Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Volume 17 Number 3 Symposium—Using Law and Identity Article 11 to Script Cultural Production 3-1-1997 An Alternative Approach to the Problem of Midterm Demands for Contract Renegotiation in the National Football League: The Incentive-Based Contract Daniel M. Walanka Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel M. Walanka, An Alternative Approach to the Problem of Midterm Demands for Contract Renegotiation in the National Football League: The Incentive-Based Contract, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 771 (1997). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol17/iss3/11 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MIDTERM DEMANDS FOR CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION IN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE: THE INCENTIVE-BASED CONTRACT I. INTRODUCTION In this day of the multipurpose, multiyear, and multimillion dollar contract, the average football fan marvels at how much National Football League ("NFL") players earn to hit the gridiron. As a result of these lucrative contracts, it is only natural for fans to develop certain expectations as to the quality and consistency of the product displayed throughout the grueling seventeen-week regular season and the ensuing playoffs.