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COVER FEATURE Copy Protection Technology Is Doomed

Those determined to bypass copy-protection technologies have always found ways to do so—and always will. A holder’s best protection lies in creating an attractive business model.

Dan S. t some fundamental level, seemingly as environments. Because CDs were a fundamental ad- Wallach axiomatic as the speed of light or the con- vance over earlier analog technology, consumers had Rice University servation of energy, copying information— less incentive to copy digital music to analog media. strings of bits—will always be easy. A Historically, systems intended to restrict this SNAKE-OIL CURES fundamental property have always been defeated, and With the ubiquity of CD burners, technology has there is no reason they won’t continue to be defeated. again advanced, making copying audio CDs bit for bit Copying has always been easy, whether it was my trivial. The record companies could address this situ- junior high school computer buddies running Copy ation by creating fundamental advances in how they ][+ to pirate games in our school’s computer lab or kids deliver music to consumers. Instead, technology com- today swapping MP3 files on chat systems and panies are offering the record companies a wide vari- burning them to CD-ROMs. But vendors continue sell- ety of snake-oil schemes to help them maintain their ing content and people continue to buy it, even when previous business models. These schemes can be they can get that content illegally. defeated—doing so only requires that somebody study how they work. HISTORICALLY UNFOUNDED CONCERNS Copyright concerns have persisted for as long as the Watermark woes media for making copies have existed. Some early Some copy-protection systems focus on water- musicians refused to record their work, fearful that marking music by adding largely inaudible distortions nobody would attend their live shows. When radio to it before the content reaches the consumer. appeared, record companies feared that it would can- Watermarks can encode digital information, whether nibalize record sales. These fears never materialized. they are as simple as a single bit—“this music is or is Instead, with analog music technology, copying music not copyrighted”—or as complex as the purchaser’s always entailed generational loss. For that matter, user ID. Likewise, watermarks can be either fragile or every time you played a record, the quality declined as robust. Even modest changes in the music generally the needle wore down the record’s surface. To have the destroy fragile watermarks, whether by converting best fidelity, consumers would purchase their own from digital to analog and back, or through a lossy copies. Radio play served as an advertisement for con- compression scheme like MP3—which compresses sumers to buy record albums, which in turn created audio by removing sounds inaudible to most listeners. fans to attend live performances. Existing copyright Robust watermarks are engineered to survive these law proved quite sufficient to shut down attempts to transformations. Some schemes use a robust water- produce pirated copies. mark to identify a tune’s original purchaser. If that tune The introduction of the initially reduced later appears in wide distribution, the purchaser could music piracy because duplicating CDs required expen- be held liable for damages. Imagine the reaction if a sive equipment and because CDs provided features not record company dragged a 13-year-old girl into court available with analog technology, such as instant track because she gave her friends a track from the latest skipping and improved resistance to wear and harsh boy band.

48 Computer 0018-9162/01/$10.00 © 2001 IEEE Other schemes combine a fragile watermark with a online, subsequent content releases would delete robust one to indicate two bits. The robust water- the cryptographic keys for the hacked device. Devices such as mark’s presence indicates that a copyright protects the Consequently, future content releases would not digital-audiotape music, while the fragile watermark indicates the music play properly on these devices. The vendor is still in its original form. Every CD player, computer would then be forced to replace confused con- drives and other sound card, and music-reading or -playing device in sumers’ once-working devices. Alternatively, more recent systems the world would be required to detect these bits. If a consumers could reverse-engineer the device- simply embed copyrighted song had been tampered with, the device specific keys from some other device and install copy-protection bits might refuse to play it. If a song remains in its original those keys inside their device. form, it might then be subject to some kind of security Further, once pirates have extracted the nec- in the metadata. policy, perhaps a rule that only “compliant” devices essary secrets, they can program their PCs to can handle the track and that these devices allow mak- perform the decryption, yielding unencrypted ing only a few copies before deleting the original. content that they can easily share over the Internet or via other means. Laws that might restrict Not a bit safe commercial companies from producing such software Rather than focusing on watermark schemes— will have little practical effect on the free-software which have all been defeated, anyway—devices such community. as digital-audiotape drives and other more recent sys- tems simply embed copy-protection bits in the meta- IP WANTS TO BE FREE data. If the bits say “this is a first-generation copy,” Rather than giving up, the snake-oil salesmen now the device might allow creation of a backup labeled seek to buttress their broken technologies by leverag- “second generation” but might disallow backups of ing the legal system, using various combinations of the second-generation copy. patent law, trade secrecy, and new laws that ban These schemes only work when device manufactur- . These new laws, including the ers uniformly follow the standard. Once a deviant Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US and com- device becomes available, or existing devices’ firmware parable laws elsewhere, make a farce of free-speech has been reverse-engineered and suitably modified, rights and of essential legal balances like the right of these bits become merely advisory and can be casually . Pending US legislation, including the Security ignored. The movie industry discovered this phenom- Systems Standards and Certification Act, might actu- enon when the freely available DeCSS software tool, ally mandate that all content-playing devices have using information reverse-engineered from a normal “certified security technologies.” Might the US gov- DVD playback package, chose not to follow the rules. ernment ban ? Hopefully, the SSSCA will be Even in a world of truly uniform devices, such as withdrawn and challenges against the DMCA will game consoles or satellite TV receivers, these schemes succeed. are still easily defeated. The PlayStation provides a great example. The PlayStation stores its games on standard compact discs, but Sony arranged for some istory tells us that the ease of digitally copying tracks to have invalid checksums. No self-respecting music, video, and any other media won’t CD burner would ever write invalid checksums, so the H destroy the copyright holders. It also tells us PlayStation only needs to validate that the checksums that attempts to restrict copying will uniformly fail. are, in fact, invalid to abort the game-loading process. The only way to prevent teenage girls from freely It’s easy to defeat the PlayStation’s protection sys- sharing boy-band MP3s will be to provide reason- tem by using a low-cost embeddable microprocessor ably priced service that’s irresistibly better than free and soldering a few traces onto the PlayStation’s file sharing. Some vendors, such as eMusic.com, are motherboard. The new chip watches the host com- beginning to offer flat-rate subscription services that puter as it reads data from the CD. When it sees a appear to be a step in the right direction. Any other request for the invalid block, it clocks out the invalid technology, business model, or legal framework is data to the host computer, regardless of what is on the simply doomed. ✸ CD. You can download code for these chips for free, or you can ship your PlayStation to vendors who will “chip” it for a small fee. Dan S. Wallach is an assistant professor at Rice Uni- versity. His research interests include a variety of secu- Revocation schemes rity topics. Wallach received a PhD in computer Some vendors propose a revocation scheme in which science from Princeton University. He is a member of all shipped content would include device-specific cryp- the IEEE, the ACM, and Usenix. Contact him at tographic keys. When hacking instructions appear [email protected].

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