1. ( S// NF) Personal Information : JDIMS/NDRC Referencename

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATES COMMAND HEADQUARTERS , JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION , GUANTANAMO BAY , CUBA APOAE09360

JTF- GTMO- CDR 26 December2008

MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN -001458DP( S)

JTF - GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information :

JDIMS/NDRC ReferenceName: Muhammad Binyam Current/ True Name and Aliases: Binyam Ahmad Muhammad, Talha al-Kini, Talhaal-Nigeri, Ben, Benjamin AhmadMuhammad, John Samuel Fouad Zouaoui, Muhammad al-Habashy, Nabil, Binyamin Zouioue Place of Birth: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (ET) Date of Birth: 24 July 1978 Citizenship: Ethiopia Internment Serial Number (ISN) : US9ET 001458DP

2. ( U //FOUO ) Health: Detainee is inoverall good health.

3. ( U ) JTF- GTMO Assessment :

a . ( S) Recommendation: JTF- GTMO recommendsthis detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control ( CD) . JTF- GTMO previously recommendeddetainee for CD on 17 November2007.

b . (S//NF) Executive Summary: Even ifreleased with rehabilitation, close supervision , and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law -abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee wouldprobably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF -GTMO, detainee has expressed his intentions of participating in hostilities against the US and its citizens ifreleased and in one instance physically assaulted an interrogator. Additionally, detainee has been uncooperative with

CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON : 12958, AS AMENDED , SECTION 1.4( C ) DECLASSIFY ON : 20331226

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN -001458DP ( S)

intelligence collection efforts since November2004. Detainee is an assessed member of al Qaida who acknowledgedhis involvementin terrorist plots designed to inflict mass casualties within the US. Detainee and his co -conspirator, Jose Padilla, aka (A Muhajir), ISNUSOUS-010008DP (US-10008), developed a planto explode a radiological bomb in the US, and presented this plan to senior al-Qaida members including MuhammadSalah al-Din Abd al-Halim Zaydan, aka Sayf al-Adil; Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar, ISN 010024DP (KU-10024); andZaynal Abidin MuhammadHusayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN -10016 (GZ- 10016), for approval and funding. Detainee was captured during his attempt to travel to the US. Detainee, who expressed a desire to become a martyr, received extensive terrorist training in Afghanistan (AF) at camps associatedwith al-Qaida andNorth African extremists, and traveledto Afghanistan for combat. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONABOUT THIS DETAINEEISAVAILABLEINAN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] -GTMO determined this detainee to be

A HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGHthreat from a detention perspective Of HIGHintelligencevalue

. (S ) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes inthis assessment will be annotated by to the footnote.)

UpdatedReasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMOsection Includedadditionalreportingof detainee'sinvolvementin a terrorist plot Includedadditionalreportinglinkingdetainee to GZ- 10016 Includedreportingindicatingdetainee'sintentionsofharmingUS citizens Includedreportingof detaineephysicallyassaultinganinterrogator Addednew detaineealiases: Nabil and BinyaminZouioue

4. ( U Detainee's Account of Events :

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account . These statements are included without consideration of veracity , accuracy , or reliability .

a. (S// NF) Prior History : In 1992 , detainee traveled to Maryland and New Jersey with his father to visit siblings . Detainee stayed in the US with relatives, but his father left the

1 6 034 0412 08 2 316-08240-07

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN 001458DP ( S)

country and subsequently returned to the US in 1994. Upon his father's return the two traveled to Chicago and Minneapolis to visit his father's associates. Detainee and his father then traveled to the United Kingdom (UK) in March 1994, where detainee obtained political asylum . attended college in the UK from 1995 through 2000 , receiving a Bachelor's of Science inMathematics, an advanced certificate in business and technology , and an electronic technician certificate. Also during this period, detainee attended the Baker Street Mosque in London, UK three to four times. detainee quit school , he joined the Jamaat Tablighi ( ), and served as a janitor at the Islamic Heritage Center Mosque, where he met Soufian Abar Huwary, aka ( Abd Rahim ), ISN -001016DP (AG- 1016, transferred ). this time period, detainee began abusing drugs, progressing from alcohol and hashish to cocaine , crack, and opiates including heroine. Detainee also watched extremist videos at his home with AG- 1016, Ranim , Yusef Jamaiki, aka ( Andrew Rowe, detained in England , and Yusef Hamadi. at the Islamic Heritage Center Mosque, detainee listened to Abu Qatada al-Masri speak about fighting in Indonesia.?

b . ( ) Recruitment and Travel: In May 2001, AG- 1016 informed detainee their associates were traveling to Afghanistan, and urged detainee to go with them . Detainee obtained a passport from his friend, Fouad Zouaoui. AG- 1016's associate, Amin Achimlal, aka (Amin) replaced Fouad's passport photo with detainee’s and provided a falsified visa for a three -month stay inPakistan (PK ). The following week detainee made separate travel arrangements and departed the UK alone, on approximately 25 May 2001. Detainee traveled to Islamabad, PK where he spoke with a Pakistani named Muhammad who informed detainee to meet him inPeshawar, PK. Muhammad worked for Jaffar al- Tayyar who was incharge of the Algerian Camp near Jalalabad, AF . Muhammad took detainee to the Algerian Guesthouse in Jalalabad where he met Jaffar and Muhib. Detainee surrendered his passport and money at the guesthouse and stayed only a few hours before proceeding to the camp .

3 001458 FM4024- SEP-2004, 001458FM4028- SEP-2004 4 AnalystNote: The BakerStreet Mosque aka (FourFeathersMosque), is home of the radicalimamAbuQatada and Abu Hamzaal- Masri imprisoned) . It servedas a recruitmentfacilityinthe UK. 5 Analyst Note: Al-Qaida has usedthe JT facilitateand fund the internationaltravels ofits members. The JT is a NationalIntelligencePriorityFramework(NIPF) Counter Terrorism(CT) Priority3 Terrorist SupportEntity (TSE) . Priority3 TSEs have demonstratedintent and willingnessto provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US personsor interest, or provide witting operationalsupportto 1-2 terrorist groups. For additionalinformationon the JT see: IIR2 227 0131 03 , Jamaat TablighProvidesCover 28-Dec- 2005, Special AnalysisUS JamaatTabligh, AFOSIReporton Jamaat Tabligh27-OCT-2004, Jamaat Al Tabligh(JT) Members- - 04-03-1083 10 -MAR-2004. 6 001458 FM40 28- SEP-2004, 001458 FM40 06-OCT-2004, 001458 FM40 30 -SEP-2004, FM40 05 -OCT 2004 , TD-314/ 05888-03 7 001458 FM40 06-OCT-2004 8 TD-314/ 05888-03 9001458 FM40 27-OCT-2004, IIR 6 034 0120 05

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN -001458DP ( S)

c. (S NF) Training and Activities: Jaffar instructed detainee to attend training at the al Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Camp near Kandahar, AF . Detainee traveled to the Algerian Guesthouse located in the Wazir Akbar Khan area, and later traveled with a group of about 40 others to a Kandahar guesthouse . visits to the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, detainee met Richard Colvin Reid, aka (Richard Reid) . About ten days later, detainee left with this group for al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee spent at least 40 days at the camp receiving training on small arms, topography, map reading, guerilla tactics, and basic explosives . At the al-Faruq Training Camp, detainee attended religious lectures given by Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, aka (Abu Hafs al-Mauritani), inwhich he urged the trainees to pledge bayat ( oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL) , an oath which detainee claims he did not give.

( S //NF) Upon completion oftraining, detainee returned to the Kandahar guesthouse and then traveled to Kabul, AF with a group of Moroccans. Detainee and the group then traveled to the Moroccan Tarik Training Camp at Bagram, AF where they trained inurban warfare and small arms. Detainee trained with Jamal who he identified as Richard Dean Belmar, ISN -000817DP (UK- 817, transferred ) Detainee then traveled to the front lines near Bagram , opposite the Northern Alliance , for 10 days . The group was recalled to Bagram, but detainee proceeded to Kabul for malaria treatment. During his travel to Kabul, the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred. From Kabul, detainee traveled again to the Algerian Camp in Jalalabad to retrieve his passport . From Jalalabad detainee returned to the Moroccan house in Kabul and traveled with a group of Moroccans to Logar, AF , where they occupied an Islamic school for about two weeks . Detainee then traveled back to the Tarik Training Camp in Bagram , staying less than a week before returning again to the Moroccan house in Kabul for one week. During his stay in Kabul, detainee met Richard Colvin Reid for a second time. Reid discussed an explosives training camp located about a quarter mile from the Tarik Camp in Bagram . Detainee and Reid decided to attend this training, where they received instructions on explosives, detonators, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Reid left the training early to perform an operation, which was likely the failed shoe bomb attack. Detainee completed training and returned to the Kabul Guesthouse for two days. At this time , the Northern Alliance attacked Kabul and the group fled to Logar and

10 Analyst Note: The WazirAkbarKhanarea was a diplomaticdistrictoccupiedby the Talibanand al-Qaida. The guesthouseinKandaharis assessedto be the HajjHabashGuesthouse. The HajjiHabashGuesthouseservedas an administrativein -processingfacility for trainees en routeto the al- Faruq Camp. The trainees surrenderedtheir passportsand valuables to the guesthouseadministratorfor safe keeping. The guesthousealso served as a waypoint for extremiststravelingto and fromPakistan, or betweeneast andwest Afghanistan. Itwas locatedacrossthe street fromthe IslamicInstituteoperatedby UBL’sreligiousadvisorMahfouzOuldal-Walid, 11 001458 FM4027- OCT-2004, 001458FM4027- JUL-2004, TD - 314/ 05888-03, IIR6 034 009405, IIR6 034 0120 05 AnalystNote: AbuHafs al-Mauritaniservedas UBL’sreligiousadvisorand was responsiblefor the administrationof the IslamicInstituteinKandahar. Foradditionalinformationreference: 000575 302 04- JUL-2002, 000575 SIR 07 -JUN -2004, IIR6 034 0173 02, TD-314/ 06291-02.

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN -001458DP ( S)

12 then Khowst, AF . raids on the city forced the group to flee to the nearby mountains where they remained for 10 days . From there, detainee volunteered to defend Kandahar, but was forced to withdraw from Kandahar after only two days. They then traveled to Zormat, AF where detainee met his original Moroccan group who along with other groups totaling about 300 were retreating from the area. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al- Baqi, aka (Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN 010026DP ( - 10026), informed the group they only needed 100 (made up of mostly al-Qaida members) to remain in Afghanistan, and the other 200 would proceed to Pakistan. Detainee volunteered to stay in Afghanistan with the al-Qaida group. In an effort to see if detainee was suitable for a mission, IZ- 10026 scrutinized detainee's passport and asked detainee about his training and education. IZ- 10026 then informed detainee his extremist group may have an upcoming mission for him to execute. Detainee's 13 group then traveled to Birmal, AF.

(S//NF) The group stayed at a guesthousein Birmalfor aboutone week. On approximately 12 January2002, detainee met GZ-10016 for the first time and againwith IZ- 10026. IZ 10026 informeddetainee of electronicstraining involvingremote controlledIEDsin Pakistan. The group relocatedto a nearbyIslamicschool where detainee met convicted terrorist and suspected bomb” co- conspirator US- 10008; GhassanAbdallahGhazi al Sharbi, ISN 000682DP (SA-682); and Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-Qahtani, 000696DP(SA- 696) . IZ-10026 chose detainee and these three to attend the electronics training inPakistan. They agreed they wouldreturn to AfghanistanandtrainAfghans to construct explosives devices or buildthe devices themselves and distribute them to the Afghans for future operations. GZ-10016 chose about 30 membersofthe groupto take with himto Pakistan, includingthe electronics trainees. FromBirmal, they traveled to Banu, PK and then to Lahore, PK. However, detainee and a Saudi stayed behindfor about five days before traveling to Lahore. Beforeleaving, a Pakistaniknown as Abd al-Razakvisited the two left behind and instructedthem in the creation of explosives and remote-controlled detonators. After arrivinginLahore, US-10008 told detaineehe was there for operations, and notjust training. Detaineealso learnedofplans to use an “ H -bomb frommaterials locatedon a computer at the house. - 10016 was intenton going forward with this attack. GZ-10016 discussedplans to use a gas tanker to cause an explosion, and cyanide to attack nightclubsin the US withdetainee and US-10008'sassistance. GZ-10016 informeddetainee he was better suited for “ foreign operations” andwas to conduct attacks on foreignground the US) insteadof returningto Afghanistan. After the training, detainee was sent to Karachi, PK to meet with KU- 10024. The plans for the operationwere sent to Karachi for

12 AnalystNote: Coalitionair strikeson Kabulbeganon 7 October2001. 13 001458FM4021-JUL-2004, 001458FM40 28-JUL-2004, TD-314/ 04594-04 14 AnalystNote: Abd al-Razakmay be identifiablewith Said BinBrahimBinUmranBakush, US9AG- 000685DP (AG-685) , due to his presenceat the Faisalabadsafehouse, prior ties to explosives training, and havinga similar alias.

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN 001458DP ( S)

review by al-Qaida explosives expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab al Masri) 15 Detainee and -10008 were separated from the other two individuals involved in the electronics course , then reunited three days later at another guesthouse. During their stay in Lahore, detainee and US-10008 downloaded information from the internet on creating an “ H -Bomb” and discussed the possibility of creating a weapon with GZ-10016. After a week , they relocated to a Faisalabad guesthouse where they met Sufyian Barhoumi, ISN 000694DP (AG- 694). GZ-10016 informed detainee that AG-694 would be the instructor for the electronics course.16

( S //NF) GZ- 10016 discussed detainee's plan with KU- 10024 and sent detainee and US 10008 to Karachi, PK to allow them to discuss the dirty bomb mission with KU -10024. In March 2002, detainee departed Faisalabad with US- 10008. They traveled to Karachi where they met Sayfal-Adil and KU-10024 who stated the bomb plot was too complex and al Qaida was looking for short -term operations that would put pressure on the US government to curtail military operations in Afghanistan and release the prisoners from JTF-GTMO. KU 10024 discussed conducting operations involving setting fire to a hotel or gas station. Detainee and US-10008 informed KU- 10024 it was impossible to implement these attacks . KU-10024 directed US-10008 to apply the explosives training he received in Afghanistan to demolish apartment buildings in the central US using natural gas in the buildings. KU-10024 and his nephew , Ammar al-Baluchi aka (Abd al-Aziz Ali , ISN -010018DP (PK 10018), instructed both US-10008 and detainee on the methods to execute this operation. Detainee was to return to the UK where he would obtain valid travel documents before traveling to the US to meet US-10008. Following their meetings with KU-10024, Jaffar al Tayyar taught detainee and US- 10008 to falsify documents by substituting photographs, erasing entry/exit stamps and removing visas Al-Qaida operative and 11 September coordinator Ramzi Bin al- Shibh, ISN -010013DP (YM-10013) taught them how to encode a telephone number before passing it to another individual. The co -conspirators then surrendered their passports to PK-10018, who forged a Pakistani visa and departure authorization. For the last week ofMarch 2002, detainee and US- 10008 spent time creating email addresses on the internet for communication while abroad. On 4 April 2002 , PK 10018 gave them a total of $16,000 US. Later, they met again with KU- 10024, YM- 10013, and Abd al-RahimMoulana Gulam Rabbani, ISN -001460DP (PK- 1460), at which time KU- 10024 provided US- 10008 with an additional $5,000 US and they exchanged email

15 Analyst Note: Abu Khabab al-Masri was killed on 28 July 2008 . 16 001458 FM40 21-JUL -2004, 001458 FM40 28-JUL-2004,TD-314 / 05932-03 , TD-314 / 05874-03 , TD -314 /28434 02 , TD-314 63719-03 17 Analyst Note: This is believedto be the same Jaffar al- Tayyar, aka (Adnan el-Shurijumah), who has ties to the dirty bomb plot and numerousties with senior al- Qaida leadership. Additionally, al-Tayyar had previousties with US- 10008in Florida; however, detainee has deniedrecognizingJaffar. Detainee’snon- recognitioncan be found in: 001458 FM4027- OCT-2004. For additional informationlinkingdetaineeand US- 10008with Jaffar al-Tayyar, reference: IIR7 718 0116 03, TD-314/ 09403-04.

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN 001458DP ( S)

addresses. As detainee attempted to leave Pakistan, he was detained at the airport when security officials realized his travel documents were forged. Within a halfhour US- 10008, who had also been prevented from traveling, joined him in the immigration office They were released the next day. Detainee gave his passport to PK- 10018 again. On 7 April 2002, detainee met with PK- 10018 and KU - 10024, who returned detainee's passport and reassured him he would have no problem leaving Pakistan. KU- 10024 informed detainee to purchase 18 an airline ticket to London via another European country.

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. ( S //NF) Detainee tried to depart Pakistan again using a forged passport on 9 April 2002 . Pakistani security personnel again doubted the authenticity of his passport and they turned him over to Pakistani immigration services. He was taken to a Karachi police station where he was interrogated. During the interrogation, detainee claimed to be a Nigerian national, but following consultation with the Nigerian diplomatic mission in Karachi and the British High Commission who believed his claim to be untrue, the police transferred him to an investigation center. During the next two months, investigators were able to determine detainee's true identity, his association to al-Qaida, and his plan to use a dirty bomb 19 attack targets within the US . He was then transferred to US custody and moved to Bagram .

b . ( S) Property Held: None

(S) Transferred to JTF- GTMO: 19 September 2004

d . (S ) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF-GTMO: To provideinformationon the following

Plans of attack considered by al- leadership against the US Key al-Qaida operatives involved in plans of attack against the US Al-Qaida associated mosques High level al-Qaida members, trainers , and other extremist fighters Extremist guesthouses Codes used in nuclear and other attack planning Individuals involved in the forging and acquisition of fraudulent travel documents Methods of falsifying travel documents and encoding phone numbers Training camps Route of ingress and egress into and out of Afghanistan

18 001458 FM40 21-JUL -2004 , TD -314 / 05915-03, TD 314/ 05874-03 , 001458 FM40 05- OCT -2004 19 TD- 314 / 05915-03 , TD-314 / 17397-02

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Explosivestraining

6. ( S ) Evaluation of Detainee's Account : A majority of detainee's account and associated activities are assessed to be true, as he was previously forthcoming on his alleged ties to terrorist plots, associated individuals, and his timeline. Detainee's initial story contained a few discrepancies and is considered primarily accurate based upon corroborating reports from other JTF-GTMO detainees . During an interrogation in 2004; detainee admitted guilt on his part and “ wished to bring his case to a peaceful resolution ” which included a signed statement 20 documenting his activities. Prior to November 2004, interrogators consistently noted his high level of cooperation and lack of hesitation answering questions posed during sessions. However, since November 2004, detainee has been uncooperative and sometimes hostile towards interrogation teams to include punching and spitting at an interrogator. Detainee has also provided conflicting reports regarding training camps he previously attended and his initial reasons for traveling to Afghanistan .

7. (U ) DetaineeThreat:

a. (S) Assessment Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b . (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Even if released with rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law -abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee wouldprobably seek out prior associates and reengage in extremist activities at home and abroad. Since transfer to JTF -GTMO , detainee has expressed his intentions of participating in hostilities against the US and its citizens if released and in one instancephysically assaultedan interrogator. Additionally, detainee has been uncooperative with intelligence collection efforts since November 2004. Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida. Detainee and US- 10008 developed a plan to detonate a radiological device within the US and presented the plan to senior al-Qaida members for approval. Detainee has admitted ties with senior al-Qaida operational planners and facilitators. Detainee received extensive terrorist training in Afghanistan at camps associated with al-Qaida and North African extremists, and traveled to Afghanistan in preparation for combat. Detainee expressed his desire for martyrdom and willingness to attack US forces, US civilians, and any other opponent of al-Qaida. Detainee views the US as his enemy .

( S //NF ) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who admitted direct involvement in planned terrorist operations inside the US.

20 001458FM4028-JUL-2004

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) Detainee admitted his involvementin the Bomb intended to attack the US and subsequent operations proposed by KU -10024.21 ( S //NF) Detainee indicated due to the complexity of the “ H - Bomb” operation , KU- 10024 asked detainee to review other less complex operations , such as setting fire to a hotel building or gas station. After these potential plots were disregarded, KU- 10024 instructed US- 10008 and detainee to destroy up to 20 buildings simultaneously using natural gas and a detonation device. US- 10008 felt 20 buildings would lead to suspicion and requested the attack consist of two or three buildings . Detainee stated he was tasked to build the detonation device by connecting a programmed stopwatch to an electric detonator.22 (Analyst Note: The building for the attack mayhave been located in Chicago as mentioned by KU- 10024 in other reporting. ( S //NF) Duringa custodial interview on 9 November 2004, detainee admitted he was fully aware he was implicated in an operation to attack US citizens within 24 the CONUS, which had the potential of killing or injuring thousands. S //NF ) Senior al-Qaida members GZ- 10016, KU- 10024 , YM- 10013 , PK- 10018, and SA-696 provided corroborating reporting that detainee and US- 10008 were part 25 of a cell tasked to execute a terrorist plot . ( S //NF) GZ- 10016 stated detainee and US- 10008 presented the idea to him of constructing a nuclear dirty bomb for an attack against the US. GZ- 10016 reported detainee stated he could make the dirty bomb work and expressed his 26 (detainee) willingness to become a martyr. ( S //NF) GZ- 10016 then instructed detainee, US-10008, explosives trainer Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim, aka (Abd al- Bari al -Filistini), and advanced electronics instructor Ashur al-Jazairi, aka (Abu Basir al-Jazairi), to report to Sayf al -Adil and KU- 10024 with their proposals and await KU- 10024’s instructions before proceeding. GZ-10016 discussed detainee and US- plan with PK 10018; who provided them with a letter of introduction to KU - 10024 endorsing their plan. GZ - 10016 stated once in the US, the two planned to steal the ingredients and proposed attacking subway trains. GZ-10016 explained the dirty bomb would combine a regular explosive with uranium or other radiological material . (Analyst Note: This type of bomb would not, nor was it intended to, cause a nuclear explosion , although that was the initial idea, according to GZ 10016. Instead the nuclear material would be disbursed throughout a limited

21 TD - 314 / 05874-03 22 TD - 314/ 05874-03 23 TD- 314/ 38760-02 24 FM40 09- NOV - 2004 25 TD - 314/ 18008-04 , TD -314 / 14963-04 ,TD -314 /20723-02 , TD-314 / 16969-02 , TD-314 / 12780-04 , TD -314 /39772 02, 000696 SIR 18-JUN -2002 26 TD- 314/ , TD-314/ 35332-02, TD-314/

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JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN 001458DP ( S)

regiondue to the blast, exposingallwithinthe area to the radiatedmaterial, likely causinglatent illnessfor most, as well as widespreadpanic far exceedingthe affectedarea. ( S //NF) SA-696 stated several al-Qaida operatives were at large with orders from GZ-10016 to carry out terrorist actions . SA-696 identified these operatives as Tulha al-Keen (assessed to bedetainee ), Abd al-Bari (assessed to be Abd al Bari al-Filistini , and US-10008.28 ( S //NF) Ahmad HakimFawzan al-Qasim stated detainee was part ofthe group that stayed with GZ- 10016, because GZ- 10016 had operational plans for them 29 ( S //NF) YM- 10013 stated KU- 10024 had responsibilityfor AbuTalha ( assessedto be detainee) and US- 10008's mission, despitebeing unaware oftheir 30 final destination. ( U //FOUO ) Detainee indicated he received training in the use of telephonic codes from YM- 10013. Additionally , he admitted attending a meeting in Karachi where YM- 10013, KU- 10024, and PK- 10018 were 31 present ( S / / ) KU-10024 provided a variant of detainee’s alias (Talha al Jamaiki ), as an individual among a list of converts he worked with in Afghanistan and Pakistan . However he was unsure detainee was a true convert . KU-10024 added detainee was a close associate ofUS-10008.32 (S// NF) PK-10018 indicated detainee and US- 10008 traveled to Karachi to discuss planned operations with KU-10024 (PK- 10018's uncle) for a period of a week . Although PK-10018 denied knowing the specifics of the operation , he stated he provided email accounts to both detainee and US-10008 ; while KU 10024 facilitated the two operatives travels to the US. With the email accounts created , detainee and US-10008 were to contact PK-10018 and KU- 10024 using coded messages .33 //NF ) Detainee admitted he and US-10008 downloaded information from the internet on how to create an “ H bomb ." Detainee further stated the information included the process for creating a bomb using a mixture of pure Uranium 235 .34

27 TD -314 / 51751-02, TD-314 / 18008-04, TD-314 / 17373-02, TD-314 / 17397-02, TD-314/28434-02 , TD -314/ 39577 02, TD -314 /24335-02, TD-314 / 14963-04, TD - 314 /43246-02 , TD-314/ 20723-02 , TD -314 /16969-02, TD -314 /07947 2804, TD-314/ 12780-04, TD-314 / 38760-02 000696 SIR 18 - JUN- 2002 , IIR 7718 0094 03 , IIR 7 718 0105 03 29 - 314 /66073-06 30 TD- 314/ 39772-02 31 001458 FM4005- OCT-2004 32 TD- 314/ , TD-314/ 12780-04 33 TD -314 /09431-04, TD-314/ 12265-04 34 TD- 314/ 05874-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoDControl (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISNUS9ET-001458DP(S)

(S//NF) Authorities recovered an article on constructing an “H-bomb” from a computer seized during a raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Lahore on 28 March 2002. The safe house was identified as one likely occupied by detainee and US- 10008, and included instructions on obtaining ingredients and assembling the bomb.35 (S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISNUS9SU-000707DP (SU-707), identified detainee and US-10008 as associates, who used the computer in the Lahore Guesthouse extensively.36 (S//NF) SA-696 stated al-Qaida operatives used the internet to communicate at GZ-10016’s house in Faisalabad.37 (S///NF) As noted, GZ-10016 reported detainee and US-10008 volunteered to execute any operation and suggested a dirty bomb attack on Washington D.C. to GZ- 10016 for authorization and assistance. GZ-10016 noticed detainee and US-10008’s eagerness to begin the operation, so GZ-10016 sent them to Karachi to meet with Sayf al-Adil and KU-10024. (Analyst Note: These comments support the claim the bomb plot was detainee and US-10008’s idea, not GZ-10016’s as reported by detainee. .)38 (S//NF) Detainee and US-10008 also mentioned a plan to disburse poisonous cyanide gas throughout a building by introducing the gas into the air conditioning system. GZ-10016 instructed the two to present this plan to KU-10024 and Sayf al- Adil when they met in Kabul.39 • (S//NF) Detainee received advanced training in Afghanistan through al-Qaida and other extremist organizations with the intent of engaging in hostilities. (C//REL USA AND GCTF) Detainee admitted receiving instruction on mortars and anti-aircraft weapons at the Algerian Training Camp; explosives training with Richard Colvin Reid at a Turkish camp; AK-47 training at the Moroccan Camp, aka (Tarik Camp); and basic training to include his introduction to explosives at the al- Faruq Camp.40 (S//NF) Muhammad Shah took detainee to the Algerian Guesthouse in Jalalabad where they met with Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi and Muhib. Detainee claimed Abu Jaffar instructed him to train at the al-Faruq Camp near Kandahar.41

35 TD-314/17580-02 36 IIR6 034 0657 02 37 IIR6 034 139603 38 TD-314/18008-04,TD-314/18283-02,TD-314/16969-02,TD-314/12780-04,for additionalinformationsee: TD- 314/20355-02 39 TD-314/63719-03,TD-314/20723-02,TD-314/21111-02,for additionalinformationsee: TD-314/17625-02 40 IIR6 034 0280 05, 001458 FM40 27-JUL-2004 41 001458 FM4027-OCT-2004,IIR6 034 0094 05,IIR6 034 0120 05, for additionalinfo see: 001458 FM40 27- JUL-2004,TD-314/05888-03

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoDControl (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISNUS9ET-001458DP(S)

(Analyst Note: Abu Jaffar was responsible for the guesthouse, the Algerian Training Camp, and all the Algerians at both locations.) (S//NF) Abu Jaffar was a senior al-Qaida facilitator affiliated with the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and other Islamic extremist groups operating in Europe.42 He was a principal associate of GZ-10016 who operated guesthouses for extremists traveling to Afghanistan for training at al-Qaida camps near Jalalabad and elsewhere.43 (U//FOUO) Detainee admitted his inclusion in a cell consisting of SA-682 and SA-696. SA-682 and SA-696 received training by AG-694 on the construction of remote control explosive devices in Pakistan intending to return to Afghanistan to build the devices or train others.44 GZ-10016 stated detainee and US-10008 were sent to KU-10024 for an operational assignment before the training started because of their visible eagerness to conduct an operation.45 (S//NF) SA-696 admitted receiving electronics training for IED detonators with the full knowledge and understanding that these devices would be employed specifically against US forces.46 Detainee stated he resided at GZ-10016’s Faisalabad safe house where the training was conducted for two months before their capture.47 (S//NF) GZ-10016 stated the remote control explosives training was in preparation for attacks against US troops and the forces of Afghanistan’s Interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.48 GZ-10016 further commented the remote control devices would be used to detonate car bombs.49 (U//FOUO) Analyst Note: Detainee’s prior education, travel history within the US, and passport made him a prime candidate for conducting terrorist operations in western culture societies. • (S//NF) Detainee expressed his desire for martyrdom while targeting the US and any other opponent of al-Qaida. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has expressed his

42 IIR6 034 0053 02,AnalystNote: The GSPCannouncedin 2006 its merger with al-Qaidaand is now knownas al-Qaida in the Landsof the IslamicMaghreb(AQIM). AQIMis a NIPFPriority1 CT target.Priority 1 targets are defined as issues,opportunities,or threatsthat rise to, or are expected to rise to, the levelof interestof the President, Vice President,DNI,and NSC/HSCPrincipalsDeputies.This includesterroristgroups,countries that sponsor terrorism,or countries that have state organizationsinvolvedin terrorism that pose a clear and immediatedanger to USpersonsor interest,as well as countriesand regionscontainingsafe havens for Priority 1 terroristgroups. The categoryspecificallyincludesterrorist groupspreparingto employ Weapons of MassDestruction(WMD). 43 TD-314/19998-02,IIR6 034 0265 05,IIR2 340 6384 02,for additionalinformationsee: IIR6 832 0132 02,IIR 6 853 0137 02 44 001458 FM4028-JUL-2004 45 TD-314/18008-04 46 IIR6 034 0065 03,000696 302 06-AUG-2002 47 IIR6 034 112603,IIR6 034 0446 03 48 TD-314/35879-02 49 TD-314/17060-02

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoDControl (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISNUS9ET-001458DP(S)

intentions of engaging in hostilities against the US and its citizens if released and in one instance physically assaulted an interrogator. (S//NF) Detainee initially said he traveled to Afghanistan to receive militant training in preparation for combat in Chechnya. Detainee stated after he received training at the al-Faruq Camp, his focus for fighting changed to Israel and later towards the US. Detainee stated prior to his capture, he would have fought anyone who al-Qaida asked him to fight.50 (C//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) Detainee indicated in a conversation with al- Qaida accountant and UBL bodyguard, Ibrahim Ahmad Mahmoud al-Qosi, ISN US9SU-000054DP (SU-054), that the end of the US is coming soon. “They will lose the next war, just as they lost the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Detainee continued saying, “Americans are our enemies, but the law is on our side, and we may be set free after all. Americans will remain our big enemies.”51 (S//NF) On 15 December 2006, detainee told a JTF-GTMO guard “America will pay for the way they treat their Korans and their religion….when he [detainee] gets released we will get our payback.” Detainee further stated that each search conducted on a Koran will equal “10 American heads.”52 (S//NF) During a custodial interview on 23 June 2005, detainee physically 53 assaulted an interrogator and spat on his face.

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 138 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 27 November 2008, when he refused to come out of recreation. He has four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 19 January 2008, when he grabbed a guard’s arm. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, general offense requiring the use of FCE team and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 89 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction, 38 in 2008, and none so far in 2009.

50 001458 FM40 27-OCT-2004,001458 FM40 27-JUL-2004,001458FM4028-JUL-2004,Analyst Note: Training at al-Faruqwas conducted in 4 phases: small arms firing,physical conditioning,map reading/topography,and explosive devices. Generally,trainees completed all phasesas a requirementfor basic training. Following completion of their basic training,traineeshad an opportunity to sign up for specializedcourses. The courses available at al-Faruq or other locationsincludedsniper,forgery,mountainor urbantactics,heavy weapons (such as mortars),medical,and assassination/ambush.For additionalinformationon the al-FaruqTrainingCamp see NGIC- 1139-7046-0415-OCT-2003. 51 IIR6 034 0158 07 52 001458JIG INCIDENT15-DEC-200600:48:00 53 001458SIR 23-JUN-2005

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoDControl (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISNUS9ET-001458DP(S)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 24 October 2005.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee’s prior education and attendance at advanced training camps allowed him access to the most senior levels of al-Qaida leadership. This access provided detainee knowledge of planned al-Qaida plots, the logistics and locations of al-Qaida leadership personnel, and insight into the facilitation of travel and coding techniques used by al-Qaida. Detainee’s previous travels to the US and throughout the Middle East made him a prime candidate for al-Qaida operations inside the US. Detainee has stayed at multiple guesthouses and safe houses linked to extremist activity, fled Afghanistan with GZ-10016’s group, and met with senior al-Qaida operational planners and commanders in Pakistan.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided an extensive amount of information pertaining to his knowledge of al-Qaida directed plots, extremists tied to those plots, and previous associations among extremists. Detainee likely possesses unique information of intelligence value regarding senior levels of al-Qaida leadership and specific details he may have intentionally avoided disclosing during his earlier interrogation sessions to avoid implicating himself.

d. (S//NF) Areas of PotentialExploitation:

• Al-Qaida Terrorist plots targeting US interests Chicago Afghanistan Leadership IZ-10026, KU-10024, GZ-10016, PK-10018, YM-10013, PK-1460, Sayf al- Adil, Abu Khabab al-Masri Operatives US-10008, Richard Colvin Reid, SA-682, SA-696 Training Camps Instruction Personnel – trainers, trainees, commanders, facilitators • Islamic Extremist groups JT LT Global Jihad Support Network

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-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN 001458DP ( S)

Basic and advanced training camps Communication methods and techniques

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatus was reassessedon 22 November2004, andhe remainsan enemycombatant.

D. M. THOMAS, JR Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding

Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology .

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