Is the Neuroscience of Ethics Really a New Challenge to Moral Philosophy? Sarah Songhorian(Α)

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RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2019.0001 Vol. 10 (2019), n. 1, pp. 1-15

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The Methods of Neuroethics: Is the Neuroscience of Ethics Really a New Challenge to Moral Philosophy? Sarah Songhorian(α)

Ricevuto: 23 novembre 2018; accettato: 5 marzo 2019

█ Abstract Within the otherwise lively debate on neuroethics, little attention has been devoted to the peculiar methodological issues and challenges it faces. My aim is to track down its methodological specificities. Firstly, I will investigate to which traditional debates neuroethics bears similarity and to what extent it actually represents a novelty in ethical thinking. While the ethics of neuroscience is akin to bioethics, the neuroscience of ethics seems akin to moral psychology. And yet they differ as far as the level of explanation of human moral behavior and reasoning is concerned. Thus, while the neuroscience of ethics and moral psychology share a family resemblance, they cannot be reduced to one another. Secondly, I will ex- plore three different philosophical temperaments towards the role empirical findings can and should have in normative ethics and in metaethics. Prudential reasons would recommend openness to new sources of evidence without risking either reductionism nor neglect. KEYWORDS: Neuroethics; Methods; Moral Psychology; Empirical Ethics; Levels of Explanation

█ Riassunto I metodi della neuroetica: la neuroscienza dell’etica è davvero una nuova sfida per la filosofia morale? – Nonostante il dibattito in ambito neuroetico sia molto vivace, poca attenzione è stata dedicata alla questione relativa al suo metodo specifico e ai problemi a cui essa va incontro. Il mio scopo è quello di identificare le specificità metodologiche di questa disciplina. Anzitutto cercherò di determinare a quali dibattiti tradizionali la neuroetica può essere avvicinata e in che misura invece questa costituisce una no- vità all’interno del pensiero etico. Mentre l’etica della neuroscienza ha delle affinità con la bioetica, la neuroscienza dell’etica appare maggiormente simile alla psicologia morale, sebbene tali discipline siano diver- se fra loro per via del livello a cui spiegano il comportamento e il ragionamento morale degli esseri umani. Pertanto, nonostante la neuroscienza dell’etica e la psicologia morale rivelino una certa somiglianza di famiglia, non è possibile ridurre l’una all’altra. In secondo luogo esplorerò tre diversi atteggiamenti filoso- fici rispetto al ruolo che i risultati empirici giocano o dovrebbero giocare rispetto all’etica normativa e alla metaetica. Ragioni di prudenza suggeriscono di rimanere aperti verso nuove fonti di evidenza evitando tanto di ridurre l’etica a esse quanto di trascurarle del tutto. PAROLE CHIAVE: Neuroetica; Metodi; Psicologia morale; Etica empirica; Livelli di spiegazione

(α)Facoltà di Filosofia, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, via Olgettina, 58 - 20132 Milano (I) E-mail: [email protected] ()

Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale

2 Songhorian

NEUROETHICS IS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD On the one hand, there is no universally ac- in which philosophical insight interacts with da- cepted method of ethics and, thus, the contro- ta from cognitive neuroscience and other scien- versy would simply be moved one step forward tific areas. Since its origins in the early 2000s,1 while remaining substantially unsolved: for there has been growing academic interest2 in one would still have to determine which one of focusing on: the different proposed methods in ethics is the most suitable for neuroethics. On the other ethical issues raised by our increased and hand, the methods of cognitive neuroscience constantly improving understanding of and those of ethics rest on very different the brain and our ability to monitor and grounds and it is not obvious how they can in- influence it, as well as on ethical issues that form each other: the former is mostly con- emerge from our concomitant deepening cerned with how the techniques actually work, understanding of the biological bases of the latter concerns our knowledge (or lack agency and ethical decision-making.3 thereof) of what should count as good or right. Not only do these domains of inquiry not seem Despite this substantive interest in how necessarily related, but also their combination, neuroscientific data can inform our theories however performed, would require a non- of moral agency and moral decision-making, trivial passage from description to prescription there has been little attention to the peculiar that should, at least, be argued for.4 Thus, even methodological issues and challenges neuro- trying to avoid the question of the nature or ethics has to face. Assuming that the issues existence of a specific method of neuroethics, and challenges neuroethics has to deal with one would still have to investigate which are similar – or even identical – to those ad- method, among the possible methods of ethics, dressed by other empirical disciplines, the rel- is the most suitable for neuroethics, or to ask evant peculiarities of the methods of neuro- how cognitive neuroscience and ethics can re- ethics can be obscured by excessively under- late to each other while being so different. In scoring this resemblance. For this reason, I the end, then, it seems that methodological is- will focus on the methods of neuroethics as a sues akin to those one has tried to avoid by distinctive discipline. saying that we can simply combine the meth- The methodological challenges neuroeth- ods of ethics and those of cognitive neurosci- ics has to face should not be conflated with ence, come back through the window after be- those of neuroscience. It is one thing to take ing thrown out the door. into account the methodology of neuroscien- With the need for a proper consideration tific research per se – e.g., learning how neu- of the methods of neuroethics in mind, my roimaging techniques work and to what ex- aim in this paper is twofold. First, I will try tent experiments may fall below given stand- and see whether there are some specificities of ards –; it is another thing to assess and evalu- neuroethics, as far as its methodology is con- ate the methods related to, on the one hand, cerned, that make it, also from a purely meth- the ethical considerations that can – and odological perspective and not only from a should – be raised while doing cognitive neu- substantive viewpoint, a truly novel research roscience, and, on the other, the impact the field in ethics. To do so, I will consider the latter can – and should – have on ethics. Cer- definition put forth by Roskies in 2002 of two tainly, one may claim that the methods of sub-fields within neuroethics: the ethics of neuroethics are nothing more than an a poste- neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. I riori combination of the methods of cognitive will contend that each of them bears some neuroscience and those of ethics, whatever similarity to more traditional debates: specifi- these may be. And yet, this kind of answer cally, the ethics of neuroscience is akin to bio- begs the question in two different ways. ethics, and the neuroscience of ethics is akin

The Methods of Neuroethics 3 to moral psychology. Besides this family re- ethics of neuroscience, can be conceived of as semblance, however, I will claim that the neu- analogous to bioethics. It thus raises mostly the roscience of ethics should nonetheless be con- same issues that are raised by bioethics but in sidered as distinct from moral psychology in- relation to the innovative technological possi- sofar as the explanations these two disciplines bilities afforded by cognitive neuroscience. In- provide for human behavior and human deci- formed consent and incidental findings, for in- sion-making processes are at different levels. stance, take on specific features when applied Lacking a proper distinction between these to neuroscientific research. Just to provide an levels of explanation, one could be unduly example, experiments in cognitive neurosci- prone to believe that moral psychology can be ence mostly use volunteers whose brains are reduced to the neuroscience of ethics. scanned while performing a task in order to see The investigation into the proper relation- the typical functioning of the human brain: ship between these two latter domains of in- these subjects volunteer for the sake of science quiry may lead one to wonder if there is any and the acquisition of further knowledge about prospect for a form of naturalist reductionism brain functioning. And yet, it may happen that, in the study of moral cognition. As my second while scanning a supposedly healthy subject aim, thus, I will deal with the issue of the ex- with no behavioral or clinical symptoms, the tent to which empirical findings in general researchers find some abnormality that may or can have consequences for normative ethics may not have consequences for the future or for metaethics – an issue not necessarily health of the subject. The obvious ethical issue specific to neuroethics – with reference to the is whether such information should be provid- traditional distinction between facts and val- ed to the subject or not – just as much as it ues, or “is” and “ought” in ethical reflection. happens that DNA testing shows a subject’s As a caveat, since the aim of this paper is susceptibility to some pathologies that may or to investigate primarily methodological is- may not actually develop in her lifetime. sues, I will as far as possible avoid any sub- On the other hand, (2), i.e. the neurosci- stantial assumptions which may indirectly af- ence of ethics, seems to be the subset of neu- fect methodological considerations. roethics that is “truly novel”.7

█ Ethics of neuroscience and neuroscience The neuroscience of ethics refers to the of ethics impact of neuroscientific knowledge upon our understanding of ethics itself.8 In a very influential article, Adina Roskies proposed a distinction between two main Its core interest is in the knowledge that branches within neuroethics that would be can be acquired by these new technologies as welcomed by most scholars.5 She defined (1) far as our moral abilities are concerned. Just the ethics of neuroscience and (2) the neuro- to provide an example of the kind of science of ethics as follows: knowledge that can be acquired by scanning typical subjects’ brains, consider the research (1) the ethical issues and considerations launched by Joshua Greene and colleagues on that should be raised in the course of de- the neural bases of moral judgment.9 They signing and executing neuroscientific stud- showed which brain areas are involved in ies and (2) the ethical and social impact judging the appropriateness of a certain that the results of those studies might course of action by using primarily moral di- have, or ought to have, on existing social, lemmas as stimuli. It is easy to see that, if this ethical, and legal structures.6 is really to be seen as some novelty that the new field of neuroethics is to bring to ethics, In a nutshell, on the one hand, (1), i.e. the then it actually shows some family resemblance

4 Songhorian to traditional moral psychology, since the latter device does and why. Following Marr’s exam- can be described as exploring «human func- ple, the cash register sums. tioning in moral contexts».10 It could thus be The what-question is answered by a theory argued that what is really new about neuroeth- of addition. The why-question is answered by ics is not its aim – i.e. investigating how we ac- considering the reason for choosing that par- tually make decisions and pass judgments in ticular operation – addition – instead of other moral circumstances (as opposed to dealing possible options. It is answered by a series of with how we ought to do those very same constraints. The second level – i.e. the algo- things) –, for this is shared by moral psycholo- rithmic and representational level – on the gy as well; rather, the novelty would be seen to contrary, is described by Marr as a way to real- lie in the methods it uses and in the level of the ize the process, it specifies how to do it. Thus, explanation that it intends to provide. The second level of the analysis of a pro- █ Not just moral psychology with new tools cess, therefore, involves choosing two things: (1) a representation for the input Because of their shared aim, moral psy- and for the output of the process and (2) chology and the neuroscience of ethics are of- an algorithm by which the transformation ten conflated in contemporary debate and it is may actually be accomplished. For addi- not trivial to draw a line between them. tion, of course, the input and output rep- Should, for instance, experiments on implicit resentations can both be the same, because attitudes be considered to pertain to moral they both consist of numbers. […] For ad- psychology or to the neuroscience of ethics? dition, we might choose Arabic numerals Furthermore, by focusing on specific is- for the representations, and for the algo- sues and topics – just to give an example, con- rithm we could follow the usual rules sider the study of implicit attitudes –, one about adding the least significant digits risks overlooking the existing methodological first and “carrying” if the sum exceeds 9.12 differences between these two fields and losing some relevant aspects of both. In fact, Finally, the last level is the implementational when considering particular issues, one might one; in the case of the cash register, it is the spe- end up disregarding the relevance of method- cific machine that physically embodies the algo- ological aspects: if one’s aim is that of under- rithm. Various implementations of the algo- standing implicit attitudes, it may be natural rithm are, nonetheless, possible. The cash regis- to take into account all available evidence re- ter, for instance, can be mechanical or electron- gardless of whether their source refers to one ic. Moreover, human beings themselves are ca- method or the other. pable of performing the same operation a cash Thus, even though both moral psychology register does – namely, summing up quantities and the neuroscience of ethics may aim at de- –, even though they are very different as far as scribing and explaining human ways of be- their basic mechanisms are concerned. having, judging, and deciding, they do so by Once the distinction between the compu- appealing to different levels of explanation.11 tational, algorithmic, and implementational As David Marr pointed out, one can distin- levels of explanation has been proposed, guish between a computational, an algorith- though, a question concerning the relations mic, and an implementational level of expla- between them may arise. Marr explains how nation for a certain phenomenon. In order to he believes the three levels relate to each oth- introduce these levels, Marr uses the example er as follows: of a cash register. The first and more abstract level of explanation is that of a computational there is a wide choice available at each lev- theory, which aims at understanding what the el, and the explication of each level in-

The Methods of Neuroethics 5

volves issues that are rather independent tions apart can account for different possible of the other two.13 implementations of the same representation: just as much as, in Marr’s case, the algorithm The three different levels are of course, ac- addition can be implemented by certain opera- cording to Marr, «logically and causally relat- tions of a person’s mind, but also by some oper- ed».14 And yet: ations of a cash register. These two different de- vices constitute differences in the implementa- an important point to note is that since the tion, but not in higher levels of explanation – three levels are only rather loosely related, say, representational and computational. some phenomena may be explained at only How does all this apply to our present one or two of them. […] In attempts to re- concern? While moral psychology is interest- late psychophysical problems to physiology, ed in what we can call the representational too often there is confusion about the level level of how humans judge, decide, and act at which problems should be addressed.15 morally; the neuroscience of ethics deals with the neural mechanisms that undergo and im- That the three levels are logically and plement such representations. If this way of causally related can be exemplified, for in- understanding the difference between moral stance, by the fact that, when one is designing psychology and the neuroscience of ethics is a device, there might be some implementa- plausible, then it is easy to see how the latter tional constraints guiding the choice for a cer- cannot be fully reduced to the former – nor tain algorithm to be implemented, or it might the other way around. In other words, the be the other way around. However, as Marr neuroscience of ethics cannot be considered claims, the three levels are to some extent in- as being just moral psychology with new and dependent from one another.16 One can ad- more efficient tools. I, thus, agree with vocate a computational theory of vision with- Schleim who claims that: out entering into details about how it is repre- sented or implemented, just as much as one had the research been restricted to that de- can defend a theory of addition without deal- scriptive question only, just offering an ing with its implementation in any given sys- updated scientific account of how people tem nor with its representation in Arabic or of different kinds make moral decisions Roman numerals. under certain circumstances, moral neuro- By distinguishing between different levels science might have just become a modern- of explanation, one can account for the fact ized form of moral psychology, promising that generalization on higher levels – repre- to offer better explanations owing to its sentational or computational levels – can more direct access to the central organ of provide explanatory elements that would be the mind, the human brain.17 missed if one focuses only on a low-level and purely implementational description. However, what made the neuroscience of Neuroimaging studies can, for instance, re- ethics particularly interesting and troubling – veal how typical humans’ brains are activated depending on the viewpoint – is precisely the when we face moral dilemmas. However, if attempt to bridge the gap between description moral computers or cyborgs became possible, and prescription. Again, in Scheim’s words: the implementational level of explanation would certainly differ, while the representation- The seductive allure, from the neuroscien- al one might remain identical. The same could tific point of view, and the provocation, be said of inhabitants of other planets who from the philosophical point of view, in- might be wired differently from us. Keeping stead consisted in the attempt to cross the representational and implementational explana- border between the descriptive and the

6 Songhorian

normative, for example, by distinguishing temporary empirical research on morality is morally justified (“rational”) intuitions hugely cited in the humanities.19 In particular, from unjustified (“irrational”) ones, based recent empirical findings are used either in on the brain areas, associated psychologi- normative ethics or in metaethics.20 A similar cal processes, and evolutionary pathways role was always played by empirical data – e.g. putatively underlying them.18 moral psychological ones –, one difference being, though, that it was not clear how exact- My aim so far has been to show to what ex- ly they could provide such a contribution. tent the methods of neuroethics are similar to From a philosophical viewpoint, the intrica- those which can be found in other more tradi- cies and complications of the relationship be- tional debates in ethics and to what extent they tween empirical findings and normativity has represent a novelty. It seems fair to claim that extremely deep roots. The interpretation of the ethics of neuroscience has a family resem- Hume’s is/ought passage,21 the division be- blance to traditional bioethics and the neuro- tween facts and values,22 and Moore’s argu- science of ethics looks akin to moral psycholo- ment against the naturalistic fallacy23 consti- gy. I have focused primarily on the relationship tute the main reasons why there seems to be between the neuroscience of ethics and moral philosophical resistance to the possibility of psychology underlining both the elements that empirical findings having an impact on moral make them look alike and those that pull them theorizing. As Sinnott-Armstrong puts it: apart from each other. Specifically, I have argued for the fact that the neuroscience of eth- G.E. Moore’s diatribe against the natural- ics and moral psychology concern – in Marr’s istic fallacy in 1903 set the stage for most of terms – two different levels of explanation in twentieth-century moral philosophy. The accounting for how humans judge, decide, and main protagonists over the next sixty years act morally. Lacking a proper distinction be- were intuitionists and emotivists, both of tween these levels of explanation, one could be whom were convinced by Moore that em- unduly prone to believe that moral psychology pirical science is irrelevant to moral philos- can be reduced to the neuroscience of ethics or ophy and common moral beliefs. Even in the other way around. the 1970s and 1980s, when a wider array of The investigation into the proper relation- moral theories entered the scene and ap- ship between these two latter domains of in- plied ethics became popular, few moral phi- quiry may lead one to wonder if there is any losophers paid much attention to develop- prospect for a form of naturalist reductionism ments in biology and psychology. in the study of moral cognition. Up until now This isolation must end. Moral phi- I have avoided dealing with the “seductive al- losophers cannot continue to ignore de- lure” and the “provocation” – as Schleim calls velopments in psychology, brain science, it – that the neuroscience of ethics represents and biology. Of course, philosophers need for moral cognition and moral philosophy. In to be careful when they draw lessons from the next section, I will focus on my second empirical research. As Moore and his fol- aim in this paper and I will discuss whether lowers argued, we should not jump empirical findings can have an impact on straight from descriptive premises in psy- normative ethical theories or on metaethics, chology or biology to positive moral con- and to what extent (if any) they can do so. clusions or normative conclusions in moral epistemology. That would be a fallacy. █ The (not-so-new) challenge of empirical Nonetheless, psychology can still affect ethics moral philosophy in indirect ways.24

As Christen and Alfano point out, con- If we interpreted Hume’s passage as the

The Methods of Neuroethics 7 claim according to which it is impossible to go tions. They can, for instance, (even non-deductively) from empirical prop- ositions to normative ones,25 the neuroscience supply material for minor premises in eth- of ethics would have no impact whatsoever ical arguments—it is perhaps a priori true on normative accounts. However, this seems that creatures capable of pleasure and pain an extreme interpretation of Hume’s concern deserve moral consideration, but whether – and definitely not the only one available. It fetuses are sensate creatures is an empiri- is in fact possible that he was mainly con- cal question.28 cerned with the lack of argumentation in favor of the passage from “is” clauses to “ought” Empirical data can, thus, tell us something clauses rather than with a complete denial of about “why and how”29 people make moral the very possibility of such passage. And yet, judgments, but that is, according to Armchair even if a prohibition was actually in place, Traditionalism, only partially relevant for a that would say nothing about the possibility moral theory that concerns whether such of drawing metaethical implications from judgments are true or truth-apt. Such empirical premises, since metaethics is itself a knowledge of how morality works for human descriptive enterprise.26 minds is relevant for a moral theory insofar as Kauppinen distinguishes three “philosoph- it aims at being psychologically feasible.30 But ical temperaments”27 one can display as re- again, the fact that a certain moral theory can gards the question whether empirical research be realized by human subjects says nothing should have an impact and play a role in eth- about its being true or not. It is for this and ics. His account is particularly interesting for for similar reasons that Armchair Traditional- the present purposes as he applies these tem- ism claims that «the role of empirical facts is peraments precisely to metaethics and to marginal, not essential or fundamental to ethi- normative ethics. Table 1 summarizes Kaup- cal inquiry».31 pinen’s distinctions. On the contrary, those who advocate Ethi- Let me now briefly summarize Kaup- cal Empiricism argue in favor of a much more pinen’s description of the three temperaments relevant role for empirical findings. In particu- to see how they can prove useful for the pre- lar, they claim that empirical data can contrib- sent work as well. Armchair Traditionalism ute to solving ethical debates (Moderate Ethical mainly claims that empirical findings can only Empiricism), or even that they are fundamental marginally contribute to our ethical ques- and essential for ethical inquiry (Bold Ethical

Armchair Bold Ethical Moderate Ethical Traditionalism Empiricism Empiricism Empirical facts are only rel- Questions about the na- Empirical results are an evant for causal explana- ture of moral judgment important source of evi- Metaethics tions of particular moral or facts can be answered dence about the nature of judgments and the capacity via empirical study. moral judgment or facts. to make moral judgments.

Empirical facts are only rel- Normative ethical ques- Empirical results are an evant for deriving judg- tions are empirical que- important source of evi- ments about particular cas- stions. dence about non-derivati- Normative ethics es from non-empirical prin- ve moral truths and/or the ciples and for practical rec- empirical presuppositions ommendations. of normative theories. Table 1. Kauppinen’s distinctions - adapted from A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, cit., pp. 280-281.

8 Songhorian

Empiricism). They represent different forms of ethical empiricism (or Bold Empirical Ethics) naturalism: Moderate Ethical Empiricism can seems to be the least plausible option, because be defined as a revisionist naturalistic account, its reductionism could easily disregard rele- Bold Ethical Empiricism as a reductionist one.32 vant aspects of moral philosophical inquiry, Thus, Bold Ethical Empiricism claims that ethi- focusing solely on its basic elements. As men- cal issues can – and probably should – be re- tioned in section 3, different levels of explana- duced to empirical ones. In fact, according to a tion of one and the same phenomenon allow bold version of empirical ethics, normative some elements to be relevant only in one of ethical questions are nothing more than empiri- them. Similarly, reducing normative theories cal ones and metaethical issues can be solved by to facts about human moral psychology is to empirical studies. assume a substantive claim about the nature Things get more complicated when one of moral facts, namely, that they are nothing takes into account Moderate Ethical Empiri- more than human typical projections. Moral cism. Indeed, a moderate version of empirical truth would, thus, be identical to typical hu- ethics does not imply reductionism, but it still man response. While such a form of moral an- attributes a more robust role to empirical ti-realism34 could be argued for, the problem findings both in normative ethics and in with Bold Empirical Ethics is that it just seems metaethics compared to the marginal one al- to take this for granted and to presuppose it. lowed for by Armchair Traditionalism. Thus, These considerations should be sufficient to as far as normative ethics is concerned, a see how a bold version of empirical ethics can moderate version of ethical empiricism would be problematic. not simply grant the possibility that moral On the contrary, it is far more complicated psychological facts are relevant for ascertain- to provide general reasons and intuitive ar- ing that a certain normative theory is psycho- guments in favor of (or against) Armchair logically feasible, but also that they constitute Traditionalism or Moderate Ethical Empiri- a relevant source of evidence for accounting cism. The latter seems a viable option in order for «non-derivative moral truths and/or the to take into account as much data as possible empirical presuppositions of normative theo- without either losing important sources of in- ries».33 Similarly, as far as metaethics is con- formation or reducing normative issues to cerned, a Moderate Ethical Empiricism claims empirical ones. And yet, one has to admit that that empirical findings are a relevant source accepting such a thesis presupposes, at least, of evidence for understanding the very nature some form of revisionist methodological nat- of moral judgments and of moral facts, in- uralism, which is far from being inarguable.35 stead of either being only marginally relevant Since arguing in favor of (or against) Arm- for a causal account of moral judgments and chair Traditionalism or Moderate Ethical Empir- of moral facts – as for Armchair Traditional- icism seems far more complex, one possibility is ism – or being one and the same thing as to renounce assuming one single philosophical moral judgments and moral facts, so that temperament for normative ethics and for knowing the relevant empirical facts would metaethics and rather considering each of them exhaust what one could ever know about such separately to see which temperament suits each judgments and such facts – as Bold Empirical discipline best. In fact, these philosophical tem- Ethics would claim. peraments differ in the extent to which they al- In this work, I do not intend to argue in low empirical data to impact metaethical de- favor of any among such “philosophical tem- bates such as that between moral cognitivism or peraments”, but simply to acknowledge their non-cognitivism, that concerning whether or difference and to show their respective plau- not moral facts exist, or that between judgment sibility as far as normative ethics and internalism and externalism. metaethics are concerned. A bold version of Taking this last debate as an example,

The Methods of Neuroethics 9

Adina Roskies considered patients with ven- piricism just as much as with Armchair Tradi- tromedial prefrontal damage as counterex- tionalism – if the latter is properly understood amples to substantive belief-internalism (or not as a theoretical framework denying any motive-internalism about belief), that is, to role to empirical data, but rather as a theory the view that the simple fact of holding cer- acknowledging they play only a marginal role. tain moral beliefs and making certain moral The difference between Armchair Traditional- judgments is sufficient to have a motive for ism (so construed) and a Moderate Ethical Em- acting in accordance with such beliefs and piricism rests uniquely on a very small differ- judgments.36 If Roskies’ argument is sound, ence: both claim that empirical data per se can- then empirical data on ventromedial prefron- not solve normative issues, but, while the for- tal damage is essential to show that holding a mer considers their contribution only margin- belief or passing a judgment is not sufficient al, the latter seems to acknowledge they play a for motivating an agent to act. If that is the more active role – even though it is extremely case, it seems that Moderate Empirical Ethics complicated to see to what extent it is more so. is more suited to metaethical disputes, since Joshua Greene – somehow replying to sev- empirical findings seem to do more than just eral objections his and others’ studies have marginally contribute to resolving them. In raised concerning how they seem to derive the case made by Roskies against belief- normative conclusions from the description internalism, data from this set of subjects is of empirical facts40 – advocates for some sort taken as a disproof, or a counterexample, of of Moderate Empirical Ethics: the thesis itself: hence, playing a crucial rather than a marginal role in our attempt to uncov- I am not claiming one can derive a moral er metaethical truths. Moreover, since “ought” from nothing but a scientific “is”. metaethics is a descriptive enterprise rather Rather, my point is that moral psychology than a properly normative one,37 it seems less matters for ethics, that it is “normatively problematic to claim that empirical findings significant”. Moral psychology matters, impact on it more than on normativity, for not because it can generate interesting empirical findings and metaethics both lie in normative conclusions all by itself, but be- the domain of facts and being, whereas nor- cause it can play an essential role in gener- mativity lies in the domain of oughtness, or ating interesting normative conclusions.41 having to be. On the contrary, Armchair Traditionalism The role Greene attributes to empirical seems more suitable for accounting for the data seems, in fact, more than marginal. In relationship between empirical data and nor- particular, Greene claims that deontological mative theories. The former can certainly accounts are undermined by the data we have provide information about how and why peo- on moral cognition,42 even though the latter ple reason in a certain way, how and why they cannot fully dismiss them all alone.43 pass certain judgments, and how and why As Kauppinen claims, ethical empiricism they have certain moral beliefs; but they can- has four possible ways to try and bridge the not by themselves solve normative debates.38 gap between “is” and “ought”, an attempt Arm- This does not mean they can play no role, but chair Traditionalism would have no interest in simply that the priority should be given to doing: via reductionism (Bold Ethical Empiri- philosophical reflection in the contemporary cism would go this way), via aetiological de- forms of conceptual analysis and argumenta- bunking,44 via ethical conservatism,45 or via tive reasoning.39 This way of conceptualizing psychological unfeasibility.46 Without entering the contribution of empirical findings to into details about these strategies, I will very normative issues is, as it may appear clear briefly consider the last three. As it happens in now, compatible with Moderate Ethical Em- Greene,47 aetiological debunking arguments

10 Songhorian aim at showing that deontological or other can be realized by human moral psychology. non-consequentialist beliefs are explained by A theory that prescribes something complete- emotional reactions, and that «their aetiology ly impossible for human beings is psychologi- renders them untrustworthy»48 and unjusti- cally unfeasible and, if “ought implies can”50 fied. Thus, those who advocate for aetiological holds, then such a theory should be rejected. debunking arguments would claim that we For instance, since psychological data have ro- should reject – or question – deontological or bustly shown that human beings’ conduct is other non-consequentialist normative ac- sensitive to situational features that are moral- counts since the beliefs they are based upon are ly irrelevant,51 normative ethics should take untrustworthy and unjustified. Somehow simi- such influences into account. If one prescribes larly, ethical conservatism claims that empiri- a normative theory that completely disregards cal study can identify ethical commitments situational features, the account would be psy- that have normative authority even though chologically unfeasible for humans. This, how- they result from «a-rational and a-reliable ever, says nothing about the specific way in emotional processes».49 which the normative theory should actually For maintaining such kind of commit- take such features into account (leaving open ments and the current ethical outlook that de- the possibility for several theoretical outlooks). rives from them, we would have only prag- The novelty of the neuroscience of ethics matic and non-epistemic reasons, on the one consists, here, in moving this claim further: a hand, and reasons concerning the undesirable normative theory that has an impact on hu- consequences that would derive from giving man beings’ lives needs to be feasible not only them up, on the other. That is so because, ac- at a psychological and representational level, cording to ethical conservatism, they are in but also at a neural and implementational truth unwarranted. Thus, empirical research one. Data from the neuroscience of ethics would allow us to differentiate between war- show that moral judgment activates brain ar- ranted and unwarranted commitments. And, eas associated both with reasoning and with even though such a distinction would not emotions. If that is the case, a normative the- necessarily imply depriving the latter of any ory claiming that moral judgments can and kind of normative authority, they would cer- should only be founded upon one or the other tainly hold a different normative status: one source, is a neurally unfeasible theory. But that has to be granted only because of prag- again, this role of empirical data is totally matic and non-epistemic reasons and of the compatible with it being marginal (as Arm- undesirable consequences that would other- chair Traditionalism wants it to be): it just wise be produced. limits the theoretical possibilities, without While reductionism, aetiological debunk- telling us anything about the right or true ing, and ethical conservatism seem to imply a normative moral theory. quite strong attempt to bridge the gap be- Since it is so complicated to settle how tween description and prescription – one that marginal the contribution of empirical evi- is certainly not undisputed –, psychological dence, in general, and of the neuroscience of unfeasibility is probably the least controver- ethics, in particular, should be, there seem to sial way of taking empirical data seriously in be prudential reasons for being open to either normative ethics, and it is not a strategy that Armchair Traditionalism or to Moderate Em- can only be ascribed to Ethical Empiricism. In pirical Ethics, as far as normative issues are fact, even Armchair Traditionalism can ac- concerned. What is important is to avoid two count for it – whereas it cannot account for opposite risks, that neither of these two per- the other three strategies. The main thesis of spectives actually faces while still reaching the psychological unfeasibility consists in a series goal of ending the isolation of conceptual of constraints to the normative theories that analysis, namely reductionism of normative

The Methods of Neuroethics 11 accounts to empirical ones, on the one hand, different explanatory levels, one avoids the and complete neglect of the relevance of em- risk of believing that moral psychology can be pirical findings, on the other. reduced to the neuroscience of ethics or the other way around. █ Conclusions Having shown that opting for a reduction would mean facing the risk of disregarding My aim has been to track down the meth- important explanatory elements, I have, thus, odological specificities of neuroethics. Firstly, moved to the consideration of whether there I have tried to find out what traditional de- is any prospect for a form of naturalist reduc- bates neuroethics resembles and to what ex- tionism in the study of moral cognition. For tent it actually represents a novelty in ethical this reason, I have considered the divide be- thinking. While the ethics of neuroscience has tween facts and values and the extent to been defined as close to bioethics, the neuro- which empirical findings might be conceived science of ethics seems akin to moral psychol- of as bearing consequences for our normative ogy. However, the latter explains human or metaethical accounts, thus bridging such a moral behavior and moral cognition at a rep- gap. On this, the debate is extremely rich and resentational level rather than at the imple- I could just gesture at a few relevant issues. mentational one to which the neuroscience of Certainly, the huge amount of research in ethics aims. neuroethics, moral cognition, developmental Marr’s distinction and the elaboration he psychology, social psychology, and the like advances clarifies to what extent moral psy- that have been conducted in the last two dec- chology and the neuroscience of ethics can be ades,54 have prompted a reaction by philoso- related to each other, as well as the extent to phers challenging them to refine their concep- which they differ. While the former illumi- tion of the relationship between empirical da- nates the representations and the conscious ta and philosophical insight. The debate, thus, mechanisms involved in moral reasoning and is not new, but it has been revitalized and in moral agency; the latter explains the neural stimulated by recent developments in other and even the hormonal functioning of the disciplines. human brain. As Marr points out, these two Since I aimed at providing a portrait of the levels are related though independent: as I debate concerning the methods of neuroeth- have recalled above, it is at least theoretically ics, I have tried to avoid going into substantial possible to imagine other species or other en- debates. Clearly, once a general framework tities that would be able to realize the same has been chosen or agreed on, then more de- representations humans’ display when reason- tailed and specific debates, concerning both ing and acting morally; and yet this does not the methods and the substance, can be raised. necessarily entail that they would need to For instance, it is easy to claim that the meth- have the same exact brain. Furthermore, as ods of an fMRI study on moral judgment, as we learn about neuroplasticity even after well as its implications for normative theories, brain injuries in adults,52 the multiple realiza- can differ from the methods and the implica- bility thesis seems to increase in likelihood.53 tions of, say, a developmental longitudinal and In fact, if our brains were found to be plastic behavioral study on altruistic behavior towards even as far as the so-called moral brain is con- strangers in need. Thus, one needs to bear in cerned, then the disjunction between the rep- mind that things can get much more specific as resentational and the implementational level, far as both the implications for normative the- between moral psychology and the neurosci- ories and the methods are concerned. And yet, ence of ethics, would not refer only to hypo- the general framework and the general issues thetical and unreal cases, but also to real ones. that I have considered here seem to hold Hence, by properly distinguishing between throughout these more specific debates.55

12 Songhorian

Thus, even considering more specific top- ron», vol. XXXV, n. 1, 2002, pp. 21-23; S.J. MAR- ics and issues, one would always have to face CUS (ed.), Neuroethics: Mapping the Field, Dana some version of the three philosophical tem- Press, New York 2002; J. ILLES, Neuroethics in a peraments considered above. Prudential rea- New Era of Neuroimaging, in: «American Journal sons would, then, recommend openness to the of Neuroradiology», vol. XXIV, n. 9, 2003, pp. possibility that data coming from the neuro- 1739-1741; J. ILLES, Neuroethics: Defining the Is- sues in Theory, Practice, and Policy, Oxford Uni- science of ethics would play some role in ei- versity Press, Oxford / New York 2006. ther metaethics or normative ethics. Avoiding 2 For a perspicuous survey, see J. CLAUSEN, N. the two major risks, namely reductionism and LEVY (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics, Springer, neglect, there is plenty of room for debate Dordrecht 2015, pp. 9-29. concerning the extent of the contribution 3A. ROSKIES, Neuroethics, in: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), The such data might offer. What seems implausi- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring Edition ble is to think that empirical evidence would 2016, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ have an ultimate role or no role at all. Howev- spr2016/entries/neuroethics/ [retrived: November er, which exact position along the continuum 16th, 2018]. 4 between these extremes they might occupy is Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being open to discussion and likely to depend on an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method the specific issue at hand. Moderate Ethical of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739), critical edition by D.F. NORTON, M.J. NORTON, Claren- Empiricism and Armchair Traditionalism don Press, New York 2007, p. 302. (understood as advocating a marginal role 5 Cf., e.g. N. LEVY, Neuroethics. Challenges for the and not as denying any role at all to empirical 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cam- findings) are both plausible ways of account- bridge/New York 2007; M. REICHLIN, Neuroeth- ing for the relationship between empirical da- ics, in: D. FASSIN (ed.), A Companion to Moral An- ta and normative ethics. thropology, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden 2012, pp. One thing this paper aimed at adding to 595-610. the debate on this relationship and, in par- 6 A. ROSKIES, Neuroethics for the New Millenium, cit., p. 21. ticular, on the thesis that a normative theory 7 ought to be psychologically feasible is a con- Ibidem. 8 N. LEVY, Neuroethics. Challenges for the 21st Cen- sequence of an appropriate distinction be- tury, cit., p. 1. tween the psychological and the neural levels 9 Cf. J.D. GREENE, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Moral- (adapted from Marr’s one): a normative theo- ity: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Eth- ry should not only be psychologically feasible, ics, in: «Ethics», vol. CXXIV, n. 4, 2014, pp. 695- but it should also be neurally possible for hu- 726; J.D. GREENE, Why Are VMPFC Patients More man brains. Hence, moral psychology would Utilitarian? A Dual-Process Theory of Moral illuminate the constraints we have at a repre- Judgment Explains, in: «Trends in Cognitive Sci- sentational level; while the neuroscience of ences», vol. XI, n. 8, 2007, pp. 322-323; J.D. ethics would enlighten those that refer to the GREENE, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure specific implementation humans have. As for of the Moral Mind, in: P. CARRUTHERS, S. LAU- the relation between such data and me- RENCE, S.P. STICH (eds.), The Innate Mind: Struc- taethics, I have argued that a moderate em- ture and Contents, Oxford University Press, Ox- ford/New York 2005, pp. 338-352; J.D. GREENE, pirically informed metaethics presently ap- F.A. CUSHMAN, L.E. STEWART, K. LOWENBERG, pears the most promising option. L.E. NYSTROM, J.D. COHEN, Pushing Moral But- tons: The Interaction Between Personal Force and █ Notes Intention in Moral Judgment, in: «Cognition»,

vol. CXI, n. 3, 2009, pp. 364-371; J.D. GREENE, 1 Cf. W. SAFIRE, The But-What-If Factor, in: «The L.E. NYSTROM, A.D. ENGELL, J.M. DARLEY, J.D. New York Times», May 16, 2002; A. ROSKIES, COHEN, The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict Neuroethics for the New Millenium, in: «Neu- and Control in Moral Judgment, in: «Neuron»,

The Methods of Neuroethics 13

vol. XLIV, n. 2, 2004, pp. 389-400; J.D. GREENE, ARMSTRONG (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. III: The R.B. SOMMERVILLE, L.E. NYSTROM, J.M. DARLEY, Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, J.D. COHEN, An fMRI Investigation of Emotional and Development, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) Engagement in Moral Judgment, in: «Science», 2008, pp. 371-394, here 271. vol. CCXCIII, n. 5537, 2001, pp. 2105-2108. 21 Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, cit., 10 Cf. J. DORIS, S. STICH, J. PHILLIPS, L. WALMSLEY, p. 302. Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches, in: E.N. 22 Cf. H. PUTNAM, The Collapse of the Fact/Value ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso- Dichotomy and Other Essays, Harvard University phy, Winter Edition 2017, URL: https://plato.stan Press, Cambridge (MA) 2002. ford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/moral-psych- 23 Cf. G.E. MOORE, Principia Ethica (1903), edited emp/ [retrived: November 16th, 2018]; J. DORIS, by T. BALDWIN, Cambridge University Press, Cam- MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH GROUP (eds.), The bridge 1993; P. CLIPSHAM, Does Empirical Moral Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Psychology Rest on a Mistake?, in: «Philosophical Press, Oxford/New York 2010. Studies», vol. CLXX, n. 2, 2013, pp. 215-233. 11 Cf. D. MARR, Vision. A Computational Investiga- 24 W. SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, Moral Intuitionism tion into the Human Representation and Processing Meets Empirical Psychology, in: T. HORGAN, M. of Visual Information, Freeman, New York 1982, TIMMONS (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Claren- pp. 24-25; D.M. KAPLAN, Explanation and Levels don Press, Oxford 2006, p. 339-365, here p. 339 - in Cognitive Neuroscience, in: J. CLAUSEN, N. LEVY italics added. (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics, cit., pp. 9-29. 25 Cf. S.M. BROWN JR., Does Ought Imply Can?, in: 12 D. MARR, Vision, cit., p. 23. «Ethics», vol. LX, n. 4, 1950, pp. 275-284; B. CELA- 13 Ivi, p. 25. NO, Dialettica della giustificazione pratica. Saggio sul- 14 Ibidem. la legge di Hume, Giappichelli, Torino 1994. 15 Ibidem. 26 Cf. R. JOYCE, What Neuroscience Can (and Can- 16 On how things like minds can relate to things like not) Contribute to Metaethics, cit., p. 371. brains, cf. K. AIZAWA, C. GILLETT, Realization, Re- 27 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, duction, and Emergence: How Things Like Minds Re- cit., p. 279: «it is important not to caricature these late to Things Like Brains, in: J. CLAUSEN, N. LEVY positions. Moral philosophers have never claimed (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics, cit., pp. 49-62. that empirical facts play no role in ethics». 17 S. SCHLEIM, Moral Cognition: Introduction, cit., 28 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, p. 98-99. cit., pp. 280. 18 Ivi, p. 99. 29 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, 19 Cf. M. CHRISTEN, M. ALFANO, Outlining the cit., pp. 280. Field – A Research Program for Empirically In- 30 Cf. also O. FLANAGAN, Varieties of Moral Per- formed Ethics, in: M. CHRISTEN, C. VAN SCHAIK, J. sonality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge FISCHER, M. HUPPENBAUER, C. TANNER (eds.), (MA) 1991, p. 32; K.A. APPIAH, Experiments in Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Ethics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Facts and Norms, Springer, Heidelberg/New (MA) 2008, pp. 22-23 and 46. York/Dordrecht/London 2015, pp. 3-27, here pp. 31 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, 3-4. See also S. MATUSALL, M. CHRISTEN, I. cit., pp. 280. KAUFMANN, The Emergence of Social Neuroscience 32 Haack distinguishes between five different con- as an Academic Discipline, in: J. DECETY, J. ceptualizations of naturalism in epistemology. I take CACIOPPO (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social such disambiguation – or a similar one – to be need- Neuroscienc, Oxford University Press, Oxford ed also in the field of moral epistemology. See S. 2011, pp. 9-27. HAACK, Naturalism Disambiguated, in: S. HAACK, 20 Cf. A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychol- Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in ogy – Critical Remarks to Empirically Informed Eth- Epistemology, Blackwell, Oxford/Cambridge(MA) ics, in: M. CHRISTEN, C. VAN SCHAIK, J. FISCHER, 1993, pp. 118-138, here 118-120. M. HUPPENBAUER, C. TANNER (eds.), Empirically 33 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, Informed Ethics, cit., pp. 279-305, here p. 280. See cit., pp. 281. also R. JOYCE, What Neuroscience Can (and Can- 34 Cf. R. JOYCE, Moral Anti-Realism, in: E.N. ZALTA not) Contribute to Metaethics, in: W. SINNOTT- (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Win-

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ter Edition 2016, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/ 42 J.D. GREENE, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in: archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/ W. SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG (ed.), Moral Psycholo- [retrived: November 16th, 2018]. gy, vol. III, cit., pp. 35-79; J.D. GREENE, Beyond 35 Cf. D. PAPINEAU Naturalism, in: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), Point-and-Shoot Morality, cit. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter Edi- 43 For a critique of this aspect of Greene’s action 2016, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives count, see R. DEAN, Does Neuroscience Undermine /win2016/entries/naturalism/ [retrived: November Deontological Theory?, in: «Neuroethics», vol. 16th, 2018]; J.J. PRINZ, Naturalizing Metaethics, in: T. III, n. 1, 2010, pp. 43-60. METZINGER, J. M. WINDT (eds), Open MIND, vol. 44 Cf. J.D. GREENE, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, cit. XXX, MIND Group, Frankfurt a.M. 2015 - doi: 45 Cf. S. NICHOLS, M. TIMMONS, T. LOPEZ, Using 10.15502/9783958570511; J. LENMAN, Moral Natu- Experiments in Ethics – Ethical Conservatism and ralism, in: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclope- the Psychology of Moral Luck, in: M. CHRISTEN, C. dia of Philosophy, Spring Edition 2014, URL: VAN SCHAIK, J. FISCHER, M. HUPPENBAUER, C. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries TANNER (eds.), Empirically Informed Ethics, cit., /naturalism-moral/ [retrived: November 16th, pp. 159-176. 2018]; M. DE CARO, D. MACARTHUR, Naturalism 46 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, and Normativity, Columbia University Press, New cit., pp. 290-304. York 2010. 47 Cf. J.D. GREENE, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, cit. 36 Cf. A. ROSKIES, Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsi- 48 A. KAUPPINEN, Ethics and Empirical Psychology, cally Motivational? Lessons from “Acquired Sociop- cit., pp. 292. athy”, in: «Philosophical Psychology», vol. XVI, 49 S. NICHOLS, M. TIMMONS, T. LOPEZ, Using Ex- n. 1, 2003, pp. pp. 51-66; A. ROSKIES, Patients periments in Ethics, cit., p. 160. with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral 50 Cf. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Beliefs, in: «Philosophical Psychology», vol. XIX, edited by N. KEMP SMITH, Palgrave MacMillan, Ba- n. 5, 2006, pp. 617-627. singstoke 1929, A548/B576; I. KANT, Religion with- 37 Cf. R. JOYCE, What Neuroscience Can (and Can- in the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), edited by not) Contribute to Metaethics, cit., p. 371. A.W. WOOD, G. DI GIOVANNI, Cambridge Universi- 38 Cf., e.g., S. BERKER, The Normative Insignifi- ty Press, Cambridge 1998, VI, p. 50. See also J. cance of Neuroscience, in: «Philosophy and Public KEKES, “Ought Implies Can” and Two Kinds of Mo- Affairs», vol. XXXVII, n. 4, 2009, pp. 293-329. rality, in: «The Philosophical Quarterly», vol. 39 For an interesting reconstruction of how our XXXIV, n. 137, 1984, pp. 459-467; R. STERN, Does contemporary attempt to bridge the gap between “Ought” Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think It Does?, psychology and philosophy is a return to their in: «Utilitas», vol. XVI, n. 1, 2004, pp. 42-61; K.A. original indistinctiveness rather than an actually APPIAH, Experiments in Ethics, cit.; F. HOWARD- novel enterprise, see K.A. APPIAH, Experiments in SNYDER, Ought Implies Can, in: The International Ethics, cit., pp. 5-32. Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley-Blackwell 2013 - doi: 40 Cf., e.g. J.D. GREENE, Why Are VMPFC Patients 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee402. More Utilitarian?, cit.; J.D. GREENE, Cognitive Neu- 51 K.A. APPIAH, Experiments in Ethics, cit., pp. 33-72. roscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, cit.; 52 Cf. Y.R. SOPHIE SU, A. VEERAVAGU, G. GRANT, J.D. GREENE, F.A. CUSHMAN, L.E. STEWART, K. Neuroplasticity after Traumatic Brain Injury, in: D. LOWENBERG, L.E. NYSTROM, J.D. COHEN, Pushing LASKOWITZ, G. GRANT (eds.), Translational Re- Moral Buttons, cit.; J.D. GREENE, L.E. NYSTROM, search in Traumatic Brain Injury, CRC Press, Boca A.D. ENGELL, J.M. DARLEY, J.D. COHEN, The Neural Raton/London/New York 2016, pp. 163-178. Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 53 For a review of the debate on multiple realiza- Judgment, cit.; J.D. GREENE, R.B. SOMMERVILLE, L.E. bility, see J. BICKLE, Multiple Realizability, in: E. NYSTROM, J.M. DARLEY, J.D. COHEN, An fMRI In- N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- vestigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judg- losophy, Winter Edition 2016, URL: https://plato ment, cit.; J.D. GREENE, J. HAIDT, How (and Where) .stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/ Does Moral Judgment Work?, in: «Trends in Cogni- [November 23rd, 2018]. tive Sciences», vol. VI, n. 12, 2002, pp. 517-523. 54 Cf. M. CHRISTEN, M. ALFANO, Outlining the 41 J.D. GREENE, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality, Field, cit., pp. 3-4. cit., p. 711. 55 For a more detailed analysis of these debates,

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see J. CLAUSEN, N. LEVY (eds.), Handbook of Neu- TANNER (eds.), Empirically Informed Ethics, cit.; roethics, Springer, Dordrecht 2015; M. CHRISTEN, M. CHRISTEN, M. ALFANO, Outlining the Field, C. VAN SCHAIK, J. FISCHER, M. HUPPENBAUER, C. cit., pp. 16-25. ____