Business Law International Business Law
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
BUSINESS LAW INTERNATIONAL Business Law International Vol 20 No 3 pp 191–304 ISSN 1467 632X September 2019 Making Executive Compensation Less Controversial: The Rise of Pay Ratios ECHJ Lokin Indian Public M&A: A Comprehensive Guide to the Key Concepts, Deal Structuring and Execution Considerations and Market Practice for an International Lawyer Nikhil Narayanan VOL 20 Multiparty Contractual Networks: New Tool for Global Entrepreneurship and Supply Chains William B Bierce NO 3 The Application of US Anti-Boycott Laws: From the Arab League to Ireland SEPTEMBER 2019 Richard L Shamos The State of Crowdfunding Regulation in the United States Noreen Weiss Case Comment: European Commission Fines Guess over Anti-competitive Agreements to Block Cross-Border Sales (Case AT.40428 – Guess) Nelson Jung Published by the Legal Practice Division of the International Bar Association 217 Indian Public M&A: A Comprehensive Guide to the Key Concepts, Deal Structuring and Execution Considerations and Market Practice for an International Lawyer Nikhil Narayanan* Introduction At first glance, the legal framework governing Indian public M&A transactions may appear to be similar to that in England and Wales. The company law foundation is similar, and a number of familiar English law concepts find place in the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations 2011 (the ‘Takeover Regulations’). However, on closer examination, the Indian regulatory regime is very different to that in England and Wales in relation to matters such as delistings, minority squeeze-outs and the operation of the regulatory regime in practice. Contested deals have, until recently, been rare. Listed companies are, in many cases, subject to high levels of control by founding shareholders known as ‘promoters’, independent directors have historically not felt able or been willing to act as a meaningful counterpoint to executive management and the institutional investor base is not as organised as it is in England and Wales or the United States. * Nikhil Narayanan BCL (Oxon) (Radhakrishnan/Chevening Scholar), BA, LLB (Hons) and MBA (London Business School) (Merrill Lynch Scholar). 218 BUSINESS LAW INTERNATIONAL Vol 20 No 3 September 2019 However, this landscape is changing. A number of controlling shareholders are in a weakened position due to the insolvency or over-leveraged position of their groups and this loss of influence is spilling over to mainstream transactions. International private equity and hedge funds hold positions in a number of listed companies and are more assertive than the traditional shareholder base in India. Both of these factors played a role in the recent IHH/Fortis acquisition where there were a number of competing bids and where the board changed (to become more independent) in the midst of the deal. While it is too early to draw any longer-term conclusions from this deal, 2019 has seen an unsolicited bid for Mindtree Limited that is currently under way. These are encouraging signs for Indian public M&A. Against that backdrop, this article seeks to guide international counsel and clients seeking to undertake Indian public M&A deals through the regulatory landscape, drawing comparisons with corresponding concepts in England and Wales. Backdrop to the Indian public M&A environment Before considering the techniques to achieve public M&A transactions in India and the more detailed features of public M&A in India, it is worth pausing to consider some basic contextual issues. Regulatory architecture The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulates public takeovers in India through the Takeover Regulations and its views are critical. For structural questions, it is possible to consult SEBI through its ‘informal guidance scheme’, but this process takes longer and is less fluid than the consultation process with the Takeover Panel in England and Wales (and the query and the SEBI response are made public). Apart from SEBI’s views, as a result of litigation, certain aspects of the Takeover Regulation, particularly around concert party status and the meaning of ‘control’, have been subject to judicial determination. Promoter concept Founding shareholders in India are commonly referred to as promoters. There are different definitions of promoters under company law and under securities law, but both include the concept of ‘control’ of the relevant company (discussed further below). However, the definition under the INDIAN PUBLIC M&A 219 Companies Act 2013 (CA 2013) also includes a shadow directorship concept (which is no longer a feature of directorship itself under Indian law).1 CONSEQUENCES OF BEING A PROMOTER There are two aspects to the promoter concept of relevance in the public M&A context. First, promoter-controlled companies comprise the majority of listed companies in India. In contrast to England and Wales, where premium listed companies must have a relationship agreement with their controlling shareholder, there is no such requirement in India.2 This allows controlling shareholders to exert a greater degree of influence over listed companies in India. Second, any potential acquirer or investor in a public company will need to understand the possibility and the risk of being treated as a promoter. This is an issue that is of concern not just to strategic investors. Financial investors are also capable of being treated as promoters (although most such investors try not to be treated as such).3 In this regard, the issue is that unlike England and Wales, where the UK Listing Authority’s (UKLA) listing rules clearly define ‘controlling shareholders’ by reference to a 30 per cent threshold, there is no such clear- cut guidance in India. In practice, any holding over 20 per cent is likely to necessitate discussion as to promoter status with SEBI. If an investor is treated as a promoter, the main implications are disclosure- related as well as the investor being deemed to be a concert party of the other promoters in a takeover context. Promoters are also subject to lock-in 1 The historic definition of ‘director’ under the Companies Act 1956 was with reference to ‘any person occupying the position of director, by whatever name called’, a construction that imported the ‘shadow directorship’ concept into Indian company law. However, the CA 2013 defines director by reference to ‘a director appointed to the Board of a company’, a narrower definition. That said, the definition of promoter includes in limb (c) a person who ‘in accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the Company is accustomed to act’. This is the classic shadow directorship test. 2 Although reg 4(2) of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) 2015 (the ‘Listing Regulations’) contains some general obligations on the listed company to protect minority shareholders from abusive actions by controlling shareholders and there are other obligations with regard to the equal treatment of shareholders, this is not a clear requirement for a relationship agreement and there is no direct equivalent to Listing Rule 6.5 and 9.2.2 of the UK Listing Authority’ Listing Rules, which necessitate a relationship agreement and establish a clear requirement that the listed company be independent. 3 Eg, in the IPO of Pratap Snacks Limited, an entity controlled by Sequoia has been listed a promoter and in relation to the offer of shares of CMS Info Systems Limited, Sion Investment Holdings Private Limited, an entity controlled by Baring Private Equity Asia, has been listed a promoter. 220 BUSINESS LAW INTERNATIONAL Vol 20 No 3 September 2019 requirements in an initial public offering (IPO). 4 Other residual provisions also apply under company law and various securities laws. Therefore, as a formal matter, the exposure created by being classified as a promoter would seem to be limited. However, in situations where there is a breach or an alleged breach of any securities or other laws, in practice, SEBI is perceived as being harsher on promoters. This explains why most financial investors (and indeed most shareholders other than the founding shareholder or their families) prefer not to be treated as promoters by SEBI. Shareholder control Despite the influence that promoters exert in practice, the legal and regulatory environment in India does confer some power on shareholders of public listed companies in India as various matters require shareholder approval but is wary of permitting any particular shareholder special rights. The main considerations in relation to ‘special rights’ are summarised below. INVESTOR PROTECTION RIGHTS IN PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES Upon a listing of a company’s shares, SEBI will require most investor protection rights to fall away. Although SEBI’s views on this are evolving, it has accepted the survival of limited investor board nomination rights and has frowned on the survival of affirmative voting rights and transfer restrictions on shares (although there have been certain exceptional cases). Therefore, financial investors will need to manage their expectations as to what rights are permissible both in relation to any investor rights when they invest in public-listed companies as well as the survival of any pre-IPO rights that they may have negotiated. 4 Regulation 36 of the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations 2009 provides for a promoter lock of three years to the extent of 20 per cent of the post- IPO share capital of the company and any promoter holdings in excess of this will be locked up for a one-year period. INDIAN PUBLIC M&A 221 DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES Although Indian company law permits shares with differential voting rights in certain circumstances,5 in the listed company context, shares with superior voting rights (which would provide control to founding shareholders) have until recently been restricted. However, SEBI approved the concept of shares with superior rights in the listed company context in a board meeting on 27 June 2019, subject to certain protections.