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This article was downloaded by: [Mercyhurst College] On: 18 May 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 788722758] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713723134 Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations Brian Champion To cite this Article Champion, Brian(2008) 'Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 21: 3, 530 — 564 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08850600701651268 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600701651268 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 21: 530–564, 2008 Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online DOI: 10.1080/08850600701651268 BRIAN CHAMPION Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations The rationale for using front companies or business covers in covert operations has existed for centuries and most likely has been used since time immemorial. What are now called ‘‘proprietaries,’’ ‘‘notional companies,’’ or ‘‘commercial covers’’wereusefulinformationalartsused by spies and have existed as tools in the security toolbox since governments began. AN ANCIENT HERITAGE Documented cases from premodern times are eclectic and rare, as in the biblical account of Joshua seeking to take the children of Israel into the Promised Land in the thirteenth century BCE. He sent spies ahead to survey the land of Canaan; presumably, they adopted covers which permitted them easy assimilation into the local culture. But, however well they may Downloaded By: [Mercyhurst College] At: 16:31 18 May 2010 have tried, they were quickly spotted and, with their cover blown, beat a hasty retreat under the cover of darkness and rejoined Joshua’s surrounding army.1 A superb source for premodern accounts of espionage, Francis Dvornik’s Origins of Intelligence Services, describes in great detail the cultivation of politico–economic and military intelligence in the ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslin empires, Mongol China, and Muscovy. According to Dvornik, one of the earliest examples of the use of commercial cover for covert activity comes from the tenth century BCE Assyrian surveillance of merchant caravans, Brian Champion is Political Science and World Politics Librarian in the Department of Social Sciences and Education at the Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 530 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE THE EARLY USE OF BUSINESS AND CIVILIAN COVERS IN COVERT OPERATIONS 531 including descriptions of their cargo and numbers of personnel.2 By one account, fourth century BCE Greek city-states had created the working essentials of a modern intelligence organization,3 and Greek historian Xenophon (considered by Dvornik ‘‘a pioneer’’ in the arts of military intelligence)4 portrayed Persian conqueror Cyrus as having spies adopt the appearance and manners of ‘‘brigands’’ in order to authenticate their covert missions.5 Mercenaries were also used by ancient tyrants as sources of politico-military intelligence, as they frequently affected the styles and customs of commercial travelers and merchants.6 By the very fact that merchants were ‘‘ubiquitous and welcome in most of the Greek world’’ and were keen to obtain information on markets, prices, competitors, and conditions that they might exploit, their mannerisms and costumes were frequently adopted to protect clandestine missions.7 Xenophon extended his analysis of spies to include an espionage taxonomy differentiated by task, in part emphasizing the utility (even necessity?) of commercial cover for covert operations: It is also necessary to have given thought to spies ...before the outbreak of war, so that they may be from states friendly to warring parties and also from merchants; for all states always receive those importing foods and men well disposed to them. Fake deserters ...can be useful as well.8 Thus, for the Greeks, neutrals, fake deserters (or outsiders), and—more importantly—merchants were significant sources of intelligence. As Frank Santi Russell notes, The outsider is typified by the fake deserter, who is distinguished in syntax and thought from the neutral group and merchant. The outsider seeks to infiltrate another state or social group, to which he or she Downloaded By: [Mercyhurst College] At: 16:31 18 May 2010 would be denied access if his or her affiliation and purpose were known. Merchants and neutrals,however,aremorelikelytobe admitted to a target state. Merchants were associated more with their trade than with their state of origin, and since their trade was beneficial, their presence was welcome.9 And to ensure the success of a covert mission, disguises were used: ‘‘usually they were props designed to lend credence to a cover, rather than attempts to render an individual’s identity unrecognizable. There are stories of people donning the garb of beggars, hunters, peasants, or foreign peoples when engaged in some crafty enterprise or another.’’10 Of more concern to Greek covert agents was the establishment and maintenance of credibility through a cover story. Sometimes a basic cover could be implicit in an assumed role—that of an envoy or a merchant, for example. Those agents assuming such covers would be AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 21, NUMBER 3 532 BRIAN CHAMPION obliged to know about the trade they professed, but to some extent the pretext for their presence was supplied by the cover.11 THE ROMAN VARIATION Despite the self-evident benefits of covert information-gathering that commercial cover provided the Greeks, the Romans by contrast seemed considerably less eager to fully maximize a wide array of intelligence assets. As Rose Mary Sheldon notes, Rome ignored the Greek intelligence experience and failed to create its own imperial intelligence service—‘‘a naive attitude toward the importance of intelligence prevailed during the Republic and it was never entirely shaken off.’’12 Especially in the early period of the Roman era, communication of even the most meager intelligence was essentially nonexistent. As Francis Dvornik explains, Roman imperial intelligence utilized a variety of collection techniques with varying degrees of effectiveness. In one sense, the use of signaling towers was one method of communicating the information legions had collected and transmitted. They seem to have relied, in the early Republican period, on information given them by their allies of the movements of dangerous neighbors. We find numerous pieces of evidence of this kind in Livy’s historical work. From the manner in which he describes this kind of information, we have the impression that the Romans themselves had not even thought of establishing a systematic intelligence service and that they possessed no special agents among the befriended and allied tribes. They left it entirely to their allies to keep them informed of events which might endanger their common interests.13 Such indifference to the value of intelligence is sharply contrasted with the Downloaded By: [Mercyhurst College] At: 16:31 18 May 2010 view of one of Rome’s early enemies, the Carthaginians, during the Punic Wars of the third to first centuries BCE. The Carthaginians were western Phoenicians who had established a prodigious trading empire stretching from modern Lebanon to Morocco, north into Spain, and as far north as Pisa in Italy.14 The Carthaginians had expertise in collecting and analyzing intelligence based on their savvy practice of garnering business information at every turn. Again citing Dvornik: Owing to their frequent commercial intercourse with Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, the Carthaginian Phoenicians—the city of Carthage was founded by the Phoenicians of Tyre in Syria—were well acquainted with all that took place in the Near Eastern countries. They knew of the elaborate information services which had developed in those lands andtheywereshrewdenoughtoapplyfortheirownbenefitthe methods used by Near Eastern monarchies. The Carthaginians were INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE THE EARLY USE OF BUSINESS AND CIVILIAN COVERS IN COVERT OPERATIONS 533 daring seafarers and applied the principles of good information service to their foreign trade.15 The inability of official Rome to institute sound intelligence practices,