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Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression

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Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression Historical Review of Developments relating to Aggression United Nations New York, 2003 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.03.V10 ISBN 92-1-133538-8 Copyright 0 United Nations, 2003 All rights reserved Contents Paragraphs Page Preface xvii Introduction 1. The Nuremberg Tribunal 1-117 A. Establishment 1 B. Jurisdiction 2 C. The indictment 3-14 1. The defendants 4 2. Count one: The common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace 5-8 3 3. Count two: Planning, preparing, initiating and waging war as crimes against peace 9-10 4. The specific charges against the defendants 11-14 (a) Count one 12 (b) Counts one and two 13 (c) Count two 14 D. The judgement 15-117 1. The charges contained in counts one and two 15-16 2. The factual background of the aggressive war 17-21 3. Measures of rearmament 22-23 4. Preparing and planning for aggression 24-26 5. Acts of aggression and aggressive wars 27-53 (a) The seizure of Austria 28-31 (b) The seizure of Czechoslovakia 32-33 (c) The invasion of Poland 34-35 (d) The invasion of Denmark and Norway 36-43 Paragraphs Page (e) The invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 44-45 (f) The invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece 46-48 (g) The invasion of the Soviet Union 49-51 (h) The declaration of war against the United States 52-53 28 6. Wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances 54 7. The Law of the Charter 55-57 The crime of aggressive war 56-57 8. The common plan or conspiracy 58-62 9. Individual criminal responsibility 63-117 (a) Defendants convicted of counts one and two 64-80 (i) Goring 64-66 a. High-level positions, influence and knowledge 65 b. Conclusion 66 (ii) Hess 67-70 a. Knowledge andparticipation 68 b. Defence claim ofpeaceful aims 69-70 (iii) von Ribbentrop 71 (iv) Keitel 72 (v) Rosenberg 73 (vi) Raeder 74-75 (vii)Jodl 76-78 a. Defence claim. superior orders 77 b. Conclusion 78 Paragraphs Page (viii) von Neurath 79-80 46 Knowledge 80 47 (b) Defendants acquitted of count one and convicted of count two 81-89 47 (i) Frick 81-82 47 (ii) Funk 83-84 49 (iii) Ddnitz 85-87 51 High-levelposition, participation and significantcontribution 87 52 (iv) Seyss-Inquart 88-89 53 (c) Defendants acquitted of counts one and two 90-103 54 (i) Schacht 90-97 54 a. Rearmament as a crime against peace 93-95 56 b. Knowledge andparticipation 96-97 57 (ii) Sauckel 98 58 Sufficient connection and involvement 98 58 (iii) von Papen 99-101 59 Support,participation and purpose 101 61 (iv) Speer 102-103 61 Rearmament as a crime against peace 103 62 (d) Defendants acquitted of count one and not charged with count two 104-117 62 (i) Kaltenbrunner 104-105 62 Directparticipation 105 63 (ii) Frank 106-108 63 Paragraphs Page Sufficient connection with the common plan 107-108 (iii) Streicher 109-110 Connection with the common plan 110 (iv) von Schirach 111-112 Involvement andparticipation 112 (v) Fritzsche 113-115 a. Subordinateposition 114 b. Knowledge andparticipation 115 (vi) Bormann 116-117 Knowledge 117 Tribunals established pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 118-266 A. Establishment 118-120 B. Jurisdiction 121-125 C. Indictments 126-127 D. United States ofAmerica v. CarlKrauch et al. (the I G. Farbencase) 128-141 1. The charges of crimes against peace 128 2. Judgement 129-141 (a) The Nuremberg precedent: cautious approach requires conclusive evidence of knowledge and participation 129 73 (b) The requirements for individual criminal responsibility 130 74 (c) Knowledge 131-134 75 (i) Common knowledge 133 75 (ii) Imputedpersonal knowledge 134 76 Paragraphs Page (d) High-level position and degree of participation 135-138 (e) Conclusion 139-141 E. United States ofAmerica v. Alred Felir Altn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al. (the Krupp case) 142-148 82 1. The charges of crimes against peace 142 82 2. The motion for dismissal 143-148 82 (a) The Nuremberg precedent 144-147 82 (i) The aggressive wars 144 83 (ii) Knowledge 145-146 83 (iii) Rearmament as aform of participationin the crime of aggression 147 83 (b) Conclusion 148 84 F. UnitedStates ofAmerica v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (the High Command case) 149-165 1. The charges of crimes against peace 149 2. Judgement 150-165 (a) The nature and characteristics of aggressive wars and invasions 150-155 85 (b) The elements required for individual criminal responsibility 156-164 88 (i) Knowledge 157 89 (ii) High-level policy position 158-162 90 (iii) Participation 163-164 92 93 (c) Conclusion 165 G. United States ofAmerica v. Ernst von Weizsaicker et al. (the Ministries case) 166-259 93 Paragraphs Page 1. The charges of crimes against peace 166 93 2. Judgement 167-259 94 (a) The law relating to aggressive wars and invasions 168 94 (b) The question of individual criminal responsibility for aggressive wars and invasions 169 (c) The tu quoque doctrine 170 (d) The alleged acts of aggression 171-195 (i) The claim that Germany acted in self- defence and the alleged invalidity of the Treaty of Versailles 172-176 99 (ii) The invasion ofAustria and Czechoslovakia 177-182 (iii) The invasion ofPoland 183 (iv) The invasion ofDenmark and Norway: the claims of self-defence and military necessity 184-186 107 (v) The aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands andLuxembourg 187-188 108 (vi) The aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia: the aggressorState's inability to claim self-defence and military necessity 189-192 (vii) The aggression againstRussia 193 (viii)The aggressionagainst the United States 194 112 (ix) Conclusions regardingthe alleged acts of aggression 195 (e) Individual criminal responsibility I 96-199 (i) High-levelposition 196 P-argraq) Page (ii) The essentialelement of knowledge 197-198 113 (iii) The claims ofcoercion andduress 199 115 (f) von Weizsaiker 200-216 115 (i) Generalconsideration of criminal responsibility and defence claims 200-203 115 (ii) The invasion ofAustria 204 118 (iii) The annexation of the Sudetenland by the Munich Pact and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia 205-209 119 (iv) The aggressionagainst Poland 210 122 (v) The aggressionagainst Denmark and Norway 211 123 (vi) The aggressionagainst Belgium, the Netherlands and Lwxemboug 212 124 (vii) The aggression againstGreece and Yugoslavia 213-214 126 (viii)The aggression againstRussia 215 126 (ix) The aggressionagainst the United States 216 128 (g) Keppler 217-221 129 (i) Generalconsiderations 217 129 (ii) The aggression againstAustria 218-219 129 (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 220-221 131 (h) Woermann 222-231 132 (i) Generalconsiderations: high-level position and wide discretionary powers 222-223 133 (ii) The aggression againstPoland 224-225 134 Paragraphs Page (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 226 136 (iv) The aggression againstDenmark and Norway 227 137 (v) The aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands andLuxembourg 228 137 (vi) The aggression against Greece 229 137 (vii) The aggression against Yugoslavia 230 138 (viii)The aggressionagainst Russia 231 139 (i) Lammers 232-242 139 (i) General considerations:high-level position, knowledge andparticipation 232 139 (ii) The aggressionagainst Austria 233 140 (iii) The aggressionagainst Czechoslovakia 234 141 (iv) The aggression against Poland 235 141 (v) The aggression against Norway and Denmark 236 142 (vi) The aggression againstBelgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 237 142 (vii) The aggression againstRussia 238 143 (viii) Conclusion 239-242 143 (j) Koemer 243-250 144 (i) Generalconsiderations: high-level position andknowledge 243-244 145 (H) The aggression againstAustria 245 146 (iii) The aggression against Czechoslovakia 246 146 (iv) The aggression againstPoland 247 147 (v) The aggression againstRussia 248-249 147 X Paagraphs Page (vi) Conclusion 250 148 (k) Ritter 251 148 (1) Veesenmayer 252 149 (m) Stuckart 253 149 (n) DarrE 254 150 (o) Dietrich 255 150 (p) Berger 256 151 (q) Schellenberg 257 151 (r) Schwerin von Krosigk 258 152 (s) Pleiger 259 153 H. The Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in German, v. Hermann Roechling et al. (the Roechling case) 260-266 153 1. The charges of crimes against peace 260 153 2. The judgement of the General Tribunal 261 154 3. The judgement of the Supreme Military Government Court 262-266 154 (a) Sufficient and international collaboration 262 154 (b) The principal originators 263 155 (c) Intent 264 155 (d) A leading part 265 156 (e) Conclusion 266 156 III. The Tokyo Tribunal 267-378 158 A. Establishment 26' 158 B. Jurisdiction 268-269 158 C. The indictment 270-287 160 1. Group one 275-279 162 Paragraphs Page (e) The war against the Philippines (United States) 323 195 7. Individual responsibility of the accused 324-378 196 (a) Araki, Sadao 325-326 196 (b) Dohihara, Kenji 327-328 197 (c) Hashimoto, Kingoro 329-330 198 (d) Hata, Shunroko 331-332 199 (e) Hiranuma, Kiichiro 333-334 200 (f) Hirota, Koki 335-338 201 Defence claim: advocated dispute settlement 336-338 202 (g) Hoshino, Naoki 339-340 203 (h) Itagaki, Seishiro 341-342 204 (i) Kaya, Okinori 343 206 (j) Kido, Koichi 344-345 206 (k) Kimura, Heitaro 346 208 (1) Koiso, Kuniaki 347-349 209 (m) Matsui, Iwane 350 210 (n) Minami, Jiro 351-352 210 (o) Muto, Akira 353-354 212 (p) Oka, Takasumi 355 212 (q) Oshima, Hiroshi 356-358 213 Defence claim: diplomatic immunity 357-358 214 (r) Sato, Kenryo 359-360 214 High-level position and knowledge 360 215 (s) Shigemitsu, Mamoru 361-363 216 (t) Shimada, Shigetaro 364-365 217 Paragraphs Page Self-defence claim 365 217 (u) Shiratori, Toshio 366-368 218 (v) Suzuki, Teiichi 369-370 219 (w) Togo, Shigenori 371-373 220 Defence claims 372-373 220 (x) Toji, Hideki 374-376 221 Self-defence claim 375-376 222 (y) Umezu, Yoshijiro 377-378 222 IV.
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