Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes

Sook-Jong Lee

Abstract

The U.S.-ROK alliance has been strained over recent years. New challenges are facing both South Korea and the United States. Growing discontent and grievances over the presence of U.S. forces on Korean soil is complicating the management of the alliance. Bolder opposition from Korean politicians and civil society to Washington’s North Korea policy is increasing the political cost for the South Korean government in maintaining its alliance relationship with the United States. On the other hand, the post– 9/11 U.S. global strategy and accompanying redeployment of U.S. forces in South Korea are pushing the alliance to adapt to the new era. The strategic value of South Korea is being modified in the context of the new post–9/11 global strategy. Unless South Korea and the United States invest their political energy and wisdom into putting the alliance onto a clear and secure path, the U.S-ROK alliance could be ruptured during this transitional period. Understanding the structural changes taking place in South Korea is critical to restoring the alliance in a constructive fashion. South Koreans became more critical of the post-9/11 United States as they embraced a new nationalism of being more assertive vis-à-vis the United States and, at the same time, more sympathetic toward North Korea. With democratization of South Korea, the security policy process is today more open to diverse social groups beyond the narrower policy circle. While divisions clearly exist, the majority of Koreans no longer regard North Korea as a major threat. These domestic changes in South Korea make the task of a timely redefining of the U.S.-ROK alliance more necessary. Leveling-up the alliance to one preserving regional peace and prosperity would be a good option.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Spring 2005 82 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 83

Recent Strains in the U.S.-ROK Alliance Local residents started to demand the closure of the Maehyang-ri camp since 1988, and this demand heated up again when American pilots A series of events have strained the U.S.-ROK alliance over the past accidentally dropped bombs during a drill in May 2000. The U.S.-Korea several years. One stream of events is coming from the Korean side, joint team that was set up to investigate the case concluded that serious varying from complaints about the U.S. military bases to a more seri- damage was not caused and bombing drills were consequently ous policy challenge against the perceived U.S. unilateralism. Growing resumed. The local community mobilized and outside civic associa- discontent from the South Korean side reflects the complex socio-politi- tions helped to publicize the Maehyang-ri case forcing the eventual clo- cal changes South Korea has undergone during the past decade. The sure of its ground firing drill camp. Again, the later incident of poiso- other stream of strains is emerging from the new U.S. deployment plan nous material leaking from the Yongsan Base into the Han River was for its forces in South Korea and the accompanying changing assess- denounced as serious environmental damage by South Korea’s power- ment of South Korea’s strategic value. Although this military plan is ful civic associations. Conventionally subdued social problems sur- essentially derived from the U.S. global plan to adjust its overseas force rounding military bases of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) under structure to match the post-9/11 security environment, it is inevitably authoritarian regimes nowadays clamor loudly as the so-called “camp- enmeshed with the alliance politics between the United States and town communities” are no longer prepared to tolerate the dispropor- South Korea. If these two streams do not merge into the same sea of tional cost of hosting U.S. bases. common national interests, the U.S.-ROK alliance will face a serious Since the launch of the Bush Administration, bilateral tension challenge that could possibly lead to an irreparable rupture. Both coun- between the host nation and the U.S. forces transcended into much tries need to understand the military and political changes taking place more serious policy discord. Two weeks before a scheduled U.S.-ROK in each country and forge ever stronger mutual trust to reinvigorate summit in Washington, President Kim Dae-jung openly sided with this half-century old alliance. Russia by supporting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the ROK- Russia summit in Seoul while opposing the missile defense program Korean Discontent proposed by President Bush.1 The March 2001 U.S.-ROK summit further soured bilateral relations as Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” Recent years have witnessed intensified South Korean grievances toward North Korea was dismissed by President Bush, who loathes in its bilateral relationship with the United States. The Nogeun-ri mas- Kim Jong Il as a dictator starving millions of North Koreans.2 The sub- sacre of civilian refugees and villagers by U.S. soldiers during the Kore- sequent 9/11 terror attacks against the United States exacerbated the an War suddenly emerged as an issue when the new century was about two governments’ different policies toward North Korea. The Bush to begin. The Associated Press reported in September 1999 on this war administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea was toughened crime committed by retreating U.S. soldiers in July 1950. As the tragedy as the U.S. foreign policy goals came into focus on curtailing weapons was publicized, it became an emotional as well as a humanitarian issue of mass destruction and preempting potential terrorism against the for many South Koreans. The U.S.-Korea joint investigation team was United States. This policy-shift was reflected in President Bush’s State set up, but its prolonged 15-month investigation concluded that it could not identify the line of command through which the U.S. soldiers were ordered to shoot and excluded any provision for compensation. 1 Seung-hwan Kim, “Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment Toward the United States, 2001–2004,” in Derek J. Mitchell, ed, This conclusion was condemned by Nogeun-ri villagers as a scheme to Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views and the U.S.-ROK Alliance (Washing- avoid legal responsibility. ton, DC: CSIS, June 2004). The Maehyang-ri case, however, brought a more positive result. 2 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 84 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 85 of the Union address in January 2002, where North Korea was branded dubbed as “candlelight vigils,” in downtown Seoul in late 2002. A con- as part of the “Axis of Evil,” together with two other “rogue states,” tinuous mass rally at Gwanghwamun Plaza drew thousands of stu- Iran and Iraq. dents, religious groups, and ordinary citizens. At the root of the exten- South Korean reaction to this turnaround was largely negative. sive anti-American rallies was the late November acquittal of two Even Koreans who didn’t support the “Sunshine Policy” felt irked, American soldiers of responsibility for the accidental deaths of two watching their older president apparently being humiliated by the schoolgirls during an armored vehicle exercise in June 2002.4 There was newly-elected American president. While the majority of South Kore- a general outcry from the public and a national coalition focusing on ans were sympathetic toward the epochal terrorist attacks in the United this case was established. The protests then focused on the revision of States, a significant number were quick to point out, as most Western the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to ensure the mandate that the critics opposed to the United States would argue, the U.S. responsibili- USFK concede its jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. troops ty for producing frustrated countries with degrading economic condi- while performing their duties on Korean soil. Despite its polarization, tions deriving no benefits from globalization. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Korean society was united on the question of SOFA revision regarding statement following the U.S. attack on Afghanistan alarmed many the future presence of USFK and the incident was viewed from a South Koreans since it put the Korean peninsula under potential mili- humanitarian angle.5 tary conflict. This new tension was viewed as being “imposed” by the Against all expectations, the tide of anti-American sentiment did United States against the will of South Koreans who were envisioning a not subdue with the reissuing of nuclear threats by North Korea. The rosy picture of rapprochement with North Korea. anti-American sentiment also helped the progressive candidate’s presi- Bilateral policy conflicts at the governmental level and a certain dential election, campaigning on a platform of an independent foreign degree of public anxiety came to be translated into popular anti-Ameri- policy for the election of December 19, 2002. In the past, security threats can sentiment throughout 2002.3 The unfair disqualification of a South from the North would have made Koreans favor a conservative candi- Korean short-track skater in the Winter Olympics held in Salt Lake City date and seek solidarity with the United States. This time, however, a during February provoked anger amongst Korean youth against the pro-American image worked as a burden to candidates in the election. United States. They responded with a campaign to veto the South By the spring of 2003, for several reasons there was a gradual Korean government’s selection of the Boeing F-15K fighter jet over ebbing of anti-American sentiment in South Korea. First, the newly European competitors as the country’s next-generation fighter jet. They launched Roh Moo-hyun government moved to a more conventional claimed that the selection was pushed by the Bush Administration and pro-U.S. stance. President Roh pushed Korea’s National Assembly to called for a review of the decision. pass a bill dispatching non-combatant troops to Iraq, despite opposition The U.S.-ROK alliance was marred by the unprecedented protests, from his own party and his grassroots supporters. His visit to the United States in mid-May was generally regarded as a success by restoring 3 As for recent writings on the anti-American sentiment, see Seung-hwan Kim, warm relations between the two countries. Moreover, the Pentagon’s “Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. l initiative to realign the USFK effectively turned the tide of anti-Ameri- (Winter, 2003). For a similar topic with more opinion poll data, see Yong-shik Bong, “Anti-Americanism and the U.S.-Korea Military Alliance,” in Yong-shik 4 After separate trials of the driver and commander of the armored mine-clear- Bong, eds., Confrontation and Innovation on the Korean Peninsula (Washington, ing vehicles, Sgt. Mark Walker and Sgt. Fernando Nino, respectively were DC: KEI, 2003); Sook-Jong Lee, “Anti-Americanism in Korean Society: A Survey- found not guilty on charges of negligent homicide. Following these rulings of Based Analysis,” in Sook-Jong Lee, eds., Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Vol. November 20 and 23, the mass rallies against their acquittals began. 14, The United States and South Korea: Reinvigorating the Partnership (Washington, 5 Byung-kook Kim, “The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Anti-American Challenges,” DC: KEI, 2004). Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May-August, 2003). 86 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 87 canism. This unexpected debate, officially first broached in the Senate issues of reduction or relocation of the U.S. troops were not discussed. Armed Services Committee on February 13 by the U.S. Defense Secre- sed then in view of the public concern over the possibility of relocating tary Donald Rumsfeld, effectively deflated the anti-American rallies. the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division away from the inter-Korean border.7 The second meeting of FOTA, held in Seoul on June 4-5, 2003, clari- U.S. Moves to Realign its Forces in South Korea fied the direction of change. Defense Department officials of the United States and South Korea reaffirmed that the May 14 U.S.-Korea Summit The idea of realigning USFK was first raised by U.S. officials in late between President Bush and President Roh provided the basis for fur- 2002.6 As the Pentagon works on restructuring overseas U.S. troops to ther promoting and developing the Alliance for the 21st Century, and give them a new role in the anti-terrorist war, USFK has been subjected agreed on the need to develop detailed plans to carry out the vision of to major adjustments, since it has a large infantry unit. Until early 2003, the two presidents on modernizing the alliance. They agreed to begin the South Korean government was embarrassed and denied that there work on several implementation plans—for capability enhancement, was any official discussion on the matter of U.S. troop redeployment. the relocation of the Yongsan base in Seoul, the transfer of military mis- The timing of the discussion, amid the North Korean nuclear crisis, sions, and the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea. The United States was considered to be ill-conceived by the majority of South Koreans. also presented its plan to invest in over 150 enhancements to the com- The ROK’s then Defense Minister, Lee Jun, confirmed only on February bined defense, valued at over US$11 billion, over the next four years.8 19 that Washington and Seoul would begin consultations in April of The meeting reiterated the fundamental goal to enhance deterrence that year on realigning the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. and security on the Korean peninsula and improve the combined Top South Korean and U.S. defense officials have been convening defense.9 since April 8, 2003 on the future military alliance between the two In response to the new U.S. investment commitment, the South countries. Bilateral negotiations titled, “Future of the Alliance’s Policy Korean government increased its defense budget to modernize its Initiative” (FOTA), have focused on relocation issues. As of August weaponry. At the same time, President Roh began to express a new 2004, as many as 11 FOTA meetings have been held and relocation concept of defense, with the emphasis on the nation’s enhanced self- agenda were mainly drawn up during the first two meetings. The first defense capability.10 Later, South Korea’s National Security Council meeting produced a 10-point agreement, including the early relocation of the U.S. military base in Yongsan and the creation of a joint consulta- 7 Korea Herald, April 10, 2003. As the two sides agreed on the Korean forces’ tive body to discuss transferring wartime command of the armed “selected mission” due to its enhanced defense capabilities, however, security forces, which is currently under the control of the U.S.-led UN Com- experts interpreted this as expanded responsibilities for the Korean military in mand. The two sides are reported to have agreed on the need to adapt the defense of the DMZ in preparation for an eventual relocation of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division to the south. See also, Chosun Ilbo, April 10, 2003. the alliance to the new global security environment and to expand the 8 Washington File, Text: U.S., S. Korean Officials Explore Ways to Enhance Security, Korean forces’ role in defense of the peninsula and beyond, and to available at http://U.S. info.state.gov, accessed on June 6, 2003. enhance USFK’s contribution to regional stability. The controversial 9 This point was echoed in the speech delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in a speech to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry 6 In a meeting with a Korean envoy representing the newly-elected government on June 2, 2003. He maintained that the effectiveness of the alliance must be of President Roh, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had first broached the sub- guided by two principal considerations: strengthening deterrence and sustain- ject of relocating U.S. forces. He also told the Senate Armed Service Committee ing a strong alliance over the long run. On June 3, USFK Commander LaPorte on February 13 that he was considering plans to reposition U.S. forces farther said in a forum at the Korean National Assembly that the United States was away from the demilitarized zone and even to reduce their numbers. Washing- planning to redeploy 6,000 of its 7,000 troops stationed in Seoul to a location ton Post, Feb. 14, 2003. south of the capital. Korea Herald, June 4, 2003. 88 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 89 drew up a defense policy to expand the comprehensive alliance rela- self-reliant national defense posture since last year.12 In response to tionship with the United States while strengthening South Korea’s self- domestic criticism that the government had been over-hasty in accom- defense capability.11 This new concept was coined as “cooperative self- modating the U.S. plan without sufficient assessment and consultation reliant defense.” with the United States, the Korean government emphasized that there Bilateral talks that had previously been limited to USFK relocation had indeed been close consultation on the issue of redeploying the U.S. issues have swiftly developed to include its reduction by the spring of troops from Korea. At the same time, it emphasized the need to insti- 2004. As the United States faced a shortage of soldiers in Iraq amidst tute a system for advanced consultations between U.S. and South Kore- rising terrorist insurgency, a potential future plan to reduce the size of an policymakers. USFK became a reality. The U.S. government unexpectedly notified the About two weeks after the United States announced its decision to Korean government that it would redeploy 3,600 U.S. troops currently relocate its troops stationed in Korea to Iraq, the Korean government stationed in South Korea to Iraq. President Roh and his aides did not was even more taken aback by the U.S. decision to cut by about one- expect such a hasty decision, given their commitment to dispatching third its troop strength in Korea. During the first weekend of June 2004, Korean troops to Iraq despite domestic opposition, which was antici- the U.S. government notified that it would reduce USFK forces by pated to halt such a move. President Roh’s two month hiatus from the 12,500 by the end of 2005 as part of its global redeployment plan for its presidency following the National Assembly’s impeachment against overseas military presence. Both governments subsequently opened him would have given the United States a ready excuse for its unilater- the first talks on June 7, 2004 on the issue of reducing USFK, separately al decision. Right after President Roh returned to office following the from the FOTA talks for relocating USFK. The South Korean govern- Constitutional Court’s ruling nullifying the National Assembly’s ment is reported to favor the gradual reduction over a period from impeachment, the United States notified Seoul of this transfer plan. 2007 to 2013; starting after the relocation of the USFK’s 2nd Infantry to President Bush also called President Roh on May 17 and confirmed the the Osan and Pyeongtaek areas and in conjunction with South Korea’s same U.S. decision. 10-year plan for strengthening its self-reliant defense capability that On May 20, 2004, the Korean government underscored this policy- will be completed by 2013.13 By the fall of 2004, the United States shift in a briefing made right after the cabinet meeting to discuss the agreed to postpone the planned major reduction by the end of 2007. U.S. redeployment of USFK troops to Iraq. The briefing emphasized Both the U.S. government’s plans to move 3,600 U.S. troops from that the government had been preparing for the possible reduction in South Korea to Iraq and to cut by one-third its forces in South Korea the numbers of U.S. forces in South Korea and that it had proposed a came as a surprise to the Korean public, since as far as they were aware, the bilateral talks had been limited to the relocation issue. Few Koreans seem to remember, however, that on several occasions in the 10 In a speech delivered on March 11, 2003 at the commencement ceremony of past, the United States had unilaterally reduced its forces in South the Korea Military Academy, President Roh Moo-hyun said his government would thoroughly prepare to cope with a possible realignment of USFK. Korea Korea. The first reduction was made in June 1971 following the 1969 Herald, March 11, 2003. Also at the meeting with the newly-promoted Korean “Nixon Doctrine,” which called for the defense of Asia by Asians. military officials on April 21, he reiterated the need to strengthen South About 18,000 U.S. troops, mainly of the 7th Division, were withdrawn Korea’s self-defense capabilities to prepare for possible U.S. redeployment. in June 1971 despite strong protests from Korea. The second debate on Korea Herald, April 21, 2003. The same point was made during his speech the further reduction of the USFK began with the initiative of President commemorating the liberation day from the Japanese colonial rule on Aug. 15, 2003. 11 National Security Council, Pyeong-Hwa Pun-Young kwa Kuk-Ka An-Bo (Peace- 12 Blue House Briefings, “Readjustment of U.S. Forces in Korea,” May 20, 2004. Prosperity and National Security) (Seoul: March 2004). 13 Chosun Ilbo, June 4, 2004. 90 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 91

Jimmy Carter, who informed South Korea of the gradual withdrawal of Structural Changes in the U.S. -ROK Alliance U.S. ground forces over a period of four to five years after his inaugu- ration in 1977.14 The third debate on the U.S. forces reduction occurred Korean grievances against the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship have with the passage of the revised Nunn-Warner Act in the U.S. Senate in been accompanied by the deteriorating public image of the United 1990.15 Accordingly, the U.S. Administration proposed a three-stage States and criticism of its policies. plan over a 10-year period from 1990 to 2000 to ultimately allow for just Survey data suggest that South Koreans have been increasingly a minimum presence of U.S. troops. In the first stage, 6,987 U.S. mili- critical of the United States since the late 1980s, and that negative views tary personnel—5,000 ground forces plus 1,987 naval forces—left Korea have become more widespread since George W. Bush took office. Data between 1990 and 1992. However, the second stage was suspended due compiled by the U.S. Department of State showed that South Koreans’ to the nuclear crisis sparked off by North Korea in 1993. The whole overall opinion of the United States was slipping during the period plan was subsequently nullified by the 1995 East Asian Strategic Initia- from January 2000 to July 2002. The July 2002 survey revealed that 53 tive (EASI) of the Clinton Administration that proclaimed its intention percent of South Koreans had a favorable opinion, while 46 percent of to keep 100,000 U.S. troops stationed in East Asia. Since then, there had them held an unfavorable opinion.17 An August 2002 poll by the Pew been no further talk of reduction of U.S. forces, until the issue was Research Center revealed that South Korea ranked eighth among the 44 raised again in May-June 2004 countries surveyed in terms of unfavorable attitudes toward the United However, this time around, the same kind of unilateral U.S. deci- States, with higher rates of disapproval than Indonesia and India. Only sion to reduce its troops created much more controversy, as the current 53 percent of South Koreans had a favorable view of the United States, Korean society is politically vibrant. Conservative-oriented opposition while 44 percent were unfavorably inclined. A survey by Samsung Eco- forces that have valued the alliance relationship with the United States nomic Research Institute, conducted among 1,500 Koreans during Jan- criticized the Roh government’s pro-North Korea policy and its disre- uary 2003, also found that the proportion of Koreans who have favor- gard of policy coordination with Washington that led to this outcome. able feelings toward the United states dropped by 11 percent over two While responding with a resolve to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, years from 2001 to 2003 (from 36 percent to 24.5 percent). On the other their trust in the U.S. commitment to Korea’s national security was hand, the number of Koreans who have negative feelings toward the eroded at the same time. On the other hand, the liberal segment of United States has increased by 20 percent over the same period (from Korean society was silent, voicing neither open opposition nor support 21.7 percent to 41.9 percent).18 A survey conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo for the planned U.S. troop reduction. So far, some liberal civic organiza- in June 2003 showed that 27.6 percent of Koreans indicated that the tions have been advocating linking the U.S. troop reduction to the issue United States was “bad,” while 25.4 percent responded that the United of disarmament, while opposing Korea’s defense budget increase.16 States was “good.” This is a much improved result compared to the Those trying to seize upon this occasion to maintain the idea of with- previous survey taken in mid-December of 2002 when the ratio was drawing USFK have been limited to a few radical leftist groups. 36.4 percent vs. 13 percent.19

14 However, the U.S. Congress opposed this idea and President Carter lowered 17 Office of Research, Opinion Analysis, Oct. 17, 2002 (Washington, DC: Depart- the size of the reduction from 6,000 to 3,400 as a compromise in 1978. ment of State). 15 This Act called for the Asian allies of the United States to shoulder more 18 Koreans who responded that they did not have special feelings toward the responsibilities and costs in hosting the U.S. troops and for gradual and partial United States have decreased from 2.3% to 33.6%. U.S. troop reduction in South Korea and Japan. 19 JoongAng Ilbo, Poll on Koreans’ attitudes on U.S.-Korea Relations, Dec. 15–16, 16 Civic Network for a Peaceful Korea, “Appeals for Peace in Korea and North- 2002; Poll on Korean attitudes one year after the deaths of schoolgirls, June 9–10, east Asia,” April 20, 2004. 2003. 92 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 93

These survey data consistently point out that South Korean views ceptions and consequent revision in security norms.21 of the United States have been turning more negative over recent years. Although the Bush Administration’s seemingly hard-line North Korean New Nationalism policy had increased Korean criticism of the U.S. government, South Korea’s critical attitudes toward the United States are likely to remain South Korea’s modern-day nationalism is manifested in two so, considering the structural changes taking place in Korean society. dimensions. One is “assertive nationalism” vis-à-vis the United States. Until the 1970s, anti-Americanism was essentially based on anti- The other is “inter-Korean nationalism.” These two types of national- capitalist ideology and limited to a minority of leftist university stu- ism are separate, but they are inevitably intertwined to affect the U.S.- dents and intellectuals. It was, however, since the Gwangju uprising in ROK alliance. 1980 that anti-Americanism became an integral part of the student South Korea is becoming more assertive toward the United States. movement aiming at democratization and reunification.20 The United Economic development and democratization are critical in nurturing States was condemned as an ally of the dictatorial government and South Korea’s assertiveness in its relations with the United States. USFK was regarded as a functionary seeking the continuous division of Korea has become a materially-affluent society since the late 1980s and the peninsula. Militant students invaded the American Embassy, U.S. its entry into the OECD in the early 1990s boosted Koreans’ sense of Information Service facilities, and other American-owned properties. national pride. In this vein, Shin argues that Korean anti-Americanism By contrast, the manifestations of today’s anti-American senti- in the early 1990s was an expression of a new nationalism based on the ments appear to be fundamentally different from those of the past. nation’s increased economic strength.22 South Korea’s new self-confi- First, they are an expression of popular feelings rather than coherent dence was fully manifested with its successful democratization. Hav- ideology. Nevertheless, they can be mobilized into powerful political ing achieved democratic transition in 1987 by popular pressure, Korean activism, as demonstrated by the 2002 candlelight protests. Second, democracy is being consolidated despite some growing pains. National these negative feelings are diffused among various segments of Korean confidence makes South Koreans resent U.S. dominance and fuels the society, although younger Koreans tend to share them more. Third, the quest for an equal partnership with the United States. On the other major actors who are involved in the anti-American protests are no hand, inter-Korean nationalism is spreading in the wake of the post- longer radical university students or dissidents. They are rather the 2000 reconciliation between the two Koreas. The inter-Korean rap- established civic organizations active in advocating social and environ- prochement following the meeting of President Kim Dae-jung and mental issues surrounding the U.S. military bases. With these charac- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on June 15, 2000 changed popular teristics, contemporary anti-American sentiments have deeper social perceptions of North Korea among South Koreans. The image of North repercussions and could have a significant impact upon the U.S.-ROK Korea as a nation of the same race has been strengthened, while the alliance. perception of the North as an enemy state has weakened. As the seeds One can identify three major factors in this popularization of pub- of the Korean War were planted by the post-Second World War divi- lic criticism against the United States in Korean society. These factors sion of the Korean peninsula by the United States and the Soviet are conceived with the swift political changes in South Korea over the past decade. The first is the new nationalism; secondly there is the 21 For similar arguments, see Sook-Jong Lee “Sources of Anti-Americanism in democratization of Korean society; and thirdly the changing threat per- Korean Society: Implications for Korea-U.S. Relations” in Jong-Chun Baek and Sang-Hyun Lee, eds., Korea-U.S. Relations in Transition (Korea: The Sejong Institute, 2002), pp. 161–80. 20 Jinwung Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 22 Gi-Wook Shin, “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspec- XXIX, No. 8 (August 1989). tive,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No. 8 (August, 1996). 94 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 95

Union, many South Koreans believe that inter-Korean affairs and they tend to advocate active engagement with North Korea while seek- future reunification should be controlled by Koreans themselves— ing more independence from the United States. including those in the North. This inter-Korean nationalism naturally Since democratization, Korean political parties and politicians have clashes with Washington’s hard-line North Korea policy as it is viewed been realigning along the conservative vs. progressive fault lines. as foreign intervention hampering peace on the Korean peninsula. Although this ideological cleavage has not yet been sharply and clearly refined, routine political confrontation surrounding major national Democratization and Power Shift policies is significant enough to split the Korean society. Among other things, South Korea’s U.S. policy and USFK affairs are often the subject Under the authoritarian regimes of the past, the police and intelli- of divisive politics because they can draw more popular attention gence agencies suppressed the expression of anti-Americanism, as it among the Korean public. In this context, certain events get publicized was denounced as being an act of subversion. The agencies, in fact, tied and form a negative spiral of public opinion against the United States. it to the “dangerous” forces of leftists or ultra-nationalists who ultimately served the interests of North Korea. Democratization has had Threat Perception Changes an especially liberating effect on leftist or liberal ideals and values. An uninhibited and vibrant civil society now freely expresses critical opin- The security norms of contemporary Korean society are in flux. ions against the United States, in the same way that they are free to crit- Perceptions of North Korea and the government’s North Korea policy icize their own government. As democratic reform has lowered entry are very much polarized. Nevertheless, many Koreans now view North barriers for diverse social groups to participate in public policymaking Korea as having neither the willingness nor the capacity to wage a war processes, security policy is no longer an exclusive issue area for public against the South. elites in government and the military. Under this open political envi- This changed threat perception of North Korea has also created a ronment, empowered civic organizations raise the issues of lax treat- divergence between the United States and South Korea on how to ment of U.S. soldiers committing crimes against civilians in Korea, or respond to the current nuclear threat posed by North Korea. While the apparent favoritism of U.S. contractors in the weapon procurement United States defines North Korea’s nuclear buildup as an imminent process.23 threat to its national security agendas of anti-terrorism and non-prolif- One of the important effects of democratization on the U.S.-ROK eration of weapons of mass destruction, South Korea does not appear alliance is that progressive political forces have controlled power dur- to share the same degree of awareness of a nuclear threat from the ing recent years. Former dissidents and activists who were isolated North. Although both governments concur on the goal of the “complete, during the authoritarian past have now become legitimized to chal- verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s lenge the establishment and a significant number of them joined poli- nuclear program, South Korea’s preference lies in a diplomatic resolu- tics and government. Critical of the past socio-political order, new lead- tion with incentives rather than any form of sanctions. Opposition to a ers in Korean politics are putting forward progressive reform agendas possible surgical strike against the nuclear sites in North Korea was to dismantle existing institutional arrangements and rules. With evident as soon as this idea was adumbrated. Having experienced the ingrained nationalism and critical attitudes against the United States, terrible Korean War, pacifism is strongly ingrained among South Kore- ans. For them, the assured ultimate victory of the combined forces of South Korea and the United States in a war with North Korea is not 23 Katharine H. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism, and Democratic Consolidation,” in Samuel Kim, ed., Korea’s Democratization (New York: Cam- preferable to the current status quo if one considers civilian casualties in bridge University Press, 2003), pp. 135–57. the hundreds of thousands. 96 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 97

The diminished threat from North Korea against the South is more ings more while younger Koreans lean toward negative feelings. This widely accepted among the public rather than among security experts fault line became visible as younger Koreans feel less threatened by and policymakers in Seoul. As democratization has led the security North Korea compared to their parent and grandparent generations policy process politicized to include various societal groups, a more and is more sensitive to how South Korea is treated by the United cautious and defensive approach was evident among security experts States. They increasingly began to view the USFK as infringing on trying to guard against North Korea’s ambiguous intentions and bel- Korea’s national sovereignty, rather than as a deterrent against the ligerent capacity. Policymakers also came to face the political necessity North. to redefine the rationale of the U.S. troop presence and bolster the This generational divide reflects the rapid historical changes in alliance. Expanding the alliance’s goal to realize regional peace and South Korea itself. Younger Koreans are the generation of affluence and growth beyond the Korean peninsula seems to be the best option so democratization. They were nurtured by prosperous parents and spent far.24 their youth growing up in an increasingly liberal and democratized society. On the other hand, most older Koreans spent their youth poverty-stricken. Koreans aged 60 and over represent the hardship Generational Divide in Korean Attitudes Toward the United States generation who survived turbulent circumstances of colonial rule, post- independence chaos of the late 1940s, and war. Having lived through Korean attitudes toward the United States show a clear genera- such history, they prefer stability and order and harbor strong anti- tional gap. Political activism among younger generations tends to be Communist sentiments. Such contrasting historical memories greatly expressed as support for domestic reform, sympathy for North Korea, sharpen the generational gap in political attitudes. and independent foreign policy from the United States.25 The new Most polls in the United States and South Korea conducted over nationalism is most vividly captured by the younger generation of the past few years have shown that younger Koreans in particular today. This most Americanized generation in terms of pluralistic and were very critical of the United States. For example, a joint poll by the liberal values is searching for their country’s identity in its relationship JoongAng Ilbo and CSIS carried out in September 2003, reveal that with the long-time patron, the United States Koreans in their 20s chose the United States as the least favored coun- Conventionally, South Koreans hold a complex mixture of feelings try—35.4 percent—while only 4.1 percent chose North Korea. By con- about the United States. On one side, there is gratitude, fondness, and trast, Koreans aged 50 and over chose North Korea as the least-favored respect both for values and ideals the United States represents. The country—25.3 percent—while only 5.3 percent chose the United States. extensive military and economic support the United States has provid- In the same poll, more than four out of 10 Koreans in their 20s thought ed South Korea over the last half century is largely appreciated. On the that “inter-Korean cooperation” should take precedence over South other hand, a sense of resentment at the continuous influence of the Korea’s cooperation with the United States. Older Koreans aged 50 and United States has been present most of the time. In this mix of complex over responded that cooperation with the United States should come feelings toward the United States, older Koreans embrace positive feel- before that with North Korea—38.8 percent vs. 26.4 percent.26

24 As for such arguments, see Sung-han Kim, “Anti-American Sentiment and the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Fall 26 To the question, “Cooperation with North Korea and the United States are 2003). both important, but which one do you think should come first?” 39.4% of all 25 Sook-Jong Lee, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force,” in Richard C. respondents of the survey answered that inter-Korean cooperation comes first, Bush et al., eds., Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003–2004 (Center for North- while 24.4% answered in favor of U.S.-Korea cooperation. Another 34.4% east Asian Studies, Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 15–30. answered that cooperation with each party is equally important. 98 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 99

When asked about the future in the same JoongAng-CSIS poll, a important issues to avoid being abandoned, Japan also has tried hard greater number of younger Koreans indicated that they would like to not to become entangled in major U.S. military conflicts. Although see the timely withdrawal of the U.S. forces than older Koreans. More Japan has accommodated many U.S. demands for security assistance in than one-third of Koreans in their 20s and 30s supported the withdrawal recent years, pacifist public opinion and a constitutional barrier have of the U.S. forces from South Korea. As many as 61.9 percent of Kore- limited such endeavors.28 ans in their 20s and 59.5 percent of Koreans in their 30s supported the In the case of South Korea, the fear of entanglement or entrapment continued presence of the U.S. forces “for a decent amount of time” or had not been an issue. There was no serious opposition to sending “even after reunification.” By contrast, only 8.5 percent of older Kore- troops to Vietnam in the mid-1960s out of any fear of entanglement. ans aged 50 and over supported the withdrawal idea. Meanwhile, 72.6 Facing a common enemy—North Korea—the mutual interest in the percent of these older Koreans wanted to have the U.S. forces for a U.S.-ROK alliance was solid. On the other hand, the fear of being aban- lengthy period of time, with 18.4 percent of them supporting its pres- doned by the United States had always been a prevalent factor. In the ence even after reunification.27 past, whenever talks of reducing or withdrawing U.S. forces took place, South Korea’s year 2000 National Census shows the sheer political the South Korean government and civil society would become alarmed weight of the younger generation. Two-thirds of Korea’s population is and strongly backed the position supporting the presence of USFK. For under the age of 40. Looking at the voting population, Korean voters South Korea, securing a strong U.S. security commitment tended to are roughly divided into two groups: younger voters in their 20s and prevail over potential resentment about being dominated in the 30s and older voters in their 40s and older. Within a decade, new gener- alliance relationship. ations with no memories of the Korean War and the Cold War will The equilibrium of security psychology has changed significantly comprise the majority of South Korea’s adult population. Forging con- with inter-Korean rapprochement and the burgeoning democratization structive values and rationale in the U.S.-ROK alliance will be crucial of South Korean society. New fear of entrapment has started to rise for the United States and South Korea to remain as military allies in the among a significant number of South Koreans. The entanglement prob- future. lem has been raised in two recent cases. One is the fear of being involved in a preemptive war against North Korea by the United States to resolve the nuclear crisis. This fear has only been assuaged by Old and New Fears in Allying with the United States repeated statements from Washington denying this possibility. The other case of entanglement, despite its limited scope, would be the The alliance with the United States has long provided an almost pressure to participate in the U.S.-led war, such as in Iraq. complete sense of security to most South Koreans. When an alliance is The balance of the two fears in the U.S-ROK alliance relationship is forged between two asymmetrical powers, a weaker party has conflict- also perceived differently across generations. The fear of abandonment ing senses of “abandonment” and “entrapment.” Japan is a case in is less acute among younger South Koreans, perhaps because they tend point. While it has tried hard to be on the side of the United States on to believe that the United States would never abandon South Korea due to its strategic value. By contrast, older South Koreans fear that the 27 An earlier poll by the JoongAng Ilbo in June 2003 couched the options in different wording. While 54.2% of older Koreans aged 50 and over favored the continued presence of the U.S. forces, only 13.5% of Koreans in their 20s and 14.9% 28 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in in 30s favored the same idea. Instead, more than half of younger Koreans Post-war Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and favored the gradual withdrawal, with which only 16.9% of older Koreans Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses agreed. in a Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 100 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 101 anti-American voices of South Korean youth and policy discord to narrower inter-Korean affairs. This parochial security interest of between Washington and Seoul regarding North Korea’s nuclear prob- South Koreans is understandable, since their national security concern lem will induce the United States to rethink the strategic value of South has been exclusively the threat from the North and the inter-Korean Korea and no longer commit to the country’s defense. rapprochement is still far to slow to produce any tangible military con- Allying with the United States is increasing domestic political confidence-building. However, it is time for South Korea to think about its flict as progressive politicians and pacifist civic movements gain influ- responsibility and contribution beyond the peninsula in maintaining ence in Korean society. More challenges were raised in 2003–4 when the global peace and prosperity. Only after broadening its perspective, South Korean government decided on the dispatch of troops to Iraq at would South Korea be able to have a clearer perspective of its future in the request of the United States. On April 9, South Korea’s National allying with the United States. Assembly approved a bill dispatching 566 engineering troops and 100 medical workers by a vote of 179 to 68 after President Roh made a last- ditch appeal to the lawmakers. When the necessary legislation was rati- Conclusion fied in the National Assembly, the first decision to send engineering and medical units to Iraq in the spring of 2003 faced significant opposi- Considering the increasingly negative attitudes toward the United tion from both civil society and ruling party politicians. States and today’s divisive domestic politics in Korea, the ongoing relo- This opposition intensified when the United States and South cation and reduction talks between the United States and South Korea Korean governments began to consult with each other over the dis- must proceed with the utmost care and sensitivity. The U.S. govern- patch of much larger-scale combat forces to Iraq. After long delibera- ment must show its continued commitment to South Korea’s defense tion, in October 2003, the National Security Council finally decided to more vigorously than before. Washington should not be perceived as a dispatch ROK troops to Iraq without specifying their size. After several unilateral party pushing the USFK restructuring only for its own secu- months, on February 13, 2004, the South Korean parliament ratified a rity interests. A bigger challenge will confront the Korean government. plan to deploy 3,000 troops—1,400 combat forces and 1,600 military By controlling dangerous politicization of this major change in the engineers and medics—to Iraq only for a year by a 3 to 1 margin (155 to USFK structure, Seoul must use this opportunity to stabilize the recent 50). In December 2004, the Korean National Assembly voted on a bill strains in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. It is time for the Korean approving the extension of stay for the dispatched Korean military in government to draw a forward-looking U.S.-ROK alliance and educate Iraq. The current National Assembly was newly-formed after the par- its people to reinvigorate public support for a redefined alliance. liamentary election of April 2004. The leftist Democratic Labor Party Until recently, U.S. security experts were rather optimistic about made a successful representation for the first time in Korean history, the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although Korea would seek capturing 10 seats, and many younger progressive politicians were greater independence from the United States and avoid entanglement elected as candidates of the ruling Uri party. Therefore, opposition to in the U.S.-China rivalry, the U.S.-Korea alliance has been largely the bill is likely to be greater than before, although it won’t be sufficient expected to survive the fundamental change in the inter-Korean rela- to overturn the government decision. tionship or reunification of the two Koreas. For example, a RAND Whether for or against the dispatch, most South Koreans do not report states that “A major potential effect of unification or reconcilia- see the troop dispatch in terms of enhancement of South Korea’s global tion would be pressure on the United States to abandon its military peacekeeping role. Rather, they view the troop dispatch as another bases in South Korea. Unification or reconciliation could also provoke example of South Korea’s subjugation to the will of the United States. nationalist sentiment in Korea, which would in turn intensify opposi- So far, the security concerns of South Koreans have been largely limited tion to a continued U.S. presence. In response, the United States would 102 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 103 have to make the case to the Korean government and public that the the military training or drills of the U.S. “hub” with a limited size of presence of its forces served the overall goals of regional stability and ground forces. The U.S.-ROK alliance can redirect its focal goals to hence was advantageous to Korea even in the absence of an immediate human security. Participating in the U.S.-led anti-terrorist military threat.”29 A CSIS report echoed the prevailing interests of both the actions would be an example. Another possibility might even be a United States and a unified Korea to keep their alliance; i.e. the United political alliance without the USFK at all, while giving the United States will remain interested in maintaining a ready, forward-deployed States free access to local seaports or airports.32 Whatever the future U.S. force on the peninsula as an importance symbol and executor of scenario is, redefinition of the U.S.-ROK alliance in a reinvigorated the U.S. regional security commitment.30 fashion will not be achieved unless both Seoul and Washington invest Watershed anti-American events of 2002 took U.S. policy circles by political energy and enhance mutual trust. surprise. The U.S. foreign policy think tanks suddenly began to pay The recent U.S. decision to relocate and reduce USFK along the more attention to South Korean domestic affairs. Both RAND and CSIS lines of enhancing its combined defense capability foretell a shift in the published reports trying to understand the attitudinal change of South USFK’s role from deterrence against the North’s aggression to that of a Koreans toward the United States and recommended more sensitive “regional stabilizer.” With the ROK military taking over the major role Korean policies by Washington and reach-out efforts by USFK toward of defense, the lightened but strengthened combined capability of the Korean society.31 Better management of the alliance and strengthened Navy and Air Force would enable them to react swiftly to regional institutional mechanisms can certainly contribute to resolving South emergencies or conflicts. Although the new concept of the USFK as a Korean grievances in hosting the U.S. military bases. Pursuit of more regional stabilizer was first broached after the post-2000 inter-Korean independent policies and an equal partnership vis-a-vis the United detente, it has not circulated beyond a narrow policy circle. Now, when States by nationalistic leaders can be settled with more voices and this concept is beginning to gain wider currency, it is being misinter- responsibilities in the alliance affairs. preted as some politicians portray it as South Korea being part of a pre- Nevertheless, a fundamental question remains for the long-term emptive U.S. war against North Korea or China. Today, more than ever, survival of the U.S.-ROK alliance. That would be finding a new ratio- the Korean public needs more education regarding its nation’s interests nale for the alliance after the threat from North Korea completely dis- and strategic choices. Since the late 1990s, South Korea has been appears. This situation can come about with a sudden collapse of expanding its political ties and various forms of cooperation with its North Korea or with peaceful coexistence institutionalized between the Northeast Asian neighbors. Reconciliation with Japan over the past two Koreas with the success of current efforts for reconciliation and colonial history has progressed and programs for closer economic inte- cooperation by the South. Flexible forms of the alliance will be possible gration are being prepared. South Korean has warmed its relationship options in this peaceful stage. South Korea can serve as a “spoke” for with China due to the latter’s economic significance and its influence over North Korea. A recent poll by the Dong-A Ilbo revealed that the 29 Khalilzad, Zalmay et als., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy majority of South Koreans think China will be a more important coun- and Force Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 9. try to their national security—not to mention to their economy.33 South 30 CSIS, A Blueprint or U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2002). 32 Seong Ryoul Cho, “The ROK-U.S. Alliance and the Future of U.S. Forces in 31 CSIS, Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance: A Blueprint for the 21st Century South Korea,” Korea Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No.2 (Fall 2003), pp. (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2003); Derek Mitchell, ed., Strategy and Sentiment: 97–102. South Korean Views and the U.S.-ROK Alliance (Washington, DC: CSIS, June 33 48.3% of South Koreans surveyed indicated that China will be important to 2004); Eric L. Larson et al., Ambivalent Allies: A Study of South Korean Attitudes South Korea’s diplomacy and national security while 38.1% chose the United Toward the U.S. (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2004). States for the same question. As for the economic importance in the future, 104 Allying with the United States

Korea’s rising interests in the region had better be guided to develop without being at the expense of the strategic importance of the United States. South Korea’s vital interest in the future is still likely to remain ensuring its survival in Northeast Asia, where big powers such as China, Japan and Russia are competing for influence. Given this geo- political situation, balancing the power of strong neighbors—especially China and Japan, which are expected to enter into greater rivalry in the future—through the alliance relationship with the United States, would serve the national interests of South Korea, or even a reunified Korea. Improving its relations with neighbors and deepening regional ties, while keeping the United States as an ally, would certainly give South Korea more strategic options.

61.6% chose China whereas 26.2% chose the United States. Only in the question asking to choose a socially and culturally important country, did the United States score more than China—31.7% vs. 18.0%. See the telephone survey carried out by Dong-A Ilbo on May 21, 2004.