Chapter 6 Counterterrorism Law and Practice in Tanzania 6.1 Introduction: Tanzanian Law and Practice Unlike its neighbors Burundi and Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania1 has experienced a level of political stability and national unification over the past fifty years that many persons attribute to the political leadership of Julius Kambarage Nyerere.2 This, in itself, is a significant accomplishment in a country of about 54 million people in 130 diverse ethnic groups; while the Muslim/Christian split in the overall population is about 35/60 percent, more than 95 percent of the people in the Zanzibari archipelago are Muslim (largely Sunni, a majority of whom are likely Sufis).3 Nyerere, the first president of 1 Tanganyika gained its independence from the United Kingdom on Dec. 9, 1961; the UK then ended its protectorate over Zanzibar in Dec. 1963. Tanganyika was initially an independent Commonwealth State with the British monarch as the head of state; it subsequently adopted a 1962 Constitution that abolished the monarchy. Zanzibar was briefly ruled as an independent constitutional monarchy under Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah who was promptly deposed during the January 1962 Revolution. Both sovereign States then merged into a political union in April 1964 based upon an agreement between Julius Nyerere and Zanzibari revolutionary leader Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume who served as the first post-revolutionary—and dictatorial—president of Zanzibar (1964–75). On Oct. 29, 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania. Subsequently, the nationalist Tanganyika National African Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar-based, African- oriented Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) became the only legal political parties. Despite the formal union, Zanzibar retained considerable autonomy and did not enact its own Constitution until 1984. Still, modern Tanzania experiences three distinct identity conflicts: between the large Christian and Muslim populations, between mainlanders and Zanzibaris who believe that the islands have been “swallowed” and marginalized by the mainland, and between residents of the main island of Zanzibar (also known as Unguja) and the slightly smaller Pemba Island. Bruce Heilman & William John, Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Tanzania, (Freedom House, undated), https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/ tanzania (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 2 Bonny Ibhawoh & J.I. Dibua, Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa, 8 Afr. J. of Pol. Sci. 59–83 (2003). See also Marie-Aude Fouere, Remembering Julius Nyerere in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 2015) (examining how Nyerere is remembered by Tanzanians today, to include what he means to people and what he stands for). 3 CIA, World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world -factbook/geos/rw.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); Abdisaid Musse Ali-Koor, Islamist Extremism in East Africa, 32 Afr Sec. Brief (Aug. 2016), at 3. Islamic Salafis (i.e., Wahhabi believers, often originating from conservative Arab States) typically consider © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004389892_007 228 Chapter 6 the Tanzania from April 1964 until his retirement in October 1985, developed a political and economic “philosophy of Ujamaa as an attempt to integrate traditional African values with the demands of the post-colonial setting.”4 As a national development philosophy, Ujamaa sought to make Tanzania into a self-reliant socialist nation; Ujamaa had as its core an emphasis on the family- hood and communalism of traditional African societies. In fact, Nyerere placed considerable emphasis on nation building, to include preparing children through primary education, promoting basic literacy in Kiswahili, and preventing the politicization of ethnic and religious identities.5 Thus, while Nyerere’s 1967 Arusha Declaration with its Ujamaa philosophy could be seen “on one level [as] a political manoeuvre, which shored up support and eliminated rivals, it also served to recapture and re-moralize public space, re-enchanting nationalist discourse in a narrative that put Nyerere firmly at the centre as author of the new aims of [the ruling political party, TANU].”6 But, while many of Nyerere’s economic policies, such as the nationalization of the economy and the coercive villagization campaign, met with only limited success, many writers see Tanzania’s most notable achievements in the strong sense of national identity and its advances in social welfare. On one hand, Mwalimu (Teacher) Nyerere is lionized is the “Father of the Nation” (Baba wa Taifa), to the extent that some have campaigned for his canonization by the Catholic Church7 and his name is frequently invoked by politicians and the Sufism—sometimes described as a “mystical” interpretation of Islam—to be heretical with offensive practices. This suggests a split in cultural identity between “foreign” and “native African” Islamic believers, offering avenues for combating foreign terrorists and countering violent extremism. Ali-Koor, Islamist Extremism in East Africa, at 4. 4 Ibhawoh, Deconstructing Ujamaa, supra n.2, at 60 (explaining that Ujamaa sought to integrate what was best from traditional African society and from the country’s colonial experience; Ujamaa was formally inaugurated in the famous Arusha Declaration of 1967 and was based upon three essentials: individual freedoms, equality among people, and social unity). 5 Heilman, Countries at the Crossroads 2012, supra n.1, at 2. 6 Emma Hunter, Julius Nyerere, the Arusha Declaration, and the Deep Roots of a Contemporary Political Metaphor, in Fouere, Remembering Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, supra n.2, at 85. 7 Simeon Mesaki & Mrisho Malipula, Julius Nyerere’s Influence and Legacy: From a Proponent of Familyhood to a Candidate for Sainthood, 3 Int’l J. of Soc. & Anthropology 93–100 (March 2011) (also noting that Nyerere found nothing incompatible between socialism and any religion which accepts the equality of man, with socialism operating in the public sphere and religious activity belonging in the private). In one sense, Nyerere’s own modesty, to include his acceptance of the Mwalimu moniker with reference to his university education and earlier work as teacher, stands in contrast to some of his own megalomaniac contemporaries, such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa, a former colonel who proclaimed himself Emperor of the Central African Republic; Idi Amin, a former sergeant with a fourth-grade education, who promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal and gave himself various .