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Odyssean Forward Guidance in Monetary Policy: a Primer

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Odyssean Forward Guidance in Monetary Policy: a Primer Odyssean forward guidance in monetary policy: A primer Jeffrey R. Campbell Introduction and summary with making its internal decision-making process The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) more transparent and therefore more forecastable. In monetary policy statement from its September 2013 this, they followed several foreign central banks that meeting reads in part: had already adopted explicit inflation targets. (See Bernanke and Woodford, 2005, for a review of inflation In particular, the Committee decided to keep targeting and its implementation outside the United the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to States.) The financial crisis dramatically accelerated 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this ex- the transition to greater openness, and the FOMC’s ceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unem- ployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, infla- Jeffrey R. Campbell is a senior economist and research advisor tion between one and two years ahead is projected in the Economic Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and an external fellow at CentER, Tilburg to be no more than a half percentage point above University. The author is grateful to Marco Bassetto, Charlie the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and Evans, Jonas Fisher, Alejandro Justiniano, and Spencer Krane for many stimulating discussions on forward guidance and to longer-term inflation expectations continue to be Wouter den Haan, Alejandro Justiniano, and Dick Porter for well anchored.1 helpful editorial feedback. This article is being concurrently published in Wouter den Haan (ed.), 2013, Forward Guidance— This extended reference to the conditions deter- Perspectives from Central Bankers, Scholars and Market mining the FOMC’s future interest rate decisions is Participants, Centre for Economic Policy Research, VoxEU.org. an example of forward guidance. © 2013 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Although participants in FOMC meetings have Economic Perspectives is published by the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The views long used speeches and congressional testimony to expressed are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the views discuss the Fed’s possible responses to economic de- of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve velopments, the Committee has only issued formal System. Charles L. Evans, President; Daniel G. Sullivan, Executive Vice and regular forward guidance since February 2000, President and Director of Research; Spencer Krane, Senior Vice when it began to include in its statement a “balance President and Economic Advisor; David Marshall, Senior Vice of risks.” The first one read as follows: “Against the President, financial markets group; Daniel Aaronson, Vice President, microeconomic policy research; Jonas D. M. Fisher, Vice President, background of its long-run goals of price stability and macroeconomic policy research; Richard Heckinger, Vice President, sustainable economic growth and of the information markets team; Anna L. Paulson, Vice President, finance team; William A. Testa, Vice President, regional programs; Richard D. currently available, the Committee believes the risks Porter, Vice President and Economics Editor; Helen Koshy and are weighted mainly toward conditions that may gen- Han Y. Choi, Editors; Rita Molloy and Julia Baker, Production erate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable Editors; Sheila A. Mangler, Editorial Assistant. 2 Economic Perspectives articles may be reproduced in whole or in future.” Less than two years later, the Committee’s part, provided the articles are not reproduced or distributed for August 21, 2001, statement noted that “... the risks commercial gain and provided the source is appropriately credited. are weighted mainly toward conditions that may gen- Prior written permission must be obtained for any other reproduc- 3 tion, distribution, republication, or creation of derivative works erate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.” of Economic Perspectives articles. To request permission, please Between the FOMC’s first statement of risks and contact Helen Koshy, senior editor, at 312-322-5830 or email the financial crisis that began in August 2007 and in- [email protected]. tensified in September 2008, the Fed experimented ISSN 0164-0682 130 4Q/2013, Economic Perspectives forward guidance became more elaborate and detailed. exchange of future flexibility for current macroeco- After lowering the federal funds rate from 5.25 percent nomic performance becomes especially attractive. in early August 2007 to 0–25 basis points in mid- December 2008, the Committee’s statement read: Future policy actions only have impact “In particular, the Committee anticipates that weak if credible economic conditions are likely to warrant exception- In general, statements of future policy intentions ally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.”4 have no impact (benign or otherwise) when the public “Extended period” replaced “some time” in March does not find them credible. This problem is particu- 2009, adding specificity. This phrase remained in the larly acute for a central bank, because a central bank statement until the August 2011 meeting, when it was seeking to improve households’ current and future replaced with the even more specific “at least through welfare will be tempted to renege on past interest rate mid-2013.” The January 2012 statement pushed this promises. The interest rate that is currently optimal date back to “late 2014.” might not be consistent with promises that improved By this point, these statements had become known past economic performance, and breaking those promises as calendar-based forward guidance. Campbell et al. now does nothing to the past and improves present (2012) discuss the confusion this language had engen- and future outcomes. If the public anticipates that dered among the public and market participants as of monetary policymakers will apply such logic in the early 2012. Was “late 2014” a forecast that the economy future, then promises of low future interest rates will would remain weak until then or a reassurance that not be believed and, therefore, will have no beneficial the Committee would keep interest rates low through effect in the present. This conundrum is one example that date regardless of economic developments? The of the time-consistency problem, for the discovery of Committee’s September 2012 statement somewhat which Kydland and Prescott (1977) received a Nobel clarified this by stating that the Committee expects “that Prize in 2004. Since this kind of beneficial forward guid- a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy ance requires the policymaker to keep past promises, will remain appropriate for a considerable time after even when sorely tempted to do what seems best at the economic recovery strengthens.”5 Also, in that the moment, Campbell et al. (2012) label this Odyssean statement, “late 2014” became “mid-2015.” In its forward guidance. Like Odysseus bound to the mast December 12, 2012, statement, the FOMC changed of his ship, a monetary policymaker must forswear the nature of its forward guidance to reduce confusion the siren call of the moment and stick to plans laid in by explicitly tying increases in the federal funds rate the past. Odysseus achieved this with ropes for himself to unemployment and inflation outcomes, using lan- and earwax for his crew. Research into the analogous guage nearly identical to that from the September 2013 tools available to monetary policymakers is ongoing. meeting quoted previously.6 Of course, not every pronouncement by a mone- It might seem paradoxical that at a time when the tary policymaker is a promise. Some statements merely FOMC has done so little with its policy interest rate, forecast the evolution of the private economy. Campbell it has talked so much about its plans. Even in normal et al. (2012) label such forecast-based statements times, a policymaker promising particular future actions Delphic forward guidance. Like the pronouncements constrains her future behavior and concomitantly loses from the oracle of Delphi, they forecast but do not flexibility. However, such forward guidance (sometimes promise. While Delphic pronouncements undoubtedly called “open-mouth operations”) can substantially contribute positively to the execution of monetary policy, improve current economic performance when house- I ignore them in this article to develop instead a primer holds’ and businesses’ current decisions depend on their on the economic theory of Odyssean forward guidance. expectations of future macroeconomic outcomes. If the This primer’s basic framework is the minimal FOMC’s assurances that rates will remain low raise New Keynesian model, in which the central bank private individuals’ expectations for future inflation chooses the interest rate to achieve the best feasible and growth, then they will wish to consume more today, trade-off of output and inflation. First, I discuss this thereby lifting current aggregate demand and closing model, develop key results, and present some simple the output gap (the gap between actual and potential calculations of optimal monetary policy paths that start economic output). Although this benefit might indeed with the economy at the zero lower bound. Although come at the cost of future flexibility, poor enough current I review the model’s two linear equations, one inequality, macroeconomic performance
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