Choice of Law: Defining the Place of Performance for General Contract Disputes in Oklahoma, 64 OKLA
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Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts
University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2018-03-29 Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts Karimi, Sahar Karimi, S. (2018). Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary. AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/31771 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/106483 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Application of the Theory of Dépeçage to Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts by Sahar Karimi A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW CALGARY, ALBERTA MARCH, 2018 © Sahar Karimi 2018 Abstract Determination of the applicable law in upstream oil and gas contracts plays an important role with regards to the parties’ rights and liabilities. There are various approaches regarding the choice of applicable law and different theories have been expressed relating to choice-of-law provisions. This research explores one of these theories called Dépeçage in private international law and conflict of law. The theory of Dépeçage is a concept in private international law that refers to the process of cutting a case into individual issues whereby each issue is constrained to a different applicable choice-of-law analysis. -
Conflict of Laws: Contracts and Other Obligations F
Louisiana Law Review Volume 35 | Number 1 Fall 1974 Conflict of Laws: Contracts and Other Obligations F. Michael Adkins Repository Citation F. Michael Adkins, Conflict of Laws: Contracts and Other Obligations, 35 La. L. Rev. (1974) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol35/iss1/8 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENTS CONFLICT OF LAWS: CONTRACTS AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS In ordering relations between parties to a contract, the courts have developed standards for choosing between conflicting laws of two or more jurisdictions in at least four areas of contract law: capac- ity of the parties to contract, availability and nature of the remedy, formal validity, and substantive validity.' Of the fascicle of conflicts rules applicable to such a problem, those providing the substantive law to determine the validity of the alleged contract have been dealt 1. Louisiana jurisprudence peculiarly splits these considerations of conflicts prob- lems sounding in contract into separate categories. Capacity: The law of the domicile of the parties in question controls the capacity to contract. See Pilcher v. Paulk, 228 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (minors); Sun Oil Co. v. Guidry, 99 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (minors). Louisiana courts have regularly held that the law of the domicile of the parties governs the capacity of a party to contract with his or her spouse for a regime other than the community of gains, or for a settlement or division of property owned in common. -
Oklahoma Statutes Title 12. Civil Procedure
OKLAHOMA STATUTES TITLE 12. CIVIL PROCEDURE §12-1. Title of chapter...........................................................................................................................30 §12-2. Force of common law.................................................................................................................30 §12-3. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-4. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-5. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-6. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-7. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-8. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................30 §12-9. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984.............................................................31 §12-10. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984...........................................................31 §12-11. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984...........................................................31 §12-12. Repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, § 32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984...........................................................31 -
State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waters—A Summary and Reexamination Peter N
Nebraska Law Review Volume 57 | Issue 3 Article 4 1978 State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waters—A Summary and Reexamination Peter N. Davis University of Missouri School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Peter N. Davis, State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waters—A Summary and Reexamination, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 665 (1978) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol57/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. By Peter N. Davis* State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waters-A Summary and Reexamination I. INTRODUCTION States rely on state ownership of the beds of streams, rivers, and lakes for various regulatory and proprietary purposes. These include licensing of bed use, leasing of underlying miner- al rights, protection of public use rights, assertion of public trust powers, and location of boundaries of abutting privately-owned land. The extent of this state ownership in states created from federal territories is determined by a conjunction of the follow- ing: (1) the "equal footing rule," (2) the law of federal land patent interpretation, (3) state rules on incidents to title to abutting uplands, (4) federal and state definitions of navigability, and (5) the law of implied grants of land from the sovereign. States have asserted title to the beds of many streams, rivers, and lakes by assuming the correctness of certain interpretations of these rules of law. -
Commissioner Richard B. Long Chair, UUDDA/UUDA Drafting Committee
Memo to: Commissioner Richard B. Long Chair, UUDDA/UUDA Drafting Committee From: Joe Colquitt Reporter Date: September 24, 2015 Apart from a few routine tweaks, at the close of our meeting there were three issues to be addressed. I have spent considerable time researching, reading and deciding how to address the issues raised. Here are my suggestions: ISSUE 1: Question: How can a statute overrule a constitutional provision? That is a good question with an easy answer. It cannot. Thus, as explained below, I have tweaked the language in § 2(2) and left § 4(a) intact. Why the question? Section 2(2) defines “law” to include “the federal or a state constitution, a federal or state statute, a judicial decision or order, a rule of court, an executive order, and an administrative rule, regulation, or order.” Section 4(a) states that with limited exceptions, “if a law of this state requires or permits use of a sworn declaration, an unsworn declaration meeting the requirements of this [act] has the same effect as a sworn declaration.” Assume the enacting state’s constitution required all declarations used in adoption proceedings be under oath or sworn (any law to the contrary notwithstanding). Applying Section 4(a), the “law [i.e., “state constitution” – § 2(2)] of the state requires use of a sworn declaration,” yet 4(a) establishes that an unsworn declaration “has the same effect as a sworn declaration.” Ergo, the [act] trumps the state constitutional provision. But, of course, it cannot; thus, the provision is defective and declarations for adoption proceedings would need to be under oath as required by the state constitutional mandate. -
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation
CHOICE OF LAW IN COMPLEX LITIGATION LARRY KRAMER* Nearly all proceduralistsagree that all the claims in a complex case should be de. cided under a single substantive law or, at the very least, under a uniform choice-of- law rule In this paper, ProfessorKramer challenges the assumptions at the foun- dation of that consensus. In so doing, he confronts two myths of late-twentieth century procedure: that the sort of proceduralmaneuvers used to circumvent un- ambiguous Supreme Court precedents precluding federal courts from creating choice-of-law rules are legitimate;and that the unusualnature of complex litigation justifies such measures. ProfessorKramer exposes the fallacies underlying the first premisse then presents historicaland normative arguments against the second. He questions both the principle that the parties in complex litigationare similarly situ- ated with respect to the applicable law and the notion that adjudicatingsuch litiga- don under more than one law is unmanageable. Consensus is increasingly rare in today's legal world. Our profes- sion has grown so big and has such a wide assortment of groups repre- senting diverse interests that advocates are found on more than one side of almost any issue. This is especially true if the stakes are high, as in complex litigation. Few questions about how to handle these gigantic lawsuits are matters of general agreement. Choice of law is even worse, though not necessarily because the stakes are high. Con- flicts scholars just seem to like disagreement, and they have helped to confuse courts and make a mess of choice-of-law analysis. All things considered, then, it's surprising to find even partial consensus on choice of law in complex litigation. -
ONG VUE, Petitioner
No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ONG VUE, Petitioner V. FRANK X. HENKE, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; ERNEST E. HAYNES, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; MICHAEL W. ROACH, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; DIANNE B. OWENS, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; ADAM LUCK, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; JOHN HOLDER, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; KEVIN J. GROSS, Oklahoma Board of Corrections Member; DELYNN FUDGE, Executive Director, Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board; THOMAS GILLERT, Chairperson of the Pardon and Parole Board; ROBERT MACY, Pardon and Parole Board Member; C. ALLEN McCALL, Pardon and Parole Board Member; MICHAEL STEELE, Pardon and Parole Board Member; ROBERTA FULLERTON, Pardon and Parole Board Member; MELISSA L. BLANTON, Pardon and Parole Staff Attorney Respondents On 'Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Ong Vue DOC#26488 1 Pro se Litigant Dick Conner Correctional Center 129 Conner Road Hominy, Oklahoma 74035 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that Petitioner Vue "failed to state a claim" is in contrary to the holding of Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), where Petitioner Vue, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, challenges the constitutionality of the Oklahoma state parole procedures on constitutional and statutory grounds. Whether Petitioner Vue's 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claim on the crucial distinction between I judicial review of substantive agency decisions and judicial review of the agency's compliance with the substantive requirements of Oklahoma Statutes title 57, § 332.7 (Supp. -
215227952.Pdf
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR IN THE PUBLIC JUNIOR COLLEGE OF OKLAHOMA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION BY RAYMOND E*"CLEVELAND NORMAN, OKLAHOMA 1967 SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR IN THE PUBLIC JUNIOR COLLEGE OF OKLAHOMA APPROVED BY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writer would like to take this opportunity to express his appreciation to the many individuals who rendered assistance in this undertaking. In particular my gratitude ta Dr. Herbert R. Hengst as Major Professor and Committee Chairman for his patient and helpful guidance in the preparation of this report. Also to the other mem bers of the committee: Dr. James G. Harlow, Dr. Robert E. Ohm, and Dr. Joseph E. Pray. In addition, a vote of thanks to Dr. Freeman McKee, President of Murray State College and to Joan Kimbrough, Secretary to the Deans, for giving so generously of their time and assistance in this study. And to my wife. Ginger, sons, Mark, John, Greg, and Jeff, and to daughter, Val, to whom this effort is dedicated for their steadfast encouragement and moral support. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWI£DGEMENTS ............................... ill Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 1 The Concept of Discipline, Back ground and P u r p o s e ........... ...... 1 Statement of Problem............... 13 Delimitation of the Study......... 14 Definition of Terms................. 15 P r o c e d u r e ......................... 15 S u m m a r y .................... -
Conflicts Basics: CHOICE of LAW and MULTISTATE JUSTICE by Friedrich K. Juenger
Catholic University Law Review Volume 44 Issue 2 Winter 1995 Article 4 1995 Back to Conflicts Basics: CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE by Friedrich K. Juenger Stanley E. Cox Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Stanley E. Cox, Back to Conflicts Basics: CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE by Friedrich K. Juenger, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 525 (1995). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss2/4 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BOOK REVIEW Back to Conflicts Basics: CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE by Friedrich K. Juenger Reviewed by Stanley E. Cox* Chief Justice Stone is reported to have said that the study of conflict of laws is a good substitute for a more formal course on legal jurisprudence.' Conflicts theories, among other things, at their heart address issues of how "true" laws are, how much respect governments should give to other sovereigns or to private agreements, and what role the judiciary should play as lawmaker or law interpreter. Discussions about how to choose law are in essence discussions about what constitutes justice. A good book on conflicts should provoke foundational thinking about such issues and other basics of the conflicts discipline. Choice of Law and Multistate Justice2 does. I. A QUICK OVERVIEW Professor Juenger's thesis is that the only sensible choice-of-law theory is to apply the best substantive law to interstate and international dis- putes.3 Whether one agrees or disagrees with this thesis, it is refreshing to read a conflicts monograph that argues consistently at the foundational level and pursues its thesis from introduction to conclusion. -
The Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection
Denver Law Review Volume 61 Issue 4 Article 8 February 2021 The Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection Anne E. Covey Michael S. Morris Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Anne E. Covey & Michael S. Morris, The Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 Denv. L.J. 837 (1984). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR FORUM AND CHOICE OF LAW SELECTION ANNE E. COVEY* MICHAEL S. MORRIS** This article shall examine the enforceability of agreements providing for forum and choice of law selection. The forum selection clause and the choice of law clause will be analyzed separately. The enforceability of a forum selection clause involves a question of the court's jurisdiction. The enforceability of a choice of law clause involves the determination of the appropriate law to be applied. Each type of clause is a separate and distinct issue, providing for differ- ent considerations in resolution of whether the clause is enforceable. How- ever, pertinent to both issues are the following Conflict of Laws values: (1) predictability, (2) advancement of the relevant policies of concerned states, (3) advancement of the basic policies underlying the field of law, and (4) simplicity. I. -
Timing the Choice of Law by Contract Dolly Wu Shore Chan LLC, [email protected]
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 9 Article 3 Issue 7 Spring Spring 2011 Timing the Choice of Law by Contract Dolly Wu Shore Chan LLC, [email protected] Recommended Citation Dolly Wu, Timing the Choice of Law by Contract, 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 401 (2011). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol9/iss7/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Timing the Choice of Law by Contract Dolly Wu Spring 2011 VOL. 9, NO. 7 © 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Copyright 2011 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 9, Number 7 (Spring 2011) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Timing the Choice of Law by Contract By Dolly Wu∗ I. INTRODUCTION ¶1 Contracts are a backbone of the economy.1 Parties enter into contracts to solidify their bargains and carry out their intentions.2 However, subsequent unanticipated changes in law might defeat the very purpose of a contract. “Our laws are not frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs of a changing society.”3 New legislation, regulations, and common law are inevitable. However, such new law might prevent an existing contract from being executed as intended. Familiar examples of legal changes that affect contracts include new tax plans, local ordinances, and food and drug regulations.4 Less familiar examples include new patent laws,5 remedies,6 statutes of limitation,7 court procedures,8 judicial decisions governing forum selection,9 and adjustments to the Uniform Commercial Code.10 ∗ Ms. -
Choice of Law, Jurisdiction and ADR Clauses
Choice of law, jurisdiction and ADR clauses Choice of law, jurisdiction and ADR clauses 6th annual Contract Law Conference 26-28 February 2008 John Levingston1 Contents Abstract ...........................................................................................................................2 Introduction ......................................................................................................................2 Application to contracts and other things .............................................................................3 Contracts, arrangements and understandings..................................................................3 Bailment (on terms).......................................................................................................4 Tort..............................................................................................................................4 Elements to be considered.............................................................................................4 1 Choice of governing law.............................................................................................5 Statute .........................................................................................................................7 Express choice .............................................................................................................7 Implied choice of law .....................................................................................................8 Law of the forum,