Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Change of Government in WP New Emphases in Domestic and Foreign Policy

Sabine Fischer and Uwe Halbach S

In autumn 2012, Georgia underwent a development that is already being described as historical. Following an emotional and at times hostile election contest, the Georgian parliamentary elections on 1 October led to a change of government, which the country is hailing as proof of its democratic maturity. President ’s United National Movement party, which had been in power for the last nine years and held a two-thirds majority in the last parliament, suffered a clear defeat against a coalition of six opposition parties, none of whom had been represented in the previous parliament. Saakashvili will remain in office until 2013. What course will the new coalition govern- ment under Prime Minister now set in domestic and foreign policy? Will the incumbent president, who is endowed with a wide range of powers, and the new government be able to work together in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elec- tions or will they become entrenched in bitter rivalry?

If the opposing political camps led by change that has not been brought about by President Saakashvili and Prime Minister a coup d’etat. Ivanishvili succeed in working together Before the elections, voices warning of a peacefully up until the presidential elec- polarisation of society were getting louder tions (due to be held in October 2013), this both in Georgia and abroad. The country’s change of government could justifiably be highest moral authority, the head of the considered exceptional. Around 120 par- Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II appealed liamentary and presidential elections for maintaining peace. The West also fol- have been held in the former lowed the elections with concern. The gov- region (excluding the Baltic republics) since ernment vilified the opposition as a politi- 1991. They have usually resulted in the cal force wanting to take Georgia back into re-election of the ruling government and the past and into Russia’s political orbit. many have been clouded by suspicions of The opposition labelled the incumbents fraud. A peaceful change of government “fascists”. From October 2011 (when multi- by means of an election process remains billionaire Ivanishvili entered politics) to the exception. In Georgia, this is the first August 2012, Transparency International

Dr. Sabine Fischer is Head of SWP’s Russian Federation / CIS Division SWP Comments 3 Dr. Uwe Halbach is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Russian Federation / CIS Division January 2013

1

Georgia documented cases of intimidation ment and reform. Then there are the other of opposition activists, political arrests, three parties, whose spectrum of ideology unequal treatment of government and and policies range from entrepreneurial opposition parties with regard to illegal interests (Industry will Save Georgia) to party financing, and prevention of oppo- nationalistic views (). How- sition party activities by the police. State- ever, the parties still only ments from the opposition camp fuelled have a weak footing in Georgian society fears that conflicts would break out after and are barely institutionalised. This may the elections. The Georgian Dream elec- threaten the coalition and make it difficult tion coalition, centred around Ivanishvili’s to consolidate the party system. Georgian party (Georgian Dream − Democratic Dream owes its election victory first and Georgia), criticised the president’s authori- foremost to the popularity of the coalition tarian leadership style and pledged an “end leader and the social unrest caused by griev- of the Saakashvili era”. Ivanishvili made ances against the former government elite. his unexpected entrance onto the Georgian The election results varied widely at political stage in autumn 2011. Until then the regional level, with the capital he had lived a secluded life, although his emerging as the stronghold of the opposi- name was well known in connection with tion. With the exception of some regions various charitable projects. He earned his like Ivanishvili’s home constituency, where fortune as an entrepreneur in Russia before 93 percent of the vote went to Georgian returning to Georgia in 2002. Saakashvili’s Dream, people in rural areas in the Arme- party consequently did its best to paint nian and Azerbaijani minority enclaves him as a Kremlin stooge, and the president tended to vote for the ruling government attempted to sideline his opponent by with- party, although the results were not as deci- drawing his Georgian citizenship. sive as in previous elections. That is surpris- ing given that Georgian Dream’s main criti- cism of the previous government was that Realignments in political power it had neglected the development of rural Up until shortly before the elections, regions. opinion polls were predicting a victory for the ruling government. However, they also showed that many voters were still Georgia in the transition phase undecided. A video released two weeks With a solid majority in the new parlia- before the elections showing torture scenes ment, which moved its seat from Tbilisi to in a prison also stirred up anti-government the country’s second largest city Kutaisi, sentiment among the public. Ivanishvili was able to secure the position The elections on 1 October created sur- of prime minister for himself and form a prising realignments of political power in government. Although it is still the respon- parliament and brought the opposition sibility of the president to appoint the into government. Eighty-five of the 150 prime minister, Saakashvili announced he parliamentary seats went to the Georgian would respect the electorate’s demand for Dream coalition. Of the six parties in the a change of government. A constitutional coalition, two others beside Ivanishvili’s amendment, passed in 2010, transferring party are significant: Our Georgia – Free executive powers from the president to the Democrats led by the new Minister of prime minister and the parliament, will Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Irakli only come into effect after the 2013 presi- Alasania, and the Republican Party of dential election. After two terms in office, Georgia headed by , the Saakashvili will not be able to stand for new chairman of the Georgian parliament. re-election. Until then, however, he will Both are advocates of democratic develop- still be the chief executive in a system that

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

2

endows the president with great power. announced its plans to set up a parliamen- It remains to be seen how Saakashvili will tary committee to investigate cases of abuse cooperate with his rivals in the upper eche- of office among the former government lons of government during the transition elite. , who served as prisons phase. chief from 2005 to 2008 and subsequently The beginning of this phase has given as minister of defence, followed by a brief cause for optimism. President Saakashvili spell as minister of the interior, has been conceded his party’s defeat on the day of arrested on charges of mistreating soldiers, the election. He said that although there as have Giorgi Kalandadze, chief of joint were fundamental differences between staff of the Georgian armed forces, and the new and outgoing governments, he, as another senior official. Other high-ranking president and guarantor of the constitu- civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior tion, would ensure that the transition of have also been charged with abuse of office. power would be as civilised “as never before They are accused of taking “extralegal sur- in Georgia’s history.” However, the decisive veillance measures” against Ivanishvili question is still whether the current presi- during the election campaign. in the latest dent is really prepared to give up the politi- edition of the annual report Freedom in the cal leadership of his country in 2013. If so, World 2013, released January 16, Georgia’s he would cut a striking contrast with the status was upgraded to “electoral democ- Putins, Lukashenkos, Karimovs and Nazar- racy”. Nevertheless, the report’s authors bayevs of other post-Soviet states. His rival criticized the new government for prompt- Ivanishvili initially announced that he ly arresting some 30 officials of the pre- would only serve as prime minister for an vious government, which raised concerns intermediary period of 18 months. He later about politically motivated prosecutions. qualified this announcement by saying he These developments have put would only leave the political arena when Saaskashvili on the defensive, even though, the change in government had been con- in addition to his wide-ranging powers, he solidated and he had fulfilled his election (still) has a plentiful army of followers at promises. Shortly after the elections and the regional and local administrative levels. the formation of the new government, Prime Minister Ivanishvili meanwhile an- military and political officials from the nounced plans to accelerate the constitu- defeated government were arrested for tional changes curtailing the president’s abuse of office. The subsequent disputes powers and to ensure these came into effect between the two camps suggest that the before the next presidential election. On country’s political road ahead could well the ninth anniversary of the Rose Revolu- be rather bumpy. tion on 23 November 2012, Saakashvili expressed his disapproval of the measures taken by the new government and com- Cohabitation or power struggle? mented: “More and more people in Georgia The new dual power constellation in realise that our country is in danger.” The Georgia is known as “cohabitation” – a New Year addresses given by the president term used to describe the relationship and the prime minister demonstrated between a president and prime minister their sharply different standpoints and cast who belong to different political camps doubt on the ability of the two leaders to and both have executive powers. engage constructively in the cohabitation The change in government has not been process. quite as free of conflict as initially hoped, with some members of the previous govern- ment hurriedly leaving their posts and even the country. The newly elected coalition

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

3

New cabinet policy? Emphases in domestic policy President Saaskashvili’s staffing policy The new coalition government wants to seemed aimed at creating a young and make further changes to the constitution flexible cabinet. Ministers were hired and to move the country towards a parliamen- fired in quick succession. In the months tary system. However, it is 15 parliamentary leading up to the war with Russia in 2008, seats short of the majority needed to make for example, no less than four different constitutional amendments. Defections foreign ministers were appointed. Since from the previous governing party to the 2003, there have been eight changes in the new one could create the necessary major- leadership of the Ministry of Defence and ity. Beginning in 2004, the former govern- of the armed forces. Some of Saakashvili’s ing party, now in opposition, and Presi- followers had held several ministerial posts dent Saaskashvili introduced reforms in by the time they reached their mid-thirties. administration, public services (which bare- Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s cabinet ly existed until then), the police and in the policy seems to be more focused on con- fight against crime and corruption. These tinuity and professionalism. This includes are acknowledged even by their critics. The appointing officials who held government accusations directed at the previous govern- posts before the . One of ment concerned the way it repressed those the experienced, yet relatively young offi- with unwelcome political views, its attacks cials in the new government is Minister of on the business community, the precarious Defence , who worked with- state of the prison system and other prob- in the security forces prior to 2003. Under lems, which the president and his interior Saakashvili, he was initially involved in and justice ministers in particular are held mediating the conflict with and responsible for. The ranks of the current later sent to New York as Georgia’s UN parliamentary majority and the new gov- ambassador. In 2008 he distanced himself ernment contain many of Saakashvili’s from the ruling elite and criticised Saakash- former allies, who joined the opposition vili for his policies towards breakaway out of disappointment at these develop- regions of the country. After almost ten ments. years at the European Court of Human To date, the powerful Ministry of the Rights, 37-year-old lawyer Tea Tsulukiani Interior has controlled the majority of the took up the post of minister of justice. How- country’s security forces. From 2004, it was ever, there are also newcomers in Ivanish- headed by , a key figure vili’s cabinet. Just turned 30, lawyer Irakli in Saakashvili’s power structure. In a time Garibashvili is a loyal follower of Ivanish- of rapidly changing faces in government vili’s and has worked closely with the bil- ministries he served as a symbol of con- lionaire for the past eight years, helping tinuity. However, he also personified an him to run his bank and charitable foun- atmosphere in which the president and his dation. He will now head the Ministry of party’s monopoly on power was sustained the Interior. Another Cartu Bank employee by force. The new interior minister, Gari- has been appointed minister of economic bashvili, has promised to “depoliticise” the affairs. One of the most surprising political ministry, and, in particular, to protect legal newcomers is football star Kakha Kaladze, bodies from political meddling. The Minis- who was originally considered for the post try of the Interior is due to be entirely of regional development minister but was restructured and will be comprised of only later appointed energy minister. two main departments in future: the police and the borders agency. Garibashvili has also promised to continue the previous gov- ernment’s success in fighting crime. This success has also had grave consequences,

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

4

however. Prisoner numbers have shot In the field of economic policy, the main up from just over 6,000 in 2003 to 24,000 criticism levelled at the former govern- today, and conditions in prisons were the ment by the opposition and large sections main reason for claims of human rights of the population was that it had largely violations by the Georgian ombudsman and disregarded the social dimension of the international organisations. A video show- reforms so highly praised by international ing torture scenes in Gldani prison no. 8 in financial organisations. Pre-election opin- Tbilisi led to protests in the capital. Presi- ion polls revealed voters’ three main con- dent Saakashvili conceded fundamental cerns to be the country’s high unemploy- problems in the prisons system after the ment levels, the prohibitive cost of health- video was released at a tactical point in care for most Georgians, and agriculture, the election campaign. which had been neglected in the Rose In 2006, the European Union listed Revolution’s reform agenda. Even though judicial reform and the independence of it makes up a mere eight percent of Geor- the judiciary as its top priorities in its gia’s economic output, more than half the action plan for Georgia. Follow-up reports population are employed in this sector, in the following years praised the reforms mostly in some form of subsistence farm- in the training of judges, but found that ing. The Rose Revolution did not therefore the courts could still not be regarded as lay out a bed of roses for most Georgians. It independent from the executive. In this was only in 2012 that the previous govern- respect, a report said, Georgia has not suf- ment decided to allocate more resources ficiently distinguished itself from neigh- to social programmes, and invest in health bouring Russia, even though it is allegedly insurance and the development of rural so keen to set itself apart from this country regions. Since poverty reduction measures through its democratic and constitutional had largely fallen by the wayside in the reforms. By appointing Tea Tsulukiani as past, billionaire Ivanishvili’s long record of minister of justice the new government has charitable work has raised high expecta- shown it is making human rights a policy tions. A phenomenon can be seen here that priority. The arrests of former government Georgia has experienced repeatedly since members on charges of abusing their office its independence: In view of the harsh reali- are currently playing a central role in shap- ties of Georgian life, political leaders like ing opinion on the latest developments in presidents Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze the country’s justice system. Tsulukiani and and Saakashvili all began their time in Ivanishvili both stressed “the primacy of office being hailed as a kind of messiah and the law” in their statements on the arrests bringer of hope. The new messiah is called and refuted the opposition’s claim that Ivanishvili and he has a private fortune they were using the chance to exact re- equivalent to half of Georgia’s GDP and, venge on their political opponents. Voices in arithmetical terms, the government’s outside the country, including the NATO entire budget. When Georgian Dream were Secretary General, emphasised the impor- elected, it was not clear to what extent the tance of transparency and the rule of law state budget and the coalition leader’s in the ongoing criminal proceedings, and private fortune would be used to fulfil that warned against any kind of politically dream. The former governing party, now in motivated “selective justice”. In his New opposition, claims that Ivanishvili did not Year message, Prime Minister Ivanishvili adequately specify how the promised new identified the “establishment of rule of law social services would be financed. which is replacing political persecutions and selective application of justice” as the main challenge to Georgia’s political trans- formation after the power change.

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

5

Conflicts and foreign policy – on the other hand, were regarded as Mos- a new beginning? cow’s puppets without a political role to The new coalition’s objectives in foreign play. This approach had become official policy and in the conflicts with Abkhazia policy by the time of the Russo-Georgian and South Ossetia are also markedly dif- war of 2008 at the latest, and in 2009 and ferent to those pursued by the previous 2010 was enshrined in the Law on Occupied government. Here too, cabinet choices Territories and the State Strategy on Occu- reflect a significant shift in substance and pied Territories: Engagement Through Co- priorities. However, it immediately became operation. apparent that there is a very deep divide on In recent years, voices calling for confi- these issues both between the government dence-building measures and direct inter- and the opposition, and within the ruling action with societal actors and the de- coalition. The government therefore has facto governments in Abkhazia and South little room to manoeuvre in both these Ossetia had largely been marginalised policy areas. and vilified. Zakareishvili and his (few) Perhaps the most revolutionary appoint- like-minded companions denounced the ment in the new government was that of government for what they regarded as a Paata Zakareishvili of the Republican Party nationalistic and confrontational policy as state minister for reintegration. Zaka- prior to the 2008 war and the restrictive reishvili was one of the most prominent measures subsequently enforced. In their critics of the policy of Saakashvili’s United view, the State Strategy on Occupied Ter- National Movement towards Abkhazia and ritories was merely intended to appease South Ossetia. Over the last 15 years he was Georgia’s western allies and was not moti- a civil society representative involved in vated by a genuine desire to resolve the numerous civil society dialogue processes problem together with the other parties to coordinated by western non-governmental the conflicts. organisations, including the Heinrich Böll The new minister’s first statements did Foundation and Berghof Conflict Research. indeed point to a radical change of strategy He has excellent contacts and is exception- and direction. He announced a de-isolation ally well regarded in Abkhazia and South strategy, which would pave the way for Ossetia. social, economic and political contact with For these reasons and because Zakareish- Abkhazia and South Ossetia. His first specif- vili’s views differ so drastically from the ic proposals were to rename the ministry previous government’s policy, his appoint- (and delete the word “reintegration”, which ment signalled a clear change of direction had been so heavily criticised by Abkhazia and raised great hopes in Tbilisi and also and South Ossetia), to reopen the Russo- in and Tskhinvali, the capitals of Georgian railway line through Abkhazia, the breakaway regions. and to recognise Abkhaz and South Osse- The Saakashvili administration had tian identification documents for travel taken a two-pronged approach to inter- within Georgia. Zakareishvili, who em- nationalising the conflicts from a very early phasised that these would be unilateral stage. First, it sought to more actively en- steps undertaken by Georgia, thus sought gage the US and the EU in the existing con- to counterbalance the rhetoric and policies flict resolution mechanisms, in order to of the Saaskashvili era and create a new reinforce Georgia’s position towards Russia. basis for building trust. Second, it identified Russia as its main ad- However, it soon became clear just versary in the conflicts. As a consequence, how difficult it would be to implement a resolution of the conflicts was considered these ideas. The government is presenting possible only at the level of Georgian- a divided picture. While Zakareishvili’s Russian relations. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, initial statements indicated a departure

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

6

from the line taken by Saakashvili, other take the position of the old rather than the government representatives were still new government, and ambassadors are still plainly using the latter’s rhetoric. The state appointed by the president. This could lead minister was forced to publicly endorse the to new conflicts in the coming months; for existing documents (the Law on Occupied example, when it comes to appointing a Territories and the State Strategy for Re- new ambassador for the all-important em- integration) and confirm that these would bassy in Washington. only be amended following an in-depth Russia has reacted cautiously to the new review. The debate on the name of the political landscape in Georgia. Some sug- ministry has also proved thorny and con- gestions, especially the opening of the rail- troversial. The government has found it way line between the two countries, which difficult to present a united front on other is in Moscow’s interest, could indeed bring key issues too, such as an agreement on new momentum to Russo-Georgian rela- the non-use of force being demanded by tions. However, there are still difficult Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and Russia). obstacles ahead. There are no signs that All this is damaging Zakareishvili’s credi- Moscow and Tbilisi will come to an agree- bility. The cautiously optimistic reaction ment on their greatest point of contention: to his appointment in Abkhazia and South Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has meanwhile turned to bitter Ossetia, and the presence of Russian troops criticism. there. The close connection between these This internal wrangling, compounded by two issues and Abkhazia and South Osse- attacks from the opposition, show just how tia’s mistrust of a potential rapprochement little scope Zakareishvili has for achieving between Russia and Georgia also entail the his aims. If he is not able to establish cross- risk of triggering further destabilisation government consensus soon, he will not be should the new government fail in its con- in a position to make Abkhazia and South flict resolution policy. A first meeting Ossetia any serious offers. The already slim between Russian and Georgian envoys took chances of creating a more constructive place on the margins of the latest round of approach to the conflicts could soon evap- the Geneva Discussions in December, but orate. relations remain fragile and the outcome In foreign policy, the new government unpredictable. is seeking to combine its strategy of Euro- Atlantic integration with the aim of im- proving relations with Moscow. The focus Conclusions on normalising economic and social rela- The Georgian population has effected a tions with Russia might prove a smart change in government by means of a demo- move, as could the appointment of a special cratic election. If the transition period envoy on relations with Russia. This could passes smoothly, this will mark a unique lead to a division of labour in which the achievement in the former Soviet Union Foreign Ministry promotes partnership area. The presence of a strong opposition with the US, Nato and the EU, while Special in parliament also gives reason to hope that Envoy Zurab Abashidze pragmatically the democratic process will progress. How- works on improving relations with Russia. ever, to make the most of this potential, all However, Georgia’s state representatives are the country’s political actors will have to not all towing the same line on this issue play by the rules. If not, the situation could either. Officially, foreign policy is still the soon spiral out of control, as it did in the preserve of the president. Saakashvili has final years of the Saakashvili administra- been using it to strengthen his position tion. both within and outside Georgia. After the In some areas, like fighting corruption elections, many embassies continued to and Euro-Atlantic integration, the new gov-

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

7

ernment will continue the work of its predecessor. In others, like agricultural policy, economic policy, social policy, con- flicts and Russian relations, it will strike out in a new direction and may even suc- ceed in correcting some of the mistakes of the past few years. That said, the govern- ment lacks cohesion and the exact dis- tribution of power will remain unclear until after the presidential elections in 2013. This creates uncertainty and could tempt both sides to manipulate the am- biguous situation to their own advantage. Germany and the EU should act as

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und critical yet supportive partners to Georgia Politik, 2013 during this complex phase. Within the con- All rights reserved text of bilateral relations and the Eastern

These Comments reflect Partnership, they should aim to boost the solely the author’s views. reform process and draw attention to any

SWP worrying tendencies. A clear statement Stiftung Wissenschaft und recognising the new government would Politik German Institute for help it consolidate its domestic position. International and This particularly applies to the govern- Security Affairs ment’s conflict policy, which could now Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 shift significantly closer to the European 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 non-recognition and engagement policy Fax +49 30 880 07-100 towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the www.swp-berlin.org new coalition succeeds in improving rela- [email protected] tions between Georgia and Russia, while ISSN 1861-1761 preserving its close relations with the EU

Translation by and the US, it will have taken a major step English Express e.K., Berlin towards stabilising this volatile region. Ger-

(English version of many can play an important supporting SWP-Aktuell 72/2012) role here.

SWP Comments 3 January 2013

8