Bank of England Festschrift for Professor Charles Goodhart 15-16 November 2001
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Bank of England Festschrift for Professor Charles Goodhart 15-16 November 2001 Is there a Goodhart’s Law of financial regulation? By Andrew Sheng & Tan Gaik Looi ∗ Introduction I am very grateful to the Bank of England for inviting me to this Festschrift in honour of Professor Charles Goodhart. As another doyen of central banking, Gerry Corrigan likes to say, a man may leave central banking, but his heart never leaves central banking. As a young central banker who learnt his craft in the developing world under the late and legendary Tun Ismail Mohd Ali of Bank Negara Malaysia, I met Charles at one of the Commonwealth Central Bankers’ meetings in the late 1970s. This used to be hosted by the Bank in the Oak Room just before the BIS Annual Meetings. I remember asking Charles one of those naïve questions on interest rate policy, for which I got a clear thoughtful answer that provoked my thinking for the rest of the trip. My next encounter with Charles was reading his book on Money, Information and Uncertainty. Our paths crossed again in Hong Kong in ∗ The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong 2 1993, when I assumed duties at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Charles was not only a member of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee, but was also one of the founders of the Hong Kong Link to the US dollar, commonly called the peg. He was asked by the Bank in the dire days of 1983 to advise on what to do to stabilise the Hong Kong dollar in the politically volatile days of Anglo-Chinese discussions on the future of Hong Kong. I have learnt much from Charles in his frequent visits to Hong Kong, which he used to combine with his duties as Visiting Professor at the City University of Hong Kong and en route to Beijing to lecture to the Graduate School of the People’s Bank of China. Like many other central banks throughout the world, I am sure the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the People’s Bank owe no small debt to Charles for his sound advice and training provided to many young staff members. All of us benefited hugely from both his sharp theoretical insights, as well as practical solutions to real life situations, delivered in a sincere manner that reflected his humanity and deep care for the welfare of the student as well as the emerging markets and central banks. On behalf of emerging market central banks and financial supervisors, I want to pay tribute today to Charles the teacher, the theoretician and practical banker, and friend. Financial regulation As far as I am aware, Charles came into financial regulation relatively late in his career, and his papers on the subject appeared in the beginning of the 1990s. Charles’s approach to supervisory issues is as insightful as his approach to monetary policy, in spite of the fact that he was never himself a bank or securities supervisor. He grasped clearly the question of regulatory objectives, the need for quality of information and transparency, and brought 3 a sense of proportionality in a field where common sense was not always common. As far as I am aware, he was the first monetary economist to devote attention to the economic analysis of regulation in financial markets. He understood that economists tended to take the legal underpinnings of the economy for granted, sometimes a fatal flaw in analysis (Goodhart, 1997). More important, he understood that the market was shaped by behaviour of market participants in response to regulations, incentives, and uncertainty over property rights. Many a bank regulator would be grateful for his sympathy for the asymmetric rewards for regulators (Goodhart, 2000, page 28): … the conduct of supervision is a thankless task which is all too likely to tarnish the reputation of the supervisor. …The best that a supervisor can expect is that nothing untoward happens. A supervisor is only noticed when either he/she angers the regulated by some Extract restrictive or intrusive action, or when supervision 'fails' in the sense that a financial institution collapses or a customer gets ripped-off. One can talk oneself blue in the face about the desirability of allowing some freedom for banks or other financial institutions to fail, etc., but supervisors will always tend to get a bad Press when that does happen, come what may. Even this statement was made in the context of conflicts in the pursuit of price stability and financial stability policy goals of central banks. It was a good reflection of Charles's deep appreciation of the inter-locking issues surrounding central banking, monetary, financial and systemic stability. He understood that in deciding when to provide lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities, central bankers did not find it easy to distinguish between liquidity and solvency problems. By the early 1990s, it became relatively clear that the three key objectives of central banks were monetary stability, financial stability and 4 safety of the payments system. But in the lead up to Goodhart’s Law of Monetary Targeting, where does the central bank draw the line in providing LOLR particularly where problems in non-banks pose a threat to systemic stability? Like the difficulty in drawing the boundary between monetary aggregates to M3 or M4, what is a bank and how far should the safety net be cast? This highlights the conflict between monetary policy and financial stability objectives. Charles was the first to debate the issue of central bank independence to pursue a single objective of price stability, and whether the regulatory and supervisory function should be undertaken by institutions other than the central bank. I will not try to summarise his many insightful and persuasive contributions on the why, how and where now of financial regulation. Much of the insights are listed in the conclusions in Financial Regulation: Why, how and where now? (Goodhart et al, 1998a), reproduced in the Annex to this paper. From these diverse conclusions, I would like to attempt to infer Goodhart's Law of Financial Regulation. Goodhart's Law The earliest form of Goodhart’s Law on monetary targeting was ‘Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.’ (Goodhart 1984). This was paraphrased into ‘As soon as the government attempts to regulate any particular set of financial assets, these become unreliable as indicators of economic trends’ (Pears Cyclopaedia, 1990) or ‘When a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure.’ (Strathern, 1977). 5 But how different is a financial regulatory rule from a monetary rule? Can we differentiate regulatory credibility from monetary credibility? Or monetary discipline from financial discipline? As Charles perceptively pointed out, financial markets involve a complex structure of contracts between market participants, and regulation is about changing the behaviour of regulated institutions (Goodhart et al, 1998a). If so, monetary or financial behaviour involves a complex game between the regulator and the regulatees. In the same way that physicists cannot assume that the observer is independent of the observed, can the behaviour of regulators be assumed independent of the regulatees? Charles also keenly observed that regulatory services are not provided by a market process, but largely imposed, which causes a variety of problems. In particular, ‘If the perception that regulation is costless is combined with risk-averse regulators, there is an evident danger that regulation will be over- demanded by consumers and oversupplied by the regulator.’ (Goodhart et al, 1998a, page 190). In the 25th Chorley Lecture (Goodhart, 1997, page 21), Charles said: The public does not realise that ultimately they themselves mostly bear the costs of regulation; they often see it as a free good that ought to be operated so perfectly and efficiently by the regulators that failure Extract should never be allowed to occur. Given such standard preconceptions, it is all too easy to understand how excessive regulation can be introduced after well-publicised failures, and how all such financial failures are treated by the media as examples of regulatory mismanagement and failure. On the other hand, a typical asymmetric reward system for financial regulators in emerging markets is the tendency to ‘over-regulate and under- enforce’. This is because regulators are underpaid and have all incentives to engage in regulation, which generates power, and under-enforcement, since 6 no one likes the laborious and often thankless task of investigation, prosecution and sanctions. Since all financial regulation rules have a cost, the setting of any particular regulatory rule will invite regulatory arbitrage or encourage innovation to circumvent the rules. For example, the capital adequacy rules caused banks to expand off-balance sheet activities or move offshore. Regulated entities may also establish non-regulated entities to escape the regulatory net. Hence, Goodhart’s Law of monetary behaviour applies also to financial regulation. Since regulators are in the same game as regulatees, the behaviour has feedback mechanisms, not unlike Soros’s concept of reflexivity.1,2 In rational expectations theory, the policies alter economic behaviour. The result is that economic agents anticipate and neutralise the systematic component of each policy. The exception occurs when economic agents are surprised by purely random events or shocks (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Monetary and financial discipline In essence, both monetary policy and financial regulation are conducted with the goal of influencing the behaviour of economic agents and financial intermediaries so that the policy objectives of monetary and financial stability are achieved. Whether the policy outcome achieves the policy objectives would depend on the credibility of the monetary or regulatory authority.