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ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Agency, Expression, and the Virtual Sphere: Social Media in

Saudi Arabia

Fiona Hayman[1]

Abstract

This paper seeks to address the question of why so many Saudi Arabians use social media. Prior literature investigating social media usage in the is either too broad or too narrow. This necessitates academic inquiry that addresses the “middle ground”. Saudi Arabians' markedly high rates of social media usage appear incongruous with the traditional, highly restrictive nature of Saudi Arabian society. Given social media's status as a relatively new phenomenon, and its recognized ability to engender civil engagement and political participation, its foothold in a conservative, undemocratic society appears unusual. Thus, this paper investigates the motivations behind Saudi Arabians' social media usage. Qualitative and quantitative data from NGO reports, statistical databases, case studies, news articles, and social media accounts demonstrate a causal link between state repression and social media usage. The evidence indicates that Saudi Arabians use social media to circumvent societal restrictions.

Keywords

Social media, Saudi Arabia, society, civil society, repression

[1] Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA. Corresponding author: [email protected].

© 2017 Fiona Hayman. Some rights reserved, licensed under CC BY 4.0 Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 4

1. Introduction recognized ability to “encompass civic engagement, political participation, In this paper, I seek to determine entrepreneurial efforts, and social change” why so many Saudi Arabians use social (Mourtada and Salem, 2012), its strong media. I argue that Saudi Arabians use foothold in a conservative, undemocratic social media to circumvent societal society seems unusual. Saudi Arabia, to restrictions. In developing my argument, I which Freedom House recently bestowed a categorize Saudis’ social media usage score of “least free” in the criteria of according to the type of repression it seeks political rights, civil liberties, and overall to circumvent: political or social. Using freedom rating (Freedom House, 2016), qualitative and quantitative data collected hardly seems a welcome host for social from NGO reports, statistical databases, case media platforms full of potential for studies, news articles, and social media political, cultural, and social transformation. accounts, I demonstrate a causal link An absolute monarchy influenced by the between state repression and social media conservative Wahhabi sect of Islam, the usage. Saudi government operates under Islamic (sharia) law—which, according to critics, is 1.1. Research Question and its used to justify widespread abuses and denial Motivations of human rights (Taylor, 2015). In one dimension, it restricts its citizens’ capacity This question is worthy of to participate in the political process and investigation because Saudi Arabians’ limits access to freedoms of speech, press, markedly high rates of social media usage expression, religion, and fair trial. In appear, on the surface, to be incompatible another, it exercises tight control over with the traditional, restrictive nature of societal structures and interactions, Saudi Arabian society. Compared with especially through subjecting women to a nations around the globe, Saudi Arabia strict set of rules regarding their behavior, stands out in terms of its social media usage. lifestyle, and appearance. In 2013, Saudi Arabia ranked first in the Investigating the motivations behind world for Twitter penetration, meaning that Saudis’ use of social media and the purposes the highest percentage of the country’s total for which it is used may shed light on Internet users were active on Twitter important developments in Saudi Arabian (Almashabi and Nereim, 2015). Two years society. Such investigation can reveal the later, nearly half of Saudi Internet users had implications widespread use of social media become members of Instagram, while the holds for Saudi Arabian society and its global average trailed at only 23% (ibid). political, social, and cultural evolution. When compared with nations in the region, Insights gleaned from the case of Saudi Saudi Arabia’s social media usage stands Arabia, in turn, may help scholars out as significantly higher. Twitter users in investigate how social media usage can Saudi Arabia alone generate 40% of tweets impact other societies. In an age when from the Middle East and North Africa, and technology continues to transform political, Saudi Arabia has consistently been home to social, and cultural life across the globe, it is the highest number of Facebook users in the important that the role of social media is Middle East (Mohammed Bin Rashid examined, and its role in transformative School of Government, 2014: 36, 23). processes understood. Focusing on the case Given social media’s status as a of Saudi Arabia in particular can contribute relatively new phenomenon, and its Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 5

to our understanding of how social media 60%, a positive correlation exists between can facilitate social and political change in levels of state-imposed repression and social countries that limit civil discourse and media usage. I then present evidence that exercise censorship over the conventional supports my argument. I draw upon both media. quantitative and qualitative data from case studies, think tank and watchdog reports, 1.2. Paper Outline datasets, news articles, and primary sources, such as Saudi Facebook pages and In this paper, I first provide a review Instagram accounts. These sources highlight of prior literature, discussing contributions, Saudi Arabians’ motivations for using social limitations, and areas where further research media to circumvent political and social is needed. The literature review shows that repression. prior scholarship has made significant I conclude with a summary of contributions in discussing the role of social findings. I discuss the limitations of the media’s predecessors—satellite TV and the argument, its theoretical implications, and Internet—as disruptive technologies with the its broader application to cases beyond potential for transforming social and Saudi Arabia. Lastly, I provide suggestions political landscapes in the Middle East, the for further research. role of social media in mobilizing collective action during the Arab Spring, and social media’s role in specific contexts within 2. Literature Review Saudi Arabia, such as its use during a 2009 natural disaster. The literature, however, is 2.1 Introduction either too broad and outdated, or too narrow to adequately address my question. These In this section, I review literature shortcomings result in the need for middle relevant to answering the question I have ground to be covered: for new academic posed. There is a limited body of literature inquiry that is broad enough to illuminate surrounding my question, due in part to the motivations behind Saudis’ social media social media being a fairly recent usage on a country-wide scale, but narrow phenomenon. Most relevant literature was enough to investigate the reasons for usage produced within the past decade. Earlier that are specific to the unique social and literature on emergent information political conditions in Saudi Arabia. technologies such as satellite television and Next, I build the argument, the internet can be useful in setting the stage identifying the independent variable, for further proliferation of technology, yet dependent variable, and causal mechanism the projections and predictions common that links the two variables. I argue that throughout this body of work stray far from societal restrictions impact social media the reality of the present day. Therefore, I usage in Saudi Arabia, due to Saudi have chosen relatively recent literature, Arabians’ desire to circumvent these mostly from the last decade, so that these restrictions. I assert that Saudis use social texts can provide relevant and accurate media in response to two distinct forms of context for my question of study. repression: social and political. Based upon I have divided the literature into my findings in the Saudi Arabian case, I three groups: 1. Usage of New Media in the predict that across countries with internet Middle East, 2. Usage of Social Media in the and smartphone penetration rates of over Arab Spring, and 3. Usage of Social Media Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 6

in Saudi Arabia. These groups, descending in which new forms of media have played a in order of specificity, fall short of solving role in shaping the region, this literature the puzzle of why so many Saudi Arabians provides context for how Saudi Arabians use social media. Group 1 discusses the might interact with and use the new tools of interactions of mass digital communications social media. This body of literature, with Middle Eastern social, cultural, and however, discusses general regional political life, but the literature is too broad developments without delving into the and outdated. Group 2 discusses the use of specific case of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, social media as an activist tool during the its discussion of the impact of new media Arab Spring uprisings, but the literature predates the emergence of social media as a focuses on a limited revolutionary context phenomenon distinct from ‘new’ Internet or where many events and developments were TV media. For these reasons, Group 1 fails not applicable to Saudi Arabia. Group 3 to answer the question of why so many analyzes social media usage in Saudi Saudi Arabians use social media. Arabia, but this body of literature—a Ghareeb assesses the role of new collection of scattered case studies—fails to media—such as pan-Arab newspapers, comparatively analyze why so many Saudis, satellite networks, and the Internet—in as opposed to members of other societies, shaping information flows and political use social media. While the literature as a discourse in the Arab world (Ghareeb, whole provides valuable context as to how 2000). He concludes that such new communication technologies and social communications technologies, “ideally networks have shaped the region, it is either suited for the spread of political and social too broad—as in the case of Group 1—or ideas” (p.398) could be used to promote too limited to certain cases, as in Groups 2 cross-cultural discourse, pan-Arab unity, and 3. Therefore, I recommend synthesizing forums of free expression, and a more the existing literature to both form a involved citizenry. Ghareeb’s work, which comprehensive image of Saudis’ discusses the Arab world on a large scale motivations and purposes for using social without delving much into particular country media in their unique national context, and cases, is too broad to adequately address the to investigate the comparative aspect of why question. Furthermore, his analysis of media so many Saudi Arabians, compared to forms that were new in 2000 is now citizens of other countries, use social media. outdated and not especially relevant to Achieving this, however, first necessitates a recent social media platforms. Beyond this, review of the literature. his concluding predictions, which have since proven inaccurate—for instance, that Group 1: Usage of New Media in the “technical infrastructure problems will Middle East constrain the ability of the Internet (and even satellite TV) to reach the majority of The literature in Group 1 introduces the Arabs” (p.416)—disproved by today’s forms of ‘new media’ such as satellite high internet and mobile penetration rates networks, transnational news outlets, and across the Middle East (Mohammed Bin online communities as potentially Rashid School of Government, 2014)— revolutionary tools to enable cross-cultural cannot serve as a solid foundation for further communication, support the free flow of research. information, and shape political and social Seib (2007) examines how new life in the Middle East. By discussing ways media, such as that communicated through Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 7

the Internet and cellphones, impacts anticipate the potential of such media to democratization in the Middle East (Seib, transform civil society, their analysis falls 2007). He finds these media to be “potent short, as they only consider the physical tools in fostering political transformation” vehicles—television, web browsers, and cell (p.1) that “are affecting democratization phones—that enable social media, rather within the Middle East, particularly in terms than social media itself, with its distinct of their transnational impact” (ibid). Seib’s capacity to form communities and work, like Ghareeb’s, concerns too broad of interactive networks. an area to generate valuable insights into the case of Saudi Arabia. Though more recent Group 2: Usage of Social Media in than Ghareeb’s, his work is also too the Arab Spring outdated to be applicable to the uses of social media, as it differs profoundly in The literature in Group 2 analyzes nature from internet or TV media the use of social media to engender social predecessors. Technologies such as the and political change during the Arab Spring Internet and satellite television increased the revolutions of 2011. While this body of accessibility of information and speed of literature is successful in investigating the communication in the early 2000s, and they purposes for which social media was used generally involved a binary relationship, throughout the Middle East during the Arab such as that between TV news outlet and Spring, its focus on the limited context of viewer, in which the audience occupied a these revolutions prevents it from passive position. The expansive developing a more comprehensive analysis interpersonal networks introduced by social of social media usage beyond this context. media, on the other hand, enable audiences Furthermore, given the minimal effect the to create and share their own content, Arab Spring had on Saudi Arabia’s social creating new potential for interaction, and political landscape (McCullagh, 2012), collaboration, and mobilization. this literature—focused on the activism and Along these lines, Eickelman and collective action associated with the Anderson (2003) argue that new media movement—cannot be meaningfully applied “refigure audiences as communities” (p.9), in explanation of why so many Saudi transforming top-down patterns of Arabians use social media in an everyday communication into community-oriented setting. communication flows and, in the process, Howard and Hussain (2013) assert creating space for the emergence of a public that digital media transmitted through social sphere. Eickelman and Anderson view new networks is a force contributing to a “fourth media as tools for the cultivation of civil wave of democratization.” As evidenced in society under repressive regimes (ibid). Like the case of the Arab Spring, civil society the prior two works mentioned, Eickelman actors have “learned to leverage social and Anderson’s book provides breadth but media” while “digital media use by multiple not depth, and fails to provide useful insight political actors and interests continue to specific to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the shape emerging Arab media systems” (p.4). two authors’ work, published in 2003, faces Howard and Hussein’s focus on the Arab the same limitation of being outdated, since Spring limits their analysis of social media the usage of ‘new’ media discussed refers usage to the specific context of the primarily to TV, Internet, and cell usage, not revolutionary movement, thus limiting any social media usage. While the authors do broader implications for social media usage. Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 8

Additionally, the authors draw from cases of same factors that motivated social media countries most affected by the Arab Spring, activism during the Arab Spring would drive such as and , therefore social media usage in Saudi Arabia. neglecting Saudi Arabia in their analysis. Furthermore, the authors’ focus on countries For these reasons, Howard and Hussein’s such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, instead of work does not adequately address the Saudi Arabia, renders them unable to question of why so many Saudi Arabians directly answer the question of why so many use social media. Saudi Arabians use social media. Miladi explores the role that platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Group 3: Usage of Social Media in YouTube played in the Arab Spring Saudi Arabia revolutions, as well as “the extent to which their availability served in a complex The literature in Group 3 consists manner the democratic transition that mainly of case studies regarding the use of Tunisia has been undergoing and the social media during particular events or political turmoil that Egypt is witnessing” movements in Saudi Arabia. While each (Miladi, 2016: 36). Basing her argument work offers insight into how social media upon these insights, Miladi asserts that the was used in the context discussed, most new forms of communication created by works of this literature are too narrow in social media enable the emergence of scope to adequately address the question of vibrant, online spaces for political why so many Saudi Arabians use social mobilization and social empowerment media. Additionally, none of the works in (ibid). Miladi’s argument is largely Group 3 offer comparative analyses that descriptive, and it investigates the use of would shed light on why so many Saudis, as social media only as it applies to the Arab compared to members of other societies, use Spring revolutions—thus limiting the social media. applicability of her findings to other cases. In their article, Agarwal et al. (2012) Additionally, Miladi mainly discusses utilize the case of women’s right-to-drive countries most impacted by the Arab Spring, campaigns in Saudi Arabia to study the like Egypt and Tunisia—leaving out Saudi interactions between social media and Arabia, where only “minor protests…had collective action. The authors found that little impact” (Howard, 2011: 9). social media was used to help the campaign Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) theorize that gain transnational support, as “individual politics serve as a primary factor, both sentiment diffuses within the [social] analytically and chronologically speaking, in network, shapes into collective sentiment, determining social media’s impact on and transforms into collective action” collective action. The authors then apply the (p.106). These findings, however, apply to case of the Arab Spring to show that such a specific case; thirteen to seventeen political factors drive the use of social media thousand people’s use of social media to for collective action, not vice versa. Due to support the right-to-drive campaign—not all the Arab Spring being a relatively unique of them Saudis—is not representative of the phenomenon, the findings of Wolfsfeld’s rest of the Saudi Arabian population’s social work cannot easily be applied to other cases. media usage. Additionally, Agarwal et al.’s Indeed, the lack of effect the Arab Spring work contains no comparative elements that demonstrated on the Saudi Arabian would illuminate why so many Saudi population may make it unlikely that the Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 9

Arabians, versus citizens of other countries, Bahkali et al.’s work explores the use social media. use of social media as a platform upon Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2015) which to promote women’s health education investigate how and why Saudis’ usage of in Saudi Arabia. The authors found that social media spiked after devastating floods Saudi Twitter members used the platform to in 2009. The authors conclude that social seek health information from accounts media allowed users to discuss the extent of promoting women’s health, and that the damage inflicted; rationally process the followers of these accounts showed greater events that transpired, and who could be health awareness than non-followers— held responsible; express qualms against the findings that show “social media has the government and demand that remedial potential to improve women’s health in action be taken; and commiserate over the developing countries through health loss of life in a unifying fashion (ibid). As is education and promotion” (Bahkali et al., the case with Agarwal et al.’s work, Al- 2015: 259). The narrow scope of Bahkali et Saggaf and Simmons’ article is so narrowly al.’s case study is problematic for its constrained in scope—analyzing social application to other cases—the motivations media usage surrounding one natural driving the 3,449 followers of the Twitter disaster—that it is hard to justify applying health promotion account to engage with the authors’ findings more broadly. social media (personal health concerns for Furthermore, the article lacks theoretical young and middle-aged women) are not implications, rendering its conclusions of common across the entirety of the Saudi little use in application to other contexts. population (ibid). As in the other works Like Agarwal’s, it also lacks a comparative included in Group 3, Bakhali et al.’s work analysis that would place Saudi Arabia’s also lacks a comparative aspect. social media usage, and the motivations behind it, side by side with that of other countries. 2.2 Conclusion & Recommendations Askool (2013) explores “the use of social media among individuals in Saudi I have presented a review of the Arabia…the effect of cultural restrictions on literature relevant to answering the question individual’s motivation, users’ attitude, of why so many Saudi Arabians use social intention behavior and their actual use” media, and I have explained the limitations (p.201) and finds that social media, used that have prevented this body of literature more for socializing than any other purpose, from providing a complete answer to this appears to be catalyzing a cultural shift that question. I divided this literature review into may lead to social change and new business three groupings: 1. Usage of New Media in opportunities for Saudis. While Askool’s the Middle East, 2. Usage of Social Media in work includes thorough quantitative analysis the Arab Spring, and 3. Usage of Social producing insights on Saudis’ motivations, Media in Saudi Arabia. Group 1 explores attitudes, and behaviors regarding social how the ‘new’ media, as it was conceived in media use, it does not investigate the the early-to-mid 2000s, interacted with question of why so many Saudi Arabians social, cultural, and political life in the use social media—thus neglecting the Middle East. Group 2 analyzes the social comparative element between countries that and political use of social media during the would be imperative in solving the puzzle. Arab Spring revolutions of 2011. Group 3 draws upon various case studies to explore Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 10

why and how social media is used in Saudi understanding of Saudis’ motivations and Arabia. purposes for using social media, taking into As a whole, the literature account Saudi Arabia’s distinct cultural, demonstrates modest progress towards social and political contexts. This research answering my research question. The should constitute a step towards answering literature in Group 1 may be valuable in why Saudi Arabians use social media. I also providing historical context as a backdrop propose using existing data to compare for the present political, social, and social media use and surrounding technological conditions with which social motivations, attitudes, and behaviors media interacts. The theoretical framework between Saudi Arabia and other countries. offered by some works in Groups 1 and 2 Investigating this element of the topic may be helpful in guiding approaches to should be an endeavor in answering why so answering the question. The cases studied in many Saudi Arabians use social media, Group 2 may help guide thinking by when compared to social media users in differentiating social media usage in Saudi other countries. Addressing both dimensions Arabia from that of countries where the of the question is imperative for developing Arab Spring spurred heavily activist usage. a complete answer to the question. I attribute The cases studied in Group 3 touch more the lack of a comprehensive answer to the directly upon the question, providing relatively recent emergence of social media incomplete answers that could be as a socially, culturally, and politically synthesized in a more complete analysis. salient phenomenon warranting academic Despite these strengths, the literature study. As I have stated, the increasingly leaves major gaps that result in the question rapid transformation of media over the past having been left unanswered. The literature few decades has made it so past academic provides both broad theories about the topic work on media and communications as well as narrow case studies. Middle technologies can become less relevant over ground that addresses the question without time. This reality, however, cannot hinder being too broad or narrow in scope is the production of meaningful academic lacking. An additional challenge arises with work on such developments. This type of the fact that social media is a relatively new work seeks to provide understanding of the and rapidly changing phenomenon in ongoing rapid transformations that academia, so any work produced more than characterize life in the 21st century. a decade ago may not be particularly Prior literature offers contributions relevant to the topic. The literature included that are relevant to my question, but as a in Group 1 is too broad and outdated, while whole fails to adequately address it. I have Group 2’s literature is limited to the context divided the literature into three groups, of specific events/movements that don’t descending in order of specificity: 1. Usage relate much to Saudi Arabia. The works of New Media in the Middle East, 2. Usage included in Group 3, while more applicable of Social Media in the Arab Spring, and 3. to the Saudi population, are also limited in Usage of Social Media in Saudi Arabia. scope, and lack a comparative aspect Group 1 discusses the interactions of mass evaluating social media usage between digital communications with Middle Eastern Saudi Arabia and other countries. social, cultural, and political life, but the To fill these gaps, I recommend literature is too broad and outdated. Group 2 synthesizing the existing literature to discusses the use of social media as an develop a complete, multidimensional activist tool during the Arab Spring Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 11

uprisings, but the literature focuses on a Thus, the need emerges for work that covers limited revolutionary context where many middle ground: work that explores the events and developments were not current use of social media among Saudis, in applicable to Saudi Arabia. Group 3 a way that can elicit broader conclusions analyzes social media usage in Saudi about its use across the Saudi Arabian Arabia, but this body of literature fails to population as a whole. There also exists a comparatively analyze why so many Saudis, need for comparison between the as opposed to members of other societies, technological, social, and political use social media. While the literature as a conditions of Saudi Arabia versus other whole provides valuable context as to how countries, in order to comparatively analyze communication technologies and social the high rates of social media usage in Saudi networks have shaped the region, it is either Arabia when put aside those of other too broad—as in the case of Group 1—or countries. In the argument, I synthesize the too limited to certain cases, as in Groups 2 conclusions drawn from prior literature with and 3. Therefore, I recommend synthesizing those developed through my own research to the existing literature to both form a form a comprehensive answer to the comprehensive image of Saudis’ question. I also compare levels of social and motivations and purposes for using social political repression between Saudi Arabia media in their unique national context, and and other countries, exploring the influence to investigate the comparative aspect of why of such repression on social media usage so many Saudi Arabians, compared to across populations. citizens of other countries, use social media. 3.2 Definitions

3. Argument Social media use is defined as active, consistent engagement with one or more of 3.1 Introduction the five largest global social networks: Facebook, Whatsapp, Tumblr, Instagram, I argue that Saudi Arabians use and Twitter (Kemp, 2016). State repression social media to circumvent restrictions in is defined as state-imposed restrictions on their country, driven by a desire for more citizens’ political rights and civil liberties. agency and freedom in everyday life. In the Political rights enable free and meaningful argument, I categorize Saudi Arabians’ participation in the political process, social media usage into two groups, each including the right to vote in free, legitimate responding to a distinct type of state elections with distinct choices, to contend repression: political and social. Based on my for public office, to join political parties and findings in the case of Saudi Arabia, I then organizations, and to elect accountable predict that in countries with internet and representatives that are empowered to smartphone penetration rates of over 60%, a impact public policy (Freedom House, positive correlation will exist between levels 2012). Civil liberties “allow for the of state repression and social media usage. freedoms of expression and belief, The argument addresses the gaps left associational and organizational rights, rule by prior literature. All prior literature is of law, and personal autonomy without either too broad and outdated, or too narrow interference from the state” (ibid). Political to sufficiently address the question of why repression involves limiting or forbidding so many Saudi Arabians use social media. citizens’ ability to engage in a society’s Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 12

political sphere. It may include restricting guardianship system, which forbids them access to freedoms, such as speech, press, from obtaining a passport, marrying, expression, and religion. Social repression traveling, pursuing higher education, or refers to “the act of controlling, subduing or undergoing medical procedures without a suppressing people, groups, and larger social male relative’s approval (ibid). Women are aggregations by interpersonal means” also banned from driving, starting a business (Psychology Dictionary, 2016). Methods of without a male sponsor, or interacting with maintaining social repression may include unrelated men for more than brief time information control, eradication of periods (The Week, 2016). These conditions movements for reform, and manipulation of provide for a repressed society in which local leaders (ibid). relatively little freedom is left to the citizen. I argue that, in order to circumvent 3.3 Argument political restrictions, Saudis use social media to create their own public sphere, which I argue that Saudi Arabians use serves as a virtual forum for expression of social media to circumvent restrictions in political opinions, exposure of corruption, their country. I hypothesize that such social and engagement in civil discourse. Social media usage is driven by Saudis’ desire for media proves instrumental in the formation more agency and freedom in everyday life. I of an online civil society that is both a assert that, beyond a certain threshold of challenge to, and a result of, the state internet and smartphone penetration, a preventing civil society from forming in positive correlation exists between state legitimate channels. Through these new, repression and social media usage. relatively safe spaces for discussion and In my argument, I categorize Saudi dissent, Saudi Arabians exercise their ability Arabians’ social media usage into two to voice their opinions, criticize the groups, each responding to a distinct type of government, and hold officials accountable. state repression: political and social. To I also argue that Saudis use social understand this argument, it is important to media to both protest and virtually have prior knowledge of Saudi Arabia’s circumvent social restrictions, especially current social and political circumstances. those imposed on women. Women use The Saudi monarchy has long been social media to engage comfortably in an characterized by its neglect to provide online public sphere, despite strict gender citizens with political rights and civil segregation and limited freedom of mobility liberties, and it is notorious for subjecting in public. They use networks to advocate for peaceful dissidents and human rights their rights, sometimes reaching activists to imprisonment, corporal international audiences, and to obtain access punishment, and/or capital punishment to information and business opportunities (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Public that would not be as accessible otherwise. protests are banned countrywide, traditional media are government-owned directly or by 3.4 Logic proxy, and any press “blaspheming” Islam or the monarchy is forbidden (ibid). The I argue that social media use, the state’s refusal to register political or human outcome of interest, is affected by state rights organizations further leads to an repression, the explanatory variable of absence of civil society (ibid). Saudi interest. I assert that Saudi Arabians’ desire Arabian women are subject to a male to circumvent state-imposed restrictions, in Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 13

order to gain more freedom in daily life, To support my argument, I draw serves as the causal mechanism by which upon both quantitative and qualitative data state repression influences social media use. from case studies, think tank and watchdog I hypothesize that this desire for greater reports, statistical datasets, news articles, agency—freedom from state repression—is and social media accounts. Evidence from the driving force that motivates and these sources supports the argument that characterizes Saudi Arabian social media Saudi Arabians use social media out of a usage. desire to circumvent state repression, as well as my prediction that state repression and Other possible explanatory factors social media usage positively correlate in a include internet and smartphone penetration country with over 60% penetration. I present rates or physical and cultural geographical the evidence and explain how it supports the factors. However, the evidence illustrates, claims I make in this paper. I begin by beyond a certain point, high internet and introducing evidence of how Saudi Arabians smartphone penetration rates do not directly use social media to circumvent political correlate with high rates of social media repression. I proceed to present evidence usage. In fact, many countries with regarding Saudis’ use of social media to penetration rates higher than those of Saudi circumvent social repression. I then provide Arabia show lower rates of social media aggregate data that rules out other possible usage. The evidence will also indicate that explanatory factors influencing social media social media usage varies greatly within and usage. Finally, I provide evidence across regions, ruling out geography as an supporting my prediction that, across independent variable. countries over a certain threshold of internet After eliminating other potential and smartphone penetration, a positive explanatory variables, it becomes evident correlation between state repression and that state repression impacts social media social media usage exists. usage. The data shows that beyond a threshold of 60%, social media usage no 4.1 Political Repression longer increases in clear correlation with increasing penetration rates. When A major instance in which Saudi comparing levels of state repression across Arabians used social media to react to and countries with penetration rates above 60%, circumvent political repression took place a positive correlation is apparent between following the 2009 floods of the city of levels of state repression and social media Jeddah. Following the floods, a Facebook usage, with the chosen case of analysis— page entitled “Popular Campaign to Save the Saudi Arabia—exemplifying this trend. City of Jeddah” was created to express Based on this conclusion, I predict that public outrage over the lack of infrastructure beyond a threshold of 60% internet and that had enabled the floods to inflict heavy smartphone penetration, a positive damage (Murphy, 2009). With 11,000 correlation exists between levels of state followers, the page attracted significant repression and rates of social media usage. internet attention even beyond the group; one post telling the story of Farman Ali Khan, a Pakistani expat who saved 14 4. Evidence people from drowning, only to drown himself in an attempt to save a 15th person, was picked up by the Sydney Morning Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 14

Herald and then carried into subsequent defiant taunt to the Saudi state and its global circulation, drawing international antiquated legal system (ibid). One tweet attention to the floods (Al-Saggaf and read, “Saudi Arabia says it’ll sue people Simmons, 2015: 5). Facebook, in this saying its justice “system” is like #ISIS’s. instance, served as a conduit through which Beheading folk for apostasy etc means it is. Saudis could make their voices heard So #SueMeSaudi!” (Marten, 2015). internationally—a process of amplification Although the original subject of protest—a often denied to the population, as the Saudi Palestinian poet that was executed for government pressures foreign journalists to apostasy—suffered fatal consequences for self-censor and otherwise complicates the his free expression, social media provided candid reporting of news (Freedom House, the #SueMeSaudi tweeters with a space for 2013). to exercise relatively free speech and Saudis also took advantage of social expression, and to protest the restrictions media as a safe, relatively anonymous space and legal threats constraining such freedom to criticize the government and demand in the physical world. accountability. One Facebook post regarding the floods read, “It is very clear that 4.2 Social Repression negligence and corrupt officials are responsible for this, because for more than The online discourse surrounding the 20 years they started the water drainage 2009 Jeddah floods served the additional projects and till now a flood like this is purpose of providing women with a space happening which means all these projects for meaningful participation in the public are not functioning” (Al-Saggaf and sphere. A Saudi woman’s comment on a Simmons, 2015: 6). Another declared “This Facebook video read, “What do you mean is the result of corruption and nepotism, first by [Nice View]!!!...people are losing their the big thieves should be brought to justice families and the only thing you think of is then the small ones” (p.7). More posts called yourself…….I am really sorry for you:((you for the impeachment of Jeddah’s mayor and are missing lots of things in your demanded that the government make life:(……..**I am a saudi and a muslim girl, amends for the loss of life and property and I am proud of it:).” (Al-Saggaf and (ibid). In light of the lack of legitimate Simmons, 2015:5). In this comment, the channels to express dissent or disagreement female speaker proudly asserts her religious, with the government, Saudi Arabians were national, and gender identities and expresses able to transform social networks into virtual her views in an open, confrontational public squares where free speech could be fashion—with no regard for the gender of expressed and government officials called to the Facebook user she addresses. Women answer for their actions. such as this speaker were able to engage Another case in which Saudi confidently and openly in the virtual public Arabians used social media to circumvent sphere that proliferated after the floods political restrictions surrounded a despite the gender segregation and lack of government official’s threat to sue a Twitter freedom they faced in public life. user who had compared the Saudi legal Saudi women have been active in system’s death sentence to an ISIS execution using social media to further the cause of (Ilsley, 2015). Over 110,000 Twitter users women’s right to drive. In 2011, after a jumped to their fellow tweeter’s defense, woman protested the anti-driving law by developing the hashtag #SueMeSaudi as a posting a video online of herself behind the Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 15

wheel, the Twitter hashtag #Women2Drive using the network because she “wanted to be emerged as the rallying slogan for her own boss” (Amos, 2015). Al-Mazrou subsequent women’s right-to-drive states that because of her work, “I’m free, campaigns (Agarwal et al., 2012: 953). and no man has to take responsibility for Facebook served as another platform that me” (ibid). The two women both express a consolidated support; the “Saudi Women desire to escape from rigid, socially dictated Spring” Facebook page, named after the control over women’s lives as a motivating 2011 Arab Spring revolutions, gained over factor in starting their businesses over social 7,000 followers and called for solidarity media. with the issue of women’s rights (Facebook, 2016). Another Facebook page entitled 4.3 Possible Alternative Causes “Saudi Women to Drive” has 36,000 followers to date, and its timeline boasts a While internet and smartphone bold graphic declaring plans to establish an penetration rates and geographical factors NGO in New York City (ibid). The caption may appear to be potential independent below the graphic announces an ongoing variables, the evidence indicates otherwise. search for fiscal sponsors of the NGO, and While it is logical to assume that social contains a link to a crowdsourcing site media usage increases with penetration (ibid). The women’s right-to-drive campaign rates, the evidence shows that this is only illustrates Saudi women’s development of a the case up until a threshold of 60% reform movement, existing in an online penetration (Kemp, 2016). A number of dimension, which has attracted international countries demonstrate higher penetration attention, breaking the historical barrier that rates, yet lower social media usage rates state-sponsored media had put up between when compared to Saudi Arabia—including Saudis and the outside world. the , , South Saudi women additionally use social Korea, , and . Korea, for media to circumvent restrictions relating to instance, has 89.9% Internet and 88% business and finance. Recent years have smartphone penetration (Kissonergis, 2016), seen a proliferation of social media-based compared to Saudi Arabia’s 69.6% for businesses run by women who seek to Internet (World Bank, 2015) and 72.8% for generate their own source of income while smartphones (Omics International, 2013). circumventing the male sponsorship While 60% and 65% of Saudi Arabian necessary to formally start a business Internet users use Twitter and Facebook, (Almashabi and Nereim, 2015). Rozana al- respectively, only 25% of South Korean Daini, for instance, runs @accessories_ar, Internet users are on Twitter, and 48% on an Instagram account with 129,000 Facebook (Chaffey, 2016). Over half of followers that she uses to market and sell Saudi Arabian Internet users use Instagram, clothing and accessories (al-Daini, 2016). and the average Saudi Arabian Internet user Rozana, who handles over 25 orders per has nine active social media accounts; in day, appreciates being able to “solve any , Instagram usage comprises problems or difficulties, financial or only 7% of total social media usage (Kemp, otherwise, without interference of family 2016) and the average Internet user has four members” (Almashabi and Nereim, 2015). active social media accounts (Global Web Nouf al-Mazrou, the founder of a barbecue Index, 2016). Furthermore, while Saudi catering business advertised on Instagram as Arabians spend an average of 2 hours 56 @bbq__time (al-Mazrou, 2016), started minutes using social media per day, South Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 16

Koreans only use networks for 1 hour 6 selected to control for geography as a minutes each day (Kemp, 2016). Figure 1 possible alternate cause, since each country illustrates a similar pattern across additional is in a different region. Saudi Arabia, the countries when compared to Saudi Arabia. , and are Variation in social media usage examined because they are the few countries within and across regions rules out with Internet and smartphone penetration at geography as a possible independent or above 60%, Freedom House and CATO variable. Only 26% of the population in the rankings below average, and information Middle East holds active accounts on the available on social media usage. The world’s largest social networks, compared to selection of these six countries provides for 59% in North America, 47% in Europe, 11% comparison of the high and low ends of the in Africa, 50% in South America, 40% in state repression spectrum, which can be Asia, and 45% in Oceania (ibid). This is due generalized to other countries along the in part to variation in Internet penetration spectrum with penetration rates over 60%. rates within and across regions—while The three countries with low levels Africa has the lowest Internet penetration of state repression demonstrate lower rates rates across the board, the countries in Asia of Twitter usage and Facebook usage, lower and the Middle East vary widely in their average social media usage per day, and levels of penetration (ibid). fewer average numbers of social media The elimination of the two accounts per Internet user when compared to aforementioned potential independent the three countries with relatively high variables points to state repression as the levels of state repression. This suggests a applicable independent variable in the positive correlation between state repression puzzle. Having established state repression and social media usage, once the threshold as the main explanatory variable, I predict a of 60% penetration has been reached. positive correlation between state repression and social media usage when penetration 4.4 Summary of Key Findings rates exceed 60%. When comparing levels of state-imposed repression between The evidence presented supports the countries with penetration rates of over argument that Saudi Arabians use social 60%, it appears that higher levels of media with the goal of circumventing and repression correlate with higher social media protesting state repression. Primarily usage, with Saudi Arabia exemplifying this qualitative data from a number of case correlation. This relationship is evident in studies illustrate the ways in which Saudi Figure 2. Arabians use social media to circumvent Using Freedom House rankings and both political and social restrictions. the CATO Human Freedom Index to Quantitative aggregate data supports state measure levels of state repression, Figure 2 repression as the explanatory factor causing examines the relationship between state higher rates of social media usage and rules repression and social media usage at the out other possible independent variables. high and low ends of the spectrum of state Additional aggregate data, as well as think repression, across six countries with Internet tank indices, support the prediction that a and smartphone penetration at or above positive correlation exists between state 60%. Australia, South Korea, Spain, the repression and social media usage if a U.S., and the U.K. demonstrate relatively country has over 60% Internet and cellphone low levels of state repression, and were penetration. Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 17

key terms as they are used in the context of my argument. I then provided background 5. Conclusion on the socially and politically repressive conditions in present-day Saudi Arabia. 5.1 Summary Afterwards, I described the political and social dimensions of my argument. I In this paper I have argued that Saudi argued that politically, Saudi Arabians use Arabians use social media to bypass state social media to create a safer, virtual civil restrictions imposed in political and social society. Government suppression of dimensions. First, I introduced my question legitimate channels for civil society and its motivations. I described the apparent necessitates and motivates the formation of abnormality of high social media usage rates civil society over social media. These new in a deeply conservative society, as well as online spaces are then used as forums to the need to understand of how social media express dissent, voice opinions without fear can foster political and social of punishment, and hold government transformations in countries that restrict officials accountable. I argued that socially, political rights and civil liberties. Saudi Arabians use social media to both After introducing the research protest and virtually bypass restrictions on question and its motivations, I provided a society—especially those to which women literature review to highlight the are subject. The online public sphere contributions and limitations of prior provides Saudi women with a space to literature. I discussed how existing literature engage comfortably—one they are not is either too broad and outdated, or too afforded in their physical existence. Social specific to adequately address my media also provides women with unique question—leaving room for middle ground opportunities to access information and to be covered that is sufficiently narrow to explore business ventures. I proceeded to investigate Saudi-specific reasons for social present both quantitative and qualitative data media usage, but sufficiently broad to to support my argument and my predictions. produce findings that can be generalized to Finally, I conclude by discussing the the whole country. I expressed the need for limitations of my argument, as well as synthesis of the existing literature to form a possibilities for future research. comprehensive idea of why so many Saudi Arabians use social media, as well as 5.2 Criticisms and Limitations of the comparative analysis of why so many Argument Saudis, compared to members of other societies, use social media. The argument is limited in that it I then constructed an argument that assumes the existence of only one fills the gaps in the existing literature. I independent variable—state repression— presented my argument that Saudi Arabians when in reality, political, social, and use social media in an effort to bypass social technological phenomena are complex and and political restrictions out of a desire to may be interwoven with many other causal obtain more freedom and agency in their factors. By limiting my argument to a single everyday lives. I predicted that in countries independent variable, I may oversimplify, or with penetration rates exceeding 60%, levels altogether misunderstand, numerous causal of state repression and social media usage relationships at work. Focusing on one will positively correlate. I operationalized Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 18

possible causal factor may come at the cost Additional research conducted to of ignoring the rest. answer my question would benefit from A lack of available data further limits access to more complete data on social the argument. In the cross-country analysis, media usage across countries. More complete information on social media usage comprehensive data, including penetration was not uniformly available; thus, the rates of each major social media platform, conclusions may not be steadfast. and average number of hours spent per day Additionally, lack of information on some on social media, would provide for a more countries led to the selection of certain accurate understanding of social media countries over others to include in my usage across countries, and how exactly analysis. This skewed case selection may Saudi Arabia measures up to other countries. result in the conclusions misrepresenting the Having complete, foundational information reality of social media usage across would provide for a more thorough and countries. Since the conclusions are based accurate analysis. only on countries with available data, they Further research aimed at addressing cannot be generalized with certainty to my question would benefit from interaction countries where data simply was not with Saudi Arabian society itself. available. The lack of information on usage Determining the motivations and different of all of the largest five global networks— aspects of Saudi Arabians’ social media which led me to include only the 2-3 usage may be best achieved through inquiry, networks on which data was most observation, and measurement in their home available—makes my analysis less accurate country. Engaging with Saudi Arabian and complete than it would be if I had used culture, society, and political life could yield more extensive data. a deeper, more complete understanding of Lastly, my study is limited by my why so many Saudi Arabians use social being outside of Saudi Arabia. My media. Collecting opinion data on social geographic location limits the methods of media and the country’s social, cultural, and data collection and analysis to that which political conditions, as well as more can be done remotely, excluding any extensive information on usage of social research on the ground. Through the media platforms, including purposes for use inability to gather data on the ground in and time spent online, could help generate a Saudi Arabia, I miss out on potentially clearer idea of how and why social media is richer, more accurate insights related to my used in the distinct socio-political context of research question. In Saudi Arabia, it could Saudi Arabia. be possible to administer surveys and Exploration of cultural factors conduct interviews in-person with social influencing social media usage across media users to gain further understanding of countries could also generate interesting and reasons for usage. Additionally, observation valuable insights on patterns of usage, and of day-to-day life in Saudi Arabia, as well as how they may be expected to change or stay survey and interview data on the country’s the same in light of distinct cultural social and political conditions, could provide contexts. Do societies that value the family insight into the social and political landscape unit discourage social media usage, or in which social media usage takes place. encourage it? What about more individualistic societies? Where does culture 5.3 Suggestions for Further Research remain static despite the constantly shifting

Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 19

role of social media, and where does it real-life civil society is nonexistent. The become transformed? power of social media must be understood, This study furthers understanding of as a tool for political and social how social media is used in different social transformation in societies like Saudi and political contexts, beyond its Arabia, before it can be harnessed as such. fundamental purpose of connecting people and ideas. In particular, it sheds light on how Conflict of Interest Statement social media can help create virtual public spheres, enable political involvement, and The author declares no conflict of interest generate new opportunities for the with respect to the research, authorship, disempowered in countries where citizens and/or publication of this article. are denied certain rights and freedoms, and

Global Societies Journal Vol. 5 (2017) 20

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Appendix

Figure 1 Internet/Smartphone Twitter usage Facebook usage Avg. time spent Avg. number of Penetration (% of (% of Internet (% of Internet on social active social population) users) users) media/day media accounts (hours) per Internet user Saudi Arabia 69.6/72.8 60 65 2h 56m 9 Australia 84.6/77 22 62 1h 09m 4.5 South Korea 89.9/88 25 48 1h 06m 4 U.K. 92.0/62.2 30 63 1h 29m 4.5

Figure 1: Examining relationship between penetration rates and social media usage. Sources: World Bank, Kissonergis, Omics International, Chaffey, Kemp, Global Web Index.

Figure 2 Freedom CATO Twitter usage (% Facebook usage Avg. time Avg. # of active House Human of Internet users) (% of Internet spent on social media ranking Freedom users) social accounts per (100- free, Index (152 media/day Internet user 0- not free) countries (hours) ranked) Australia 98-Free 7 22 62 1h 09m 4.5 South Korea 83-Free 9 25 48 1h 06m 4 U.K. 95-Free 31 30 63 1h 29m 4.5 Saudi Arabia 10-Not Free 144 60 65 2h 56m 9 United Arab 20-Not Free 117 43 82 2h 40m 9 Emirates Jordan 36-Not Free 78 Data Unavailable Data Unavailable 2h 20m Data Unavailable

Figure 2: Examining relationship between state repression and social media usage at the high and low ends of the repression spectrum, among countries with above 60% penetration. Sources: Freedom House, CATO Institute, Chaffey, Kemp, Global Web Index, eMarketer.