Lecture 27 – May 1, 2007 Economics 172: Lecture 27 3 Outline: (1) Keen (2005) on Sierra Leone (2) the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) and Its Aftermath

Economics 172 Issues in African Economic Development

Professor Ted Miguel Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley Economics 172 Issues in African Economic Development

Lecture 27 – May 1, 2007 Economics 172: Lecture 27 3 Outline: (1) Keen (2005) on Sierra Leone (2) The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) and its aftermath

Economics 172: Lecture 27 4 Politics and Violence in Sierra Leone • Basic historical timeline: – 1787: Freetown established by the U.K. as a settlement for freed slaves, and a U.K. protectorate – 1896: all of Sierra Leone becomes a protectorate

Economics 172: Lecture 27 5 Map of Africa

Economics 172: Lecture 27 6 Map of Sierra (with 1985 Population density)

Freetown

Economics 172: Lecture 27 7 Politics and Violence in Sierra Leone • Basic historical timeline: – 1787: Freetown established by the U.K. as a settlement for freed slaves, and a U.K. protectorate – 1896: all of Sierra Leone becomes a protectorate – 1898: Major uprising against British rule in the interior (“Hut Tax War”) – 1928: Slavery officially abolished – 1937: Native Administration established, with great authority, lifetime posts, high salaries to Chiefs

Economics 172: Lecture 27 8 Politics and Violence in Sierra Leone • Basic historical timeline: – 1787: Freetown established by the U.K. as a settlement for freed slaves, and a U.K. protectorate – 1896: all of Sierra Leone becomes a protectorate – 1898: Major uprising against British rule in the interior (“Hut Tax War”) – 1928: Slavery officially abolished – 1937: Native Administration established, with great authority, lifetime posts, high salaries to Chiefs – 1950s: Diamond boom spurred internal migration, and enriched mainly elites (i.e., Chiefs, Lebanese) – 1948, 1950, 1955-6: Popular revolts against chiefs

Economics 172: Lecture 27 9 Post-independence politics • 1961: Independence. First Prime Minister Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)

Economics 172: Lecture 27 10 Post-independence politics • 1961: Independence. First Prime Minister Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) • 1961-1964: Milton Margai is considered a reasonably balanced ruler, did not promote ethnic politics • 1964-1967: Albert Margai (his brother) increased Mende officers in the army from 26% to 52%, Mendes also dominated the cabinet

Economics 172: Lecture 27 11 Post-independence politics • 1961: Independence. First Prime Minister Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) • 1961-1964: Milton Margai is considered a reasonably balanced ruler, did not promote ethnic politics • 1964-1967: Albert Margai (his brother) increased Mende officers in the army from 26% to 52%, Mendes also dominated the cabinet • 1967: Opposition African People’s Congress (APC) won elections, led by Siaka Stevens. A coup by Mende army officers, SLPP politicians put down

Economics 172: Lecture 27 12 Post-independence politics • 1961: Independence. First Prime Minister Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) • 1961-1964: Milton Margai is considered a reasonably balanced ruler, did not promote ethnic politics • 1964-1967: Albert Margai (his brother) increased Mende officers in the army from 26% to 52%, Mendes also dominated the cabinet • 1967: Opposition African People’s Congress (APC) won elections, led by Siaka Stevens. A coup by Mende army officers, SLPP politicians put down • Stevens aggressively installed northerners (Temne, Limba) in power, crushed the SLPP, and made Sierra Leone into a one-party APC state. He shut down the country’s profitable railroad to the south-east, cutting off trade between Mende regions and Freetown

Economics 172: Lecture 27 13 Post-independence politics and policy • Stevens made no attempts at serious nation-building / creating a compelling Sierra Leone identity despite the existence of a lingua franca (Krio), extensive intermarriage, and limited religious tensions

Economics 172: Lecture 27 14 Post-independence politics and policy • Stevens made no attempts at serious nation-building / creating a compelling Sierra Leone identity despite the existence of a lingua franca (Krio), extensive intermarriage, and limited religious tensions • Political intimidation through a “shadow” security service (“Special Security Division”): student protests were brutally suppressed, labor unions outlawed, newspaper offices blown up • Corruption and patronage politics was extreme: a political culture of greed became the norm from chiefs all the way up to ministers

Economics 172: Lecture 27 15 Post-independence politics and policy • Agricultural marketing boards (for coffee, cacao) offered very low prices in the 1970s-1980s, and this led to extensive smuggling • Increasing corruption in the mining sector and fishing sector, and agricultural pricing policies, led to dramatic decreases in revenue: by 1985-6 domestic revenue collection was just 18% of 1977-8 levels!

Economics 172: Lecture 27 16 Post-independence politics and policy • Agricultural marketing boards (for coffee, cacao) offered very low prices in the 1970s-1980s, and this led to extensive smuggling • Increasing corruption in the mining sector and fishing sector, and agricultural pricing policies, led to dramatic decreases in revenue: by 1985-6 domestic revenue collection was just 18% of 1977-8 levels!

• As a result spending on services collapsed by the 1980s: Sierra Leone was nearly last in the world on most measures of health (infant mortality rate) and education (literacy, attainment). Spending on development only 3% of the overall budget in 1984 • Sierra Leone was ripe for political unrest when Stevens was replaced by Joseph Momoh in 1985

Economics 172: Lecture 27 17 Economics 172: Lecture 27 18 War and Local Institutions in Sierra Leone • After Siaka Stevens stepped down in 1985, and the total economic collapse of the late 1980s, Sierra Leone experienced a brutal civil conflict 1991-2002: at least 50,000 killed and over one million displaced

Economics 172: Lecture 27 19 War and Local Institutions in Sierra Leone • After Siaka Stevens stepped down in 1985, and the total economic collapse of the late 1980s, Sierra Leone experienced a brutal civil conflict 1991-2002: at least 50,000 killed and over one million displaced

• Bellows and Miguel (2006) estimate the relationship between conflict intensity and later local institutional, political, and economic outcomes in Sierra Leone

Economics 172: Lecture 27 20 The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) • Fighting started in the eastern Liberian border but eventually affected the entire country – Radical dissidents trained in Libya, led by Foday Sankoh, formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). RUF was allied with Charles Taylor in Liberia

Economics 172: Lecture 27 21 The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) • Fighting started in the eastern Liberian border but eventually affected the entire country – Radical dissidents trained in Libya, led by Foday Sankoh, formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). RUF was allied with Charles Taylor in Liberia

• The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was corrupted by the mid- 1980s, with officer positions going to the highest bidder. Collusion between rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and SLA meant that most violence was directed against civilians rather than at each other

Economics 172: Lecture 27 22 Consequences of the Sierra Leone war • RUF attackers massacred chiefs and elders, destroyed public buildings, displaced civilians – Recruits often attacked their home villages. Many children were forcibly recruited

Economics 172: Lecture 27 23 Consequences of the Sierra Leone war • RUF attackers massacred chiefs and elders, destroyed public buildings, displaced civilians – Recruits often attacked their home villages. Many children were forcibly recruited

• The Civilian Defense Forces (CDF) were locally organized and financed militias that successfully fought off the RUF/SLA in some areas – CDF’s were organized around traditional secret societies, including Mende hunter groups – New institutions formed in response to the violence

Economics 172: Lecture 27 24 Causes of the war • Diamond smuggling financed group leaders and arms purchases, and armed groups often fought over control of the mines

• Deep underlying grievances against the state also fed the violence: Sierra Leone was second to last in the 1990 UN Human Development Index, and public services had completely fallen apart

Economics 172: Lecture 27 25 Economics 172: Lecture 27 26 Economics 172: Lecture 27 27 Economics 172: Lecture 27 28 Where was the fighting in Sierra Leone? • Local diamond mines, higher prewar incomes are both positively associated with local attacks and battles, “greed” as a driving factor

• Is Sierra Leone condemned to perpetual poverty as a result of the war?

Economics 172: Lecture 27 29 Conflict intensity and post-war recovery • Conflict victimization is – surprisingly – positively associated with several measures of postwar political mobilization, including community meeting attendance, voter registration, community group membership

Economics 172: Lecture 27 30 Conflict intensity and post-war recovery • Conflict victimization is – surprisingly – positively associated with several measures of postwar political mobilization, including community meeting attendance, voter registration, community group membership – And there is no significant negative relationship between conflict exposure and postwar 2004 socioeconomic outcomes (per capita consumption, schooling, child nutrition) – Partial recovery from the war appears to have been very rapid (within only a few years)

Economics 172: Lecture 27 31 .2 0 -.2 Meeting Attendance(residuals) -.4

-.2 0 .2 Conflict victimization index (residuals)

Meeting Attendance (residuals) Fitted values Economics 172: Lecture 27 32 Sierra Leone GDP Per Capita

250

200

150 Sierra Leone GDP Per 100 Capita US$ PPP US$ 50

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year

Economics 172: Lecture 27 33 The bottom line

• We find no lingering adverse effects of civil war violence in Sierra Leone on local living standards or institutions

– Several measures of political mobilization / collective action are somewhat better in areas that experienced more violence during the conflict – 60% of 2005 IRCBP respondents claim that the war positively impacted community cooperation – Institutions, norms, and organizations forged during war persist into the postwar period

Economics 172: Lecture 27 34 Implications

• More speculatively: did the Sierra Leone civil war generate new – and possibly stronger – local institutions? Local governments?

• Keen (2005) claims the war increased political awareness and mobilization, especially for youths • Ferme (2001, p. 228): “[Sierra Leoneans] have sometimes turned [social instability] into a creative, though violent, opportunity to refashion themselves vis- à-vis their own institutions”

Economics 172: Lecture 27 35 Implications

• More speculatively: did the Sierra Leone civil war generate new – and possibly stronger – local institutions? Local governments?

• Uncertainty over the July 2007 Presidential elections

Economics 172: Lecture 27 36 • For next time: readings on Botswana, Africa’s best- known success story

Economics 172: Lecture 27 37 Whiteboard #1

Economics 172: Lecture 27 38 Whiteboard #2

Economics 172: Lecture 27 39 Whiteboard #3

Economics 172: Lecture 27 40 Whiteboard #4

Economics 172: Lecture 27 41 Whiteboard #5

Economics 172: Lecture 27 42 Map of Africa

Economics 172: Lecture 27 43 Map of Africa

Economics 172: Lecture 27 44