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Universilv Micrdnlms International 300 N. Z eeb Road Ann Arbor. Ml 48106
1320658
SHERMAN, VICKI ANN
AN ANALYSIS OF REDUCED PRICE TICKET CENTERS
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY M.A. 1983
University Microfilms
InternStionel 30 0 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Copyright i9S3 by
SHERMAN, VICKI ANN
All Rights Reserved
AN ANALYSIS OF REDUCED PRICE TICKET CENTERS
by
Vicki A. Sherman
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
in
Performing Arts
Signatures of Committee
Chairman
I AÂÀjJk^
Dean of the College J
■ /j , / ? > Datp)atp 7
1983
The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 iolls?7> AN ANALYSIS OF REDUCED PRICE TICKET CENTERS
BY
Vicki A. Sherman
ABSTRACT
As performing arts organizations are finding economic
survival increasingly difficult, the implementation of
creative marketing techniques, such as discount ticketing,
has become necessary. "An Analysis of Reduced Price Ticket
Centers" examines the evolution, success, and adaptation of
the Times Square Theatre Center (TKTS), the first discount
ticket booth. Operation of discount booths in several
United States cities and in London, England has significantly
increased net revenues to participating organizations.
Many factors must be considered in adapting the TKTS model because the level and type of arts activity vary in
every city. By analyzing TKTS and adaptations, the author
has concluded that the marketing strategy of discount
ticketing is a viable technique, helping performing arts
organizations lessen the gap between revenues and
expenditures.
ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The assistance and guidance of many people was necessary to research and write this thesis. The author gratefully acknowledges their efforts. Special thanks to her thesis advisors, Valerie Morris, Charles Crowder and
Kenneth Baker for their wise suggestions and for the countless hours they spent working with the author.
To the staff of many organizations who provided valuable research materials, a special thank you to Peter
Jablow and the staff of the Cultural Alliance of Greater
Washington and to the staff of the Theatre Development
Fund and to Andrea Rounds for her patience in conveying the elements of style to the author. And last, a sincere thanks to the author's family for their constant support.
Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... Ü
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... i ü
INTRODUCTION ...... 1
The Economie Situation ...... 6
Chapter I. THE TIMES SQUARE THEATRE CENTER ...... 7
Planning ...... 7 The Theatre Development Fund ...... 8 Description ...... 12 Impact on Performing Arts Organizations . . . 13 Problems and Modifications ...... 16
II. B O S T I X ...... 19
Arts Boston ...... 19 Planning ...... 21 Description . 24 Impact on Cultural Organizations ...... 26 Problems and Modifications ...... 27
III. TICKETPLACE...... 28
Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington . . . 28 P l a n n i n g ...... 30 Description ...... 36 Impact on Performing Arts Organizations . . . 37 Problems and Modifications ...... 39
IV. PLANS FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO TICKET BOX O F F I C E ...... 42
V. PLANS TO ADAPT THE TIMES SQUARE THEATRE C ENTER ...... 45
P i t t s b u r g h ...... 45 Philadelphia ...... 47
iv Chapter
D e n v e r ...... 49 Chicago and L o n d o n ...... 50
VI. CONCLUSION ...... 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 57
V INTRODUCTION
Facing severe funding shortages in an unstable economy, performing arts organizations are finding economic survival increasingly difficult. Within the last twenty years, performing arts organizations have created and adapted a variety of marketing techniques to counter this economic trend. Marketing techniques have enlarged audiences by generating larger ticket sales, increasing an organization's visibility to a wider public.
One innovative marketing technique was the sale of half-price tickets to theatrical performances on the day of the show. The first half-price ticket booth, the Times
Square Theatre Center (TKTS), was instituted by the Theatre
Development Fund (TDF) in 1973. TKTS proved so successful that it soon became a model for the establishment of half-price ticket booths in several major U.S. cities, including Boston, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C., as well as London, England. In each case, the ticket booth has significantly increased attendance and net revenues for performing arts organizations, helped to attract new and more diverse patrons, and increased the frequency of
attendance of former patrons.^ This thesis will examine the
evolution and success of this half-price marketing strategy,
its impact on the financial stability of performing arts
organizations in communities where it operates, and innova
tive adaptations to the marketing strategy. This thesis will also examine the underlying factors making this marketing
technique so vital to the sustenance of performing arts
organizations and the industry as a whole. Discussion will
briefly focus on the economic structure of presenting live
performances; its relationship to the adaptation and refine
ment of half-price ticket booths; and the marketing
strategies of the umbrella organizations which have
sponsored and developed these projects. The ticket booths in
New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. will be analyzed in
light of their application to the audience development
potential of other metropolitan cultural communities.
The Economic Situation
Despite a surge of interest and enthusiasm in the
performing arts over the last twenty years, performing arts
institutions must still struggle to remain financially
solvent. The economic structure of presenting live
^Theatre Development, "A Strategic Plan for a Central Ticket Marketing Outlet for the Performing Arts in Washing ton, D.C." (New York: Theatre Development Fund, 1980). performances has never been conducive to making a profit.
Costs rise more rapidly than revenues, leaving a performing arts organization with an earnings gap. fThe gap is nearly forty percent for most nonprofit groups. Broadway theatres and other profit-making entities find it equally hard to break even. Unlike nonprofit organizations, the dilemma of commercial companies is exacerbated by their inability to solicit tax-deductible contributions.)
The earnings gap is the main financial problem beset ting performing arts organizations. William Baumol and
William Bowen compiled the initial research explaining this phenomenon. Although the findings of their research, presented in Performing Arts; The Economic Dilemma, are based on studies conducted prior to 1966, they remain 2 applicable to the performing arts industry today.
Three options employed to help mitigate the financial difficulties facing performing arts groups are raising ticket prices, soliciting funds from outside sources, and reducing the number of unsold seats. There are limitations to the benefits of employing these options, which performing arts organizations must consider.
The first option, raising ticket prices, is
2 William J, Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing Arts ; The Economic Dilemma (New York: A 20th Century Fund Study, 1966) , unattractive to performing arts organizations for several reasons. An increase in the price of tickets deters lower- income groups from attending performances. Since performing arts groups have been working hard in the last ten years to develop an audience from this particular segment of the population, increasing ticket prices would be morally abhorrent.
In the context of the current inflationary economy, attending live performances is perceived as a "luxury" item.
Because of this, performing arts organizations are reluctant to raise ticket prices for fear of decreasing attendance.
They must endeavor to keep their prices competitive with lower-priced alternatives to live performances, such as the media and video entertainment.
Even if ticket prices were raised, it is unlikely that the increase would be substantial enough for most performing arts organizations to fill the existing gap between costs and revenues. The real cost per ticket is so high (as much as $100.00 per seat for grand opera), that it would be impossible to increase prices the requisite amount to offset the high cost factor.
The second way to generate additional revenues is through fundraising, an option viable mainly for nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations. The majority of this unearned income can be obtained from government agencies, corporations, foundations, and individuals. As federal funding to all nonprofit groups has decreased since 1980, requests to the other sources has increased proportionately. Although these other sources have contributed substantial amounts of money to performing arts groups in the past, it is unlikely that they will continue to do so in light of increased requests for funding from "more important" health and socially- oriented groups.
The third means of increasing revenues to performing arts organizations, reducing the number of unsold seats, is an attractive option since most companies perform to audiences at seventy percent of capacity.^ Within the last twenty years, performing arts organizations have created a variety of marketing techniques to achieve near audience capacity.
In the early 196 0s, Danny Newman, an audience develop ment consultant, created and refined the concept of season subscription campaigns. In his book. Subscribe Now;
Building Arts Audiences Through Dynamic Subscription
Promotions, Newman explains that subscription sales are necessary to the fiscal health of performing arts
3 Interview with Sheryl Eisenberg, Staff Member, Theatre Development Fund, September 14, 1982. organizations because most do not sell enough single tickets
to fill their houses, Newman cites numerous examples of
successful subscription campaigns which have helped trans
form the financial position of performing arts organizations
"overnight." Newman's subscription campaign techniques have proven so successful that most performing arts organizations 4 have instituted them.
Other innovative marketing strategies to reduce the number of unsold seats were employed by performing arts groups in the early 1970s. Among them were computerized
ticket sales, telephone and mail ordering, box office sales at department stores, and discount ticketing. These
techniques have helped to fill seats, thereby increasing
revenues to performing arts groups. The marketing strategy of discount ticketing, the latest innovation implemented by
performing arts groups, will be fully discussed in this paper.
4 Danny Newman, Subscribe Now! Building Arts Audiences Through Dynamic Subscription Promotions (New York; Theatre Communications Group, 1977). CHAPTER I
THE TIMES SQUARE THEATRE CENTER (TKTS)
Planning
Joe Leblang, owner of Gray's Drugstore, first con ceived of the idea of a discount ticket facility in the
1920s. Creator of the famous adage, "there is nothing so useless as an unsold seat," Leblang sold discount/day of 5 performance tickets at Gray's. Legal changes in city regulations, however, forced Leblang to discontinue his ticket business. The demise of Leblang's operation prompted many theatre enthusiasts, both professional and patrons, to
consider the merits of Leblang's original concept. Anna
Crouse, board member of the Theatre Development Fund;
representatives from the League of New York Theatres and
Producers; the office of the League of Midtown Planning of
the City of New York; and several others embarked on
discussions regarding the feasibility of establishing a
professionally-managed discount ticket booth. The group
5 Anna E. Crouse, "Nothing So Useless as an Unsold Ticket. Boston Tackles Adage," Variety, January 9, 1980. 8 recommended that the Theatre Development Fund (TDF) undertake the project. Its organizational structure was already in place; its staff had many contacts with members of the theatre community; and its nonprofit status allowed it to draw on contributions to cover start-up costs.^
The Theatre Development Fund
Since its inception in 1968, TDF has played a vital role in supporting worthwhile projects and organizations and in making the performing arts accessible to a wider public.
TDF has grown from a grassroots service organization to a full-fledged professional organization serving the needs of the entire theatre community. As the level of theatre and performing arts activity has risen in New York and across the United States, many concomitant needs have developed to which TDF has responded.
To provide assistance to worthwhile projects and large organizations, TDF instituted the Theatre Subsidy program in
1968, helping guarantee the survival of new plays during the first few weeks of a run when sales are usually slow. By purchasing blocks of tickets for performances and then selling them to persons on their mailing list at a lower
^Interview with Vincent Marron, Director of Development & Management Services, Theatre Development Fund, October 1, 1932, price, TDF gives producers an extra margin of time in which to find an audience. Persons on the mailing list include students, teachers, military personnel, and retired individuals. During the 1980-81 season, TDF subsidized 7 eleven plays. Among them were "Amadeus," "The Fifth of
July," and "Brigadoon." A total of nearly 85,000 admissions were generated and $610,650 were dispersed to those produc- g tions receiving support. From 1968 to 1981, the program 9 accounted for over 600,000 tickets and $3,570,000.
In 19 80, TDF established a Dance Subsidy, operating in the same manner as its progenitor, the Theatre Subsidy, to assist New York companies and large regional companies
(when performing in New York). In its first year, admissions to the performances of ten different companies totalled over 10 37,000, with $262,000 paid to them.
TDF also operates a Non-Subsidy program, an outgrowth of the subsidy programs. Lower-priced tickets for per forming arts events, in the less desirable seat locations and performance dates, are sold to persons on the mailing list. This service enlarges the number of productions available to persons on the list and also diminishes the
n Theatre Development Fund, Annual Reports, 1978-79, 79.-80, 80-81, p 9 10 *Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 10 number of unsold seats.
To encourage the growth and economic stability of small performing arts organizations, TDF offers the Performing
Arts Voucher program. The growth of small and experi mental groups is important to the performing arts industry because these groups provide a vehicle to develop the creative talents of young aspiring artists without the constraints of the profit motive. The Performing Arts
Voucher addresses the special needs of small and experi mental groups whose programs range from the unpopular avant garde to the traditional and are presented for limited runs in obscure and small performance spaces. TDF helps these companies develop audiences by offering vouchers (low- priced, open tickets) to people on their mailing list.
Small, professionally oriented companies in theatre, dance, and music accept these vouchers for admissions and then redeem them for a larger amount than the purchase price from
TDF. In so doing, TDF subsidizes the difference.
When the program began in 1972, TDF sold vouchers for
Off-Off Broadway. The success of this program induced TDF to set up a dance voucher program the following year. In
1977, a music voucher program was established and by 1980, the three voucher programs were combined to form the
Performing Arts Voucher, with the hopes of encouraging 11 audiences to cross-fertilize their attendance preferences.
The voucher programs have enjoyed steady growth since 1972.
From that time until 1981, over 155,000 admissions have been sold and $774,000 returned to participating groups.
In response to a growing number of requests for advice from arts organizations in other cities, TDF established an
Office of Development Services in 1974. The most popular programs are the Vouchers, Half-Price Ticket Booths, and the
Non-Subsidy, TDF tailors the planning, implementation, and evaluation of these marketing programs to the specific needs of each city. Most of the programs are developed for cities housing at least fifty or more professionally oriented performing arts groups because less than that would not 12 provide enough tickets.
Like TDF, other organizations have begun to diversify
their marketing programs by offering a wider range of services to performing arts groups and audience members. The TDF
Office of Development Services is responsible for initiating
half-price ticket booths/marketing facilities in Boston and
Washington, D.C., and for planning similar facilities in
San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Denver, and Toronto.
Representatives from organizations in London, Chicago,
Houston, and Minneapolis have also met with the office staff
11 12 Ibid. Interview with Sheryl Eisenberg. 12 to discuss marketing projects.
Description
The Times Square Theatre Center (TKTS) opened as an experimental program, designed to provide a central box office for the performing arts community, assist theatres in filling their houses, attract impulse buyers, and help expand audiences by attracting persons unable to afford full-price tickets. Tickets are available for performances
On- and Off-Broadway and for other major theatrical per forming arts events. Participating theatres inform TKTS of the number of available seats for each performance which
TKTS can sell. Tickets are sold at half-price plus a surcharge of $0.50 for tickets with a face value under $10.00 and a $1.00 surcharge for tickets above $10.00. The sur charge, retained by TKTS, covers operating expenses and helps to fund other TDF programs. The ticket revenues accrue to the participating theatres.
TKTS is open seven days a week, Monday through
Saturday from 3:00 to 8:00 p.m., on Sunday from 12:00 to
7:00 p.m. and on matinee days from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. Two boards outside the booth list available discount tickets.
General information can be obtained beforehand through a telephone service.
Tickets are available on a first-come, first-serve 13 basis, TKTS patrons are required to pay for tickets in person, usually after waiting in line under minimal shelter.
After standing in line for between thirty and sixty minutes, patrons are usually willing to substitute another show if their first choice is not available. This "substitution" theory is central to the concept of half-price ticket booths.
Patrons are often enticed by the allure of a major production to visit the booth to buy a ticket and then learn that tickets to that production are unavailable or sold out.
Because the booth operates on a cash-only basis, patrons are inclined to substitute their first choice since they have the cash, have waited in line for up to one hour, and have already planned for an evening out.
Impact on Performing Arts Organizations
TDF conducted several studies to assess the impact of
TKTS, Data from TKTS patrons and numerical estimates of
TKTS's net effect on the size of total audience and theatrical earnings indicate that the operation was very successful. One study used was based on surveys of TKTS patrons. In August, 1973 and February and May of 1974, questionnaires were filled out by 1,600 ticket buyers for
Theatre Development Fund, "Last Minute Discount of Unsold Tickets: A Study of TKTS" (New York: Theatre Development Fund, 1973). 14 all weekly performances. Two questionnaires were admin istered, one to those waiting in line to purchase tickets and a different questionnaire to persons who had already purchased them. The surveys found that the TKTS patrons were different from average theatre-goers; they were younger (thirty years old versus forty years old); they were less affluent (annual earnings of $15,800 versus
$17,000); they had achieved higher levels of education
(seventy percent having completed college versus forty—five percent); there were more blue-collar workers (five percent versus three percent) ; and there were more professionals 14 (sixty percent versus fifty-six percent). The data indicated that TKTS was drawing new patrons and new revenues to theatres, not just selling cheaper tickets to those already planning to attend performances. Although TKTS did compete with full-price ticket sales, the finding indicated that only twenty-five percent of the tickets purchased at the TKTS booth would have been purchased at full price if TKTS were not operating. The studies showed that TKTS was attracting impulse buyers. Of the TKTS purchasers, fifty percent planned to buy tickets no more 15 than two days in advance.
Other statistical methods employed to determine TKTS * s
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 15 net effect on total audience and theatrical earnings con firmed these findings.The change in size of the total audience was calculated by comparing survey information on the frequency of previous attendance by newcomers to TKTS with that of previous TKTS users. Other comparisons were drawn from Variety's figures of gross revenues of theatres ten weeks before and ten weeks after TKTS opened. The figures implied that TKTS sales represented a substantial 17 portion of the net gain in revenues to theatres.
An alternative estimate of the net revenues which TKTS contributed to theatres was calculated by comparing prices of tickets sold by TKTS and prices of tickets that might 18 have been purchased through other sources. This analysis showed that during its first year of operation, out of total gross box office receipts of $2,000,000, TKTS contributed
$1,240,000 in net revenues to theatres. This figure represents an increase in average weekly ticket sales from
7,000 initially to 14,0 00 by the end of the year, and 19 total annual ticket sales of 450,000.
Based on the data, TDF concluded that the first year of operations was successful. Not only did ticket sales increase, but TKTS patrons frequented the theatre four times
l^Ibid. l^Ibid.
^®Ibid. ^^Ibid. 16 more often after the booth opened than before. TKTS increased both total sales and net revenues to theatres, reached new audiences, functioned as a central box office, and attracted impulse buyers. The study analysts recom mended that TDF's model be adapted by other cities.
Problems and Modifications
Despite TKTS's success during its year of experimenta tion, some professionals throughout the theatre community remained unconvinced. They maintained that TKTS would infringe on full-price ticket sales and that discount ticket buyers would become accustomed to purchasing lower- priced tickets, thereby shrinking the pool of full-price ticket buyers. They recommended that the financial interests of the theatre industry would best be served by the establishment of a full-price central box office, augmented by a discount booth.
Although annual studies of TKTS from 1973 to 1981 20 have categorically refuted these opinions, TDF has always been committed to investigating and implementing modifica tions of the booth. After the first season of TKTS, TDF instituted minor changes. Due to the constant flux in availability of tickets, TKTS discontinued providing
p fj Theatre Development Fund, Annual Reports, 1978-79, 79-80, 80-81. 17 telephone information on specific ticket discounts, and instead provided a general information message. A second board was added to the board where available tickets were posted and both were raised in height for better viewing,
A map illustrating theatre locations was printed and distributed at the booth for the convenience of patrons.
Noting the sharp oscillation in demand for tickets relative to the popularity of a show and the day of performance, TDF analyzed ways of varying the fifty percent flat reduction in ticket prices to reflect free market competition. However, none were found to be sufficiently 21 cost-effective to be instituted,
TDF investigated the possibility of opening a branch
TKTS booth to alleviate the problem of long lines and high volume at the main booth. In 1974, TDF opened a branch discount booth in New York’s financial district. This Lower
Manhattan booth operates in the same manner as its progenitor, with minor schedule modifications. A third booth is opening in Brooklyn in the late fall of 1982 or early spring of 1983.
Since the discount ticket operations opened in 1973, the booths have been increasingly successful in selling
21 Theatre Development Fund, "Last Minute Discount of Unsold Tickets." 18 tickets, generating revenues to theatres, and expanding audiences. From 1973 to 1981, the TKTS booths have sold over 8,300,000 tickets, netting $51,800,000 to the theatres 22 and over $1,680,000 to TDF. Compared to 450,000 tickets and $2,000,000 gross box office receipts in the 1973-74 season, ticket sales for the 1980-81 season approached
1,700,000, with returns of $18,400,000 to participating theatres. Revenues from the TKTS centers accounted for eighty-six percent of all income generated by TDF programs, or thirty-two percent of total income, earned and unearned 24 combined, during the latest season,
TKTS has been so successful that many other organiza tions have taken the concept of discount ticketing and created a system suitable to the needs of their cultural community. The first city to open a marketing facility based on TKTS was Boston, Massachusetts.
^^Theatre Development Fund, Annual Report, 1980-81.
23ibid. 24ibid. CHAPTER II
BOSTIX
Arts Boston
In August of 1979, Bostix, the second discount ticket booth/marketing facility, opened in Boston under the auspices of Arts Boston, Inc. Established in 1975 with the guidance of TDF, Arts Boston is a nonprofit audience develop ment organization created to serve the needs of the cultural community of Greater Boston by expanding the audiences of theatres, museums, and historic sites, and to increase the 9 c frequency of attendance of arts patrons.
Since its inception. Arts Boston's programs have changed to better meet the needs of the cultural community.
Initially, Arts Boston operated a Performing Art Voucher program similar to TDF's voucher program. Subsidized sets of vouchers were available to persons on Arts Boston's mailing list and redeemed by the participants. Reimburse ments to member groups averaged about $45,000 annually from
25 Arts Boston, Inc., Reports 1977-82.
19 20 2 g from 1976-77 to 1980-81. Over the years, Arts Boston developed a mailing list of 12,00 0 patrons who were interested in attending performances but could not afford expensive tickets. 2 7
As mailing costs increased. Arts Boston searched for a mailing program which would more efficiently cover the costs of helping people attend performances. With the guidance of TDF, Arts Boston replaced the voucher program with the Arts/Mail package, a program similar to TDF's Non-
Subsidy program. By offering tickets for theatre, music, and dance performances in advance at a substantial discount to persons on Arts Boston's mailing lists, Arts/Mail fills seats that otherwise would go empty. The program also has served to build audience support during previews, to bring in new audiences, and to fill seats for slow selling performance dates and in less desirable seat locations.
Arts Boston set up a pricing schedule which makes the program self-sustaining. Tickets which regularly sell for $15,00 are priced at $6.50 for Arts/Mail patrons. Arts Boston deducts a commission fee of $1.50, thereby returning $5.00 to the participating organization. The commission covers the operating expenses of the program. The first three mailings averaged a fifty-three percent response and paid
ZGibid. ^"^Ibid. 21 for most of the operating expenses. During its first year,
Arts/Mail returned a total of $56,600 to participating 2 R groups.
Another program, Arts/List, was established in the winter of the 1981-82 season to make mailing operations of member organizations more efficient. Arts/List offers discount; computer services to approximately forty non profit member g r o u p s .^9 The program allows participants to maintain and to exchange lists.
Arts Boston also sponsors seminars in audience develop ment and promotional techniques through its Consulting and
Promotional Assistance program. Initiated in March, 1980, the program helps member organizations increase the effectiveness of their promotional programs.
Planning
In spite of the successes of these programs, persons in Boston's arts community became increasingly aware of the need for a system to coordinate audience development activities. It was simply a matter of time before a study would be undertaken to assess the needs of the cultural community. In 1977 planning. Arts Boston contracted TDF to undertake a study to determine the feasibility of establishing a half-price ticket booth or a centralized box office/
28ibid. 29lbid. 22 information center.During April and May of 1977, TDF and
Arts Boston conducted twenty-four interviews with repre sentatives from Boston's four commercial theatres, a number of nonprofit performing arts organizations and other interested organizations.^^
Most of the representatives interviewed were very responsive to the idea of a collective marketing program and emphasized two related concerns: increased visibility and greater audience development. Increased visibility would lead to increased ticket sales and a broadened audience.
All but a few major performing arts institutions found it difficult to reach particular audience segments.
The TDF survey, based on information covering the
1976-77 season, found that the performance patterns among arts organizations in Boston were unpredictable and unstable,
The schedules of many commercial houses which presented national touring shows or pre-Broadway tryouts were erratic.
Nonprofit groups generally operated for a ten-month season.
Performing arts activity for these groups was very slow during the months of July and August, Unless a commercial
^^Theatre Development Fund, "The Feasibility of a Half- Price or Other Central Ticket Marketing Outlet for the Performing Arts in Boston" (New York: Theatre Development Fund, September, 1977) .
^^Ibid. 23 production was extended, these houses were also dark in the summer.
The survey's findings revealed that during the twelve month period, there were 1.85 million available tickets for performing arts events. Over one-half of this total, or
996,500 tickets, were for performances given by the commercial theatres. The remaining 861,000 tickets were for the produc tions of thirteen nonprofit organizations. Of the total
1.8 5 million available tickets, 476,000 went unsold. Nearly two-thirds of the unused tickets were for performances in 32 the commercial theatres. The evidence suggested that the supply and regularity of available tickets was too uncertain to sustain a ticket booth dealing only in half-price tickets.
In addition, the volume of tickets available for half-price sale would not generate enough income to cover the operating costs of a discount booth. (TDF always recommends that the booths be opened only if they can generate enough income to cover operating costs after an initial period of one year.)
Arts Boston relied on the cooperation of the com mercial community to make Bostix a success. The owners of a nearby building had to be assured that crowds of patrons could be controlled. In addition, there were financial obstacles which had to be overcome. Construction costs
^^Ibid. 24 of the ticket kiosk had increased during the planning period and more money had to be raised to completely finance the 33 project. These issues were resolved and in August, 1979,
Bostix opened for business.
Description
Bostix is a creative adaptation of TKTS. It is the first attempt to combine a half-price ticket booth, advance sales for nonprofit groups and information services under a single marketing project. To generate enough revenues to be self-sustaining, the scope and variety of Bostix's offerings had to be expanded since there was not enough theatre or performing arts activity in Boston to support a system identical to New York.
Although both TKTS and Bostix sell half-price tickets, there are substantial differences between the two operations
While TKTS sells half-price tickets only to events of a theatrical nature— for example, Broadway and Off-Broadway—
Bostix sells half-price tickets to events covering all the arts; half-price tickets at four commercial theatres; half- price tickets and full-price advance tickets for nonprofit community theatre; admissions to concerts, opera, dance, tourist attractions and historic sites; and discount coupon
3 3 Interview with Larry Murray, Executive Director, Arts Boston, Inc., September 28, 1982. 25 packets to museums. Also through Bostix, performing groups can sell subscription series prior to opening night. In addition, Bostix operates as an information booth at which participating groups are encouraged to supply their promo tional literature. Advertising space is also available. As a combined box office/information center, Bostix is truly a collective marketing facility.
Bostix is located in historic Fanueil Hall, one of the country's most successful urban redevelopment projects.
Although outdoor advertising is not permitted on this historic site, Bostix is exempted from the regulation and remains the only place in Fanueil Hall at which advertising can be posted. This factor is very significant since the location has a potential market of 20,000 to 30,000 visitors daily.
The box office at Bostix operates similarly to those at the TKTS booths. Half-price/day of performance tickets and advance full-price tickets are listed daily on a menu board. Patrons must purchase tickets in person, first-come,
first-serve, on a cash-basis-only for the half-price tickets,
cash basis or by in-state check for advance tickets. Service charges for tickets are as follows: for half-price, a $0.50
fee for tickets with a face value under $10,00; $1.00 with
a value of $10.00 to $17,49; $1.50 with a value of $17.50 26 to $24.99; and $2.00 with a value of $25.00 or more. Other charges include $0.25 on advance performance tickets and attractions tickets to museums and historic sites. There is no fee imposed on subscription sales. Bostix is open seven days a week, Monday through Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. and on Sunday from noon to 6:00 p.m.
Impact on Cultural Organizations
After twelve months of operation, Bostix sold 55,24 2 tickets, contributed nearly $335,000 to participating 34 organizations and over $42,000 to Arts Boston. The deficit from the total operation of the facility was only $50 0 because 35 projected ticket sales exceeded actual sales by $20,000.
After the initial year of operation, Bostix became self- supporting and business has been increasingly better every year.^^ By the 1981-82 season, sales from Bostix showed a healthy increase over projections. The kiosk generated over
100,000 admissions, returning $760,000 to participants and
$91,000 to Arts Boston from service charges. Advertising fees yielded $37,000. In total, revenues from the facility were approximately $130,000, expenses incurred totalled
$75,000, resulting in a profit of $55,000,^^
^^Ibid, ^^Ibid.
3Gibid. ^^Ibid, 27
Problems and Modifications
Bostix proved to be so successful that its Executive
Director, Larry Murray, has recommended that few changes take 3 0 place. In 1981, the service charge for discount tickets increased from $0.50 for tickets with an original face value of less than $10.00 and a $1.00 fee for tickets with a face value above $10.00 to a minimum fee of $1.00 and a maximum fee of $2.00. The offerings included in the discount packet continually change to meet market demands. Arts Boston hopes to place greater emphasis on promoting the facility and its participants, and is also considering expanding Boxtix by building another facility. In the meantime, the market for
Bostix is larger than the product can bear but until the economy improves significantly, Arts Boston will delay expansion plans.
The establishment of Bostix, a combined marketing facility, has benefitted not only the city of Boston, but also the performing arts industry in general. After much hard work and many ticket sales, Bostix has become a secure and successful institution, serving the needs of the cultural community of Boston and as an example for organizations in other cities to emulate.
^®Ibid. 39lbid. CHAPTER III
TICKETPLACE
Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington
The third reduced ticket booth, TiCKETplace, was opened by the Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington. Founded in
1978, the Cultural Alliance is a service organization for over 250 local arts groups and 550 individual artists.
Activists in the area's cultural community established the
Cultural Alliance for the express purpose of developing communications and instituting services for its members, and advocating the collective interests of the Washington, D.C. arts community.
The Cultural Alliance’s first project was devoted to developing a communications network among its membership.
In September of 19.78, the Cultural Alliance began publishing a monthly newspaper informing members of educational activities and pertinent issues. To further an open exchange of information, the Cultural Alliance began holding membership meetings in 197 9 during which common concerns and problems could be discussed. Informal discussions were
28 29 augmented by lectures and presentations by leaders from the private sector, labor and the government, as well as representatives of the arts community.
To avoid duplicate scheduling of events, the Cultural
Alliance maintains an in-house telephone service called Arts
Clearinghouse of Events. On Stage, a monthly guide to performing arts events in the metropolitan area, provides
free publicity for events sponsored by Alliance members.
Since 1979, institutional services include three
insurance plans and a discount purchasing system for office and art supplies. This division also offers a cooperative computerized mailing service and other discounted services.
In 1979, the Cultural Alliance implemented new services to assist members in developing programs and in sharpening their business skills. The Technical Assistance and Referral program offers information in the areas of arts administra
tion, grantsmanship, and marketing and program development.
The Cultural Alliance also offers workshops and seminars to
explore pertinent topics such as fundraising, marketing
and advertising, legal issues, and cable television.
The Advocacy Committee, established in 1978, develops ways of supporting the interests of Washington's arts community and of the nonprofit sector in general. The
committee's major accomplishment was development of the 30
"Guide to the Lively Arts" in the Washington Post and the
"Curtain Call" in the now disbanded Washington Star. The
"Guide" lists performing arts events daily.
Planning
In the winter of 1979, Peter Jablow, the Executive
Director of the Cultural Alliance, proposed the idea of a half-price ticket booth to the organization's Board of
Directors. Although the Cultural Alliance had already established a number of programs serving the needs of the cultural community in Washington, D.C., there were still some unresolved issues, the most important of which were the needs for increased visibility and audience development.
There were a number of unsold seats for many performances; at the time that TiCKETplace opened, there was no central box office selling tickets to performing arts events; small performing arts groups could not afford to set up their own box offices; performing arts organizations located outside of downtown Washington, D.C, had no means for reaching the downtown audience; and there was no means to encourage audiences to try new art forms. The half-price ticket booth could offer a solution to these problems.
The next winter, the Board of Directors formulated a
Task Force to study Jablow*s proposal. The deliberations of the Task Force led to commissioning TDF to undertake a 31 planning study to determine the feasibility of establishing a central box office and a Performing Arts Voucher program.
To assess the need for these programs, questionnaires were
sent to visual and performing arts groups in the metro politan Washington area during the 1979-80 season. Most of the individuals surveyed expressed interest in participating
in the central box office project, voucher program, or both.
Several respondents from smaller groups thought that the primary need for the community was to create greater public awareness of the entire spectrum of performing arts offerings in Washington, D.C. Group representatives also
expressed interest in expanding their audiences to include more students, minorities, and young professionals.
The TDF study indicated that a total of 4,250,000
tickets were available for sale during the 1979-80 season.
Of that amount, nearly 1,164,000 tickets, approximately
twenty-seven percent, were unsold. A sample of weekly
ticket availability in April and July showed that although
the average number of daily performances was greater in
April (twenty-two versus seventeen), the average number
of unsold tickets was greater in July (4,26 0 versus 4,191).
40 Theatre Development Fund, "A Strategic Plan for a Central Ticket Marketing Outlet for the Performing Arts in Metropolitan Washington, D.C." (New York: Theatre Develop ment Fund, 1980). 32
The summer festivals made up for the lack of theatre activity during June, July and August because they had a larger audience capacity. As a result, there was a greater 41 supply of unsold tickets.
The findings of the study indicated that a central box office would be very helpful to the health of the performing arts industry in Washington, D.C. Because of the substantial number of unsold tickets and the consistency of supply of tickets, TDF recommended that the Cultural
Alliance consider the project a top priority. In time, the income generated from the central box office could then be channelled into other audience development programs which 42 would not be self-sustaining, such as the voucher program.
TDF recommended that the central box office sell both discount and full-price tickets. The majority of performing arts groups would benefit from extending the service to include full-price sales. Many of the smaller groups are widely dispersed geographically and a full service box office would facilitate regular ticket sales. Larger organizations, with higher priced tickets, would also benefit from the booth as they would be able to sell their unsold seats at half the regular price. The cooperation of both small and large groups was deemed necessary for the
^^Ibid. Ibid. 33 success of the booth because the larger groups would draw potential patrons to the booth who would then be more inclined to purchase tickets for performances of the smaller groups.TDF emphasized that the participation of the
Kennedy Center, the single largest multi-arts facility in
Washington, D.C., was crucial to the success of the central box office. Not only was the Kennedy Center the largest source of unsold tickets, but its prestige was an attractive drawing card to potential patrons. In the 1979-80 season, the total number of available tickets at the Kennedy Center,
1,600,000, was nearly twice as many as the next highest total of available tickets. The number of Kennedy Center unsold tickets represented almost fifteen percent of unsold tickets among all D.C. performing arts organizations for the 1979-8 0 season. 44
Finding a location for the booth posed a problem.
Unlike TKTS's close proximity to the Theatre District in New
York, the central box office in Washington would be geographically removed from most of the performing arts activity. Performing arts activity in Washington is widely dispersed throughout the city itself and the nearby suburban communities in Maryland and Virginia. Performing arts groups based in the suburbs expressed concern over the
^^ibid. ^'^Ibid, 34
distance involved in travelling between their organizations
and the booth. Some group representatives suggested that
a "triangle" approach be implemented, whereby three booths were set up, one downtown and two in the suburbs. Repre
sentatives from most of the organizations suggested that
the booth be located near their particular performance space, which was, of course, impossible. They all agreed, however,
that the location of the booth be attractive to a diverse
audience, and accessible by public transportation and by car.45
Although no location was considered ideal, TDF
recommended choosing Farragut Square as the primary site.
In Farragut Square, there is heavy pedestrian traffic,
accessibility to subways and buses, and the age, education,
and level of income of those persons frequenting the area
are similar to patrons of TKTS and Bostix. However,
Farragut Square, situated in the heart of the white-collar
working district, has pedestrian traffic only five days per week. Because the site would not attract all of the desired
audience segments, the costs of reaching other markets would 46 increase. Later, when TDF learned that the transit stop
adjacent to the Square closed on the weekends, the location
was changed to F Street between 12th and 13th Streets, N.M.
45ibid. 35
The F Street location was chosen because of its central location, proximity to public transportation, accessibility to a diverse public, and high pedestrian traffic six days . 47 a week.
TDF proposed a preliminary budget of $235,000 which would cover planning and development costs, start-up and 4 8 construction costs, and the first year's operating costs.
As with TKTS and Bostix, the income from grants would cover the costs of establishing TiCKETplace. The operating income would be derived from service fee charges. Additional revenues could be generated from soliciting advertising at the facility. Final recommendations from TDF emphasized that surveys of the booth should be conducted periodically 49 to evaluate the program's effectiveness.
Soon after TDF submitted its final report to the
Cultural Alliance in September, 1980, the Board of Directors voted to undertake the project. In the winter of 1980, the
Cultural Alliance announced the details of the project and began to raise the necessary funds. After the first year of operation, the Cultural Alliance expected the box office to be self-sustaining.^^ Funding efforts proved successful enough to proceed with plans for opening the booth.
47lbid. 48ibid.
^^Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, Internal Memoranda. 36
Description
In November, 1981, TiCKETplace opened. Modelled after TKTS and Bostix, TiCKETplace is a half-price ticket booth/central box office, located in downtown Washington,
D.C. Like its progenitors, TiCKETplace was established to raise additional revenues for performing arts organizations by developing new audiences and by selling seats that would otherwise go unsold. Tickets are sold for all types of performing arts events including theatre, dance, music, opera, and an occasional puppet show. Half-price tickets can be purchased on the day of performance on a first-come, first-serve basis for cash only. Full-price tickets can be purchased in advance by using cash or credit cards. A service charge of $0.50 per $10.00 face value is charged for half-price tickets. The service charge for full-price ticekts is $1.00 regardless of the ticket's face value.
Currently available performances are listed at the booth on a menu board. TiCKETplace is open on Monday from noon to
2:00 p.m., and Tuesday through Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to
5:30 p.m. Tickets for Sunday performances can be purchased at half-price on Saturday,
^^Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, Promotional Brochures, 37
Impact on Performing Arts Organizations
TiCKETplace opened with fifty performing arts organiza tions registered to participate. During the first week, 52 sales totalled 693 tickets and gross receipts were $5,300.
Nearly all of the tickets were for half-price seats. The most requests during this period were for "Evita," a
Broadway touring show, which did so well at its own box office that TiCKETplace did not receive any tickets to sell for it.
In the beginning when TiCKETplace had just opened, only a limited supply of tickets was available for choice major productions and were selling out very quickly.
According to two ticket seekers of that period, Mitchell
Alkoin and Paul Edelman, there were some "kinks" in the 53 ticket system. Patrons were enthusiastic about the concept, yet they were disenchanted with the offerings of events, "Something like this is good for plays that are doing poorly, not for hit shows," remarked Alkoin. Edelman did not purchase tickets but planned to try again "right when the booth opened in the morning."
The "kink" referred to by Alkoin and Edelman is
^^Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, "TiCKETplace Cumulative Sales Report," November, 1981.
^^Washington Post, November 23, 1981. 38 central to the concept of half-price ticket booths. Often patrons are enticed by a major production to visit the booth to purchase a ticket only to learn that tickets to that production are unavailable or sold out. Because the booth operates on a cash-only basis, patrons are inclined to substitute their first choice with another show since they have the cash and have planned for a special evening out.
The first survey of TiCKETplace patrons administered after the first week of operations confirmed this "substitution" 54 theory. Although most patrons were able to purchase tickets of their choice, only one who could not do so did not substitute another show. However, that one patron said that he planned to obtain tickets for that show of his choice from the theatre's box office. TiCKETplace's second survey reaffirmed this pattern,
Ticket sales through the end of the year increased weekly with the exception of a slight decline during the week of Thanksgiving, a time when many area residents go out of town. (Since, according to the first survey, over ninety percent of the tickets were being bought by area residents, their absence made a significant impact upon ticket sales.
^^cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, "Entrance and Exit Questionnaire," Winter, 1981.
55cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, "Entrance and Exit Questionnaire," Spring, 1982. 39
A similar situation occurred during the New Year holiday when sales declined approximately thirty percent from the previous w e e k .56) Overall, ticket sales have increased steadily through August 15, 1982. As of that date, a total of 52,613 tickets had been sold, the majority of which were half-price.
Gross receipts totalled nearly $559,695 of which $501,171 accrued to the participants and $58,524 to the Cultural 57 Alliance. The Cultural Alliance projected sales of 65,000 tickets, and gross receipts of $650,000 to $700,000 58 annually. As expected, TiCKETplace will probably incur an operating loss for the year 1981-82. According to estimates, it will take two full years of operation before the booth 59 begins to generate a profit.
Problems and Modifications
TiCKETplace has instituted only a few minor changes thus far, according to Peter Jablow.Noting that traffic in the area was very low after 5:30 p.m., TiCKETplace's closing hours were cut back from 7:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.,
Tuesday through Saturday. Monday operations remained from
55cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, "TiCKETplace Cumulative Sales Report," January, 1982.
5^Interview with Peter Jablow, Executive Director, Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, October 4, 1982.
5®ibid. ^^Ibid. ®°Ibid. 40 noon to 2:00 p.m. The list of participants has grown to include one dinner theatre and a night club. Jablow is optimistic that the booth will eventually capture the business of all the dinner theatres and clubs in town. The
Cultural Alliance is considering one major change, however: expanding the booth's services by building another facility in a shopping mall. Several representatives from local malls have approached the Cultural Alliance with offers.
The Cultural Alliance staff is writing guidelines which will detail the criteria employed to determine an appropriate new site.
The Cultural Alliance is no longer considering the implementation of a Voucher program because it is not in the position to assume the high costs involved. As the availability of grant money to Washington, D.C. is limited, the time and expertise of securing other funding would drain 61 the Cultural Alliance's resources.
Overall, the first year of operating TiCKETplace has been successful. Revenues from the ticket surcharges is slightly ahead of projections. Although revenue from 6 2 advertising fees is greatly behind projections, the total
G^Cultural Alliance of Greater Washington, Internal Memoranda, 1982.
®^Interview with Peter Jablow. 41 revenue from the operation of TiCKETplace is only slightly behind projections. Jablow is optimistic that total sales will continue and that fees from advertising will increase.
He is pleased with the status of TiCKETplace as a central box office and hopes that more groups will register as participants.^ ^
^ ^Ibid. CHAPTER IV
PLANS FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO
TICKET BOX OFFICE
The newest discount booth/marketing facility, the San
Francisco Ticket Box Office (STBS), opened in San Francisco,
California in the fall of 1982, under the sponsorship of the Performing Arts Services, Inc. (PASS). PASS is a nonprofit organization, founded in 1976 to increase ticket sales and expand audiences for performing arts companies in the San Francisco Bay Area. Programs of PASS have been modelled after TDF programs and adapted to meet the needs of the cultural community in San Francisco.
p a s s 's first undertaking was a voucher program. From
1977 to 1981, the voucher program generated 84,549 admissions and disbursed $211,373 in ticket subsidies to over 200 companies.In July of 1979, PASS began to diversify its audience development services, starting with a group sales program and direct mail discount ticketing program. Both
®^Performing Arts Society of San Francisco, Reports and Publications.
42 43 programs produced income for PASS and for participating groups.
In January of 1980, PASS commissioned TDF to undertake a study to determine the feasibility of establishing a central box office/information center facility. Drawing on data from the 1978-79 theatre season, TDF found that of the 3,600,000 available tickets, 982,000 went unsold.The four large commercial houses in San Francisco could not generate enough performing arts activity to support a facility selling only half-price tickets. The activity of the nonprofit groups varied little from month to month.
Although the majority of performing arts activity originated from the nonprofit organizations, nearly twenty-nine percent of the unsold tickets were to performances at commercial theatres. The commercial bookings of national touring shows, and an occasional Broadway show, did not interrupt the steady supply of unsold tickets throughout the season, as is normally the case. The number and supply of unsold tickets to all performances remained fairly constant throughout the year.
G^ibid.
^^Theatre Development Fund, "The Feasibility of a Central Ticket Marketing Outlet for the Performing Arts in the San Francisco Bay Area" (New York: Theatre Development Fund, October, 1980). G^ibid. 44
Most respondents to a TDF survey indicated an interest in selling both discount and full-price tickets. Many viewed the project as an ideal opportunity to attract new and diverse audience members. As in Washington, D.C., the performing arts activity in San Francisco is widely dispersed,
Some of the respondents expressed concern about the distance involved in travelling between the facility and their performance spaces.
In their study, completed in October, 1980, TDF recommended that PASS establish an outlet offering half- price/day of performance tickets; full-price, advance sales for companies without an established centralized means of selling tickets; and information services and advertising opportunities. The Board of Directors of PASS approved the project shortly thereafter. Located in downtown San
Francisco, STBS is expected to become the major audience development program of PASS, generating substantial revenues for participating organizations and eventually for PASS as well. CHAPTER V
PLANS TO ADAPT THE TIMES SQUARE
THEATRE CENTER
The discount booths/marketing facilities in Boston and
Washington, D.C., and the planned facility in San Francisco have adapted the New York model, TKTS, to suit the needs of their particular cultural communities. Since the degree and type of arts activity in each city vary, each of the . marketing facilities have been designed differently. By reviewing several of the planned marketing facilities in
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Denver, one can gain further insight into the process of tailoring a marketing program to the specific needs of a city. Discussion will briefly focus on discount booths in Chicago and London.
Pittsburgh
The findings of a TDF feasibility study conducted in
Pittsburgh illustrate this "matching" process very well.
The study was conducted for the Pennsylvania Allegheny
45 46
County Cultural Alliance (PACCA).®® In 1980, PACCA was formed by a group of arts activists. The organizational purposes were ill-defined but they knew they wanted the group to serve as some type of service organization. The group worked with the two hundred performing and visual arts organizations to determine ways in which PACCA would be useful to them. The organization decided that an audience development program would be most beneficial to the cultural community and so began reviewing programs of other arts alliances.
In 1981, PACCA commissioned TDF to conduct a study in
Pittsburgh to assess the needs of the cultural community.
The data revealed that of the twenty arts groups surveyed, most were performance-oriented, with audiences of over three million people annually.The study found that because there are few quality spaces for commercial productions,
Pittsburgh does not house Broadway tryouts, although touring shows are presented there. The study found that Pittsburgh does not have enough commercial theatre activity to warrant establishing a booth selling only discount tickets, despite the large number of arts offerings available and the large
^^Interview with Barbara Pekovic, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Allegheny County Cultural Alliance, September 8, 1982.
^^Ibid, 47 number of arts patrons. For this reason, TDF recommended that PACCA consider establishing a collective marketing facility which would combine both ticket sales and promotional activities.
Philadelphia
In 1982, representatives from the Greater Phila delphia Cultural Alliance (GPCA) contracted TDF to perform a study of the Philadelphia metropolitan area to assess 7 Û the need and impact of a collective marketing facility.
(Since its formation, GPCA has devised many collective audience development and promotional projects for its members.)
GPCA had originally approached TDF to discuss the possibility of sponsoring a Performing Arts Voucher program.
TDF advised against the proposal because there were not enough performances in Philadelphia to sustain the high costs involved in the program. However, GPCA remained interested in using TDF's services to develop a different type of program which would help the city's cultural organization achieve greater visibility, thereby increasing
their audiences.
As of this writing, TDF is engaged in interviewing
^^Greater Philadelphia Cultural Alliance, Internal Memorandum, June 28, 1982. 48 staff from the area's cultural institutions. Since GPCA is already committed to undertaking this project, the study will not focus on the project's feasibility, but rather the particular type of marketing facility which would best suit 71 the city's needs.
GPCA staff members expect the facility to open as a 72 "central box office/cultural information facility." As there are not enough performing arts events to sustain a facility dealing exclusively in ticket sales, the facility would probably sell subscriptions, advance, as well as half-price/day of performance tickets and full-price tickets.
GPCA hopes the facility will be regarded as a cultural center, providing information on museums and other cultural institutions, as well as performing arts museums. Since museums comprise a large part of GPCA's membership and the city's cultural institutions, GPCA might also sell museum coupons. Advertising space will be available at the outlet 73 as well.
^^"Half-Price Ticket Booth Here Studied," The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 16, 1982.
^^ibid.
7 Greater Philadelphia Cultural Alliance, Internal Memorandum, June 28, 1982. 49
Denver
The cultural situation in Denver presents some very interesting and unusual problems for that area's arts organizations. Under the auspices of The Denver Partner ship, Inc., TDF will soon begin a study of the area's cultural facilities to determine the feasibility of establishing a central box office.
The Denver Partnership is a nonprofit umbrella organi zation comprised of the Downtown Denver, Inc., an alliance of private sector business persons, and the Denver Civic
Ventures, Inc., a nonprofit public-sector group. A small percentage of Partnership members are cultural organizations.
Formed in 1981 to provide a framework for shaping the develop ment of downtown Denver, The Partnership is concerned with issues of housing, transportation, convention exhibition space, employment and neighborhood revitalization, as well as securing adequate performance spaces for performing and visual arts groups.
The Partnership recognizes that the arts can play an important role in vitalizing downtown Denver and, therefore, it contracted TDF to consider implementing a central box office. In conjunction with the development of a downtown mall, The Partnership is considering establishment of a ticket facility as a way to help maximize the use of downtown, 50
increase net revenues to participating groups, and increase 74 audiences.
The organization is interested in establishing a ticket booth selling discount and full-price tickets, according to 75 Karen Collins, a staff member at The Partnership. Several
theatres and a performing arts center provide most of the performing arts activity of Denver. Although touring road
shows from New York perform for Denver audiences, there is not enough performing arts activity to sustain a ticket booth serving Denver alone. The Partnership is exploring ways of promoting the arts, both visual and performing, on a
state-wide basis, by selling tickets for all of Colorado's
arts groups, including the state's large summer festivals in
Aspen and Boulder. Instituting a state-wide ticket service
has never been done before. (The results of TDF's study will not be available until the fall of 198 3.)
Chicago and London
Chicago and London, which currently offer discount
ticket outlets for theatrical performances, engaged in preliminary consultations with TDF staff, but did not
^^Interview with Karen Collins, Staff Member, Denver Partnership, Inc., September 10, 1982. 75lbid. 51
conduct any follow-up research on their projects. The booths in Chicago and London operate similarly to TKTS,
selling half-price tickets on the day of performance, on a
first-come/first-serve basis. Reports from the sponsoring arts organizations indicate that the booths have been very
successful.
Hot Tix, Chicago's half-price ticket booth, opened in
November of 1980, under the auspices of the League of
Chicago Theatres. From November, 198 0 through July, 1982,
Hot Tix was responsible for selling over 190,000 admissions and earning gross revenues of $1,700,000.^^ The League
disbursed $1,456,000 in revenues to participants and retained $276,000. In its first full year of operations
in 1981-82, the booth sold over 100,000 admissions and produced nearly $1,000,000 of gross income. Of the tickets
sold by Hot Tix, nearly seventy percent are to commercial productions, twenty-seven percent to nonprofit theatre 77 events and two percent to community theatre.
Although Hot Tix appears to be a financial success,
the League refused to acknowledge that fact publicly.
According to John Economis, a League employee, financial
^^League of Chicago Theatres, Reports, 1980-8 2. 77 Ibid. 52 78 information is "not available." As previously stated, only New York City and London have enough performing arts activity to sustain a facility selling only discount tickets.
Yet, Chicago appears to be succeeding very well. However, there is no statistical information to confirm this.
In December of 1980, the League of West End Theatres in London opened a half-price ticket booth in Leicester
Square. Many theatres previously faced difficulties in attracting large enough audiences to break even. As of this writing, the booth has been very successful in selling most 79 of the available discount tickets.
Each of these variations of the TDF model affirms the basic soundness of the approach to marketing cultural events,
As service organizations continue to develop and refine their marketing programs, the question will not be whether to institute marketing facilities, but how to do so.
78 Interview with John Economes, Director of Sales, Hot Tix, October 1, 1982. 79 Interview with Sheryl Eisenberg. CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This thesis has shown that the existence of discount ticket booths/marketing facilities in several major United
States cities and in London, England has helped performing arts organizations in these cities lessen the gap between
revenues and expenditures by increasing attendance. Although
increased attendance will not in and of itself remedy the
imbalanced cost/earnings ratio facing the performing arts
industry, a capacity audience is a goal worth striving for.
The concept of discount ticketing was first embodied
in TKTS. Both the TKTS booths in New York City and the one
in London sell only discount/day of performance seats to
events of a theatrical nature. New York and London alone
offer a large enough number of theatrical performances to 8 0 sustain this type of operation.
Facilities in other cities have had to adapt the New
York model to break even by expanding the types of organiza
tions eligible to participate. For example, Bostix, located
in Boston, Massachusetts, offers discount/day of performance
BOlbid.
53 54 tickets to performances in music, dance, and opera, as well as theatre. This same situation exists at the other discount
facilities in Washington, D.C. (TICKETplace), and in San
Francisco, California (STBS).
Other modifications of the New York model include selling discount tickets to museums and historic sites. In cities such as Boston, where museums and historic sites comprise a substantial amount of the city's cultural activities, the marketing facilities will sell tickets to events offered by these organizations. The facilities outside
New York and London also sell advance, full-price tickets and advertising space, and several of them also provide promotional literature on participating organizations.
The planned facility in Denver, Colorado may provide a creative solution for cities which do not have an adequate amount of cultural activities to sustain a facility. The planned facility in Denver will experiment selling discount
and full-price tickets to cultural events occurring
throughout the entire state of Colorado, where an adequate
amount of arts activity exists. If this marketing strategy
of selling tickets on a state-wide basis is successful in
Colorado, other states which have a similar situation will probably investigate the feasibility of implementing a
marketing facility. 55
It is likely that any future marketing facility will have to sell a combination of discount/day of performance tickets to a variety of cultural events, full-price advance tickets, advertising space, and provide promotional litera ture. In designing a marketing facility, several other factors should be considered: location of the facility, the logistics of the operation, and the extent and nature of cultural activity. The facility should be centrally located, highly trafficked, and accessible by public transportation and to a diverse public.
Another important factor is the way in which the facility is operated. Information on specific tickets should be posted only at the facility so that potential patrons are required to visit it. Once there, patrons should wait in line to purchase tickets, usually on a cash basis. If tickets to their first choice are unavailable, patrons are usually inclined to purchase tickets to a show they may not have planned to attend.
To insure a large enough supply of tickets, the Theatre
Development Fund recommends that cities house at least fifty
professional arts organizations selling tickets to events.
In addition, the supply of tickets must be relatively
constant throughout the entire year. Participating
organizations must include commercial companies whose 56 attractions draw patrons to visit the facility. The attractions of smaller, nonprofit groups do not usually possess drawing power. Yet, when tickets to commercial productions are unavailable or sold out, patrons often purchase tickets to performances by smaller groups.
Research has shown that in cities where organizations have implemented discount ticket booths/marketing facilities, the financial health of participating groups has improved.
Any city (and, perhaps, any state) offering a number of attractions, both performance- and visually-oriented, should consider studying the feasibility of implementing a marketing facility fashioned after TKTS. As performing arts organizations face increasing economic difficulties, it will be necessary for them to continue exploring and instituting new techniques and adapting old ones which have already proven successful. The TKTS model is one such technique. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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