The US-Iranian Relationship and the Future of International Order
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The Case of Iran's Nuclear Program
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs Volume 2 Issue 2 November 2013 The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program Mary Ellen O'Connell University of Notre Dame Law School Reyam El Molla Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Rule of Law Commons, Social History Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons ISSN: 2168-7951 Custom Citation The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l Aff. 315 (2013). The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and School of International Affairs. Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2013 VOLUME 2 NO. 2 THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE FOR ARMS CONTROL: THE CASE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla* In many discussions of Iran’s nuclear program, there seems to be an implicit assumption that states have a right to use military force to end the program. For example, the Institute for National Security Studies,1 an Israeli think tank, in an article titled, The Legality of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, places emphasis on proving the necessity of an attack as a last resort but fails to indicate any accepted legal basis for resort to military force as an initial matter.2 In fact, international law does not permit the use of military force without United Nations Security Council authorization for arms control of any kind, whether to end a nuclear program, to end a chemical weapons program, or to prevent missile shipments. -
The OIL PLATFORMS Case and the Use of Force in International Law I
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law (2003) 7 pp 579–588 The OIL PLATFORMS Case and the Use of Force in International Law ∗ Caroline E. Foster I. Introduction This brief article reports on the decision of the International Court of Justice on 6 November 2003 in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States).1 The Oil Platforms dispute related to events that took place in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. In the time that it has taken for proceedings to reach the stage where judgment on the merits of the case could be delivered, there has been high-profile United States (US) and US-led activity in Asia and the Middle East. This note does not set out to establish a legal case either against or in defence of US action in Afghanistan or Iraq. At the same time, the judgment in Oil Platforms does draw attention to the continued operation of international law and international judicial machinery in relation to the body of law most directly at issue at least in relation to the US invasion of Afghanistan: international law on the use of force in self-defence.2 The prohibition on the use of force under international law is found both in customary international law and in the UN Charter (Article 2(4)), but under neither does this prohibition extend to a use of force in a State’s exercise of the right of self-defence. The estab- lished criteria for the exercise of the right of self-defence include requirements that the force used must be necessary to repel the armed attack and must be proportionate to this need. -
Tightening the Reins How Khamenei Makes Decisions
MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS MEHDI KHALAJI TIGHTENING THE REINS HOW KHAMENEI MAKES DECISIONS POLICY FOCUS 126 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 126 | March 2014 The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho- tocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2014 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Cover: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei holds a weapon as he speaks at the University of Tehran. (Reuters/Raheb Homavandi). Design: 1000 Colors CONTENTS Executive Summary | V 1. Introduction | 1 2. Life and Thought of the Leader | 7 3. Khamenei’s Values | 15 4. Khamenei’s Advisors | 20 5. Khamenei vs the Clergy | 27 6. Khamenei vs the President | 34 7. Khamenei vs Political Institutions | 44 8. Khamenei’s Relationship with the IRGC | 52 9. Conclusion | 61 Appendix: Profile of Hassan Rouhani | 65 About the Author | 72 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EVEN UNDER ITS MOST DESPOTIC REGIMES , modern Iran has long been governed with some degree of consensus among elite factions. Leaders have conceded to or co-opted rivals when necessary to maintain their grip on power, and the current regime is no excep- tion. -
The Unexpected Results of Presidential Election in Iran
1 The Unexpected Results of Presidential Elections in Iran By Akbar E. Torbat Iranians voted in the presidential, city and rural council elections on June 14, 2013. The two elections were arranged to be on the same day to boost participations and show support for the Islamic Republic. The Guardian Council had handpicked eight candidates and rejected the rest of the applicants for presidency in violation of the Islamic Republic’s constitution.1 Despite 1.6 million first-time young voters, the turnout was 10% lower than the previous election. Some political factions had indicated that they would boycott the election. However, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei encouraged Iranians to vote by saying “It is possible that some people, for whatever reason, do not want to support the Islamic Republic establishment but if they want to support Iran, they should come also to vote at the polls.” In reality, those who did not support the regime did not have anyone on the ballot to vote for. According to John R. Bird, Canada’s Foreign Minister, the election was “effectively meaningless” because only “regime-friendly” candidates were allowed in the race.2 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had designated his former Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashei as a nominee for president but the Guardian Council rejected him to be on the ballots. As Mashei was pushed aside, the election became a competition between the two wings of the clerical oligarchy; the conservatives (or principalists) and the moderates plus their reformist affiliates. Mashaei who had advocated secular policies and had nationalistic sentiments was considered a threat to the clerics, and therefore they decided to bar his candidacy. -
Self-Defense to Cyber Force: Combatting the Notion of ‘Scale and Effect'
American University International Law Review Volume 36 Issue 4 Article 1 2021 Self-Defense to Cyber Force: Combatting the Notion of ‘Scale And Effect' Thomas Eaton Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr Part of the Internet Law Commons Recommended Citation Eaton, Thomas (2021) "Self-Defense to Cyber Force: Combatting the Notion of ‘Scale And Effect'," American University International Law Review: Vol. 36 : Iss. 4 , Article 1. Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol36/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SELF-DEFENSE TO CYBER FORCE: COMBATTING THE NOTION OF ‘SCALE AND EFFECT’ THOMAS EATON* I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................697 II. WHY THIS QUESTION IS IMPORTANT......................702 III. STARTING WITH THE TEXT........................................704 IV. CHARTER-IS-DEAD SCHOOL ......................................706 V. SCALE AND EFFECTS SCHOOL ..................................710 VI. PROBLEMS WITH SCALE AND EFFECTS SCHOOL.715 A. PREDICTIVE PROBLEMS..................................................717 B. DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEMS................................................719 -
Cultural Policies in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Cultural Policies in the Islamic Republic of Iran Farideh Farhi* The following article was written by Farideh Farhi in connection with her participation in the conference entitled “Iran After 25 Years of Revolution: A Retrospective and a Look Ahead,” which was held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on November 16-17, 2004. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and in no way represent the views or opinions of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “We did not make the revolution for cheap melons; we made it for Islam.” These words, reportedly uttered by the leader of Iran’s Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, have been deemed as an announcement of the centrality of culture in post-revolutionary reorganization. Indeed there can be no doubt that the forceful post-revolutionary imposition of Islamic values and ways of living, as interpreted by the emerging Islamic mandarins, can be considered to be the most distinctive aspect of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Through the attempted ideological fusion of culture and religion, the Islamic revolutionaries hoped, on the most manifest level, to make a statement about a new and unified set of values that was about to become important, explicitly rejecting what to them was also an integrated set of values revolving around the impact of westernization on Iranian life and cultural practices. They also aspired to claim cultural authenticity for their own practices and, on that basis, deny political participation to those whose everyday practices did not presumably match their own. As such, the cultural policies of the Islamic Republic from the beginning had both ideological and political components. -
Islamic Republic of Iran V United States of America)*
CASE NOTES CASE CONCERNING OIL PLATFORMS (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)* DID THE ICJ MISS THE BOAT ON THE LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE? Case Note — Oil Platforms CONTENTS I Introduction II Facts and Earlier Proceedings III The Judgment on the Merits A Iran’s Claim B The US Counterclaim IV Comment A The Law on the Use of Force B The Meaning of ‘Freedom of Commerce’ C Judicial Methodology V Concluding Remarks I INTRODUCTION On 6 November 2003 the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the merits in the Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America).1 The decision, handed down more than 10 years after Iran initiated proceedings, brought to a close a series of disputes between Iran and the US.2 Arising out of the US attacks on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war, this unusual case came before the ICJ as a question of alleged breaches of a ‘freedom of commerce’ provision in a bilateral trade agreement between the US and Iran, rather than as a dispute over the use of force under general international law.3 However, it did offer the Court an opportunity to comment on the law of self-defence at a time when the Charter of the United Nations framework on the use of force was under significant * Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Merits) [6 November 2003] ICJ <http://www.icj-cij.org> at 1 May 2004. -
Terrorism, Betrayal, and Resilience: My Story of the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings / Prudence Bushnell
TERRORISM, BETRAYAL & RESILIENCE adst- dacor Diplomats and Diplomacy Series series editor Margery Boichel Thompson Since 1776, extraordinary men and women have represented the United States abroad under widely varying circumstances. What they did and how and why they did it remain little known to their compatriots. In 1995 the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (adst) and dacor, an organization of foreign affairs professionals, created the Diplomats and Diplomacy book series to increase public knowledge and appreciation of the profession- alism of American diplomats and their involvement in world his- tory. The disturbing aftermath of the August 1998 bombings of Embassy/Nairobi and Embassy/Dar es Salaam forms the dramatic core of Ambassador Prudence Bushnell’s “tale of terror and resil- ience.” It is the sixty- fifth volume in the series. TERRORISM, BETRAYAL & RESILIENCE MY STORY OF THE 1998 U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS PRUDENCE BUSHNELL an adst- dacor diplomats and diplomacy book Potomac Books An imprint of the University of Nebraska Press © 2018 by Prudence Bushnell Part of chapter 12 was originally published in Foreign Service Journal (January–February 2017). The views and opinions in this book are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, dacor, Inc., or the Government of the United States. All rights reserved. Potomac Books is an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press. Manufactured in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Bushnell, Prudence, 1946– , author. Title: Terrorism, betrayal, and resilience: my story of the 1998 U.S. -
Self-Defense": What Is the Proper Role of the International Court of Justice in Use of Force Cases?
When Naked Came the Doctrine of "Self-Defense": What Is the Proper Role of the International Court of Justice in Use of Force Cases? Harvey Rishikoft I. INTRODUCTION In the unique novel set in South Florida, Naked Came the Manatee, thirteen talented authors created a "literary game of telephone" whereby each wrote a chapter and then passed it on to the next contributor, who did his best to craft a plot line.' The result was a novel of "wildly fluctuating styles and more crazy plot curves than a daytime drama, but thanks to these ... masters of the craft, this roller coaster of a book is almost as much fun to read as it obviously was to write." 2 After reading the recent opinions of the fifteen judges from the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),3 one cannot help but believe the Court has just issued its legal version of "Naked Came the Doctrine of Self-Defense." The masters of the craft of legal writing have combined fluctuating legal styles, jurisprudential plot turns, and creative avoidances with tortured analysis to produce a roller coaster of an opinion t Visiting Professor, National War College, Washington, D.C., 2002-2003; Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I would like to give special thanks to Trudi Rishikof for her assistance, David P. Auerswald, Kevin Keith, Robert Louis, Michael Mazarr, and Theresa Saboinis-Helf for their help and comments, and Patrick Bratton for his research and comments. I would like to especially thank Professor Harvey M. -
American Behavioral Scientist
American Behavioral Scientist http://abs.sagepub.com Nested Institutions, Political Opportunity, and the Decline of the Iranian Reform Movement Post 9/11 Stephen C. Poulson American Behavioral Scientist 2009; 53; 27 DOI: 10.1177/0002764209338804 The online version of this article can be found at: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/1/27 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for American Behavioral Scientist can be found at: Email Alerts: http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/53/1/27 Downloaded from http://abs.sagepub.com at JAMES MADISON UNIV on August 13, 2009 American Behavioral Scientist Volume 53 Number 1 September 2009 27-43 © 2009 SAGE Publications 10.1177/0002764209338804 Nested Institutions, Political http://abs.sagepub.com hosted at Opportunity, and the Decline http://online.sagepub.com of the Iranian Reform Movement Post 9/11 Stephen C. Poulson James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA Using the recent Iranian reform movement (1997-2003) as an example, this article dem- onstrates how social movement activism in the Middle East is often constrained by U.S. foreign policy and rhetoric. Directly after the 9/11 attacks, there was a remarkable con- fluence of shared interests between Iranian reformers and U.S. policy makers. Despite common goals and interests—and an explicit desire by many in the Iranian reform movement to normalize relations with the United States—Iranian reformers were forced to abandon the possibility of cooperating with U.S. -
A Social Justice Theory of Self-Defense at the World Court James Kraska U.S
Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9 Article 3 Issue 1 Fall/Winter 2011 2011 A Social Justice Theory of Self-Defense at the World Court James Kraska U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General Corps. Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation James Kraska A Social Justice Theory of Self-Defense at the World Court, 9 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 25 (2011). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol9/iss1/3 This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago International Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A SOCIAL JUSTICE THEORY OF SELF-DEFENSE AT THE WORLD COURT James Kraskat I. Introduction. ......................................... 25 II. Background. ......................................... 26 III. Social Justice and the Use of Force Jurisprudence.............. 31 A. Protecting the Global Commons: The Corfu Channel Case .. 33 B. Defining Aggression Up in the Post-Colonial Era ........... 36 C. Paramilitary Activities: The Nicaragua Case ............... 37 D. Irregular Maritime Warfare: The Oil Platforms Case ........ 40 IV. Conclusion: Realizing a Social Justice Theory ................. 42 I. Introduction This article offers a theory of social justice that helps to explain use of force or jus ad bellum jurisprudence at the World Court.' More precisely, the theory pro- vides a prism for understanding the interpretation of Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). -
Interpreting Self-Defense Restrictively: the World Court in the Oil Platforms Case Leopold Von Carlowitz*
Duve/Möller, Medienfreiheit als sicherheitspolitische Voraussetzung ❘ THEMENSCHWERPUNKT of the OSCE in the Perspective of the Enlargements of Peacock, Alan (1993) The Value of Freedom of Expression. In: NATO and the EU. PSIO Occasional Paper 1/2004. Genf.: El-Agraa, Ali M. (1993) Public and International Econom- Graduate Institute of International Studies. S. 123-145. ics. Houndsmill: Macmillan. S. 10-19. Möller, Christian (2004b) Die Situation der Pressefreiheit im OSZE-Gebiet und die Aktivitäten des OSZE-Medien- Schneider, Norbert (2002) Das Verhältnis von Aufsicht und beauftragten. In: Institut für Friedensforschung und Si- Beaufsichtigtem – Informationsgesellschaft und die Rolle cherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg/IFSH (Hrsg.) der Medienaufsicht. In: Fachjournalist. Nr. 5 Oktober OSZE Jahrbuch 2003. Baden-Baden: Nomos, S. 357-370. 2002. S. 2-5. Möller, Christian/Popescu, Alexandra (2004) Transforma- Schwarz, Hans Peter (1977) Zwischenbilanz der KSZE. Stutt- tionen des Journalismus: Über die Implementierung des gart: Seewald. Prinzips Unabhängigkeit in osteuropäischen Staaten seit 1989. In: Duve, Freimut/Haller, Michael (Hrsg.) Leitbild Tudyka, Kurt P. (1997) Das OSZE-Handbuch. Die Organisa- Unabhängigkeit: Die publizistische Verantwortung in tion für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit von Vancouver der Mediengesellschaft. Konstanz: UVK. bis Wladiwostok. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Interpreting Self-Defense Restrictively: The World Court in the Oil Platforms Case Leopold von Carlowitz* Abstract: The judgment in the Oil Platforms case between Iran and the United States is the third decision by the International Court of Justice in a series that restrictively interprets the international law on the use of force. The article provides an overview of the case and comments in detail on the parties’ arguments and the Court’s fi ndings on the right to self-defense, essential security interests and related evidentiary issues.