Premium on Safety Issue 04 Year 2010 Insuring Safe Skies

PREMIUM ON SAFETY ISSUE 04 YEAR 2010 INSURING SAFE SKIES

IN THIS ISSUE

Turbine Pilot: Single-Pilot Safety 03

Engine Failure at Night 04

Accident Profile: Fogged Out 05

Turbine Trouble: Jet Engine vs. Volcano 06

Safety Experts: NOAA 07

Critter woes A MESSAGE FROM USAIG Uninvited guests may lead to in-flight issues Greetings! The arrival of warm weather BY ROB FINFROCK signals birds and other critters alike to find a cozy spot in With summer upon us, now may be the right corporate aircraft, over a weekend flyer’s your aircraft. These little pests time for a refresher on the birds and the piston-powered Cessna. build their imperceptible nests with great panache, and their bees, and the havoc they may bring upon A more persistent issue may be of the swiftly built dwellings can be our aircraft. insect variety. Flying pests such as bees a nuisance, even dangerous, if Any unplugged vent, intake, or other open- and wasps are attracted to several things not deconstructed before flight. ing on a parked aircraft gives critters the on an airport ramp—from the bright colors We’ve heard of mice, wasps, chance to make that space their home. If of intake covers and even aircraft paint snakes, and other vermin an aircraft sits unattended for any length schemes, to the scent of aviation fuels. Did finding their way into hangars and airplanes; a startling finding of time—even overnight—that gives ample you use a citrus-scented cleaner to touch up for the unsuspecting pilot during opportunity for birds, mice, and other small the cabin before that next charter? You may preflight, but gone undetected a animals to take up residence. want to take a cautionary glance around dangerous discovery in flight. What’s the risk? If left unnoticed, ani- your aircraft before departing on the next Have you had a critter mal nests may restrict airflow through an trip leg...or, listen for buzzing. encounter? Tell us your stories so we may share your airplane’s engines, or hinder the free move- If that sounds a bit farfetched, take experiences in an upcoming ment of the aircraft’s controls. Debris from heed of a May 2006 incident on the ramp newsletter. the nest—twigs, mud, and don’t forget the at California’s Bob Hope Burbank Airport. Safe skies. animals themselves—will cause significant Pilots walking to their Beech King Air 200 damage if they pass through delicate tur- were stunned to discover a swarm of bees bine blades, and may even lead to engine or nesting on their aircraft. The airport’s fire David L. McKay electrical fires. department responded by spraying affected President and COO, USAIG That said, incidents of bird or mice areas of the aircraft’s exterior with fire retar- leading to difficulties on turbine aircraft dant, while the pilots took a vacuum cleaner aren’t very common, compared to the to several adventurous drones that managed piston fleet. Higher utilization rates for to make their way inside the cabin. Those turbines mean less time on the ground for measures curtailed the bees’ activities, but those pests to take up residence; also, that wasn’t the end of it. After the aircraft those aircraft are often hangared when completed an uneventful charter leg to San not in use. While those factors certainly Francisco, followed by a quick repositioning don’t eliminate the risk, they do reduce flight to Sacramento, technicians were

the chances for nesting animals inside a (continued on page 2) DID YOU KNOW?

FAA’S NEW TAXI Critter woes (continued from page 1) PROCEDURES shocked to discover a thick layer of dead “Examination of the pitot static system An important change in taxi bees covering the inside of the engine cowl- revealed that the captain’s airspeed indica- clearance phraseology and ing...and even a few live ones that managed tions were lagging behind the first officer’s procedures took place on June to survive their short excursion up into the airspeed indications,” the NTSB deter- 30, 2010: The familiar “taxi flight levels. mined, “and that the captain’s pitot tube to runway” clearance, which Insects also have a way of making their was partially blocked by the remains of an allowed you to taxi across presence known, even after they’ve flown insect nest.” Of note, the NTSB added the all runways intersecting your path to the takeoff runway, away. Two persons onboard a Piper PA-60 aircraft was not hangared when parked, has been dropped from ATC Aerostar were fortunate to walk away from a and that “covers for the pitot tubes on the parlance. Instead, now you will November 2000 takeoff incident. Departing accident airplane were not available.” receive a specific clearance to IFR from Preston, Minnesota, the pilot stated So, what can pilots do to reduce their cross each runway. airspeed failed to increase above 115 KIAS risk of having uninvited guests cause Getting to the runway in the climb. Wary of raising the nose further problems on their flight? As with many The clearance starts with and risking a stall, the pilot waited until the potential issues, the answer is a diligent, the assigned runway, then specifies the taxi route and any initial runway crossing and/ or hold short instructions. For example: “Cessna Four-Golf- Technicians were shocked to Alpha, Runway 36L, taxi via Alpha, Charlie, cross Runway discover a thick layer of dead bees 13, hold short of Runway 27.” If multiple runways intersect the covering the inside of the engine route to the takeoff runway, the controller will not issue all the cowling...and even a few live ones crossing clearances at once. An exception may be made that managed to survive their short in cases where the distance between two runway centerlines excursion up into the flight levels. is less than 1,000 feet. Taxi to the gate “Taxi to” will be used when instructed to taxi to the ramp last second to pull up, and clipped treetops thorough preflight inspection. This starts or gate, but you will receive at the end of the runway. With the airplane with taking notice of any bird or animal specific crossing instructions still flyable, the pilot diverted to Quad City droppings underneath the aircraft—telltale for each runway encountered International Airport in Moline, Illinois, where indicators something may have gotten on the taxi route. he made an uneventful landing. During the inside your airplane. The bottom line trip, the pilot verified the airspeed indicator When looking inside the engine cowling, Whether an aircraft is inbound was displaying false readings. “I had a prob- don’t just look for fluid leaks and obvious or outbound, controllers are lem six weeks ago with a mud dauber wasp signs of wear. Use a flashlight to shine a required to issue a specific building a nest in the pitot tube,” the pilot light on the depths of the nacelle assembly clearance for each and every admitted to investigators with the National for signs of nesting, too. runway crossed or operated on. Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), adding Finally, be sure to pay careful heed to The FAA expects to incorporate “But this had been cleared out, and the air- your aircraft’s pitot-static system. If any these changes in the August craft flew several times since.” contamination is noted, simply clearing out 26 edition of the Aeronautical Information Manual. Such incidents aren’t limited to piston- what you can may not be enough. Have a engine aircraft, either. The NTSB deter- technician inspect the system as well…even More information mined the 2006 runway overrun of a if that means a delayed flight. It’s better to For more details and a few Dornier 328-300 twinjet in Manassas, be safe than sorry. real-world examples of the Virginia, was because of the late decision changes visit the website Rob Finfrock is a licensed sport pilot, and (www.aopa.org/taxichanges). to abort takeoff, when the flight crew expe- formerly managing editor of an online aviation --MAS rienced a discrepancy between the pilot’s and copilot’s airspeed readings. news service.

2 Safety Brief Turbine pilot: Single-pilot safety The risks of riding solo

BY THOMAS A. HORNE

There are a number of reasons why turbine flying is safer than operations involving piston-powered airplanes. For one, turbine pilots usually attend thorough, structured, simulator-based training designed around the type of airplane they’ll be flying; after all, insurance companies require it in order for pilots to be covered. In addition, turbine powerplants, owing to their comparative simplicity of design, are more reliable than piston engines. Then there’s a recency-of- experience factor at work. Many turboprop and turbofan airplanes serve in air taxi, charter, fractional, and cargo-hauling fleets. This means that their pilots fly on a regular basis. But to be more specific, what about single-pilot turbine operations? Has the record shown that single-pilot (SP) flying is more risky than flights with two-pilot crews? In a word, yes. Robert E. Breiling Associates, an accident analysis firm based in Florida, has been compiling accident data on turboprop and turbofan airplanes since the 1960s. Breiling’s annual compilation of business aircraft accidents has become 2007 U.S. mishaps involving turboprop air- What is known is that turboprop twins a standard reference tool in the business craft certified for single-pilot operation took flown in corporate/executive operations aviation community. place while the aircraft was flown by one by professional crews were involved in two Breiling gets his data from the FAA, the pilot. What’s more, he says that, over the accidents (one of them fatal) and 11 inci- NTSB, aviation underwriters, AvData Inc., past 10 years, 73.6 percent of all turboprop dents in 2007. During the same period, in and manufacturers. Using reported active accidents involved single pilots. Yet a fleet the owner-flown category there were 13 fleet sizes, fleet hours flown, and accident survey shows that about 62 percent of the accidents and 17 incidents resulting in 20 categories, he draws his own conclusions total turboprop fleet are SP-operated. fatalities. Air taxi and charter turboprop about the status of business aviation From 2003 through 2007, Breiling says twins had 15 accidents and 13 major safety. His annual review of 2007’s busi- that the numbers show a 76.4 percent incidents in 2007, yielding a total of 17 ness turbine accidents was published in representation of SP turboprop accidents. fatalities. June 2008. This represents a more timely This, he says, implies that a single pilot accident review than that put out by the has over 1.5 times the chance of having What went wrong NTSB, which can take two years or more to an accident. It’s important to note that Of all turboprop crashes in 2007, 42.7 finalize its accident data. the above data refers to turboprop twins percent happened in the landing phase, What follows are his deductions concern- certified for SP. They do not include single- 16.7 percent were in climb, 10.4 percent ing the comparative statistics between engine turboprops flown in SP operations. while taxiing or parked, 9.4 percent in the single-pilot and two-pilot accidents—for “It wouldn’t be fair to lump the twin turbo- approach phase, 8.3 percent in cruise, both turboprops and jets. props with the single-engine turboprops for 7.3 percent during takeoff, 4.2 percent accident analysis,” Breiling says. “There while maneuvering, and 1 percent during SP-flown turboprop twins—150 isn’t enough data available yet on hours- descent. percent more risky? flown for single-piloted, single-engine tur- Pilot action (or inaction) was blamed Breiling has determined that 78 percent boprops. What information there is comes for 45 percent of all business turboprop (41 accidents/incidents out of 71) of the from the manufacturers.” accidents in 2007, so there’s nothing really (continued on page 4) Reprinted with permission from AOPA Pilot, © October 2008

3 Safety Brief (continued from page 3) surprising there. What is of concern is that the relatively small, and these airplanes haven’t factors contributing to 28.2 percent of accidents accumulated enough time in service to pro- involved mechanical, maintenance, or manufac- duce meaningful data regarding accident turer design problems—with landing gear sys- types and causes. The Cessna Mustang, tem malfunctions leading the pack. Airport and which went into service in 2006, had a fleet runway conditions, plus unknown causes, round of 40 airplanes but only one (non-fatal) acci- out the list of 2007 probable causes. dent in 2007. This happened when a tempo- Real Pilot rary registration number pasted over a fuel Single-pilot jets vent caused the fuel tank and wing to distort. Stories The biggest SP-certified fleets in this cat- The airplane landed without further incident. egory belong to several of the Cessna Citation As for Eclipse jets, 81 were delivered in 2007, Lessons from types, including the Citations 500, I/SP, II/SP, but no accidents were recorded until this the Cockpit the CitationJet series, and the Mustang. Next year. Eclipses have been involved in several come the Hawker Beechcraft Premier I and incidents, however. Most notable was a soft- IAs, followed by the Eclipse 500 jet. ware malfunction that caused an engine to Engine failure Breiling says that it’s difficult to identify remain at full power after a go-around. the number of SP-certified jets actually being So although single-pilot-certified turboprops at night flown single-pilot because many SP jets are and jets continue to build in popularity, the Imagine you’re flying at night bought SP-certified to enhance resale value, statistics appear to confirm the notion that when the engine suddenly but are seldom flown that way. Insurance single-pilot operations create higher work- underwriters and training firms give widely loads and greater demands on pilot skill when sputters and explodes—10,000 varying estimates as to how many such jets the chips are down and stress levels run high. feet above the dark Pennsylvania are flown single-pilot, so it’s hard to know The old adage that two heads are better than countryside. what the SP accident exposure rate really is. one seems to hold true in turbine operations. Manny Kanal doesn’t have to As a best effort, Breiling compared As for VLJs, the jury is still out. Perhaps by imagine. That’s exactly what SP-certified Citation accident profiles with this time next year we’ll be able to identify happened to him flying his turbo those of two-crew-certified Citations, and some useful trend information based on big- charged Cessna 400 Corvalis TT looked at the years from 1972 (the time of the ger fleet numbers and higher utilization. But from White Plains, New York, to introduction of the first SP Citation) to 2007. until then, prepare for the usual when it comes He concluded that the total accident rate per to any airplane accident scenario. The land- Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 100,000 flight hours (the standard measure ing phase is consistently the most dangerous, In “Engine Failure at Night,” for accident rates) of single-piloted Citations with the IFR approach phase coming in a close Kanal shares his story and how is 2.7 times greater than that of two-crew second. And be sure the landing gear of your he coped with the emergency. The Citations—and that the fatal accident rate is turbine airplane is well maintained. multimedia presentation includes 3.7 times greater than two-crewed Citations. For more detailed information on busi- actual ATC communications, The Premier I and IA airplanes—both of ness turbine accident involvement, consider images of the burst engine, and which are SP-certified—have had seven non- obtaining a copy of Breiling Associates’ tips that might save you in a fatal accidents since their introduction in Annual Review. The price is $320. Contact 2001, all of them in the landing phase. Many Robert E. Breiling Associates, 765 N.E. similar situation (www.asf.org/ involved runway overshoots where ground 35th Street, Suite B, Boca Raton, Florida enginerps). spoilers failed in early models. 33431; www.breilinginc.com. The problem with the latest phenomenon— light jets and very light jets (VLJs)—is a lack Tom Horne is Editor at Large for AOPA Pilot of data. The fleets of these airplanes are and a 4,500-hour CFII and ATP.

IN THE LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS NEXT ISSUE What’s Your Strategy?

4 ASF ONLINE decayed to 68 knots and it descended another Risk assessment Accident Profile: 100 feet before radar coverage was lost. Fogged out By this time, the TBM was below the MDA Airline pilots consult company while still outside the step-down fix. Two wit- guidelines when it comes to go/ no-go decisions for any given BY DAVID JACK KENNY nesses reported hearing the airplane without flight. But general aviation pilots ever seeing it through the fog; one estimated are mostly left to their own Accidents that take place in fog tend to be visibility as less than 100 feet. However, at least judgment when deciding about an severe. One of two things typically happens: four others did see the airplane and told investi- upcoming flight. And pressure from Either the aircraft flies into something solid gators that after descending out of the overcast, work or passenger schedules can the pilot can’t see, or the pilot loses con- it banked hard left while pitching up sharply. influence that decision and make trol of the aircraft before it hits the ground. The nose dropped and the airplane went into it outright difficult to adequately Consequences are dire either way. the trees, killing all three on board. The NTSB assess the flight’s safety. Wouldn’t The Leesburg (Virginia) Executive Airport attributed the crash to, “the pilot’s failure to it be nice to be able to tap into a reported one statute mile visibility on the after- fly a stabilized, published instrument approach knowledge base to sort out the noon of March 1, 2003, with a two-degree procedure, and his failure to maintain adequate risk factors? temperature/dew point spread. At 2:20 p.m., airspeed which led to an aerodynamic stall.” the ceiling was 500 overcast—a little above The left-seat pilot was relatively inexperi- the 338-agl MDA for the localizer approach to enced to be operating a pressurized turboprop; Runway 17. At 2:29, the pilot of a Socata TBM- his most recent medical application, submitted 700 inbound from Greenville-Spartanburg told seven months earlier, had reported 730 hours the approach controller that he had the current total flight time. Perhaps for that reason, the Leesburg weather. At 2:40—about the time that airplane’s insurance required that he fly it with an updated METAR reported a 300-foot overcast a copilot. In the right seat was an 8,000-hour with visibility still one mile—the controller told ATP with type ratings for four transport-cate- the pilot to intercept the localizer. A minute later gory aircraft and instrument and multiengine the TBM was cleared for the approach and a instructor ratings. Both had completed a com- change to the local advisory frequency. mercial TBM-700 proficiency course less than Enter the AOPA Air Safety Its radar track showed a series of S-turns three months before the accident. Foundation’s Flight Risk Evaluator, across the localizer course. The airplane There is no direct evidence as to which pilot recently launched on ASF’s website. descended 100 feet below the segment mini- was actually flying; nor is it clear why the copilot This nifty application provides mum outside the final approach fix, and then did not notice and correct the premature descent. general aviation pilots with a formal approach to judge the safety of maintained that altitude over the FAF. Its ground The overcast and low visibility left little margin a proposed flight. The go/no-go speed decreased from 130 knots to 80 in just for error—and were implacably unforgiving of too choices are still up to the pilot—and two miles. By this time, three miles from the little precision in flying a non-precision approach. because the feedback is based field, it was 300 feet below the last step-down on the pilot’s profile and expected altitude. Over the next few seconds, the airplane David Jack Kenny, manager of aviation safety flight conditions, the decisions are began turning left, opposite the direction of the analysis for the AOPA Air Safety Foundation, is an meaningful to the planned flight published missed approach. Its ground speed instrument-rated commercial pilot. operation. The Flight Risk Evaluator is Data Diving: made up of three sections: an Fog accidents, Commercial flights (Parts 135 and 137): entertaining introduction to learn 1998—2007 Aircraft category Flight plan Accidents Fatal accidents Fatalities about flight risk elements; a quick Airplane IFR 12 7 9 evaluation and personalized list The NTSB found fog VFR 4 2 3 of guidelines based on just a few (including mountain Company VFR 5 2 7 details; and a detailed evaluation, obscuration and visibil- None 5 5 6 which rates the flight’s safety ity below IFR approach Helicopter IFR 0 across several areas based on minimums) caused VFR 1 1 2 more extensive information about or contributed to 292 Company VFR 8 3 10 the runway, airport environment, weather, aircraft, and pilot GA accidents. More None 2 1 4 proficiency. than 70 percent (211) were fatal, causing Non-commercial flights (Part 91 and public-use): Risk evaluation and management 386 deaths. Accidents is crucial to the safety of every Aircraft category Flight plan Accidents Fatal accidents Fatalities flight, whether you have logged involving fog occurred Airplane IFR 66 49 93 on commercial and thousands of hours at the VFR 27 22 43 flight levels or recently joined a non-commercial flights Company VFR 1 1 3 more complex flight operations alike. Some were None 138 104 176 setting. Go online (www.asf.org/ operating on IFR flight Helicopter IFR 1 1 4 flightriskeval) before your next plans, some on VFR VFR 1 1 1 flight. flight plans, and many Company VFR 7 3 7 —MAS on no flight plan at all. None 12 9 18 5 DID YOU KNOW?

SMS & FLIGHT OPS Turbine Trouble: Jet engine vs. volcano

BY CHIP WRIGHT BY MACHTELD A. SMITH

Aviation has undergone a series On the morning of December 15, 1989, a Before takeoff from Amsterdam, the of transformational changes in its Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) Boeing 747-400 Netherlands, the crew had received advi- history. It began with risky, uncer- carrying 231 passengers and 14 crew pre- sories of volcanic eruption some 100 miles tain technologies, and the result pared for arrival at Anchorage International southwest of their destination. En route, they was a mix of excitement and a high accident rate that was due Airport, Alaska. As KLM flight 867 descended received an advisory for a second eruption. more often to mechanical failure from FL 390 the crew received ATC vectors But ATC radar could only detect volcanic ash than to human error. In time, the to avoid the last known area of an ash plume for a five- to ten-minute period after eruption. mechanical failures were solved, blown from Redoubt Volcano some 150 miles Meanwhile, the ash cloud had been forecast or at least minimized, through bet- away. But, while descending through FL 260, to move north-northeast at 60 knots, but sat- ter engineering and studies of the the 747 got in trouble: ellite later showed it actually had moved at a high-risk types of accidents. That KLM 867: KLM 867 heavy is reaching speed of about 120 knots. specifically meant the ability first to withstand turbulence as well FL250, heading 140. No one on board was hurt, but the ash blast as severe weather avoidance, fol- Anchorage Center: Do you have good sight filled the cockpit with smoke and eroded win- lowed by minimizing low-altitude on the ash plume at this time? dows, fuselage, wings, and engine nacelles. accidents (takeoffs and landings). KLM 867: Yeah, it’s just cloudy. It could be The engine flameout caused electrical power Most accidents can now be ashes. It’s just a little browner than a normal interruption, loss of airspeed indication, and a placed largely on the shoulders of cloud. forward cargo area fire alarm. the organizational and individual KLM 867: …we have to go left now…it’s The NTSB cited “lack of available informa- operators. Pilots continue to make poor decisions regarding weather smoky in the cockpit at the moment, sir. tion about the ash cloud to all” as a related while demonstrating poor risk man- Anchorage Center: KLM 867 heavy, roger, factor in this accident. Since then, U.S. gov- agement and analysis skills. left at your discretion. ernment agencies such as the U.S. Geological The FAA and industry, through KLM 867: Climbing to level 390, we’re in Survey—which had begun to address hazards the International Civil Aviation the black cloud, and the heading is 130. posed by airborne volcanic ash in the North Organization (ICAO), are making KLM 867: KLM 867, we have a flameout Pacific when it established the Alaska Volcano an effort to blunt as much as pos- all engines and we are descending now. Observatory (AVO) in 1988—and NOAA’s NWS sible the human factors elements that contribute to accidents. Using KLM 867: KLM 867 heavy, we are now and the NESDIS have stepped up research and a tool called Safety Management descending, now…we are in a fall! analysis of volcanic ash phenomenon. They Systems (SMS), the intention is to While the crew attempted several engine- are now crucial in providing pilots accurate create a top-down culture within restarts, KLM flight 867 plummeted more forecasts and warnings of volcanic eruptions each flight department or company than two miles—dropping from 27,900 feet to (See “Safety Experts” on the next page). to prioritize safety both vertically 13,300 feet. Getting close to the Talkeetna and horizontally, so that the entire mountain peaks, the pilot was finally able to Machteld Smith is a senior aviation technical organization is equally responsible, and perhaps more importantly, start all four engines and nurse the crippled writer for the AOPA Air Safety Foundation and a equally invested, in safety. Each jet to Anchorage. multiengine instrument-rated commercial pilot. person is encouraged to learn and point out potential risks, no matter how insignificant they may seem. Further, each individual is to be equally open to the inputs of others. Safety and profit are to be treated with equal importance, with the realization that a gain or loss in one can have significant consequences in the other. If you want non-aviation proof, look at what BP went through with the Gulf oil spill. Both the FAA and NBAA web- sites have a wealth of information on what constitutes a solid SMS, as well as how to implement one that will meet upcoming regula- Title.... tory requirements (www.faa.gov/ about/initiatives/sms/ and www. Rime ice appears rough, milky white, while clear ice varies from lumpy, translucent to clear nbaa. org/admin/sms/). and smooth; clear and rime ice combine as mixed ice. From airframe to induction icing, Chip Wright is a CFI, ATP, and a Canadair Regional Jet captain for become ice savvy with ASF’s free Safety Spotlight: Aircraft Icing (www.asf.org/aircrafticing) Comair. and download a kneeboard-formatted icing definition and risk table.

6 Safety Experts: NOAA—analysis, tracking, and forecasting volcanic ash BY JEFFREY OSIENSKY

NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS) and National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) is the Look at all it does global leader in providing BY BRUCE LANDSBERG volcanic ash information. President, AOPA Air Safety Volcanic ash, which is high- Foundation ly abrasive, damages the airframe and windscreen— The more deeply I get involved and most critical, it may with advanced technology the more appreciative, yet cautious, I cause damage to the air- become. The glass cockpit of today craft engines. Two notable is truly marvelous although there volcanic ash encounters in are times when the complexity the 1980s (British Airways makes me wonder what the design- over Indonesia in 1982 and KLM over Alaska in Meteorologists have several tools available ers were thinking. It sometimes 1989) had all four engines flame out for a time to help detect volcanic ash. Satellite imagery, takes two knob twists and four before successful restarts allowed safe land- radar data, and pilot reports (PIREPs) are some button-pushes to access something that used to have its own dedicat- ings. Since then, many researchers have studied of the most common data used. Model output ed controls. Then it was one knob the effects of volcanic ash on aircraft. combined with this data helps to make the most twist and maybe a button push. The United States has a “zero tolerance” rule accurate and timely forecast for the aviation Downside was it took more space. with respect to volcanic ash and aircraft operators community. Meteorologists work closely with vol- The manuals, if anyone still are urged to avoid ash. The warning product issued canologists and seismologists from the Volcano uses them, have gotten much by a Meteorological Watch Office (MWO) is the Observatories (VO). The VO provides seismic and thicker and simulation is almost Volcanic Ash SIGMET (WV). These “warnings” are other precursory information to the meteorolo- essential to really learn something and stay proficient with it. If issued for periods of up to six hours and define an gists and air traffic authorities. Once a volcano you’re flying daily and in the same area of volcanic ash. The ash is usually identified erupts, the VO and meteorological authority col- aircraft it’s a good bit easier, but through remote sensing techniques—most often laborate and inform the aviation authorities of the weekend warrior or renter has through satellite imagery. There are three MWOs in changes in the character of the ash plume. a tall hill to climb. the U.S.: Kansas City, Anchorage, and Honolulu. Volcanoes erupt frequently across the globe. The manufacturers often say The office responsible for the analysis and At any one time, there may be at least one “But look at all it does.” My feel- detection of volcanic ash is the Volcanic Ash volcanic eruption taking place somewhere ing is the same as it is to most computer software—I don’t need Advisory Center (VAAC). There are nine interna- on earth. Recently, the eruption of Iceland’s but 20 percent with gusts to 35 tional VAACs serving most areas of the globe. Eyjafjallajökull volcano caused major disrup- percent. Time, speed, bearing, In the United States there are two VAACs tions to air travel across the North Atlantic and distance, and altitude are essen- (Washington, D.C., and Anchorage, AK). VAAC’s Europe. Several eruptions over a multi-week tial—beyond that we’re getting into forecasters are responsible for issuing Volcanic period caused the industry to lose well over nice-to-know. Despite sounding a Ash Advisories (VAA) for areas of observed and two billion dollars in revenue. Airlines, engine bit curmudgeonly, I’ve learned and forecasted ash. The forecasts are available manufacturers, and meteorological and avia- used five different FMS/GPS systems in IMC conditions so perhaps out through 18 hours. VAACs run volcanic ash tion authorities have taken this opportunity to my Luddite standing isn’t quite dispersion models to help determine where ash discuss the impact and attempt to determine deserved…yet. The new systems plumes will travel based upon winds aloft. There a safe threshold for operating in volcanic ash. are better but a favorite quote from are several ash dispersion models; however, This will continue to be explored and may even- Antoine de St.-Exupery: “A designer the official model is known as HYSPLIT (http:// tually lead to agreed upon standards. For now, knows he has achieved perfection ready.arl.noaa.gov/READYVolcAsh.php). the United States continues a “zero tolerance” not when there is nothing left to Volcanic ash is considered a hazard to aviation operation when it comes to volcanic ash. add, but when there is nothing left to take away.” due to its abrasive and melting/congealing nature. The bottom line? Provide a safe operating envi- We’re not there yet. It may block intakes, cause false instrumentation ronment to our nation’s airline and aviation indus- readings, and produce an acrid and dusty condi- try by providing the most accurate and timely fore- Safe Flights… tion in the cockpit and cabin. In a worst case sce- casts of volcanic ash plumes to flight operations. nario, ash may seize aircraft engines and cause the plane to crash. Airline pilots are trained in how Jeff Osiensky is the National Weather Service Bruce Landsberg to deal with the hazard in the event they encoun- Volcanic Ash Program Manager and the team lead President, AOPA Air Safety Foundation ter an unexpected ash cloud. for NOAA’s Volcanic Ash Services (www.noaa.gov).

7 PRESORTED STANDARD U.S. POSTAGE PAID ROCKVILLE, MD www.asf.org PERMIT #800

421 Aviation Way Frederick, Maryland 21701

USAIG Premium on Safety: AMERICA’S FIRST NAME Data Diving— IN AVIATION INSURANCE Gear-up accidents 212.952.0100 ph 212.349.8226 fax I thought the item on gear-up accidents (Data enough to support statisti- Diving, Issue 03) was misleading because you cal analysis is accidents www.usaig.com didn’t define accident. The low numbers that you by the Part 830 definition. used are accidents recorded by the NTSB, but This is limited to events understate the frequency of gear-up landings by that cause “substantial” damage to the aircraft, but thousands of percent. There is an average of one the NTSB does not consider damage to landing gear gear-up per day on the FAA’s preliminary accident or belly skins “substantial.” Insurance companies and incident report, but almost none of those regard their claims data as proprietary, and reporting rise to the NTSB definition of accident. However, to the FAA incident database is inconsistent and every one of them results in an insurance claim. incomplete. The FAA preliminary reports do provide So, instead of 234 gear-up accidents in 10 a snapshot of gear-up incidents in real time, but only years, there were more like 3,650 if accident is remain available for two weeks after they’re filed, Publishers used in the normal sense, not the NTSB term you and to the best of my knowledge are not archived David L. McKay used without defining it. The NTSB database is anywhere. President and COO, USAIG useful, but it misleads as much as it sheds light. —Mac McClellan, New York Are there topics you’d like to see covered? Send Bruce Landsberg suggestions to: ASF Editor, Premium on Safety, President, ASF David Kenny responds: 421 Aviation Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701, or Point well taken, and allow me to clarify. While I [email protected]. We welcome your feedback as we agree that numerous gear-ups don’t meet this crite- plan upcoming editions. Editor rion, the only outcome that’s reported consistently —The Newsletter Team Machteld A. Smith

Designer Premium on Safety is published for the United States Aircraft Insurance Group (USAIG) by the AOPA Air Safety Angie Ebersole Foundation (ASF) © 2010. We welcome your comments. Address letters to: ASF Editor, Premium on Safety, 421 Aviation Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701. Send e-mail to [email protected]. Please include your full name and address on all correspondence, including e-mail. Letters will be edited for length and style.