the issue as well as the Kyokiren which was also formed in April 24, 2004. These groups created national and local networks to fight the

FLE revision, and their opposition activities provided the members of the two teacher's unions with the opportunity to engage in cooperative endeavors.

As we will discuss shortly, Nikkyoso and Zenkyo engaged in separate campaigns against the FLE revision, but both unions also participated in the important rallies held by the outside network groups. I here will explain how the two unions were involved in these networks and will introduce four cases of local campaigns that exhibited voluntary collaboration between the Nikkyoso and Zenkyo members.

94 Ibid., . http://kyokiren.seesaa.net/ Nihon kyOshokuin kumiai, http;//www.jtu·net.or.jP/ Zen'nihon kyoshokuin kumiai, Official Website, http;//www.zenkvo.bizl

53 Central Rallies

Zenkyo and Nikkyoso 's Central Rallies

Zenkyo held eighteen central rallies between May 2002 and December 2006, and its May 27, 2006 rally attracted more than 50,000 participants. Another huge protest rally was held on October 14 at Meiji Park in Tokyo with 27,000 participants (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. The Opposition Rally at the Meiji Park, Tokyo (October 14, 2006)

Source: hno:llwww.zenkyo.bizihtml/menu3n006n0061014192205.html (accessed on March 24, 2007)

Zenkyo also held two rallies in which 10,000 people participated, and eleven rallies in which more than 1,000 people participated. Nikkyoso held its first rally to oppose the

FLE revision on October 22, 2002, and held a total of seventeen rallies in Tokyo until the 54 FLE bill passed the Diet on December 13, 2006. Nikkyoso's largest rally was held on

December 8, 2006 with 12,000 participants. In addition, it held nine rallies with more than 1,000 participants (see Table 3):

Table 3. Date and Size of CentralRallies,held by Nikkyoso and Zenkyo (2002-2006) Date Nikkyoso Zenkyo Date Nikkyoso Zenkyo

5/12/02 800 5/16/06 230 6/14/03 4,000 5118/06 600 3/13/04 1,000 5/19/06 700 4123/04 2,000 5/27/06 5,000 50,000 4/24/04 2,000 612106 3,000 5/22104 700 617106 2,500, 9118/04 2,500 10/2106 300 1116/04 5,500 10114/06 27,000 11121104 4,000 10/18/06 1,000 3118/05 220 10/26106 8,000 3/26105 10,000 1118/06 2,300 5/20/05 10,000 11125/06 3,500 11116105 800 11128/06 3,000 3/31106 2,000 11129/06 3,200 4112/06 200 1216/06 8,300 4/28/06 550 12/8/06 12,000 5110/06 1,800 12/13/06 4,500

Sources: Nikkyoso Official Website, Zenkyo Official Website, and Nihon rodo nenkan

Although both unions were successful in mounting big central rallies, Table 3 shows that they did not hold a single joint rally. Moreover, when Zenkyo held its biggest rally on May 27, 2006 in Yoyogi Park, Nikkyoso held a separate rally in Shiba Park with

5,000 participants. Nikkyoso's website claims that a total of35,000 people participated in its local rallies, and most of the participants were members of its affiliated local unions. , The two unions also held several petition campaigns between 2002 and 2006; Nikkyoso

55 collected a total of 2,350,000 signatures and Zenkyo collected a total of 3,120,000

signatures, respectively. Their other events, such as assemblies, were also held separately.

No joint Statement of Protest (kiigi seimel) was published. Such evidence shows that the

structural split between Nikkyoso and Zekyo remained strong at the center. Near the end

of the FLE revision process, Nikkyoso fmally published an "Emergency Proclamation"

(hijojitai sengen) on October 26, 2006 for the first time in three decades, and Zenkyo

responded by calling for cooperation with Nikkyoso. However, even after this event, the

two unions took no official joint action in Tokyo under the names ofNikkyoso and

Outside Network Groups and Their Central Rallies

As previously introduced, the major networks that opposed the FLE revision were

formed in the early period of the FLE revision process. According to Nihon rada nenkan,

the four nation-wide network groups were the following: Association to Keep the FLE

Alive in the 21st Century (21 seiki ni kyoiku kihonho wo ikasu kai) established on March

31,2002 by University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Ota Akira and 279 education

scholars and teachers' union representatives; the FLE National Network (Kyoiku kihonho

zenkoku nettowiiku) formed on May 25, 2002 by University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus

Horio Teruhisa and six other representatives including the president of Zenkyo;

Association for Opening Education and Culture to the World (Kyoiku to bunka wo sekai

ni hiraku kai) formed on July 18, 2002 by Umebara Takeshi (writer), Setouchi JakuchO

,95 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyiijo, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007. Nikkyoso Official Website. Zenkyo Official Website. 56 (writer, a Buddhist nun), and Tsujii Takashi (novelist, entrepreneur); and Stop the

Revision of FLE! National Network Association (Kyoiku kihonho kaiaku wo tomeyou!

Zenkoku renrakukai [hereafter "Kyokiren"J) established on April 24, 2004 by university professors such as Ouchi Hirokazu (Matsuyama University), Komori Yoichi (Tokyo

University), Takahashi Tetsuya (Tokyo University), and Miyake Akiko (Chiba

University).

It is notable that, for the establishment of Association to Keep the FLE Alive in the 21 st Century, the names of a former president of Nikkokyo and a former secretary general and a former president of Nikkyoso were on the list of joint approvers.96 Zenkyo and Zenroren supported the formation of the FLE National Network and Kyokiren.97 The

Association for Opening Education and Culture to the World was a network of 129 various types of "cultural figures" (bunkajin) such as writers, doctors, lawyers, scholars, artists, etc. Nikkyoso supported this group.98 Thus these networks were able to broadly attract different groups of people as an inclusive people's network. The long list of the approvers on these associations' rosters reflects the significance of the FLE revision issue and the sense of impending crisis felt generally among the Japanese people.

Among these four networks, Kyokiren was the most dynamic in undertaking actions beyond the publishing of proclamations. Kyokiren held a total of seven central rallies, five demonstrations following the rallies, and two "human chains" that

96 Association to Keep the FLE Alive in the 2 1st Century, http;//www.peace-forum.com/kyokasho/apeallkvokihou/2lseiki.htm 97 Zenkyii Official Website. 98 Nikkyiiso Official Website. 57 surrounded the Diet building.99 It is noteworthy that the representatives of the JCP and

Social Democratic Party (hereafter ''the SOP") jointly greeted the demonstrators in all the three rallies held by Ky5kiren in 2006. More than 3,000 people participated in most of these events (see Table 4). Nihon r5d5 nenkan reported that ''teachers who were affiliated with different unions and ordinary citizens also participated" in these rallies. loo A comparison of the data of Nihon rodo nenkan and the websites ofNikky5so and Zenky5 indicates that Zenky5 was involved in most of the events held by Ky5kiren.

Table 4. Date & Size of Ky5kiren's Central Events Date Types of Events Size

12/23/03 Rally 4,000 1116/04 Rally *( -) 517105 Rally + Demonstration 5,500 12/3/05 Rally + Demonstration 3,500 3131106 Rally + Demonstration 4,000 612106 Rally + Demonstration 3,000 11112/06 Rally + Demonstration 8,000 11116/06 Human Chain (-) 121115106 Human Chain (-)

Sources: Kyilkiren Official Website and Nihon Todo nenkan *(-) no data found as of this writing

Thus we see that the outside network groups played important roles in organizing joint struggles in Tokyo, whereas the campaigns ofNikky5so and Zenkyo were persistently divided. At the center, more anonymouS networks such as Ky5kiren appeared to better represent the general public than the union activists, although the unions were

99 Kyilkiren Official Website. 100 Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyiijo (2006), 295 58 defmitely a big part of organizing such events and the members of the two divided unions would have enjoyed sharing their common concern as well.

Joint Struggles at the Local Level

Although divided at the center, some local teachers' unions affiliated with different national unions voluntarily participated in the united struggles. Nihon radii nenkan reported "the collaboration between Zenkyo under Zenroren, and Nikkyoso under

Rengo, expanded to twenty areas including Hokkaido, Fukushima, Okayama, and

Nagasaki.,,101 According to Nihon riidii nenkan, Zenroren led most of these efforts.102

Since I was able to collect more concrete evidence for the cases of Hokkaido, Tokyo,

Nagano, and Miyagi regarding theirjoint struggles, I will present these four cases here.

In Hokkaido, the outside network groups played a significant role at the local level in opposing the FLE revisions. Yet interestingly, the groups in Hokkaido were fonned by the local unions which were affiliated with different upper organizations. In

Tokyo and Nagano, joint struggles were mounted beyond their respective borders, with various different political alignments. Finally, in Nagano and Miyagi, local teachers' unions were affiliated with Nikkyoso but did not necessarily follow the Nikkyoso-Rengo line of orientation. Miyagi stands out because it involved another important faction of the

Japanese teachers' union movement: the neutral, or "independenf' unions (chiiritsu kumim).

IOJ Hosei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyiijo (2007),239. 102 Ibid., 239. 59 Hokkaido

According to Nihon rodo nenkan, the following three groups were formed to oppose the revision of the FLE in Hokkaido: Center for Opposition Movement Against

Constitution Revision (Kenpo kaiaku hantai do undo suishin sentii) organized by

Zenroren-affiliated Dororen; Hokkaido Center for Peace Movement (Do heiwa undo senta) organized by Nikkyoso-affiliated Hokkaido kyoshokuin kumiai (Hokkyoso) imd

Rengo-affiliated Hokkaido Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Jichiro Hokkaido); and Kyokiren Hokkaido Network (Hokkaido renrakukai) organized by Hokkaido Peace

Network (Hokkaido plsu netto ).103

Dokokyoso's Statement of Protest published on December 16, 2006 proclaims that Hokkaido renrakukai was formedjointiy by all the teachers' unions ofHokkaido. It was the first realization of a joint struggle in thirty years. Its rally held on June 4, 2006 attracted 3,000 participants. Furthermore, over 10,000 people participated in a rally on

November 25, 2006, which was held in Odori Park in Sapporo city. The participants also conducted demonstrations along two routes after the rally. In addition, Hokkyoso and

Dokokyoso created "A Song of the FLE (kyoiku kihonhO no uta)" together and held some street performances. A local radio channel broadcasted it afterwards. The statement also reported that joint struggle groups between teachers' unions, labor unions, and civil groups were organized not only in Sapporo city but also in many areas in Hokkaido such as Hakodate, Tomakomai, Asahikawa, Otaru, Date, and Obihiro.

103 Ibid., 275. 60 Tokyo

Tokyo was the arena of many central raBies against the FLE revision, and it was also the battlefield in which local teachers' unions resisted the attacks of the ultra-right metropolitan government. In Tokyo, 388 teachers who rejected the forced use of the national flag (Hinomaru) and national anthem (Kimigayo) in school ceremonies were punished between 2003 and May 2007 and several lawsuits were filed regarding this matter. 104 Thus, teachers in Tokyo were already facing a serious crisis before the FLE revision became problematic. Many websites created by civil groups that opposed

Hinomaru Kirnigayo incidents in Tokyo indicated that they were also concerned with the revision of the FLE because the problem shared the same root cause: the violation of a democratic educational system guaranteed under the post-war constitutional paradigm.

Therefore, Tokyo's local teachers' unions were willing to adopt flexible tactics in their fight against the FLE revision; they did not hesitate to mount joint struggles that bridged the structural division. The presidents of the Nikkyoso-affiliated Tokyo-to kotogakko kyoshokuin kumiai (Tokokyo) and Tokyo-to koritsugakko kyoshokuin kumiai

(Tokyokyoso) as well as the Zenkyo-affiliated Tokyo-to kyoshokuin kumiai (Tokyoso) published ajoint appeal "To All the Teachers of Tokyo" (ZenIa no ky6shokuin no minasan e) on May 30, 2006 which advocated the mobilization of all the teachers in

Tokyo. Nihon r6d6 nenlwn also states that the seven local teachers' unions in Hachioji city held ajoint rally and street demonstration on May 17,2006 in which two hundred

104 Hinomaru kimigayo kyoseisha wo kokuso kokuhatsu suru kai, Official Website. http://www.kokukoku.neti

61 members of the branch unions of Tokyoso, Tokyokyoso, and Tokokyo participated. 105

These local teachers' unions also collectively participated in many central rallies described in the previous section.I06

Nagano

The Nikkyoso-affiliated Nagano-ken kyoshokuin kumiai (Nagano-ken kyoso) and

Zenkyo-affiliated Nagano kotogakko kyoshokuin kumiai (Nagano kokyoso) published a joint statement of protest on November 15, 2006 against the forceful adoption of the governmental proposal for the revision of FLE. Prior to this, these unions jointly established the Citizen's Network to Keep the FLE Alive (Kyoiku kihonho wo ikasu kenmin nettowaku [Kenrnin nettoD. This organization's website links to Zenroren.

According to the records kept on the websites of Kenrnin netto, Nagano-ken kyoso, and

Nagano kokyoso, the two unions collaborated throughout the opposition movement, and are still working together on the newer issues such as the revision of the three education laws and to protect the Constitution. They are also collaborating on Nagano's local education issues such as opposition to the unwanted reorganization of the public high school system. 107

As we will also see in the case of Miyagi, Nagano's case showed that a local union's political affiliation with a larger organization does not necessarily affect the union's objectives and activities. Kenmin netto is an embodiment of Nagano's collective

105 HOsei daigaku Ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo (2007), 275. 106 Tokyoto kyoshokuin kumiai Official Website .. hnp://www.tokyouso.ip/ 107 KyOikukihonho wo ikasu kenmin nenowaku, Official Website. hnp://www I6.plala.or.jp/kyoukihou­ netJtoppage,htm 62 education movement, which reflects the orientation of Zenkyo-Zenroren line, as indicated by its link to Zenroren's official website. As Nagano has been famous for its reputation as an "Education Prefecture (Kyoiku ken)" in Japan, its liberal attitude exhibited in the FLE revision movement is not surprising.

Miyagi

Like Nagano, Miyagi-ken kyoshokuin kumiai (Miyagi-ken kyoso) also takes a

Zenkyo-Zenroren line orientation, although it affiliates with Nikkyoso. Thus, Miyagi-ken kyoso's website links not only to Nikkyoso, but also Zenkyo and Zenroren. Although

Miyagi-ken kyoso and Miyagi kokokyoiku nettowiiku yunion (Miyagi netto) are

Nikkyoso affiliates, Miyagi kotogakko kyoshokuin kumiai (Miyagi kokyoso) is an independent union that is also a major union in Miyagi.

In the opposition movement against the FLE revision, the teachers' unions of

Miyagijointly organized the "Citizen's Assembly for Promoting the Constitution and the

FLE" (kenpo, kyoiku kihonhO wo mamori ikasu Miyagi no tsudol) in the Nishikimachi

Park in Sendai city on September 30, 2006 in which 3,800 people participated. It was one of the most successful local rallies of the opposition movement. In addition, the Miyagi­ kenkyoso and Miyagi kokyoso collected 34,000 signatures through their joint petition campaign and also held 176 street demonstrations, as well as 90 study meetings.

Although the FLE has already been revised, both Miyagi-ken kyoso and Miyagi kokyoso published all of the eleven articles of the original FLE on their webpage. In the emergency meeting held on December 19,2006, these two unions confirmed that they

63 would continue their joint struggle to fight the actualization of the new FLE in the school education. 108

It is in these cases we see the heritage of the original Nikkyoso; in Thurston's terms, its "indirect" tactics, as well as its uncooperative tactic at the implementation level.

Moreover, such unity as shown by local unions in those cases implies potential revitalization of Japanese teachers' union movement from the periphery.

Caravan Campaign

From the sources that I was able to consult, it was unclear if any of those local activities were carried out as a part of the "Caravan Campaign," which was a tactic exercised for the fust time in this movement by Japanese teachers' unions. Caravan

Campaign was a relay-style local level campaign carried out by local unions, supported by the national unions. As I will discuss in conclusion, local unions were able to approach their local community in an extensive manner through this campaign.

Moreover, both Nikkyoso and Zenkyo held caravan campaigns, although separately. Zenkyo's caravan ran in a total of twenty prefectures: Yamaguchi, Mie, Gifu,

Chiba, Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Saitama, Kochi, Ishikawa, Kagawa, Fukui, Aichi, Ehime,

Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Niigata, Kumamoto, Kagoshima, Miyazaki, and Shimane.109

Nikkyoso ran its caravan in twelve prefectures, starting in Okinawa on May 16, 2006 and ending in Yamaguchi on December 3, 2006."0 Since! was not able to find either the list

108 Miyagiken kotogakko kyoshokuin kumiai, Official Website. hnp:/lhb7.seikyou.ne.jp/home/miyagi­ kokyosol 109 Zenkyo, Official Website. 11 0 Nikkyoso, Official Website. 64 of prefectures where Nikkyoso's caravan ran or a clear statement that claims collaboration of the two unions in this tactic, it is uncertain whether Zenkyo and

Nikkyoso cooperated in covering different places or their campaigns were totally separated. However, as we saw with the joint struggles held by some local unions in the previous section, it is possible that this campaign also provided the membership of the -- ., two national teachers' unions with another opportunity to collaborate.

Shared Views, Different Audiences

As discussed earlier,.Zenkyo and Nikkyoso shared the same view toward the revision of the FLE. They both strongly opposed the revision and problematized exactly the same points that the govermnental proposal made. Moreover, the cases we have examined in the previous sections made it clear that the local unions were able to mount joint struggles according to the locus upon which they fundamentally agreed. We have also seen, however, that the two national unions' structural division was persistent and their political affiliations were a significant factor that separated their opposition campaigns.

Another important aspect to be discussed here is the different audience of their campaigns. Through reading the chronicle reports and announcements published on the two unions' websites, I have noted that besides its own membership, Zenkyo directed its message toward the general public, particularly the parents of school children. While advocating its view to the union member and non-union member teachers, the union encouraged the members to approach PTAs and to hold meetings with the parents to discuss the FLE issue, through which the parents were encouraged to join the petition

65 campaigns as well as rallies. Moreover, Zenkyo actively appealed to the pro-Constitution population of the country. As early as June 5, 2001, when Zenkyo was still engaging in their opposition against the "Three Education Laws," or ky6iku sanp6, before the goverrunent took a serious step to the FLE revision, it already pointed out that the ultimate intention of the government-led education revision is the revision of the

Constitution. The "appeal" reads:

Because ofthe Koizumi cabinet that schemes to force the approval of the laws during this Diet period, [opposition to) the proposal of the "Three Education Laws" is facing a significant challenge ... the crisis that faces children and education today had proved the failure of the LDP education policies that have been ignoring the idea of the Constitution and the FLE and promoting competition and control... when one thinks ofthe fact thatthe government has approved the "Tsukuru-kai" textbook which romanticizes the war of aggression and thus brought about the international controversy, we cannot help feeling that the future of this country is facing the dangerous dark cloud ofthe revision of the Constitution.llI

Its keen sense of mission to protect the post-war Constitutional paradigm proves that the view of the original Nikkyoso still survives in the union. Zenkyo continued to call attention to the danger of the Constitutional revision in their announcements thereafter, and thus successfully appealed to the pro-Constitution population of the country. Zenkyo was aware that the mobilization of the pro-Constitution popUlation was crucial to build a nation-wide opposition movement to fight the ongoing education revision. Indeed, the FLE and the Constitution were the front and backsides of a coin. All of the outside network groups we have examined above argued that the revision of the

FLE must be prevented in order to protect Japan's Peace Constitution, namely Article 9.

And thus, these movements stimulated the creation of the "Article 9 Associations" (kyiij6

111 Zenkyo, Official Website. 66 no !wi) blossoming throughout the country. Considerable numbers of schools in Japan now have "Article 9 Association at the Work Place" (shokuba kyiijo no kOl), and many of them are organized beyond the difference in union affiliations. 112

Conversely, although Nikkyoso's reports show that it was aware of the connection between the revision of the FLE and the Constitution, it did not officially articulate such a significant viewpoint until October 26, 2006, when it fmally published the "Emergency

Proclamation." From the beginning of its campaign, Nikkyoso mainly sought support from the institutions with which the union is politically affiliated. This attitude is most apparent in Nikkyos's earliest report on the FLE issue I could find on Nikkyoso's website:

On March 31 [2006), the day of the promulgation of the [original) FLE, Nikkyoso held the "3.3 1 Meeting of the Japan Democratic Education Politics League and the Diet Members ofSelf-Goveming Bodies" (Nisseirenjichitai giindan kaigi) regarding the FLE issue. We held this meeting because it has become even more urgent to strengthen the ties among the members of every self-governing body, the national Diet members, Nikkyoso, and its affiliated unions in order for our movement to protect, communicate, and activate the Constitution and the FLE.

Arguably, Nikkyoso maintained such an approach throughout its campaign. It also reached out to international organizations, specifically the Education International, to appeal the legitimacy of its argument to the larger political arena as well as the domestic constituencies. Indeed, both Zenkyo and Nikkyoso claimed their legitimacy by referring to international laws such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nonetheless,

Nikkyoso was more active with the business of political networking rather than engaging in popular mobilization in its campaign. I here must point out that, moreover, Nikkyoso

112 Shin bun Akahata Online http://www.jcD.or.jp/akahatalaik0712007-06-2512007062513 0 I O.html (accessed on April 3, 2008) 67 was slower than Zenkyo in working through both the diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks that Hunt et al have promulgated: that is, identifying the problem and coming up with a solution. This shows Nikkyoso's inflexibly as an organization.

This difference between Nikkyoso and Zenkyo suggests that the two unions had different orientations and objectives eventually; while Zenkyo aimed to make the

- movement a nation-wide opposition movement that can ultimately lead to a political change favorable to the Left, Nikkyoso, which is now fundamentally a reformist union, sought a way to maintain the status quo. Rengo' s corporatist orientation undoubtedly influenced this attitude ofNikkyoso.

It is particularly important to note that, moreover, the network built by the outside network groups contributed to this movement in a significant manner. Those pro-

FLE/Constitution groups had eventually become both the audiences and the protagonists for the teachers' unions, especially for the Zenkyo-Zenroren side. It was partly because of

Zenkyo's early and unrelenting appeal to those groups, but it was also because of those groups' own ability to attract constituencies from various social strata, particularly intellectuals and cultural figures whose popularity and social credibility are very high in

Japan; however it was promoted based on those groups' identity as "people's network."

This case also suggests the critical role that audiences could play in social movements.

As demonstrated in this chapter, whether or not it succeeds in appealing to the 'right' audiences will have a crucial impact on the level of success the movement can achieve.

This chapter also presented local cases that surmounted the central division. These cases are important because the union activity at the local level that succeeded in creating horizontal cooperation challenges not only the extent of the structnral division of the two

68 teachers' unions, but also the extent of applicability ofNakane's portrayal of the Japanese people as "incapable of seeing society in terms of strata within which one may locate oneself." Although such concepts as "labor union" or "social movement" would have been foreign for many Japanese people in the past, their social reality has been changing and so have the labor movements and social structure of the country.

69 CHAPTERS CONCLUSION

Perpetual Factionalism iii Japanese Labor Movement

This study ofNikkyoso and the behavior of the two successor unions after the

1989 schism comrrmedmost of the arguments. made by the theories we have outlined in

Chapter 1. The fact that such a major schism occurred to Nikkyoso, a powerful public sector union that survived the state's reckless attacks against labor unions for more than forty years, itself highlights the intricacy that labor unions have to deal with in maintaining the internal balance and unity, as Offe has described. The persistence of the organizational division between Nikkyoso and Zenkyo demonstrated the perpetual factionalism in Japanese labor movement, and thus proved the difficulty of overcoming the vertical structure that penetrates the Japanese society. Such factionalism separated the . central campaigns ofNikkyoso and Zenkyo, and this was the biggest canse that kept the two unions from acting as a unified opposition group, even in the face of such a dire situation as the FLE revision.

The case examined here demonStrates that such factionalism remains strong in the

Japanese labor movement up to this day, presumably in the form of anti-communism, as clearly shown in the formation of Rengo and its manifesto that singled out the

Communist faction of the labor as "self-righteous, egoistic influence." However, my examination of the various levels of the opposition movement against the FLE revision has shown a number of instances in which Nikkyoso and Zenkyo, and their affiliated organizations, collaborated. In particular, the outside network groups and the local unions

70 provided the members of the two national unions with the opportunity to cooperate. As we have seen in the cases of Nagano and Miyagi prefectures, even those unions officially affiliated with Nikkyoso had connections with Zenkyo and Zenroren. It is in these cases that the border between Nikkyoso and Zenkyoblurs. Jus~ as Ishida Takeshi described in his essay "Conflict and Its Accommodation: Ornote-Ura and Uchi-Soto Relations," we

. . . are able to observe in this case that "the flexibility of the border between uchi and soto ... plays an important role in maintaining social integrity and avoiding conflict" in

Japanese society. I 13

These instances of voluntary cooperation encourage the possibility of a more thorough collaboration beyond the schism of the original Nikkyoso. Moreover, these cases indicate possible alteration of the view of the Japanese people presented by

Nakane; that is, the Japanese people's incapability of creating horizontal relationship beyond verti9al bounds that separate them from each other. As Kawanishi suggested, tracking the 'after-schism' development of Nikkyoso and Zenkyo and their genba-level collaborations revealed the neglected reality of the Japanese unions-as seen in

Kawanishi's hopeful discussion, the revitalization of Japanese union movement might have begun from relatively marginal areas/spaces of the society where "minority unions" take an active part.114

1\3 Takeshi Ishida, "Conflict and Its Accommodation: Ornote-Ura and Uchi-Soto Relations" In Conflict in Japan, edited by Ellis Krauss et aI., (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), 19 114 Kawanishi, 15 71 Contribution oflntemational Norms to the Process of the FLE Revision

Having said this, it is also important to note that the Japanese government accomplished the FLE revision so quickly and easily in its last attempt, compared to how it was in the 1980s, that one could reasonably question the extent of possibility for a mere labor union to prevent it from happening. Together with the lack of attention from the - mass media, the apparent ease of the revision process almost undermines the existence of such a massive opposition movement as discussed in this study. As suggested in Chapter

2 using Schoppa's argument, there would be little chance for the opposition to stop the conservatives once they achieved a consensus. Needless to reiterate, unity is the precondition for the opposition camp to confront the conservative government. As Carlile emphasized, quoting Charles Tilly, however, "when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen" [emphasis in original].115 Thus, the way in which the FLE revision was carried out depends on when it happened and what was happening in

Japanese society as well as international society from the 1990s to the early 2000s.

To understand the international political circumstances in the period and how this particular situation contributed to Japan's domestic politics, Leheny's study on

"compensated dating" (enjo rosai) and "counterterrorism" offers a substantial viewpoint.116 In his study, Leheny utilized these two pivotal cases to analyze what was happening in the Japanese society and politics during the 1990s and discussed the

Japanese state's use of "fear" to strengthen its control over the nation. He then argued

115 Lonny E. Carlile, Divisions of Labor: G1obality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement. (Honolulu: University oh Hawaii Press, 2005), 4 116 David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan. (Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press, 2006) 72 that some international norms and laws enabled the Japanese government to construct

"problems" and to legitimize its interpretation. As indicated in the popularity of the

Koizumi cabinet, it seemed that many believed in its interpretation of the "problem."

Considering the outcome of this process helps us to analyze the recent success of the government in the revision of the FLE. As I recall, there certainly was intense "fear" felt among the Japanese during the mid-I 990s through the 2000s. The "fear" was of social disorder, moral decline, collapse of traditional family roles, and weakening of community ties, and this anxiety was stimulated by those highly publicized schoolgirls who committed compensated dating as well as the increasing numbers of murder and suicide cases by children. And all of that ultimately helped the government to put the blame on the post-war education system and legitimize its attempt to dismantle the system.

Overwhelming advocacy of such international "fear" of terrorism by the United

States government supported the Japanese government's efforts to pass the counterterrorism laws; to dispatch the Self-Defense Force (SDF) to Iraq; and to promote the Defense Agency to become the Ministry of Defense. To legitimize the SDF's participation in the U.S.-led international counterterrorism military force, the Japanese goveniment is eager to become a "normal" country by revising the Constitution, particularly Article 9.

Without the construction of such "fear" and the contribution of international norms like "counterterrorism" to this process, revising a law such as the FLE, which functioned as the gatekeeper for the pacifist Constitution that denounced the possession of military force, would hardly have been as easy as it turned out to be. In fact, the

73 intention of the government to strengthen its control over family and community affairs is clear in the new FLE as well: It newly introduced articles on family education (Article

10) and social education (Article 12) to be controlled by the state, while the autonomy of family affairs and the state's responsibility for social services were eliminated.lll

Beyond tbe Schism: Social Movement Theories and tbe Case of Japanese Teachers' Union Movement

Under such an abnormal circumstance, the opposition movement failed to prevent the revision of the FLE; however, the campaigns were successful in rallying Japan' s general public to focus on this crucial issue. In closely analyzing the actual activities of

Nikkyoso, Zenkyo, and the other actors in this movement, the social movement theories provided very useful tools.

Among the tactics used by the two unions and the outside network groups, we were able to identifY many listed in the "repertoire of tactics" formulated by Tilly, such as slogans, rallies, street demonstrations, assemblies, petitions, and developing "special- purpose associations into nationwide challenges to the existing distribution or use of state power." 118 Besides mass demonstrations as such, in this movement, the teachers' unions and the other groups communicated more directly with their protagonists, antagonists, and audiences, following Hunt et ai's model of how social movements interact with their identity fields. I 19 They exercised such micro-level tactics as sending letters and faxes to each of the protagonist and antagonist Diet members; holding symposia and study

117 Kyoiku kihonho kaiaku wo lomeyou! zenkoku renrakukai, http://www.kyokiren.net 118 Tilly, 12-42 119 Hunt el aI., 185-208. 74 meetings to educate local community members; and visiting local officials as well as politicians to obtain their support. Those tactics were developed, often based on what was initially borrowed from other experienced labor movements, as the Japanese teachers' union movements grew.

In addition, there was a new tactic called the "Caravan Campaign." The primary goal of this tactic was to advocate their position nationwide through a micro-level communication tactic, which local branches of both Nikkyoso and Zenkyo carried out, although separately. As noted in Chapter 4, some local unions of Zenkyo discussed the issue with PTAs; informed parents and students by handing out the pamphlets prepared by their upper organizations; and encouraged workplace-based cooperation beyond the difference of union affiliation. In many cases different but related demands, such as

"sooner realization of thirty students a class system" (sarifiinin gakkyii no sokijitsugen) and "opposition to the National Achievement Tesf' (zenkolcu issei gakuryolcu tesuto hantai), were included in their campaign objectives. 120

I found no written evidence that clearly states the two unions' cooperation in coming up with this new idea of the caravan campaign, yet sharing a new tactic nonetheless implies sharing of a common purpose between Nikkyoso and Zenkyo members. What have seen in the joint struggles at the local level seems to support this hypothesis. In fact, Zenkyo's announcement published on December 15,2006 states, "in many places we created cooperation among teachers beyond the differences of their union affiliation" (kumiai shozoku no chigai wo koeta kyoshokuin no kyodo wo kakuchi de tsukuridashita). Thus, through this movement, union members and teachers at the

120 Zenkyo, Official Website. 75 genba certainly developed a ground for their joint struggles to grow. It is therefore reasonable to argue that what has not been visible at national level politics may have been emerging at the grassroots level politics of Japan.

Nevertheless, in the case of the opposition movement against the FLE revision, the lack of an autonomous, united national teachers' union was the most detrimental element. This kind of multi-dimensional movement that involved both competition at the level of industrial federation and cooperation at the local level has not yet been theorized comprehensively in the field of social movements, and thus this complex configuration of the movement may require more thorough study and can potentially contribute to the literature of social movements.

The less successful campaigns of the new Nikkyiiso as an opposition group in this movement have shown that the union has been institutionalized after the schism, andre­ identified it further away from the interests of many Japanese people who cherish the post-war tradition of a democratic, egalitarian education system. Now that the FLE has been revised, nevertheless, Japanese teachers' unionists at the genba are anxious to fight the actualization of the new FLE at the actual site of school education. Confronted with the reckless attack by the ruling government, the results of this ongoing fight at the implementation level will have decisive impact on the future of Japanese education. New generations rise and new circumstances surround the country's education as well as labor.

New types oflabor movements are emerging that reflect changes in the structure of employment in Japan. It is certain that there is no way for Japan's education laborers' movement to revitalize itself without addressing these new developments.

76 Nanbara Shigeru, the chainnan of the Education Refonn Committee who created the 1947 FLE proposal, remarked, however, "even if there has to. come any era of reaction, no one shall be able to rewrite fundamentally the spirit of the FLE. Because it is a truth, and rejecting this equals an attempt to dam up the current ofhistory.,,121 Just as the Preamble of the original FLE articulated, moreover, the realization of a human ideal - . . championed in the Japanese Constitution shall depend fundamentally on the power of education.

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