Turkish Women's Predicament

PII S0277-5395(99)00029-1

TURKISH WOMEN’S PREDICAMENT

Meltem Müftüler-Bac Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara 06533, Turkey

Synopsis — To the foreign observer, Turkish women constitute an anomaly amongst Muslim societies. Since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has engaged in a project of modernization and secularization. As part and parcel of this process of modernization, Turkish women have been granted social, political, and legal rights. Despite Kemalist reforms of the 1920s, the basics of male domination stayed intact. It is this paradoxical character of Kemalist reforms that this article emphasises. The legal equality granted to Turkish women did not succeed in their emancipation. The image of Tur- key as the only modern, secular, democratic country in the Islamic Middle East has been an effective distortion, concealing many truths about Turkey. The author proposes that the Mediterranean culture, the Islamist traditions, and the Kemalist ideology act together in perpetuating the oppression of women in Turkey and keep patriarchy intact. © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

To many students of Turkish society and poli- gaining acceptance as a European state in its tics, the status of Turkish women is a puzzle. own right (Berkes, 1964; Müftüler-Bac, 1997), Turkey is said to be the only modern, demo- one of the stumbling blocks on the way to cratic, Islamic country, which makes it some- modernization was the oppression of women what an anomaly among the Islamic world, in Turkey. As part and parcel of Turkey’s and the status of Turkish women visibly marks modernization process embarked in 1923, this difference. The aim of this article is not so Turkish women were emancipated and Turkey much to focus on the struggle going on over became the only Islamic country that granted women in Turkey, but rather to look at the un- social, legal, and political rights to women derlying social dynamics of this struggle and early in the 20th century. A few lucky women emphasise the paradoxical character of women’s who came from the highest socioeconomic emancipation in Turkey. Since the creation of backgrounds in Turkey were chosen as the the modern Turkish Republic (October 29, leading “army.” This small, privileged group 1923), the ultimate aim for the modernisers was able to receive the same education as men has been to gain acceptance for Turkey among and compete with them under the same condi- the European system of states (Berkes, 1964; tions for jobs. Paradoxically, the presence of Lewis, 1961; Mardin, 1991). This objective is an emancipated small group of women does best summarized by the Turkish Republic’s more harm to women in Turkey because it cre- founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as “our aim ates the illusion that Turkish women are not is to elevate Turkey to the ranks of contempo- subject to oppression as in other Islamic coun- rary civilizations” (Berkes, 1964). Turkish society tries. In addition, the recognition of social and perceives the process of modernization as a political rights in Turkey well ahead of many process of Europeanization, the adoption of Western countries, “perhaps preempted the European norms, attitudes, and standards of emergence of a women’s movement” (Arat, living (Mardin, 1991), and, therefore, Turkish 1989, p. 33). people reject traditional (i.e., non-European) Despite many rights Turkish women ac- elements. It is within this context of modern- quired at least on paper, there still exist serious ization and Europeanization that Turkish women obstacles to Turkish women’s liberation, and a were granted certain rights, atypical for an Is- vast majority of Turkish women lack the op- lamic country. portunities to enjoy their rights as granted by When in 1923, Turkey made its bid towards the Turkish legal system. A number of scholars

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claim that Turkish women are emancipated the Turkish aspiration to be accepted as a Eu- but unliberated (Arat, 1989, 1994; Kandiyoti, ropean country, and the way that the status of 1987; Tekeli, 1995). Therefore, it seems con- Turkish women is used towards that end. tradictory that despite modernization efforts Thus, an illusion that Turkish women are and legal changes, Turkish women are still op- emancipated is essential to fulfil that aspira- pressed by the patriarchal system. tion, and the projection of that image is found On the surface, there seems to be a dichot- to be more important than their actual emanci- omy between two types of women in Turkish pation. society: the open, Western, emancipated woman, The status of women has been an issue of and the closed, traditional, “unliberated” much controversy in the process of Turkish woman. A favorite sight for foreigners is the modernization. Whether to veil women or not, Turkish girl in a miniskirt walking side by side and under what conditions to integrate them with her veiled sister. Whether the liberal, into the public sphere, is one major axis Western-oriented woman or her traditional, around which modernization efforts have re- pious sister represents the majority of Turkish volved. When in the 19th century, moderniza- women is the question in many minds. This ar- tion efforts began in the Ottoman Empire, the ticle claims that the divide among Turkish predecessor of the Turkish Republic, two op- women is a reflection of the identity crisis or posing camps emerged in Turkish society; the the cultural dilemma that Turkish society has modernizing, secularizing, Western-oriented been facing since the 19th century. This article elite and the traditional, Islamist, and reaction- proposes that the perception that Turkey is the ary conservatives. Their struggle still continues only Islamic state where women are emanci- in modern Turkey, impacting political and so- pated is an illusion. There is a small, elite cial developments (Arat, 1989; Arsel, 1987; group of educated, professional, Western-ori- Müftüler-Bac, 1997). The most visible line of ented women in Turkey, the existence of demarcation between these two opposing which contributes to the fallacy that Turkish camps is Turkish women. Interestingly, the women are not chained by discriminatory status of women became one important crite- practices as in other Islamic countries, and that rion determining the extent and success of they are in a much better position than their modernization and Westernization efforts. The Middle Eastern sisters. However, the seem- emancipation of women became the barome- ingly bright picture—that Turkey as the most ter of Turkish modernization, to the extent modern, democratic, secular Muslim state that that the reactionary groups of the anti-West- also secures woman’s rights—is misleading in ern social strata have fought the war against many ways. In fact, I propose that this percep- Westernization on women’s bodies and dress. tion is more harmful than outright oppression Turkish women have suffered mostly from be- because it shakes the ground for women’s ing “the focal point of intense debate among rights movements by suggesting that they are groups with conflicting political interests,” but unnecessary. what most groups agreed on was “the neces- Women are oppressed in all countries from sary continuation of the patriarchal domina- the most modern to the most traditional, but to tion of men over women” (Tekeli, 1995, p. 10). varying degrees and in varying intensities. As part of the reform package enacted They suffer from political, social, economic, upon the establishment of the Turkish Repub- and legal inequalities as well as equality of op- lic, women were granted social and political portunities. This article does not claim that the rights, an analysis of which is provided in the problems Turkish women face are no longer next section. Turkish women’s rights were an issue in the West, on the contrary, despite granted and promoted by the Kemalist elite, religious and cultural differences, Turkish mostly men; it was not achieved as a result of women share with women at large similar pat- women’s movements since, at the time, they terns of oppression. In northwestern Europe, were nearly nonexistent. Women’s liberation women seem to be doing comparatively better movements gained momentum in the 1980s as than Turkish women, however, many of the is- educated, professional women began pushing sues raised in this article are still very much at for modifications in the legal system and domi- the core of women’s liberation movements in nant social norms. Thus, one explanation for the West. What sets the Turkish case apart is the relative weakness of women’s rights move-

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ments in modern Turkey is that under Kemal- comprise patriarchy in Turkey would include: ism, a number of changes were made. At first the Mediterranean culture, Islam, and Kemal- glance, Turkish legislation concerning gender ism—the official state ideology. roles seems egalitarian, especially for an Is- lamic country. In reality, Turkish legislation reflects conventional gender ideology where The Mediterranean culture gender roles are constructed around “male breadwinner-female homemaker” roles (Dun- The Mediterranean culture is the machismo can, 1996, p. 419). The utmost duty for Turkish tradition that one can come across to varying women is to be good wives and mothers, basi- degrees in all Eastern Mediterranean societies. cally because “the woman” is viewed as the In the Mediterranean region, it is claimed that mechanism for protecting the cultural bound- women are subject to oppression and exploita- aries that set the community apart from other tion by all religious groups (Beck & Keddie, societies (Bouhdiba, 1985; Moghadam, 1994). 1978; Delaney, 1987; Mernissi, 1975; Tillion, The fact that Turkey is a Muslim society in- 1966), and there seems to be a set of family creases the symbolic value of women as the laws common to the region that crosscuts na- differentiating element between West and tional boundaries, with the possible exception non-West. For example, when women veil of France and Northern Italy. The Mediterra- themselves, they emphasize the physical differ- nean family structure is based on male superi- ences between men and women, and, by doing ority and female inferiority,1 which is repro- so, demarcate the boundary lines between Is- duced by women themselves as mothers and lam and secular Western modernity. In this mothers-in-law. For example, a recent study manner, women become the guardians of tra- on sexuality in Turkey (Report on Sexuality in dition and collective identity. It is for this rea- Turkey, 1996) revealed that the most conserva- son that Turkish women’s subordinate posi- tive group among those interviewed are older tion partly stems from their identity as the (age group 50–59), married women with chil- social and biological carrier of the community dren of their own. This group vehemently op- (Arat, 1989; Kagitçibasi, 1982; Kandiyoti, posed such notions as premarital sex, single 1982). women living on their own, extramarital affairs; 94% of those women opposed such practices. These results suggest the importance of AGENTS OF OPPRESSION IN TURKEY women as transmitters and protectors of domi- What Turkish women share with their contem- nant social values and norms. The culturally poraries in other societies is that women are defined modes of control in the Mediterranean the “second sex” (de Beauvoir, 1953), and they region are deeply vested in traditions and so- try to survive in a male constructed system cial norms constraining female behavior. Male (Arat, 1989, 1994; Cindoglu, 1997). The image superiority is maintained through honor and of urban, middle-class, Turkish women is shame codes and women’s oppression is justi- pretty similar to “Western standards” in their fied by society’s rules of appropriate behavior. dress code, living standards, and political (Delaney, 1987; Peristiany, 1966, 1976). It is rights. There are two problems in this picture, said that “The Mediterranean woman, fre- first the proportion of Westernized Turkish quently abused in spite of laws, sometimes women is pretty small, and second, all Turkish sold, often beaten, forced to work and whose women are bound by the same gender roles assassination may sometimes remain unpun- dominant in Turkish culture. Turkish women ished is the slave of our modern times” (Til- face various forms of oppression and subordi- lion, 1966, pp. 161–178). Male supremacy in nation in their daily lives; these can be catego- the Mediterranean culture, endorsed by the rized under tangible and intangible forms of asymmetrical power relations between men oppression. The intangible ones include legal and women, in this manner acts as an agent of discrimination, economic inequality, and social oppression over women in Turkey. The Medi- inequality. The tangible ones comprise sexual terranean culture, therefore, is a basis of male harassment, assault, insult, battering, rape, vir- dominance in Turkey, the pattern of which de- ginity tests, torture, and murder at the most pends on the “virginity-fidelity-son-producing extreme. A preliminary list of the factors that ethos” (Beck & Keddie, 1978, p. 25).

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Islam pire—from 1299 to its collapse in 1923—female behavior was determined and scrutinized The second factor is Islam, the dominant re- through the triple coalition of state, religion, ligion in Turkey where the majority of the and family. The administration (i.e., the Pal- population, 99% is the official figure, is of ace), issued decrees stating the days of the Muslim faith. Islam divides the world into two, week that women can go outside their homes the public sphere that belongs to men, and the and the proper form of clothing they should private sphere, the domain of domesticity that wear while outside. Such issues as the thick- belongs to women. The two do not mix. Islam, ness of the veil covering the face, the proper with its strict rules of confining women to the length of the chaddur were decided by the private sphere, has traditionally incapacitated state authority and broadcast through the de- women’s ability to receive education and to crees of the Sultan. hold jobs, in short to exist in the public sphere. Covering oneself up is a sexual concept, There are two competing views on how Islam women veil themselves because their faces, views women; there are those who claim that bodies, hair, and voice attract men; thus, Islam equality between men and women is a basic views woman only in terms of sexuality and principle in the Koran, the separate-but-equal not as part of humanity. Humanity is male and argument (Hatemi, 1988). The proponents of it has to be protected from the female. The im- this view claim that women are already liber- portance to order of veiled women in Turkish ated in Islam, therefore, there is no legitimate society is evident in the clash between the ground for women’s rights movements. On the modernizing and traditional tendencies. other hand, there are those who claim that Is- lam treats women as second class people (Ar- Women’s clothing, veils, slaves and polyg- sel, 1987; Calislar, 1991). For example, male amy were all themes that occupied a para- superiority is endorsed by Islamic law on fam- doxical place in the debate on the westerniz- ily matters and inheritance. The fact that Ko- ing of Turkey at the end of the 19th century. ran is Allah’s words legitimizes women’s posi- These cultural particularities of Turkish life tion as subordinate and inferior, since it would did not fit into the modernizing plans of the not be possible to challenge divine judgement. pro-Western elites who contemplated Tur- Islam provides the infrastructure for keeping key through the gaze of Europeans. But at women off the public sphere, equal or not; the same time, it would seem that the Turk- what is certain in Islam is that women are sep- ish or Ottoman identity lay almost entirely in arated from (i.e., excluded from public sphere) these cultural traits, as if a great part of men’s realm. Turkish identity was tied to these traditional According to Mernissi (1975), women were ways. (Seni, 1995, p. 25) confined to their homes—excluded from the public sphere—because they have the poten- At the end of the 20th century, the debate in tial power to upset the social order. Turkey still continues over the extent to which women can reveal their bodies and participate In Islam there is no belief in female inferior- in public life without upsetting public order. In ity. On the contrary, the whole system is the 1990s, as a result of the increasing strength based on the assumption that women are of political Islam in Turkey, one observes a re- powerful and dangerous beings. All sexual versal to Islamic dress and to Islamic rules for institutions (polygamy, repudiation, sexual gender roles. An interesting example of the segregation, etc.) can be perceived as a strat- relevance of the debate to modern Turkish life egy for containing their power. (Mernissi, is the dispute in January 1998 as to whether 1975, p. 19) women can pray along with men at funeral ser- vices or whether the presence of women in the A woman in the public sphere is a threat to so- crowd would jeopardize the integrity of men’s cial order because she carries with herself the prayers.2 The proponents of the Islamic tradi- danger of fitna—her ability to create chaos tion are adamant that women have no place through her sexual attraction (Al-Hibri, 1982; among men in public prayers, and that the Arsel, 1987; Göle, 1991; Ilyasoglu, 1994; Mer- presence of women upsets the general order. It nissi, 1975). For example, in the Ottoman Em- is for this reason that, even when properly

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veiled, women in modern Turkey are still ish society, the integration of women into public physically separated among the pro-Islamic, sphere was possible only if women concealed traditional groups from men in all gatherings. their femininity and displayed modesty in their attire and behavior. The ideal woman is portrayed as pure, honorable, and unreachable, serving the higher cause of modernization in Kemalism Turkey. In that manner, Turkish women are The third agent of oppression in Turkey, seen as self-sacrificing, sacred creatures whose paradoxically, is Kemalist ideology. In contrast integration into public sphere as teachers, to Islamic premises, Kemalist ideology aims at nurses, and professionals does not threaten integrating women into Turkish public life. morality or order. The price for female free- When the new Turkish republic was founded dom in this early republican era in Turkey was in 1923 on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the suppression of female femininity, thus visi- the founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk strove to bility. Islamic practice controls women’s visi- create a modern state. The emancipation of bility—their potential to threaten public or- women was found to be critical in this en- der—by separating private and public spheres deavor. and by veiling women. Kemalism, on the other The first step toward emancipation was hand, controls their visibility by developing a marked by changes in dress codes. The Kemal- stereotype of a Turkish woman; modest in ap- ist reforms of dress eliminated the curse of sex- pearance, companion to her male in moderniz- uality from Turkish women by forbidding the ing the country. In that aspect, Islam and Ke- use of veil and chaddur. Through the dress re- malism were similar in that both depended forms of 1925, the Islamic way of dressing was upon the notion that women constituted a abandoned in favor of Western attire. Second, threat to the social order. Islam dealt with that the Civil Code of 1926 eliminated the Islamic threat by confining women to their houses and rules for marriage even though it still de- Kemalism dealt with that threat by stripping pended upon male dominance for the survival women of their sexuality and by putting forth of the family as a social institution. The new asexual stereotypes that typified the new Civil Code forbade polygamy—under Islamic Turkish woman. laws of marriage, a man is entitled to four wives and can divorce any one of the wives The Leftist Ideology himself. The Civil Code introduced gender equality in marriage, divorce, and in matters of The Leftist ideology, dominant in Turkish inheritance, and granted equal child custody politics, especially among the modernizing rights for both parents. Third, in 1930, Turkish forces in Turkish society, from 1965 to 1980, is women were granted the right to vote in local another ideology that tried to strip women of elections and in 1934, the right to vote for and their sexuality. In this manner, the Leftist ide- to be elected to public office in national elec- ology treated the female question in Turkey in tions, rather early even when compared to a similar manner to Kemalism and Islam. The their European sisters. These reforms during Turkish Left took upon itself the liberation of the early years of the Turkish Republic brought all the Turkish people and it did not handle legal equality for women, at least on paper. As women as a separate category. The “female a consequence, women became staunch allies problem” was perceived to be one of the nu- of the Kemalist regime, which granted them merous ailments of the Turkish bourgeoisie or rights and liberties. Women’s rights became the capitalist development in Turkey. The part of the process of modernization and secu- Turkish Left consisted of the Republican Peo- larization (Arat, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1987; Tekeli, ple’s Party, Communist Party, Turkish Work- 1995). During the early years of the Turkish ers Party, trade unions, as well as student orga- Republic, “most of the feminists have become nizations in various universities. Even though militant ‘Kemalists’ and for the prominent all these groups had varying levels of commit- women of this generation ‘feminism’ and ‘Ke- ment to a “socialist revolution,” they con- malism’ became synonyms” (Tekeli, 1986, p. 193). verged around the notion that feminism is a One should note that even though Kemal- bourgeois phenomenon, blocking the way to ism had highly improved women’s lot in Turk- societal salvation (Sirman, 1989; Taylor, 1983)

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During the 1970s, the Turkish Left focused on application of Islamic practices and Islamic law women’s rights as part of a systemic social to women and family matters. The 1990s are transformation. “The Turkish Left has tradi- witnessing the emergence of Islamic women as tionally ascribed the oppression of women to an important civil society movement. (Göle, the socio-economic backwardness of a country 1991; Ilyasoglu, 1994) The paradox is that these said to be dominated by feudal relations” women are in the public sphere but they live in (Berktay, 1995, p. 251) Women were included the Islamic way. For example, there is a grow- in the Leftist movements as comrades and ing number of girls who are seeking education asexual beings, reminding one of the Islamic and employment but who wear the veil. These argument that women constitute a threat to women, who mostly support the pro-Islamic the public order. It would be interesting to Welfare/Virtue Party, follow the Islamic way note that women working side-by-side with of living but work for the Party. As Islam polit- men are called baci—sister, thus eliminating icized in the 1980s, women came forth as mili- the threat of sexuality. The Turkish Left has tant activists, the veiled women became the used this terminology extensively to “denote symbol of activism for political Islam, while at an unsexed, depersonalized kind of ‘woman the same time, they constituted the boundary comrade’” (Berktay, 1995, p. 252). Tansu Cil- line between Islamists and secular Western- ler, the leader of the conservative, right wing ists.4 One possible explanation for being out- True Path Party, who was the Prime Minister side yet veiling oneself is, of course, political. from June 1993 to January 1996 and Deputy But, there is another side to the story. These Prime Minister until June 1997, refers to her- women shield themselves from male harass- self as baci when she appeals to the masses in ment by their Islamic dress; their veil gives an attempt to desexualize herself and be taken them space in the public sphere without being seriously as a politician. threatened by men. The veil in modern Turkey To sum up, despite many improvements works as a protective shield against being la- that the process of modernization and Kemal- beled as fair game or a sexual being if and ist reforms brought to women’s rights in Tur- when women are outside their domestic space. key, the basics of male domination stayed in- Thus, the veiled woman in Turkey in the tact. Left unacknowledged and untreated both 1990s could be considered to be a reaction to by Kemalism and by the leftist ideology, the male dominance. It has been developed as a oppression of women in Turkey has not re- defense mechanism by those women who no ceived the attention it had in Western societ- longer want to be contained in their traditional ies. The patriarchal order persisted under a realm, the house; but who feel threatened by different cover. The legal equality granted by men. For some, these women veil themselves Kemalist reforms did not achieve the emanci- because they are “hostile to the message of the pation of women in Turkey. As Simone de feminist ideology” (Tekeli, 1986, p. 194). This Beauvoir (1953) pointed out: “Even when her may be true to a certain extent. However, the rights are legally recognized in the abstract, trend may be toward an opposite direction, long-standing custom prevents their full ex- that these “Islamic” women may be using the pression in the mores” (p. 10). This has been traditional dress as a weapon in order to se- the situation in Turkey, even though Kemalist cure themselves in the public sphere without reforms took a drastic step toward women’s being subject to male harassment. It seems, emancipation. therefore, too simplistic to claim Islam the In the 1990s, one witnesses a step backward only culprit of women’s oppression in Turkey. toward Islamic practices. The popular support One should note, however, that one common for pro-Islamic political party—Welfare/Virtue denominator for all social groups in Turkey, Party3—has increased steadily since 1987. In whether Islamists, Kemalists, or Leftists, is that a the 1987 local elections, RP received 18.4% of woman’s value is determined by her sexual pu- the votes and in the 1995 general elections, it rity, which is addressed in the next section. received 21.7% of the national vote (Müftüler- Bac, 1998). Thus, Islam has become a major force NAMUS: SEXUAL PURITY to be reckoned with in Turkish society and politics. Its implications for the status of women is In Turkey, woman’s chastity remains the most that militants of political Islam are demanding important control mechanism over female

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freedom. Such social institutions as the family, unacceptable. What is common to all classes is the courts, and cultural traditions constitute that the aim is strict control over female behav- the backbone of this control mechanism. The ior. Even rumors are enough to besmirch the reflection of female chastity in modern Turk- family honor. Namus can only be cleansed— ish society is namus, family honor that exists in because it has been dirtied by the woman—by varying degrees in other Mediterranean societ- blood; so the woman has to be killed by one of ies. Namus can be roughly translated to sexual the male members of the family. Namus mur- purity. Kandiyoti reflects on sexual purity as ders are commonplace in Turkey, especially in another form of control over female behavior. groups of lower socioeconomic status. They are quite separate and distinct from crimes of The corporate control over female sexuality passion. A striking example of such a “cleans- becomes strikingly evident in the large num- ing process” took place in Southeast Turkey in ber of different individuals who see them- April 1996 when a 13-year-old girl ran from selves as immediately responsible for ensur- home and her 14-year-old cousin was ordered ing women’s appropriate sexual conduct . . . by the family to cleanse the family honor by firmly imprinting the notion that her sexual- killing her. In court, the judge sentenced the ity is not hers to give or withhold. (Kandi- murderer cousin to 2 1/2 years in prison be- yoti, 1987, p. 325) cause of the traditions of the region where the incident took place.5 One aspect of sexual purity for women is that Thus, the most important aspect of sexual premarital and extramarital affairs are strictly purity for women is virginity and chastity. That forbidden. The basic difference between Turk- is partly because of their value as reproductive ish society and European societies is that, in agents. The image of God as Father in mono- Turkey, these activities are not personal but theistic religions is sustained in the patriarchal involve state authority. The state in Turkey is a and patrilineal social system, which both praises party to women’s sexual activities reflecting and preserves male dominance. A woman may society’s values vis-à-vis women’s sexual pu- claim a place in the social order only through rity. For example, married women caught in her reproductive capacities. Women’s virginity the act of infidelity receive jail sentences; sin- and chastity are the only guarantees that men gle women caught with a married man may be can claim fatherhood; the patriarchal system subject to virginity tests to determine whether controls female promiscuity in order to secure sexual intercourse has occurred; girls under fatherhood. Judeo-Christian and Islamic pre- state control, such as at state schools, orphan- mises legitimized male control of female sexu- ages, and mental hospitals, may be required to ality for this purpose of legitimate birth. undergo virginity tests. For example, a former The modern legal structure in Turkey is Minister of Health, Yildirim Aktuna, ordered based upon the same concern: the control of regular monthly virginity tests for female pa- female sexuality. A promiscuous woman is a tients while he was in charge of the Istanbul danger to the social order created under Islam, Bakirkoy Mental Hospital (Cindoglu, 1997, p. but man’s promiscuity is not controlled, it is 257). These are all attempts by the state to even encouraged. The importance of female control female sexuality. chastity in Turkish social order is best illus- Women’s sexual behavior is a measure of trated by Serif Mardin (1991), who claims that both the society’s and the state’s dominant val- from the 17th century onward, female chastity/ ues in Turkey. A family’s/men’s honor is at morality as epitomized by female clothing and stake when one of the women of the family is behavior has been used by religious reaction- behaving or is reputed to be behaving in a non- aries and conservatives as basis for urban re- virtuous manner. Educating females, allowing bellion. Din elden gidiyor–We are losing our them to walk on the streets, letting the girl religion—has been a favorite protest by the re- choose her own spouse may all have the poten- ligious conservative reactionaries in order to tial to threaten namus. In different social express their discontent and opposition to the classes, ‘namus’ would be jeopardized by dif- modernization efforts. The most visible proof ferent misdemeanors. In middle class, it is only for the process leading to infidelity was, of sexual liaisons that are not tolerated, in lower course, women’s morality as measured by their middle class, going to the grocery store alone is clothing and behavior. The battleground of

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modernization was women’s bodies and the his bride a virgin on their first night may kill most visible form of control over women’s the bride, but still escape social alienation for bodies is their virginity. his act. The fact that most virgins do not neces- The most recent debate over women in sarily bleed on their first intercourse is mostly Turkey is whether girls are to be subjected to overlooked. The woman who does not bleed virginity tests by the state. Virginity tests and on her first night is either shot or sent back to controls of young girls are generally conducted her father’s house as damaged goods. The ex- on girls suspected of illicit behavior or on tended media coverage of murder of women brides who do not bleed on their first night. on account of honor seems to suggest that it is The importance of virginity lies in its capacity a common problem, especially in less-devel- to determine the woman’s value in the mar- oped regions in Turkey. However, a society riage market and, therefore, her status in soci- that cannot secure its women’s survival cannot ety. In December 1997, a new law was passed secure its women’s welfare either. regarding virginity tests, stating that a girl may If the woman escapes violence on her first refuse to have such a check; but one should night, there is no guarantee that life shall con- note that given the social value of virginity, a tinue blissfully. There is violence directed girl refusing to be checked would be automati- against women, both inside their homes and on cally declaring herself a nonvirgin. “Being a the streets. Wife battering is not uncommon— virgin bride signifies a woman’s purity and her a recent report indicates up to 30% of all loyalty to her family. In a sense, the virginity of women in Turkey are regularly beaten by their the bride is an asset for both her family and the husbands (Report on Domestic Violence, 1995). groom’s family” (Cindoglu, 1997, p. 253). Ac- A common Turkish saying legitimizes the act cording to one study conducted by the Istanbul by claiming that “Husbands both love and beat Social Research Foundation, more than 70% their wives.” of men interviewed still regard virginity as an As for single women, their sexuality poses a absolute condition in their brides (Report on serious threat to social order. Even though a Sexuality in Turkey, 1996, p. 37). rank of professional women coexists with men Female virginity is definitely not a personal in the public sphere, men still dominate over choice, it involves society—a nonvirgin is faced the “liberated” woman in terms of her per- with social alienation and marginalization. sonal life. For example, a single woman living What is particular to Turkey is that it also in- on her own is dangerous to the community in volves the state. The Minister responsible for which she is living, especially in middle-class Women’s Affairs, Ms. Isilay Saygin, in an in- neighborhoods. The reason is basically that terview to a Turkish daily newspaper (Yeni she is not abiding the rules set by the male- Yüzyìl, 1998), stated that the Turkish state is dominant system, which requires that she be responsible for girls’ virginity and, therefore, married. An unmarried, independent woman virginity tests should be continued.6 She based living on her own is regarded as an anomaly. her arguments on the supremacy of the social Thus, even the educated male has a tendency values and protection of the family reflecting to view an unmarried, therefore, masterless the general attitude of Turkish society regard- woman, as fair game. Ayse Saktanber (1995) ing virginity. These perceptions, deeply em- asserts that this tendency reflects the division bedded into the collective memory of the of Turkish women into two categories; “those Turkish society, reflect the dominant view of almost totally devoid of sexuality” (i.e., the women as the social and biological carrier of family woman), and “those that are nothing the community. “Because of their reproductive but sexuality” (Saktanber, 1995, p. 155). This capacity, women are seen as the transmitters categorization reminds one of the mother/ of group values and traditions and as agents of whore dichotomy in the West. An event that socialization of the young” (Moghadam, 1994, took place in Istanbul in May 1998 illustrates p. 18). Their sexual purity, therefore, is essen- this tendency to view single women as fair tial for the survival of society’s norms and values. game; in a middle-class neighborhood of Istan- It is, therefore not a major surprise to find bul, three models/actresses who lived together that most of the violence directed against were attacked and gang raped in their own women stem from namus-sexual purity con- house by seven men. The media coverage re- cerns. Accordingly, a groom who does not find flected the society’s biases that the women

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rather than the aggressors were guilty, because pression. The women’s liberation movement of their professions and lifestyles.7 found fertile ground in that period. In 1983, In short, woman’s value in the Turkish soci- abortion was legalized in Turkey with the ety is measured through her sexual purity, Abortion Act. In 1987, a massive campaign which is controlled by customs, mores, norms, against wife-battering began and a number of and laws. The interplay of Mediterranean cul- women shelters were opened. Women also be- ture and Islamist ideology is the determining gan a campaign against sexual harassment on factor for measuring women with respect to the streets or in public places. In 1990, a their sexual propriety. Women’s Library and Information Center was opened in Istanbul for the purpose of dissemi- nating information on women. In 1991, a Min- TURKISH WOMEN IN STRUGGLE istry of Women’s Affairs was established. To recall the dichotomy of Turkish women Women’s Day celebrations on March 8 have mentioned above, the modern woman and the attracted media and public attention. traditional woman, it seems that the common In addition, in the 1990s, women’s move- denominator for all Turkish women is the vari- ments are trying to eliminate the legal bases of ous forms of oppression they face. Rural and inequality such as the Civil Code and the Penal urban women face different problems, as do Code. Though it is a major improvement over women from the urban middle classes and the Islamic law, the Civil Code of 1926 still lower middle classes, but they are all subject to falls short of gender role egalitarianism. For the rules of patriarchy. The patriarchal system example, Article 152 of the Code dictates that survives by feeding on the continuity of male the Head of the Family is the man, Article 153 dominance, which is achieved by oppressing states that upon marriage woman has to carry the female population. The most visible woman, her husband’s last name. (A minor revision in the educated, middle-class, working woman, is May 1997 allows women to keep their maiden as close as the Turkish woman gets to emanci- name along with their husbands’). Further- pation. The proportion of this type of woman more, the Civil Code states that the Head of to the whole population of women in Turkey is the family is the father (Article 154), thus pretty small; 87.36% of all women in Turkey overlooking all the families in which the head are not employed (Report on Domestic Vio- can be a single mother; for example, divorced lence, 1995, pp. 84–85), on the other hand, or widowed mothers with children. These arti- roughly 30% of all university professors, medi- cles are what women’s movements aim to cal doctors, and lawyers are women; so those modify through legal amendments. who are employed are mostly working in pro- It is not only the Civil Code that perpetu- fessional jobs. In the business sector, the pro- ates ties of subordination in Turkey. The Penal portions are much lower; for every 100 men at Code also discriminates against women. It is the executive level, there are 3 women.8 Eco- expected that women are the first target of vio- nomic equality is achieved by this small, privi- lence in all societies, but laws protect women leged group, but they are still bound by the against such practices by punishing the culpa- rules of the society in which they are con- ble. In Turkey, a man who rapes a prostitute demned to live as proper women. What the may be entitled to a reduction in his sentence, Kemalist reforms have achieved is the integra- and a man who kills his sister, wife, mother, tion of some women into the male-dominated sister-in-law for her improper actions, is looked system; what needs to be done—if equality is upon as the victim not the victimizer. Raping a to be achieved—is transform the system itself, married woman, therefore, not a virgin, has a which is the ultimate aim of women’s move- lesser sentence than raping an unmarried ments in Turkey. woman in Turkey. The best illustration of gen- A feminist movement flourished in the der-based legal inequality is Zina—extramari- post-1980 period and became one of the most tal sex. Zina, under the Civil Code, is a cause important social movements, helping to define for divorce. However, under the Penal Code, civil society in Turkey. A student of Turkish married women accused of Zina are punished politics would be quick to point out that 1980 with jail sentences, whereas married men com- is the year when the military took over civilian mitting the same act of infidelity are not pun- politics, which resulted in massive political re- ished at all. Such patterns of oppression are so

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deeply embedded in the social and legal infra- always pictured with the mother, helping her structure that few question them or try to elim- cook, setting the table, or doing the laundry. inate them. Fortunately, women’s movements The setting for the female child is always the that campaign against these patterns of op- domestic scene, while the boys are portrayed pression are increasingly more active in the with their father, looking at the newspaper, 1990s; two notable examples are, KADER, a watching television, helping with the chores new movement established in 1997 for the pur- outside, in short, engaged in “manly” activi- pose of increasing women’s participation at lo- ties. Journalist Nalan Kuloglu, investigated the cal and national politics; and Purple Roof, a gender roles in secondary school books on reli- women’s movement organization that aims at gion and morals, found that in almost all of eliminating violence directed against women them women are either ignored or treated in in domestic and public sphere. There are also terms of their servility and subordination to organized women’s movements against do- men, mostly their husbands. The media and mestic violence, against legal inequalities the daily newspapers in Turkey also contribute noted above. These feminist movements at- handsomely to this constant socialization. Televi- tract extended media coverage and generate sion commercials and soap operas teach wom- hostility by the conservative circles. anly behavior and condemn acts such as working A good method of keeping women down is outside the home as unfeminine and destruc- to exclude them from education. In rural areas tive to the happiness of family life. Newspa- and in the lower middle-class neighborhoods pers provide women’s section on separate in the cities, families are reluctant to send their pages titled “For Women,” in which women daughters to school, even though it is compul- are indoctrinated with helpful hints as how to sory. The Republican People’s Party con- make themselves better looking, sexually will- ducted a survey on women’s education and the ing, good care takers, good cooks, etc. findings indicated that 8 million Turkish women, The whole system—the family, schooling one third of the female population, do not and the media—constantly sends one message know how to read and write (Yeni Yüzyìl, to women. A woman’s first duty is to marry as 1997a) A recent study by UNICEF revealed early as possible and continue her life as a doc- that one out of every three school-aged girl ile, pleasant wife and a dedicated, sacrificing does not receive any education in Turkey, and mother. This process of socialization into gen- that 30% of all women in Turkey are illiterate der roles determines the power relations be- (World Bank Development Report, 1995). tween the sexes. The schooling of girls can be as low as 12% in The Foundation of Social Research Cen- certain regions in the rural areas. The reason ter’s study on sexuality in Turkey found a clear for keeping girls out of the schooling process is correlation between education and gender that the interplay of the Mediterranean and Is- roles (Report on Domestic Violence, 1995). lamic tradition keeps girls at home learning 70% of uneducated women considered beating domestic skills from their mothers. Illiteracy their daughters a viable way of disciplining among women leads to worse outcomes, mak- their daughters, whereas only 3% of university ing it easier to subordinate these women who graduate women thought so; 57% of the uned- have no training and to keep them under their ucated women considered that a woman’s fathers, brothers,’ or husbands’ control. place was at home, and that the woman should While most girls are kept out of school, ed- not intervene in man’s business—the saying ucation materials are designed in such a man- goes in Turkish as “With flour in her hands, ner that they indoctrinate the values and the she is intervening in man’s business”— rules of patriarchy. Thus, the socialization pro- whereas no university graduate woman agreed cess of children into gender specific roles be- with that. It also is more probable that women gins early in the family, but the schooling pro- university graduates choose their spouses cess is also one of the main elements in this themselves, whereas the girls in rural areas and socialization, like in most European countries. living in traditional settings have no chance of Books in primary and secondary schools por- doing so. tray gender roles in a specific manner and so- It seems that women suffer from double op- cialize the students into gender roles and re- pression, they do not receive education and sponsibilities. For example, girls are almost they are kept out of the labor market. Article

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159—revoked in 1991—of the Turkish Civil tics except as wives. Thus, the mechanisms of Code stated that a woman required her hus- the labor market sustain gender inequality due band’s approval before she takes up employ- to vertical and horizontal segregation. ment. In a society where women ask their husbands’ permission even to go out,9 let alone work outside the home, what the law dictates CONCLUSION has less importance. A study conducted by the To sum up, Turkish women are faced with op- Turkish Prime Ministry, Family Research In- pression despite the Kemalist reforms of the stitution revealed that 40% of all Turkish 1920s. The agents of oppression over female women do not work outside the home because freedom are the Mediterranean culture with of their husbands’ objections (Report on Do- its honor and shame codes, the Islamic tradi- mestic Violence, 1995, pp. 120–121). Women tion with its divine judgement on female be- from lower socioeconomic groups are faced havior and the Kemalist ideology with its ste- with the inability to participate in labor market reotype of an asexual, self-sacrificing Turkish activities because of their lack of education woman. and lack of skills. The social factors that keep Despite many reforms that granted Turkish women at home also serve an economic pur- women legal, social, and political rights in the pose. Turkey has high unemployment rates, 1920s, Turkish women are still far off from therefore, the competition by women with emancipation. It is this paradoxical character men on the job market is highly undesirable. of Kemalist reforms that this article tries to The labor force in Turkey is 47.4% of the pop- emphasize. The process of Turkish moderniza- ulation, with 69.9% male and 25.2% female; tion provided Turkish women rights, at least the unemployment ratio is 6.9%. As for unem- on paper, while it also created the illusion that ployment for educated young people, the ratio Turkish women are emancipated. Consequently, is 25.3% for males and 45.3% for females. Per- the educated, professional women, produced sons not in the labor force comprise 52.6%, by Kemalist reforms, were not organized un- within this group housewives comprise 52.8%, der a women’s rights movement until the 63.3% of which live in urban areas. It seems, 1980s, basically because they did not perceive therefore, that females in urban areas (i.e., the ongoing oppression of women in Turkey. It housewives mostly) are passive in the labor is this misperception that prevented the emer- force (State Institute of Statistics, 1998). On gence of women’s movements and helped sus- the other hand, women in rural areas carry tain the contradiction of “liberated” women. most of the burden for agricultural production; Women suffer from lack of education, employ- 67.2% of all women in Turkey are employed as ment, and opportunities that are sustained by “nonsalaried family workers,” especially in ag- dominant social norms. Controlled in their ricultural production (Yeni Yüzyìl, 1997a). Ac- sexuality, kept out of schools, discriminated in cording to the October 1997 Household La- the labor market, Turkish women are still a bour Force Survey conducted by the State long way from emancipation. Institute of Statistics (1998), 51% of people The “liberation” of Turkish women has employed in agriculture in Turkey were un- been one of the best concealed lies in Turkey. paid family workers and 71% of these were fe- In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of questions male (State Institute of Statistics, 1998). This arose as to who Turkish women are. It is means that women are carrying the highest against this background that women’s move- burden in agricultural production, but do not ments found fertile ground. One should note, receive any return for the value they create. To however, that the women’s question is only illustrate the obstacles women face in the labor one aspect of the deeply buried identity crisis market, one may mention that in the census of that Turkey is undergoing in the 1990s. November 30, 1997, the State Statistics Insti- tute collected information regarding employment and labor movements from the heads of ENDNOTES the family—overlooking millions of married 1. For a detailed analysis of the Mediterranean family women who have jobs themselves, thus, indi- structure, see Mediterranean Family Structure (Peris- rectly, the Turkish state was declaring that the tiany, 1976). working women have no value to state statis- 2. The issue became politicized in the second week of Jan-

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