RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 2

ANALYSIS

Developed Putinism: Change without Development Richard Sakwa, Canterbury Abstract One of the key features of Putinism is it adaptability to changing circumstances, in part derived from sensi- tivity to shifts in the balance of power between the various factions. What was a strength has now become a vulnerability, since intra-systemic change is severely constrained in terms of both policy scope and societal depth. The limits on evolutionary potential are now evident by a growing inability to respond to the new challenges in creative and progressive ways.

Neither Black Nor White But Grey from this perspective, is reflected in an aggressive and Putin’s leadership remains the subject of intense and counter-productive foreign policy. polarised debate. For many he remains the saviour of Neither of these views does justice to the complex Russia. He presided over years of unprecedented growth, reality. Putin has been able to respond to some of the and even weathered the economic crisis from late 2008 very real challenges facing Russia in a relatively compe- with relatively little damage because of textbook macro- tent and coherent manner. Thus his critics who accuse economic management. Improvements in health care the regime of failing to deliver the basics of effective gov- and welfare policies, accompanied by family support, ernance are off the mark. Even the various forthcom- have ameliorated the predicted demographic crisis. In ing mega-projects, from the Sochi Winter Olympics in international affairs Putin is seen as having restored 2014 to the World Cup in 2018, however wasteful the Russia’s status as an independent player, defending its construction costs, are something in which the country interests while avoiding becoming boxed into some sort can take pride. Nothing is black and white about a gover- of ‘pariah’ status. After a string of still-born integration nance system caught up in the whirlpools of policy con- efforts in its neighbourhood, moves towards the creation flicts over the most appropriate developmental path, the of the Eurasian Union by 2015 look finally like a via- country’s place in Eurasia and in energy markets, and in ble supranational project. Russia has allied with China general the position that Russia should adopt in a world in defence of the traditional postulates of state sover- torn between conflicting geopolitical blocs and weak- eignty and non-interventionism, while avoiding becom- ened institutions of international governance, notably the ing the junior partner in what is becoming an increas- United Nations system. However, the adaptability of the ingly unequal relationship. regime and its ability to provide public goods in a reason- Putin’s critics take a very different view. His most ably efficient and cost effective manner is declining, and intransigent opponents consider him the conscious exe- the country finds itself increasingly locked in stalemate. cutioner of Russian democracy from the very beginning, offering instead only the form while gutting political Stages of Putinism life of the competiveness, dynamism and pluralism that Putin remains the dominant political figure in Russian a great nation deserves. Economic growth and rising politics, and thus talk of ‘Putinism without Putin’ is living standards, declining poverty, and national inte- off the mark. However, neither he nor the country has gration are ascribed to buying off the population and stayed the same. Although there are profound conti- opponents with the windfall energy rents. These rents nuities in Putin’s leadership style, at least four different allowed corrupt and self-serving elites to consolidate phases in his rule can be identified, coinciding with the their power, using the language and forms of democracy classic cycle of leadership politics in general. to suppress dissent and pluralistic contestation. Fraudu- The first phase was of remedial politics. In March lent elections have deprived the regime of the final ves- 2000 Putin won election in a hard-fought ballot, and tiges of legitimacy. The chimera of post-Soviet integra- quickly set upon stamping his vision of ‘remedial’ poli- tion is little more than a distraction from the very real tics on Russia. Although Putin was careful not to attack challenges facing the long-term viability of a resource- Yeltsin personally, his politics was based on the idea that based and undiversified economy. Anti-Western rhetoric in the 1990s the Russian state lost the ability to man- acts as a substitute for a genuine forward-looking pro- age affairs, the economy declined, and powerful special gramme, while Russia’s ‘cockiness’ on the world stage interests had emerged that threatened governance in its reflects not a defence of traditional norms of interna- entirety. The era is presented as a new ‘Time of Troubles’ tional politics but the self-serving interests of an illegit- (smutnoe vremya), which takes an act of supreme con- imate ruling class. Authoritarian consolidation at home, centration to overcome. The latent powers of the Rus- RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 3

sian state, eclipsed by powerful oligarchs and gover- In the third phase, between 2008 and 2012, Rus- nors in the 1990s, were re-activated. However, the only sia was governed by the ‘tandem’ form of rule. Dmitry effective carrier of these powers was not the new forces Medvedev was constrained by the terms of the deal, but unleashed by Russia’s capitalist revolution, notably lib- from the first showed signs of political independence and eral political parties, an independent business class or advanced a distinctive programme of his own. From his an active civil society representing the forces of demo- condemnations of ‘legal nihilism’ to supporting what he cratic modernity, but the bedrock of the Soviet system, called ‘modernisation’, including measures to ease the which had been overthrown with so much fanfare in pressure on businesses, Medvedev shaped a policy that 1991: the vast bureaucracy and the equally vast secu- was not anti-Putinite but represented a modification of rity apparatus (collectively known as the siloviki). From some of the key features of classic Putinism. As a lawyer the first the Putin system was marked by the contrast by profession, Medvedev was above all concerned with between the declared goals of the administration, and re-asserting the independence of the judiciary as part the means by which its aspirations were implemented. of a broader programme of strengthening the constitu- The turning point that inaugurated the second phase tional state against the arbitrariness of the administra- of Putinite politics, a period of regime consolidation tive regime. While it is now customary to mock Med- marked by intensified constraints, was the assault against vedev’s ineffectual style, in fact he represented a form of the Yukos oil company and the arrest of its head, Mikhail evolutionary development that could have maintained Khodorkovsky, on 25 October 2003. Two logics of moder- the achievements of the remedial aspects of Putinism nity collided. Khodorkovsky came to represent a more lib- while pushing back against the excesses of the consol- eral and open style of politics and economic governance. idation period. Although the creation and development of Yukos in the Just as Putin had transcended what he considered 1990s was accompanied by the shortcomings and sharp the limitations of Yeltsin’s rule, so Medvedev, without practices typical of that era, nevertheless in the early 2000s condemning Putin the man, reflected the potential of the company was transformed and presented itself as the the system to evolve by strengthening the institutions modern corporation that Russia needed to become a devel- of the constitutional state, while clipping the wings of oped and diversified economy. Unfortunately, this pro- the partisans of the administrative regime. This was an gramme became a sort of crusade, which was perceived idealistic but realistic possibility, and gained the sup- to threaten once again the prerogatives of the state. The port of a growing band of adherents who had been at response of the statists and siloviki was not long in com- the heart of the creation of classic Putinism. In the end ing. The regime destroyed not only a political opponent the option of intra-systemic reform was scuppered by but also the oil company. the constraints of the tandem arrangements, which did The gap between the regime and the state became not allow the reformist programme to take political form increasingly apparent. The distinction between the two to challenge the power of the siloviki and other defend- wings of the ‘dual state’, the administrative regime and ers of the administrative regime. The swelling counter- the constitutional state, already apparent in the Yelt- movement to Medvedev’s liberalising aspirations was sin years became wider. Too often, when talking about provoked in no small part by concerns over the per- strengthening the state, Putin in fact only reinforced ceived unlimited geopolitical ambitions of the West in the prerogative powers of the regime. So instead of the wake of interventions in Iraq and Libya and the pre- consolidating the rule of law, the authority of consti- cipitate demonization of Bashar al-Assad in Syria as the tutional institutions such as parliament and the formal insurgency began there in spring 2011. procedures of modern governance, administrative prac- The fourth phase is what I call ‘developed Putinism’, by tices predominated. Putin never repudiated the formal analogy with the ‘developed socialism’ proclaimed during framework of the constitution, and indeed the core of the mature phase of the Brezhnev era in the 1970s. The his political identity is that he is serving the constitu- differences between the four stages should not obscure the tion, but the sphere of discretion (which exists in all elements of continuity, just as there are some profound political systems) became extraordinarily wide. This continuities between Yeltsin’s regime of the 1990s and allowed the legal system to be subordinated to politi- Putin’s rule in the 2000s. Neither the Yeltsin nor Putinite cal authority and in certain cases (such as in the Yukos systems of rule were autocracies, but both share elements prosecutions) undermined the consolidation of inde- of authoritarianism in the management of political pro- pendent courts and the rule of law in general. These cesses. Both sought to manage competing demands, two phases make up what we can call ‘classical puti- with pressure for political participation and social wel- nism’, in which the historical development of the sys- fare, the fragmentation of post-Soviet Eurasia, and new tem remained open. security challenges at the international level. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 4

Developed Putinism becomes consolidated the scope for regime reconfigura- A single regime has perpetuated itself since 1991, with tion is evident, for example in the creation of the Pop- elections a secondary, legitimating, practice. Elections ular Front, the decline of United Russia, the ‘nationali- are not determinative of government, let alone of the sation of the elites’, and reideologisation to accompany regime. Elections do send a signal to the regime, and are continuing strategies of depoliticisation. This only accen- thus not entirely nugatory. But the regime discredits its tuates the difference between ‘classic Putinism’ and its operative legitimating mechanisms, which becomes evi- developed variant. If the earlier version sought to reshape dent when there is a divergence between popular atti- the classic instruments of democratic political represen- tudes and electoral outcomes. Elections do not regulate tation, such as parties and parliament, the developed social tensions but only exacerbate them, as was seen so model is no longer satisfied simply with colonisation vividly in the protest movement from December 2011. but experiments with more corporatist and populist As the dust from the succession crisis settled, the sys- instruments, as part of its broader reorientation towards tem of developed Putinism found new forms of politi- a more nativist stance. cal management. Four strategies were central: to coerce, constrain, co-opt and convince. Selective coercion was Conclusion applied against leading figures in the opposition, notably The Putinite system has become locked in a stalemate. in the persecution of those allegedly involved the Bolot- Putin created a loyal pro-regime party (United Russia) naya Square disturbances of 6 May 2012 and the trial of that dominated parliament, but attempts to find new Alexei Navalny. Constraints were imposed on non-offi- ways to manage political life when the old instruments cial political engagement, with hefty fines imposed for have become discredited only reveals the limited range infringements of regulations concerning demonstrations. of options available within the narrow confines of devel- There were also constraints imposed on the regime’s oped Putinism. Medvedevism has become marginalised, elites, including their rights to hold shares and accounts at the cost of eroding political pluralism and the qual- abroad. The main co-optation mechanism is through the ity of governance overall. Political opposition as a polit- Popular Front. As for convincing, this comes through ical practice has been contained, but this allows only a a range of ideological initiatives, including an accentu- bureaucratic managerial style to predominate. In the ated anti-Westernism, closer links with the Orthodox absence of an open public sphere and accessible mass Church, and the espousal of conservative cultural and media, corruption proliferates. The erosion of open pol- family values. itics forces conflicts to turn inwards and encourages the Nevertheless, the opposition movement will live on. further growth of intra-regime factionalism. The stale- Suppression can only be an ‘emergency’ procedure, how- mate in Russia will only be transcended by a broaden- ever long it may last. A systemic crisis occurs when the ing of the political options available to the administra- channels for systemic renewal become blocked. The var- tion. This could inaugurate a fifth and more pluralistic ious disciplinary techniques imposed upon Just Russia phase—Putin without Putinism; although this would are a sign of a system in which control exceeds the abil- entail dismantling the Putinite system from within. To ity to incorporate ideas for the perpetuation of the sys- achieve this, sustained pressure from democratic move- tem itself. Medvedevism was always immanent in classi- ments would be required accompanied by the reactivi- cal Putinism, but late Putinism suppresses the potential sation of the constitutional state. The alternative is rev- of this tendency. As the system of developed Putinism olution and collapse.

About the Author Richard Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent and an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.