The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city Prepared for The European Union Studies Association Conference 3-5 March 2011 Boston, Massachusetts Dr Simon Duke Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht Ph: +0031 43 3296356 E-mail: [email protected] DRAFT ONLY. PLEASE DO NOT CITE. COMMENTS WELCOME. Keywords: EU, NATO, strategy, defence, collective security, human security, CSDP, Lisbon Treaty, mutual assistance, solidarity clause, permanent structured cooperation There is a gap between image and reality when it comes to EU-NATO relations. Both organizations talk, sometimes surreally, of their mutual importance to one another yet this often belies the actual reality of their relations. The EU insists that the continuing development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is essential to the Union‟s aspirations to be a global actor and key strategic partner. Meanwhile, NATO‟s recent and well-publicized New Strategic Concept underlined not only the virility of the Alliance in its middle age, but also its ability to assume new challenges and thus enhance its relevance. The definition of relations between the two organizations is an ongoing and sensitive issue. This contribution will consider the extent to which the EU‟s Lisbon Treaty promotes partnership between the EU and NATO or whether it merely highlights existing incongruence. The analysis is based on the treaty text but also relies upon associated documents, statements of senior officials, academic and think tank contributions. The debates that took place within the Convention on the Future of Europe are particularly relevant since they offer a perspective on the intentions of the treaty framers behind the words. Although there are many dimensions that could directly or indirectly influence EU-NATO relations, this analysis limits itself to three specific treaty-based aspects that are seen as of core importance to the future of mutual relations. The first is the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty contributes to the formation of a compelling strategic direction for the EU and, by implication, what type of partner (or competitor) the EU may become. The recent unveiling of NATO‟s New Strategic Concept (NSC) is also analyzed alongside the relevant EU treaty text in order to establish the extent to which there is strategic complementarity. The second broad theme goes beyond the general security heading, which touches on the missions of both the EU and NATO, considers three inter-related terms – collective defence, mutual aid and assistance and the solidarity clause. Together the terms have been portrayed, correctly or incorrectly, as constituting a reorientation of the EU‟s security role. This section will consider the three clauses, their meanings and linkages, and whether or not they should be construed as an emerging competitive element between (and possibly within) the organisations. 1 The third area to be examined considers the perennial resource issue, which feature heavily in the CSDP aspects of the Lisbon Treaty. Two related aspects, outlined in the treaty, are of special relevance – Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The former is often portrayed as one of the significant developments of the Lisbon Treaty and, if the aspirations behind PESCO develop into reality, this will indeed have important positive knock-on effects for the EU and NATO. There are though, as argued below, many hurdles along PESCO‟s course. The Lisbon Treaty reinforces the EDA‟s role as well as the political importance attached to the Agency‟s mission. The wisdom of doing so, especially when the fundamental powers of the agency remain limited, will be assessed. The conclusions argue that the Lisbon Treaty does little to actually change CSDP, or to fundamentally realign EU-NATO relations. The changes introduced by the treaty either codify existing changes in practice (such as the expanded Petersberg tasks) or serve as tools to encourage development of the policy area by the EU members (like PESCO). The development of what may appear to be overlapping mandates by both the EU and NATO is generally exaggerated but, even where there are, they remain unlikely to lead to zero-sum competition between the organisations in the short to medium-term. Co-existence will remain the norm for the indefinite future. This also suggests that there is unlikely to be any dramatic improvements in mutual relations, not only because of the Cyprus problem, but because of underlying concerns about NATO‟s relevance and American hegemony and equally strong reserves about the political and military fundamentals of CSDP. The Cyprus problem provides a perhaps convenient pretext for avoiding these harder questions, but it also threatens to waste the potential offered by the Lisbon Treaty and to thus perpetuate the existence of two organizations divided within a common city. The vision thing It has become fashionable, with justification, to lament the lack of a compelling strategic vision for the EU in its external action. This lack of vision then hampers the development of EU external action and, in the specific context of EU-NATO relations, stymies the development and pursuit of common goals.1 At a more general level the lack of strategic vision is reflected in the debates in the literature about the nature of the EU‟s actorness, especially when it comes to security matters.2 Although it is not the job of a treaty to lay out strategy, the Lisbon Treaty nevertheless provides a useful context for any current or future 2 strategies. The treaty makes it clear that the Union‟s external action should be based upon both values and interests. It reminds the EU members what they should stand for (respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights) but goes further than the old version of the treaties by significantly expanding the objectives of the Union. To quote the relevant part of the treaty: In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.3 The values and interests of the Union in its external action are certainly not unique to the EU since the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, contains rather similar wording. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows: The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.4 This article occupied the back seat for much of the Cold War due to the prominence of NATO‟s Article 5 mission whereby in the event of an armed attack against any Alliance member they shall individually or in concert use „such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area‟.5 The collective self-defence article was important not only because of the particularities of the Cold War but also because of the underlying political solidarity provided by the existence of a common threat and the credibility of American nuclear and convention forces. It was the core „Article 5‟ commitment that prompted Karl Deutsch to describe NATO as a „security community‟ in 1957, whose sense of community rested upon the extreme unlikelihood of violence or aggression between the Alliance members and a sense of common purpose.6 3 With the fading of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union the far broader wording of Article 2 came to the fore as the underpinning justification for the assertion of broad range of military and civilian roles. Article 4 which provides for consultation „whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened‟, was also invoked to underpin NATO‟s claim that it was never just a collective defence alliance and to justify the development of the cooperative security, crisis management and arms control facets of its activities. More importantly, it also led to the Alliance going „out of area‟ and to the consideration of more general international tasks. Logically, the assumption of new tasks that go beyond the transatlantic community and that aim to respond to a far greater range of threats risks loosening the threads binding the „security community‟ together. This is why NATO‟s November 2010 NSC had to reassure all NATO members that the Alliance‟s „greatest responsibility‟ is to „protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack‟.7 Paradoxically, as Article 5 appears more and more otiose in light of the lack of any credible territorial threat to the Alliance area, its relevance as the political bedrock for the Alliance has increased. The importance of an increasingly irrelevant guarantee has been further reinforced by open disagreements between the United States and its allies over a number of fundamental questions of international politics and security (Iraq, Afghanistan, multilateralism, Guantanamo, renditions etc.). The lack of any obvious alternative to NATO alongside the international nature of many of the challenges faced by NATO‟s membership led to expansive versions of the Alliance‟s future including that of „global NATO.‟8 According to this concept the renewed Alliance would expand its protection to all democracies, including Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, transforming it into a quasi-league of democracies.