DOCSLIB.ORG

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA Logic and Intentionality

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA Logic and Intentionality THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy © Copyright All Rights Reserved By Matthew K. Minerd Washington, D.C. 2017 Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis Matthew K. Minerd, Ph.D. Director: Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L. Hervaeus Natalis’s De secundis intentionibus represents the crystalization of an important philosophical tradition concerning the nature of logic. As the 14th century opened, thinkers focused on the nature of logic vis-à-vis the inherited Aristotelian schema of sciences and ontology. Hervaeus’s treatise considers in detail the metaphysical claims necessary for maintaining that second intentions—i.e. notions such as genus, species, enunciation, syllogism, and others—are relationes rationis that are a kind of “non-being” in comparison with the ten categories. The De secundis intentionibus shows itself to be a generally conservative attempt to explain the nature of logic from a broadly Peripatetic perspective. This dissertation articulates this interpretation of the treatise. The first chapter frames the De secundis intentionibus from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics regarding “being as the true and the false” and Avicenna’s brief remarks regarding second intentions at the beginning of his Liber de prima philosophia. Then, two emblematic 13th century figures are considered, namely Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas. The second chapter focuses on the advances and ambiguities found in the thought of John Duns Scotus, who is presented as an important proximate source for Hervaeus’s treatise. The chapter emphasizes Scotus’s use of the distinction between subjective and objective existence in explaining his views concerning logic and second intentions. This distinction is important for Hervaeus, and its likely Scotistic provenance is not given adequate attention in the scholarly literature. The chapter also discusses the ambiguities found in Scotus’s remarks regarding the relationship between the various acts of intellection and the formation of second intentions. It advocates a broader interpretation of Scotus’s position than is sometimes advanced in the scholarly literature on this topic. The third chapter presents the overall view of Hervaeus’s intentionality doctrine. The doctrine is presented as being part of medieval discussions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” This dissertation challenges the reigning hermeneutic applied to the treatise, a hermeneutic that tends to emphasize questions pertaining to cognition and “realism.” This chapter explains Hervaeus’s position that second intentions are relationes rationis formed by all three acts of the intellect. It focuses on the fact that for Hervaeus “intentionality” indicates a non-real relation from the known thing to the knower. The consequences of this view are discussed at length. The fourth chapter considers the final question of the De secundis intentionibus in detail. It explains Hervaeus’s defense of the possibility of a science of second intentional being. The chapter also discusses Hervaeus’s distinction between second intentions and other kinds of entia rationis, emphasizing how the treatise greatly expands the inherited Peripatetic domain of “being as the true and the false.” The chapter closes by defending the claim that the De secundis intentionibus is primarily a work of metaphysics, not logic or epistemology. By reading the De secundis intentionibus in light of the broader medieval question concerning the nature of logic and the Aristotelian division of “being as the true and the false,” it is clear that Hervaeus’s treatise aims to present the philosophical distinctions necessary for delineating a robust, broadly Peripatetic metaphysics of logic. This dissertation by Matthew Kenneth Minerd, Ph.L. fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L, as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D. and Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D. as Readers. ___________________________________ Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L., Director ___________________________________ Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader ___________________________________ Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Reader ii In memory of Fr. Sebastian A. Samay, O.S.B. (d. Oct. 1, 2013) and John N. Deely (d. Jan. 7, 2017) Ce qui me préoccupe le plus, c’est le problème de l’intentionalité. Je m’indigne de ne trouver dans aucun ouvrage aristotélicien, ni ancien ni modern, une théorie d’ensemble de l’être intentionnel, et je vais jusqu’à concevoir l’ambition outrecuidante d’écrire les premiers lineaments de cette théorie, qui m’est devenue necessaire pour continuer de vivre. -- Yves. R. Simon, Letter to Jacques Maritain, July 30, 1932 Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis. -- Thomas Aquinas, De Trinitate q.6 a.1 sol. 2 ad 3 The notion of relation can be found realized in its place among the other categories of being . But the notion of relation has exceptional privileges and properties. First of all, the notion of relation continues to exist even when it is deprived of all reality and thus passes into the purely logical world. These are logical relations or relations of reason. Secondly, the notion of relation continues to exist when the process is reversed by intensifying its reality until its reality is made to coincide with that of the Absolute. -- Charles Journet, The Wisdom of Faith, 203-204n24 Now the paths of non-being—once one has, by a kind of inverted intuition, become conscious of it and of its formidable role in reality—are as difficult as those of being. -- Jacques Maritain, God and the Permission of Evil, 32 iii Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: From Scientia sermocinalis to Scientia intentionum .......................................... 19 1.1 Logic as Scientia sermocinalis ..................................................................................................... 19 1.2 Aristotelian Sources .............................................................................................................................. 22 1.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 22 1.2.2 Metaphysics Γ: The σοφισταί, διαλεκτικοί, and φιλοσόφoι ........................................................... 24 1.2.3 Metaphysics Δ and Ε: Being as the True and the False ...................................................................... 28 1.3 An “Avicennian Moment” in Intentionality and the Subject of Logic ................................... 38 1.4 Two Transitional Figures: Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas ................................... 46 1.4.1 Logic, Reality and Discourse in the De ortu scientiarum of Robert Kilwardby ....................... 46 1.4.1.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 46 1.4.1.2 Situating the Scientiae Sermocinales in the De ortu scientiarum.............................................................. 48 1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the De ortu scientiarum ............................................................................ 54 1.4.2 Thomas Aquinas – Intentions, Ens rationis, and Logic ..................................................................... 73 1.4.2.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 73 1.4.2.2 Aquinas and Second Intentions .............................................................................................................................. 75 1.4.2.3 Aquinas as Logical Commentator .......................................................................................................................... 88 1.4.2.4 Aquinas, the Metaphysics, and “Being as the True and False” ................................................................ 108 1.5 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 122 Chapter 2: Scotus as a Source for the De secundis intentionibus ..................................... 127 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 127 2.2 Duns Scotus—A Critical Figure in the Proximate Background ............................................ 137 2.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 137 2.2.2 Scotus’ Logical Works and the Subject of Logic ................................................................................ 142 2.2.3 Scotus, Second Intentions, and Acts of the Intellect ......................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic and Modern Relevance Logic*
    Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic* Abstract: This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises of a proof are actually used to derive the conclusion. Turning to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, I argue that there is evidence that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic satisfies both conditions. Moreover, Aristotle at one point explicitly addresses the potential harmfulness of syllogisms with unused premises. Here, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis allows for a rejection of such syllogisms on formal grounds established in the foregoing parts of the Prior Analytics. In a final section I consider the view that Aristotle distinguished between validity on the one hand and syllogistic validity on the other. Following this line of reasoning, Aristotle’s logic might not be a relevance logic, since relevance is part of syllogistic validity and not, as modern relevance logic demands, of general validity. I argue that the reasons to reject this view are more compelling than the reasons to accept it and that we can, cautiously, uphold the result that Aristotle’s logic is a relevance logic. Keywords: Aristotle, Syllogism, Relevance Logic, History of Logic, Logic, Relevance 1.
    [Show full text]
  • John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected]
    John P. Burgess Department of Philosophy Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1006, USA [email protected] LOGIC & PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY Introduction For present purposes “logic” will be understood to mean the subject whose development is described in Kneale & Kneale [1961] and of which a concise history is given in Scholz [1961]. As the terminological discussion at the beginning of the latter reference makes clear, this subject has at different times been known by different names, “analytics” and “organon” and “dialectic”, while inversely the name “logic” has at different times been applied much more broadly and loosely than it will be here. At certain times and in certain places — perhaps especially in Germany from the days of Kant through the days of Hegel — the label has come to be used so very broadly and loosely as to threaten to take in nearly the whole of metaphysics and epistemology. Logic in our sense has often been distinguished from “logic” in other, sometimes unmanageably broad and loose, senses by adding the adjectives “formal” or “deductive”. The scope of the art and science of logic, once one gets beyond elementary logic of the kind covered in introductory textbooks, is indicated by two other standard references, the Handbooks of mathematical and philosophical logic, Barwise [1977] and Gabbay & Guenthner [1983-89], though the latter includes also parts that are identified as applications of logic rather than logic proper. The term “philosophical logic” as currently used, for instance, in the Journal of Philosophical Logic, is a near-synonym for “nonclassical logic”. There is an older use of the term as a near-synonym for “philosophy of language”.
    [Show full text]
  • Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning
    Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences Volume 24 General Editor Shahid Rahman (Lille, UMR 8163) Managing Editor Juan Redmond (Universidad de Valparaiso, Chile) Area Editors Argumentation and Pragmatics Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam) Zoe McConaughey (Lille, UMR 8163) Tony Street (Faculty of Divinity, Cambridge) John Woods (British Columbia/King’s College) Argumentation and Rhetoric Gabriel Galvez-Behar (Lille, UMR 8529) Leone Gazziero (Lille) André Laks, (Princeton/Panamericana) Ruth Webb (Lille, UMR 8163) Decision Theory, Mathematics, Economy Jacques Dubucs (IHPST-Paris 1) Karine Chemla (CNRS, SPHERE UMR7219, Université de Paris) Sven Ove Hansson (Stockholm) Cognitives Sciences. Computer Sciences Yann Coello (Lille) Eric Gregoire (CRIL-Lens) Henry Prakken (Utrecht) François Recanati (ENS, Paris) Epistemology and Philosophy of Science Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy) Sonja Smets (ILLC, Amsterdam) Göran Sundholm (Leiden) Logic Michel Crubellier (Lille, UMR 8163) Dov Gabbay (King’s College) Tero Tulenheimo (Lille, UMR 8163) Political Science and Sociology Jean-Gabriel Contamin (Lille) Franck Fischer (Rutgers) Josh Ober (Stanford) Marc Pichard (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas de Calais) Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning (LAR) explores links between the Humanities and Social Sciences, with theories (including decision and action theory) drawn from the cognitive sciences, economics, sociology, law, logic, and the philosophy of science. Its main ambitions are to develop a theoretical framework
    [Show full text]
  • THE CONDEMNATION of 1277 the First Known Case of Academic
    CHAPTER TWO THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 Th e fi rst known case of academic condemnation at Oxford occurred in 1277. On March 18th of that year Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned as erroneous a series of propositions that were being upheld in the arts faculty involving grammar, logic, and natural philosophy.1 Th is event and its sequels, the Condemnation of 1284 and the Condemnation of Richard Knapwell, form the most examined ele- ment in the history of academic condemnation at Oxford, with the possible exception of the events around the condemnation of John Wyclif and the Oxford Lollards in 1381–82. Th ere is a large body of literature on this topic, and various aspects of it have been hotly debated over the past century.2 1 Th e condemnation, including the propositions, can be found in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifl e and E. Chatelain, (Paris, 1889–97), 1:558–60. It also exists (with minor variations in the wording of the propositions) in the Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condemnatorum; see Henryk Anzulewicz, “Eine weitere Überlieferung der Collectio errorum in Anglia et Parisius condemnatorum im Ms. Lat. Fol. 456 der Staatsbibliothek Preussicher Kulturbesitz zu Berlin,” in Franziskanische Studien 74 (1992), pp. 375–99, at pp. 380–81. Th ere also exists a letter from Kilwardby to Peter of Confl ans in which he defends his action; Franz Ehrle, “Ein Schreiben des Erzbishofs von Canterbury Robert Kilwardby zur Rechtfertigung seiner Lehrverurtheilung vom 18. Marz 1277,” in Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. H.
    [Show full text]
  • Kilwardby, Robert 00
    K 16/5/05 4:13 pm Page 33 KILWARDBY, ROBERT 00 appearing in Muslim Spain within his lifetime. Here, his Arab Civilization: Challenges and Response. Edited by original tables were studied by *Maslama of Madrid and G.N. Atiyeh and I.M. Oweiss. 98–111. Albany: SUNY his pupils whose adaptation, more accurate than the Press, 1988. original, adjusted the tables to make them useful to Van Dalen, Benno. “Al-Khwarismi’s Astronomical Tables astronomers in the West. This version was then translated Revisited.” In Samso and Casulleras, I: 195–252. MICHAEL C. WEBER by *Adelard of Bath and *Pedro Alfonso, and it is only this Latin version that survives complete whereas in Arabic only selections from the original survive. Al-Khwarizmi’s two other surviving works are the Geography and the Extraction of the Jewish Calendar. It KILWARDBY, ROBERT appears that the Geography represents an important Robert Kilwardby died at the papal court in Viterbo, advance over *Ptolemy’s work of the same name. It has Italy, on September 11, 1279. Although aspects of his been speculated that al-Khwarizmi’s work was based on career as an intellectual and churchman are known, noth- a world map constructed by a collection of scholars for ing is really known about his early life except that he al-Ma’mun; the Geography represents superior knowl- studied at Paris. It would be nice to know if he studied edge of the Islamic lands and the areas visited by Muslim with the natural philosopher Richard Fishacre at Oxford traders and merchants. The work on the Jewish calendar in the early 1240s, for instance: it is possible and some of is curious.
    [Show full text]
  • Concrete Possible Worlds (Final)
    CONCRETE POSSIBLE WORLDS Phillip Bricker 1. INTRODUCTION. Open a book or article of contemporary analytic philosophy, and you are likely to find talk of possible worlds therein. This applies not only to analytic metaphysics, but to areas as diverse as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics. Philosophers agree, for the most part, that possible worlds talk is extremely useful for explicating concepts and formulating theories. They disagree, however, over its proper interpretation. In this chapter, I discuss the view, championed by David Lewis, that philosophers’ talk of possible worlds is the literal truth.1 There exists a plurality of worlds. One of these is our world, the actual world, the physical universe that contains us and all our surroundings. The others are merely possible worlds containing merely possible beings, such as flying pigs and talking donkeys. But the other worlds are no less real or concrete for being merely possible. Fantastic? Yes! What could motivate a philosopher to believe such a tale? I start, as is customary, with modality.2 Truths about the world divide into two sorts: categorical and modal. Categorical truths describe how things are, what is actually the case. Modal truths describe how things could or must be, what is possibly or 1 The fullest statement of Lewis’s theory of possible worlds is contained in his magnum opus, Lewis (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis’s view is sometimes called “modal realism.” 2 Historically, it was the attempt to provide semantics for modal logic that catapulted possible worlds to the forefront of analytic philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • David Lewis's Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames by The
    David Lewis’s Place in Analytic Philosophy Scott Soames By the early 1970s, and continuing through 2001, David Lewis and Saul Kripke had taken over W.V.O. Quine’s leadership in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic in the English-speaking world. Quine, in turn, had inherited his position in the early 1950s from Rudolf Carnap, who had been the leading logical positivist -- first in Europe, and, after 1935, in America. A renegade positivist himself, Quine eschewed apriority, necessity, and analyticity, while (for a time) adopting a holistic version of verificationism. Like Carnap, he placed philosophical logic and the philosophy of science at the center of philosophy. While not entirely avoiding metaphysics and epistemology, he tried to “naturalize” both. By contrast, Lewis and Kripke embraced the modalities Quine rejected.1 They also had no sympathy for his early verificationism, or his twin flights from intension and intention. As for philosophy of science, it was transforming itself into specialized philosophies of the several sciences, and did not lend itself to unified treatment. Although Lewis had deep interests in scientific issues, and was commendably realist about science in general, science itself was not the center of own distinctive approach to philosophy. Despite similarities in their opposition to Quine, the differences between Lewis and Kripke were large – especially in the semantics and metaphysics of modality. They also had different philosophical styles. Whereas Lewis was a wide-ranging thinker who pieced together a systematic philosophical world view, Kripke gave little thought to system, focusing instead on a few central topics. There is, therefore, no conflict between the two on many of the issues on which Kripke was silent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legacy of Andre Vauchez's Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages
    The Legacy of André Vauchez � Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages Thomas Head Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY It is the appearance of a translation entitled Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages (trans. Jean Birrell [Cambridge, 1987]) which provides us the excuse this afternoon to consider the André Vauchez � masterwork and its legacy in shaping the hagiographic scholarship over the course of almost two decades. Vauchez originally published his thèse d �état in 1981. It became on its publication, and remains today, the benchmark for all study of hagiography and the cult of saints in the later middle ages. The book is a systematic examination of the records of the formal processes initiated for the canonization of saints between 1198 and 1431. Vauchez thus implicitly took up the challenge issued in 1965 by Frantisek Graus Volk, Herrscher und Heiliger im Reich der Merowinger: Studien zur Hagiographie der Merowingerzeit (Prague, 1965), that is to use neglected genres of hagiographic works as sources for the social history of western Christianity. Given the importance that has come to be accorded Graus � pioneering study among scholars �particularly Anglophone scholars �who examine hagiography more for social historical than for philological or theological reasons, it is natural to link the work of the French Catholic to that of the Czech Marxist. Our chair this afternoon, Richard Kieckhefer �himself one of the most distinguished Anglophone scholars of late medieval sanctity �made exactly that connection on the opening page (p. xix) of the foreword which he provided for the English translation. Vauchez himself invoked Graus on the first page of his own introduction, but in a much more limited manner, as one among a group of scholars of the Merovingian and Carolingian periods who have "made it possible to bring within the �territory of the historian � the terra incognita which the history of sanctity has long represented." (p.
    [Show full text]
  • The Peripatetic Program in Categorical Logic: Leibniz on Propositional Terms
    THE REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC, Page 1 of 65 THE PERIPATETIC PROGRAM IN CATEGORICAL LOGIC: LEIBNIZ ON PROPOSITIONAL TERMS MARKO MALINK Department of Philosophy, New York University and ANUBAV VASUDEVAN Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago Abstract. Greek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such as reductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical form. In the 17th century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titled Specimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule of reductio ad absurdum in a purely categor- ical calculus in which every proposition is of the form AisB. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule of reductio ad absurdum,but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic ¬ known as RMI→ . From its beginnings in antiquity up until the late 19th century, the study of formal logic was shaped by two distinct approaches to the subject. The first approach was primarily concerned with simple propositions expressing predicative relations between terms.
    [Show full text]
  • Logic: a Brief Introduction Ronald L
    Logic: A Brief Introduction Ronald L. Hall, Stetson University Chapter 1 - Basic Training 1.1 Introduction In this logic course, we are going to be relying on some “mental muscles” that may need some toning up. But don‟t worry, we recognize that it may take some time to get these muscles strengthened; so we are going to take it slow before we get up and start running. Are you ready? Well, let‟s begin our basic training with some preliminary conceptual stretching. Certainly all of us recognize that activities like riding a bicycle, balancing a checkbook, or playing chess are acquired skills. Further, we know that in order to acquire these skills, training and study are important, but practice is essential. It is also commonplace to acknowledge that these acquired skills can be exercised at various levels of mastery. Those who have studied the piano and who have practiced diligently certainly are able to play better than those of us who have not. The plain fact is that some people play the piano better than others. And the same is true of riding a bicycle, playing chess, and so forth. Now let‟s stretch this agreement about such skills a little further. Consider the activity of thinking. Obviously, we all think, but it is seldom that we think about thinking. So let's try to stretch our thinking to include thinking about thinking. As we do, and if this does not cause too much of a cramp, we will see that thinking is indeed an activity that has much in common with other acquired skills.
    [Show full text]
  • Topics in Philosophical Logic
    Topics in Philosophical Logic The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Litland, Jon. 2012. Topics in Philosophical Logic. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9527318 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA © Jon Litland All rights reserved. Warren Goldfarb Jon Litland Topics in Philosophical Logic Abstract In “Proof-Theoretic Justification of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct use-based meaning-theories for the logical constants. The assertability-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequence-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the log- ical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction (elimination) rules , what are the R strongest elimination (introduction) rules that are validated by an assertabil- ity (consequence) conditional meaning-theory based on ? I prove that the R intuitionistic introduction (elimination) rules are the strongest rules that are validated by the intuitionistic elimination (introduction) rules. I then prove that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that can be given either an assertability-conditional or consequence-conditional meaning-theory. In “Grounding Grounding” I discuss the notion of grounding. My discus- sion revolves around the problem of iterated grounding-claims.
    [Show full text]
  • Uni International 300 N
    INFORMATION TO USERS This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material subm itted. The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction. 1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity. 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted you will find a target note listing the pages in the adjacent frame. 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­ graphed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
    [Show full text]