Asia and the Global Financial Crisis: Conference Volume

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Asia and the Global Financial Crisis: Conference Volume ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Asia Economic Policy Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Edited by Reuven Glick Mark M. Spiegel Asia Economic Policy Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Santa Barbara, California October 19–20, 2009 The articles in this publication can be obtained in electronic form from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s website: http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/aepc/2009/agenda.php Contents Foreword . 1 Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference Summary . 3 Reuven Glick, Group Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Mark M. Spiegel, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Welcome Address . 11 Asia and the Global Financial Crisis Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System General Discussion . 23 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Emerging Asia . 27 Morris Goldstein, Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics Daniel Xie, Research Assistant, Peterson Institute for International Economics commentary . 81 Michael Mussa, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics General Discussion . 85 Lessons from Asian Financial Experience . 93 Anne O. Krueger, Professor of International Economics, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University commentary . 115 Andrew Sheng, Chief Adviser, China Banking Regulatory Commission General Discussion . 123 Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes . 131 Maurice Obstfeld, Class of 1958 Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics and Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University commentary . 173 Ricardo J. Caballero, Ford International Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology commentary . 179 Jacob Frenkel, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Group of Thirty General Discussion . 185 Keynote Address . 191 Reforming the Global Financial Architecture Andrew Crockett, President, JPMorgan Chase International General Discussion . 203 Fire, Flood, and Lifeboats: Policy Responses to the Global Crisis of 2007–09 . 207 Takatoshi Ito, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo commentary . 251 Frederic Mishkin, Alfred Lerner Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions, Columbia Business School General Discussion . 259 Panel Discussion: Experiences with the Crisis . 265 The Global Financial Crisis: Impact on Asia and Policy Challenges Ahead . 267 Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore Global Financial Crisis and the Korean Economy . 277 Kyungsoo Kim, Deputy Governor and Director General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, Bank of Korea Global Financial Crisis: Japan’s Experience and Policy Response . 285 Takafumi Sato, former Commissioner, Financial Services Agency, Japan General Discussion . 291 The Financial Crisis and Global Policy Reforms . 299 Barry Eichengreen, George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley commentary . 335 Anil K. Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business General Discussion . 341 Closing Remarks . 347 Asia, the Financial Crisis, and Global Economic Governance John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund General Discussion . 355 contributors . 359 conference ParticiPants . 369 1 Foreword This year’s Asia Economic Policy Conference, titled “Asia and the Global Finan- cial Crisis,” is the first in a series that the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco plans to hold every other year . Our objective is to bring together researchers, private market participants, and policymakers to explore Asia’s evolving role in the global economy . We hope that this conference series will provide a useful arena for interaction, with opportunities for both formal and informal discus- sion . We also hope to stimulate more top-quality research on Asian issues . We decided to begin this venture for several reasons . First and foremost, it goes without saying that Asia is an important force in the global economy . We consider knowledge of the region critical in insuring that the Federal Reserve System has the understanding of global economic trends needed to conduct monetary policy and to address issues relating to the stability of the financial system . Not sur- prisingly, given the strength of economic and financial ties between Asia and the western United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has a long- standing tradition of focusing on Asian developments through the activities of our Center for Pacific Basin Studies in our Economic Research Department and our Country Analysis Unit in Banking Supervision and Regulation . This year’s conference assembled an outstanding group of experts on a topic of extreme importance . I appreciate the contributions of all those who took part in the conference, including authors, discussants, panelists, and audience mem- bers . My special thanks to John Judd, Reuven Glick, and Mark Spiegel, who helped develop the program, and to Anita Todd for her assistance with the pro- duction of this volume . Janet L. Yellen President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 Asia and the Global Financial Crisis: Conference Summary Reuven Glick and Mark M. Spiegel The global financial crisis of 2007–09 has starkly demonstrated the extent to which the economic fortunes of the United States, Asia, and the rest of the world are intertwined . The crisis was transmitted to industrial and emerging market economies through both financial and trade channels . Investors were affected by exposure to failing assets in the United States and increased uncertainty in global financial markets . Emerging market economies experienced abrupt halts in capital inflows and downward pressure on their exchange rates . Export- ers throughout the world saw demand for their products decline . While Asian economies were initially perceived to be insulated from developments else- where, the notion of Asia “decoupling” from the problems in the United States and Europe evaporated as the crisis intensified . Policymakers around the world faced the tasks of stabilizing financial conditions and managing economic growth in the short run as well as adopting long-run reforms aimed at prevent- ing future crises . To explore these issues, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco inau- gurated its Asia Economic Policy Conference series with a conference on “Asia and the Global Financial Crisis” held October 19-20, 2009, in Santa Barbara, California . The conference brought together experts from around the world to discuss the transmission of the crisis to Asia and the responses of economic pol- icymakers and regulators . The conference program consisted of five commis- sioned papers and other presentations by distinguished speakers . In opening remarks, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke noted that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the late 1990s, many emerging mar- ket economies in Asia and elsewhere took advantage of improved global condi- tions to strengthen their economic and financial fundamentals . They bolstered fiscal and foreign debt positions, accumulated foreign exchange reserves, and reformed their banking sectors . When financial turmoil erupted in the sum- mer of 2007, Asian economies were well-positioned to avoid its worst effects . In particular, most financial institutions in the region were not heavily exposed to distressed markets for structured credit products and other asset-backed securities . 4 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Still, Asian nations were affected in late 2007 and 2008 when economies weakened in the United States and other industrial countries . The global finan- cial crisis intensified dramatically when Lehman Brothers failed in Septem- ber 2008 . As investor appetite for risk declined, capital flows shifted away from countries that were viewed as more vulnerable . Moreover, financial institutions withdrew money from risky assets in both advanced and emerging markets . The Federal Reserve established liquidity swap lines with central banks in Asia and other regions to help alleviate dollar funding pressures . In Bernanke’s view, emerging Asia’s sound macroeconomic and financial fundamentals provided room for maneuver in carrying out countercyclical mon- etary and fiscal policy, in contrast with earlier crises or compared with options available to other emerging market countries . In particular, China implemented a sizable fiscal program, supplemented by accommodative monetary and bank lending policies . Bernanke attributed Asia’s relatively rapid recovery in large part to such domestic demand-boosting policies, which provided a substitute for exports to trading partners outside the region . First-day presentations reviewed national experiences of the crisis . Morris Goldstein and Daniel Xie of the Peterson Institute for International Econom- ics identified several characteristics that affected the depth of the downturn among Asian countries . China and India experienced relatively small growth slowdowns, but the economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan contracted
Recommended publications
  • 1 My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My Presidency We're Facing a Student Loan Crisis
    My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My Presidency We’re facing a student loan crisis -- one that’s holding back our economy and crushing millions of American families. I have already proposed bold steps to broadly cancel student loan debt, provide universal tuition free public two- and four-year college and technical school, ban for- profit colleges from receiving federal aid, and help end racial disparities in college enrollment and resources. But the Department of Education already has broad legal authority to cancel student debt, and we can’t afford to wait for Congress to act. So I will start to use existing laws on day one of my presidency to implement my student loan debt cancellation plan that offers relief to 42 million Americans -- in addition to using all available tools to address racial disparities in higher education, crack down on for-profit institutions, and eliminate predatory lending. I spent my career studying why so many hard-working middle-class families were going broke. I discovered that they weren’t reckless or irresponsible -- they were being squeezed by an economy that forced them to take on more debt to cling to their place in America’s middle class. Student debt is no different: for decades, students have worked hard and played by the rules. They took on loans on the promise that a college education would justify their debt and provide a ticket to the middle class. But our country’s experiment with debt-financed education went terribly wrong: instead of getting ahead, millions of student loan borrowers are barely treading water.
    [Show full text]
  • Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics After World War I
    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER June 2018 Working Paper 2018-06 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2018/06/ Suggested citation: Lopez, Jose A., Kris James Mitchener. 2018. “Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-06. https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2018-06 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER* May 9, 2018 ABSTRACT. Fiscal deficits, elevated debt-to-GDP ratios, and high inflation rates suggest hyperinflation could have potentially emerged in many European countries after World War I. We demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty was instrumental in pushing a subset of European countries into hyperinflation shortly after the end of the war. Germany, Austria, Poland, and Hungary (GAPH) suffered from frequent uncertainty shocks – and correspondingly high levels of uncertainty – caused by protracted political negotiations over reparations payments, the apportionment of the Austro-Hungarian debt, and border disputes. In contrast, other European countries exhibited lower levels of measured uncertainty between 1919 and 1925, allowing them more capacity with which to implement credible commitments to their fiscal and monetary policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Mapping Exploitation
    MAPPING EXPLOITATION Examining For-Profit Colleges as Financial Predators in Communities of Color July 2021 PROTECTBORROWERS.ORG MAPPING EXPLOITATION 2021 Table of Introduction 3 Contents Student Debt is a Crisis for Black and Latino Borrowers and Their Communities 5 For-Profit Colleges are Another Example of Firms Engaging in “Predatory Inclusion" 9 For-Profit Colleges and the Geography of Financial Predation 10 For-Profit Schools Target Communities of Color with Predatory Products That Produce Suboptimal Outcomes 13 Mapping For-Profits in the Midwest 14 Recommendations 26 Conclusion 31 Endnotes 32 2 MAPPING EXPLOITATION 2021 Introduction The country is in the midst of an unprecedented student debt crisis with 45 million borrowers collectively owing more than $1.7 trillion in student debt. Student loan borrowers have been sold the narrative that education is the key to social mobility—that it is “the great equalizer.”1 Meanwhile, the rising cost of higher education has brought with it rising levels of student debt—debt that is often excused or ignored as a personal shortcoming, the result of individual choices rather than a broad array of deep systemic failures.2 These parallel trends perpetuate the narrative that student loan borrowers are not entitled to assistance or that their distress does not merit policymakers’ attention. However, as we have seen time and time again, the vision of higher education as the key to individual opportunity and student debt as “good debt” has consistently failed to account for a host of interconnected
    [Show full text]
  • From Asian to Global Financial Crisis
    This page intentionally left blank FROM ASIAN TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS This is a unique insider account of the new world of unfettered finance. The author, an Asian regulator, examines how old mindsets, market fundamental- ism, loose monetary policy, carry trade, lax supervision, greed, cronyism, and financial engineering caused both the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the cur- rent global crisis of 2007–2009. This book shows how the Japanese zero inter- est rate policy to fight deflation helped create the carry trade that generated bubbles in Asia whose effects brought Asian economies down. The study’s main purpose is to demonstrate that global finance is so interlinked and interactive that our current tools and institutional structure to deal with critical episodes are completely outdated. The book explains how current financial policies and regulation failed to deal with a global bubble and makes recommendations on what must change. Andrew Sheng is currently the Chief Adviser to the China Banking Regulatory Commission and a Board Member of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority, Khazanah Nasional Berhad and Sime Darby Berhad, Malaysia. He is also Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, and at the Faculty of Economics and Administration at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Mr Sheng was Chairman of the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong from 1998 to 2005. A former central banker with Bank Negara Malaysia and Hong Kong Monetary Authority, between 2003 and 2005 he was Chairman of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the standard setter for securities regulation.
    [Show full text]
  • Who We Are and What We Do
    Who We Are and What We Do The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is an independent statutory body established by the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance (SFCO). The SFCO and nine other securities and futures related ordinances were consolidated into the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO), which came into operation on 1 April 2003. We are responsible for administering the laws governing the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong and facilitating and encouraging the development of these markets. Our statutory regulatory objectives as set out in the SFO are: >> to maintain and promote the fairness, >> to minimise crime and misconduct in the efficiency, competitiveness, securities and futures industry; transparency and orderliness of the >> to reduce systemic risks in the securities securities and futures industry; and futures industry; and >> to promote understanding by the >> to assist the Financial Secretary in public of the operation and maintaining the financial stability of functioning of the securities and Hong Kong by taking appropriate steps in futures industry; relation to the securities and futures >> to provide protection for members of industry. the public investing in or holding financial products; In carrying out our mission, we aim to ensure Hong Kong’s continued success and development as an international financial centre. The SFC is divided into four operational divisions: Corporate Finance, Intermediaries and Investment Products, Enforcement, and Supervision of Markets. The Commission is supported by
    [Show full text]
  • Is Theworld Undergoing Afiscal/Debt Revolution?
    A SYMPOSIUM OF VIEWS Is the World Undergoing A Fiscal/Debt Revolution? he need to go into debt to support the economy during the pandemic has a broad consensus of agreement. Even after adding 10–15 percent of GDP to debt levels, though, some economists are arguing that the world needs to keep expansionary fiscal policy for at least the next decade. In today’s era of ultra-low interest rates, they believe that monetary policy is pushing on Ta string. They further argue that so long as growth and interest rates are so low, fiscal stimulus is near riskless. The argument claims that it is more appropriate to compare debt stocks to the present value of future GDP or interest rate flows to GDP flows. This thinking implies, for example, that the reasoning that went into the formation of the Maastricht Treaty or various debt-reduction efforts in the United States is no lon- ger relevant for the advanced economies. Some advocates go so far as to argue that in light of dynamic scoring, borrowing to finance appropriate categories of Federal spend- ing “pays for itself” in budgetary terms based on “reasonable” assumptions. Therefore, some economies may be less constrained by fiscal limits even properly benchmarked be- cause fiscal expansions can raise GDP more than they raise debt and interest payments. Is the global economics profession truly undergoing such a revolution? Is it—like many revolutions—likely to end in tears, or something to be applauded? Or is it like China’s Premier Zhou Enlai said about the French Revolution, too soon to tell? The opinions of nearly two dozen noted experts.
    [Show full text]
  • Market Forces Or International Institutions? the Under-Emphasized Role of Ifis in Domestic Bank Regulatory Adoption
    Market Forces or International Institutions? The Under-Emphasized Role of IFIs in Domestic Bank Regulatory Adoption Meredith Wilf∗ January 10, 2017 For discussion at The Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO) 2017 conference January 12-14, 2017 Abstract The 1988 Basel Capital Accord coordinated an increase in twelve signatory countries’ bank regulatory stringency. By 2001, in the absence of legal obligation to do so, more than 100 non-signatories also adopted the accord’s terms. Why? While existing explanations argue that countries adopted to prevent a reputation as weakly regulated, this is inconsistent with limited public information about adoption status. I argue instead that international organizations played a systematic role in broad adoption. Using an original dataset that codes Basel I status for 167 countries over the period 1988 to 2015, I analyze those factors that correlate with country adoption of Basel I. I find that International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs are robustly correlated and market forces hold little explanatory power. Further, IMF program effects are strongest immediately following 1997, the year that Basel I was embedded in new international best practices that entailed pub- lic reporting by the IMF. For an important bank regulation where adoption can be meaningfully compared across countries, this paper shows that the conventional understanding overstates the role of market forces and understates the role of international organizations. Further, this case illustrates how, even without a strong hegemonic preference for worldwide adoption, international agreements may evolve in unintended ways. ∗Meredith Wilf ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at University of Pittsburgh ([email protected]).
    [Show full text]
  • Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti's CV
    Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti The Brookings Institution Hutchins Center for Fiscal and Monetary Policy cell (202) 641-2592 E-Mail: [email protected] Current Position • Senior Fellow, the Hutchins Center for Fiscal and Monetary Policy, the Brookings Institution US employment history • Visiting Scholar, International Monetary Fund, April-July 1992. • Staff of International Monetary Fund, Jan. 1993-January 2021 Education • Ph.D. in Economics, Harvard University, June 1991 (Harvard student F1 visa Sept 1987-June 1991). • A.M. in Economics, Harvard University, March 1990. • Laurea Summa cum Laude in Economics, Università di Roma "La Sapienza", 1985. Fellowships • Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research, February 1996-present. Awards • Bhagwati award for best paper in the Journal of International Economics in 2007-2008 (“The External Wealth of Nations Mark II”) • Danielian Prize for Excellence in International Economics, Harvard University, 1991. • University Fellowship, Harvard University, 1989-1991. • Credito Italiano Scholarship towards completion of two years of graduate studies, 1987-89. Current Research Interests • Open economy macroeconomics and finance; current account and real exchange rate dynamics; capital controls; fiscal rules; external crises. Publications Books/Pamphlets/Occasional Papers: 1. “Methodologies for Exchange Rate Assessments” (joint with Jaewoo Lee, Jonathan Ostry, Alessandro Prati, and Luca Ricci), IMF Occasional Paper 261, April 2008. 2. “Rules-Based Fiscal Policy and The Fiscal Framework in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain” (joint with E. Detragiache, T. Daban, S. Symansky, and G. Di Bella), IMF Occasional Paper 225, November 2003. 3. “Anticipating Balance of Payments Crises: The Role of Early Warning Systems” (joint with Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein and Catherine Pattillo), IMF Occasional Paper 186, December 1999.
    [Show full text]
  • Monetary Policy and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Corporate Loan Market
    Monetary Policy and Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Corporate Loan Market Teodora Paligorova∗ Bank of Canada E-mail: [email protected] Jo~aoA. C. Santos∗ Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Nova School of Business and Economics E-mail: [email protected] November 22, 2012 Abstract Our investigation of banks' corporate loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades finds that monetary policy is an important driver of banks' risk-taking incentives. We show that banks charge riskier borrowers (relative to safer borrowers) lower premiums in periods of easy monetary policy than in periods of tight monetary policy. This interest rate discount is robust to borrower-, loan-, and bank-specific factors, macroe- conomic factors and various types of unobserved heterogeneity at the bank and firm levels. Using individual bank information about lending standards from the Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey (SLOOS), we unveil evidence that the interest rate discount for riskier borrowers in periods of easy monetary policy is prevalent among banks with greater risk appetite. This finding confirms that the loan pricing discount we observe is indeed driven by the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. JEL classification: G21 Key words: Monetary policy, risk-taking channel, loan spreads ∗The authors thank Jose Berrospide, Christa Bouwman, Daniel Carvalho, Scott Hendry, Kim Huynh, David Martinez-Miera and seminar participants at Nova School of Business and Economics, SFU Beedie School of Business, the 2012 FIRS Meeting in Minneapolis, and the 2012 Bank of Spain and Bank of Canada \International Financial Markets" Workshop for useful comments.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2018
    ANNUAL REPORT 2018 CARNEGIE COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Mission 2 President’s Message 3 Activities Summary 4 Program Highlights 5 Special Initiatives by Senior Fellows 16 Additional Special Events and Activities 18 Ethics & International Affairs Quarterly Journal 22 Calendar of Events and Podcasts 25 Financial Summary 35 Thank You to our Supporters 36 Supporters 37 Officers, Trustees, and Committees 38 Staff and Fellows 39 C2G2 Advisory Group 39 Ethics & International Affairs Editorial Board 40 Pacific Delegates 40 Carnegie New Leaders 40 MISSION Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs works to foster a global conversation on major ethical challenges in international politics and in communities around the world. Broadcasting across multiple formats and media channels, Carnegie Council enriches this conversation with informative lectures, interviews, articles, and programs—all available worldwide to anyone, anywhere. We convene: The world’s leading thinkers in the discussion of global issues We communicate: Ethical perspectives to a worldwide audience We connect: Communities through the exploration of shared values CARNEGIE COUNCIL: MAKING ETHICS MATTER PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE Dear Friends, We are living in a time of accelerating climate change, yet the United States’ response is to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and roll back environmental regulations; a time of growing distrust of governments, global organizations, and the very concept of liberal democracy; a time of fake news and misinformation, while professional journalists are persecuted in many countries and labeled “the enemy of the people” here in the United States. This is a time of nuclear threat; a time of increasing inequality, populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism; a time when a record number of people—over 68 million in 2017—have been driven from their homes; a time when artificial intelligence is on the cusp of changing our world forever.
    [Show full text]
  • Towards a New Paradigm in Open Strategic Autonomy?
    Towards a new paradigm in open strategic autonomy? Éric Van den Abeele 3Working Paper 2021.03 Towards a new paradigm in open strategic autonomy? Éric Van den Abeele european trade union institute trade european 3Working Paper 2021.03 ETUI publications are published to elicit comment and to encourage debate. The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the ETUI nor those of the members of its general assembly. Brussels, 2021 © Publisher: ETUI aisbl, Brussels All rights reserved Print: ETUI Printshop, Brussels D/2021/10.574/16 ISSN 1994-4446 (print version) ISSN 1994-4454 (electronic version) The ETUI receives financial support from the European Union. The European Union is not responsible for any use made of the information contained in this publication. Table of contents Executive summary ........................................................................................................................5 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................6 Part One The EU’s dependence on the great powers ..............................................................................7 1. The United States: a love-hate relationship ...................................................................7 2. China: the systemic rival .....................................................................................................9 3. Russia: an inescapable geopolitical power .................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vital February 2017 GABRIEL
    Curriculum Vital February 2017 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ ZAMBRANO Bank of Spain Directorate General of Financial Stability and Resolution Financial Stability Department Alcalá, 50 28014 Madrid, Spain Phone: + 34 91 338 57 10 e-mail: [email protected] EDUCATION Abril 2013 ESADE: Executive MBA on Leadership Development, June 2001 CEMFI (Bank of Spain): MSc in Economics and Finance. June 1999 University Complutense of Madrid: Bachelor of Arts Degree in Mathematics (Special Prize) WORK EXPERIENCE Since May 2015 Head of the Regulatory Impact Assessment Unit, Directorate General Financial Stability and Resolution, Financial Stability Department, Banco de España. Dec. 2007-April 2015 Head of the Banking Sector Analysis Unit, Directorate General Regulation, Financial Stability Department, Banco de España. Sept. 01-Nov. 07 Economist, Directorate General Regulation, Financial Stability Department, Banco de España. PRIZES 2015 Jaime Fernández de Araoz on Corporate Finance PUBLICATIONS (in chronological order) When Credit Dries Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession (with S. Bentolila and M. Jansen) Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming, 2017. Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments (with S. Ongena, J. L. Peydró and J. Saurina) Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming, 2017. 1 Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking? (with S. Ongena, J. L. Peydró and J. Saurina) Econometrica, 82 (2), 463-505, 2014. How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk Taking? (with J. A. López and J. Saurina) Journal of Financial Stability, 9, 185-195, 2013. Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications (with S.
    [Show full text]