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Sanders, Karen. "The strategic shift of UK government communication." Government Communication: Cases and challenges. Ed. Karen Sanders and MarÍa JosÉCanel. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. 79–98. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 30 Sep. 2021. <http:// dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544629.ch-005>. Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 30 September 2021, 20:55 UTC. Copyright © Karen Sanders, María José Canel and Contributors 2013. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence. 5 The strategic shift of UK government communication Karen Sanders n June 2011, the British coalition government announced that the Central IOffice of Information (COI), the 64-year-old organization responsible for commissioning and coordinating public information campaigns on behalf of the government, would close by May 2012. A month later News International, part of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp group, announced the closure of the News of the World, a best-selling Sunday newspaper, in response to allegations about illegal phone hacking activities. Shortly afterwards, the Conservative British Prime Minister David Cameron declared that an inquiry would be held to investigate the culture, practices and ethics of the press led by the judge, Brian Leveson. The announcement of the closure of the COI and the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry marked the apparent endpoints to two lines of development that had marked UK government communication since the victory of New Labour, led by Tony Blair in the 1997 general elections until the Party’s defeat in 2010 under the leadership of Gordon Brown. The first trend was the steady upward curve in resources invested in communication by successive governments. The second was related to senior politicians’ eagerness to cultivate relations with the owners and editors of national newspapers (see Campbell & Stott, 2007, pp. 349, 363, 369, 477, 603; Powell, 2011, p. 190) and avoid interference in their regulatory or self-regulatory arrangements. This chapter examines the lessons to be learnt for government communication from the Blair years (1997–2007) and their four-year postscript during which the Labour government was replaced by the coalition government 80 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION: CASES AND CHALLENGES of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. It sets out the changing approaches adopted by British governments with regards to the establishment of communication structures and strategies directed towards external audiences in the context of a dynamic political and news environment. The communication reforms introduced by Blair and his governments’ emphasis on presentational politics (see Blair, 2007, 2010) precipitated unprecedented public, media and parliamentary scrutiny of the structure and functions of government communication (see Table 5.1). Published reports and memoirs together with interviews conducted with 40 politicians, political journalists and government communicators from 1997 until 2011 provide the material for this study of the changes and challenges for government communication laid down in the Blair era. The political and news environment Media relations have been one of the growing concerns of British governments since the appointment of the first prime ministerial principal press secretary in 1932 (Seymour-Ure, 2003). Press secretaries became a permanent fixture of UK administrations after Churchill’s unsuccessful attempt to do without one in 1951 (see Kavanagh & Seldon, 1999, p. 57). The importance of media relations for government communication is, of course, not just a British phenomenon. The media’s prominent role in shaping public perception, their ability to build and destroy the symbolic capital of image and reputation are well-attested features of liberal democracies (see Stanyer, 2012). Democratic governments have sought to swing the balance of power to their advantage through, among other things, an emphasis on image strategies, on carefully crafted messaging and on what has been pejoratively termed ‘spin’ – media manipulation – or news management. This drive for positive coverage does not sit easily with the media’s role as, at best, watchdog of the political class and both sides find themselves in a relationship in which each has different and often opposing priorities (see Sanders, 2009, pp. 31–4). These tensions became particularly acute during Blair’s first prime ministership (1997–2001) when New Labour’s communication style fed fears that public opinion was being manipulated through aggressive media management (see Barnett & Gaber, 2001). As Blair himself put it (2007): ‘We paid inordinate attention in the early days of New Labour to courting, assuaging, and persuading the media.’ His justification was that ‘after 18 years of Opposition and the, at times, ferocious hostility of parts of the media, it was hard to see any alternative.’ Blair’s comment highlights the importance of situating a government’s approach to media relations in both its historical and structural context. TABLE 5.1 Reports related to UK government communication, 1997–2011 STRATEGIC SHIFT OF UK GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION SHIFTOFUKGOVERNMENT STRATEGIC Report title Publication year Report team Subject Mountfield report on the 1997 Top civil servant Government communication structure and processes Government Information Service The Government Information August 1998 Members of Parliament Government communication structure and processes and Communication Service (MPs) Special advisers: boon or bane? March 2001 MPs The role of special advisers ‘These unfortunate events’: July 2002 MPs Lessons from dispute between special adviser and lessons of the recent events at civil servant in relation to communication issues the former DTLR Defining the boundaries within April 2003 Independent Committee Review of progress made since recommendations in the executive: ministers, on Standards in Public first and sixth reports and examine ‘current concerns’ special advisers and the Life regarding roles of members of the executive permanent Civil Service An independent review of January 2004 Independent review Review of government communications including government communications established by examination of different models for organizing and (The Phillis Report) government chaired by managing the government’s communication effort media executive, Bob Phillis 81 82 TABLE 5.1 Continued Report title Publication year Report team Subject GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION: CASESANDCHALLENGES COMMUNICATION: GOVERNMENT Report of the inquiry into the January 2004 Independent inquiry As part of inquiry examined government circumstances surrounding the established by communication in relation to the production of the death of Dr David Kelly CMG government chaired by Iraq dossiers and relations to the BBC (The Hutton Report) Judge, Lord Hutton McArthur COI future of media 2008 Independent inquiry Review of multiplatform media buying strategy buying project established by COI chaired by media industry expert, Douglas McArthur Government communications 2009 Members of the House of Review of progress in government communication Lords since Phillis Report and recommendations for future DirectGov 2010 and beyond: October 2010 Review of DirectGov Examine how the government can use the internet revolution not evolution (official UK government both to communicate and interact better with website) carried out by citizens UK Digital Champion, Martha Lane Fox Review of government direct March 2011 Review carried out by Review of all direct communication activities communication and the role permanent secretary (marketing and advertising) and future of COI of COI for government communication, Matt Tee STRATEGIC SHIFT OF UK GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION 83 Labour, for example, had suffered from a hostile press in the period from 1979 until 1997 and, measured by circulation, Britain’s national newspapers had tended in this period to support Labour’s main rival, the Conservative Party (see Tunstall, 1996). Winning over the media, and especially the Murdoch press, became a high priority for the architects of New Labour and they took this concern, together with the news management techniques perfected in opposition, into government in 1997 (see Gould, 1997/2011). UK governments’ development of news media relations should also be set in the context of the peculiar features of the British news industry. The UK news industry has three structural characteristics that distinguish its news culture from that of other liberal democracies and pose particular challenges for government–media relations (see Sanders & Hanna, 2012). First, except in some anti-monopoly law, the newspaper industry is not subject to industry-specific statutory regulation. The broadcast industry, however, is legally bound to be accurate and impartial in its news provision. It must comply with ethical codes and fulfil a number of other public service commitments including provision of news as a contribution to democratic debate, in accord with the country’s 700-years-old parliamentary system within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. Public service broadcasting (PSB) commitments apply not only to the publicly funded British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) but also to the United Kingdom’s commercial broadcasting sector including its principal terrestrial and satellite television and 340 radio stations. The press is highly partisan in