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Tesi Enrico Andreoli VERS UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI VERONA DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE SCUOLA DI DOTTORATO DI SCIENZE GIURIDICHE ED ECONOMICHE DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN SCIENZE GIURIDICHE EUROPEE ED INTERNAZIONALI CICLO / ANNO: XXXII / 2016 A CENTRALIZED ADJUDICATOR IN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. UNA LETTURA CRITICA DEL MODELLO STATUNITENSE DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE S.S.D. IUS/21 Coordinatore: Prof.ssa Maria Caterina Baruffi __________________________ Tutor: Prof. Matteo Nicolini __________________________ Dottorando: Dott. Enrico Andreoli __________________________ Quest’opera è stata rilasciata con licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione – non commerciale Non opere derivate 3.0 Italia. Per leggere una copia della licenza visita il sito web: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/it/ Attribuzione. Devi riconoscere una menzione di paternità adeguata, fornire un link alla licenza e indicare se sono state effettuate delle modifiche. Puoi fare ciò in qualsiasi maniera ragionevole possibile, ma non con modalità tali da suggerire che il licenziante avalli te o il tuo utilizzo del materiale. Non Commerciale. Non puoi usare il materiale per scopi commerciali. Non opere derivate. Se remixi, trasformi il materiale o ti basi su di esso, non puoi distribuire il materiale così modificato. “A centralized adjudicator in constitutional issues. Una lettura critica del modello statunitense di giustizia costituzionale” Enrico Andreoli Tesi di Dottorato ISBN (da attribuire) INDICE INTRODUZIONE 4 CAPITOLO I LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE STATUNITENSE: UN MODELLO ESEMPLARE ALLA PROVA DELLA COMPARAZIONE Dal modello esemplare alla de-costruzione a fini classificatori. Proposte 1. 10 per un’indagine sulla giustizia costituzionale statunitense Oltre le costruzioni dell’idealtipo. Il versante interno della comparazione: 2. 19 genesi dell’ordinamento e consent al Judicial Review of Legislation (segue) Il balance di un Common Law ‘accentratore’: la Supreme Court 3. 30 come organo di garanzia dell’architettura istituzionale federale Il versante esterno della comparazione: antecedenti storici del Judicial 4. 41 Review of Legislation… (segue) …e tentativi di imitazione. Circolazione e Legal Transplants ‘di 5. 45 sistema’ nella giustizia costituzionale CAPITOLO II ALLA RICERCA DEL CENTRO. I LASCITI DELL’ADJUDICATION COLONIALE NEL DRAFTING COSTITUZIONALE DEGLI STATI UNITI D’AMERICA Ripensando la modellistica tradizionale dei sistemi di giustizia 1. 55 costituzionale Precedenti coloniali e origini storiche del Judicial Review of Legislation 2. 64 statunitense (segue) Colonial Judiciary, sovranità popolare e Higher Law. I dettami di 3. 74 Sir Edward Coke negli Stati Uniti rivoluzionari Un (incolpevole) silenzio costituzionale? Il Judicial Review of 4. 79 Legislation, applicazione istituzionale del background culturale 5. «Hanging Marbury»: la (parziale) rilettura del ‘mito’ delle origini 85 Dalla separazione dei poteri al federalismo: l’applicazione ‘a preferenza’ 6. 91 della Costituzione a difesa della Nazione 1 CAPITOLO III LA CORTE SUPREMA E L’ACCENTRAMENTO DEL DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE. FEDERALISMO, VOLONTÀ POPOLARE E CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATIONS Le dinamiche del federalismo, Costituzione e Judicial Review of 1. 102 Legislation 2. (segue) Supreme Court e Federalism Cases 109 «Constitution as ideology, and ideology as Constitution»: la via 3. 117 costituzionale al monopolio interpretativo della Supreme Court (segue) Il Judicial Review of Legislation come meccanismo equilibratore 4. 123 del sistema costituzionale Politics o Policies? La Corte Suprema come Constitutionally-oriented 5. 128 Institution (segue) One Supreme Court in difesa della Costituzione. L’accentramento 6. 135 genetico della giustizia costituzionale statunitense Substantive Activity in Constitutional Adjudications: una Corte (Suprema) 7. 140 ‘costituzionale’? CAPITOLO IV LA CORTE SUPREMA E IL SUO PROCESSO. I PROCEDURAL REMEDIES PER L’ACCENTRAMENTO DEL CONTROLLO 1. (Constitutional) Stare Decisis, Corte Suprema e attività interpretativa 146 Autorità del precedente e Limited Overruling: tra teoria e pratica della 2. 154 giustizia costituzionale statunitense Un esempio di accentramento processuale: Constitutional Interpretation 3. 159 e Constitutional Justiciability nella Political Question Doctrine (segue) La Political Question Doctrine nelle Corti inferiori: ovvero, un 4. 170 difetto di giurisdizione ‘incostituzionale’ 5. Relazioni tra Corti nel Judiciary statunitense: dualismo giurisdizionale… 174 6. (segue) …e ‘certificazione’ dell’uniformità costituzionale 178 CAPITOLO V «LEGAL ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE». L’ACCENTRAMENTO DELLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE STATUNITENSE ATTRAVERSO IMPERIAL JUDICIARY E COSTITUZIONALISMO SUDAMERICANO Modelli esemplari, tradizione giuridica e imitazione del modello 1. 185 statunitense: tra circolazione ed elementi di classificazione Common o Supreme Law of the Land? La costante garanzia di uniformità 2. 192 di un diritto ‘sovraordinato’ 2 I modelli (esemplari), la storia, le istituzioni: l’attuazione del controllo di 3. 199 costituzionalità in Argentina Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación e processo costituzionale: 4. 207 l’imitazione di una Corte accentrata in un sistema a controllo diffuso 5. (segue) The Final Interpreter of the Constitution 211 CONCLUSIONI 215 BIBLIOGRAFIA 219 APPENDICE GIURISPRUDENZIALE 254 3 INTRODUZIONE Al pari di altri ambiti della scienza giuridica, anche il diritto comparato ha una certa ambizione scientifica: dare ordine all’esistente, attraverso la creazione di categorie in grado di restituire somiglianze e differenze tra gli oggetti sottoposti ad osservazione. Classificare istituti, famiglie giuridiche e – più in generale – organizzare modelli e sistemi, serve anzitutto per una finalità didattico-esplicativa, ossia per consentire una migliore comprensione (e spiegazione) delle possibili relazioni tra ciò che viene raffrontato e comparato. Tale operazione, però, necessita di alcune valutazioni preliminari, le quali muovono dall’identificazione di ciò che è ritenuto essenziale (diremo, determinante) al fine di posizionare un oggetto – famiglia giuridica o istituto che sia – in un determinato insieme. In tal senso, ad esempio, una forma di Stato potrà classificarsi più o meno democratica a seconda dell’elemento determinante attribuito al riconoscimento di diritti e libertà alla popolazione; un ordinamento potrà classificarsi più o meno unitario a seconda dell’elemento determinante attribuito al livello di decentramento territoriale1. Dunque, la classificazione denota una certa discrezionalità, posto che gli oggetti osservati vengono spesso ordinati (anche) in virtù delle finalità proprie della ricerca in essere. In ogni caso, quel che occorre evitare è l’errore concettuale di considerare l’attività classificatoria come immutabile. In primo luogo, perché le stesse categorie tassonomiche possono cambiare nel corso del tempo. In secondo luogo, perché la classificazione, talvolta, sembra riflettere il ‘dover essere giuridico’, perdendo di vista il concreto atteggiarsi del particolare oggetto d’indagine. Una tendenza in tal senso sembra potersi ravvisare nella descrizione dei sistemi di giustizia costituzionale, e in particolare nella rappresentazione di 1 L. PEGORARO, Diritto costituzionale comparato. La scienza e il metodo, BUP, Bologna, 2014, p. 150. 4 quello che è assurto a modello esemplare di classificazione: il judicial review of legislation statunitense. Se il modello rappresenta «le caratteristiche astratte che marcano un certo modo di praticare la giustizia costituzionale, in relazione a una certa caratteristica …»2, il modello esemplare è invece ciò che assurge a ‘idealtipo’, ossia il prototipo classificatorio che reca in sé alcune caratteristiche tassonomiche ‘ideali’. In questo senso, il judicial review of legislation statunitense viene tradizionalmente identificato dalla dottrina come il modello esemplare per la classificazione dei sistemi di giustizia costituzionale a scrutinio diffuso, nei quali ogni giudice dell’ordinamento ha la competenza a pronunciarsi sulla (in)costituzionalità di un atto legislativo. La United States Supreme Court, infatti, si colloca al vertice di un ordinamento che ha fatto del carattere diffuso del controllo di costituzionalità una delle proprie peculiarità: nell’esercizio delle funzioni giudicanti, viene astrattamente garantita a ogni Corte la possibilità di sindacare la conformità delle leggi alla Costituzione applicando quest’ultima ‘a preferenza’ della fonte ordinaria, nel caso di loro discordanza (rectius, disapplicando la seconda perché in contrasto con la prima). Nella comparazione giuridica, tuttavia, ciò che può apparire ‘statico’ nella teoria – law in books – diviene spesso ‘dinamico’ nella pratica – law in action. È per questo che si rende concretamente possibile la ‘decostruzione’ della modellistica tradizionale. Posto che la mainstream narrative identifica nella diffusione del controllo l’elemento determinante per la classificazione del modello statunitense di giustizia costituzionale, può risultare utile interrogarsi in merito all’effettiva portata di tale conclusione. In altre parole, sembra opportuno indagare se la diffusione del controllo sia effettivamente quella «caratteristica astratta che marca il modo di praticare la giustizia costituzionale negli Stati Uniti d’America». 2 L. PEGORARO, Sistemi di giustizia costituzionale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2019, p. 9. 5 Dalla prospettiva di un osservatore esterno, la richiamata operazione di ‘decostruzione’ non si può limitare a una mera ricognizione
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