THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy © Copyright All Rights Reserved By Matthew K. Minerd Washington, D.C. 2017 Logic and Intentionality According to Hervaeus Natalis Matthew K. Minerd, Ph.D. Director: Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L. Hervaeus Natalis’s De secundis intentionibus represents the crystalization of an important philosophical tradition concerning the nature of logic. As the 14th century opened, thinkers focused on the nature of logic vis-à-vis the inherited Aristotelian schema of sciences and ontology. Hervaeus’s treatise considers in detail the metaphysical claims necessary for maintaining that second intentions—i.e. notions such as genus, species, enunciation, syllogism, and others—are relationes rationis that are a kind of “non-being” in comparison with the ten categories. The De secundis intentionibus shows itself to be a generally conservative attempt to explain the nature of logic from a broadly Peripatetic perspective. This dissertation articulates this interpretation of the treatise. The first chapter frames the De secundis intentionibus from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics regarding “being as the true and the false” and Avicenna’s brief remarks regarding second intentions at the beginning of his Liber de prima philosophia. Then, two emblematic 13th century figures are considered, namely Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas. The second chapter focuses on the advances and ambiguities found in the thought of John Duns Scotus, who is presented as an important proximate source for Hervaeus’s treatise. The chapter emphasizes Scotus’s use of the distinction between subjective and objective existence in explaining his views concerning logic and second intentions. This distinction is important for Hervaeus, and its likely Scotistic provenance is not given adequate attention in the scholarly literature. The chapter also discusses the ambiguities found in Scotus’s remarks regarding the relationship between the various acts of intellection and the formation of second intentions. It advocates a broader interpretation of Scotus’s position than is sometimes advanced in the scholarly literature on this topic. The third chapter presents the overall view of Hervaeus’s intentionality doctrine. The doctrine is presented as being part of medieval discussions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” This dissertation challenges the reigning hermeneutic applied to the treatise, a hermeneutic that tends to emphasize questions pertaining to cognition and “realism.” This chapter explains Hervaeus’s position that second intentions are relationes rationis formed by all three acts of the intellect. It focuses on the fact that for Hervaeus “intentionality” indicates a non-real relation from the known thing to the knower. The consequences of this view are discussed at length. The fourth chapter considers the final question of the De secundis intentionibus in detail. It explains Hervaeus’s defense of the possibility of a science of second intentional being. The chapter also discusses Hervaeus’s distinction between second intentions and other kinds of entia rationis, emphasizing how the treatise greatly expands the inherited Peripatetic domain of “being as the true and the false.” The chapter closes by defending the claim that the De secundis intentionibus is primarily a work of metaphysics, not logic or epistemology. By reading the De secundis intentionibus in light of the broader medieval question concerning the nature of logic and the Aristotelian division of “being as the true and the false,” it is clear that Hervaeus’s treatise aims to present the philosophical distinctions necessary for delineating a robust, broadly Peripatetic metaphysics of logic. This dissertation by Matthew Kenneth Minerd, Ph.L. fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Philosophy approved by Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L, as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D. and Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D. as Readers. ___________________________________ Timothy Noone, Ph.D. and M.S.L., Director ___________________________________ Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader ___________________________________ Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Reader ii In memory of Fr. Sebastian A. Samay, O.S.B. (d. Oct. 1, 2013) and John N. Deely (d. Jan. 7, 2017) Ce qui me préoccupe le plus, c’est le problème de l’intentionalité. Je m’indigne de ne trouver dans aucun ouvrage aristotélicien, ni ancien ni modern, une théorie d’ensemble de l’être intentionnel, et je vais jusqu’à concevoir l’ambition outrecuidante d’écrire les premiers lineaments de cette théorie, qui m’est devenue necessaire pour continuer de vivre. -- Yves. R. Simon, Letter to Jacques Maritain, July 30, 1932 Et hac ratione oportet in addiscendo a logica incipere, non quia ipsa sit facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximam difficultatem, cum sit de secundo intellectis, sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum procedendi in omnibus scientiis. -- Thomas Aquinas, De Trinitate q.6 a.1 sol. 2 ad 3 The notion of relation can be found realized in its place among the other categories of being . But the notion of relation has exceptional privileges and properties. First of all, the notion of relation continues to exist even when it is deprived of all reality and thus passes into the purely logical world. These are logical relations or relations of reason. Secondly, the notion of relation continues to exist when the process is reversed by intensifying its reality until its reality is made to coincide with that of the Absolute. -- Charles Journet, The Wisdom of Faith, 203-204n24 Now the paths of non-being—once one has, by a kind of inverted intuition, become conscious of it and of its formidable role in reality—are as difficult as those of being. -- Jacques Maritain, God and the Permission of Evil, 32 iii Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: From Scientia sermocinalis to Scientia intentionum .......................................... 19 1.1 Logic as Scientia sermocinalis ..................................................................................................... 19 1.2 Aristotelian Sources .............................................................................................................................. 22 1.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 22 1.2.2 Metaphysics Γ: The σοφισταί, διαλεκτικοί, and φιλοσόφoι ........................................................... 24 1.2.3 Metaphysics Δ and Ε: Being as the True and the False ...................................................................... 28 1.3 An “Avicennian Moment” in Intentionality and the Subject of Logic ................................... 38 1.4 Two Transitional Figures: Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas ................................... 46 1.4.1 Logic, Reality and Discourse in the De ortu scientiarum of Robert Kilwardby ....................... 46 1.4.1.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 46 1.4.1.2 Situating the Scientiae Sermocinales in the De ortu scientiarum.............................................................. 48 1.4.1.3 Logic, Discourse, and Reality in the De ortu scientiarum ............................................................................ 54 1.4.2 Thomas Aquinas – Intentions, Ens rationis, and Logic ..................................................................... 73 1.4.2.1 Introductory Remarks ................................................................................................................................................ 73 1.4.2.2 Aquinas and Second Intentions .............................................................................................................................. 75 1.4.2.3 Aquinas as Logical Commentator .......................................................................................................................... 88 1.4.2.4 Aquinas, the Metaphysics, and “Being as the True and False” ................................................................ 108 1.5 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 122 Chapter 2: Scotus as a Source for the De secundis intentionibus ..................................... 127 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 127 2.2 Duns Scotus—A Critical Figure in the Proximate Background ............................................ 137 2.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 137 2.2.2 Scotus’ Logical Works and the Subject of Logic ................................................................................ 142 2.2.3 Scotus, Second Intentions, and Acts of the Intellect ......................................................................