Some Psychosocial and Cultural Factors in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a Review of the Literature

Some psychosocial and cultural factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict: a review of the literature

BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI1 Institute for Human Adjustment, University of Michigan

This review is offered as an introductory three groups: psychological-theoretical (Liff, guide to the literature on selected psychoso- 1971; Tamarin, 1968a), psYchologi~l-empiri- cial and cultural aspects of the Arab-Israeli cal (Newnham, 1967; Sanua, 1970, 1971), conflict. Its aims are to survey some of and historical-ideological (Cohen, 1970; the scientific and nonscientific efforts that Deutscher, 1968; Harkabi, 1967a, 1968). This have been made to understand the psy- group of overviews was used as a source chosocial bases of behaviors in this conflict, of propositions and hypotheses, and the and to clarify evidence related to major following three issues were selected as the propositions regarding the impact of those foci for this review: (1) cultural charac- bases. Its scope is limited by accepting the teristics and &dquo;national character&dquo; as param- basic caveats of Kelman (1965a) and Etzioni eters in the conflict; (2) the internal func- (1969). tion of external conflict as an impediment Kelman (1965a) makes clear that while to solution on both sides; and (3) optimism we can use sociopsychological data to con- and the uses of psychology in reaching for tribute to our understanding of a conflict, a resolution. It should be recognized that it cannot replace looking at the real issues the review deals with a limited subset of and giving due regard to historical and psychosocial aspects, and not with the full political contexts. Etzioni (1969) suggests range of psychosocial factors or specific that sociopsychological knowledge can help issues in the conflict. clarify specific subproblems, but psychological studies cover only a segment of the behavior in international conflict. Cultural Characteristics and Attempts to deal with the history and &dquo;National Character&dquo; status of the conflict from a present psy- ARAB CULTURE AND PERSONALITY chological perspective can be classified into The idea that unique characteristics of ’ The author would like to express his thanks the &dquo;Arab personality&dquo; or the Arab &dquo;nation- to the following individuals, who have helped in al character&dquo; have affected the course of the preparation of this review: M. M. Beit-Hallah- this conflict has been widely expressed. One mi, J. D. Ben-Dak, J. E. Hofman, F. J. Khouri, implication of this idea is that we have to D. Peretz, V. D. Sanua, S. R. Silverburg, H. use an &dquo;Arab in order to ex- H. Smythe, and G. R. Tamarin. Any errors or psychology&dquo; misconceptions are of course the author’s sole plain the behavior of the Arab side in the responsibility. conflict. Both implicitly and explicitly writ- 270 ers dealing with the Arab &dquo;national charac- at avoiding or covering up the slightest ten- ter&dquo; have related their formulations to the dency towards the expression of difference&dquo; conflict between the Arabs and the West (1964, pp. 141-42). The thesis of &dquo;free float- in general, and between the Arabs and Israel ing hostility&dquo; in the Arab world may be in particular. used to explain Arab behavior in the conflict Sanua (1970, 1971, 1966) is the major pro- (Glidden, 1972). According to this thesis, ponent of the Arab personality as a major hostility may be seen as a basic part of factor in the conflict. Sanua’s main conten- close interpersonal relationships in the Arab tion is that &dquo;... the limitations of the Arab world, and not just the result of intergroup character have brought them (i.e. the Arabs) tension and specific conflicts. to their present predicament&dquo; (1970, p. 3). While most of the sources cited above He provides the most comprehensive survey contain personal observations and anecdotal on the use of psychological instruments with evidence, systematic psychological studies Arab populations. His overview of the con- of Arabs were performed over the last flict is quite ambitious, trying to generalize twenty years by Prothro and Melikian (1952) from empirical studies with small groups and Melikan (1959b) at the American Uni- to total Arab behavior vis-a-vis Israel. Sanua versity of Beirut. Melikian (1956) and regards the Arab position as more rigid than Prothro and Melikian (1953) described Arab the Israeli one, and therefore as the main culture as authoritarian, compared to the obstacle to a resolution. This rigid position American culture. Comparing a group of is seen as the result of specific Arab traits American students to a group of students related to culture, language, and thought. at the American University in Beirut, Meli- His approach is limited by lack of consider- kian (1956) reported higher levels of authori- ation given to the other party in the conflict, tarianism and hostility in the Middle East namely the Israelis. Similarly Sanua consid- group. Another comparison of American ers psychological factors, and especially and Egyptian groups (Melikian, 1959a) Arab characteristics, more important than showed similar results. Melikian (1959a) also the historical and political facts of the conflict. suggested that in Egypt an authoritarian A major Arab character trait, according Moslem may be more &dquo;healthy&dquo; psychologi- to Sanua (1970) and others (Adams, 1957; cally, because he is conforming to a general Feldman, 1958; Gillespie and Allport, 1955), cultural pattern. is extreme suspiciousness stemming from The concept of the &dquo;Arab imagination&dquo; child rearing practices (cf. MacLeod, 1959) or &dquo;lack of reality testing&dquo; is likely to be and directed towards fellow Arabs and for- used quite often in discussions of the con- eigners alike. Sanua (1966) also presents flict, and especially its military aspects conservatism and fatalism as major values iHarkabi, 1967b). &dquo;Blurred&dquo; perception and in the culture of the Egyptian fellahin (cf. &dquo;lack of distinction between truth and false- Racy, 1970). hood&dquo; were portrayed as Arab charac- Berger using personal observations de- teristics by Hamady (1960) and Hottinger scribed the interrelationship of hostility and (1963). Khatchadorian (1961) discussed the politeness in Arab society in the following quality of &dquo;as if,&dquo; which permeates Arab way. &dquo;Exaggerated hospitality and polite- culture, and attributed this lack of genuine- ness are reactions to exaggerated hostility, ness to the traditions of ntual and authori- at least in part .... Conflict is so much tarianism. which created masks instead of on the verge of breaking out that interper- men sonal relations seem to be largely directed A personality type embodying all the al- 271 leged faults of the Arab character from an in the Arab world. The five characteristics Arab point of view is that of the &dquo;fahlawi.&dquo; of Arabic, according to Shouby, are vague- The fahlawi person (al-Azm, 1967) is super- ness ; overemphasis on psychological signifi- ficial and vain in his approach to the tasks cance of linguistic symbols at the expense of reality. He constantly seeks the shortest of meaning; stereotyped emotional way to success, glossing over problems and responses; overassertion and exaggeration; errors. According to al-Azm, it was the fah- and two levels of life-ideal and real. All lawi mentality that played a role in Arab these are seen as related to Arab culture, military defeats in 1967. The fahlawi syn- religion, literature, and education. drome is related to what outside observers The issue has been discussed by other have termed &dquo;lack of reality testing&dquo; in writers, both Arabs and non-Arabs (Chejne, Arab perceptions. 1965; Harkabi, 1967b; Salem, 1958). Chejne Sharabi recognizes the problem of Arab (1965) points to the almost magical impor- credibility as a major one and calls upon tance of the Arabic language in Arab poli- Arab leaders to go beyond what he calls tics, and its central role in Arab nationalism. &dquo;crude manipulation of facts&dquo; (1970, p. 1). Sanua (1966) has produced the most thor- He suggests a process whereby exaggeration ough review of the literature on the psycho- and distortion are part of the feedback from logical properties of Arabic and their impor- recipients, which in turn reinforces any tance in interpersonal relations. He also con- original tendency to distort. Avineri (1970) siders the effects of Arabic to be among points out that a discussion of the &dquo;Arab the causes of the present &dquo;impasse&dquo; in the imagination&dquo; has to deal with wider societal conflict, and as one of the &dquo;limitations&dquo; of processes. We cannot discuss &dquo;reality test- the Arabs (1970). Prothro (1955), in the only ing&dquo; in this conflict without considering the experimental work on the subject, supports realities to be tested. A full understanding the notion that Arabs are given to more of the Arab use of fantasy in this conflict overassertion in speech than Americans, but has to consider not only cultural factors, most of the writing on the psychological im- but the value of fantasy as a functional pacts of Arabic does not go beyond the im- solution. Needs and values emphasized by pressionistic level. Glidden (1972) and Racy (1970) help us to One argument against the validity of most view the use of imagination instead of reali- research on the &dquo;Arab personality&dquo; has to ty testing as a solution to an impossible do with the populations studied. Most of situation, in terms of Arab national self-con- the anecdotal reports are based on village cept. This solution may seem baffling and populations, while most of the more system- dysfunctional to Western observers, but it atic studies, such as those by Melikian and may be a most satisfying solution in the Prothro, deal with well-educated, moder- face of experienced helplessness and fata- nized, and Westernized subjects. The prob- lism. lem of social change and modernization Related to the issues of Arab culture and (Labban, 1960; Melikian, 1960) is added to personality is the nature of the Arabic lan- that of representation. Reliance on the writ- guage. Racy described Arabic as &dquo;particu- er’s personal observations and knowledge larly apt for affective and descriptive ex- of popular literature (Hamady, 1960), how- pression but not for precise or objective ever valuable, must be used with caution. purposes&dquo; (1970, p. 21). Shouby (1951) de- When we are dealing with a rich folklore, scribes the effects of the Arabic language such as that of the Arabs, it is possible on patterns of thought and communication to find proverbs that fit almost any charac- 272 teristic or social situation. As we have seen, cepts of basic personality structure in ex- most writers agree on a number of charac- plaining and predicting national behavior of teristics, most of them quite negative. the actors in the conflict (cf. Terhune, Although several sources agree on the ex- 1970)? Given the lack of systematic analysis istence of suspiciousness as part of the Arab we may conclude that the issue is worth &dquo;national character,&dquo; the question especial- further exploration, and a clear presentation ly in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of conceptual steps from national character is to explain its sources. Berger (1964) sug- to national behavior is needed. gested that the domination by local arbitrary ISRAELI CULTURE AND PERSONALITY and foreign rulers over the centuries has contributed to the creation of a certain sus- Systematic studies of the &dquo;Israeli person- piciousness. Gardner (1959) commented on ality&dquo; or Israeli character traits, are even the Arab &dquo;inferiority feeling&dquo; resulting from rarer than those dealing with its Arab coun- centuries of foreign domination (cf. Racy, terpart (Sanua, 1971). One reason is the 1970). Arab suspiciousness regarding Israel &dquo;melting pot&dquo; character of Israel. It is diffi- can be well understood in this context: cult to discuss an Israeli modal personality Being defeated repeatedly by a Western, given the heterogeneity of Israeli society. technologically superior opponent, who A basic question, related to one of the cen- seems to be very resourceful in finding new tral issues of the emerging Israeli identity ways to humiliate them, and feeling victim- (Herman, 1970), is that of the possible carry- ized by stronger unknown outsiders are ex- over of &dquo;Jewish traits&dquo; to the new &dquo;Israeli periences which would contribute to clearly identity. &dquo;I functional suspiciousness. In a situation Some traits stemming from the Jewish his- where victimization and helplessness are the tory of being an oppressed minority were dominant experiences, it is better to be over- suggested in a psychoanalytic discussion of suspicious than let down one’s guard. The Jews by Loewenstein (1951). Among these connection between Israel and Western co- are restlessness, a sense of inferiority, lonialism is not only historical and political skepticism, and mistrust of Gentiles. Khouri but also psychological, since Israel brings (1971) described Israeli lack of trust as being back the same feelings of domination and as great as, or greater than, similar Arab helplessness. feelings. Moreover he sees these feelings Triandis (1971) came out against the whole as directed not only towards the Arabs, but concept of the &dquo;Arab personality,&dquo; and sug- towards all outside powers. Rogers (1972) gested that societal patterns may be reports personal observations of suspi- responsible for the behaviors attributed to ciousness and grandiosity in the Israeli posi- the Arab basic personality structure. An- tion vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The other problem is the generality of the attri- grandiosity according to Rogers is expressed butes supposedly unique to Arabs, since in the Israeli claims to rights that have a such attributes have been found to exist privileged status and transcend international in other groups (including Israelis). Cohen law. (1970) points out one limitation of the em- Rubinstein offers personal observations phasis on basic personality structure-its in- on the &dquo;Israeli psyche,&dquo; stating: &dquo;As indi- ability to account for cultural and historical viduals and as a society, Israelis are charac- changes. The issue surrounding the use of terized by a deeply rooted suspicious atti- &dquo;modal personality&dquo; concepts in this case tude toward others&dquo; (1971, p. 111). Suspi- is that of efficiency. How helpful are con- ciousness according to Rubinstein permeates 273 interpersonal relationships in Israel and limited marking-off function. The &dquo;Sabra&dquo; spills over into every interaction with the generation, Israeli-born Jewish residents of outside world. He describes three levels of Israel, is described by Patai (1961) as having &dquo;distrust and rejection&dquo;-one directed a umque identity. Its main characteristics agamst the non-Jewish world, one directed are Israel-centeredness, in a spatial and against the Arabs, and a third against &dquo;in- temporal sense; lack of interest in recent ternational machineries.&dquo; Rubinstein thus Jewish history, even of their own parents; agrees with the observations made by ambitions centered around material security Khouri (1971) and Rogers (1971). Despite and comfort; and unquestioned patriotism. his lack of psychological sophistication, he Similar observations are reported by Rogers describes an elaborate paranoid system re- (1972) and Tamarin and Eisenberg (1969). lated to the traditional distrust of Gentiles Israeliness and Jewishness are seen by and to more recent suspicion of Arabs, Herman (1970) as two subidentities, which which according to him has a major impact sometimes overlap. In Herman’s sample of on Israeli policies and actions. An explana- Israeli high school students and their parents tion similar to that presented above in con- the perception of overlap between these nection with Arab suspiciousness seems to subidentities was reported by two-thirds of apply here. Thus being paranoid seems both the respondents. However attitude towards prevalent and functional for all actors in Jewish religion turned out to be a significant this conflict, as in other international con- modifier of the Jewish-Israeli overlap. flicts. When respondents were divided into reli- The basic posture towards outgroups and gious, traditionalist and nonreligious, 41 per- intergroup relations within Israeli society are cent of the nonreligious students saw no intimately related to questions of identity overlap between Jewishness and Israeliness. as the following studies show. Mead (1958) The religious dimension in Israeli identity contrasted the traditional Jewish identity was also analyzed by Hofman (1970). Em- with the developing Israeli identity. Accord- pirically he found that the semantic space ing to Mead what was always necessary of identity concepts in Israeli high school to maintain Jewish identity was the larger students could be divided into a Jewish reli- outside group. &dquo;The only thing that was gious subarea and an Israeli secular subarea. completely necessary to identify a group Israelis could be classified on the basis of of Jews was to have some goyim&dquo; (p. 11). their identification with each subarea. Mead found in Israel a &dquo;preoccupation with Dimensions that turn out to be significant a continuing sense of identity, with Israel’s in the measurement of Israeli identity struc- umque mission, with Israel’s position as dif- ture also turn out to be the dimensions of ferent from that of any other people&dquo; (p. potential and actual conflict and division 20). in Israeli society. Two such dimensions are Herman (1970) agrees with Mead regard- ethnic origin and religiosity. Tamarin (1968b, ing the marking-off implications of the Jew- 1971a, 1971b) calls attention to the disrup- ish identity. He states that the division of tive potential of these elements Internal the world between Jews and non-Jews is conflicts in Israel are described by Smythe an essential implication of Jewish identity, and Wemtraub, as involving ’’rehgion. lan- and the image of the Gentile is central in guage, culture, politics and race&dquo; 1971. p the mind of the Jew. This demarcation from 17). the Gentile world is still very much in effect Similarly Herman (1970) describes the in Israel while Arabs are serving only a major divisions inside Israeli society as 274 those between Oriental and European Jews, conflict is greater in Jordan, since Jordanian veteran settlers and new immigrants, and society is only partially integrated and the religious and nonreligious Jews. Peres conflict is being used by nationalist spokes- (1971a) states that the tranquility in the rela- men to encourage integration. Another tions between Orientals and Europeans in payoff of the conflict on the Arab side ac- Israel is astonishing, given the social and cording to Harkabi (1968) is its contribution economic gaps between the two groups. So- to the definition of the Arab identity. Hostil- cial distance between Oriental and European ity can help the formation of a national Jews in Israel was found to be considerable selfhood by negating the qualities ascribed and asymmetrical. Orientals expressed more to other nations. Cohen (1970) points to the readiness to accept Europeans, and social use of anti-Israeli sentiment in the Arab distance between Orientals from different world to conceal national disunity and pro- countries of origin was larger than the dis- mote pan-Arabism and Arab unity (cf. Diab, tance between Europeans and Orientals 1967). (Peres, 1971a). These findings seem to paral- The unifying effects of the conflict on lel those by Hofman (1971), dealing with internal subgroups in Israel were explained social distance between Israeli Jews and by Peres (1971a) in terms of three compo- Arabs. Rim (1968) and Rim and Aloni (1969) nents : (1) interdependence of fate, as a na- found an essentially negative stereotype and tional loss is perceived as a loss to all Israeli self-stereotype of Orientals, compared to ethnic groups; (2) a common goal, since Europeans in Israel. This negative Oriental cooperation is perceived as necessary for self-concept and the perceived European su- survival; and (3) an outlet for aggression, periority appeared at an early age. Possible as antagonistic impulses have a legitimate impacts of the forming Israeli identity and target. Newnham (1967) assumed similar the present internal conflicts in Israel on payoffs for the Israeli side in the conflict. the course of the wider conflict will become Religious circles in Israel may see a certain manifest in the next section. payoff in a continued conflict. Drori (quoted in Tamarin and Eisenberg, 1969), an Israeli religious spokesman, expresses the view Sociopsychological Payoffs From that the constant conflict involves &dquo;many the Conflict blessings,&dquo; while a true peace involves the The permanence of the Arab-Israeli con- danger of &dquo;assimilation&dquo; and loss of Jewish flict has led to a series of sociopsychological &dquo;uniqueness.&dquo; This may help to explain adjustments paralleling the political and mili- some positions taken by religious political tary ones. parties in Israel. Liff (1971) sees both Arabs and Israelis Heightened cohesiveness as a result of as reacting to an external threat in a way external danger was one of the results of which prevents internal fragmentation, the 1967 crisis according to Herman (1970). stagnation, inertia, and apathy. Accordingly Differences between Europeans and Orien- &dquo;... the tension threa~ levels tend to be tals, religious and nonreligious, veterans and raised or lowered in a manner consistent new immigrants were lessened as a result with what each nation considers to be its of the perceived threat. Similar observations own vital national interests&dquo; (p. 9). Harkabi regarding the effects of the 1967 war are (1968) emphasized the importance of the reported by Rogers (1972). Harkabi (1967a) conflict as a cohesive factor in several Arab sees the continuous conflict as a source of states. According to him the salience of the strength and unity in Israel. He clearly im- 275 plies that this payoff is one reason why that decreasing those differences would Israel is not forced to seek a resolution. bring about a resolution of the conflict. It While admitting that Israel needs peace is important to spell out the assumptions more than the Arabs, Harkabi claims that involved in this line of reasoning. she can survive without it, and can gain The first assumption, universally ac- strength until it comes. cepted, is that Israel is more &dquo;modernized&dquo; Of special interest in this context are re- or Westernized than ;he Arab countries. The cent observations covering &dquo;disturbances&dquo; second states that with changes in Arab so- in the internal cohesion-external conflict ciety and the narrowing of the gap, militancy model. Since the cease-fire of August 1970 on the Arab side is likely to decline. The a considerable decrease in the salience of second assumption, as articulated by Israeli experienced threat has been noticed in spokesmen (Ben-Gurion, 1968; Stock, 1968), Israel. At the same time there has been sees the more modernized Arabs as better a clear increase in expressions of internal off, educationally and materially, and thus intergroup tension. Demonstrations by Ori- less frustrated. There is some naivete to ental groups organizing around claims of this assumption, both psychologically and discrimination, wildcat strikes in consider- politically, but it has been espoused as al- able numbers and in public services, and most official policy in Israel (Avineri, 1970). a heightening of tensions between the reli- Implicit in this view are certain assumptions gious and the secular segments-all signs regarding the sources of Arab behavior in of internal conflict-appeared with intensity the conflict, namely generalized frustration during the first twelve months of the Suez and backwardness (cf. Sharabi, 1970). cease-fire. These developments confirm the The modernization hypothesis spelled out generalizations by Peres (1971a) and Harka- in terms of better education and a higher bi (1967a) reported above. It would be standard of living is central to expressed wrong to assume that external conflict is Israeli hopes for peace (cf. Ben-Gurion, the only thing holding Israel together, but 1971). Operationally, the prediction has been it is clear that in the absence of external that as Arabs become more modernized, conflict internal divisions, described above, better educated (less religious?), and more become prominent in Israeli society. advanced economically, they will be more compromising vis-a-vis Israel. Behind it was not only a hypothesis relating Arab behavior Optimism and the Uses of to various objective frustrations, but also Psychology another hypothesis relating more &dquo;rational&dquo; compromising behavior to modernization. THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION Data on the effects of relative moderniza- Viewing the conflict as a clash between tion on the attitudes of Israeli Arabs (Lan- a traditional and a modern culture has been, dau, 1969; Peres, 1971b) indicate clearly that for a wide range of writers (e.g., Patai, these optimistic predictions have not been 1961), an easy way of conceptualizing it borne out by reality. Israeli Arabs acknowl- (Avirneri, 1970). The cultural gap between edge the role of the Israeli government in the Arabs and the Israelis has most often their modernization, and the necessity of been mentioned as a factor in Arab military acquiring modern technology (Peres, 1971b). defeats (Zuraiq, 1967; Harkabi, 1967b). At the same time increase in Arab national- Viewing the Israeli-Arab differences as a ism is positively correlated with moderniza- result of a cultural gap led to the expectation tion. These findings indicate that the pacify- 276

ing effects of modernization in the contact tion hypothesis&dquo; seems to rest on its limited between Arabs and Israelis inside Israel are use of psychological factors. Its one major totally nonexistent. implicit assumption appears to be that the The discussion of modernization and its Arab position in the conflict stems from hypothetical effects is related to the ques- Arab backwardness. Thus it ignores both tion of secularization as a force, affecting the reality of the conflict and the psycholog- ideology and behavior in the conflict. The ical viability of the Arab position. While in link of religion and ideology seems to be this case optimism results from a limited similar on both sides. Religious individuals use of psychology as an explanation, a wider and groups seem to hold extreme non- use of psychology can lead to a more perva- compromising positions (Harkabi, 1968; Ta- sive optimism, as the next section shows. marin, 1971a, 1971b). The role of religion THE &dquo;HUMAN RELATIONS&dquo; APPROACH in the ideological background of the conflict has been discussed more often in connection A notable group of writers offering con- with the Arab side; its role in connection crete suggestions towards resolution are the with the Israeli side has been discussed &dquo;human relations&dquo; advocates. The human more recently, when basic Zionist assump- relations approach sees the whole conflict tions have been analyzed (Harkabi, 1967a). as created by psychological factors, and The seeming decline in the importance therefore solved through psychological of religion, as measured by the decline in means. Lakin (1969) reports on two en- observance on the Israeli side (Herman, counter groups conducted in Israel consist- 1970), and in the decrease in discussions ing of Jewish and Arab members. The ratio- of the conflict in a religious context on the nale behind these groups is that expression Arab side (Harkabi, 1968), may lead us to of feelings and recognition of emotional re- predict a related decrease in extremism. Just actions will decrease intragroup and inter- as in the case of modernization the realities group Arab-Jewish conflict. Lakin recom- of the conflict are different. A &dquo;turn to mends human relations training as a poten- the right&dquo; seems to have taken place in tial tool for Jewish-Arab cooperation, while Israel since the war of 1967 (Tamarin, 197 la, Allen (1971) suggests group experiences in- 1971b). The Israeli occupation of &dquo;holy cluding children from both sides. While we places&dquo; seems to have driven home the must respond to the sincerity of these at- basic religious-mystical message of Zionism tempts, good intentions are not enough and (Harkabi, 1967a), and religious arguments this case is no exception. Generalization are being used in favor of noncompromising from these group experiences is impossible positions (Rubinstein, 1971). On the Arab since members were self-selected, having side the decline in the expressed religious the prerequisite readiness for a dialogue significance of the conflict seems to be only (Benjamin, 1971). Other criticisms stem partial. A unified &dquo;Moslem front&dquo; including from the small scale of such attempts and such distant and noninvolved countries as the ambiguity of resulting changes in the Pakistan was formed around issues involv- participants. ing &dquo;holy places.&dquo; At the same time gen- In addition to the &dquo;planned change&dquo; at- uinely nonreligious (i.e. Marxist) groups in tempts at resolution there were also expecta- the Arab world seem to be more non- tions for a &dquo;natural&dquo; change in interaction compromising than ever in their opposition between the two sides which would lead to Israel. to a resolution. A natural potential for bridg- The apparent failure of the &dquo;moderniza- ing the gap between the parties in conflict 277 was found in two groups, by dint of their The Israeli-Arab conflict is not a human sharing in the traditions and motivations of relations problem in the narrow sense. Lakm both sides-the Israeli Arabs and the Orien- quotes an anonymous Arab politician as say- tal Jews in Israel. These two groups were ing &dquo;We do not need arms; we need psychi- considered natural candidates for &dquo;human atrists&dquo; (1969, p. 1). The answer to this relations&dquo; work in everyday contact. The view of the conflict was given by Harkabi, present potential as stated by Peres (1971a) who stated that &dquo;Arab hostility towards is rather meager; &dquo;... individuals who Israel was not created because of some psy- might have been the pioneers of integration chological need to release tension or aggres- under different circumstances became the sion&dquo; (1968, p. 111, translated from He- most outspoken advocates of political hostil- brew). ity&dquo; (p. 62). These two groups of potential Understanding the sociopsychological mediators are now the least motivated processes is necessary for a full and com- towards a reconciliation. The limitations of plete resolution but is not its basis. Given planned change and naturally expected the reviews by Kelman (1965a, 1965b) and change via the &dquo;human relations&dquo; approach Etzioni (1969) it is easy to realize how limited are quite clear from the above presentation. is the literature in the case of the Arab-Israeli Some of the implications of their psycholog- conflict. The literature reviewed offers many ical reductionism will be discussed below. more untested hypotheses than empirical data. If we to determine the &dquo;rules of the Conclusion try game&dquo; for each of the actors in the conflict, From these studies of sociopsychological one basis for such rules are the assumptions factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, what regarding the psychology of the other side. can we predict regarding the behavior of Such assumptions regarding the rationality the actors? Can we predict or explain the and irrationality of the other actors are cen- development and possible resolution of the tral to the positions of both sides. A cursory conflict any better than we could consider- examination would suggest that both sides ing only political and economic factors? are inconsistent in their perceptions. For These questions lead us to two important example in Israel the widely held opinion recognitions-one regarding the general limi- that &dquo;the Arabs understand only force&dquo; (as- tations of sociopsychological concepts in ex- suming rationality) is replaced by claims re- plaining the behavior of actors in interna- garding Arab &dquo;inability to learn&dquo; and &dquo;im- tional conflicts, and another regarding the placable hatred&dquo; (assuming irrationality), specific limitations in coverage of the litera- when it is realized that the Arab actors ture reviewed above. &dquo;have not learned their lesson&dquo; (Cohen, Some psychosocial overviews of the con- 1970). These processes and the ways they flict (e g., Sanua, 1971; Glidden, 1972) illus- affect decision making and policies, such trate the dangers of overemphasizing psy- as deterrence or retaliation, have not been chological aspects and thus psychologizing studied. the conflict away. Psychological reduction- Suggestions for further areas of research ism, in the form of viewing this conflict seem almost unnecessary, since there is lit- as caused by &dquo;psychological problems,&dquo; tle coverage of any area. One neglected &dquo;national character,&dquo; or &dquo;irrationality&dquo; group in terms of available research is the show the futility of one-factor theories or Palestinians. Systematic studies of Palestin- umdisciplmary approaches to social conflict. ians are with rare exceptions (Bruhus. 1955; 278

Dodd and Barakat, 1970) almost nonexis- Al-Azm, S. J. Al-Ahad, Beirut, August 23 & 30, tent. Paradoxically the best studies of Pales- 1967 (in Arabic). Allen, D. T. Discussion, The International Psy- tinians are of those under Israeli rule and chologist, 1971, 12 (2, International Under- of those in Israel living permanently (Hof- standing suppl.), 31-33. man and Debbiny, 1970; Jiryis, 1968). Avineri, S. Modernization and Arab society: some At the same time there are few attempts reflections. In R. I. Sinai (ed.), Modernization East. New York: American to assess the importance of psychological and the Middle Academic Association for Peace in the Middle factors in the Israeli moves in the conflict. East, 1970. While some writ- One example is language. Baal-Theshuva, J. (ed.). The Mission of Israel. ers deal with the presumed effects of Arabic New York: Speller, 1963. on Arab behavior, no similar attention is Ben-Gurion, D. David Ben-Gurion, In His Own Words. New York: Fleet 1968. paid to the usage of Hebrew in Israel, ex- Press, _. Quoted in Time, October 18, 1971, p. for one attempt cept clumsy by Zweig 46. A look at the of Israeli (1969). writings Benjamin, A. On Arab-Jewish encounter groups. ideologists suggest the need for a careful Second Haifa Conference on Research in Arab- study of the language, especially in view Jewish Relations, Haifa University, Haifa, of the use of Old Testament references, Israel, July 1971. Berger, M. The Arab World Today. Garden City, messianic ideas, and a terminology of &dquo;mis- N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. sion&dquo; and &dquo;destiny&dquo; (Ben-Gurion, 1958; Bruhus, F. A study of Arab refugee attitudes, Baal-Theshuva, 1963; Davis, 1956). Middle East Journal, 1955, 9, 130-38. If we consider the system of participants Chejne, A. Arabic: its significance and place in in this conflict at various levels of involve- Arab-Muslim society, Middle East Journal, 1965, 19, 447-70. ment, we are impressed with the dearth of Cohen, A. Israel and the Arab World. New York: data them and psychosocial covering the Funk and Wagnalls, 1970. lack of differentiation among subgroups. Davis, M. (ed.). Israel: Its Role in Civilization. There is little differentiation in the literature New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1956. I. The Non-Jewish Jew and Other among subgroups in the Arab world, and Deutscher, London: Oxford lack of of the of Essays. University Press, appreciation complexities 1968. on both sides large subgroups (e.g., Oriental Diab, L. N. Measurement of social attitudes: Jews in Israel and Palestinians in the Arab problems and prospects. In C. W. Sherif and world). M. Sherif (eds.), Attitude, Ego-Involvement and One of the main priorities of future work Change. New York: Wiley, 1967. P. and H. Barakat. Palestinian should be the investigation of those dif- Dodd, refugees of 1967: a sociological study, Muslim World, ferences among subgroups. Most of the ap- 1970, 60, 123-42. proaches presented in this review were glo- Etzioni, A. Social psychological aspects of in- bal and comprehensive. Any attempts at ternational relations. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson The Handbook Social more specific and selective conceptualiza- (eds.), of Psy- tions should help in how impor- chology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, determining 1969, vol. 5. tant of the selected issues are in the any Feldman, H. Children of the desert: notes on future course and eventual resolution of this Arab national character, Psychoanalysis and the conflict. Psychoanalytic Review, 1958, 45, 40-50. Gardner, G. The Arab Middle East: some back- REFERENCES ground interpretations, Journal of Social Issues, 1959, 15, 20-27. Adams, J. B. Culture and conflict in an Egyptian Gillespie, J., and G. W. Allport. Youth Outlook village, American Anthropologist, 1957, 59, on the Future. New York: Doubleday, 1955. 225-35. Glidden, H. The Arab world, American Journal 279

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