Philosophy of Science Prof. Hutcheson Fall 2019

Course Content: We shall theorize about, study, and analyze some of the fundamental concepts of science.

Required Text: Hutcheson. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: course book available at University Bookstore; a.k.a. “the green book.” Optional Textbook: Curd and Cover, eds. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (=PS) (New York: Norton, 1998). I posted nearly every primary source reading on the TRACS site for this course.

Office Hours: : MW: 9:00-9:55; 2:00-3:00. Electronic Hours: TTh: 2:00-3:20. Office: COMAL 111. Office Phone: 245-2285; 245-2047. E-Mail Address: [email protected].

Course Requirements (undergraduates): The best two of three thesis-defense papers (80% total) and two essay tests (20% total). Class participation can boost or detract from your average as much as 3%.

The Papers: Your papers should be "thesis-defense" papers in which you defend a particular stance that you choose. These papers should be short, or about 5 pages long (double spaced). Each paper should be on the topic discussed in class. About a week before each paper is due I will give you a list of possible thesis statements. There will be a penalty for late papers.

Important Dates: Your papers are due Monday 23 September , Wednesday 23 October, and Monday 25 November. The mid-term test will be Wednesday 16 October; the final test (which will not be comprehensive) will be Wednesday 11 December 11:00-11:50.

Academic Honesty: The penalty for academic dishonesty will be an F in the course.

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Page 1 of 7 Philosophy of Science Reading List

I have posted virtually every primary source reading on the TRACS site. The readings will be under RESOURCES / DOCUMENTS / or, in a few cases, under RESOURCES / WEB SITES. The number next to each reading corresponds to the list of readings here.

The rule of thumb is that you should read 1-2 articles for each class period. The reading marked with an asterisk are more likely to be deleted.

INTRODUCTION

PSEUDOSCIENCE 1. Pigliucci and Boudry, “Introduction: Why the Demarcation Problem Matters,” PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE, 1-6. 2. Popper, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," PS, 3-10. Any scientific theory (or hypothesis) must be testable–or open to refutation by testable predictions. 3. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" PS,1-19. Popper’s testability requirement for science is false. A theory’s claim to scientific legitimacy depends on historical considerations. 4. Lakatos, "Science and Pseudoscience," PS, 20-26. Popper’s testability requirement for science is false. 5. Thagard, "Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience," PS, 27-37. Popper’s testability requirement for science is false. A theory is pseudoscientific IFF it has been less progressive than alternative theories, and faces many unsolved problems; and practitioners make little attempt to solve the problems, and are selective in considering positive and negative evidence. 6. Ruse, "Creation-Science is not Science" PS, 38-47. Science is (1)guided by natural law, (2)is explanatory by reference to natural law, (3)is testable by observations, (4)has tentative conclusions, and (5)is falsifiable.

Page 2 of 7 7. Laudan, "Commentary: Science at the Bar–Causes for Concern," PS, 48-53. There is no list of necessary and sufficient conditions for science. (2) is too strong, and (3) and (5) are too weak. 8. Ruse, "Response to the Commentary: Pro Judice," PS, 54-61. This is Ruse’s response to Laudan. 9. Laudan, “More on Creationism,” SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMAN VALUES 8, #1 (Winter 1983), 36-38. 10. Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” TRACS / DOCUMENTS / SCIENCE VS. PSEUDOSCIENCE. 11. Pigliucci, “The Demarcation Problem: A (Belated) Response to Laudan,” PHILOSOPHY OF PSEUDOSCIENCE 9-28.

FIRST PAPER DUE: 23 September

RELEVANT EVIDENCE 12. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," MIND (1945). There are various logical conditions for a qualitative theory of confirmation. Confirmation should be defined in terms of satisfaction. 13. Goodman, “Selective Confirmation and the Ravens,” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 69, #3 (10 Feb. 1972), 78-83. 14. Pollock,”Laying the Raven to Rest” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 70, #20 (22 Nov. 1973), 747-754. 15. Salmon, "Confirmation and Relevance." This consists of an explanation of Carnap’s criticism of Hempel's definition, Carnap's theory itself, and counter examples to Carnap's theory. Any definition of confirmation will have to be in quantitative terms. 16. Glymour, "Relevant Evidence," JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (1975). There is a reasonable qualitative definition of confirmation that is independent of quantitative considerations. Confirmation is only in relation to a theory. 17. Hanson, "The Logic of Discovery," JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY(1958). Confirmation (positive evidence) is defined by reference to explanation. 18. Achinstein, "Concepts of Evidence," MIND (1978). This is a theory of evidence that combines probability and explanation. There are difficulties with Salmon's conclusions about Carnap's theory and with Glymour's "bootstrap" theory of confirmation.

Page 3 of 7 19. Salmon, "Rationality and Objectivity in Science OR Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes,” PS, 551-583. Instead of seeking a priori principles governing reasonable subjective probabilities, we should look to the history of science to see how often hypotheses have been successful. 20. Glymour, "Why I am not a Bayesian," PS, 584-606. The Bayesian (quantitative) theory of confirmation is implausible.

RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE 21. Kuhn, “The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions,” PS 86-101. The history of science does not support the popular picture of science as the progressive accumulation of facts that culminate in the current theories. Thus, normative philosophies of science must be abandoned.0 22. Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,” PS 102-118. Kuhn replies to objections that his theory of scientific development implies relativism about truth and instrumentalist about theories. 23. McMullin, “Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science,” PS 119-138. Kuhn is wrong to claim that the notions of objective progress and truth are not relevant to understanding scientific revolutions. 24. Laudan, “Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change,” PS 139-169. Kuhn has a false and misleading picture of scientific rationality. Kuhn’s arguments for relativism are flawed. 25. Longino, “Values and Objectivity,” PS 170-191. A defensible theory of science reconciles the contextualist analysis of evidence with objectivity.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM VS. ANTI-REALISM 26. Maxwell, "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities," PS 1052-1063. The observational/theoretical distinction that empiricists (antirealists) draw is untenable. Skepticism about theoretical entities must be rejected. 27. van Fraassen, "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism," PS 1064-1087. The observational/theoretical distinction is plausible, and scientific theories should be accepted as being true about observables. Arguments for scientific realism are inconclusive. This is a defense of theory-skepticism.

Page 4 of 7 28. Musgrave, “Realism versus Constructive Empiricism,” PS 1088-1113. If we do not accept TTT theoretical terms refer to real things, then it would be a miracle that our scientific theories are successful.[reply to VF] 29. Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism," PS 1114-1135. The inference-to-the-best-explanation defense of scientific realism (Musgrave’s) is implausible. This is the historical argument for theory- skepticism. 30. Brown, "Explaining the Success of Science" PS 1136-1152. Laudan rightly believes that the concept of approximate truth is too vague to support realist arguments. A different realist explanation of the success of science should be substituted. 31. Antonio Diéguez-Lucena, “Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?” JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 37, #2 (October 2006), 393-403. 32. *Hacking, "Experimentation and Scientific Realism," PS 1153-1168. There are good reasons to believe that (some) theoretical entities exist, but TTT scientific theories are true or approximately true should be rejected. 33. *Resnick, "Hacking’s Experimental Realism," PS 1169-1185. Hacking’s Experimental Realism relies on the (discredited) success-of- science argument. Realism about entities and antirealism about theories cannot be successfully put together. 34. *Fine, "The Natural Ontological Attitude," PS 1186-1208. Realists and antirealists add indefensible and unnecessary accounts of truth to the neutral acceptance of scientific theories. 35. *Musgrave, "NOA’s Ark: Fine for Realism," PS 1209-1225. Fine’s “natural ontological attitude” is not really neutral. A genuinely neutral natural attitude has no philosophical content. SECOND PAPER DUE: 23 October

THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 36. Lipton, "Induction," PS, 412-425. This is a thorough explanation and clarification of the problem of induction. 37. Popper, "The Problem of Induction," PS, 426-432.3 Induction cannot be justified. Science can be understood without induction (in terms of deductive falsification). 38. Salmon, “Rational Prediction,” PS, 433-444.6 Popper’s deductive falsificationism cannot adequately account for some

Page 5 of 7 features of science. 39. Strawson, “Strawson on the Problem of Induction,” . Although the (continued) success of induction is a contingent matter, it is a necessary truth that induction is rational. Some versions of the problem of induction trade on a failure to understand this distinction. 40. Salmon, "Should We Attempt to Justify Induction?" Philosophical Studies 8, # 3 (Apr., 1957), 33-48. Strawson does not successfully dissolve all versions of the problem of induction. 41. Hutcheson, “Vindicating Strawson” . 42. Snyder, “Is Evidence Historical?” PS, 460-480. 43. Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction," . The problem of induction should be understood as the problem of deciding which competing hypotheses is confirmed by the evidence.

THIRD PAPER DUE: 25 November

EXPLANATION 44. Carnap, “The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction,” PS 678-684. Testable laws are a requirement for scientific explanation. This explains the motivation behind Hempel’s covering law theory. 45. Hempel, “Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation,” PS 685-694. Some scientific explanations have the structure of a deductive argument, the conclusion of which is the event to be explained. 46. *Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws." This is a challenge to several features of Hempel's theory of scientific explanations. 47. Hempel, “The Thesis of Structural Identity,” PS 695-705. All adequate explanations are potentially predictions, and all adequate predictions are potentially explanations. 48. Hempel, “Inductive-Statistical Explanation,” PS 706-719. Some explanations are I-S. Some scientific explanations have the structure of an inductive argument, the conclusion of which is the event to be explained.

Page 6 of 7 49. Ruben, “Arguments, Laws, and Explanation,” PS 720-745. Hempel’s conditions for an adequate explanation can be satisfied by arguments with premises that are explanatorily irrelevant to their conclusions. Thus, Hempel’s theory should be rejected. 50. Railton, “A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation,” PS 746-765. Hempel’s thesis that probabilistic explanations are arguments is false. Hempel’s maximal specificity requirement must also be rejected.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM & ITS CRITICS 51. Hempel, “Problems and Changes in Empiricist Criteria of Meaning,” article on TRACS. 52. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” PS 280-301.

Topics paper #1: defining science paper #2: rationality of science or scientific realism -vs- anti-realism paper #3: scientific realism -vs- anti-realism or problem of induction

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