Anthropocentrism As Environmental Ethic
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of Kentucky UKnowledge Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 2016 Anthropocentrism as Environmental Ethic Kyle L. Burchett University of Kentucky, [email protected] Digital Object Identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.259 Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Burchett, Kyle L., "Anthropocentrism as Environmental Ethic" (2016). Theses and Dissertations-- Philosophy. 12. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/12 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STUDENT AGREEMENT: I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the copyright to my work. REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above. Kyle L. Burchett, Student Dr. Theodore Schatzki, Major Professor Dr. David Bradshaw, Director of Graduate Studies ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC ______________________________________ DISSERTATION ______________________________________ A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky By Kyle Burchett Lexington, Kentucky Director: Dr. Theodore Schatzki, Professor of Philosophy Lexington, Kentucky 2016 Copyright © Kyle Burchett 2016 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, human- centered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings with nature. Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the environmental degradations associated with our species. On the other hand, a handful of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a foundation for environmental ethics. According to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11). Norton notes that although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the various reasons they have for advocating such policies, they nevertheless share an equal commitment to protecting the environment. Because any form of anthropocentrism must fundamentally favor humanity over nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are nevertheless concerned that such favoritism is “nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias” (Taylor 1981:215). They reason that only a nonanthropocentric ethic can guarantee that policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their interests conflict with those of nonhumans. I argue that critics of convergence fail to appreciate that Norton’s hypothesis is limited to ideologies that he deems “reasonable” and “suitably broad and long-sighted,” or else they misapprehend what these terms imply. When it comes to ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales. The most unreasonable, narrow, and short-sighted ideologies are those that are the most individualistic. It is at the collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place. I defend a version of anthropocentrism that I term ecological anthropocentrism. KEYWORDS: Anthropocentrism, Nonanthropocentrism, Convergence Hypothesis, Bryan Norton, Axiom of Future Value, J. Baird Callicott Kyle Burchett ________________ ___April 27, 2016________________ ____ Date ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC By Kyle Burchett _______Theodore Schatzki___________________ Director of Dissertation _______David Bradshaw_____________________ Director of Graduate Studies _______April 27, 2016_______________________ Date For Kevin Acknowledgements The following dissertation would never have been completed without the kind support of several people. In particular, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Theodore Schatzki, my Dissertation Chair, for his invaluable advice and direction as well as his saintly patience over the years. The other members of my Dissertation Committee, Dr. Arnold Farr, Dr. Clare Batty, and Dr. Lynne Rieske-Kinney, also provided helpful comments and questions that vastly improved the finished product. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the material and psychological support of my friends and family. I could not have finished this project or maintained a modicum of sanity without their help. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. iii Preface ................................................................................................................................. v Chapter One: Should Environmentalists Regret that Humans Exist? 1.1 Apocalypse Now? ........................................................................................ 1 1.2 Are Human-Centered Worldviews Really to Blame for Our Ecological Predicament? .............................................................................................. 7 1.3 Regarding Smilanskian Regret – Should We Be Sorry that We Exist? ...... 10 1.4 Smilanskian Regret Meets Environmental Philosophy ............................. 17 Chapter Two: Ecological Anthropocentrism – A New Paradigm 2.1 A Preliminary Defense of Convergence .................................................... 29 2.2 What’s Wrong with Anthropocentrism? The Standard Arguments ........ 39 2.3 Anthropocentrism as Ontological Error .................................................... 41 2.4 Do Humans Have Privileged Access to Reality? ........................................ 44 2.5 Anthropocentrism as Axiological Error ..................................................... 47 2.6 How Effective Is the Concept of Intrinsic Value on Our Behaviors? ......... 50 2.7 The Person-Affecting Intuition and Parfit’s Paradox ................................ 55 2.8 Implications for the Ineliminability of Perspectival Anthropocentrism ... 59 2.9 What Would Genuine Nonanthropocentrism Entail? .............................. 63 2.10 A Not-So-Ignorant Intertemporal Rawlsian Veil ....................................... 68 2.11 A Convergence of Smilanskian Regret ...................................................... 70 2.12 Does Norton’s Convergence Hypothesis Make Sense? ............................ 71 Chapter Three: On the Moral Relevance of a Geologic Scale 3.1 The Limitations of an Individualistic Ethic ................................................ 74 3.2 Can a Geologic Scale Be Morally Relevant? .............................................. 78 3.3 Are Determinations of Ecological Normalcy Arbitrary? ........................... 82 3.4 An Appeal to Ignorance ............................................................................ 86 3.5 A Personalist’s Appeal to Ignorance – Regarding Parfit’s Paradox........... 90 3.6 Individuals as Complicit Participants in Collective Wrongdoing ............... 92 3.7 On the Moral Irrelevance of Spatial and Temporal Proximity .................. 96 3.8 Lifeboat Earth and the Tragedy of the Commons .................................. 100 3.9 Mass Extinction – Crossing a Dangerous Threshold ............................... 109 Chapter Four: Conclusion 4.1 What Have We Learned So Far? ............................................................. 118 4.2 Looking Forward – The Problem of Nero’s Fiddle .................................. 121 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 125 Vita .................................................................................................................................