Defining DSIEC's Relationships with Government and Political Parties

Between Independence and Engagement: Defining DSIEC’s Relationships with Government and Political Parties

Introduction: the “Dukean confession”1

Let us begin with the mea culpa widely attributed to the former Governor of

Cross River State, Mr. Donald Duke. In a report widely published by newspapers in 2010, the ex-Governor graphically describes how elections are rigged in

Nigeria when he was Governor. Essentially, the model is that an INEC Resident

Electoral Commissioner (REC) arrives in a State capital, pays a courtesy call on the

Governor and complains about lack of vehicles, accommodation, funding – everything practically. The Governor calls in his Chief of Staff and orders that the

REC’s every need be provided. The following day, the REC receives several vehicles, keys to a posh accommodation and princely “spending money” to go with them. From then on, the State INEC office becomes an extension of the

Government House, a mere parastatal under the State Governor and, by extension, an arm of the ruling party in the State.

1 By this I refer to the widely publicized comments by the former Governor of Cross River State, Donald Duke, detailing how in the past State Governors and INEC Resident Electoral Commissioners connive to rig elections in Nigeria. I have reproduced the awing remarks in the Appendix since I consider it a must read for election administrators. See http://saharareporters.com/report/must-read-how-governors-rig-elections-donald-duke- guardian?page=4 [Accessed 17th February 2014]

This “Dukean confession” only confirms what Nigerians have known to be true for some time namely, that rigging of elections is a cooperative enterprise between political parties, political authorities, security agencies and susceptible EMB officials. However, what is not exactly correct is the ring of finality and inevitability that Donald Duke weaves around this thesis. It is not correct because it is based on certain underlying assumptions that are not necessarily true. First, it is based on an assumption that underestimates the personal integrity of INEC staff, particularly RECS. In other words, it assumes that INEC staff would necessarily be susceptible to the kind of influence that he outlines. Second, it is based on the assumption that the conditions, which he identifies as making them susceptible to those influences, are necessarily permanent and given. He fails to realize that those conditions are intrinsically linked to issues of resource

(mis)management which could be redressed by strong managerial structures based on strong, credible, transparent and accountable leadership in INEC. Third, it is also based on the assumption that this edifice of rigging that he outlines cannot be countered. The truth remains that the main trajectories of rigging elections in Nigeria have been well documented and studied and can be effectively countered where the knowledge and will exists in INEC.

The challenge for EMBs in Nigeria then is to demonstrate that these assumptions on which the “Dukean confession” is built are not necessarily correct by depicting a high level of personal integrity, improving resource management and

2 developing effective strategies for combating rigging that would combine technology, administrative measures and public monitoring. To be able to do these requires that we get the right perspective on the relationship between the

EMB and political parties and political authorities. This is the central purpose of this discussion paper. The central problematique is a simple one: Election

Management Bodies must relate with political parties and political authorities. But how do you relate with such intensely partisan entities and still remain non- partisan? In other words, how do you engage and still remain separated? To answer these questions, our starting point is to understand models of relationships between election management bodies and political parties and political authorities. This is because the pattern of interactions between an EMB and political authorities and parties is at the very heart of its independence, and independence, in turn, is at the heart of free, fair and credible elections.

Models of Election Management Bodies (EMBs)

The independence of EMBs is often taken for granted. Yet, there is nothing natural about that independence outside the intrinsic principles that guide the liberal or market democracy that we practice. This type of democracy is informed by certain liberal principles that matured in the West in the 18th and 19th

Centuries namely, equality, rationalism, pluralism and institutionalism. Applied to electoral democracy, these principles have to do with equality of votes and of the right to vote and be voted for; rationality of voters in making informed choices;

3 pluralism of political platforms among which voters choose; as well as institutional and regulatory framework that manages this process such that they appear to be relatively autonomous of and dissociated from specific political, economic or other sectional interests. Top among these institutions is the election management body. EMBs must therefore appear to embody not the interest of one political party or candidate, but the collective interests of the people-nation. This is the underlying source of the expectation of independence of EMBs.

In essence, liberal or market democracy is the political equivalent of the market economy and market society. They are all built on pervasive commodity production and exchange, or what Claude Ake has called “thoroughgoing commoditization”.2 In market societies, people are first and foremost commodity bearers, even if the only commodity they bear is their labour power. Market norms such as individualism, formal freedom and equality, profit motive, and competition dominate social life. As commodity bearers, members of a market society exist as separate, self-interested, formally free and aggressively competitive individuals. Market forces (demand, supply and price) regulate this competition and everybody is equally subject to these seemingly neutral and natural forces.

2 Claude Ake ‘The Future of the State in Africa’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985.

Being socially atomised, formally free, equal and self-interested proprietors, these commodity bearers evolve a political architecture that is akin to the market.3 It is a system of constituting government, in which each actor is individualistic, self- interested, equal, autonomous and competitive, and in which there is a choice of political platforms and an independent institutional framework that is autonomous of these separate political interests regulates the entire system.

Thus, the same conditions that propel the market economy also propel liberal democracy namely, pervasive commoditisation, the rational actor and independent regulation. However, ironically, it is precisely this same pervasive commoditization, which informs the autonomy and independence of institutions of a market society that leads to their corruption. This is because where these institutions are weak, they could also become commodities to be bought and sold by the highest bidder.

This whole political architecture is best expressed in elections. In line with market principles, the legal framework for elections in a market democracy invariably provide for the freedom of individuals to vote and be voted for, the equality of votes and freedom to choose between political platforms. In other words, like the market economy, election in a market democracy assumes the existence of socially atomized and self-interested individuals. For added measure, just as

3 Ibid.

5 money is the medium of exchange in the economic market the ballot is the medium of exchange in the electoral (political) market.

As with market economy, market democracy actualizes the “independence” of the regulatory agency, in this case the EMB, by masking the unequal relations of power among classes that are ingrained in them. This is expressed in the key instruments of these two levels of structure namely, money in the economy and ballots in politics. Just as money masks the unequal relations of economic power between the worker and the non-worker in which the later appropriates surplus value, the ballot masks the unequal relations of political power between the voter and the candidate in which the latter appropriates political power. The role of regulatory institutions (the Central Bank which issues money and the EMB which issues ballots) is to maintain this ideological masking of unequal power relations.

To do so, they must retain an appearance of independence. Consequently, the election regulatory regime, just like the forces of demand and supply in the market, must be seemingly dissociated from the interests of individual candidates, political parties, political authorities or indeed classes and all are equally liable to the rules of the game. This is necessary to maintain public confidence in elections through a high value attached to the ballot. 4

4 Okechukwu Ibeanu ‘Elections and the paroxysmal future of democracy in Nigeria’, in Attahiru Jega and Okechukwu Ibeanu (eds) Elections and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria, Lagos: Nigerian Political Science Association, 2007.

It is the above logic that explains the importance of the independence of EMBs in

liberal democracies. However, in practice, independence has been actualized

through four major models of EMBs namely, independent, double independent,

government and mixed models. The features of each of these and their

implications for independence are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Models of Election Management Bodies

Type Description Country Comments Independent  The EMB is institutionally  It holds the Model independent and Indonesia, possibility of being autonomous from the Liberia, truly independent. executive branch of Mauritius, government, and it has and Nigeria,  However, although it manages its own budget. Poland, Thailand is said to be  The EMB is not accountable South Africa, independent, there to a government ministry or India, are varying degrees department. Timor-Leste, of independence, as  It may be accountable to the Costa Rica, the Nigerian case legislature, the judiciary, or Burkina Faso, has shown. the head of state. Uruguay,  It may enjoy varying degrees Armenia, of financial autonomy and Australia, Canada accountability, as well as Estonia & varying levels of performance Georgia accountability.  It is composed of members who are outside the executive while in office.  Many new and emerging

democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral management. Double  In this model two bodies  The advantage of Independent exist for the management of Jamaica, this model is that it Model elections, both of which are Suriname, separates policy independent of the executive Romania & from the actual and can be considered as Vanuatu conduct of election. independent EMBs.  The two components  One of these bodies is likely could serve as check to have responsibility for and balance on each policy decisions relating to other. the electoral process, and  The body that the other to be responsible organizes the for conducting and election need not be implementing the electoral permanent. process.  Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters. Government  There is no EMB as such  In Sweden, Model because elections are Switzerland, the UK Denmark, Tunisia organized and managed by and the United Seychelles, the executive branch States, elections are Singapore through a ministry (such as implemented by the Ministry of the Interior) local authorities. Switzerland, and/or through local  In Sweden and United States & authorities. Switzerland a central United Kingdom  At the national level a body assumes a (for elections but minister or a civil servant policy coordinating not referendums) answerable to a Cabinet role.

minister is in charge of the  Suits stable process. democracies where  A State or local elections have Commissioner or official is in become routinized. charge at the local level. For  May be marred by instance in the US, it is partisan loyalties of usually the Secretary to the government officials Local Government. as in Florida in 2000  With very few exceptions they have no ‘members’. Their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities.

Mixed Model  It has dual structures, with a  Vast variations in policy, monitoring or this model. France, Japan, supervisory component that Sometimes Mali, Spain, is independent of the Independent Senegal & Togo executive branch of component assumes government (as for the strong supervisory & Independent Model) and an oversight roles, implementation component while in others it located within a department merely observes the of state and/or local election. government (as for the  Relation between Governmental Model). the two components  The governmental also varies vastly. component organizes  Liable to being elections with some level of manipulated to oversight provided by the bolster the independent component. government  The powers, functions and component to strength of the independent favour partisan

component in relation to the interests. governmental component vary in different examples of this model Source: Based on information from http://www.aceproject.org

These models produce four distinct possibilities in terms of relationship between

EMBs and political parties and authorities namely, dormant, dependent, dominant and autonomous. Each of these is defined by two variables – interaction with political parties and political authorities on the one hand and its level of independence as an election management body on the other (Fig. 1).

Dominant model

 A dominant EMB has minimal interaction with political parties and political

authorities.

 Rules and procedures are passed “down” to political parties usually by written

memos.

 Dictates to political parties.

 Independence is interpreted as “autarky” and complete separation from

government agencies.

 Totally avoids support from political authorities

Autonomous model

 Sustained, but managed engagement with political parties and political

authorities.

 Regular meetings with political parties

 Rules and procedures are discussed and agreed with political parties.

 Independence is interpreted as “balanced interaction” with political parties and

political authorities

 Support from political authorities are based on pre-agreed rules and procedures

that are transparent

Dependent model

 Excessive engagement with political parties and political authorities, especially

ruling political parties.

 Rules are determined by dominant political parties.

 Minimal independence – tends to be dependent on political authorities.

Dormant model

 Controlled by ruling parties and political authorities.

 Absence of rules of engagement with political parties.

 Members are highly partisan, usually members of ruling parties

Fig. 1: Relationship between EMBs and Political Parties and Authorities

INTERACTION

HIGH LOW

HIGH Autonomous Dominant

INDEPENDENC

LOW Dependent Dormant

Type Description Comments Dominant  EMB has minimal interaction with  It has the advantage of high political parties and political legitimacy in public eyes authorities.  Elections conducted by dominant  Rules and procedures are passed EMBs are very likely to be seen as “down” to political parties usually reflecting the choices of the by written memos. electorate  Dictates to political parties.  It has the disadvantage of  Independence is interpreted as experiencing conflicts with “autarky” and complete political parties and political separation from government authorities. agencies.  Could be overbearing on political  Totally avoids support from parties. political authorities  Members could misrepresent their position by dictating outcomes  High likelihood of conflicts among

members.  High likelihood of abuse of power by members Autonomous  Sustained, but managed  If rules are adhered to, it enjoys engagement with political high legitimacy in public eyes. parties and political authorities.  If rules and procedures are  Regular meetings with political adhered to, elections conducted parties by autonomous EMBs are likely to  Rules and procedures are reflect the choices of the discussed and agreed with electorate. political parties.  Conflicts between autonomous  Independence is interpreted as EMBs and political parties and “balanced interaction” with authorities are likely to be political parties and political minimal. authorities  It has the disadvantage of  Support from political authorities experiencing intermittent is based on pre-agreed rules disagreement with opposition and procedures that are parties. transparent  There is the risk that members could be negatively influenced by political parties and political authorities. Dependent  Excessive engagement with  Low legitimacy in the eyes of the political parties and political public. authorities, especially ruling  Election outcomes are likely to be political parties. highly controversial and  Rules are determined by contested. dominant political parties.  Rampant conflict with opposition  Minimal independence – tends parties. to be dependent on political  Frequent changes in rules and authorities. procedures.

Dormant  Controlled by ruling parties and  Extremely low legitimacy

political authorities.  Extension of the ruling party and  Absence of rules of political authorities engagement with political  One-sided electoral outcomes for parties. ruling parties.  Members are highly partisan,  Regular conflicts with opposition. usually members of ruling parties

Principles of good relations between EMB and political parties and authorities

Generally, the legal framework ab initio defines relationships between an EMB like

DSIEC and political parties and authorities. The enabling act would normally define the constitution, staffing, funding, roles and responsibilities of the EMB. To meet the requirements of an election management institution in a liberal democracy, such as we earlier outlined, certain conditions are however necessary.

These include:

a) Guaranteed tenure – members of the EMB have clearly specified tenures

and cannot be removed at the whim of political parties or political

authorities, except in exceptional conditions like abuse of office.

b) Measure of financial autonomy – This entails guaranteed funding for the

work of the EMB. Where an EMB goes cap in hand to government for

funding or where funding is perpetually inadequate, the independence of

the EMB is seriously compromised.

c) Power to hire and fire staff – this insulates the EMB from political influence

and ensures that only the best staff are retained.

d) Clearly defined and inalienable functions/roles – this is particularly

regarding the conduct of elections for which EMBs are not subject to any

other authority.

e) Reporting – An EMB is only answerable to the people, not to government.

However, EMBs must act within the law and there their actions are always

subject to the judicial process.

Beyond statutory considerations, however, there are many other practical considerations that an EMB should note in conducting its relations with political parties and political authorities. They include the following:

Rules of engagement

Rules of engaging with political parties and political authorities must be clearly defined and shared with political parties and the public. These may be embodied in codes of conduct or guidelines for officials of EMBs. Although such codes are sometimes misunderstood as a control mechanism, they are actually meant to protect the officials and insulate them from partisan influences and unnecessary public criticisms.

Need to Control outcomes

A central preoccupation of election management officials is to retain control of outcomes of engagement with political parties and political authorities. By this I mean that interactions that enable political parties and authorities to dictate or

15 control outcomes undermine the independence of an EMB. Consequently, such interactions should be minimized or completely avoided. One useful way of doing this is to clearly specify the objectives of engagement and avoid environments that give undue advantage to political parties and political authorities. For instance, locating offices of the EMB in buildings provided or controlled by partisan interests should be avoided. Thus, the continued location of INEC offices in Local Government buildings should be reconsidered.

Balanced interaction and treatment

The most common source of accusation of partisanship against EMBs is lopsidedness of interactions with political parties and political authorities. Where officials of an EMB appear to meet often with ruling parties and authorities, it creates suspicion and resentment among opposition parties. Again, seeming favouritism towards ruling parties and political authorities undermines the independence of an EMB. Consequently, balanced interaction with and treatment of all political parties are essential to the work of an EMB.

Public legitimacy and acceptance of electoral outcomes

The most important goal of the work of an EMB is public acceptance of electoral outcomes. Elections should not only be free and fair, they must also be seen to

16 be credible in the eyes of the public. As such, public opinion and evaluation of actions of an EMB must be central concerns. Interactions with political parties and political authorities that generate negative public opinion must be avoided. This refers not only to the collective actions of an EMB, but to the individual actions of its members.

Practical tips for relating with political parties and authorities

I will end with some practical tips. The following are ten dos and don’ts in relating with political parties and authorities:

1. Don’t meet with party officials alone. Always take somebody along,

especially around elections.

2. Avoid meeting with one party of select group of parties. Few (if any) issues

would exclusively affect a single party or group of parties. Extending

meeting invitations to all political parties is to be preferred.

3. If you are in doubt about the purpose of an invitation to a meeting or a

request to attend a meeting by a political authority, political party or

affiliate organization, postpone the meeting and consult.

4. As much as possible, don’t receive offers from political parties or political

authorities. Receiving such offers is like receiving a blood transfusion in an

enemy camp – it could be blood alright, but it could also be bad blood.

5. Always insist on a mutually agreed public statement – press release,

communiqué, etc. – to be issued after every meeting with political parties

or political authorities.

6. Regular, scheduled meetings with political authorities and political parties

should be preferred to ad hoc summons and sudden, unplanned meetings.

As much as possible avoid such summons and meetings and suggest

postponement to the next regular meeting. However, if you must go out of

respect, inform headquarters, don’t go along and ask for a public

statement immediately after.

7. Avoid secret meetings and secret deals, both bilateral and multilateral,

completely. Nothing about election management is secret except balloting.

8. As much as possible, meetings must be in INEC offices and should be

made public.

9. INEC offices must not be located in premises controlled by government, a

political party or party member.

10. Any demand/request for assistance that you make on political authorities

must be cleared with the national commission and communicated before

hand to all political parties and to the general public.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that the foregoing discussion is only meant to provide usable tips and should be seen only as such. There are really no objective hard-and-fast rules for relating with political parties and political authorities. In reality, the subjective human dimension including the level of personal integrity, accountability and dedication of the individual, plays the determinant role. Rules, regulations and guiding principles notwithstanding, in the last analysis Election

Management Bodies like DSIEC will be as independent and credible as the knowledge, courage and carriage of their members.

APPENDIX: “The Dukean Confession”

Culled from: http://saharareporters.com/report/must-read-how-governors-rig- elections-donald-duke-guardian?page=4 [Accessed 17th February 2014]

“LET me start this way. Professor Maurice Iwu is truly an enigma; he enjoyed the limelight. He enjoyed all the attacks, thrown and meted at him, he remained undaunted. I think, he belongs to the school of thought that believes that bad publicity is better than no publicity. So, even though he was being attacked and scolded and all sorts of things were said about him, he didn’t shy away from even going to the United States and talking to Nigerians in the Diaspora about his work, he didn’t shy away from it. I was told he organized a rally to ensure that he will come back to do the work he was appointed to.

Why do I call him an enigma? The truth is, the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission has little or no bearing on the success of elections, that’s the truth. To me, it’s actually immaterial because he is head of the administration he takes the brunt. The best he can do is perhaps, draw up a blueprint but the implementation of that blueprint is outside his control. So, if elections are rigged in say -Taraba State- we don’t do that stuff in Cross Rivers State (laughter),Every one looks at Iwu and he proudly says we did this or that. Hogwash!

Let me now take you through the process of an election. We have a hundred and twenty thousand booths in Nigeria. At the hierarchy, you have the Chairman of INEC, then you have the zonal Commissioners, then you have the Resident Electoral Commissioners and they are the heads in every state the zone as the name implies; we have six zones in Nigeria, so you have six of them. Then you have the Resident Electoral Commissioners and there are 36 of them of course, and Abuja. Then for each local government, you have an electoral officer. Beyond that you have a hundred and twenty thousand polling booths, headed by presiding officers. The people think that at the end of the elections, the PDP

20 would just decide who wins and who doesn’t and announces the results. I think the process is a bit more sophisticated than that.

This is what happens; the Resident Electoral Commissioner is usually from another state. The electoral officers, they move around. They are usually from that state, but for the conduct of elections itself, you would probably move from Cross River to Akwa Ibom or to Abia, but these musical chairs don’t mean nothing.

When the Resident Electoral Commissioner comes before the elections are conducted- of course when he comes to the state, usually, he has no accommodation; monies have not been released for the running or conduct of the elections and all that because we always start late. He pays a courtesy call on the governor. It’s usually a televised event you know, and of course he says all the right things. ‘Your Excellency, I am here to ensure that we have free and fair elections and I will require your support.’ Now, at that courtesy call, most governors, at least I did, will invite the Commissioner of Police because he is part of the action and he sits there.

After the courtesy call, the Resident Electoral Commissioner now moves in for a one-on-one with the governor the says, “Your Excellency, since I came, I’ve been staying in this hotel, there is no accommodation for me and even my vehicle is broken down and the last Commissioner didn’t leave the vehicle, so if you could help me settle down quickly;’ and the governor says, ‘Chief of Staff, where is the Chief of Staff here?’ And the Chief of Staff appears. Governor says: ‘Please ensure that the REC is accommodated–put him in the Presidential lodge, allot two cars to him, I give you seven days to get this done. Then the relationship has started; I am going to share some of these things with you so that we don’t leave here with any illusions. A lot of us, folks who have gone through an election or have been elected for one thing or another, see groups like Save Nigeria Group (SNG), the CLP as woolly-eye dreamers, you have to come down to the backsides, since I am now a hybrid between both. I want to bring you both down to backsides. Let me take you down to what happens so that you can change it because if you

21 don’t change it, we here won’t suffer but I think of our children will. We the elite, I am one of them, we send our kids to the best schools around the World, when they come back they are misfits, they cannot fit in and so ultimately we are designing a system that would destroy us in the end.

Let me take our minds back to Somalia. Somalia is mono-religious, mono-ethnic; they only have clans (but) they have one tribe. What has happened there? It’s a failed state because the elite in Somalia were so disconnected from the people that once they had some money, they buy houses in England, Washington and all those places; they were not investing, putting their best foot forward and I think that was what Pastor Bakare was talking about. If you want to be in a contest, you put your best foot forward; at the end of the day, there was such a disconnect that even till today, they cannot bridge it. Let me tell you, the last recognized President of Somalia is buried in Lagos- Siad Barre.

We are multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-problematic. The reason why most people worry about us is if we explode, who will contain us? Let me also say this, I know what I am saying now is an aside, I will go back to the elections. When we conducted the census in 2006 or so, the raw figures said we were over two hundred million; when they went and processed the figures it came down to 140million.

When you look at those figures and compare to those we had in 1991 at a growth rate of 2.1 or something like that, it is really just an extrapolation, because we were too embarrassed to admit our true numbers. If we get it wrong, we will fail like Somalia; in Somalia, half of them are in Kenya, Ethiopia, and a few are in Europe here and there; who will contain us in all of West Africa and Central Africa and for that it is imperative not just for ourselves but for the rest of the continent that we get it right.

Now, back to the elections, once that relationship has been established between the governor and the REC, if you are a governor who is ‘A Governor’, maybe two nights after you just pop by at the governors lodge and see the REC and say ah,

‘ah REC how are you doing? Are you OK?’ He says, ‘ah! Your Chief of Staff has been wonderful. He has been very nice to me; he supplied me the vehicles and everything is Ok’.

A few weeks to the elections, the REC sees the governor; you probably have on the average about three thousand five hundred, four thousand depending on the polling booths in every state. So, REC goes to the governor and says, ‘Your Excellency, could you please give us the names of about four, five thousand people so that we can hurriedly train them, we need them as Presiding Officers.’ You need experience. A good coach is one who has played and has lost matches in the past? The REC now goes down and says, ‘we need to conduct a training programme for the presiding officers and em, headquarters hasn’t sent us any money yet, you know.’ And the governor is like: ‘How much would that cost?’

REC replies: ‘N25million for the first batch, we may have about three batches.’ Governor: ‘Ok, the Chief of Staff will see you.’Now, the Chief of Staff, you call him: ‘Make sure, that we arrange N25 million this week and in two weeks time another N25 million and Seventy-Five million in all.’ Chief of Staff: ‘Your Excellency, how do we do it?’ Governor: ‘Put it under Security Vote.’

In other words, its cash, ok, now, cash in huge Ghana Must Go bags – some of my colleagues will shoot me- (turns to the audience) is any former governor here? (Crowd replies no!). Good. Cash is lodged in huge Ghana Must Go Bags for the REC and of course, to be fair to them, they call their electoral officers and say the governor has been very benevolent; he has given us this and that. I say three batches because they have them in Senatorial districts. So, you have one in Calabar, you have One in Ikom and Ogoja, those are the headquarters of the Senatorial districts. Each one costs twenty-five million. Of course, the sums are not properly retired. I don’t know how much of this twenty-five million worked. But, there is a rapport this is going on.

The governor now turns round and says: ‘call me the party chairman.’ The party chairman appears and the governor says: ‘INEC requires 50 thousand people for conducting the elections. See to it that we meet their needs.’ The chairman goes and you hear in the evening on radio and television: There will be an urgent meeting of all chairmen and secretaries of XYZ party at the headquarters. They should report promptly at 10am (because) matters of urgent interest will be discussed. End of announcement. Now we have texts messages, so its easier, in no time everyone is here. It’s a very short meeting, please go back and within 48 hours submit from each local government two hundred and fifty names of trusted party members. So in a week the deed is done. The names, sometimes even passport photographs if required are sent to INEC. And the training programme is carried out. Let me pause a bit, this is at party level. They are usually civil servants. They may be teachers, whatever, but they are party members. The remuneration, for each of them for the elections from Abuja is 10,000 Naira for the day’s work. But the state in its benevolence gives 50 to 100,000 Naira to each of these folks right before this election.

This is even where it gets even more interesting. So, you have each of the three or four thousand polling booths; they are manned by party stalwarts. They are usually party stalwarts. You don’t send any peripheral member. The remuneration from Abuja has not arrived but that of the state was received 48 hours prior. On the day of elections, each polling booth has no more than five hundred ballot papers, that is standard.

There is not a polling booth that is more than five hundred. So only two hundred people appear here, three hundred there, one hundred there, fifty there, four hundred there, at the end of election what happens. The Presiding Officer sits down and calls a few guys and says, ‘hey, there are a few hundred papers here, let’s thumbprint. This is the real election. Well, this is not a PDP thing. I am not here to castigate the PDP; it’s a Nigerian thing. This process may sound comical and jovial, it happens throughout the country, whether its Action Congress or APGA it’s the same thing. We are all the same. They start thumb-printing, some

24 are overzealous. So at the end of the day you find some voting more than the number of people that were registered to vote.

Other wise they do it, you have 95 percent turnout. You start wondering where were the voters, I didn’t see so many people. And the election results are announced; XYZ party wins and it takes a week for this paltry ten thousand Naira for each presiding officer to arrive. Listen to this before you ask your question: Who is the most important person in an election? – The presiding officer. And if there are a hundred and twenty thousand of them (booths) there are a hundred and twenty thousand presiding officers, they are the most important people in the elections, not the Chairman.

So, as long as we keep applying that same method, you will get the same results. Its crazy to think that because you substitute Iwu for Jega all will change. In other words, Iwu is a crook, Jega is a saint. Jega is great, he has an impeccable reputation. Iwu was great, now he seems not so great. Ok, they are both professors, they have reached the peak of whatever discipline that they profess. The point is that it is the system and the personnel and the chairman has little or no control over that.

Where are we now, we don’t even know when the elections will be. The Constitution amendment seems to be stalling somewhere. So it’s either in January or in April. Sometimes, we behave as if we invented democracy. We always want to draw new rules. We should know the day of elections. It should be fixed. We should know that on so and so date I think, America is the 4th of November or so and if it falls on a Sunday it doesn’t make a difference. The point I am making here is that date is fixed, you know; because in a democracy, election should be a norm, not an event. In our democracy, election is an event. Its like, we are going to spring on to you with fire works, hey, we are going to have an election, we are all running around- I know most politicians are broke right now, so we are all running around the field.

Secondly, if you have your ears to the ground there, are whispers that may be, we need to postpone this thing. The whispers are there. In a democracy, you postpone an election? You postpone things you didn’t plan for, not things that are there in the Constitution, that says you must do this, that and that, you can’t but –you know two ways of moving forward. This is where I like what SNG and CNP are doing.

We need a critical mass of Nigerians to get out and vote. It is important because the more ballot papers that are legitimately used on election day, the fewer available to be used to rig the vote, that’s the truth. Don’t keep to yourself and think that they will announce results. They are more sophisticated than that. And that’s why the aspirants who felt cheated and had the resources to employ forensic personnel, like those elections had the elections upturned in Edo and Ondo, because they could establish multiple voting by thumbprint.

So, if it’s an AC state the procedure is the same. I remember a state, that state will remain nameless. I hear the story that the then President was so determined that he must change the leadership of this state and he called the IG and said, ‘look, that Governor is a security breach. Let's have elections and flush the governor out, and the governor knows he is under siege. A week before the elections, a new police Commissioner arrives. And you know if you are a governor and a new Police Commissioner arrives before elections, you know something is wrong somewhere and he spends two, three days without going to see the governor, which is again a breach of protocol. The day he decides to see the governor, the governor says, I won’t be at the office. However, if he gives him a particular address they may discuss. Then the chap goes there and smartly salutes and it’s in a highbrow neighborhood of the city. (Shouts of Ikoyi rent the air.) ‘No! It’s Yobe!’ (The hall explodes in loud laughter).

The Commissioner of Police walks up to the governor and smartly salutes and says: ‘Your Excellency, I just came to introduce myself. My name is Mr. So, so and so. And the governor goes: ‘Ah, you are welcome. I heard you were here two or three days ago and I was wondering whether I won’t see you. Anyway, you are

26 welcome. Have you settled down?’ ‘Yes I’ve been given accommodation and all that. And the governor asks, ‘where was your last posting?’ He tells him, he says fine.

Governor: ‘That car over there, this is the key and this is your house. The Commissioner of Police now says: ‘Your Excellency, this Obasanjo is a very bad man. He is a very, very bad man. If you see all the things he has planned for you eh Olorun maje.’ How do we move on? How do we get out of here? What I have done is I’ve tried graphically to paint a picture of a process. How do we change this process?

One, I think, since we cannot change attitudes as quickly, we must ensure mass participation. In an election where there is a very high turnout, the results are usually genuine. The most celebrated election in Nigeria, June 12, 1993 what happened? People came out. The more people who come out to vote the fewer– there may be mago, mago here and there but there wouldn’t be much in such a critical manner to upset the will of the people. Beyond that, if you don’t vote in an election, you have no reason to criticize the government and I tell folks everywhere that guys, I would say, I have lived my life. You guys have not and you are all criticizing Nigeria but did you vote in the last election? Most of them say no then I say, you’ve lost the moral right to criticize what the government does because you were not part of the process.

Is there a way out? I think there is. I think we need to employ technology. It's just a suggestion and I want to share with you. I have said this in one or two fora and I’ve heard people say it has not been done in America or the West why should we do it here? I say they don’t have the attitude we have here. Necessity is the mother of invention. It is not necessary for us to do what I’m about to suggest.

For the purposes of this, 3455, this number is for a phone and that number is unique to you and valid for that election or the set of elections. And each party has a numerical equivalent. AC could be 1, the PDP could be 5, the Labour Party could be 3, whatever. And on the date of elections you decide that your number

27 even if you don’t have a phone, you can go to a centre where they have a bank of phones and once you put in your number 3455 it recognizes you, it cannot be duplicated. Its only you that has that number and for that election on that date, once its used it cannot be used by anyone else. Then you can do this one from your house or anywhere, and any time between the hours of 9-12. When it says which party, you say 3 or 4 whatever the number, they ask you, ‘are you sure you say Yes’. You press it then you’ve voted. With that, I think we can conduct election but people say ah, it’s to technological and I say, why do you always underestimate the people in the rural areas? If you send them money this way, won’t they be able to cash it? Why is it that when it is to conduct their civic responsibilities it becomes high tech? I know this country, I ran a state for eight years, I know the nooks and crannies of my state. We are not the most enlightened of states in the country, but you see, I had a deal with MTN and Glo to ensure that every community in Cross River State has a base station; for that I gave them sites free of charge; so, virtually every nook and cranny of Cross River has a base station. Even the most rural of places; even in Bakassi when we still had control of it. And they all use it. They still use it to call their folks in the urban centres to say send us money. Why is that when it comes to civic responsibility it is high tech? Because the politicians don’t want to use it, that’s the truth.

I am not saying this is a perfect system, it can be fine-tuned, that will ensure that within an hour or two every one has voted and the results are near perfect. Of course, once you design a system, there are those whose work is to un-design the system. There are people like that and they work backwards. Once you have that we also think the same way. How do we work backwards, where can this be faulted? It can be faulted in many ways. The service companies if you are able to break-through the integrity of the system, you know, here and there; but I think we are going to think outside the norm.

The point I’m trying to make is we have to think outside the box. I want to commend the federal government, each time the government talks about elections, it keeps on talking about credible elections with brilliant sound bite. But

28 it must go beyond the sound bite and lets not kid ourselves, by thinking that by putting a Jega there that all is well. With Jega there, all will be well if he is able to design along with his team a system that is virtually fool proof. In other words, he himself must understand the system of elections, he needs to know how it works and how its been holding.

As I speak to you, we’ve not started voters’ registration. That exercise will take any where from three to four months. It will take at least, ninety days to run through its course, another six weeks to tidy up before it is published; lets not kid ourselves. You can have elections anytime, but you can’t have credible elections in January. So, for those thinking we can have elections in January, I think we have to rethink the process; we cannot have credible elections in January. We may have elections but it may not be credible. Where are we? We need to get out of these holes; we need to traverse the length and breath of this country. We need to recruit an army of people may be 5, 000 in each state, two hundred young men and women who will reach our (people), give each of them a task to ensure that he registers at least a hundred person. That alone, will bring twenty million people into the fold. This is what they did in the Obama election.

Fortunately, I was monitoring the Obama election, whether you attain voting age or not, you are able to send text and move around and get people to vote. It's one thing to register, some folk tell me, ‘how can I go to line up for hours to vote for this person’. This is again what pastor Bakare was talking about, if people are not excited about the candidates they will not come out. ‘Look at the four people running, they are all clowns. I’ m going to watch television; I’m not going to vote because either way a clown is going to win’.