Is the Neuroscience of Ethics Really a New Challenge to Moral Philosophy? Sarah Songhorian(Α)
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RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2019.0001 Vol. 10 (2019), n. 1, pp. 1-15 RICERCHE The Methods of Neuroethics: Is the Neuroscience of Ethics Really a New Challenge to Moral Philosophy? Sarah Songhorian(α) Ricevuto: 23 novembre 2018; accettato: 5 marzo 2019 █ Abstract Within the otherwise lively debate on neuroethics, little attention has been devoted to the pe- culiar methodological issues and challenges it faces. My aim is to track down its methodological specifici- ties. Firstly, I will investigate to which traditional debates neuroethics bears similarity and to what extent it actually represents a novelty in ethical thinking. While the ethics of neuroscience is akin to bioethics, the neuroscience of ethics seems akin to moral psychology. And yet they differ as far as the level of expla- nation of human moral behavior and reasoning is concerned. Thus, while the neuroscience of ethics and moral psychology share a family resemblance, they cannot be reduced to one another. Secondly, I will ex- plore three different philosophical temperaments towards the role empirical findings can and should have in normative ethics and in metaethics. Prudential reasons would recommend openness to new sources of evidence without risking either reductionism nor neglect. KEYWORDS: Neuroethics; Methods; Moral Psychology; Empirical Ethics; Levels of Explanation █ Riassunto I metodi della neuroetica: la neuroscienza dell’etica è davvero una nuova sfida per la filosofia morale? – Nonostante il dibattito in ambito neuroetico sia molto vivace, poca attenzione è stata dedicata alla questione relativa al suo metodo specifico e ai problemi a cui essa va incontro. Il mio scopo è quello di identificare le specificità metodologiche di questa disciplina. Anzitutto cercherò di determinare a quali dibattiti tradizionali la neuroetica può essere avvicinata e in che misura invece questa costituisce una no- vità all’interno del pensiero etico. Mentre l’etica della neuroscienza ha delle affinità con la bioetica, la neu- roscienza dell’etica appare maggiormente simile alla psicologia morale, sebbene tali discipline siano diver- se fra loro per via del livello a cui spiegano il comportamento e il ragionamento morale degli esseri umani. Pertanto, nonostante la neuroscienza dell’etica e la psicologia morale rivelino una certa somiglianza di famiglia, non è possibile ridurre l’una all’altra. In secondo luogo esplorerò tre diversi atteggiamenti filoso- fici rispetto al ruolo che i risultati empirici giocano o dovrebbero giocare rispetto all’etica normativa e alla metaetica. Ragioni di prudenza suggeriscono di rimanere aperti verso nuove fonti di evidenza evitando tanto di ridurre l’etica a esse quanto di trascurarle del tutto. PAROLE CHIAVE: Neuroetica; Metodi; Psicologia morale; Etica empirica; Livelli di spiegazione (α)Facoltà di Filosofia, Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, via Olgettina, 58 - 20132 Milano (I) E-mail: [email protected] () Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale 2 Songhorian NEUROETHICS IS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD On the one hand, there is no universally ac- in which philosophical insight interacts with da- cepted method of ethics and, thus, the contro- ta from cognitive neuroscience and other scien- versy would simply be moved one step forward tific areas. Since its origins in the early 2000s,1 while remaining substantially unsolved: for there has been growing academic interest2 in one would still have to determine which one of focusing on: the different proposed methods in ethics is the most suitable for neuroethics. On the other ethical issues raised by our increased and hand, the methods of cognitive neuroscience constantly improving understanding of and those of ethics rest on very different the brain and our ability to monitor and grounds and it is not obvious how they can in- influence it, as well as on ethical issues that form each other: the former is mostly con- emerge from our concomitant deepening cerned with how the techniques actually work, understanding of the biological bases of the latter concerns our knowledge (or lack agency and ethical decision-making.3 thereof) of what should count as good or right. Not only do these domains of inquiry not seem Despite this substantive interest in how necessarily related, but also their combination, neuroscientific data can inform our theories however performed, would require a non- of moral agency and moral decision-making, trivial passage from description to prescription there has been little attention to the peculiar that should, at least, be argued for.4 Thus, even methodological issues and challenges neuro- trying to avoid the question of the nature or ethics has to face. Assuming that the issues existence of a specific method of neuroethics, and challenges neuroethics has to deal with one would still have to investigate which are similar – or even identical – to those ad- method, among the possible methods of ethics, dressed by other empirical disciplines, the rel- is the most suitable for neuroethics, or to ask evant peculiarities of the methods of neuro- how cognitive neuroscience and ethics can re- ethics can be obscured by excessively under- late to each other while being so different. In scoring this resemblance. For this reason, I the end, then, it seems that methodological is- will focus on the methods of neuroethics as a sues akin to those one has tried to avoid by distinctive discipline. saying that we can simply combine the meth- The methodological challenges neuroeth- ods of ethics and those of cognitive neurosci- ics has to face should not be conflated with ence, come back through the window after be- those of neuroscience. It is one thing to take ing thrown out the door. into account the methodology of neuroscien- With the need for a proper consideration tific research per se – e.g., learning how neu- of the methods of neuroethics in mind, my roimaging techniques work and to what ex- aim in this paper is twofold. First, I will try tent experiments may fall below given stand- and see whether there are some specificities of ards –; it is another thing to assess and evalu- neuroethics, as far as its methodology is con- ate the methods related to, on the one hand, cerned, that make it, also from a purely meth- the ethical considerations that can – and odological perspective and not only from a should – be raised while doing cognitive neu- substantive viewpoint, a truly novel research roscience, and, on the other, the impact the field in ethics. To do so, I will consider the latter can – and should – have on ethics. Cer- definition put forth by Roskies in 2002 of two tainly, one may claim that the methods of sub-fields within neuroethics: the ethics of neuroethics are nothing more than an a poste- neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. I riori combination of the methods of cognitive will contend that each of them bears some neuroscience and those of ethics, whatever similarity to more traditional debates: specifi- these may be. And yet, this kind of answer cally, the ethics of neuroscience is akin to bio- begs the question in two different ways. ethics, and the neuroscience of ethics is akin The Methods of Neuroethics 3 to moral psychology. Besides this family re- ethics of neuroscience, can be conceived of as semblance, however, I will claim that the neu- analogous to bioethics. It thus raises mostly the roscience of ethics should nonetheless be con- same issues that are raised by bioethics but in sidered as distinct from moral psychology in- relation to the innovative technological possi- sofar as the explanations these two disciplines bilities afforded by cognitive neuroscience. In- provide for human behavior and human deci- formed consent and incidental findings, for in- sion-making processes are at different levels. stance, take on specific features when applied Lacking a proper distinction between these to neuroscientific research. Just to provide an levels of explanation, one could be unduly example, experiments in cognitive neurosci- prone to believe that moral psychology can be ence mostly use volunteers whose brains are reduced to the neuroscience of ethics. scanned while performing a task in order to see The investigation into the proper relation- the typical functioning of the human brain: ship between these two latter domains of in- these subjects volunteer for the sake of science quiry may lead one to wonder if there is any and the acquisition of further knowledge about prospect for a form of naturalist reductionism brain functioning. And yet, it may happen that, in the study of moral cognition. As my second while scanning a supposedly healthy subject aim, thus, I will deal with the issue of the ex- with no behavioral or clinical symptoms, the tent to which empirical findings in general researchers find some abnormality that may or can have consequences for normative ethics may not have consequences for the future or for metaethics – an issue not necessarily health of the subject. The obvious ethical issue specific to neuroethics – with reference to the is whether such information should be provid- traditional distinction between facts and val- ed to the subject or not – just as much as it ues, or “is” and “ought” in ethical reflection. happens that DNA testing shows a subject’s As a caveat, since the aim of this paper is susceptibility to some pathologies that may or to investigate primarily methodological is- may not actually develop in her lifetime. sues, I will as far as possible avoid any sub- On the other hand, (2), i.e. the neurosci- stantial assumptions which may indirectly af- ence of ethics, seems to be the subset of neu- fect methodological considerations. roethics that is “truly novel”.7 █ Ethics of neuroscience and neuroscience The neuroscience of ethics refers to the of ethics impact of neuroscientific knowledge upon our understanding of ethics itself.8 In a very influential article, Adina Roskies proposed a distinction between two main Its core interest is in the knowledge that branches within neuroethics that would be can be acquired by these new technologies as welcomed by most scholars.5 She defined (1) far as our moral abilities are concerned.