Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Communicating the Virtue of Friendliness
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Video Games in the Supreme Court
Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2017 Newbs Lose, Experts Win: Video Games in the Supreme Court Angela J. Campbell Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1988 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3009812 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Angela J. Campbell* Newbs Lose, Experts Win: Video Games in the Supreme Court Table of Contents I. Introduction .......................................... 966 II. The Advantage of a Supreme Court Expert ............ 971 A. California’s Counsel ............................... 972 B. Entertainment Merchant Association’s (EMA) Counsel ........................................... 973 III. Background on the Video Game Cases ................. 975 A. Cases Prior to Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n .............................................. 975 B. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n .......... 978 1. Before the District Court ...................... 980 2. Before the Ninth Circuit ....................... 980 3. Supreme Court ................................ 984 IV. Comparison of Expert and Non-Expert Representation in Brown ............................................. 985 A. Merits Briefs ...................................... 985 1. Statement of Facts ............................ 986 a. California’s Statement -
The Roles of Sonia Sotomayor in Criminal Justice Cases * Christopher E
THE ROLES OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES * CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH AND KSENIA PETLAKH I. INTRODUCTION The unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 20161 reminded Americans about the uncertain consequences of changes in the composition of the Supreme Court of the United States.2 It also serves as a reminder that this is an appropriate moment to assess aspects of the last major period of change for the Supreme Court when President Obama appointed, in quick succession, Justices Sonia Sotomayor in 20093 and Elena Kagan in 2010.4 Although it can be difficult to assess new justices’ decision-making trends soon after their arrival at the high court,5 they may begin to define themselves and their impact after only a few years.6 Copyright © 2017, Christopher Smith and Ksenia Petlakh. * Christopher E. Smith is a Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard University, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.); J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988. Ksenia Petlakh is a Doctoral student in Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. B.A., University of Michigan- Dearborn, 2012. 1 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html [https:// perma.cc/77BQ-TFEQ]. 2 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appointment Could Reshape American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/us/politics/scalias-death-offers-best- chance-in-a-generation-to-reshape-supreme-court.html [http://perma.cc/F9QB-4UC5]; see also Edward Felsenthal, How the Court Can Reset After Scalia, TIME (Feb. -
Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News Kathy Elrick Clemson University, [email protected]
Clemson University TigerPrints All Dissertations Dissertations 12-2016 Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News Kathy Elrick Clemson University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations Recommended Citation Elrick, Kathy, "Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News" (2016). All Dissertations. 1847. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1847 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact [email protected]. IRONIC FEMINISM: RHETORICAL CRITIQUE IN SATIRICAL NEWS A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design by Kathy Elrick December 2016 Accepted by Dr. David Blakesley, Committee Chair Dr. Jeff Love Dr. Brandon Turner Dr. Victor J. Vitanza ABSTRACT Ironic Feminism: Rhetorical Critique in Satirical News aims to offer another perspective and style toward feminist theories of public discourse through satire. This study develops a model of ironist feminism to approach limitations of hegemonic language for women and minorities in U.S. public discourse. The model is built upon irony as a mode of perspective, and as a function in language, to ferret out and address political norms in dominant language. In comedy and satire, irony subverts dominant language for a laugh; concepts of irony and its relation to comedy situate the study’s focus on rhetorical contributions in joke telling. How are jokes crafted? Who crafts them? What is the motivation behind crafting them? To expand upon these questions, the study analyzes examples of a select group of popular U.S. -
Lessons Learned from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
LESSONS LEARNED FROM JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG Amanda L. Tyler* INTRODUCTION Serving as a law clerk for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the Supreme Court’s October Term 1999 was one of the single greatest privileges and honors of my life. As a trailblazer who opened up opportunities for women, she was a personal hero. How many people get to say that they worked for their hero? Justice Ginsburg was defined by her brilliance, her dedication to public service, her resilience, and her unwavering devotion to taking up the Founders’ calling, set out in the Preamble to our Constitution, to make ours a “more perfect Union.”1 She was a profoundly dedicated public servant in no small measure because she appreciated just how important her role was in ensuring that our Constitution belongs to everyone. Whether as an advocate or a Justice, she tirelessly fought to dismantle discrimination and more generally to open opportunities for every person to live up to their full human potential. Without question, she left this world a better place than she found it, and we are all the beneficiaries. As an advocate, Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged our society to liber- ate all persons from the gender-based stereotypes that held them back. As a federal judge for forty years—twenty-seven of them on the Supreme Court—she continued and expanded upon that work, even when it meant in dissent calling out her colleagues for improperly walking back earlier gains or halting future progress.2 In total, she wrote over 700 opinions on the D.C. -
The US Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy
The University of Akron IdeaExchange@UAkron Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals July 2015 The mpI act of New Justices: The .SU . Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy Christopher E. Smith Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be important as we plan further development of our repository. Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Smith, Christopher E. (1997) "The mpI act of New Justices: The .SU . Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy," Akron Law Review: Vol. 30 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol30/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The nivU ersity of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Smith: The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy The Impact of New Justices: The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Policy by * Christopher E. Smith I. Introduction The Supreme Court is an important policy-making institution. In criminal justice,1 for example, the high court issues decisions affecting institutions, actors, and processes throughout the justice system, from police investigations2 through corrections and parole.3 The Court's policy decisions affecting criminal justice are produced by the votes of the nine justices who select, hear, decide, and issue opinions in cases. -
What Does Justice Scalia's Death Mean for Congress and the Nation?
CRS Reports & Analysis Legal Sidebar What Does Justice Scalia’s Death Mean for Congress and the Nation? 02/16/2016 Over the weekend, the nation was shocked to learn of the passing of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. The death of the longest serving and, in the view of some commentators, most influential Justice on the current Court will have significant implications for the third branch of government. Justice Scalia’s absence may alter the outcome of several cases of interest to Congress pending before the Court and could mark a seismic shift in many legal doctrines, depending on who is confirmed to fill the newly vacant seat on the Court. The job of confirming the President’s nomination to fill the vacancy resides with the Senate, making Justice Scalia’s death likely to have a profound impact in both the short and long term on Congress. This sidebar, the first of several pending CRS projects on Justice Scalia and the new Supreme Court vacancy, provides an overview of the major implications of Justice Scalia’s death for Congress. Court’s Consideration of Cases in the Current and Future Terms Justice Scalia’s passing will undoubtedly impact the work of the Court in the near and long term. He brought well- known views regarding textualism and originalism to his consideration of cases before the Court. Textualism can be broadly described as a method of construing statutes and other texts that focuses on the plain meaning of the words used, affording little, if any, significance to extrinsic sources, like legislative history. -
Justice Sandra Day O'connor: the World's Most Powerful Jurist?
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL JURIST? DIANE LOWENTHAL AND BARBARA PALMER* I. INTRODUCTION Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been called a "major force on [the] Supreme Court,"' the "real" Chief Justice, 2 and "America's most powerful jurist."' 3 Others have referred to her as "the most 5 powerful woman in America" 4 and even of "the world.", Even compared to women like Eleanor Roosevelt and Hillary Clinton, there is no one "who has had a more profound effect on society than any other American woman... If someone else had been appointed to her position on the court, our nation might now be living under different rules for abortion, affirmative action, race, religion in school and civil rights. We might well have a different president." 6 Former Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger noted, "What is most striking is the assurance with which this formerly obscure state court judge effectively decides many hugely important questions for a country of 275 million people.",7 As one journalist put it, "We are all living in * Diane Lowenthal, Ph.D. in Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University and Barbara Palmer, Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Minnesota, are assistant professors in American University's Washington Semester Program. The authors would like to thank their undergraduate research assistants, Amy Bauman, Nick Chapman-Hushek, and Amanda White. This paper was presented at October 28, 2004 Town Hall The Sway of the Swing Vote: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Her Influence on Issues of Race, Religion, Gender and Class sponsored by the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class and the Women, Leadership and Equality Program. -
Criticism of the Supreme Court
Criticism of the Supreme Court Failing to protect individual rights (Page 1 of 2) Court decisions have been criticized for failing to protect individual rights The Dred Scott (1857) decision upheld slavery. Federal versus state power Plessy v Ferguson (1896) upheld segregation under the doctrine There has been debate throughout American history about the of separate but equal. boundary between federal and state power. Kelo v. City of New London (2005) was criticized by prominent While James Madison and Alexander Hamilton argued in the politicians, including New Jersey governor Jon Corzine, as Federalist Papers that their then-proposed Constitution would undermining property rights. not infringe on the power of state governments, others argue A student criticized a 1988 ruling that allowed school officials that expansive federal power is good and consistent with the "to block publication of a student article in the high school Framers' wishes. newspaper." The Supreme Court has been criticized for giving the federal Some critics suggest the 2009 bench with a conservative majority government too much power to interfere with state authority. has "become increasingly hostile to voters" by siding with One criticism is that it has allowed the federal government to Indiana's voter identification laws which tend to "disenfranchise misuse the Commerce Clause by upholding regulations and large numbers of people without driver’s licenses, especially poor legislation which have little to do with interstate commerce, and minority voters," according to one report. but that were enacted under the guise of regulating interstate Senator Al Franken criticized the Court for "eroding individual commerce; and by voiding state legislation for allegedly rights." interfering with interstate commerce. -
Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2006 Less is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty James S. Liebman Columbia Law School, [email protected] Lawrence C. Marshall Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2006). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/470 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LESS IS BETTER: JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE NARROWED DEATH PENALTY James S. Liebman and Lawrence C. Marshall* INTRODUCTION: JUSTICE STEVENS ON THE DEATH PENALTY In a recent speech to the American Bar Association, Justice John Paul Stevens "issued an unusually stinging criticism of capital punishment."1 Although he "stopped short of calling for an end to the death penalty," Justice Stevens catalogued a number of its "'serious flaws,' '2 including several procedures that the full Court has reviewed and upheld over his dissent-selecting capital jurors in a manner that excludes those with qualms about the death penalty, permitting elected state judges to second- guess jurors when they decline to impose the death penalty, permitting states to premise death verdicts on "victim impact statements," tolerating sub-par legal representation of capital defendants, and eschewing steps that might moderate the risk of executing the innocent.3 News reports on the * Professor Liebman was a Law Clerk for Justice Stevens in the October 1978 Term. -
Taking Note: Justice Harry A. Blackmun's Observations from Oral
Taking Note: Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s Observations from Oral Argument about Life, the Law, and the U.S. Supreme Court AMANDA C. BRYAN, RACHAEL HOUSTON, and TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON Introduction Thus, while Blackmun took his (usual) notes on Christopher Wright’s arguments for On November 4, 1992, the U.S. Supreme the federal government, Blackmun’s mind, Court heard oral arguments in Bath Iron and his pencil, wandered to how his life might Works v. Workers’ Compensation Programs.1 quickly change. Writing in his characteristic As attorneys presented their arguments, Jus- green pencil, he mused about the implica- tice Harry A. Blackmun, like the entire tions of the election, “What do I do now. nation, had a lot on his mind because the [R]etire at once, 6/30/93, 6/30/94.” He added, night before William Jefferson Clinton had perhaps nostalgically, “33 years ago today, I been elected the first Democratic President in went on the fed bench! Seems like yesterday. twelve years. While the political implications What a privileged experience!” of the Clinton victory would be undoubtedly We know what was going on in Black- vast, Blackmun was more concerned with mun’s mind that day only because he was a how it would affect him personally. It was just habitual note-taker. In fact, as he did in Bath days until Blackmun’s eighty-fourth birthday, Iron Works, in almost every case Blackmun and it suddenly seemed viable for him to took copious notes about what transpired depart and allow the new President to make a during oral arguments. -
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL Sociely Announcement of Chief Justice Burger's Retirement Takes Nation by Surprise
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIElY VOLUME VII NUMBER 4 Announcement of Chief Justice Burger's Retirement Takes Nation By Surprise; President Reagan Nominates Justice Rehnquist to Fill Center Chair Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist Chief Justice Warren E. Burger After fourteen years on the Supreme Court as Associate Jus On Thesday, June 17, 1986, President Ronald Reagan took tice, William H. Rehnquist was nominated by President Rea the nation by surprise, calling a 2:00 PM press conference to gan to be the Chief Justice of the high bench upon the retire announce several pending changes on the Supreme Court ment of Chief Justice Burger. bench. Chief Justice Warren Burger would be resigning said the Born October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to William President. Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist would be and Margery Rehnquist, the future Justice served in the U.S. nominated to replace his colleague, Chief Justice Burger, in the Army Air Corps from 1943 to 1946 during World War II. Mr. Court's center chair. And, Judge Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Rehnquist was discharged with the rank of sergeant and at- Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would be - continued on page three - continued on page twelve Judge Antonin Scalia Nominated to Succeed Associate Justice Rehnquist Society Adds to Its Portrait Collection Culminating a quarter century-long legal career which in The Society has recently added two new portraits of former cluded six years in private practice with a large Ohio firm, gov Justices to its collection for display in the Supreme Court ernment service during two presidents' administrations, ten Building. -
Originalism the Lesser Evil
chapter 21 Originalism The Lesser Evil Antonin Scalia Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (1986–2016) and Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (1982–1986) distribute or IT MAY SURPRISE the layman, but it will surely not surprise the lawyers here, to learn that originalism is not, and had perhaps never been, the sole method of constitutional exegesis. It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of bothpost, feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean. That is, I suppose, the sort of behavior Chief Justice Hughes was referring to when he said the Constitution is what the judges say it is. But in the past, nonoriginalist opinions have almostcopy, always had the decency to lie, or at least to dissem- ble, about what they were doing—either ignoring strong evidence of original intent that contradicted the minimal recited evidence of an original intent congenialnot to the court’s desires, or else not discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad constitutional generalities with no pre- tense of historical support. It is only in relatively recent years, however, thatDo nonoriginalist exegesis has, so to speak, come out of the closet, and put itself forward overtly as an intellectually legitimate device. To be sure, in support of its venerability as a legitimate interpretive theory there is Acknowledgment to Justice Antonin Scalia for excerpts from the William Howard Taft Constitutional Law Lecture given at the University of Cincinnati (September 16, 1988), which appears in 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989).