1 Gladys Limón (SBN 228773) COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 2 6325 Pacific Blvd., Suite 300 Huntington Park, California 3 T: (323) 826-9771; F: (323) 588-7079 [email protected] 4 Attorneys for Cross-defendant Youth for Environmental Justice

5 Adam B. Wolf (SBN 215914) PEIFFER ROSCA WOLF ABDULLAH CARR & KANE 6 9696 Culver Blvd., Suite 301 7 Culver City, CA 90232 [email protected] 8 T: (415) 766-3545; F: (415) 402-0058 Attorney for Cross-defendant Youth for Environmental Justice 9 (additional counsel listed on next page) 10 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 11 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

12 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL Case No. BC600373 JUSTICE, SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH 13 LEADERSHIP COALITION, and Assigned to Hon. Terry A. Green, Dept. 14 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL 14 DIVERSITY, NOTICE OF AND SPECIAL 15 MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED Plaintiffs/Cross-Defendants, CROSS- PURSUANT TO 16 C.C.P. § 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP); vs. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 17 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CITY OF LOS DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN 18 ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF CITY SUPPORT PLANNING, MICHAEL J. LOGRANDE, 19 in his official capacity as Director of Los Date: February 16, 2017 Angeles Department of City Planning; and Time: 8:45 a.m. 20 DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Dept.: 14 Reservation ID: 161109172742 21 Defendants/Respondents.

22 23 CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION, 24 Defendant/Respondent-in- 25 Intervention/Cross- Complainant. 26

27

28 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 (Caption continued)

2 Maya Golden-Krasner (SBN 217557) THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3 P.O. Box 1476 La Canada Flintridge, CA 91012 4 T: (213) 215-3729; F: (510) 844-7150 [email protected] 5 Attorney for Cross-defendant Center for Biological Diversity 6 Kassia R. Siegel (SBN 209497) 7 THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 1212 Broadway, Suite 800 8 Oakland, CA 94612 T: 760-366-2232, F: (510) 844-7150 9 [email protected] 10 Attorney for Cross-defendant Center for Biological Diversity

11 Deepak Gupta (pro hac vice pending) GUPTA WESSLER PLLC 12 1735 20th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 13 T: (202) 888-1741; F: (202) 888-7792 [email protected] 14 Attorneys for Cross-defendant South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (SCYLC)

15 NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO 16 CALIFORNIA CODE OF SECTION 425.16 17 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 18 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 16, 2017, at 8:45 a.m., or as soon thereafter 19 as the motion may be heard in Department 14 of the above-captioned Court, located at 111 N. 20 Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Cross-Defendants Youth for Environmental Justice, 21 South Central Youth Leadership Coalition, and the Center for Biological Diversity (“Non-Profit 22 Defendants”) will and hereby do move to specially strike the First Amended Cross-Complaint 23 (“Cross-Complaint”) of the California Independent Petroleum Association (“Petroleum 24 Association”), without leave to amend, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 25 425.16. The Non-Profit Defendants further seek an award of their attorney fees and costs 26 associated with this motion pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.16(c). 27 28 1 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 The Non-Profit Defendants bring this special motion to strike on the grounds that (1) the 2 Cross-Complaint, including both of the causes of action alleged against the Non-Profit 3 Defendants, arise from acts in furtherance of the Non-Profit Defendants’ right of petition or free 4 speech in connection with a public issue; and (2) the Petroleum Association cannot demonstrate 5 a probability of prevailing on either of its causes of action. 6 The movants also request that the Court award them their attorney fees and costs under 7 Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(c). If the Court grants this motion, the Non-Profit 8 Defendants will file a noticed motion for their fees and costs. 9 This motion is made following telephonic conferences of counsel on October 7, 2016, 10 and October 14, 2016. See Declaration of Gladys Limón ¶¶14-16. Unfortunately, those 11 conferences, which discussed the grounds for this motion, did not result in resolution. Id. 12 This motion is based on this notice of motion; the accompanying memorandum of points 13 and authorities; the declaration of Gladys Limón, as well as the exhibits attached thereto; the 14 arguments and other evidence as may be presented at or prior to the hearing on this motion; the 15 record and files in this action; and such other facts and matters of which the Court may take 16 notice. 17 DATED: November 14, 2016 Respectfully submitted,

18 19 Gladys Limón (SBN 228773) COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER 20 ENVIRONMENT 6325 Pacific Blvd., Suite 300 21 Huntington Park, California Tel: (323) 826-9771; Fax: (323) 588-7079 22 [email protected] Attorneys for Cross-defendant 23 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

24 Adam B. Wolf (SBN 215914) PEIFFER ROSCA WOLF ABDULLAH CARR & 25 KANE 9696 Culver Blvd., Suite 301 26 Culver City, CA 90232 [email protected] 27 T: (415) 766-3545; F: (415) 402-0058 Attorneys for Cross-defendant 28 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

2 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 Maya Golden-Krasner (SBN 217557) 2 THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY P.O. Box 1476 3 La Canada Flintridge, CA 91012 T: (213) 215-3729; F: (510) 844-7150 4 [email protected] Attorney for Cross-defendant 5 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

6 Kassia Siegel (SBN 209497) THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 7 1212 Broadway, Suite 800 Oakland, CA 94612 8 T: 760-366-2232, F: (510) 844-7150 [email protected] 9 Attorney for Cross-defendant CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 10

11 Deepak Gupta (pro hac vice) GUPTA WESSLER PLLC 12 1735 20th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 13 T: (202) 888-1741; F: (202) 888-7792 Attorneys for Cross-defendant 14 SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COALITION 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

3 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ...... 1 3 I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 4 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...... 2 5 III. MEET-AND-CONFER DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION’S CROSS-COMPLAINT ...... 5 6 IV. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS 7 PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16 ...... 6 V. ARGUMENT ...... 7 8 A. The Petroleum Association’s Claims Arise From The Non-Profit Defendants’ Acts That 9 Were In Furtherance Of The Defendants’ Right Of Petition Or Free Speech...... 7 B. The Petroleum Association Cannot Demonstrate A Probability That It Will Prevail On Its 10 Claims Against the Non-Profit Defendants...... 9 11 1. The Petroleum Association’s Due Process Claims Lack Merit Because The Petroleum Association Has Not Been Denied Process...... 9 12 2. The Petroleum Association’s Claims Against The Non-Profit Defendants Fail Because 13 Due Process Claims Cannot Be Asserted Against A Private Party...... 10 3. The Petroleum Association’s Due Process Claims Are Likely to Fail Because the 14 Association Has Not Identified Any Property Interest It Has Been Denied...... 11 15 4. The Petroleum Association Is Unlikely to Prevail For the Additional Reasons Discussed In the City’s Motion To Dismiss...... 15 16 C. The Non-Profit Defendants Are Entitled To Recover Their Fees and Costs...... 15 17 VI. CONCLUSION ...... 15

18

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 i NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 3 Cases 4 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 568 ...... 7 5 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1106 ...... 8 6 Cabral v. Martins (2009) 7 177 Cal. App. 4th 471 ...... 9 Coleman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin. (1991) 8 52 Cal. 3d 1102 ...... 10 9 Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 53 ...... 6 10 Garfinkle v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 268 ...... 10 11 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 12 7 Cal. 4th 1 ...... 10 Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 13 244 Cal. App. 4th 344 ...... 8 14 Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837 ...... 13, 14 15 Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland (1986) 16 478 U.S. 501 ...... 12 Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 17 37 Cal. App. 4th 8 ...... 7 18 Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82 ...... 8 19 Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 322, 329 ...... 12 20 Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section (2001) 21 94 Cal.App.4th 1048 ...... 13 Seltzer v. Barnes (2010) 22 182 Cal. App. 4th 953 ...... 8 23 Southern California Edison Co. v. Lynch (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 794, modified on other grounds (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 943 ...... 14 24 Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 25 211 Cal.App.4th 921 ...... 12 Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Educ. (2013) 26 57 Cal.4th 197 ...... 9, 11 27 28

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1 Rules 2 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) ...... 6, 7 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2) ...... 7 3 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c) ...... 17 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

iii NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I. INTRODUCTION This case is a classic example of a retaliatory strategic lawsuit against public participation 3 (“SLAPP”). In this matter, the oil industry has sued two youth groups and a non-profit 4 environmental organization because they settled an earlier-filed lawsuit brought against the City 5 of Los Angeles challenging long-standing municipal practices that authorized oil drilling 6 operations to expand next to their homes and schools in disregard of public interest laws. 7 The City amended many of the policies and practices that the organizations had 8 challenged before the non-profit organizations settled their lawsuit. Accordingly, in order to 9 settle the case, the City agreed to pay some amount of attorney fees to the non-profit 10 organizations, in exchange for dismissal of their lawsuit. In other words, the settlement 11 agreement between the non-profit organizations and the City did not mandate the creation or 12 implementation of any new policies or practices. 13 Upset about the City’s new policies and the case settlement, the California Independent 14 Petroleum Association (“Petroleum Association”) in response sued not only the City, but also the 15 non-profit organizations. The Petroleum Association thus named the non-profit organizations as 16 defendants only because they filed, negotiated for, and settled their lawsuit. Fortunately, the 17 State’s anti-SLAPP law protects the non-profit defendants from such actions intended to chill 18 their exercise of constitutional rights to petition and free speech. 19 This special motion to strike should be granted for two reasons: 20 First, the Petroleum Association’s claims against the non-profit organizations clearly 21 arise from the organizations’ protected activity. Filing a lawsuit, negotiating a settlement, and 22 dismissing a lawsuit are textbook examples of the rights to petition and free speech. 23 Second, the Petroleum Association’s claims against the non-profit organizations are 24 baseless on numerous, independent grounds. As a threshold matter, the private non-profit 25 organizations are not state actors and therefore cannot as a matter of law deprive the Petroleum 26 Association of any purported right to due process. Moreover, the Petroleum Association has not 27 alleged that the Non-Profit Defendants (or the City, for that matter) undermined any legally 28 1 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 protectable property interest that gives rise to due process protection. 2 While the Petroleum Association is free to challenge the City’s new policies if and when 3 those policies give rise to an actionable claim, a challenge to the settlement agreement based on 4 procedural due process grounds is a bizarre and wrong way to do that. The settlement agreement 5 between the non-profit organizations and the City post-dated the City’s new procedures and does 6 not require the City to do anything other than pay attorney fees. The Petroleum Association need 7 not have—and should not have—sued the non-profit organizations in order to challenge the 8 City’s new policies. 9 Because the non-profit organizations were sued only on account of their exercising their 10 right to petition and free speech, and because the Petroleum Association’s claims against these 11 organizations are meritless, the Court should grant this special motion to strike. 12 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 13 The Non-Profit Defendants are two youth groups (Youth For Environmental Justice and 14 the South Central Youth Leadership Coalition) and an environmental organization (the Center 15 for Biological Diversity) (collectively, “Non-Profit Defendants”). The organizations are devoted 16 to improving the quality of the environment. The youth groups focus on achieving environmental 17 justice in communities of color. Declar. of Gladys Limón (“Limón Decl.”) Exh. A (¶¶ 5-15). 18 On November 5, 2015, the Non-Profit Defendants filed a complaint in California 19 Superior Court against the City of Los Angeles, its Planning Department, and the Director of its 20 Planning Department (collectively, the “City”). Id. The complaint alleged that the City 21 (1) violated a state by its pattern and practice of approving oil drilling 22 applications in a manner that contravened environmental review mandates, and (2) engaged in 23 unlawful racial discrimination by requiring inferior protective conditions for oil operations in 24 communities of color, as compared to largely white communities. Id. 25 Shortly after filing that complaint, the City and the Non-Profit Defendants (plaintiffs in 26 their underlying case) commenced settlement discussions. Limón Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. K. 27 Accordingly, the City and Non-Profit Defendants entered into a voluntary litigation stay in the 28 state court, so that the parties could devote their time and resources to efforts at resolving the

2 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 case. Id. 2 In the meantime, the Petroleum Association sought to intervene in the state-court case, 3 alleging that its members’ economic interests could be impacted by the non-profit organizations’ 4 case. The court granted permissive intervention to the Petroleum Association on July 20, 2016. 5 See id., ¶ 6, Exh. J at 26. 6 On September 19, 2016, the City voluntarily amended procedures related to oil drilling 7 applications that seek City approval for expansion of drilling operations. Id. Exh. B. 8 Specifically, the Department of Planning issued new application forms for oil drilling projects 9 and issued a memorandum establishing “procedures and policies for the acceptance and 10 processing of applications for [] drilling approvals pursuant to . . . [Los Angeles Municipal Code] 11 Section 13.01-H and . . . City guidelines” for environmental review of the proposed drilling 12 projects as required by the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Id. at 1. 13 The memorandum provides only procedural requirements for application processing and 14 determinations pursuant to the Planning Department’s discretion under municipal code, and 15 supersedes past memoranda that similarly outlined such procedures. Id. The memorandum 16 specifies that its purpose includes “[e]nsur[ing] . . . compl[iance] with all legal requirements of 17 CEQA” and “provid[ing] for transparent disclosure and participation process[.]” Id. at 5. 18 The City’s new procedures were not conditioned upon any settlement of the non-profit 19 organizations’ lawsuit: the City, in fact, implemented these new procedures and posted them 20 publicly before a settlement was reached in that case. Id. 21 On September 26, 2016, the Petroleum Association filed this suit alleging that the Non- 22 Profit Defendants and the City violated its constitutional rights. Id. Exh. C. The Petroleum 23 Association claimed that it was “prejudiced by the settlement” between the Non-Profit 24 Defendants and the City, id. (¶ 33), even though no such settlement yet existed. It further claimed 25 that “[e]xecution of the settlement agreement by [the Non-Profit Defendants] and the City and its 26 subsequent enforcement against [the Petroleum Association’s] members . . . would irreparably 27 harm the due process rights of [the Petroleum Association] to have a decision on the merits 28 rendered” on the claims brought by the Non-Profit Defendants against the City. Id. (¶ 34).

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1 The Non-Profit Defendants later settled their case against the City. Because the City had 2 amended its procedures in a manner that mostly satisfied the Non-Profit Defendants, there was 3 not much to discuss in order to resolve the matter. There were only two substantive provisions of 4 the settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”): (1) the Non-Profit Defendants would 5 dismiss their complaint and forgo pursuing their claims, (2) if and when the City paid a portion 6 of the attorney fees of the Non-Profit Defendants. Id. Exh. D (Terms of Agreement 1-2). To be 7 clear—and as the document itself demonstrates—the Settlement Agreement between the Non- 8 Profit Defendants and the City was not conditioned on implementation of new procedures. Id. 9 The City could not enter into the Settlement Agreement until the City Council approved 10 the above-referenced attorney fees. On September 28, 2016, the City Council considered (and 11 approved) the fees. Id. Exh. E. Accordingly, the City signed the agreement on September 28, 12 2016. Id. Exh. D. That same day, per the Settlement Agreement, the Non-Profit Defendants 13 dismissed their complaint. Id. Exh. F. 14 The Petroleum Association’s operative cross-complaint lists two causes of action. Id. 15 Exh. G (¶¶ 39-47). While denominated as the relief the Petroleum Association seeks— 16 declaratory and injunctive relief—both causes of action are grounded in alleged violations of the 17 Due Process Clause of the California Constitution.1 Id. (¶¶ 40, 45). The theory behind these 18 claims is that the Settlement Agreement between the Non-Profit Defendants and the City 19 violated the Petroleum Association’s alleged due process right to litigate the claims that the Non- 20 Profit Defendants previously asserted (and then dismissed) against the City. Id. (¶ 37). 21 While the Petroleum Association’s cross-complaint is oddly centered on attacking the 22 Settlement Agreement, the Association’s true concern appears to be the City’s new drilling 23 application procedures. Id. (¶¶ 43, 47; Prayer for Relief b, c). However, because the Petroleum 24 Association insisted on attacking the parties’ litigation conduct and settlement agreement, it 25 named the non-profit organizations as the defendants (along with the City) in its cross-complaint.

26 1 The Petroleum Association’s original Cross-Complaint alleged identical causes of action for violations of the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. Immediately after the Non- 27 Profit Defendants and the City removed the Petroleum Association’s complaint based on federal- 28 question jurisdiction, the Petroleum Association amended its complaint to replace its federal due process claims with identical due process claims under the California Constitution. 4 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 Prior to filing the operative cross-complaint, the Petroleum Association’s counsel had 2 obtained a copy of the Settlement Agreement between the Non-Profit Defendants and the City. 3 Declaration of Jennifer Tobkin (“Tobkin Decl.”) (filed Nov. 8, 2016) ¶ 10; see also Limón Decl. 4 ¶ 13 & Exh. G (¶ 38) (Petroleum Association’s acknowledging that it reviewed the settlement 5 agreement before filing the present version of the cross-complaint). Accordingly, at the time the 6 Petroleum Association filed its complaint against the Non-Profit Defendants, it knew that the 7 Settlement Agreement included only two substantive provisions: payment of attorney fees to the 8 Non-Profit Defendants and the Non-Profit Defendants’ subsequent dismissal of their complaint. 9 III. MEET-AND-CONFER DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE PETROLEUM 10 ASSOCIATION’S CROSS-COMPLAINT Prior to bringing this motion, counsel for the Non-Profit Defendants twice conferred with 11 counsel for the Petroleum Association. Those discussions, transcribed by a court reporter, further 12 demonstrate that the Non-Profit Defendants were not sued for any valid reason. Despite verified 13 allegations in its Cross-Complaint that consistently challenge the Non-Profit Defendants’ 14 litigation conduct and settlement agreement, the Petroleum Association changed its story once it 15 was on notice of the Non-Profit Defendants’ proposed anti-SLAPP motion. Its counsel stated— 16 time and again—during meet-and-confer calls that the Petroleum Association really wants to 17 challenge only the City’s recently adopted procedures for new oil-drilling applications, that it 18 thus does not really care about the settlement agreement between the City and the Non-Profit 19 Defendants, and that the Non-Profit Defendants are therefore not the true targets of the 20 Petroleum Association’s legal challenge. The Petroleum Association’s counsel stated: 21  “You guys are witnesses, that it’s not your regulations that we’re attacking. It’s 22 the City’s regulations. That’s why I believe that, you know, I don’t need you in the 23 case.” Limon Decl. Exh. H, at 31. 24 25  “[V]ery clear that we were interested in having the environmental groups, you 26 know, out of here [this case].” Id. at 14. 27  “If you folks want to keep your settlement together, we’re not interested in 28 voiding your settlement, . . . it really doesn’t matter what it requires of the City. There is

5 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 no reason why we have to go after your settlement. I mean, I want to be very clear about 2 that. We do not need to void your settlement to get the relief that we’re seeking.” Limon 3 Decl. Exh. I, at 19.

4  “We are not seeking to void the settlement. That’s not what our lawsuit seeks to 5 do.” Id. at 17.

6  Non-Profit Defendants’ counsel: “[O]ur folks really don’t have much to do with 7 what your challenging here. . . . I’m not sure what we’re really doing in this case.” 8 Petroleum Association’s counsel responded: “I don’t disagree with you[]. I really don’t.” 9 Limon Decl. Exh. H, at 29. 10 Taking the Petroleum Association at its word, there was no need for the Petroleum 11 Association to have sued the Non-Profit Defendants. Yet, as the Cross-Complaint repeats 12 throughout, the reason that the Petroleum Association sued the Non-Profit Defendants is that 13 these groups entered into a settlement agreement with the City—which is conduct that is 14 protected speech under the anti-SLAPP laws. 15 IV. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS PURSUANT TO 16 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 425.16 17 In 1992, the California legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the 18 “anti-SLAPP statute”) in order to “encourage continued participation in matters of public 19 significance.” Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 53, 59-60. Section 20 425.16(b) authorizes a “special motion to strike” a cause of action against a person arising from 21 “any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the 22 United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 23 § 425.16(b)(1). 24 In considering an anti-SLAPP motion, the court employs a two-step process: First, the 25 moving party must make a prima-facie showing that the challenged claims arise from an alleged 26 act that was taken “in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech under the 27 United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Equilon Enter., 29 28 Cal. 4th at 67. Second, the non-moving party must establish that there is a probability that it will

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1 prevail on the challenged claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); see also 1-800 Contacts, 2 Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 568, 584-85. 3 “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and 4 opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” Cal. Civ. Proc. 5 Code § 425.16(b)(2). The anti-SLAPP statute is “intended to provide a fast and inexpensive 6 unmasking and dismissal of SLAPPs.” Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 16 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 V. ARGUMENT 9 Both prongs of the anti-SLAPP law are easily satisfied. 10 First, there is no question that the Non-Profit Defendants were sued due to their litigation 11 conduct: negotiating a settlement with the City and executing the resulting settlement agreement. 12 That is, after all, the only reason that the Petroleum Association sued the Non-Profit Defendants. 13 Second, the Petroleum Association cannot demonstrate that it is likely to prevail on its 14 claims. There are myriad insurmountable obstacles to those claims, including that the Petroleum 15 Association has not been denied any process that is due, that non-governmental entities (such as 16 the Non-Profit Defendants) cannot violate the Due Process Clause, and that the Due Process 17 claim cannot succeed here because the Petroleum Association has not identified a legally 18 protected interest that is at stake and cannot be deprived of without due process protections. 19 A. The Petroleum Association’s Claims Arise from the Non-Profit Defendants’ Acts 20 That Were in Furtherance of The Defendants’ Right of Petition or Free Speech.

21 The Petroleum Association’s claims against the Non-Profit Defendants arise out of one of 22 three acts: engaging in settlement discussions with the City, entering into a Settlement 23 Agreement, and/or filing a dismissal of their claims in superior court. Limon Decl. Exh. G, ¶¶ 5, 24 6, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 40. Each of these activities is clearly in furtherance of the Non- 25 Profit Defendants’ right of petition or free speech. 26 The anti-SLAPP statute is triggered when a cause of action asserted against a defendant 27 “aris[es] from any act of that [defendant] in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or 28

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1 free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.” Section 425.16(b)(1).2 2 The anti-SLAPP statute specifies four categories of acts that are in furtherance of the 3 right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Section 425.16(e). Those 4 categories include: 5 (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive or 6 judicial proceeding . . ., 7 (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue 8 under consideration of review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body . . ., or 9 (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of 10 petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue 11 or an issue of public interest. 12 Id. 13 The Non-Profit Defendants’ action(s) that animate the Petroleum Association’s claims 14 fall squarely within each of the three categories above. Negotiating for and signing a settlement 15 agreement with the City and/or filing dismissal papers are most clearly statements or writings 16 “made in connection with an issue under consideration of review by a legislative, executive, or 17 judicial body.” Section 425.16(e); see, e.g., Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 90 18 (holding that the negotiation and execution of a release involved “statement[s] or writing[s] 19 made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body” for 20 purposes of Section 425.16(e)(2)); Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 21 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123 (noting that the California Supreme Court “has definitively held [that] 22 statements in relation to pending or upcoming litigation (a ‘public issue’) are covered by Section 23 425.16.”); Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal. App. 4th 344, 353-54 (noting that anticipated 24 litigation and settlement were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP law); Seltzer v. Barnes 25 (2010) 182 Cal. App. 4th 953, 962-63 (claims subject to anti-SLAPP law because they arose 26 from defendant’s alleged conduct regarding the negotiation of a settlement agreement); Cabral v.

27 2 Defendants’ actions must also be connected to a “public issue.” Section 425.16(b)(1). It 28 is beyond doubt that the process by which oil drilling degrades the environment and public health—and a challenge to the City’s permitting such a public-health crisis—is a “public issue.” 8 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 Martins (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 471, 480 (“[A]ll communicative acts performed by attorneys 2 as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding . . . are per se protected as 3 petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.”). 4 Here, the Petroleum Association sued the Non-Profit Defendants only because of their 5 negotiating for and signing a settlement agreement with the City, and then dismissing the case. 6 Under clear case law, the Petroleum Association’s claims against the Non-Profit Defendants 7 arose out of the Non-Profit Defendants’ right of petition or free speech. 8 B. The Petroleum Association Cannot Demonstrate A Probability That It Will 9 Prevail On Its Claims Against the Non-Profit Defendants. The Petroleum Association’s claims against the Non-Profit Defendants are baseless. 10 While the burden now shifts to the Petroleum Association to demonstrate it is “probable” that it 11 will prevail, here, it is very clear that the Petroleum Association cannot. Indeed, its constitutional 12 claims against the Non-Profit Defendants are destined to fail for multiple, independent reasons. 13 14 1. The Petroleum Association’s Due Process Claims Lack Merit Because The Petroleum Association Has Not Been Denied Process. 15 The Petroleum Association’s Due Process claims cannot succeed because, among other 16 reasons, the Petroleum Association has not been denied any process at all. The Petroleum 17 Association simply has not been denied an opportunity to challenge the City’s new procedures. 18 The Due Process Clause affords notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to being 19 deprived of a protected property interest. See, e.g., Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles 20 County Office of Educ. (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212. One problem (among many) with the 21 Petroleum Association’s Due Process claims is that it has not been denied a hearing prior to a 22 deprivation of a protected property interest. 23 While the Petroleum Association’s claims are premised on the Non-Profit Defendants’ 24 settlement conduct and Settlement Agreement, the Petroleum Association may claim that it did 25 not have an opportunity to contest the City’s new procedures. However, even assuming 26 arguendo that the City’s new procedures could at some point deprive the Petroleum 27 Association’s members of a property interest, there is nothing stopping the Petroleum 28 Association from challenging those procedures by filing suit. Whether that is now or in the 9 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 future, the Petroleum Association can litigate any alleged legal deficiencies with the new 2 procedures in the very forum that it complains it was denied process (the superior court). 3 Moreover, to the extent that the Petroleum Association strains to argue that the settlement 4 agreement between the City and the Non-Profit Defendants somehow deprived the Petroleum 5 Association of a hearing, the settlement agreement plainly demonstrates the falsity of this claim. 6 The settlement agreement did not create new rules or require the implementation of any new 7 rules, id. Exh. D, and therefore could not deprive the Petroleum Association of any process due. 8 The Petroleum Association admitted as much when its counsel stated on record that “[t]here is 9 no reason why [the Petroleum Association has] to go after [the] settlement.” See Limon Decl., 10 Exh. I at 19. 11 And, again, nothing deprives or prevents the Petroleum Association from filing a lawsuit 12 that directly challenges the City’s new regulations. That opportunity demonstrates that the 13 Petroleum Association has not been denied a hearing in contravention of any due process rights. 14 2. The Petroleum Association’s Claims Against The Non-Profit Defendants 15 Fail Because Due Process Claims Cannot Be Asserted Against A Private Party. 16 The Non-Profit Defendants cannot be sued for alleged violations of procedural due 17 process because they are not governmental entities. On this ground, too, the Petroleum 18 Association’s due process claims against the Non-Profit Defendants must fail. 19 A plaintiff can sue only a public entity, not a private party, for alleged violations of the 20 Due Process Clause of the California Constitution. Garfinkle v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 21 268, 281-82. Nearly 40 years ago, the California Supreme Court held that “California’s due 22 process clause . . . applies to state, not private action.” Id. at 281. More recently, the state’s 23 highest court reiterated that the Due Process Clause permits causes of action against only 24 governmental entities. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 27-28 (citing 25 Garfinkle); see also, e.g., Coleman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin. (1991) 52 Cal. 3d 1102, 1112 (“Only 26 those actions that may. . . fairly be attributed to the state [] are subject to due process 27 protections.”). This blackletter law makes sense, since private parties cannot grant or deny 28 hearings. 10 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 The Petroleum Association has acknowledged that the Non-Profit Defendants do not 2 have state authority. Limón Decl. Exh. H, at 34 (Petroleum Association’s Counsel: “[N]o one is 3 claiming that you have state authority here. . . . This is a case against the City for depriving our 4 clients of due process[.]”). And the Petroleum Association cannot allege any facts or provide 5 legal authority to show that the Non-Profit Defendants’ conduct at issue was as state actors. 6 Accordingly, they cannot be liable for the Petroleum Association’s Due Process claims. 7 3. The Petroleum Association’s Due Process Claims Are Likely to Fail 8 Because the Association Has Not Identified Any Property Interest It Has Been Denied. 9 A basic tenet of due process challenges is that the plaintiff identify a legally cognizable 10 interest—here, a purported property interest—that the plaintiff has been denied. Today’s Fresh 11 Start, Inc., 57 Cal. 4th 197 at 214. But the Petroleum Association fails to identify the deprivation 12 of any such protected property interest. While the Petroleum Association’s complaint focuses on 13 attacking the settlement, the Settlement Agreement simply does not upset the Petroleum 14 Association’s property interests. And even if the Petroleum Association tried to argue that it is 15 really the City’s adoption of the new processes that denied it due process, that claim would 16 similarly fail because the Association has no protected property interest of which it has been 17 deprived by the new processes. 18 a. The Settlement Agreement does not implicate the Petroleum 19 Association’s property interests. 20 The settlement agreement was a simple exchange of attorney’s fees from the City for 21 dismissal of the Non-Profit Defendants’ claims. Limón Decl. Exh. D. It thus does not remotely 22 implicate the Petroleum Association’s alleged property interests. The Petroleum Association has 23 admitted this. Id. Exh. I, at 19 (“If you folks want to keep your settlement together, we’re not 24 interested in voiding your settlement. . . . There is no reason why we have to go after your 25 settlement.”). That should be sufficient to dismiss the Non-Profit Defendants from the Petroleum 26 Association’s due process case. 27 Nor does the Petroleum Association’s status as an intervenor in the underlying, now- 28 dismissed lawsuit confer property interests on the Petroleum Association. The general economic

11 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 interest upon which it was allowed permissive intervention does not suffice under the different 2 standard in determining whether a protected property interest exists for due process purposes. 3 The Petroleum Association’s cross-complaint suggests the extraordinary proposition that 4 original parties to an action are barred from having settlement discussions or settling unless an 5 intervenor also engages, but clear case law refutes that contention: “It has never been supposed 6 that one party—whether an original party . . . or an intervenor—could preclude other parties 7 from settling their own disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation.” Local No. 93, Int’l 8 Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland (1986) 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (“Local 9 No. 93”). While the Petroleum Association had a general right to embark on settlement 10 communications of its own, it declined to so engage with the Non-Profit Organizations.3 11 Further, the Petroleum Association need not have been heard on the Settlement 12 Agreement because such rights exist only where a settlement is presented for court approval as 13 an enforceable consent decree or as required in a class action. Id. In such circumstances, clearly 14 absent in this case, intervenors may present objections but may “not have power to block the 15 decree.” Id. at 529. Even then, courts may disapprove of a consent decree only if it “imposes [] 16 legal duties or obligations on the [intervenor]” or “purport[s] to resolve” substantive claims 17 “under the Constitution, statute,” “or as a matter of contract[.]” Id. at 529-30.4 18 Nothing in the Settlement Agreement here binds the Petroleum Association to do (or not 19

3 20 See Pls’ Opp. to Intervenor’s Ex Parte App. Seeking Order to Shorten Time, at 3-4 (filed Sept. 29, 2016) (“[S]ince becoming a party to this action, [the Petroleum Association] has shown 21 no interest in and made no effort toward settlement communications with Plaintiffs[.]”). 4 The same is true in two other cases upon which the Petroleum Association relies: In Reed 22 v. United Teachers Los Angeles, 208 Cal. App. 4th 322, 329 (2012), plaintiff students and defendant school district settled the students’ claims through a consent decree that potentially 23 abrogated seniority rights granted by the union’s collective bargaining agreement. 24 Likewise, in Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 921, 936, the plaintiff challenged terms of a settlement agreement that exempted certain billboard 25 companies from municipal code ordinances that remained applicable to all other members of the public. Id. at 932. (Moreover, Summit Media was not a due process case. Rather, Plaintiffs in that 26 case claimed that the offending exemption was an ultra vires act. Id. at 934-35. The Petroleum Association can file such an action against the City, but it has elected not to do so.) 27 Here, the Settlement Agreement, unlike in Reed and Summit Media, does not confer any 28 rights or obligations. The Settlement Agreement neither creates nor implements any new processes or regulations. 12 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 do) anything. The Settlement Agreement requires only that the Non-profit organizations give up 2 their rights to pursue litigation of their claims and requires dismissal of their case in exchange for 3 payment of attorney fees from the City. The Agreement, therefore, cannot infringe on any 4 conceivable legally protectable interest held by the Petroleum Association’s members. 5 b. The City’s new processes do not implicate the Petroleum 6 Association’s property interests. While the Petroleum Association’s Cross-Complaint is premised on the Non-Profit 7 Defendants’ settlement conduct and Settlement Agreement, see, e.g., Limón Decl., Exh. G ¶¶ 5, 8 6, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 40, the Petroleum Association has indicated, post-filing, that it 9 would prefer to challenge the City’s procedures and policies for the acceptance and processing of 10 applications for oil-drilling approvals. Again, nothing prevents the Petroleum Association from 11 properly filing a separate action challenging the procedures as invalid and/or unenforceable as a 12 matter of California law, if and when it is able to identify an actionable claim. But to maintain its 13 due process claims based on adoption of the procedures, it must nevertheless first identify a 14 protected property right of which it was deprived by the adoption of the procedures. It cannot do 15 so for the following simple reason: the Petroleum Association cannot point to a statute or 16 contract that entitles its members to a relevant protected property interest, such as guaranteed 17 approvals or a lower amount of costs, upon submitting future drilling applications. 18 The Petroleum Association asserts broad and vague interests in its members not facing 19 “uncertainty, delays, and compliance costs” in future drilling applications that may affect their 20 “financial interests.” Limón Decl., Exh. G ¶ 19. But an “‘abstract need or desire’ or a ‘unilateral 21 expectation’ in receiving a benefit” is not a property interest subject to due process protections. 22 Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1061. “Th[e] 23 California due process clause does not protect all conceivable property interests, but only those 24 property interests or benefits that are conferred by statute” or contract. Las Lomas Land Co., 25 LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 855 (“Las Lomas”). 26 The Petroleum Association’s alleged property interest based increased compliance costs 27 and uncertainty in environmental review was rejected by the Second District Court of Appeal in 28

13 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 Las Lomas. See, generally, id. In Las Lomas, the court explained that “[a]n ownership interest 2 alone does not cloak the prospect of developing [a]” property with procedural due process 3 protections. Id. at 853. “Rather, a land use application invokes procedural due process only if the 4 owner has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the approval[.]” Id. And, “[a] benefit is not a 5 protected property interest under the due process clause if the decision maker has the discretion 6 to grant or deny the benefit.” Id. The court then held that the Los Angeles Planning 7 Department’s denial of a land development application “did not violate constitutional due 8 process rights,” further rejecting alleged general economic interests, despite the developer’s 9 expenditure of millions of dollars on the application process, because the City’s decision was 10 discretionary. Id. at 854-55. 11 The same result would be required here. It is uncontested that approval or denial of 12 drilling applications is within the Planning Department’s discretion. As in Las Lomas, the 13 Petroleum Association cannot show that its members are entitled to drilling application 14 approvals, certain environmental review, or compliance costs limitations of which they have 15 been deprived by the City’s new processes. 16 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Southern California Edison is also instructive and shows 17 that the Petroleum Association’s general economic interests are not protected property interests 18 giving rise to due process protections. Southern California Edison Co. v. Lynch (9th Cir. 2002) 19 307 F.3d 794, 800, modified on other grounds (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 943. Similar to the 20 proceedings in this matter, in Southern California Edison the trial court proceedings were stayed 21 pursuant to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s stipulation, during which they negotiated a settlement 22 agreement. Id. at 802. The permissive intervenor consumer interest group objected on due 23 process grounds on account of its financial interests in the utility rates at issue. Id. at 806-08. The 24 Ninth Circuit held that no process was due because the consumer group had no “legally 25 cognizable interest in protecting the refund rights,” “securing [] lower rates,” or “preventing [] 26 rate increases” that the intevenor claimed would inevitably result from the settlement. Id. at 807. 27 As in Southern California Edison, the Petroleum Association’s interests in preventing 28 increased costs in submission of drilling applications, securing low environmental compliance

14 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 costs, or meeting the oil industry’s economic expectations are not “legally cognizable interests” 2 upon which it may seek due process protections. 3 Accordingly, even if the Petroleum Association were to challenge the new processes on 4 due process grounds, the claim would not succeed because the Association’s members have no 5 legally established property interest at stake.

6 4. The Petroleum Association Is Unlikely to Prevail For the Additional 7 Reasons Discussed In the City’s Motion To Dismiss. The City has filed its own special motion to strike, motion to strike, and demurrer. The 8 Non-Profit Defendants formally join in the City’s motions and incorporate herein the City’s 9 arguments in those motions. Those additional grounds demonstrate further that the Petroleum 10 Association is unlikely to prevail on its claims. 11 12 C. The Non-Profit Defendants Are Entitled To Recover Their Fees and Costs. 13 The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to 14 strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 15 425.16(c) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Non-Profit Defendants respectfully request that 16 the Court’s order granting this motion include the Petroleum Association’s paying the Non-Profit 17 Defendants’ attorney fees and costs—the amount of which the Court can determine upon a 18 noticed motion if the parties unable to resolve that matter without this Court’s intervention.

19 VI. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Non-Profit Defendants respectfully request that the Court 21 grant their special motion to strike the Petroleum Association’s claims in their entirety and order 22 the Petroleum Association to pay their attorney fees and costs. 23 24 DATED: November 14, 2016 Respectfully submitted,

25 Gladys Limón (SBN 228773) 26 COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT 27 6325 Pacific Blvd., Suite 300 Huntington Park, California 28 Tel: (323) 826-9771; Fax: (323) 588-7079 15 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT

1 [email protected] Attorneys for Cross-defendant 2 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

3 Adam B. Wolf (SBN 215914) PEIFFER ROSCA WOLF ABDULLAH CARR & 4 KANE 9696 Culver Blvd., Suite 301 5 Culver City, CA 90232 [email protected] 6 T: (415) 766-3545; F: (415) 402-0058 Attorneys for Cross-defendant 7 YOUTH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

8 Maya Golden-Krasner (SBN 217557) THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 9 P.O. Box 1476 10 La Canada Flintridge, CA 91012 T: (213) 215-3729; F: (510) 844-7150 11 [email protected] Attorney for Cross-defendant 12 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

13 Kassia Siegel (SBN 209497) THE CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 14 1212 Broadway, Suite 800 Oakland, CA 94612 15 T: 760-366-2232, F: (510) 844-7150 [email protected] 16 Attorney for Cross-defendant CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 17 Deepak Gupta (pro hac vice) 18 GUPTA WESSLER PLLC 1735 20th Street, NW 19 Washington, DC 20009 T: (202) 888-1741; F: (202) 888-7792 20 Attorneys for Cross-defendant SOUTH CENTRAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP 21 COALITION 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

16 NOTICE OF MOTION & SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF GLADYS LIMON IN SUPPORT