Between Independence and Engagement: Defining DSIEC’s Relationships with Government and Political Parties Introduction: the “Dukean confession”1 Let us begin with the mea culpa widely attributed to the former Governor of Cross River State, Mr. Donald Duke. In a report widely published by newspapers in 2010, the ex-Governor graphically describes how elections are rigged in Nigeria when he was Governor. Essentially, the model is that an INEC Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) arrives in a State capital, pays a courtesy call on the Governor and complains about lack of vehicles, accommodation, funding – everything practically. The Governor calls in his Chief of Staff and orders that the REC’s every need be provided. The following day, the REC receives several vehicles, keys to a posh accommodation and princely “spending money” to go with them. From then on, the State INEC office becomes an extension of the Government House, a mere parastatal under the State Governor and, by extension, an arm of the ruling party in the State. 1 By this I refer to the widely publicized comments by the former Governor of Cross River State, Donald Duke, detailing how in the past State Governors and INEC Resident Electoral Commissioners connive to rig elections in Nigeria. I have reproduced the awing remarks in the Appendix since I consider it a must read for election administrators. See http://saharareporters.com/report/must-read-how-governors-rig-elections-donald-duke- guardian?page=4 [Accessed 17th February 2014] 1 This “Dukean confession” only confirms what Nigerians have known to be true for some time namely, that rigging of elections is a cooperative enterprise between political parties, political authorities, security agencies and susceptible EMB officials. However, what is not exactly correct is the ring of finality and inevitability that Donald Duke weaves around this thesis. It is not correct because it is based on certain underlying assumptions that are not necessarily true. First, it is based on an assumption that underestimates the personal integrity of INEC staff, particularly RECS. In other words, it assumes that INEC staff would necessarily be susceptible to the kind of influence that he outlines. Second, it is based on the assumption that the conditions, which he identifies as making them susceptible to those influences, are necessarily permanent and given. He fails to realize that those conditions are intrinsically linked to issues of resource (mis)management which could be redressed by strong managerial structures based on strong, credible, transparent and accountable leadership in INEC. Third, it is also based on the assumption that this edifice of rigging that he outlines cannot be countered. The truth remains that the main trajectories of rigging elections in Nigeria have been well documented and studied and can be effectively countered where the knowledge and will exists in INEC. The challenge for EMBs in Nigeria then is to demonstrate that these assumptions on which the “Dukean confession” is built are not necessarily correct by depicting a high level of personal integrity, improving resource management and 2 developing effective strategies for combating rigging that would combine technology, administrative measures and public monitoring. To be able to do these requires that we get the right perspective on the relationship between the EMB and political parties and political authorities. This is the central purpose of this discussion paper. The central problematique is a simple one: Election Management Bodies must relate with political parties and political authorities. But how do you relate with such intensely partisan entities and still remain non- partisan? In other words, how do you engage and still remain separated? To answer these questions, our starting point is to understand models of relationships between election management bodies and political parties and political authorities. This is because the pattern of interactions between an EMB and political authorities and parties is at the very heart of its independence, and independence, in turn, is at the heart of free, fair and credible elections. Models of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) The independence of EMBs is often taken for granted. Yet, there is nothing natural about that independence outside the intrinsic principles that guide the liberal or market democracy that we practice. This type of democracy is informed by certain liberal principles that matured in the West in the 18th and 19th Centuries namely, equality, rationalism, pluralism and institutionalism. Applied to electoral democracy, these principles have to do with equality of votes and of the right to vote and be voted for; rationality of voters in making informed choices; 3 pluralism of political platforms among which voters choose; as well as institutional and regulatory framework that manages this process such that they appear to be relatively autonomous of and dissociated from specific political, economic or other sectional interests. Top among these institutions is the election management body. EMBs must therefore appear to embody not the interest of one political party or candidate, but the collective interests of the people-nation. This is the underlying source of the expectation of independence of EMBs. In essence, liberal or market democracy is the political equivalent of the market economy and market society. They are all built on pervasive commodity production and exchange, or what Claude Ake has called “thoroughgoing commoditization”.2 In market societies, people are first and foremost commodity bearers, even if the only commodity they bear is their labour power. Market norms such as individualism, formal freedom and equality, profit motive, and competition dominate social life. As commodity bearers, members of a market society exist as separate, self-interested, formally free and aggressively competitive individuals. Market forces (demand, supply and price) regulate this competition and everybody is equally subject to these seemingly neutral and natural forces. 2 Claude Ake ‘The Future of the State in Africa’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985. 4 Being socially atomised, formally free, equal and self-interested proprietors, these commodity bearers evolve a political architecture that is akin to the market.3 It is a system of constituting government, in which each actor is individualistic, self- interested, equal, autonomous and competitive, and in which there is a choice of political platforms and an independent institutional framework that is autonomous of these separate political interests regulates the entire system. Thus, the same conditions that propel the market economy also propel liberal democracy namely, pervasive commoditisation, the rational actor and independent regulation. However, ironically, it is precisely this same pervasive commoditization, which informs the autonomy and independence of institutions of a market society that leads to their corruption. This is because where these institutions are weak, they could also become commodities to be bought and sold by the highest bidder. This whole political architecture is best expressed in elections. In line with market principles, the legal framework for elections in a market democracy invariably provide for the freedom of individuals to vote and be voted for, the equality of votes and freedom to choose between political platforms. In other words, like the market economy, election in a market democracy assumes the existence of socially atomized and self-interested individuals. For added measure, just as 3 Ibid. 5 money is the medium of exchange in the economic market the ballot is the medium of exchange in the electoral (political) market. As with market economy, market democracy actualizes the “independence” of the regulatory agency, in this case the EMB, by masking the unequal relations of power among classes that are ingrained in them. This is expressed in the key instruments of these two levels of structure namely, money in the economy and ballots in politics. Just as money masks the unequal relations of economic power between the worker and the non-worker in which the later appropriates surplus value, the ballot masks the unequal relations of political power between the voter and the candidate in which the latter appropriates political power. The role of regulatory institutions (the Central Bank which issues money and the EMB which issues ballots) is to maintain this ideological masking of unequal power relations. To do so, they must retain an appearance of independence. Consequently, the election regulatory regime, just like the forces of demand and supply in the market, must be seemingly dissociated from the interests of individual candidates, political parties, political authorities or indeed classes and all are equally liable to the rules of the game. This is necessary to maintain public confidence in elections through a high value attached to the ballot. 4 4 Okechukwu Ibeanu ‘Elections and the paroxysmal future of democracy in Nigeria’, in Attahiru Jega and Okechukwu Ibeanu (eds) Elections and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria, Lagos: Nigerian Political Science Association, 2007. 6 It is the above logic that explains the importance of the independence of EMBs in liberal democracies. However, in practice, independence has been actualized through four major models of EMBs namely, independent, double independent, government and mixed models. The features of each of these and their implications