81 Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean Attitudes Sook-Jong Lee Abstract The U.S.-ROK alliance has been strained over recent years. New challenges are facing both South Korea and the United States. Growing discontent and grievances over the presence of U.S. forces on Korean soil is complicating the management of the alliance. Bolder opposition from Korean politicians and civil society to Washington’s North Korea policy is increasing the political cost for the South Korean government in maintaining its alliance relationship with the United States. On the other hand, the post– 9/11 U.S. global strategy and accompanying redeployment of U.S. forces in South Korea are pushing the alliance to adapt to the new era. The strategic value of South Korea is being modified in the context of the new post–9/11 global strategy. Unless South Korea and the United States invest their political energy and wisdom into putting the alliance onto a clear and secure path, the U.S-ROK alliance could be ruptured during this transitional period. Understanding the structural changes taking place in South Korea is critical to restoring the alliance in a constructive fashion. South Koreans became more critical of the post-9/11 United States as they embraced a new nationalism of being more assertive vis-à-vis the United States and, at the same time, more sympathetic toward North Korea. With democratization of South Korea, the security policy process is today more open to diverse social groups beyond the narrower policy circle. While divisions clearly exist, the majority of Koreans no longer regard North Korea as a major threat. These domestic changes in South Korea make the task of a timely redefining of the U.S.-ROK alliance more necessary. Leveling-up the alliance to one preserving regional peace and prosperity would be a good option. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 1, Spring 2005 82 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 83 Recent Strains in the U.S.-ROK Alliance Local residents started to demand the closure of the Maehyang-ri camp since 1988, and this demand heated up again when American pilots A series of events have strained the U.S.-ROK alliance over the past accidentally dropped bombs during a drill in May 2000. The U.S.-Korea several years. One stream of events is coming from the Korean side, joint team that was set up to investigate the case concluded that serious varying from complaints about the U.S. military bases to a more seri- damage was not caused and bombing drills were consequently ous policy challenge against the perceived U.S. unilateralism. Growing resumed. The local community mobilized and outside civic associa- discontent from the South Korean side reflects the complex socio-politi- tions helped to publicize the Maehyang-ri case forcing the eventual clo- cal changes South Korea has undergone during the past decade. The sure of its ground firing drill camp. Again, the later incident of poiso- other stream of strains is emerging from the new U.S. deployment plan nous material leaking from the Yongsan Base into the Han River was for its forces in South Korea and the accompanying changing assess- denounced as serious environmental damage by South Korea’s power- ment of South Korea’s strategic value. Although this military plan is ful civic associations. Conventionally subdued social problems sur- essentially derived from the U.S. global plan to adjust its overseas force rounding military bases of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) under structure to match the post-9/11 security environment, it is inevitably authoritarian regimes nowadays clamor loudly as the so-called “camp- enmeshed with the alliance politics between the United States and town communities” are no longer prepared to tolerate the dispropor- South Korea. If these two streams do not merge into the same sea of tional cost of hosting U.S. bases. common national interests, the U.S.-ROK alliance will face a serious Since the launch of the Bush Administration, bilateral tension challenge that could possibly lead to an irreparable rupture. Both coun- between the host nation and the U.S. forces transcended into much tries need to understand the military and political changes taking place more serious policy discord. Two weeks before a scheduled U.S.-ROK in each country and forge ever stronger mutual trust to reinvigorate summit in Washington, President Kim Dae-jung openly sided with this half-century old alliance. Russia by supporting the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the ROK- Russia summit in Seoul while opposing the missile defense program Korean Discontent proposed by President Bush.1 The March 2001 U.S.-ROK summit fur- ther soured bilateral relations as Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” Recent years have witnessed intensified South Korean grievances toward North Korea was dismissed by President Bush, who loathes in its bilateral relationship with the United States. The Nogeun-ri mas- Kim Jong Il as a dictator starving millions of North Koreans.2 The sub- sacre of civilian refugees and villagers by U.S. soldiers during the Kore- sequent 9/11 terror attacks against the United States exacerbated the an War suddenly emerged as an issue when the new century was about two governments’ different policies toward North Korea. The Bush to begin. The Associated Press reported in September 1999 on this war administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea was toughened crime committed by retreating U.S. soldiers in July 1950. As the tragedy as the U.S. foreign policy goals came into focus on curtailing weapons was publicized, it became an emotional as well as a humanitarian issue of mass destruction and preempting potential terrorism against the for many South Koreans. The U.S.-Korea joint investigation team was United States. This policy-shift was reflected in President Bush’s State set up, but its prolonged 15-month investigation concluded that it could not identify the line of command through which the U.S. soldiers were ordered to shoot and excluded any provision for compensation. 1 Seung-hwan Kim, “Yankee Go Home? A Historical View of South Korean Sentiment Toward the United States, 2001–2004,” in Derek J. Mitchell, ed, This conclusion was condemned by Nogeun-ri villagers as a scheme to Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views and the U.S.-ROK Alliance (Washing- avoid legal responsibility. ton, DC: CSIS, June 2004). The Maehyang-ri case, however, brought a more positive result. 2 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 84 Allying with the United States Sook-Jong Lee 85 of the Union address in January 2002, where North Korea was branded dubbed as “candlelight vigils,” in downtown Seoul in late 2002. A con- as part of the “Axis of Evil,” together with two other “rogue states,” tinuous mass rally at Gwanghwamun Plaza drew thousands of stu- Iran and Iraq. dents, religious groups, and ordinary citizens. At the root of the exten- South Korean reaction to this turnaround was largely negative. sive anti-American rallies was the late November acquittal of two Even Koreans who didn’t support the “Sunshine Policy” felt irked, American soldiers of responsibility for the accidental deaths of two watching their older president apparently being humiliated by the schoolgirls during an armored vehicle exercise in June 2002.4 There was newly-elected American president. While the majority of South Kore- a general outcry from the public and a national coalition focusing on ans were sympathetic toward the epochal terrorist attacks in the United this case was established. The protests then focused on the revision of States, a significant number were quick to point out, as most Western the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to ensure the mandate that the critics opposed to the United States would argue, the U.S. responsibili- USFK concede its jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. troops ty for producing frustrated countries with degrading economic condi- while performing their duties on Korean soil. Despite its polarization, tions deriving no benefits from globalization. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Korean society was united on the question of SOFA revision regarding statement following the U.S. attack on Afghanistan alarmed many the future presence of USFK and the incident was viewed from a South Koreans since it put the Korean peninsula under potential mili- humanitarian angle.5 tary conflict. This new tension was viewed as being “imposed” by the Against all expectations, the tide of anti-American sentiment did United States against the will of South Koreans who were envisioning a not subdue with the reissuing of nuclear threats by North Korea. The rosy picture of rapprochement with North Korea. anti-American sentiment also helped the progressive candidate’s presi- Bilateral policy conflicts at the governmental level and a certain dential election, campaigning on a platform of an independent foreign degree of public anxiety came to be translated into popular anti-Ameri- policy for the election of December 19, 2002. In the past, security threats can sentiment throughout 2002.3 The unfair disqualification of a South from the North would have made Koreans favor a conservative candi- Korean short-track skater in the Winter Olympics held in Salt Lake City date and seek solidarity with the United States. This time, however, a during February provoked anger amongst Korean youth against the pro-American image worked as a burden to candidates in the election. United States. They responded with a campaign to veto the South By the spring of 2003, for several reasons there was a gradual Korean government’s selection of the Boeing F-15K fighter jet over ebbing of anti-American sentiment in South Korea.