20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 1/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 1
1 Special Tribunal for Lebanon
2 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Badreddine, Merhi,
3 Oneissi, and Sabra
4 STL-11-01
5 Presiding Judge David Re, Judge Janet Nosworthy,
6 Judge Micheline Braidy, Judge Walid Akoum, and
7 Judge Nicola Lettieri - [Trial Chamber]
8 Monday, 17 November 2014 - [Trial Hearing]
9 [Open Session]
10 --- Upon commencing at 10.20 a.m.
11 THE REGISTRAR: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is sitting in an
12 open session in the case of the Prosecutor versus Ayyash, Badreddine,
13 Merhi, Oneissi, and Sabra, case number STL-11-01.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Good morning to everyone.
15 Could we please take appearances, starting with the Prosecutor.
16 MR. CAMERON: Good morning, Your Honour. It's Graeme Cameron for
17 the Office of the Prosecution. I'm assisted today by my friend
18 Gulnaz Bari and Skye Winner.
19 MR. HAYNES: Good morning, Your Honour. Peter Haynes for the
20 participating victims, together with Mohammad Mattar and
21 Nada Abdelsater-Abusamra. We're assisted today by Tamara Kosic and
22 Joanna Spek.
23 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Good morning, Eugene O'Sullivan, Tom Hannis, and
24 Denis Stoychev, we represent the interests of Mr. Ayyash.
25 MR. JONES: Good morning, Your Honours. John Jones representing
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 2/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Procedural Matters (Open Session) Page 2
1 the interests of Mr. Badreddine. I'm joined today by Pauline Baranes.
2 MR. HASSAN: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour,
3 honourable members of the Bench. The Oneissi team is composed today of
4 Mr. Philippe Larochelle, Mrs. Artemis Chatzistavrou, and myself,
5 Yasser Hassan.
6 MR. YOUNG: Your Honours, good morning. David Young representing
7 the interests of Assad Sabra, assisted today by my associate legal
8 officer Sarah Bafadhel. Thank you.
9 MR. AOUINI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour,
10 honourable members of the Bench. I'm Mohamed Aouini. I'm assisted today
11 by Ms. Dorothee Le Fraper du Hellen. Thank you.
12 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Good morning to you --
13 MR. AOUINI: [Interpretation] And of course we represent the
14 interests of Mr. Merhi.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And I note also in court this morning the
16 presence of the Defence Office in the form of the Head of the Defence
17 Office, Mr. Roux, and another lawyer.
18 Mr. Cameron, you're going to call Mr. Marwan Hamade this morning.
19 That's the only business you have before the Court today?
20 MR. CAMERON: Yes, Your Honour.
21 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: All right. We will do that, but first I
22 have to -- the Trial Chamber has to deliver a reasoned decision in
23 relation to the decision we made on Friday in relation to the scope of
24 Mr. Hamade 's evidence. It's going to take a few minutes to do this, so
25 I would ask you to bear with me. The decision is the following.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 3/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 3
1 The Prosecution proposes to call Mr. Marwan Hamade to testify as
2 a witness in this trial today, Monday, the 17th of November, 2014.
3 Counsel for the five accused asked the Trial Chamber not to hear some of
4 the evidence that the Prosecutor proposed to call.
5 Mr. Hamade's name appeared on the Prosecution's witness list
6 filed on the 13th -- sorry, 15th of November, 2012, and has remained
7 there since.
8 Mr. Hamade, it appears from the material provided to the
9 Trial Chamber, made some 11 statements, including interviews, to the
10 United Nations Independent Investigation Commission and to the Special
11 Tribunal's Prosecution. The dates are 4 October 2014; 4 July 2005;
12 22 December 2005; 26 January 2006; 8 September 2006; 12 March 2008;
13 13th of March, 2008; 19th of March, 2008; two on the 21st of May, 2010;
14 and again on the 3rd to 5th of October, 2011.
15 The Prosecution appears to be relying, for the purposes of
16 Mr. Hamade's testimony, upon evidence contained in the statements of the
17 22nd of December, 2005; 13th of March, 2008; 21st of May, 2010;
18 5th of October, 2011; and in an interview made on -- over 12th to
19 13th of March, 2008.
20 The Prosecution disclosed these statements to counsel for the
21 accused Mr. Ayyash, Badreddine, Oneissi, and Sabra on the
22 14th of November, 2012. The statements were disclosed to counsel for the
23 fifth accused, Mr. Merhi, on the 3rd of January, 2014.
24 Mr. Hamade was himself the victim of an assassination attempt on
25 1st of October, 2004, and on the 5th of August, 2011, the Pre-Trial Judge
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 4/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 4
1 in a decision entitled: Decision on the Prosecutor's connected case
2 submission of 30th of June, 2011, held that the Special Tribunal has
3 jurisdiction over this attack, that is, the attack on Mr. Hamade. We
4 still await the confirmation of an indictment in that case.
5 The Prosecution in its pre-trial brief filed on the 15th of
6 December, 2012, stated that it intended to lead evidence of the attack on
7 Mr. Hamade as evidence in this trial, that's the trial against Mr. Ayyash
8 and the other three accused. However, on the 18th of December, 2013, in
9 a submission entitled: Prosecution submission pursuant to Rules 91(G)
10 (ii) and (iii), the Prosecution informed the Trial Chamber that it was no
11 longer going to lead that evidence in this trial.
12 Counsel for the Prosecution, in lengthy legal submissions on the
13 13th of November, outlined what were described as five themes of relevant
14 evidence contained in Mr. Hamade's statements and interviews. He
15 foreshadowed that a total of 13 Prosecution witnesses would give evidence
16 in relation to these. The five themes are: Mr. Hariri's deteriorating
17 relationship with Syria, as a consequence of his goal to strengthen the
18 Lebanese autonomy; Syria's corresponding increasing resolve to exert
19 control beyond mere influence over Lebanese internal affairs; growing
20 concerns voiced by the international community regarding external
21 pressures bearing upon the political affairs of Lebanon; the evolution of
22 an effective opposition movement in September 2004, and thereafter in
23 Lebanon, of which Mr. Hariri was first a silent and then a more public
24 participant; and fifth, Mr. Hariri's status as an influential statesman
25 in the Gulf Region and beyond.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 5/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 5
1 This evidence, according to the Prosecution counsel, would
2 provide useful background or context in respect of the political
3 circumstances prevailing in Lebanon at the time of Mr. Hariri's
4 assassination, and in understanding certain evidentiary aspects of the
5 alleged co-conspirators' conduct in respect of the timing of the
6 conspiracy and to the significance of particular acts committed to
7 achieve the goals of the conspiracy charged. In support of its
8 arguments, the Prosecution referred to and relied upon decisions of the
9 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
10 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal
11 Court, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
12 Mr. Hamade, who was a minister in the Lebanese government in
13 2004, is expected to testify about meetings that Mr. Hariri had with
14 Syrian officials, including its President Mr. Bashar Al-Assad in
15 December 2003 and then between August 2004 and February 2005. The most
16 important meeting, according to the Prosecution case, occurred in
17 Damascus on the 26th of August, 2004. It was followed by a number of
18 relevant political events, including discussions about the extension of
19 the mandate of the then-President Lahoud; the amendment of the Lebanese
20 Constitution to permit this; the passing of United Nations Security
21 Council Resolution 1559 on the 2nd of September, 2004; political debates
22 about proposed reforms to the Lebanese electoral laws; the resignation of
23 a number of ministers from Mr. Hariri's cabinet; and Mr. Hariri's own
24 resignation as prime minister of Lebanon on the 20th of October, 2004.
25 The Prosecution connects this proposed evidence with the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 6/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 6
1 allegations in the consolidated indictment by explaining a possible
2 confluence of events occurring during the initial preparations for the
3 alleged conspiracy.
4 The Prosecution also connects the dates of the alleged
5 surveillance of Mr. Hariri by some of the accused on 17 different dates
6 between 20th of October, 2004, and 14th of February, 2005, including
7 Mr. Hariri's trips to the Parliament in Beirut and to Beirut airport and
8 to some of these other political events.
9 The evidence of contemporaneous political events and tensions in
10 Lebanon, according to the Prosecution, is relevant background to what
11 counsel described as "the political assassination of 14 February 2005."
12 These events, in the Prosecution's view, could shed light on the progress
13 of the conspiracy, including its preparations. The evidence could also
14 provide the Trial Chamber with "an enhanced appreciation of the effect or
15 reasons underlying the conduct itself. And it also adds to the political
16 nature of the assassination itself." The Prosecution did not anticipate
17 submitting at the end of the trial that the five accused had individual
18 motives to assassinate Mr. Hariri.
19 The Prosecution also submitted that because the five accused have
20 each been charged with committing terrorism-related offences, contrary to
21 Lebanese law, Mr. Hamade's evidence could be used to establish a
22 non-private motive for the commission of the alleged offences. Acts of
23 terrorism, submitted the Prosecution, are "in most cases essentially a
24 political act ... terrorism is a criminal act, but is more than mere
25 criminality." The evidence of Mr. Hamade and the other proposed
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 7/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 7
1 political witnesses could provide this evidence.
2 Prosecution counsel also made it clear that the Prosecution was
3 not intending to use evidence of the attempt on Mr. Hamade's own life as
4 evidence against the five accused in this trial.
5 Prosecution counsel emphasized that the content of Mr. Hamade's
6 proposed evidence was of evidence supporting material facts pleaded in
7 the consolidated indictment and did not itself constitute material facts.
8 Rather, they said, it was evidence possibly capable of supplying a
9 general but not a personal motive, of any of the five accused, for the
10 assassination of Mr. Hariri. The evidence will not demonstrate that they
11 have committed any of the elements of the offences charged.
12 The Prosecution anticipates that Mr. Hamade will testify in
13 giving his evidence in chief over about three or so days. His
14 cross-examination by some Defence counsel would be anticipated in the
15 week of 8 to 10 December, 2014. On 14th of October, 2014, Prosecution
16 counsel notified Defence counsel that they would be calling Mr. Hamade to
17 testify from today, Monday, 17th of November, and additionally of which
18 other witnesses it anticipated calling this year.
19 Counsel for the four accused made submissions opposing the
20 Trial Chamber hearing certain aspects of Mr. Hamade's evidence. None
21 submitted that the Trial Chamber could not or should not receive evidence
22 from Mr. Hamade relating to Mr. Hariri's movements and his schedule
23 during the period of the conspiracy alleged in the consolidated
24 indictment.
25 In this respect, counsel for Mr. Badreddine specifically
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 8/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 8
1 submitted that they did not oppose the Trial Chamber hearing the
2 foreshadowed evidence of Mr. Hamade insofar as it relates to evidence of
3 Mr. Hariri's movements; his whereabouts in connection with the -- sorry,
4 in relation to the connection with the alleged surveillance of Mr. Hariri
5 by any of the five accused or other alleged co-conspirators, as alleged
6 by the Prosecution. No other Defence counsel opposed the Trial Chamber
7 hearing this aspect of Mr. Hamade's evidence nor made any submissions
8 suggesting that they opposed Mr. Hamade testifying at all.
9 Defence counsel specifically opposed the Prosecution leading
10 evidence of the content of the meetings between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Assad
11 and Mr. Hariri and, for example, General Rustom Ghazaleh, who at the time
12 was the Syrian chief of intelligence in Lebanon. Counsel for Mr. Oneissi
13 argued that the evidence was not relevant or probative of anything
14 pleaded in the consolidated indictment.
15 All Defence counsel supported the argument that the evidence was
16 not relevant and had not been pleaded in the consolidated indictment, the
17 pre-trial brief, nor referred to in the Prosecutor's two opening
18 statements. The first of these was against the original four accused on
19 the 16th of January, this year, and the second against Mr. Merhi on the
20 18th of June, 2014.
21 Counsel for Mr. Sabra described this omission in the
22 Prosecution's conduct as a "very significant sea change in the way" that
23 it had put its case.
24 Counsel for Mr. Badreddine submitted that the evidence of
25 Mr. Hamade, outside of evidence of Mr. Hariri's movements and schedule,
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 9/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 9
1 should also be -- should also be excluded as being irrelevant, there
2 being no connection between the allegations against the five accused in
3 the consolidated indictment and this evidence of the political background
4 preceding the attack. The material was also speculative in their view.
5 Moreover, it amounted to material facts that had not been pleaded in the
6 consolidated indictment. This was prejudicial to the Defence case as
7 Defence counsel had prepared to meet the case against the five accused on
8 the basis of what was pleaded in the consolidated indictment and the
9 pre-trial brief. If the Trial Chamber allows the evidence, the pre-trial
10 brief and the consolidated indictment must therefore be amended.
11 Counsel for Mr. Merhi submitted that they needed more time to
12 deal with the evidence of Mr. Hamade, as the case of Mr. Merhi had only
13 been joined to the case of the other four accused nine months ago, on the
14 14th of February, 2014. They described the submissions of Prosecution
15 counsel on Thursday, 13 November 2014 as a "third opening statement."
16 They submitted that the evidence should be excluded under Rule 149(D) of
17 the Special Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This rule is the
18 general exclusionary rule which permits the Trial Chamber to exclude
19 evidence on the basis that its probative value is substantially
20 outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
21 The Trial Chamber decided on 14th of November to allow the
22 Prosecution to present this evidence. What follows are the specific
23 reasons for that decision.
24 The Special Tribunal's Rules generally favour an inclusionary,
25 rather than an exclusionary, approach to receiving evidence. Rule 149(C)
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 10/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 10
1 provides that "a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems
2 to have probative value." This is discretionary and does not mandate
3 that the Trial Chamber should receive all such evidence. Indeed, given
4 the vast quantity of available evidence, and for reasons of judicial
5 economy and effective trial management, a Trial Chamber must be selective
6 in what it receives into evidence.
7 The general exclusionary provision, Rule 149(D), however,
8 provides that:
9 "A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is
10 substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. In
11 particular, the Chamber may exclude evidence gathered in violation of the
12 rights of the suspect or the accused as set out in the Statute and the
13 Rules."
14 No argument has been made that Mr. Hamade's evidence was gathered
15 in violation of any of the accused's rights.
16 The issue for determination therefore is, first, whether the
17 evidence is relevant and probative; and then, if so, whether it should
18 nevertheless not be received into evidence because its probative value is
19 substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
20 The evidence in the Trial Chamber's view is relevant and
21 probative.
22 Evidence of the prevailing political situation in Lebanon in 2004
23 and early 2005 could provide background and give context to much of other
24 evidence adduced by the Prosecution and even by Defence counsel.
25 Mr. Hamade, as a close political associate of Mr. Hariri and a Lebanese
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 11/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 11
1 cabinet minister who was intimately involved in many of the events at the
2 time, is ideally placed to provide some of this evidence. This includes
3 the content of meetings between Mr. Hariri and Syrian officials; this
4 could help to explain the wider circumstances leading to Mr. Hariri's
5 assassination. The evidence in general could also be used to explain a
6 non-private motive for the commission of any offence that the
7 Trial Chamber could find proven.
8 Although the evidence is prima facie probative and relevant, the
9 Trial Chamber acknowledges that some aspects of it could eventually turn
10 out to be -- turn out not to be particularly relevant or probative.
11 However, the Trial Chamber does not believe that it is now - and I
12 emphasize "now" - in a position to parse the evidence by excluding at
13 this stage - that's parse, p-a-r-s-e - evidence that could potentially
14 assume greater relevance at a later point. This is especially so in
15 circumstances when it must be viewed in its totality at the close of the
16 case with all of the other evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the
17 parties.
18 In proceedings where the parties gather and present their own
19 evidence, such as those before the Special Tribunal, the significance of
20 a piece of evidence, and particularly in the circumstances of a long and
21 complex trial featuring hundreds of witnesses and thousands of documents,
22 and especially one involving circumstantial evidence, may only become
23 clear at a later point and when the evidence presented is assessed in its
24 totality. The Trial Chamber cannot perform that evaluating role at this
25 stage of the trial.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 12/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 12
1 On the issue of whether relevant evidence should be excluded
2 under Rule 149(D), the Defence arguments seem to be put on several
3 overlapping bases. The first is that the evidence of the meetings and
4 the political situation in Lebanon is a material fact that should have
5 been pleaded in the consolidated indictment and pre-trial brief. This is
6 of course somewhat contradictory of the argument that the evidence is
7 irrelevant and should not be heard, so the Trial Chamber will treat it as
8 an alternative argument; namely, that if it finds the evidence relevant,
9 as indeed it has done, on this argument it should be treated as a
10 non-pleaded material fact, which I will come to shortly.
11 The second issue is one of fairness which overlaps with the first
12 and is of notice to the Defence of the Prosecution's intention to lead
13 the evidence. This lack of notice, the Defence counsel argued, is unfair
14 to the Defence. The third argument posed - one posed by counsel for
15 Mr. Merhi - is that they need more time.
16 I turn to material facts. In relation to whether the proposed
17 evidence contained in Mr. Hamade's statements amounts to material facts
18 that should have been pleaded in the consolidated indictment or in the
19 pre-trial brief, the Trial Chamber finds the following.
20 And in doing so refers to several decided international criminal
21 law cases.
22 The ICTR Appeals Chamber case of Prosecutor versus Tharisse
23 Muvunyi decided on 12 May 2005, the decision on Prosecution interlocutory
24 appeal against Trial Chamber II decision of 23 February 2005, at
25 paragraph 19 has defined the distinction between a charge and a material
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 13/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 13
1 fact that must be pleaded in an indictment.
2 The ICTR Appeals Chamber held that a material fact is one of the
3 "acts or omissions of the accused that give rise to the allegation of
4 infringement of a legal prohibition." It confirmed this in another
5 decision, Prosecutor against Theoneste Bagosora, decision on
6 Aloys Ntabakuze's interlocutory appeal on questions of law raised by the
7 29 June 2006 Trial Chamber I decision on motion for exclusion of
8 evidence, decided on 18 September 2006, at paragraph 29 of the decision.
9 Those are the guiding international law principles.
10 The Trial Chamber has reviewed the statements and interviews
11 given by Mr. Hamade and considers their content to be evidence supporting
12 the material facts pleaded in the consolidated indictment. Specifically,
13 any evidence of Mr. Hariri's movements, his meetings, et cetera, relate
14 to the alleged surveillance of Mr. Hariri between October 2014 [sic] and
15 14th of February, 2005, and in our view is clearly evidence supporting
16 that pleaded material fact. The remainder of the proposed evidence,
17 namely, that of the prevailing political situation in Lebanon, including
18 Mr. Hariri's deteriorating relationship with the Syrian authorities,
19 provides background evidence that will make some of the evidence more
20 explicable. It may also provide context to the events leading to his
21 assassination.
22 The evidence set out in Mr. Hamade's statements is not an "act or
23 omission of any of the five accused," and that's taken from the decisions
24 of the ICTR Appeals Chamber, giving rise to an infringement of legal
25 prohibition - here, the crimes of terrorism and murder, et cetera, as
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 14/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 14
1 charged in the consolidated indictment. These facts do not constitute
2 material facts that must be pleaded in the consolidated indictment.
3 On the issue of notice to counsel for the five accused, the
4 Trial Chamber believes that Defence counsel have been on notice since the
5 service of the documents to them, in the case of the original four
6 accused in November 2012 and with counsel for Mr. Merhi since the
7 3rd of January, 2014, of the scope of Mr. Hamade's anticipated evidence.
8 Defence counsel were notified on the 14th of October, this year, that
9 Mr. Hamade was scheduled to testify today, 17th of November. They have
10 had adequate notice, in the circumstances of his anticipated evidence, to
11 prepare a defence at trial, including performing the necessary
12 investigations and preparing their cross-examination.
13 We also note that the Defence questioning of Mr. Hamade will
14 commence probably later in the week of 17th of November, that's this
15 week, and continue in the week of 8th of December, thus providing some of
16 them at least with eight weeks' notice of when they would be expected to
17 cross-examine the witness. Counsel may of course seek an adjournment at
18 any time if they consider it necessary to seek additional time. None so
19 far has been sought.
20 The Trial Chamber will therefore hear the evidence as proposed by
21 the Prosecutor. In evaluating the evidence at the appropriate time and
22 in considering it in combination with all of the evidence before it, the
23 Trial Chamber will then give it its appropriate weight.
24 It may be that this evidence is ultimately given no weight and is
25 found to have little relevance or probative value. It may even be found
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 15/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Ruling (Open Session) Page 15
1 to be exculpatory and possibly even used to acquit an accused person.
2 However, it is far too early to make a determination to exclude this
3 evidence and the Trial Chamber is not prepared at this stage to reject
4 evidence that is prima facie relevant and probative.
5 Therefore, to summarize, the Trial Chamber finds that the
6 evidence is relevant and probative. It is satisfied the Defence is on
7 notice of the scope of the proposed evidence and has had adequate time to
8 prepare a defence. There is, therefore, no basis to exclude it under
9 Rule 149(D) of the Rules.
10 That completes the decision.
11 Mr. Cameron, can the witness please be brought into court.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron, I just need to correct one line
14 in the decision I just read, or one word, actually.
15 It's at page 4, line 15, 16, where I said: "... as a consequence
16 of Mr. Hariri's goal to strengthen Lebanese economy," it -- the word I
17 should have used was "autonomy." So can the word "economy" be
18 substituted with "autonomy."
19 Good morning, Mr. Hamade.
20 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
21 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Can you please take the solemn declaration.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
23 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 WITNESS: MARWAN HAMADE
25 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade, we'd like to welcome you to the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 16/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 16 Procedural Matters
1 Special Tribunal in Leidschendam and thank you for travelling here.
2 Before I get the Prosecutor -- before I ask the Prosecutor to start
3 asking you questions, I just need to get some personal details from you.
4 Can you now hear me?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: As the transcript in front of you says, I've
7 just welcomed you. I'll re-welcome for coming here to testify today. I
8 just need to get some short personal details from you. And just tell me
9 if it's correct. Your name is Marwan Hamade, you were born in 1939 in
10 Beirut, you're Lebanese by birth, nationality, and you are a Member of
11 Parliament and a former minister in the Lebanese government -- various
12 Lebanese governments. And just please pause before you answer.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade, the Prosecutor is going to ask
15 you a number of questions, and as you'll appreciate, the Defence counsel
16 will also ask you questions and the Judges can do that as we go. I'm
17 just going to ask you to do one thing and that is to please, as I know
18 you speak fluent English, is just to look at the transcript on the screen
19 in front of you and you'll notice that I waited until it stopped before I
20 started speaking. If you too could do that, it will allow it to be
21 properly recorded. And also when someone asks you a question in Arabic
22 and you respond in Arabic, it's quite important to pause for about five
23 seconds between the question and the answer or the answer and the
24 question, to allow the interpreters to interpret it into the other two
25 languages. So Mr. Cameron will now start by asking you some questions.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 17/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 17 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Examination by Mr. Cameron:
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Hamade.
3 A. Good morning, sir.
4 Q. As His Honour Judge Re noted, you're presently a sitting
5 Member of Parliament and you're the deputy for the Chouf District. And
6 as such, the normal manner in which you would be addressed would be with
7 the term "Your Excellency." Is that correct?
8 A. Thank you.
9 Q. You'll forgive me if I alternate between "Mr. Hamade" and
10 "Your Excellency" during the course of my questions. I know that you
11 have some drops that from time to time you would like to put in your
12 eyes, and whenever you feel the need, please just go ahead.
13 I'd like to address in broad terms some of your background, if I
14 may. I understand that you have a law degree and a master's in economic
15 sciences. Is that right?
16 A. Yes, that's right.
17 Q. And one of the areas in which you began your professional life
18 was as a journalist; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And in fact during a period of time you were a war correspondent
21 who covered the war in Vietnam; is that right?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. And you eventually progressed in the area of print journalism to
24 become the editor of An-Nahar newspaper and its affiliates; is that
25 right?
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 18/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 18 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 A. That's right. During the nomination of my brother-in-law
2 Ghassan Tueini to the government, my brother-in-law Ghassan Tueini to the
3 government in 1976.
4 Q. And I understand that you are currently and have been for some
5 time a member of the board of directors?
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. Now, dealing with your political background, Excellency, when did
8 you first enter politics in Lebanon?
9 A. Well, you know, being a journalist, you're already in politics in
10 a country like Lebanon, especially being an editorialist and a political
11 correspondent and then an editor-in-chief. But my real steps in politics
12 came after Mr. Kamal Jumblatt's assassination in 1977 as I joined the
13 group headed by Mr. Walid Jumblatt and I was assisting him both in the
14 Socialist Party and specifically in the -- in directing some of the
15 political options of the Druze community in Lebanon.
16 Q. What was the nature of the Socialist Party?
17 A. The Socialist Party is a party that was founded by the late
18 Kamal Jumblatt - the late Kamal Jumblatt, as I noticed, was assassinated
19 in 1977, as it is now established, by Syrian agents - and it was a party
20 that was multi-confessional when it first started with its founders
21 including many Christians and many other Muslims from different
22 communities other than the Druze. And it was a party that was not really
23 leaning to the Communist Party, it was, as we can describe, a democratic
24 socialist party.
25 Q. And how long did you become involved in politics in that first
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 19/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 19 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 stage?
2 A. When after the assassination of Mr. Jumblatt's father, Kamal, the
3 Druze community, of whom I am one of the representatives in Parliament
4 today, underwent very serious difficulties and was drawn as other
5 communities in serious fights in Lebanon, political fights, which
6 developed later into military fights. At the time I left my job as a
7 journalist, as I considered that I could not have my political choices
8 impede on the freedom, the independence, and the neutrality of a
9 newspaper like An-Nahar and L'Orient-Le Jour, the French edition that I
10 was also heading at the time.
11 Q. So you began politics in what year then, sir?
12 A. 1977.
13 Q. And you continued at that stage until what year?
14 A. Until now.
15 Q. Is it fair to say that throughout 1990 you were pretty much
16 continuously a Member of Parliament, elected in your jurisdiction?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that also during that period of time you held a number of
19 significant ministerial posts?
20 A. Your Honour, can I shift to Arabic?
21 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: You have your choice of three languages, of
22 which I note you speak all three fluently.
23 THE WITNESS: No, because we're going to go into maybe
24 constitutional texts and it is easier for me to explain in Arabic.
25 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 20/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 20 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 THE WITNESS: Yes.
2 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I'm -- we have three official languages, you
3 may testify in whichever you consider -- you find -- whichever is most
4 comfortable for you.
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: If you wish to speak -- switch between any
7 of them, I just ask one thing before you do, just say: I'm now going to
8 speak in English or French or Arabic, to allow the interpreters to change
9 booths. Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 [Interpretation] In 1989, an agreement was made between the
12 different legislative representatives in Lebanon to solve the Lebanese
13 crisis, with Saudi support, support from Morocco and Algeria, what was
14 called the Tripartite Commission, and in collaboration with the Syrian
15 Arab Republic. The text of the Taif Agreement was a document that was
16 discussed at length with Damascus and -- between Damascus, Riyadh in
17 Saudi Arabia, and the different Lebanese parties, in addition to the
18 foreign countries that were supporting the process. The Taif Agreement
19 was set and it defined two ways to bring peace back to Lebanon. And the
20 deceased representative of the Shiite community at the time, Sheikh
21 Mahdi Shamseddine said it was the agreement of necessity.
22 MR. CAMERON:
23 Q. Excellency.
24 A. [In English] Yes, sir.
25 Q. Just before you continue, perhaps it would be appropriate now to
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 21/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 21 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 seek to introduce the Taif Agreement.
2 MR. CAMERON: It presently appears at presentation queue number 3
3 and 4 and the ERN for both languages is D0412340 to D0412349. And it may
4 be that the Tribunal considers that under Rule 60 it is entitled to
5 take -- 160, to take judicial notice of this document which is so
6 well-known within Lebanon.
7 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: The Chamber would take judicial notice of
8 such a document. I assume the Defence couldn't object to the Chamber
9 taking judicial notice of documents such as the Taif Agreement or the
10 Lebanese Constitution or other -- or Security Council Resolutions or
11 documents of that type. If you do have an objection to us taking
12 judicial notice of it, now is the time to voice it.
13 There being no voicing of objections, the Chamber of course takes
14 judicial notice of the existence of that. It doesn't really need to be
15 tendered, but if you want to have the document before us you'll have to
16 display it in the court some way. We of course have copies with us.
17 MR. CAMERON: Is it appropriate to give it an exhibit number so
18 that others can refer to it or not?
19 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Yes.
20 MR. CAMERON: Then as I understand it the next exhibit would be
21 P304.
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: The Taif Agreement will be Exhibit P304.
23 MR. CAMERON:
24 Q. Excellency, just before I take you to the Taif Agreement, may I
25 complete the general sketch that I had intended to present to the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 22/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 22 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Tribunal regarding the various ministerial posts that you held. If I
2 could read out some of them, that might be the easiest way. I understand
3 that from 1990 to 1992 you were the minister of economy and trade?
4 A. Before that, if I can interrupt you.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. From 1980 to 1982 I was minister of tourism.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 A. In the government headed by Mr. Shafiq Wazzan under the
9 Presidency of the late President Elias Sarkis.
10 Q. And after your time as minister of economy and trade, in 1992 and
11 up until 1994, you were the minister of health and social affairs?
12 A. That's right.
13 Q. And from 1994 to 1996, minister of health. And from 1996 to the
14 year 2000 you were the president of the Parliamentary Commission for
15 Planning and Development. I'll return to that a little later, but can
16 you describe what those duties entailed, just briefly, for the moment?
17 A. The ministerial duties or the duties in Parliament?
18 Q. The duties of the president of the parliamentary commission for
19 planning and development, which you undertook over a four-year period.
20 A. The Lebanese Parliament has a number of committees, foreign
21 affairs, defence and interior, law and administration, finance, this is
22 one of the committees which looks into the long-term projects and what we
23 call the laws which are taken for many years and not within the same year
24 budget. It is also supposed to implement one of the Taif Agreement
25 reforms which calls for development -- equal development between the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 23/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 23 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 regions and decentralization of the regions.
2 Q. And in between 2000 and 2003, you were the minister of the
3 displaced?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And then from 2003 until September 6, 2004, you returned to
6 become the minister of economy and trade?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And we'll return to that September 6 date later. And thereafter,
9 for a three-year period from 2005 to 2008, you were the minister of
10 telecommunications?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And from 2009 onwards, you were the secretary-general of the
13 Parliament's bureau?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is that a rough summary of the types of ministerial portfolios --
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
17 Q. And during that period --
18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Stop, stop, stop.
19 Mr. Hamade, just a slight -- just a small reminder of the pausing
20 between questions and answers and it's a real discipline, it takes a lot
21 of us a long time to learn it, but you've got a transcript in front of
22 you.
23 MR. CAMERON:
24 Q. I'm afraid, Mr. Hamade, you'll find I have not learned it yet.
25 During that lengthy period of time, from the early 1990s through
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 24/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 24 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 to 2004 and 2005, did you have occasion to work with the late
2 Rafik Hariri in a professional sense?
3 A. Yes, I had continuous occasions to work with him, and it had
4 started before as from 1982. Mr. Hariri had spent many of his efforts to
5 bring Lebanon to a peaceful situation through a consensus between the
6 parties and the fighting communities. And I've been associated with him
7 and with Mr. Jumblatt in many of the peace conferences about Lebanon that
8 took place in Geneva and in Lausanne and in Damascus at the time of what
9 was called the Tripartite Agreement.
10 Q. And if we could -- if I could take you now to the Taif Agreement
11 at Prosecution Exhibit 304.
12 MR. CAMERON: If that could be displayed for Mr. Hamade, it's
13 numbers 3 and 4 on the presentation queue. And if we could first look at
14 the opening page which is on the screen now at D0412340.
15 Q. Now, Mr. Hamade, I am not intending to read the entirety of the
16 Taif Agreement, but I am intending to go through some aspects of it with
17 you if we may. The first thing that I would ask you to confirm is the
18 preamble to the text in which it says:
19 "This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was
20 negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the
21 Lebanese Parliament on 4 November 1989."
22 And were you present in Parliament when the Taif Agreement was
23 approved?
24 A. No. At that time the Parliament that was elected first in 1972
25 was renewed -- had renewed mandates, despite the fact that it had lost
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 25/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 25 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 almost one-third of its members and so it was still the legal Parliament
2 but we did not have the chance to run for elections ourselves and our
3 group, since 1972. I was not member. But I was associated several times
4 with Mr. Hariri in writing and thinking the abstracts and the text that
5 became later the Taif Agreement.
6 Q. How would you describe Mr. Hariri's role in the creation of the
7 Taif Agreement?
8 A. Some people try pejoratively to call him the godfather of the
9 Taif Agreement. I would say he is the creator or one of the creators of
10 this Taif Agreement. He was the go-between, incessant go-between,
11 despite many risks he was taking between the front lines, asking now and
12 then for a cease-fire from what was called the Christian party or what
13 was called the Islam progressive groups, and always getting on both sides
14 of the fence to bring the word of peace. And he was assisted in that by
15 the still Prince Saud Al Faisal, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia.
16 Q. The agreement is called different names; is that correct?
17 A. Yes --
18 Q. Including the National Reconciliation Charter?
19 A. Yes. I'll shift again to Arabic, Your Honour, with your
20 permission. It is called [Interpretation] It's called the Document of
21 National Reconciliation. [In English] It underlines the fact that it is
22 somehow a new National Pact for Lebanon which not replaces but completes
23 the initial National Pact which was concluded between all the communities
24 of Lebanon on the eve of the independence in 1943.
25 Q. The Document of National Reconciliation or the National Pact
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 26/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 26 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 appears to be divided into a number of different sections, beginning with
2 the general principles set out on the page before you. Just averting to
3 two of them for the moment, under the heading: "General Principles" and
4 as the first lines of the document, it says:
5 "Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a
6 final homeland for all its citizens."
7 And under C:
8 "Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on
9 respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and
10 belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all
11 citizens, without discrimination or preference."
12 How important was it at the time of 1989 and 1990 to attempt to
13 enshrine those types of principles in a document like this?
14 A. In Arabic I will say.
15 [Interpretation] The importance of such general principles which
16 remain in place and control of national life is the decision of the
17 independence, freedom of Lebanon and its sovereignty. And this explains
18 many of the conflicts and difficulties today. This is called final
19 homeland for all its citizens. And I will add to that a sentence which
20 was not pronounced by the public prosecutor. It is unified, the land,
21 the people, and the institutions are one, and this unity is essential in
22 order to know why we have faced all the different crisis.
23 The second point which is you have, Mr. Prosecutor, mentioned,
24 you spoke about a democratic parliamentarian republic. Yes, this is what
25 distinguishes Lebanon from the rest of the Arab countries and this was a
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 27/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 27 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 distinctive element for decades and it remains - although it is very
2 folkloric - a distinction today. A democratic parliamentary republic
3 means that the institutions are democratic and the country is based on a
4 Parliament, thus the parliamentarian and presidential elections are very
5 important in the country. It is based on general freedoms, and you all
6 know that Beirut was -- since the Arab renaissance was the light of the
7 Arabic culture, it was the country that allowed printing books and books
8 distribution and the Lebanese all hold dear those principles and will
9 defend them by all means. They will defend this freedom, the freedom of
10 belief as indicated in the text, and the freedom of opinion. And it is
11 very important when we look at the different conflicts. Thank you.
12 Q. Now, as a parliamentary republic, do I understand that the
13 Document of National Reconciliation sets out the divisions which form
14 that parliamentary system and some of the responsibilities of each arm?
15 For instance, at the bottom of the present page under "Political Reforms"
16 we have the title "Chamber of Deputies," and that's the organ of state to
17 which you are presently a member and have been for many years now.
18 A. [In English] Yes.
19 Q. And the text indicates that the Chamber of Deputies is the
20 legislative authority which exercises full control over government,
21 policy, and activities. And if we might see the following page,
22 D0412341, under paragraph 4 there is a provision saying that:
23 "The electoral district shall be the governorate."
24 What does that mean, Mr. Hamade?
25 A. It means that Lebanon was due to be -- [Interpretation] I
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 28/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 28 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 apologize. The elections were supposed to be organized for Parliament on
2 the basis of an election law, and this election law was based on the
3 governorates. Another text was supposed to complete the former one,
4 saying after revision of the administrative divisions, and this text and
5 the contradiction between the governorate and the re-distribution of
6 elective districts was the reason for many of the conflicts that have
7 delayed the adoption of the election law, a modern election law, which
8 would implement the content of the Taif Agreement.
9 Q. We may return to that passage later, but continuing on in the
10 Political Reform section, in addition to the Chamber of Deputies there is
11 second mentioned on the same page about a third of the way down under B,
12 the "President of the Republic," in which it is stated:
13 "The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol
14 of the country's unity."
15 Do you see that, sir?
16 A. [In English] Yes, but not in Arabic. They didn't adjust the
17 Arabic.
18 Q. Could you --
19 A. Yeah, that's it now.
20 Q. -- read the Arabic portion?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is it the same in Arabic?
23 A. Yes. [Interpretation] "The president of the republic is the head
24 of state and the symbol of the country's unity."
25 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] Mr. Marwan, through your
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 29/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 29 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 presentation we see that the Taif Agreement was not implemented according
2 to its content. There were not elections, the elections were not
3 organized on the basis of the governorates, the administrative division
4 was not changed according to the content of the Taif Agreement. In
5 summary, what were the obstacles that stood in front of the
6 implementation of the Taif Agreement before the assassination of
7 Prime Minister Hariri?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the questions that
9 stopped the implementation of the Taif Agreement include what you have
10 mentioned but are not restricted to that. They include many topics. It
11 was an open window to the future, this Taif Agreement. It was there to
12 stop the war, on one hand, and give a climate of progress to the Lebanese
13 state. We were to look towards better perspectives, perspectives that
14 would unify the people. But those elements, those provisions which are
15 very positive and were not implemented because of political conflicts and
16 conflict of power in the area, led to a delay in the adoption of an
17 election law based on governorates and it also led to many other things
18 where the Taif Agreement was not implemented. We did not implement the
19 decentralization on an administrative viewpoint and we did not fulfil the
20 independence of the courts which we want and you all want, and the
21 security in Lebanon, the way we would reunify the state without armed
22 militias and without foreign forces, all those questions are mentioned by
23 the Taif Agreement in following provisions.
24 So the Taif Agreement includes two things: First of all, the
25 constitutional reforms that were decided by the Parliament after the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 30/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 30 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Taif Agreement, the Lebanese Parliament met after the agreement and
2 decided upon constitutional reforms; and the parts pertaining to
3 positions in the government and specifying the rules that would allow
4 elections and changes with government and all the institutions. And it
5 also decided on a gradual withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and
6 there were dead-lines that were specified by Taif. And it put
7 responsibility on the interior Lebanese forces whilst we were waiting for
8 the army's preparation - and this is happening now - and it also put
9 responsibilities on the Syrian Arab army to help the Lebanese government
10 for a period of two years in order to be able to implement the
11 sovereignty on all the country, gathering the weapons from the militias,
12 and the government was to remain the sole security entity. And we were
13 supposed to help the government, the government was there to respect the
14 general freedoms mentioned in the agreement. The government was due to
15 implement a new modern election law, new powers were entrusted to the
16 president - more powers than in the former agreements because some of the
17 competence was transferred to the government. There was also equal
18 distribution between Muslims and Christians and this equality, as
19 mentioned, is a sacrosanct principle in the Lebanese Constitution, the
20 present Lebanese Constitution, to try and make everybody feel safe. And
21 it gave the other part the possibility to apply the rule of 65 and not
22 66.
23 So the Taif Agreement was complementary, and the President Hariri
24 tried several times to implement the different provisions of the
25 agreement. Some were easy to implement and others were put in the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 31/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 31 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 document for the future, the creation of a senate, a non-confessional
2 system which we all call for, but this means to go beyond the present
3 confessions and to make the different religious groups bypass their
4 fears. And there was to be a competent administration of the state. And
5 we would only keep the religious distribution in the highest levels of
6 government, ambassadors, army, government. So the first line of people
7 in government and higher administration.
8 And the Taif Agreement is a reconciliation agreement and a
9 package deal. In this package deal, there are many parties - and I'm
10 here accusing no one - they accused the other party to try and choose and
11 pick what they want with the agreement and implement what they desire.
12 And this has led to a Syrian control over Lebanon to remain and to
13 increase rather than decrease, as desired by the Taif Agreement. The
14 Taif Agreement gave Syria a role to play in Lebanon. I will not say that
15 it is a sort of mandate; it was supposed to be a supporting role. And
16 instead of seeing this role diminish, it increased and became a true
17 tutelage and they would participate in all decisions, including the
18 nomination of ordinary members -- civil servants, the influence of the
19 security service, and a control of the activity of the country,
20 controlling the president, the government, and the Parliament.
21 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Were you looking at the time, Mr. Cameron?
23 MR. CAMERON: I was. I can continue or break now. It is an
24 appropriate time, but I will continue if you wish.
25 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Okay. That would be. But before you do, I
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 32/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 32 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 just want to point to three documents on your list which also appear to
2 be the subject of the motion for the admission of evidence on the
3 21st of October, 2014, and just ask you -- remind you to tell us if
4 you're attempting to tender documents at the moment which are the subject
5 of that motion. The last one, P304, is and there are two others, it
6 appears, on the list of documents you have here. One is the Lebanese
7 Constitution, which again is another document we can take judicial notice
8 of, which indeed is the -- on your list it's called the "Treaty of
9 Brotherhood, co-operation, and co-ordination between the Syrian Arab
10 Republic and the Lebanese Republic." That's the summary. The document
11 itself has a different title, namely, "Fraternity, co-operation, and
12 co-ordination treaty between the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab
13 Republic." It appears it uses non-gender-specific language, or
14 fraternity, but switches the order of the signatories, meaning Lebanon
15 and Syria. Those two are also included in your motion of the
16 21st of October and those two are also documents which the Chamber will
17 take judicial notice of.
18 I note too that the treaty between Lebanon and Syria has been
19 deposited at the United Nations as well. But we can get exhibit numbers
20 for those when we return, but they should be 305 and 306. You can give
21 us the ERNs upon our return.
22 We're going to take a short break, Mr. Hamade, and we'll resume
23 with your evidence after the break.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Court is adjourned.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 33/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 33 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 --- Recess taken at 11.42 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.
3 MR. CAMERON: Following Your Honour's guidance, perhaps then
4 since we're considering Rule 160, I could take the opportunity to enter
5 three documents in a similar class. The first is the Lebanese
6 Constitution, which is found at number 5 and 6 of the presentation queue,
7 at ERN D0407515 to 537. And this document was tendered in the
8 Prosecution motion under Rule 154 of the 21st of October, 2014, and
9 appears in annex A1.1 on row 1 and is also listed in annex B at row 22 of
10 the same motion in respect of a request to be added to the Rule 91 list.
11 And I'm proposing that that be Prosecution Exhibit 305.
12 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: How many documents are there that you would
13 propose we take judicial notice of under Rule 160? We'll take judicial
14 notice of the Constitution of Lebanon, clearly.
15 MR. CAMERON: There are --
16 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: What others are there?
17 MR. CAMERON: There are --
18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: That will be Exhibit P305.
19 MR. CAMERON: There are two other documents, the next one is the
20 treaty to which you referred to a moment ago, which is found at numbers 1
21 and 2 on the presentation queue and at the ERN D0412328 to 330. This is
22 the Treaty of Fraternity, Co-operation, and Co-ordination between the
23 Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. This exhibit was
24 tendered in the 21st of October, 2014, motion under Rule 154. It appears
25 in annex A1.3 at row 2 and it also appears in annex B, row 30 of the same
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 34/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 34 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 motion to be added to the 91 list -- Rule 91 list. I'm proposing that
2 that be received as Exhibit 306.
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Again, I'm assuming that there are no
4 objections to the Chamber taking judicial notice of that document? Being
5 none, it will be Exhibit P306.
6 MR. CAMERON: The third document is an Act of Congress of the
7 United States of America which appears at spot 77 and 78 in the
8 presentation queue, and the document is entitled: "The Syria
9 Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003." And it
10 was passed into force on the 7th of January, 2003. That appears in the
11 Rule 154 motion dated the 21st of October, in annex A1.2 at row 3 and
12 also at annex B, row 80 to be added to the 91 list. Those are the three
13 documents of this ilk.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: It is clearly a document that the Chamber
15 could take judicial notice of, but it probably wouldn't hurt to explain
16 the relevance of this Act of Congress of the United States of America of
17 2003 before we proceed further.
18 I anticipate Mr. Jones, who was about to jump to his feet, might
19 have been posing the same question.
20 MR. CAMERON: Its relevance is for a limited purpose. I do not
21 tender it to establish the truth of the allegations necessarily that are
22 made within it, but to -- in respect of two relevant issues. The first
23 is the position formally taken by the United States as to the
24 relationship between Syria and Lebanon during the time and certainly
25 within the same year as the meeting of December 2003 which Mr. Hamade and
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 35/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 35 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 others will describe in due course. And the second is that it adds
2 context to allegations which were made in 2003 and later that the former
3 Prime Minister had allied himself with the United States. Through the
4 point of view of Syria, this is a reflection as to what that allegation
5 actually means and how that alliance could or would be perceived by
6 Syria, i.e., as a very serious allegation. That's the purpose for which
7 the act is admitted, not for the various allegations contained in it,
8 styled as findings of fact.
9 MR. JONES: Yes. Well, I'm relatively reassured certainly with
10 the way it was put just at the end there. Initially when Mr. Cameron
11 said: "I don't tender it to establish the truth of the allegations
12 necessarily," I was slightly worried about that qualification. Our
13 position is set out in the response dated the 4th of November in relation
14 to this document at paragraphs 10 and 11, and that's not on grounds of
15 relevance but on probative value, in that the law relies on quotes by
16 President Bush, who I think few of us would regard as the font of all
17 wisdom when it comes to these matters and certainly when it comes to
18 weapons of mass destruction and whether countries possess them or not.
19 This came months after the attack on Iraq which was also launched on the
20 basis of -- the same doubtful basis of possession of weapons of mass
21 destruction.
22 So if it's entirely crystal clear and without qualification that
23 it's merely judicial notice that this law exists and was passed, then
24 that's fine, but certainly not for any reliance on the truth of its
25 contents and that's the position, I take it, from Mr. Cameron. And on
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 36/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 36 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 that basis we don't object further.
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour --
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I was just asking you to pause until the
4 line in the transcript had finished.
5 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, our position --
6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And still.
7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you.
8 Our position, quite succinctly, is that we don't see the
9 relevance of the US position in relation to the matters before us here
10 and we object on that basis, to relevance.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: We'll give you a ruling on that a little
13 later in the day, Mr. Cameron. But let's just, without foreshadowing any
14 decision, reserve P307 in case we -- do you anticipate any other
15 documents between now and the resumption after lunch?
16 MR. CAMERON: No.
17 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: All right. We'll reserve P307 in case we
18 accept it after having taken judicial notice of the contents of the
19 document.
20 Judge Braidy has a question of the witness before we go on.
21 And, Mr. Hamade, if you're more comfortable testifying in Arabic,
22 of course it's your choice, please do so.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24 JUDGE BRAIDY: [Interpretation] Mr. Hamade, I would like to ask
25 you the following question. You said a few moments ago that the main
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 37/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 37 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 purpose and goal of the Taif Agreement was to put an end to the Lebanese
2 war. First of all, I would like to know the following: Was there a real
3 will, when the Taif Agreement was being discussed, was there a real will
4 to see a Syrian withdrawal or withdrawal of the Syrian forces? At the
5 time we used to call it in Lebanon the Syrian presence as opposed to the
6 Israeli occupation. So was there a real and true will, a serious will of
7 this withdrawal of the presence -- the Syrian presence in Lebanon?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the agreement was like
9 a first step in that direction, a first step towards diminishing the
10 Syrian control over Lebanon, in addition to putting an end to the civil
11 war which was beneficial to several actors at the Arab and international
12 stage. We in Lebanon have suffered from the civil war for many years,
13 and in the agreement itself there was a will, there was an intention to
14 put the cornerstone, if you wish, of the withdrawal of all foreign forces
15 present in Lebanon, so long as the Israeli occupation was a matter of
16 fact and we did not compare at all the Israeli occupation to the Syrian
17 presence. We considered at the time that this is an occupying force, an
18 enemy, whereas the other presence was the presence, a fraternal presence,
19 who was there to assist the Lebanese.
20 Therefore, we started discussing the matters, we started mainly
21 discussing the military aspects in the agreement. That took a long time.
22 And the discussion was mainly between the late President Hafez El-Assad
23 and between the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia. At the time it was
24 Prince Saud Al Faisal. There was also in the negotiation Mr. Lakhdar
25 Brahimi who was a go-between, who was a mediator between the Syrians and
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 38/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 38 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 the Lebanese. There was insistence from President Hafez El-Assad to not
2 say in so many words and not talk clearly about a withdrawal of Syrian
3 forces under the pretext that Israel was still present on the Lebanese
4 territory. For us it was not merely a pretext, it was a valid reason
5 that we took into consideration.
6 President Assad insisted that the withdrawal should take place in
7 two stages. The first stage would be a redeployment and this is
8 something that is stipulated in the agreement, it is also stipulated in
9 documents that we will see later on, because we just saw that the Treaty
10 of Fraternity and Co-operation has been admitted into evidence, so you
11 will see that also on that treaty. The treaty and the agreement
12 stipulate a redeployment to the Beqaa area, to the area of Hammana,
13 Mdeirej and Ain-Dara. Why that area in particular, Hammana, Mdeirej,
14 Ain-Dara line? That took a long time to discuss and that will explain a
15 lot of things in the future. President Assad took as a pretext that he
16 wanted to keep an eye on the Maronite mountain and another eye on the
17 Druze mountain. He said he wanted to avoid any division in the country,
18 and at the time there was no talk about a division or a federation. We
19 were just discussing the issue of election of a president and at the time
20 President Rene Mouawad was elected.
21 So this line, Hammana, Mdeirej, Ain-Dara, was an area, a
22 triangle, that will help him stay in the middle of the various Lebanese
23 forces. These were the hills of Lebanon and these hills had a strategic
24 value for the Syrians. There were positions in Dahr-El-Baidar that were
25 later on raided, there were radars there on those hills. So these hills
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 39/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 39 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 had had a strategic importance.
2 And therefore, there was a lot of discussion regarding this
3 issue. It took a long time to make a decision on that point and Hafez
4 El-Assad did not accept to take this redeployment and withdrawal any
5 further. And he did obtain that. We were in a situation of [In English]
6 take it or leave it. [Interpretation] And finally, this scenario was put
7 in place. So the first phase of redeployment would be to the Beqaa area
8 and later on the redeployment will become like a withdrawal back to
9 Syria, and this would allow Syria to defend itself in co-operation with
10 Lebanon. That was the mentality at the time, that was the logic at the
11 time, and that paved the way to the treaty that was signed later on
12 between Syria and Lebanon.
13 So that was -- at the time people were used to seeing and would
14 see Syrian check-points all the time. There was some kind of hostility
15 to that Syrian presence, especially in Mount Lebanon. As for the other
16 party, they were able to keep control of these hills, these strategic
17 hills, that overlooked certain areas of Lebanon. In addition to the
18 presence of the Syrian intelligence which was widespread at the time.
19 MR. CAMERON:
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Hamade. My last question of you before we broke
21 for the morning break was about the nature and duties of the president of
22 the republic as identified in the Document of National Reconciliation.
23 And I think the -- you had pointed out that the president of the republic
24 is the head of state and a symbol of the country's unity. And at
25 paragraph 10 of that section, one of the duties of the president is to
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 40/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 40 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award
2 state medals by decree. Do you see that, sir?
3 A. [In English] Yes.
4 Q. And in respect of relations with other countries and the
5 development of embassies and the appointment of ambassadors, is that the
6 sort of thing that fell to the president of the republic under this
7 agreement as the head of state?
8 A. [Interpretation] The appointment of ambassadors was not one of
9 the prerogatives of the president; however, the acceptance of
10 accreditation, as it is the case in most of the countries of the world,
11 so the acceptance of accreditations and issuance of accreditations are
12 issued by the president. So the word in English "appoint ambassadors"
13 does not necessarily mean that he would appoint these ambassadors. The
14 Council of Ministers, which was the highest executive authority in the
15 country, and upon suggestion and recommendation from the foreign
16 minister, this is how it was done according to procedure, these
17 ambassadors were appointed by the Council of Ministers and the president
18 accepts the accreditation and signs the accreditation. He also accepted
19 accreditation of foreign ambassadors at the presidential palace with the
20 presence of the foreign minister.
21 Q. The next organ that's set out is that of the prime minister at
22 page D0412342 and it indicates that:
23 "The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents
24 it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the
25 general policy drafted by the cabinet."
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 41/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 41 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 And then it lists a series of powers, including being the head of
2 the cabinet. Do you see that, sir?
3 A. [In English] Yes.
4 Q. And is that in fact how the prime minister, Prime Minister
5 Hariri, viewed his duties in accordance with this document?
6 A. Well, before -- sorry. [Interpretation] Before these provisions,
7 these constitutional provisions had been implemented, the provisions that
8 were later on included in the constitution, so before they were
9 implemented and implied on Prime Minister Hariri, he had started
10 exercising these powers, and before him Prime Minister Omar Karami and
11 before that Prime Minister Solh. They all exercised these powers --
12 correction, Prime Minister El-Hoss, not Solh. And that was the main
13 difference between the first republic and the second republic.
14 During the first republic, the president of the republic used to
15 head de facto the Council of Ministers, he appointed ministers and fired
16 them, although that was not applied in reality because of the
17 National Accord that was in place in the country. However, in the second
18 republic, the president has the right to head the Council of Ministers
19 when he wants. However, he does not have the right to vote because this
20 50/50 parity between Christians and Muslims was the basis of the Lebanese
21 regime, and by virtue of this basis, the president would not be able to
22 vote; otherwise, there wouldn't be this 50/50 equality between the two.
23 And of course, the prime minister is in charge of implementing the
24 general policy that is set up by the Council of Ministers or the
25 ministerial statement that is issued by the government and for that he
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 42/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 42 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 needs to obtain a vote of confidence from the Parliament. So this
2 guarantees a balance -- so the government formation needs the signature
3 of the president between the head of the government and the
4 implementation of the government's policy, these are the powers of the
5 prime minister, and some ministers also had large and extensive powers in
6 that regard, and you also have the vote of confidence from the
7 Parliament. The president has not -- does not have the right to ask the
8 government to resign; the prime minister can resign himself or the
9 Parliament can ask for the government to resign or one-third of the
10 ministers of the cabinet can resign and then the government will be
11 considered as resigned.
12 Q. Thank you. The two remaining organs are described as the cabinet
13 and minister. And I needn't take you in detail to those, but just in
14 passing may I ask: Is it necessary to be an elected deputy or Member of
15 Partly to be a minister in the cabinet or the Council of Ministers?
16 A. [In English] No, sir, in Lebanon it's not like --
17 [Interpretation] In Lebanon it's not like Great Britain. [In
18 English] You can be either a Member of Parliament or being picked up or
19 designated by a party or by a group or by a community without being a
20 Member of Parliament, [Interpretation] without being a Member of
21 Parliament.
22 Q. Now, if I could take you then to page D0412347, and these are
23 some of the issues I think that Judge Braidy asked you about and perhaps
24 we can look at them as they appear in the Taif Accord. The section that
25 I'm interested in begins:
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 43/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 43 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 "Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over
2 all Lebanese territories ..."
3 And it begins:
4 "Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the
5 establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord,
6 the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose
7 objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all
8 Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad
9 lines of the plan shall be as follows:
10 "Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia shall be
11 announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of
12 Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the
13 national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected.
14 A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms
15 shall be approved constitutionally."
16 Can you explain, please, the purpose behind those words?
17 A. Of course Lebanon, when the Taif Agreement was adopted, Lebanon
18 was divided into areas of political and military influence and sometimes
19 even economic. This division of powers was between the various militias.
20 There was a government or a semi-government that was opposed to the Taif
21 Agreement and that was trying to stop this agreement by dissolving the
22 Chamber of Deputies, but of course that's a different matter.
23 The objective behind the Taif Agreement, as it was mentioned in
24 this paragraph, second, "Spreading the sovereignty of the State of
25 Lebanon over all Lebanese territories," I can talk about that because I
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 44/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 44 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 was a member of the government of national accord that is stipulated in
2 this agreement. I was also a member of the ministerial tripartite team
3 that was in charge of disbanding this militia and collecting its weapons.
4 And I can discuss this point with details and clarity because I can see
5 here a mention of the national accord government and this government was
6 in charge of setting up a detailed security plan over a period of one
7 year.
8 Today and decades after the Taif Agreement our successive
9 governments still talk about security plans, and these were not
10 implemented, not in one year, not in 25 years. All over these years,
11 they were unable to implement a security plan, to disband the militias,
12 and spread the sovereignty of the state of Lebanon. If you look at the
13 ministerial statements of yesterday and two weeks ago and one week ago,
14 you will see discussions of a security plan. Of course, if you will go
15 back to the records and the minutes of the various dialogue committees
16 and round-tables that were held in Lebanon, you will see that there were
17 a lot of discussions with the representatives of various confessions,
18 including Hezbollah, that talk about the spreading of the Lebanese
19 sovereignty and the sovereignty of the state, that talk about the
20 disbanding of non-Lebanese militias, and there was indeed an agreement to
21 disband the Palestinian militias outside of the Palestinian camps because
22 the forces that were inside the camps were supposed to be forces that are
23 aimed at restoring security and stability inside the camps and that would
24 work together with the Lebanese army.
25 With regards to the issue of the militias, we started seeing the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 45/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 45 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 beginning of the disagreement that will later on develop. At the time it
2 was not even a disagreement. The militia of the Progressive Socialist
3 Party was disbanded. The Lebanese forces were disbanded, their militias.
4 These were the Lebanese forces that represented the main Christian force.
5 We disbanded the Amal militia which was headed by the Speaker, the
6 current Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri. We collected their weapons
7 and the weapons were either given to the Lebanese army or they were
8 returned to their sources to Syria or even Russia in some cases. There
9 was only one militia left and that's the militia of Hezbollah.
10 At the time, the agreement was that as long as there is an
11 occupation of a part of southern Lebanon that was a need, a necessity, to
12 acknowledge the need of having a Lebanese resistance in addition to the
13 Lebanese efforts, official efforts, to implement Resolution 425, a
14 UN Security Council Resolution, 425. Therefore, we disregarded,
15 voluntarily and willingly and with all good intentions, we disregarded
16 the disbanding of this force that was conducting a resistance that we are
17 very grateful for in the south of Lebanon.
18 And this article of the Taif Agreement is the article that is
19 still being discussed, it's the topic of extensive discussions and
20 sometimes even problems in the Lebanese context, and at some point it
21 might have been also a reason. You might talk about that. I'm neither
22 an investigator nor an expert in these matters. And this is something
23 that also had a role in the commission of several crimes that affected
24 people that talked about the implementation of this provision of the Taif
25 Agreement. Until one day in the year 2000, the Israeli forces withdrew
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 46/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 46 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 from Lebanon, and with the United Nations a blue line was drawn up and we
2 were able to go back to the borders that were the borders set out in the
3 Truce Agreement of 1949.
4 So this is when there were demands in Lebanon, progressive
5 demands, gradual demands that said as long as the Israelis have withdrawn
6 from Lebanon, all of the Lebanese parties should abide by the provisions
7 of the Taif Agreement, meaning that Syria - and we are also very grateful
8 to it - but Syria should withdraw back to its borders, as it was
9 stipulated in the Taif Agreement when we talked about this two-year
10 period of redeployment and withdrawal, and this talk was happening ten
11 years after the Taif Agreement. And there were also talks about
12 Hezbollah to be included in the Lebanese army, as it was the case for
13 other militias. So they would join the ranks of the army. That was the
14 case for other militias. Some of them became foot soldiers, other were
15 officers.
16 So there was this talk about taking this additional step towards
17 achieving Lebanon's independence. It was achieved towards the outside
18 through the Israeli withdrawal, and also through organizing the
19 relationship with Syria and Lebanon's independence and sovereignty will
20 be achieved by spreading the sovereignty of the state all over the
21 Lebanese territory. The Lebanese army was supposed also to deploy in
22 southern Lebanon. Neither Syria nor their allies allowed the army to
23 deploy at the time in the south, despite the Israeli withdrawal, because
24 they considered this "withdrawal" was incomplete because of the Shebaa
25 farms, what was called the Shebaa farms dilemma. These farms, if they
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 47/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 47 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 were Lebanese, we should recover them; and if they were Syrian, then
2 Syria should recover this territory. And then the discussion became very
3 heated. [In English] Yes, Your Honour, maybe I'm going too far.
4 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: It's certainly a very interesting historical
5 discussion. Just a small question. The farms, how big are they? What
6 sort of territory are we talking about, the size of the Shebaa farms?
7 THE WITNESS: A few hundred square kilometres that are on the
8 slopes of Mount Hermon, Jabal El-Sheikh, and which sovereignty -- over
9 which sovereignty -- of course they were occupied by Israel in 1967 at
10 the time from Syrian troops and there was a discussion whether it's 425
11 or 242 Resolutions, which resolution applied to them. It was part of the
12 debate.
13 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: All right.
14 THE WITNESS: So if --
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade --
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I just ask you to pause for a moment.
18 Also in some of your answers it might not hurt to just turn
19 towards the Prosecutor, who's asking you the questions, to see whether
20 you're going in the direction which he is trying to direct you --
21 THE WITNESS: I'm looking to you.
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I'm sorry?
23 THE WITNESS: I have to look to you all the time.
24 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Well, it's a skill to -- I've got to look
25 around the courtroom. It's a skill for you to look towards the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 48/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 48 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Prosecutor and to us.
2 THE WITNESS: I even look at the Defence often.
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Well --
4 THE WITNESS: No, no, I keep my eye on you.
5 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: All right. Okay. What I'm just suggesting
6 is perhaps if you occasionally glance towards the Prosecutor, he may give
7 you a verbal -- a non-verbal hint as to whether you're straying a little
8 bit away from the area which he's actually asking you about, which is
9 what I'm just about to ask the Prosecutor.
10 Is Mr. Hamade giving you more information than you actually
11 wanted? You can answer this in a very kind way, Mr. Cameron.
12 MR. CAMERON: It's a fascinating contextual dissertation and
13 perhaps somewhat more than you need for the moment, although not
14 irrelevant by any stretch. If I may.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Having heard that, the Prosecutor should
16 have been a diplomat and you should have been a lawyer, Mr. Hamade, but
17 the Prosecutor is going to try and focus your answers a little bit more
18 specifically to what we're dealing with in the court.
19 MR. CAMERON: That's very kind of you to say.
20 Q. Mr. Hamade, thank you. And I don't mean to interrupt you. But
21 carrying on with just some of the language contained within the accord
22 itself, you referred a moment ago in your answer to Judge Braidy about an
23 area of deployment for the Syrian forces, and if we were to look at
24 paragraph (D), which is still on page D0412347, we can see language like
25 the following, after the first couple of sentences:
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 49/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 49 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 "Considering that the objective of the State of Israel is to
2 spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own
3 forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces" --
4 A. Sorry, State of Lebanon is to spread its authority.
5 Q. What did I say?
6 A. Israel.
7 Q. "... the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the
8 Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the
9 internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding
10 Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of
11 the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State
12 of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with
13 ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of
14 the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of
15 the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the
16 two governments - the Syrian government and the Lebanese national accord
17 government - shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in the Al-Biq'a
18 area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and
19 if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian
20 military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two
21 governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of
22 Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces'
23 relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist."
24 Now, in summary, Mr. Hamade, what's the true gist of this
25 language? What was intended to occur in summary?
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 50/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 50 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 A. What was intended is to adopt the Taif Agreement and translate it
2 into constitution, form a government of national unity, elect the
3 president -- we had elected president -- we had elected two presidents,
4 unfortunately, because one of them was killed 17 days after his election,
5 and it was supposed that we go into putting a plan for -- security plan
6 of -- over the territory of Lebanon. We did implement all these
7 conditions from the Lebanese side. None [Realtime transcript read in
8 error "one"] of them was respected by the Syrian side. Under many
9 pretexts at the time, I was member of the government, as I was saying,
10 and there was a permanent discussion about the limits of the Syrian
11 intervention. Was it to be a heavy one? Was it to be a light one? Was
12 it to help the Lebanese reconcile among themselves? And then they would
13 go, and why did I extend on this period, Mr. President, Your Honour?
14 It's because these are the roots of the conflict which in my
15 opinion - it's an opinion of just a witness - ended in the assassination
16 of Prime Minister Hariri. And this is why I believe it's a relevant
17 issue.
18 Q. At page D0412348, Mr. Hamade, under the title: "Lebanese-Syrian
19 Relations," there's a paragraph that appears to, in a positive way,
20 define the relationship between the two countries with a common ancestry
21 and close fraternal relations. Is that fair to say?
22 A. Yes, absolutely.
23 Q. And the language includes the sentence:
24 "This is the concept on which the two countries' co-ordination
25 and co-operation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 51/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 51 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the
2 two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the
3 sovereignty and independence of each of them."
4 For the rest of the decade, did it work out that way?
5 A. Well, we tried -- [Interpretation] We tried to implement the text
6 of the agreement and this specific provision pertaining to
7 Lebanese-Syrian relations. I was at the time minister of economy, then
8 minister for health, in the different governments. And I have signed
9 agreements, bilateral agreements, with my Syrian colleagues in the field
10 of health co-operation, economic co-operation, reducing tax duties on
11 both countries. We have to look at Lebanon and Syria. As the occupying
12 country, France, was looking at us for 20, 30 years, there were common
13 courts, there was one monetary unit, the borders were open, but there was
14 a link between the two systems, that is to say, the Lebanese system and
15 the Syrian system were within the framework of the mandate countries that
16 had parliamentarian democracy. We had political parties, different
17 political parties in Syria and Lebanon, we had elections going on, there
18 were different political forces on the ground. And all this disappeared
19 when Syria became a dictatorship and military regime in the end, as of
20 1949.
21 So when we speak about the Lebanese-Syrian relationships, we
22 speak about two brotherly countries in the full meaning of the term, but
23 this fraternity which we wanted in the agreement -- and I was in Damascus
24 in March 1990 under the government of Mr. Omar Karami, I was present as
25 minister for economy when this agreement was signed. And for us this was
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 52/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 52 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 not a step to integrate the system regime -- the Syrian regime, but we
2 were giving Syria a bit of Lebanese oxygen and we were implementing
3 agreements, respecting, as the text mentions, the sovereignty of the two
4 states and respecting this sovereignty.
5 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron and Mr. Hamade, I just need a
6 clarification, just actually go back into the transcript at page 49,
7 line 13 and 14. A few moments ago, Mr. Hamade, I think you were
8 referring to the agreement with -- between Syria and Lebanon in which you
9 said:
10 "We did implement all these conditions from the Lebanese side.
11 One of them was respected by the Syrian side" --
12 THE WITNESS: "None," I said.
13 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: That's what I thought you said. The
14 transcript said "one." I was just clarifying that you actually did in
15 fact said "none." It would probably have been picked up in the revision
16 afterwards but --
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: We can't talk over each other because the
19 interpreters will -- wait until one person is finished before they start
20 with the next one. Thank you for the clarification.
21 Mr. Cameron, please continue.
22 MR. CAMERON:
23 Q. Mr. Hamade, I'm going to leave for the moment the national
24 reconciliation document, Taif Accord, and take you to another document
25 which has been entered as Exhibit P306 and is found at tab 1 of the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 53/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 53 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Prosecution's presentation queue, beginning at D0412328 to 330, which is
2 a document entitled: "Fraternity, Co-operation, and Co-ordination Treaty
3 between the Republic of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic." If I may
4 first go to the last page at D0412330, you can see at the bottom of that
5 page that the treaty appears to have been signed in Damascus on the
6 22nd of May, 1991, sometime after the Taif Accord was reached; and the
7 two principal signatories are Elias Hrawi for the Lebanese republic, as
8 president, and for the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafez El-Assad, the
9 president of Syrian republic.
10 Now, did you have any hand as a minister during that period in
11 the discussions relating to this particular treaty?
12 A. Well, at the time we should recall that the prime minister was
13 not Rafik Hariri. The prime minister was Omar Karami. And Rafik Hariri
14 inherited this agreement. We were part of the government of national
15 unity, which is described in the Taif Agreement, and as I said, a
16 government was formed under Rachid Karami and we participated in the
17 elaboration of this document. Myself personally, as minister of economy,
18 I thought and I still think once Syria comes back to normal life, that
19 economic relations between Lebanon and Syria should be relations of
20 perfect neighbouring and very big co-operation. And we were discussing
21 at the time with our Syrian counterpart, Mr. Omari, that we should
22 develop several implementations of this accord. Of course we did not add
23 it or prepare this text, but then we started trying to implement all the
24 positive aspects, and we believed all aspects were positive if the two
25 countries had looked both at the spirit and the text of this accord. But
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 54/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 54 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 if one country is treated as an underdog and the other one as a
2 superpower, this is how the implementation ends up. All the civil
3 agreements, if I can say about social affairs, health, et cetera, were
4 going all right. Anything military, foreign policy, and security was
5 one-handed.
6 Q. And which hand was the governing?
7 A. The Syrian hand all together and its allies or agents in Lebanon.
8 Q. Now, in the first paragraph at D0413228, there is a specific
9 reference to the implementation of the Lebanese National Pact approved by
10 the Lebanese Parliament on November 5, 1989 --
11 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron, I hesitate to interrupt you,
12 but a moment ago the question you asked Mr. Hamade was whether he had any
13 hand during the period in the discussions.
14 THE WITNESS: I was a minister of economy and trade, but I -- I
15 did not put the agreement -- but I, of course, approved the fact that --
16 talking about economy and development of economic relations what was a
17 very normal thing to put and still remains a major objective of both
18 Lebanon and Syria wants situation is back to normal in the two countries.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And by that we can take it that you
20 participated in the discussions before that agreement was signed?
21 THE WITNESS: Not before, Your Honour. I discussed the
22 paragraphs concerning economy and I discussed later the implementation of
23 these paragraphs and I was present in Damascus at the signature -- the
24 whole cabinet was present when President Hrawi with Prime Minister Karami
25 and President Hafez El-Assad signed this agreement.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 55/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 55 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Was there another signature-signing ceremony
2 in Beirut or was there only one in Damascus?
3 THE WITNESS: That was in Damascus. Hafez Assad did not come to
4 Beirut.
5 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Was there any significance, as far as you're
6 concerned, with the fact that the signature-signing ceremony was held in
7 Damascus rather than Beirut or another, let us say, more neutral
8 third-party territory?
9 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, it showed the real balance of
10 forces at the time. Years before, just as I recalled, there was a
11 signature more prestigious -- between two prestigious Arab leaders,
12 Gemal Abdel Nasser and President Fuad Chehab, General Fouad Chehab, and
13 it took place in a tent exactly at the middle of the border between
14 Lebanon and Syria. At that time there was respect for the sovereignty of
15 Lebanon.
16 MR. CAMERON: I'm given to understand that you wanted to break
17 for the lunch hour at 1.20 and it's reached that point now. I'm
18 perfectly happy to carry on.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Before we break, Judge Braidy has a question
20 for you, Mr. Hamade, which will ease you into your lunch.
21 JUDGE BRAIDY: [Interpretation] Mr. Hamade, if we want to describe
22 this relation at the time, which will it be? If you want to describe the
23 relations between Syria and Lebanon.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To us it was a title, this
25 agreement, fraternity, co-operation, and co-ordination. Between two
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 56/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 56 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 republics, the first one being strong and being a reference in the
2 Middle East, more specifically after Hafez El-Assad participated in the
3 war to free Kuwait and he had acquired great influence at regional and
4 world level, and between a republic which was coming out of a civil war
5 and its woes and was trying with Arab support, international support, to
6 move forward and with Syrian co-operation to come out of its crisis. But
7 the years that followed, the first years, were years of hope. The years
8 that followed those were years of deception and the last years were those
9 of breaking down and despair.
10 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: All right. We'll take a break for lunch
11 now. Court is adjourned.
12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.21 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 2.42 p.m.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Welcome back, Mr. Hamade. Before we go on,
15 before we broke earlier, the Prosecutor asked the Chamber to take
16 judicial notice of the Fraternity, Co-operation, and Co-ordination Treaty
17 between -- sorry, excuse me. I was just having a bad flashback. I'll
18 start again.
19 Asked us to take judicial notice of the Syria Accountability and
20 Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 which is an enactment of the
21 Congress of the United States of America. The Chamber will take judicial
22 notice of that as, of course, we can, but we will admit it into evidence
23 as Exhibit P307. In doing so, we've taken note of the objections put on
24 the record by counsel for Mr. Ayyash and Mr. Badreddine and the Chamber's
25 position at the moment is that it will admit it into evidence on the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 57/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 57 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 basis, narrow basis, as set out by the Prosecutor at page 34, line 25, of
2 his submissions before, firstly, as to the position taken by the
3 United States towards Syria, which is of fairly marginal relevance; but
4 secondly, which is of more relevance, in the Prosecutor's submission it
5 adds context to the allegations made that Rafik Hariri had aligned
6 himself with the United States in 2003, which may provide some background
7 evidence. So we will admit it on that -- for that very limited purpose.
8 Please continue.
9 MR. CAMERON: If I may, there's one additional small housekeeping
10 matter relating to a reference in the transcript at page 52, line 15,
11 Mr. Hamade indicated that -- the following: The prime minister was Omar
12 Karami, Rafik Hariri inherited this agreement, and then a couple of lines
13 down there's a reference to Rachid Karami, but I think that Rachid Karami
14 should be Omar instead of Rachid, if I may.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Just to -- is that what you said?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. Rachid is the brother of Omar and he was
17 assassinated in 1987. And I think it's a lapse from Omar and Rachid.
18 MR. CAMERON:
19 Q. Just before the lunch break, Mr. Hamade, I had taken you to the
20 Fraternity, Co-operation, and Co-ordination Treaty, which appears at
21 D0412328, as Exhibit P306. Is it fair to say that on its face this
22 treaty appears to promote a co-operative relationship between Syria and
23 Lebanon, that is based upon each country's respect for the sovereignty,
24 independence, and general goals of the other country; is that fair to
25 say?
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 58/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 58 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 A. It is fair to say, especially that there is in the text of the
2 treaty, somewhere that I don't see here, a reference to the procedure to
3 be taken by both countries, which is the constitutional procedure of each
4 country. And this is -- this was meant very clearly to differentiate
5 between the presidential system, not to say the dictatorial system in
6 Syria, and the normal functioning of the institutions in Lebanon through
7 a government and an Assembly, a National Assembly, a Chamber of Deputies.
8 And so it was said that it could not be the president of Lebanon and
9 president of Syria who could take decisions, especially in the higher
10 Supreme Council, but any decision taken by the Supreme Higher Council
11 could be counter-signed by President Assad with no reference to anybody
12 of course, whereas on the Lebanese side, there is a normal procedure that
13 goes through the institutions or was supposed to go through the
14 institutions.
15 Q. And if I could take you to page 2 of this document at D0412329 to
16 Article 6, is that where you see the --
17 A. Yes, in (d):
18 "The decisions of the Higher Council shall be binding and
19 effective within the framework of the constitutional regulations of the
20 two states."
21 This was clear to keep Lebanon autonomous in its procedure.
22 Q. Is it fair to say that the Higher Council was a mechanism whereby
23 the general principles of this treaty could be extended to the mechanics
24 and day-to-day or year-to-year operations of the two countries as they
25 existed side by side?
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 59/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 59 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 A. It was -- it was not supposed to enter into every detail of the
2 Lebanese life, but as you go down the stream from the presidents to the
3 governments to the security agencies in the two countries, you can
4 realize through the implementation of the treaty that everybody was
5 under, first, the reports of the security agencies and then the
6 infiltration of these security agencies into all matters of public
7 Lebanese life. So the distortion of this treaty was not from the text
8 itself, although the treaty can reflect that the two countries will be
9 very close to each other. And this was the objective initially. But in
10 fact, it was distorted into an instrument of influence, intervention, and
11 hegemony from the Syrian state through its high commissioner in Anjar,
12 who was first Ghazi Kanaan, before that there Mohammed Ghanem, then Ghazi
13 Kanaan, then Rustom Ghazaleh, and everything was going through these
14 channels.
15 Q. Was there a point at which this distortion or deviation from the
16 treaty began or was it gradual or was there a triggering factor?
17 A. Sir, it was supposed to be degrading, it was supposed to be
18 coming down from high influence when Syrian military assistance was
19 needed to softer, more fraternal, and more co-operative and really
20 productive treaty between the two countries. What happened was exactly
21 the contrary. And then even, even, this document, as much as the Taif
22 Agreement, were no more considered as reference if compared to the
23 decision-making on the ground by officers of both sides, especially on
24 the Syrian side.
25 Q. Now, Hafez El-Assad had been the president of Syria since March
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 60/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 60 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 of 1971. Does that sound about right?
2 A. 1971 president, 1970 he took over through a coup called the
3 Corrective Movement, in late 1970 he took over. Then he was elected
4 president on that year that you -- that you stated.
5 Q. And I understand that Hafez El-Assad passed away on the
6 10th of June, 2000; does that sound right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And from the period from the signing of the Taif Accord and
9 subsequently the signing of this treaty, are you in a position to
10 describe from that general period of time until his death how relations
11 were between Lebanon and Syria?
12 A. Well, there were, as one can imagine, ups and downs in these
13 relations, even between the two presidents of the republic. And this is
14 what drove not Hafez El-Assad himself, but the group around him,
15 especially his sons, and Bashar had come amongst direct -- the directing
16 group after the accident that took the life of his brother Basel in
17 Damascus, and this group was more and more monopolizing decisions on
18 Lebanon, retrieving them from what was called the Syrian troika at the
19 time, which was Hafez Assad, Abdel Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shehabi, and
20 as this group gained an influence, especially in the last years of the
21 life of Hafez El-Assad, who was a man ailing from leukemia and not
22 operational all the time. It was the son and the group that was around
23 him that took over what we called at the time the Lebanese file with more
24 and more tendency to put the hand not only on the political decisions and
25 the military choices and the security options, but also on the economic
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 61/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 61 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 and financial resources of Lebanon through many manipulations.
2 Q. During the period -- the same period, Rafik Hariri became the
3 prime minister on a number of different occasions throughout the decade
4 of the 1990s, and you were a minister in his cabinet during that period
5 as well, I think we saw occupying different portfolios. How would you
6 describe your relationship with Rafik Hariri during that period of time?
7 A. Well, my relation was a relation that dated back to a time to
8 1981. I did not know Rafik Hariri at the time. He was living in
9 Saudi Arabia. I was already, as I stated before, a minister in the
10 cabinet headed by Shafiq Wazzan, minister for tourism. And I got to know
11 him through a phone call where he thanked me on voting for a harbour to
12 his city Sidon, in southern Lebanon, whereas other ministers from Beirut
13 and Tripoli, the three cities, voted against. So he just phoned, he
14 said: I am Rafik Hariri and I want to tell you thank you for voting for
15 my town, even if it didn't pass.
16 Then the next time I saw him it was when he started his
17 go-between actions between Lebanese parties on behalf of the Saudi
18 government and I met him in Damascus where he was contacting different
19 groups, different parties, and going back and forth to Beirut to meet at
20 the time President Gemayel, President Amine Gemayel.
21 Q. And throughout 1990s when you were a minister in Prime Minister
22 Hariri's cabinet, how would you describe your relationship with him?
23 Were you -- was it close? Was it distant? Were you --
24 A. No, it was very close, very friendly, very brotherly relation to
25 him and to his family also.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 62/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 62 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Q. And were you in a position to speak frankly with him during that
2 period and he to you?
3 A. Absolutely. I remember kind of a joke, sometimes we had to fly
4 to Europe from Damascus airport because Damascus -- Beirut airport was
5 closed because of the events in the exchange of fire. And when we took
6 off from Damascus airport, I remember we looked at the panel in his plane
7 and when we reached 37.000 feet he used to say: Now we can talk freely
8 and safely, Marwan.
9 JUDGE AKOUM: Can I?
10 [Interpretation] Mr. Marwan, while answering one of the questions
11 put to you by the Prosecution you said that the late Prime Minister
12 Hariri did not participate in the treaty, in the Fraternity,
13 Co-operation, and Co-ordination Treaty between Lebanon and Syria but he
14 inherited it. Does that mean that Prime Minister Hariri was not happy
15 and satisfied with this treaty? Did -- was that reflected in some of his
16 positions?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I did not say that he was not
18 happy or satisfied with it. I said that he did not participate in the
19 negotiation and in setting up this treaty, which was not the case for the
20 Taif Agreement, for example, where he was an essential element in this
21 agreement, an essential actor. He inherited this treaty but he took it
22 along with the Taif Agreement as part of the special relationship that
23 Lebanon had with Syria and in the framework that I had already mentioned.
24 Meaning that we looked at these steps and measures as being like an
25 umbrella, a Syrian umbrella over Lebanon, but we considered that this
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 63/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 63 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 umbrella would be lifted gradually with the reconstruction of Lebanon,
2 with the reconstruction of the Lebanese institutions, the disbanding of
3 the militias, and the withdrawal, the complete Israeli withdrawal. So we
4 looked at all these treaties and agreements as a step towards
5 establishing a true Lebanese government, a true Lebanese state that is
6 independent, free, and sovereign, that is as it was mentioned in the
7 Taif Agreement.
8 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] In your opinion, was this treaty
9 balanced or did the balance tip in favour of one of the countries more
10 than the other?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The treaty in its text is balanced;
12 however, in the implementation, it was subject to the balance of power on
13 the ground. But of course the intentions of the Syrians were different
14 from the intentions of the Lebanese public opinion at the time, and
15 therefore they looked at this treaty as a tool to increase the influence
16 of their intelligence apparatus in Lebanon, as a tool to spread its
17 control over the Lebanese army and institutions; whereas the Lebanese
18 public opinion looked at the treaty in a different manner. They
19 considered it to be as an introduction, as a preamble to establishing
20 good neighbourly relations between the two countries that would pave the
21 way to the withdrawal of the Syrian presence and the independence of
22 Lebanon. So it was like communicating [In English] basis between the
23 normalization in Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian forces.
24 [Interpretation] However, while the situation evolved and
25 developed and with the diminishing power and influence of Hafez El-Assad
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 64/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 64 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 and the interests of Bashar's group and his inner circle, the situation
2 changed and Syria tried to control everything. This is why the issue of
3 electing General Emile Lahoud for the first time as a president, this is
4 when the problems started. It started also with the re-election of
5 President Elias Hrawi or the extension of his term. This extension was
6 agreed upon to avoid Lebanon from falling under complete Syrian hegemony.
7 Elias Hrawi had privileged relations with President Hafez El-Assad, but
8 despite the privileged with Assad, he was like a safety valve for the
9 country, especially with the presence of Rafik Hariri in the government.
10 And we saw how things evolved and developed, and as soon as the term of
11 Elias Hrawi was over and he left office in 1998, Rafik Hariri was also
12 taken out of the government in an unconstitutional manner under the
13 Syrian influence. Hariri left office between 1998 until the elections in
14 the year 2000, where he won with his allies, Walid Jumblatt and a number
15 of Christian allies, and he was -- he imposed himself once again as the
16 prime minister.
17 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I'm going to ask you for a clarification,
19 but before I do I would like to remind all speakers in this courtroom,
20 which includes Judges, such as myself, Prosecution counsel, Defence
21 counsel, and of course witnesses to please pause between question and
22 answer, especially if it's in the same language.
23 I just want to clarify something you said there. Where you said
24 Rafik Hariri in 1998 was also taken out of the government in an
25 unconstitutional manner under the Syrian influence. Just very briefly,
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 65/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 65 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 as concisely as you can, explain what you meant by that.
2 THE WITNESS: I meant --
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Pausing of course, pausing.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes.
5 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During that period when the
7 consultations were taking place, so when the consultations were taking
8 place for the appointment of a prime minister in accordance with the
9 constitution, there was pressure by the Syrian Presidency and the Syrian
10 intelligence over the Members of Parliament to adopt a formula or an
11 equation that is contrary to the constitution. So the president was
12 allowed to appoint whoever he wanted as prime minister. The president
13 was given a green card, a green light, to appoint whoever he wanted as
14 prime minister. However, the constitution clearly stipulates that these
15 consultations are binding for the president and the president should
16 inform the Speaker of the result of these consultations and should
17 appoint the person who got the biggest number of votes as prime minister.
18 Rafik Hariri did obtain a large number of votes at the time;
19 however, he was not happy with this new interpretation of the
20 constitution and the Taif Agreement, and I remember the vice-president at
21 the time was called Elias Ferzli. At the time they said that this was
22 not constitutional, it constituted a violation of the constitution,
23 although Rafik Hariri did obtain the majority of votes he was not -- he
24 did not accept his appointment as prime minister by obtaining some of the
25 votes from the president himself. And that was after the imposition of
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 66/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 66 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 General Emile Lahoud as president.
2 JUDGE BRAIDY: [Interpretation] Mr. Hamade, you just mentioned
3 that there was some type of change in the inner circle, between the inner
4 circle of General Hafez Assad and the inner circle of Bashar Al-Assad.
5 What I would like to know is the following: During these two periods,
6 during the period and the time and the era of Hafez Al Assad and at the
7 time the security officials were different in Lebanon, and the other era,
8 Bashar Al-Assad's era and the different intelligence officers in Lebanon,
9 in terms of sovereignty was there any difference between these two eras?
10 For example, Ghazi Kanaan's era was Lebanon's sovereignty being more
11 respected than in Rustom Ghazaleh's era?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not think that the word
13 "sovereignty," I do not think that the word "sovereignty" --
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade, you're very eloquent and you're
15 a great raconteur. We just need to have a pause of at least five seconds
16 between question and answer because when you were answering --
17 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
18 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: -- interpreter --
19 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm used to the Lebanese Parliament where
20 we throw at each other.
21 [Interpretation] The word "sovereignty" does not apply on any of
22 those periods. However, the degree of sovereignty which was implemented
23 and the types of sovereignty varied from the situation during President
24 Hrawi and Hariri and Lebanon in the reconstruction phase and Lebanon busy
25 with the reconstruction, leaving the coalition with Syria and leaving
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 67/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 67 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Syria the major decisions in terms of foreign policy.
2 The major difference appeared, first of all, when we had to
3 negotiate in Madrid to try and find a pacific solution for the
4 Middle Eastern crisis. And I was at the time a member of government and
5 the topic of the participation of Lebanon to the Madrid conference was
6 put. Things took place and according to the agreement, co-ordination was
7 done with Syria. When we concluded the Madrid conference and when the
8 question of bilateral negotiations was set, bilateral negotiations
9 between Lebanon and Israel, between Syria and Israel, there was a strong
10 refusal, a real veto, for Lebanon to participate to any of such
11 negotiations before Syria had concluded its own negotiations. And the
12 Syrian negotiators went to Washington several times, met with the Israeli
13 representatives there. So Lebanon could not enter negotiations before
14 Syria had concluded all the files that were open between it and Israel.
15 Although Lebanon had very hot topics to negotiate, one of which was that
16 of the repatriation or the inclusion of Palestinians in the Lebanese
17 territory. Lebanon did not accept the idea of repatriating Palestinians
18 in its land, and Syria forbade us to take any measure in this direction.
19 And then when Bashar took power, when Hafez died, Bashar
20 inherited presidency, and at the time there were many promises, many
21 hopes that Syria would step in the direction of more openness, sort of
22 liberalization of the internal regime in Syria and in its general
23 relations. And what we noted on the ground was the exact opposite. So
24 in Lebanon, the stronghold was stronger and stronger through the
25 President Emile Lahoud and the intelligence services, and President
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 68/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 68 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Hariri was restricted in the creation of a first government in 2000 and
2 then a second one in 2003, which we may speak about later on. Even the
3 ministerial amendments and the names were imposed upon him so he would
4 have a majority in the hands of the Syrian services. So it appeared that
5 what we believed was a hand in a silk glove was actually the opposite, we
6 were facing a group that wanted to influence more and more the Lebanese
7 institutions, political, security, economic, and financial institutions.
8 JUDGE BRAIDY: [Interpretation] Thank you for this explanation.
9 For more details I will get back to a point and I will ask you about the
10 Madrid agreement. Who signed the agreement and when was that?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not an agreement. It was a
12 conference under the auspices of the United Nations, the United States,
13 and Russia. Russia had participated to the process and came back to the
14 scene in 1991, and the four Arab countries surrounding Israel
15 participated and some countries solved their problems. The remaining
16 files open were Lebanon and the occupation of its territory; Syria, the
17 occupation of the Golan Heights; and Palestine, of course, with the
18 absence of any rights given to the people, rights to the land. So that
19 was the group that came to Madrid. It was full of hopes at the
20 beginning, and in the end there were regional imbalances - I will not
21 mention them - which ended up by the assassination of Rabin, a
22 deterioration of the situation, the emergence of fundamentalists in all
23 the countries and more specifically in Israel as well, and the winning of
24 the right-hand political parties.
25 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade, could I just ask you to look at
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 69/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 69 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 the transcript in front of you.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And the question you were asked is: Who
4 signed the agreement and when was that.
5 THE WITNESS: This agreement --
6 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: No, no, hang on.
7 Can you look at the transcript there, the other screen.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, there is no -- I don't see the signature here.
9 It's blocked.
10 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Yes, just look at that screen. That's the
11 transcript. That's what I'm asking you to look at so that you can see
12 what's being said. Now, if you just look there it said: Who signed the
13 agreement and when was that?
14 THE WITNESS: I said there was no agreement. I said --
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I just want to demonstrate something to you.
16 What I'm going to ask you to do is to please concentrate on the question
17 being asked to you. The question was: Who signed the agreement?
18 Meaning if there was one or if it was a conference, and when was it.
19 Judge Braidy was simply asking you what year was it and who were the
20 participants.
21 THE WITNESS: It was 1991 and the participants I stated --
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Stop. Please look at the transcript, again.
23 You have to wait until the words stop before you can speak. So there are
24 two things I'd like to remind you of.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 70/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 70 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Firstly, please just wait until someone
2 stops speaking and wait five seconds. And secondly, please concentrate
3 on the question that's being asked. It may be that the person just wants
4 a little piece of information and not an explanation.
5 Now, Judge Lettieri is going to ask you a question now.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 JUDGE LETTIERI: You speak even about the murder of the president
8 soon after his election. Can you provide us with more details?
9 THE WITNESS: There is a word missing here. "You speak even
10 about the ... of the president," I don't see the word.
11 JUDGE LETTIERI: The murder of a president which occurred soon
12 later his election.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, when the Taif Agreement was adopted
14 there was an election of very moderate person accepted by most of the
15 Muslims and the Christians in Lebanon, it was President Rene Mouawad.
16 Rene Mouawad was elected as a man to implement the Taif Agreement and he
17 stayed the first few days of his mandate in his town of Zgharta, he is a
18 man from the north of Lebanon, and then he came to Beirut exactly 17 days
19 after his election to commemorate what is going -- what we are going to
20 commemorate this week, the Independence Day of Lebanon. And after he
21 received congratulations of the officials and representatives of the
22 civil society, he -- his motorcade went -- left the presidential -- the
23 office of the prime minister to his home in Beirut, and after a few
24 minutes of his departure a huge explosion rocked the city and killed
25 President Mouawad a little -- a little -- in a way that is not very far,
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 71/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 71 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 at least in the kind of thing that happened, to the murder of President
2 Hariri. And what is the most, I would say, the most scandalous about the
3 story is that until now we have no inquiry in Lebanon on the murder of
4 the president of the republic who came out of the Taif Agreement. And if
5 we hadn't your Tribunal, Your Honour, we would not be investigating other
6 things.
7 JUDGE LETTIERI: When this murder happened?
8 THE WITNESS: On the 22nd of November, 1989.
9 MR. CAMERON:
10 Q. Mr. Hamade, you indicated you were a reasonably close confidant,
11 if I can put it that way, of Rafik Hariri through the 1990s; is that
12 fair?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And in fact you worked closely with him on governmental affairs
15 throughout that period. And you were in a position to speak candidly
16 with him and to hear his thoughts in return. And are you in a position
17 to say whether you had an understanding of the prime minister's vision
18 over the longer period for Lebanon?
19 A. Yes, Rafik Hariri was a person who had profound hopes and big
20 hopes for Lebanon. He translated this in an enormous plan of development
21 and reconstruction, especially of a city who was destroyed during the
22 civil war, the centre of the city. And all the infrastructure you see
23 today in Beirut, whether the airport, harbour, the highways, are of
24 his -- were made under his mandate. He had not only development hopes,
25 but he knew and he measured his capacity to reach a more complete
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 72/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 72 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 independence. He knew that as Lebanon regained its prosperous economy,
2 its autonomy, its financial autonomy, as it went over big problems of
3 financing the reconstruction, because, here I put parenthesis, the Taif
4 Agreement and the countries which paraded -- had promised Lebanon kind
5 of -- there was a fund for the reconstruction of Lebanon with $2 billion
6 allocated to it by the Arab countries and other countries. Then, as the
7 Taif Agreement was entering into implementation, the first Gulf War
8 erupted and apparently the money allocated to Lebanon at the time was
9 forgotten and went, of course, to the military effort and the
10 reconstruction of Kuwait and the defeat of Saddam Hussein's troop. And
11 finally, Lebanon had to go into self-financing, through debts, and
12 through Arab funds and through the IMF and the World Bank.
13 So Rafik Hariri thought as we got better financially and
14 economically we would regain our independence progressively. And he
15 thought and he hoped that this would be made in co-ordination with Syria.
16 And myself as minister of economy and trade, I many times worked with my
17 colleague in Damascus on these matters, trying to bring Syria with us
18 into the European -- the association with the European Union, trying to
19 bring Syria into negotiation with the World Trade Organization, trying to
20 normalize together relations and have new openings and new view with a
21 hope that liberalization of the economy would bring the democratization
22 of the system in Syria and that we could go along as two brother
23 countries, almost twin countries, into the new century. Rafik Hariri had
24 a dream, he had a real dream on this matter, and apparently this dream
25 was not shared at all by the Syrian regime and by some of its allies in
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 73/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 73 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Lebanon. And this is where things started really and there were several
2 steps into the deterioration. Things deteriorated when it was obvious
3 that not only they had grabbed, as I said, political and security
4 matters, they had put the hand also on all kind of economic matters.
5 Q. Having worked with the prime minister so closely, can you
6 describe his general style of dealing with issues and with people. Was
7 he confrontational or flexible or accommodating, or how would you
8 characterize how he approached issues that confronted him, particularly
9 issues which were difficult?
10 A. He was -- he was a man of compromise. He was not a man of stiff
11 confrontation, but he was a man with principles. And on major issues he
12 would not give in or at least not give in easily. And when we came into
13 major issues that were connected to what we can believe is a survival of
14 Lebanon as a state, as an organized state with a constitution, with
15 functioning institutions, with a free economy, with open relations with
16 the Arab world and the world all together, at that time the big break
17 occurred.
18 Q. You described a period in 1998 where the former prime minister
19 was -- did not continue as prime minister and you also alluded to the
20 formation of a government in the year 2000 in which he became prime
21 minister again, but you mentioned that it was in restricted
22 circumstances. Can you explain what you mean, please?
23 A. Yes. During the interim period that we talked about, pressures
24 and trials of blackmailing Rafik Hariri continued and escalated. He was
25 even threatened to see his finance minister, Mr. Siniora, who later
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 74/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 74 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 became prime minister of Lebanon, imprisoned. And on a totally false
2 argument, which was that he decided to pay to Italy a debt we had
3 contracted on buying a factory for treating -- for treating garbage. And
4 as far as I remember, in the Council of Ministers which decided to pay to
5 Italy this debt, Fouad Siniora was the only minister who voted against.
6 I did vote for the payment of the debt, together with the 29 other
7 ministers. And we paid that debt to avoid that Lebanon be called to the
8 Paris club, called to the club of the defaulting countries. And what we
9 have always tried and succeeded to do with Rafik Hariri, through Paris 1,
10 Paris 2 conferences, then with Mr. Siniora through Paris 3 after the war
11 of 2006 in South Lebanon, was to keep the confidence of the international
12 community and the Arab states which are the floating instruments of the
13 economy of Lebanon through confidence into the banks, into investment,
14 into building, into -- and what we noticed is a new atmosphere prevailed,
15 especially after the year 2000. And more and more as we approached the
16 re-election, the forced re-election of Emile Lahoud, we felt that nobody
17 was anymore concerned in the other group with the sovereignty of Lebanon,
18 with the prosperity of Lebanon, with the institutions of Lebanon. What
19 was important is to keep Syrian influence and to translate it also
20 internally through the influence -- the growing influence of Hezbollah
21 militia.
22 Q. Now, in the year 2000, how did that start to manifest itself,
23 that growing influence?
24 A. Well, it was clear that in the year 2000, Israel, as I said,
25 finally left south Lebanon. Hezbollah took over the area in a very
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 75/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 75 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 decent way, no massacres, nothing, and we asked to send the army into the
2 south because we had regained the territory. And there was an absolute
3 refusal to have the army go into the south in the year 2000 --
4 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Hamade. To whom did you ask?
5 A. We asked the Council of Ministers.
6 Q. All right.
7 A. And it was obvious that word was coming from Damascus against the
8 deployment of the Lebanese army, and of course there was big reticence,
9 big refusal, by Hezbollah to have the army deployed. And we only had it
10 deployed after the war of 2006 and Resolution -- Security Council
11 Resolution 1701. In the year 2000, when this happened, there was a first
12 outcry of the Christian community, expressed by the patriarch, Patriarch
13 Sfeir, and the Maronite bishops who issued a communiqué demanding that
14 once Israel has left Lebanon, it is high time for Syria to respect the
15 sovereignty of Lebanon and implement the Taif Agreement and withdrawal.
16 Of course, this provoked very strong reactions from Syria and its allies.
17 Then Mr. Walid Jumblatt joined this demand with a more moderate
18 approach, asking for a redeployment of the Syrian forces as planned by
19 the Taif Agreement, at least to the Beqaa. And in Parliament one of the
20 Baathist MPs said that he is a spy for Israel and that he deserved death.
21 That was in the fall of 2000. Rafik Hariri phoned the government, which
22 included representatives from many parts, from many groups, which
23 included the late Bassel Fuleihan as minister of trade at the time and
24 economy, who was killed with him, killed -- or wounded in -- on February
25 14th, 2005, and then died in April. And there was some kind of balance
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 76/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 76 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 in this government for two and a half years. But there was demands more
2 and more strongly for a withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon and
3 for Hezbollah to come into terms through national dialogue with the
4 government of Lebanon to abide by the Taif Agreement and join the
5 Lebanese army or be dissolved in the Lebanese army. The argument against
6 that was the Shebaa farms that are still Lebanese territory that is
7 occupied.
8 The Shebaa farms took a lot of argument between Lebanon and
9 Syria. Syria said vocally that it is a Lebanese territory. To give
10 Hezbollah an argument for keeping what was called an armed resistance.
11 We asked Syria to give us a document to the United Nations recognizing
12 this belonging because initially it was occupied by Israel, as I said,
13 late -- earlier this morning, and we would build a diplomatic
14 initiative or would stop using military means, since the south had been
15 liberated and there was this argument on Shebaa, we would use diplomatic
16 means to obtain the restitution of the Shebaa farms to Lebanon. We never
17 got that document and there were never -- there was never a vote in the
18 Syrian Parliament that would concede to Lebanon this territory.
19 On the other hand, as we advanced in time, no Syrian withdrawal,
20 no Hezbollah abiding to the Taif Agreement, we entered a new phase which
21 was the phase of changing the balance of forces in the government. And
22 in -- I don't want to jump to new phases, but in 2003, Your Honour,
23 Rafik Hariri in one night was forced to amend his government and to expel
24 Bassel Fuleihan from it and other ministers and to introduce a number of
25 pro-Syrian ministers who would give Syria a complete upper hand on the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 77/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 77 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 government with a two-third majority and over. And this was the prelude
2 to what happened later in 2004 in the re-election of Lahoud --
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron, will you be coming back to that
4 particular topic?
5 MR. CAMERON: Yes.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, Madam.
7 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: What would likely have happened if
8 Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had not responded to the pressure to amend
9 his government and release Mr. Fuleihan as he was forced to do? What if
10 he had resisted, what would have been the likely outcome?
11 THE WITNESS: It is obvious that they would have withdrawn
12 one-third of the ministers from the cabinet, and therefore forced him to
13 resign.
14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Madam.
16 MR. CAMERON:
17 Q. Who would have withdrawn those ministers?
18 A. The Syrian government, the Syrian state. Because these were
19 ministers nominally appointed by Syria. The list of this government in
20 2003, Rustom Ghazaleh came with it from Damascus and imposed it on
21 Rafik Hariri.
22 Q. And --
23 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Can I just ask: Are you going to return to
24 this topic in greater detail at a later point?
25 MR. CAMERON: Well, I could --
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 78/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 78 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Are we getting out of sync, so to speak, in
2 terms of the chronology? I mean, it's interesting, but are you going to
3 go backwards and forwards?
4 MR. CAMERON: I think between the years 2000 and 2003 there's
5 going to be a little bit of backwards and forwards necessary.
6 Q. What I'd like to ask is you mentioned a list came from Damascus
7 in respect of a list of ministers, and you'll recall the question that I
8 asked you some time ago about the fact that you can be a minister without
9 being an elected official. Is that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. How do you know that the list came from Damascus?
12 A. Well, Mr. Hariri told me so.
13 Q. All right. And from whom in Damascus would the list have come
14 from?
15 A. From Bashar and his group.
16 Q. And how do you know that?
17 A. Well, because it couldn't come from anybody else. It is a state
18 that obeys to one person, and of course its closest associates.
19 Q. And is that how you understood the line of authority within
20 Damascus to operate?
21 A. Yes, I do understand it like that, although there was a lot of
22 allegations at the time in Beirut that Bashar was not in control of his
23 country or not in total control or that there were other forces
24 associated to him. But I do think that at the time what was called the
25 old guard, i.e., Vice-President Khaddam, Chief of Staff Shehabi, Defence
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 79/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 79 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Minister Mustafa Tlais and others had already been kept away from what
2 was called the Lebanese file and then one year later kept away from all
3 kind of official position.
4 Q. Now, we've -- you've touched upon how that kind of influence
5 could occur in the Council of Ministers. Was there a corresponding but
6 different type of influence in the Chamber of Deputies in the years 1998
7 to 2000 and beyond?
8 A. In the Chamber of Deputies, the majority, when the relation
9 with -- before the withdrawal of Syrian troops, was always a pro-Syrian
10 majority. And therefore, it would differentiate in numbers, but the
11 absolute majority was always detailed by pro-Syrian groups. And we have
12 to remember at the time - I want to say it here - that two of the major
13 Christian leaders in Lebanon, General Michel Aoun was in exile in Paris
14 and Dr. Samir Geagea was in jail at the Ministry of Defence. And the
15 only person who could talk really freely on behalf of the Christians was
16 the Maronite patriarch at that time.
17 And this is where I want to say that at that time there was a
18 major event in Lebanon in 2001, and I understand, Your Honour, that you
19 say we will go back and forth but it is a spectrum of time. There was
20 reconciliation in Mount Lebanon between old warring factions, the Druze
21 and the Maronites, under the auspices of the Maronite patriarch and
22 Mr. Jumblatt. And the patriarch came to the Chouf area, visited the
23 villages, was greeted, and it gave a new boost to what we called the
24 return of the displaced persons of which I was minister of this portfolio
25 at the time. And we were very happy and we thought that this was a big
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 80/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 80 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 progress into bringing the Lebanese communities together.
2 This was not seen by the same eye by Syria and its allies and the
3 security agencies in Lebanon because what happened is on the last day of
4 this reconciliation, young Christian demonstrated in a village called
5 Kahhaleh, between Beirut and Aley, greeting the patriarch, of course
6 applauding for the reconciliation but there were some voices that said:
7 "Suria barra," Syria out. And some people were arrested of these
8 young -- it was a young people demonstration. Immediately at the time
9 the army, the Sûreté Générale and so on grabbed these people and took
10 them down to Beirut. The next day, 7 and 8 of August of this year --
11 that year, young Christian demonstrators came in force at the Palace of
12 Justice and at the directorate of internal -- not internal security, of
13 general security and were beaten up in a very savage way by the security
14 forces and it was obvious that they wanted to foil down, to foil this
15 reconciliation atmosphere that was spreading over the country, a new
16 climate of reconciliation and a new hope.
17 Q. And, Mr. Hamade, what year was that, please?
18 A. 19 -- sorry, 2001, summer of 2001.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And --
20 THE WITNESS: Then --
21 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Hamade.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes.
23 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Just a clarification from a moment ago. You
24 said this was not seen by the same eye -- with the same eye by Syria and
25 its allies and the security agencies in Lebanon. Clarification: What
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 81/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 81 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 were you referring to when you said "security agencies in Lebanon"?
2 THE WITNESS: I mean the Mukhabarat, the army intelligence, and
3 especially the army intelligence and the directorate of general security.
4 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: You're referring to the Lebanese
5 institutions, are you?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. These two institutions were -- I'm sorry.
7 These two institutions were totally under Syrian influence.
8 MR. CAMERON:
9 Q. And the end result of that was in a nutshell ...?
10 A. The end result of that was a big discouragement of the Lebanese
11 public opinion and then we went into a new episode of Syrian intervention
12 in Lebanon. There was a partial election in the Metn area, Metn is a
13 governorate or a small directorate in Lebanon, where there was an empty
14 seat for a Greek Orthodox candidate. At the time, three candidates
15 presented themselves, two from the same family, the Murr family. There
16 was Gabriel Murr, who is the head of an important TV station in Lebanon,
17 and Mirna Murr, who is the daughter of former Deputy Prime Minister
18 Michel Mur and sister of Elias Murr. And a third candidate who was
19 Mr. Ghassan Mukhaiber.
20 When the election took place, the two Murr candidates took almost
21 the same number of votes; one was 32.400, the other 32.300-and something.
22 And of course there was, Your Honour, protest at the Constitutional
23 Council for recount and, you know, the several things that happened at
24 such occasions. The third candidate had collected 1700 votes. At no
25 time anybody believed that the third candidate would be invested.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 82/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 82 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Everybody thought that if there was some confusion in the numbers, there
2 would be an annulment of the election, it would be cancelled, and we
3 would go back to the polls. What happened is that the Constitutional
4 Council at the time, also under Syrian orders and Lebanese agencies,
5 eliminated the two candidates who had collected 32.000 votes and invested
6 Mr. Mukhaiber with 1700 votes.
7 As a result, there was huge protests in the public opinion, in
8 the press, and so on, and of course the television of Mr. Gabriel Mur
9 took a strong opposition tone and suddenly there was a decision to close
10 up this television and although we, the government, did not accept it and
11 I remember as a minister with other colleagues, Mr. Hariri and others, we
12 went and demonstrated at the TV station against this decision. And this
13 decision was confronted by a judicial decision, unfortunately by a judge
14 who was also under Syrian influence --
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Okay, can I just ask you to pause to clarify
16 two things. I'm going to ask you two questions. Firstly, you said the
17 Constitutional Council at the time was under Syrian orders.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: How do you know that?
20 THE WITNESS: It was obvious -- it was obvious from two
21 decisions, Your Honour. The most flagrant one was this one, this one,
22 when you cancel -- you cancel an election and you have them run again;
23 you don't give the third one with 1700 votes the seat.
24 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Okay.
25 THE WITNESS: The second --
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 83/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 83 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I stop you --
2 THE WITNESS: The second --
3 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I stop you. It may be obvious to you, but
4 it's certainly not obvious to me. What was it about that decision which
5 made it obvious to you that it was made under Syrian orders?
6 THE WITNESS: Because many of -- because many of the members of
7 the Constitutional Council - and I say it with regret - and their
8 president were close to the President of the Republic Emile Lahoud, who
9 was obviously a pro-Syrian president. Another case --
10 MR. CAMERON:
11 Q. Mr. Hamade, if I --
12 MR. CAMERON: And, Your Honour, if I may.
13 Q. What was the political ideology or preference of the successful
14 candidate who received 1700 votes?
15 A. One was obviously an independentist, Mr. Gabriel Murr, opposed to
16 the Syrian presence --
17 Q. Mr. Hamade, my question, I'm sorry, I didn't ask it very well.
18 The person who actually received the 1700 votes, the third candidate who
19 trailed but was nonetheless invested, what was the political ideology of
20 that particular candidate?
21 A. It was not an obvious ideology, it was not clear and I don't want
22 to say anything on him as a person. He is a respectable lawyer in
23 Lebanon and is still a Member of Parliament on General Aoun's lists.
24 Q. So I guess the issue for Judge Re may be: Why did you perceive
25 and did others perceive it to be within Syria's advantage to invest this
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 84/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 84 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 particular candidate, as opposed to the other two who had received more
2 votes?
3 A. Because it was clear at the time that this -- the count --
4 recount of the votes would give Mr. Gabriel Murr the victory.
5 Q. And what was it about Mr. Gabriel Murr's victory that would have
6 been contrary to Syrian interests?
7 A. Because he was at the head of, I would say, the most independent
8 TV station in Lebanon and the TV station who was closed just a few months
9 later and stayed closed for years, years, until we came back to power, if
10 I can say so, after the Cedar Revolution, of course the assassination of
11 Prime Minister Hariri, and our victory in the elections of 2005.
12 Q. And when you say an "independent television station," what do you
13 mean by that phrase?
14 A. I mean that it was not television that would take its order to
15 write and disclaim its news by the circles of the Sûreté Générale and the
16 army intelligence.
17 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Why the third candidate and not the second
18 one? If we've eliminated Mr. Gabriel Murr, there was someone who has
19 almost as many votes.
20 THE WITNESS: It was, in my opinion, too flagrant, too flagrant,
21 and to give one of the Murr's and not the one who had gained the majority
22 of the votes. So it is a non-understandable decision. And to support
23 what I said about the Constitutional Council - and I don't withdraw my
24 words on that - is that at the same time the Druze community, to which I
25 belong, had passed in Parliament a law establishing a procedure to elect
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 85/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 85 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 their religious chief, what we called the Sheikh Aql, and by the
2 unanimity by all the Druze representatives, even those who were not on
3 our political side, we were all united for that. And because the Sheikh
4 Aql ad interim had been imposed by the Syrian intelligence ten years
5 before, Sheikh Bahjat Ghaith, the Constitutional Council annulled a law
6 adopted by Parliament organizing the matters of a community, which in the
7 constitution is guaranteed that the communities of Lebanon are
8 represented in their self, internal organization, and let the Sheikh Aql
9 also prolong a stay ad interim for years also after -- until after 2005
10 when Syria withdrew from Lebanon.
11 I tell you, this was the climate of the Constitutional Council.
12 This was the climate of many judges in Lebanon unfortunately. Not all
13 at -- we have very respectable judges, but if we had a real institution
14 we would not be here, Your Honour.
15 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: How were the members of the Constitutional
16 Council appointed then?
17 THE WITNESS: The members of the Constitutional Council are
18 elected, half by the government, half by the House of Parliament. And
19 since Syria had the majority in both bodies, it was no problem to elect a
20 Constitutional Council.
21 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: And the other clarification I was seeking a
22 few moments ago was of the closure of that independent television
23 station, can you just remind me of the name of the television station and
24 the process by which it was closed. Who closed it? Just wait.
25 THE WITNESS: MTV, M like Malmo, T like Tripoli, V like
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 86/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 86 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Vancouver, MTV, which meant Murr Television, in fact. And it was closed
2 by a complaint presented by the prosecutor-general in Lebanon and
3 confirmed by a judge Mr. Labib Zouein at the time and it shocked
4 everybody, but I'm forced to say what happened, I'm sorry to say it. And
5 so the government could not influence negatively or positively that it
6 was a decision of a judge.
7 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: What was the basis for its closure?
8 THE WITNESS: The basis of the closure was allegations that it
9 was attempts to national unity, anything that was opposition were -- or
10 critical of Syria were attempts of national unity. And I will come later
11 on what happened to my newspaper.
12 MR. CAMERON:
13 Q. I don't want to spend much more time on this, but the second
14 El-Murr candidate, was that candidate also associated with MTV?
15 A. No.
16 Q. What was the occupation or business of that candidate?
17 A. She's a daughter of president -- Vice-President Michel Murr and
18 she's now heading -- they have popularity in the area and this explains
19 that the family took, in fact, 64.000 votes together against 1700, and
20 she is heading today the mayor's -- union of mayors of El-Metn District.
21 Q. And is the El Murr family generally considered to be independent
22 or pro-Syrian?
23 A. No, the Murr family was -- had good and cordial relations with
24 Syria at the time where everybody almost had, they had bad relations at
25 the time and they were associated with President Bashir Gemayel in the
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 87/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 87 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 year 1982. And then I want to remind you, without taking any conclusion
2 on that, of course it's not my right, that Elias Murr was the target of
3 an assassination attempt in 2005.
4 Q. Now, you spoke earlier about the removal of Bassel Fuleihan.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you recall that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can -- in a synopsized kind of way, could you tell the Tribunal
9 about how that occurred and what you understood it meant?
10 A. Well, it was double calculation, Your Honour. On one side it was
11 the elimination of one of the closer associates of Rafik Hariri, a very
12 talented young man who had returned, abandoned everything at -- and a
13 career at the World Bank and worked brilliantly at the Ministry of
14 Economy and was author of the association agreement with Europe, champion
15 of liberalism, he was a very liberal person, more than we are.
16 Q. Mr. Hamade, what period of time are we talking about now? What
17 year are we talking about?
18 A. It was between 2000 and 2003, he was eliminated in 2003, he died
19 in 2005 with Rafik. And the other issue is a pure calculation. Because
20 in the Lebanese system, you have a number allocated to each community and
21 usually when you have a 30-member government, what we call the minorities
22 which is the Protestants, the Chaldeans, the Syriacs and so on, do not
23 get a seat because the Armenians, who constitute quite a community in
24 Lebanon, get two seats. Whereas in a 24 formula, the Armenians get a
25 seat and the minorities get a seat. So by forcing Rafik Hariri to a
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 88/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 88 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 30-member government they were eliminating Fuleihan automatically by his
2 belonging to a community, they were eliminating him as minister of
3 economy. And they were able to impose one additional Armenian, who was
4 very close, still is to the Syrian regime.
5 Q. When you say "forcing," how did that come about? Who did the
6 forcing and how?
7 A. It came through very strict message from Bashar Assad carried by
8 Rustom Ghazaleh to Rafik Hariri and everything had to be settled in one
9 night, they always liked to brisk things, we will see it later. And
10 there was a big battle on the Ministry of Economy also because at the
11 time they wanted a candidate of their side in economy because both
12 ministries of finance and economy are the ministries that regulate the
13 economic situation and the relations with Paris 1, Paris 2, the IMF, and
14 the World Bank, the two ministries together. So they wanted to split the
15 thing, to leave Mr. Siniora in the Ministry of Finance, and to get
16 someone totally on their side to the Ministry of Economy. All the fight
17 of Rafik Hariri that night was to obtain from Mr. Jumblatt, who is the
18 head of my bloc, my parliamentary bloc, to accept that I move from the
19 displaced ministry back to the Ministry of Economy and Trade so that he
20 doesn't lose this access. And we finally got it because Jumblatt stood
21 firm and helped Hariri in obtaining that. But things had to be done, in
22 the morning we had to have the decree.
23 JUDGE AKOUM: Mr. Cameron, can I?
24 [Interpretation] Mr. Marwan, in your answer you said a while ago
25 that by forcing President Hariri to have a government made up of
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 89/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 89 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 30 members, they were getting rid of Mr. Fuleihan automatically because
2 he belonged to a minority group. Can you specify this a little bit?
3 When there are 30 members in the government, they get rid of him; is that
4 it?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the Lebanese regime and in the
6 confessional distribution of ministerial portfolios, we have customary
7 traditions - how should I call that? - there is an agreement which is the
8 following: The Armenians will get two seats. When it's an enlarged
9 government. But when it is a restricted government, the Armenians only
10 get one seat and the minorities will get a portfolio because they are
11 considered as a group which is really marginalised. And Rafik Hariri
12 created a ministry of 24 on purpose. He could, in such a situation,
13 choose to have Bassel Fuleihan. With a government of 30 ministers,
14 Fuleihan following the role would have been put aside and a second
15 Armenian minister was nominated. I will not give his name because he was
16 nominated because of the situation and he was a Syrian ally for sure.
17 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] If there is a government of 30
18 portfolios, the Armenian will get two seats and there is an empty seat
19 for the minorities?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no, we are entering into
21 the Lebanese way of computing portfolios. When you have a government of
22 30 ministers, you have Sunnis, Shiites, Maronites who get a certain
23 number of portfolios. You have Greek Orthodox, three Druze, three Greek
24 Catholics, and two Armenians, no room in such a government, neither for
25 the minorities nor was the door open to Alawites who are also a minority,
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 90/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 90 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 a Muslim minority.
2 JUDGE AKOUM: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. CAMERON:
4 Q. Mr. Hamade, I'd like to focus in on just one part of this story
5 and that's -- you mentioned that there was a message delivered from
6 Bashar Al-Assad through Rustom Ghazaleh to Rafik Hariri from whom you
7 heard the message.
8 A. I was involved with the [indiscernible].
9 Q. You were at the meeting with Rustom Ghazaleh and Rafik Hariri?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Okay. What did you understand the message to be from
12 Rustom Ghazaleh to Rafik Hariri?
13 A. Rafik Hariri sent for us, members of the former government, and
14 potential members of the future government to discuss this new diktat
15 that had come from Damascus, which translated into, as I said, in a
16 30-member government, where the pro-Syrian acquired not only the
17 two-thirds majority but two-thirds majority plus. And this will look
18 obvious when we will discuss the amendment of the constitution one year
19 later by the same government, by the same government. So it was in fact
20 the preparation for the new coup d’état of Syria in Lebanon, which was to
21 take place with the re-election of Emile Lahoud in the summer of 2004 and
22 all that ensued then.
23 Q. Mr. Hamade, can you paraphrase your understanding of the words
24 used by Rustom Ghazaleh to Rafik Hariri in delivering the message from
25 Damascus? Can you paraphrase what Rustom Ghazaleh actually said, if you
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 91/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 91 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 know?
2 A. Your Honour, I was not present to go into speculation. I can
3 only deduct from the results and from what Rafik Hariri told us --
4 Q. All right. This is -- if you can just stop there. Did
5 Mr. Hariri tell you the message that Rustom Ghazaleh had delivered to
6 him?
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. All right. So what -- it's not speculation if you tell the
9 Tribunal what the prime minister told you about what Rustom Ghazaleh had
10 said to him. So what did the prime minister tell you about that?
11 A. He said specifically: We have to change the government, we call
12 it in Arabic "Taedil Hukumi," we have to change some of your colleagues,
13 and this has to be done by tomorrow and I want you to help me with
14 Mr. Jumblatt, who was very attached to the ministry of displaced because
15 it concerned his area in the first place, that we shift you to the
16 economy and trade because Bassel has no place anymore in this government.
17 Q. Now --
18 A. -- and it was obvious, he said, we have to change this government
19 by tomorrow.
20 Q. So the message from Rustom Ghazaleh was to reorganise the prime
21 minister's plans to create the government; is that right?
22 A. Absolutely.
23 Q. All right. Now, why did you understand that that message was
24 being delivered?
25 A. Because --
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 92/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 92 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Q. What was the point of it?
2 A. Because Rustom Ghazaleh would not initiate himself a message with
3 the importance of amending the Lebanese government. It was delivered by
4 him, emanating from his leadership.
5 Q. What was the advantage in that change to Rustom Ghazaleh's
6 leadership?
7 A. Paralyze totally Rafik Hariri in any decision-making by the
8 government and prepare the ground for the year to come, which was the
9 year of re-election they wanted for Lahoud, although they pretended that
10 they would leave Lebanon free to choose its president.
11 Q. So --
12 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Mr. Cameron. When was this, Mr. Hamade?
13 THE WITNESS: It was in April 2003, sir.
14 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Can you be more precise?
15 THE WITNESS: On the day? No, I have to look into the files. I
16 don't remember the day, but I think it's April 2003.
17 MR. CAMERON:
18 Q. Was it before the meeting in December of 2003 in Damascus between
19 President Assad and Prime Minister Hariri?
20 A. Yes, long before. You know, there were -- there were many
21 meetings between President Assad and Mr. Hariri, but it was six months
22 before at least, before the famous meeting of December 2003.
23 Q. Okay.
24 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: I think Judge Braidy had a question.
25 JUDGE BRAIDY: [Interpretation] Mr. Hamade, was that the first
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 93/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 93 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 time in which the Syrian intervened in the definition of the members of a
2 government since 1991 until 2003? If that was not the first time, why
3 was there this specific flavour which you describe as being more
4 pressure? Was that because it was preparing a phase after this new
5 government? What is the difference between the Syrian intervention every
6 time in the creation of a government and this specific time?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Syrian intervention in the
8 constitution of the government went on non-stop and I will not go back to
9 the time of the President Rene Mouawad who fought with them on the
10 members of the government and he was killed before his first government
11 was created. This point should remain in people's minds. They
12 intervened in all the governments.
13 However, the first government, that of National Union, they
14 agreed in the year 1990, they agreed with all the names, including that
15 of Dr. Samir Geagea who left his position because of his personal
16 security situation. The Prime Minister, Mr. Karami, had to sign a decree
17 in which we had the name of Mr. Geagea. So they intervened in all
18 governments. And in 1998, they replaced Mr. Hariri by Dr. Salim El Hoss
19 and Mr. Hariri came back because he won an election. As of the year
20 2000, the vertical division started because of the -- because the Syrians
21 remained on the ground and Hezbollah kept its weapons. As of this point,
22 it became clear that Bashar Al-Assad wanted to keep things in hand and
23 that Hariri and his government could not decide everything. So the
24 decisions had become forbidden.
25 MR. CAMERON:
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 94/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 94 Examination by Mr. Cameron
1 Q. Mr. Hamade, I know that you will think this is a simple and
2 perhaps naive question in light of all that you have said, when in
3 mid-2003 Rustom Ghazaleh delivered the message to Prime Minister Hariri,
4 I take it that Prime Minister Hariri would have preferred to do things
5 differently. It's a short question. Is that fair to say?
6 A. It's fair to say.
7 Q. And --
8 A. I can even say that he was thinking of resigning and quitting.
9 Q. Now, why was it that he put into effect that direction instead of
10 either ignoring it or defying it?
11 A. It was a very special -- I remember discussing with him at the
12 time, Your Honour. There was the Iraqi attack at the time, the attack on
13 Iraq. The situation in the area was very volatile, very dangerous. And
14 Rafik Hariri was always guided by a sense of moderation and avoiding for
15 Lebanon further problems said -- and he was comforted in that and
16 approved in that by his ally at the time Mr. Jumblatt that: Let's not
17 make waves at this stage with the Syrian regime. We have time to improve
18 our situation with elections next year and so on and this is why they
19 abided by this diktat.
20 MR. CAMERON: Is this a convenient moment to end the testimony
21 for today?
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Indeed. Our thoughts exactly. Thank you,
23 Mr. Cameron.
24 Before we adjourn, I just wish to correct the transcript in the
25 decision we gave this morning at page 6, line 10, I think, where I said
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic. 20141117_STL-11-01_T_T93_OFF_PUB_EN 95/95
PUBLIC Official Transcript Witness: Marwan Hamade –PRH038 (Open Session) Page 95 Procedural Matters
1 the Prosecutor referred to "a political assassination of the 14th of
2 February," I then said "2004." That was a --
3 THE WITNESS: 2005.
4 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: -- it was a year I added. I should have --
5 I don't know why I said 2004, it was obviously 2005. So if the
6 transcript can kindly be corrected there.
7 Mr. Hamade, we're going to adjourn until tomorrow --
8 THE WITNESS: Can I --
9 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Just hang on for a second. What I'm going
10 to say to you is with every other witness, because you're mid-testimony,
11 please don't discuss your evidence with anybody, and I know you won't in
12 the way that you're shaking your hands and your head at the same time,
13 until we come back in the morning. You were just indicating to me you
14 wish to say something.
15 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think there was --
16 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Hang on, you've got to pause.
17 THE WITNESS: I think there was a mistake somewhere. I read
18 "Mr. Rambline" instead of "Mr. Rabin." I was talking of the
19 assassination of the Israeli prime minister long before that, but I
20 didn't want to interrupt. I ask in the transcript to correct this. It's
21 not Mr. Rambline, it's Mr. Rabin.
22 PRESIDING JUDGE RE: Are there any other things anyone wishes to
23 raise before we adjourn? There not being any, we will adjourn until
24 tomorrow morning. The court is adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.23 p.m.
Monday, 17 November 2014 STL-11-01 Interpretation serves to facilitate communication. Only the original speech is authentic.