TURKEY UPDATE
June 26, 2001
POLITICS UNDER THE SHADOW OF “THE THIRD WAVE”
On May 28, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit celebrated his 77th birthday, as well as the second anniversary of the formation of the three-party coalition government after the April 1999 general elections. In a long speech devoted to outlining the achievements of the government, Ecevit stressed that his Democratic Left Party (DLP) was working in full harmony with the National Action Party (NAP) and the Motherland Party (MP). Listening to Ecevit, one might have been forgiven for overlooking the reality that the country he leads is still reeling from the effects of two major financial crises his coalition stumbled into during the last eight months and that Turkey has been obliged to seek a massive new stand-by emergency aid package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
To be sure, the very durability of the coalition — it has been in office longer than any coalition in Turkish history — and its ability to manage numerous problems during the past two years are impressive. Its very cohesion, however, buttressed by the mantra of “stability,” has also unfortunately sheltered it from the need to undertake a major restructuring or reshuffle in response to its reverses, which would have almost certainly provoked resignations in most Western democracies. Moreover, with Turkey still under the political management of the team that dragged it into its current economic difficulties, domestic and foreign financial analysts, who welcomed the appointment of Minister of State for the Economy Kemal Dervis after the February crisis, are freely speculating about the likelihood of Turkey hitting an even more devastating “third wave,” possibly before the end of 2001. As Atilla Karaosmanoglu, who in similar fashion was himself brought as economy minister from the World Bank three decades ago, commented last week, the question constantly being asked of him was not whether the wave would come but when. Consequently, notwithstanding the apparently unshakable confidence of Ecevit and his coalition partners, it seems unwise to predict that the current coalition will be able to ride out the major challenges ahead or have cause to celebrate its third anniversary. Such prudence would seem all the more appropriate after the closure of the Islamist Virtue Party (VP) on June 22 by the Constitutional Court, which has added yet another major factor of instability into the equation.
GOVERNMENT BY DEFAULT
The current government’s virtual lock on power, which effectively impairs the ability of the Turkish political system as a whole to deal with its economic problems, is a direct product of the dynamics that have characterized Turkish politics during the past four years. The DLP-MP alliance, which is at the core of the current coalition, catapulted into office in the immediate aftermath of the virtual expulsion of the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and the True Path Party (TPP) government from power in June 1997 following military pressure. Ecevit and Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the MP, then displayed a remarkable degree of cooperation until the fall of the Yilmaz-led government over corruption allegations in November 1998. Following a brief interregnum of minority government by the DLP until the April 1999 elections, the two
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org politicians resumed their partnership in government, this time with Devlet Bahceli and his NAP as the third partner. With Bahceli demonstrating an unexpected and surprising flexibility as deputy prime minister to underline NAP moderation and pragmatism and to overcome lingering suspicions relating to the party’s earlier ultranationalist activism, Ecevit, Bahceli and, Yilmaz — also a deputy prime minister — have been able to systematically eradicate intra-coalition glitches through regular “leaders’ summits,” invariably also attended by Ecevit’s eminence grise in the DLP, the third deputy prime minister, Husamettin Ozkan.
The three leaders, who enjoy a comfortable majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), have benefited enormously from the absence of a politically feasible alternative government. The larger of the two other parties represented in the TGNA, the VP, the virtual successor to the banned WP, had been frozen into virtual inaction as it awaited the verdict of the Constitutional Court, which finally decided on its closure like its three direct predecessors, while so-called reformists and traditionalists in the party jockeyed for advantage. The other opposition party, the TPP, headed by former prime minister, Tansu Ciller, has also been unable to take advantage of the difficulties faced by the government and, like the VP, was virtually ostracized by the three coalition partners. With the only other major nationwide Turkish political party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), shut out of the TGNA as a result of its failure to exceed the 10 percent national threshold in the last elections, Turkey has essentially been living through government by default.
In addition to its virtual immunity from serious challenge from the opposition in the TGNA, the coalition has also taken full advantage of the virtual dictatorship of the party leaders in the Turkish political system. The members of the TGNA owe their positions to the leaders who chose to include them in their electoral slates, and, their loyalty, combined with legitimate fears of exclusion in the next elections, have permitted the three coalition leaders to squash the slightest insubordination within their parties. Ecevit’s apparent unwillingness to tolerate a speech at the DLP Congress in April by long-shot challenger Sema Piskinsut, was matched by Bahceli’s rationalization of strong-arm tactics by fellow NAP parliamentarians against one of his ministers, Sadi Somuncuoglu, during the run up to the election of a new president last year and by Yilmaz’s recent move against Interior Minister Sadettin Tantan, who resigned from the MP following the abrupt removal of his portfolio.
Despite these advantages, however, the coalition could not have sustained itself in office so easily without the support of the mass media, which has been fully cooperative in controlling the political agenda. The mass media groups, which have extended their influence from newspapers into TV with the blessing of Ankara, not only have given full backing to the policies of the government and, as much as possible, to cushion the political effects of the crises, but have also gone so far as to undermine the credibility of the politicians — and even maverick journalists — who have attempted to challenge the coalition leaders or their policies. Needless to say, the media moguls have extensive business interests, which are directly or indirectly tied to the actions of the government. These were revealed once again following the collapse of Etibank, which had been acquired by the smaller of the two mass media groups, Medya Holding, during Yilmaz’s tenure as premier, as well as by the government-sponsored media bill recently vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.
In fact, it could legitimately be argued that the entire Turkish business community is constrained in its relationship with the government by the understandable need to maintain good relations with the Turkish politicians who happen to be in power. After all, despite the much-ballyhooed privatization during the past two decades, the government in Ankara still controls around half of the Turkish economy and, among other tools of persuasion, retains the power to disburse tenders to favored bidders. It is noteworthy that while the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), the most powerful of the Turkish business organizations, has recently been critical of the government’s economic performance, the previous
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org head of TUSIAD, Erkut Yucaoglu, was praising the government for providing stability and enabling businessmen to plan for the decade ahead just before the November 2000 crisis.
DERVIS “THE SAVIOR”?
In spite of its virtually unchallengeable position, the coalition was nevertheless forced to make one major adjustment during its term in office. After the February crisis, Ecevit persuaded his skeptical coalition partners that the appointment of an “outsider” — Dervis — was necessary to try to restore the confidence of the international financial community in the Turkish economy. In other words, Dervis had to be brought in to obtain desperately needed financial assistance, which would otherwise be denied to the government, thus threatening its continuation in office.
Ecevit’s gambit has been partially vindicated, as, on his third return to Washington after his appointment in early March, Dervis was able to announce a new aid package on April 27. The IMF and the World Bank, where Dervis had been a vice president until Ecevit asked him to join the government, promptly gave Dervis’s new economic program their public approval and, on May 15, the IMF board duly approved the additional aid package, raising assistance to Turkey to $19 billion. The news immediately buoyed the Turkish stock market and currency, which had been in the doldrums since the February crisis, and despite subsequent ups and downs, the stock market has remained above the psychologically important 10,000 mark while the dollar/lira ratio has, until recently, stabilized just above the 1 million rate.
The ultimate future of the economic program remains in doubt, however, mostly because of political concerns. Having been “burnt” by 17 previous failed stand-by agreements with Turkey during the past four decades, IMF Managing Director, Horst Koehler, is understandably cautious. “There is a good chance that this government will get out of the mess,” he commented at the conclusion of the agreement, but there was “no absolute certainty.” The Bush administration, which pressured the IMF to demand that Turkey enact a series of economic reforms prior to the new loan package, has been equally wary. Having charted a course between the need to support Turkey as an important ally and its new policy of avoiding automatic disbursement of funds in every financial crisis, the administration’s point man, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, told the New York Times on the very day Dervis announced the package that Turkey would not receive any more international assistance if the latest economic overhaul plan failed. Confirming that the United States had rejected the idea of direct bilateral aid to Turkey, the article said that O’Neill had warned Dervis that he should “design the nation's economic program carefully because the international safety net would be withdrawn after this round of aid” and that the United States had “made clear that it’s three strikes and you’re out.”
Given the “tough love” realities he encountered back in Washington and the incompetence, mismanagement, and alleged corruption of the political team he joined in Ankara, Dervis has a very difficult task. Although he was successful in the first stage of his declared recovery program — getting IMF aid — Dervis revealed in June that it was far from a sure thing and that back in March he had even been forced to consider the previously unthinkable possibility of a default on Turkish debt repayments. As Dervis also confirmed, he had a series of problems with other ministers before getting approval for the legislative measures necessary for securing the aid, and on a number of occasions he was reported to have raised the possibility of resignation.
Dubbed by Ankara political pundits as the “fourth member of the coalition,” Dervis, the only independent member of the government, is in a kind of “no man’s land” between the political methods and practices of the coalition, which led Turkey into its current economic cul-de-sac, and the fiscal priorities of the
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org international financial community. As the comments of the head of the IMF team that visited Ankara in early June to evaluate the government 's performance after the disbursement of the first aid tranche confirmed, there is lingering skepticism on the part of the international financial community about the coalition’s wholehearted support for the new program and the implementation of the reform measures it had to undertake. There are also concerns about the possibility of populist and “crony capitalist” deviations. After all, as one unnamed financial observer commented, “it would be naive to expect the same people who caused the crisis to fix it.”
Although the long-anticipated partial domestic debt swap in mid-June was relatively successful, Turkey’s economic problems are still daunting. Turkey’s total external and domestic debt is currently around $190 billion, a figure that exceeds its gross national product (GNP) of $170 billion. More significantly, the Turkish treasury has to service an external debt of $11.7 billion and domestic debt of $67 billion before the end of 2001. Even with the IMF credits, Treasury Undersecretary Faik Oztrak said that Turkey still had to raise $51 billion from the domestic market in order to roll over the debt. As Turkey's former ambassador to Washington, Sukru Elekdag, wrote recently, Turkey is unable to pay even the interest of its domestic debt with the currently projected taxes. Consequently, while Dervis had previously reassured the Turkish public that there would be no additional taxes because of the crisis, as the government’s announcement of supplementary duties on June 25 showed, he has no alternative.
THE COLLAPSING “REAL ECONOMY” AND GROWING DISCONTENT
The quandary for Dervis and his Treasury team is that even as they grapple with the grave fiscal problems, Turkey is inevitably enduring equally serious problems in its “real economy and it will be difficult to raise the necessary domestic funds. A recent survey by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) revealed that 80 percent of its member companies reported that things are worse than last year, 56.9 percent reported that they have reduced their workforce, and more than 70 percent said they could not obtain bank loans. At the same time, 39 percent reported that they did not really understand the merits of the economic program and 48 percent did not expect the program to improve their performance. The National Statistics Institute reported that 358,000 people lost their jobs in the first quarter of the year, pushing the official unemployment rate to 8.6 percent, although the real rate of unemployment and the statistically unverifiable rate of underemployment are certainly much higher. Istanbul Chamber of Industry Chairman Husamettin Kavi gave voice to the almost universal dissatisfaction in the business community when he charged on June 20 that the government had simply “not taken any measures regarding the real sector.”
Not surprisingly, the combination of economic difficulties and political stagnation has produced unprecedented public alienation. A Strateji Mori poll commissioned by CNN Turk reported in May that only 28 percent thought economic conditions would improve during the coming year, while 74 percent of respondents worried about becoming unemployed or their businesses failing. Only 34.3 percent felt that the government could deal with the economic crisis. According to the poll, a mere 1 percent considered the government “very successful” and 5.5 percent “successful,” while 20.2 percent considered it “unsuccessful” and 54 percent “very unsuccessful.”
Ecevit had a personal approval of only 9.7 percent compared to 84.7 percent for President Sezer, with whom Ecevit argued on the issue of corruption at the National Security Council (NSC) meeting in February, thus provoking the second financial crisis. At the same time, another poll, by the Social Research Center of Ankara (ANAR), revealed that if elections were held today, NAP would receive 5.5 percent, MP 4.3 percent, and the DLP only 3.6 percent. Elections do not seem to be on the immediate horizon, however,
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org and Turkish voters have to endure a political leadership that has demonstrated its inability to manage the economy with success and transparency, and that knows it is unlikely to repeat earlier electoral performances and therefore has every incentive for taking advantage of the current political impasse to stay in office, with all the accompanying advantages to themselves and their followers and associates, for as long as possible. It is fortunate for the government that the traditional stoicism of the Turkish people has kept them from taking to the streets more often to demonstrate their justifiable anger over the erosion of their living standards and the government’s seeming indifference.
STALLING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE?
The public alienation is closely tied to the issue of corruption, which has long bedeviled Turkish politics and the economy. The Strateji Mori poll revealed that only 32.1 percent believed the assertions of the government that it would successfully combat graft. Operation White Energy, launched by the gendarmerie at the beginning of 2001, had revealed evidence of widespread corruption in the Energy Ministry and its affiliated institutions, which are under the control of the MP. The investigations eventually led to the resignation on April 27 of Energy Minister Cumhur Ersumer, a close associate of Yilmaz. As the operation expanded, Yilmaz responded by publicly attacking the gendarmerie — under the formal control of the Interior Ministry but in reality an integral part of the Turkish armed forces — for what he termed “Gestapo- style” tactics, as well as the chief investigating prosecutor of the operation, Talat Salk. At the same time, Yilmaz initiated an increasingly bitter campaign against Interior Minister Tantan, for supporting the investigations. Yilmaz’s rhetoric reached a climax soon after a gendarmerie raid on the offices of BOTAS, the Turkish state pipeline company, in search of documents relating to the controversial Blue Stream gas project, which Yilmaz has been promoting, and, soon after Tantan was replaced by Rustu Kazim Yucelen, a Yilmaz loyalist. The growing political controversy had reportedly prompted the transfer of Salk and the gendarmerie officers directly involved in the investigations a few days earlier. Predictably, the three coalition partners then closed ranks in the TGNA to reject the motion submitted by the VP to open a parliamentary corruption investigation of Ersumer.
Although the trial of a number of energy officials and businessmen charged with graft in state energy tenders has finally been opened and a separate investigation of Blue Stream has been launched — leading to a ban on foreign travel for Gokhan Yardim, the BOTAS general manager — it is not clear whether the corruption investigations will be allowed to continue unimpeded. With the removal of Tantan, who had become almost synonymous with the anticorruption drive and had consequently enjoyed a popular support denied to all other members of the cabinet, it is understandable that the sincerity of the current coalition on transparency is being questioned by the Turkish public, as well as by the international financial community, which has finally begun to focus on this issue as an essential component of Turkish economic recovery. It is also far from clear, however, whether the Turkish armed forces, which put the issue on the NSC agenda and pursued it through the gendarmerie, will ease their pressure for effective action on corruption. Showing his awareness of the role of crony capitalism in Turkey’s economic problems, the normally reticent Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu told journalists during a reception on April 23, “If the banks had not had their funds siphoned off, Turkey would not have been subject to this crisis.”
THE SHIFTING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: ECEVIT, DERVIS, AND BAHCELI
Sheltered by their impressive political cocoon, which has protected successive unsuccessful governments in Ankara, the coalition leaders appear impervious to criticism or the consequences of their actions. Appearances can be deceptive, however, and the need to implement the strict terms of the IMF accord, guarded by Dervis, combined with growing public dissatisfaction and discreet military pressure, is likely to
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org make it progressively more difficult for the current government to continue with “business as usual.” In fact, a number of possible developments seem certain to change the political landscape.
To begin with, there is the ever-present possibility that Ecevit might be unable to continue in office because of his advanced age and diminishing vigor. Such an event would have an immediate impact on the future of the coalition. Although Ecevit effectively quashed the widespread speculation on his future by seeking a new mandate at the DLP congress two months ago, and seems determined to carry on without focusing on his succession or the political prospects of his party after him, it is uncertain how long he will be able to do so.
Another possibility that has to be constantly borne in mind is that Dervis might resign, with immediate and incalculable repercussions for the future of the economic program. On May 15, for example, the Financial Times reported that Dervis was “adamant that he would quit at the first sign of any backtracking by the government” and quoted him saying, “I would resign. I would not stay.” The article said that the fact that Dervis had “nothing to lose, as he himself puts it, enables him to take risks that people who are desperate to keep their jobs cannot take.” It is important to note however, that Dervis feels a strong sense of personal loyalty to Ecevit and, despite his unwillingness to respond to Ecevit’s invitation to join the DLP, will surely think long and hard before resigning and responding to the siren call of his social democratic friends who would like him to take advantage of his current strong popular support by setting up a new party. Nevertheless, Dervis could well find his hand being forced by growing opposition within the coalition.
While Ecevit has been backing Dervis, despite the latter’s incongruous independent position in the coalition, in order to maintain international financial credibility and to continue to receive IMF funds, his coalition partners, who one would presume to be equally aware of the dangers of a break with Dervis, have not been as supportive. Yilmaz, who indicated some unhappiness with Dervis from the outset, was reported as saying on May 10 that if Dervis had been a member of the MP, he would “ask for his resignation.” While Yilmaz has since muted his criticism, perhaps out of concern for his close relationship with Ecevit, Bahceli and the NAP have been much more vocal. On June 12, for example, Communications and Transportation Minister Enis Oksuz, who was involved in a prolonged dispute with Dervis over the privatization of Turk Telekom, was quoted by Sabah as saying that while “certain circles” saw Dervis as a "savior" and a "guardian angel," he wanted to ask Dervis: “Who are you exactly? The Angel of Death or Gabriel?” Four days later, Ortadogu, the closest newspaper to NAP, reported Bahceli saying that “Dervis had done wrong and that Turkey would be in for trouble…He has disappointed me greatly. His image is good but there is no substance inside. He is acting according to directions given from abroad.” In fact, Bahceli’s attitude has been hardening against Dervis for some time. He told Hurriyet on May 19 that for the sake of his country he would “swallow Dervis even if he were poison.” A few days later, Radikal reported him saying that Dervis still had to prove that he was “a good technocrat” and that “if things continue like this, we will lose him and the program will suffer.” After a fight between the NAP Minister of Agriculture, Husnu Yusuf Gokalp, and Dervis over the price of wheat during a cabinet meeting on May 29, Milliyet quoted Bahceli as saying “the government cannot work if the IMF impositions take place on every issue” and reported his decision to seek the exclusion of Dervis from leaders’ meetings, which he had previously attended at the request of Ecevit.
The Bahceli-Dervis relationship is likely to become even more relevant if the NAP moves to become the leading party through parliamentary transfers. Throughout the first two years of the coalition, Bahceli was opposed to recruits from other parties that would increase the NAP representation beyond that of the DLP — its TGNA delegation is currently 126 compared to the DLP’s 132 — and thus raise the legitimate question of Bahceli claiming the premiership. His reluctance was clearly tied to his respect for the older
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org
Ecevit, as well as his desire to reciprocate the latter’s stated desire to move beyond the strife that had characterized relations between social democrats and ultranationalists, particularly in the 1970s. With Bahceli making it clear during the past few days, however, that the NAP would “welcome like-minded deputies from other parties,” it is possible that the NAP, while remaining committed to the protocol reserving the post of prime minister to the DLP, may soon be positioned to seek the leadership of the coalition. Given his cautious nature and his recent reference to the failure of Ciller to persuade then- president Suleyman Demirel to sanction her assumption of the post of prime minister from Erbakan in the waning days of the WP-TPP coalition in 1997, Bahceli will surely move with deliberation and avoid undermining his relationship with Ecevit. However, he is being pushed by developments within his coalition partner, MP, as well as by the closure of the VP.
YILMAZ CHALLENGED
Although Tantan’s enforced departure has given the appearance of strengthening Yilmaz in the short run, it may have actually further undermined his leadership of the MP. Yilmaz still has full control of the party apparatus, but with the Strateji Mori poll showing a personal approval rate of only 8.7 percent and a measly 4.3 percent vote for his party in elections, a sizable faction in the MP has apparently become convinced that a Yilmaz-led party is unlikely to retain parliamentary representation. The intraparty opposition has also been strengthened by the unpleasant recognition that the name of the MP has inevitably been associated with alleged corruption as a result of the recent ongoing investigations. It is significant that the Strateji Mori poll showed that despite the objections of Yilmaz, 64.5 percent of the interviewed group supported the gendarmerie-handling of the White Energy and Blue Stream probes into allegations of corruption in the energy sector.
On June 18, former finance minister Lutfullah Kayalar, who had voiced his concerns over the future of the MP at a CSIS Turkey Project meeting as far back as 1997, announced that he was finally challenging Yilmaz at the upcoming MP congress on August 4. Kayalar claimed in an interview with the Turkish Daily News on June 23 that the MP had “been getting further and further away from its unique identity, philosophy, vision, and mission” since 1991, when Yilmaz took over the leadership of the MP; that it had “cut off its ties to society” and that, having lost four elections during the past decade and with less than 10 percent of the vote, it was “on the road to extinction.” Expressing confidence in his ability to defeat Yilmaz, Kayalar also said that it was “wrong to remove” Tantan and his “first duty” as leader would be “to win back” Tantan and others who had left the MP.
Yilmaz has overseen the decline of the party he inherited while it was in sole control of government to its currently marginal electoral position, even as he has focused on retaining a diminishing role in government and a close relationship with the business community. In the process, however, the MP has strayed far from the inclusive pioneering spirit that the founder of the MP, the late Turgut Ozal, had carried to an overwhelming victory in the 1983 elections. Consequently, while his defeat would certainly initiate the unraveling of the political logjam, even if Yilmaz is able to maximize the advantages of party leadership to win, it is likely to be a pyrrhic victory that will lead to further defections from the MP — perhaps to the NAP — and bring into sharper focus the question of the MP’s continuation in office. After all, the DLP and the NAP could continue to govern in a two-party coalition with a few additional parliamentary recruits; and the NAP, which has long been publicly critical of the MP’s alleged connections with corruption and desirous of supplanting both the MP and TPP as it moved into the center right, may see Yilmaz’s difficulties as the ideal catalyst.
SQUABBLING OVER THE VP INHERITANCE
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org
All of these likely developments have been overshadowed by the decision of the Constitutional Court on June 22 to ban the VP on the grounds that it was “a focal point for antisecular activities” and to expel two VP deputies from the TGNA. The Constitutional Court issued its verdict after rejecting a last-minute petition by the VP to delay its decision in order to allow the TGNA to debate a proposal for constitutional amendment that would make it harder for courts to close down political parties and ignoring an appeal by Ecevit that postponement “would be advisable.”
The decision of the court avoided triggering by-elections within three months that would have been mandatory if more than 20 of the 102 VP deputies had been expelled. However, although immediate concern over elections and their feared disruptive effects has been averted, the verdict has nonetheless effectively transformed the remaining VP deputies into loose political cannons. While there is the theoretical possibility that they could remain independent, it is much more likely that they will opt to join two successor parties or existing parties and thus change the fragile political balance.
The former WP mayor of Istanbul, the charismatic and popular Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had previously announced his intention to form a new party comprising the reformist wing of VP, which includes Abdullah Gul, irrespective of the court verdict, although he is banned from political activities as a result of an earlier conviction for Islamist “incitement.” Members of the party’s traditionalist wing, loyal to Erbakan, who is also banned from politics, are also expected to form a new party. While most of the former VP deputies will almost certainly gravitate to these two groupings, the NAP, MP, and TPP have all expressed their willingness to welcome those among them who may have become exasperated with the continuing confrontation between political Islam and Turkish secularism.
The nervousness in the Turkish markets immediately prior to the VP verdict and the fall in the value of the lira underlined the recognition by investors of the increasing fragility of the Turkish political system. In fact, the international financial community and Turkey’s allies, headed by the United States, should be prepared for a period of further turbulence and unpredictability in Turkey’s politics — perhaps even in its foreign policy — parallel to its ongoing battle with the economic crisis. Continuing Turkish adherence to the strict conditions of the IMF accord was always going to be difficult because of the failed methods of the current political system, which are at the very root of Turkey’s financial predicament, and such instability will almost certainly hasten the arrival of the third wave with its incalculable consequences.
Bulent Aliriza Senior Associate Director, Turkey Project
Turkey Project • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3724 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org