Philosophers’ volume 14, no. 1 1. Hume’s Relationship to Skepticism Imprint january 2014 The core of the “Hume brand” has always been the various forms of skepticism associated with his name.1 And certainly Hume is a great marshaler of skeptical arguments — most notably over the course of Part 4 of Book 1 of the Treatise. There Hume considers a series of skep- tical arguments which appear to threaten nearly every aspect of our epistemic lives — undermining our naive views about the senses,2 our CURIOUS VIRTUES belief in external bodies,3 the coherence of modern science,4 and even our trust in reason itself.5 Thus, it is hardly surprising that after con- sidering these arguments Hume finds himself thrust into a state of skeptical melancholy, resolved “to perish on the barren rock, on which IN HUME'S I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity” (T 1.4.7.1 / SBN 263–4). But while Hume plainly takes these arguments very seriously, and EPISTEMOLOGY despite the popular association of Hume with skepticism, his actual relationship to them is far from clear. Does he, as a result of these ar- guments, come to believe that these forms of ordinary belief formation lack all epistemic merit?6 Or does he instead find some way of escap- 1. All Hume quotations are from the Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, ed. Tom Beauchamp, David Norton, and M. A. Stewart. The relevant vol- umes thereof are A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary Karl Schafer J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) (hereafter T) and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1999) (hereafter EHU). As is traditional, for specific passages, I have also included page references to the Selby-Bigge editions of Hume’s work University of Pittsburgh (hereafter SBN). The full references for these are: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Princi- ples of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). © 2014, Karl Schafer 2.T 1.4.2 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 3.T 1.4.2 4.T 1.4.4 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License 5.T 1.4.1 <www.philosophersimprint.org/014001/> 6. Following Don Garrett’s useful discussion of these issues, it is important to distinguish the question of whether some way of forming beliefs has epistemic merit from the question of whether this way of forming beliefs has rational support. See, for example, his Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy karl schafer Curious Virtues in Hume’s Epistemology ing their apparent force that allows him to endorse — perhaps with oscillating instead between a state of skeptical despair and a state of some modifications — our ordinary belief-forming practices?7 unreflective acceptance of “common sense”.10 Broadly speaking, Hume’s view was traditionally taken to be that Each of these ways of reading Hume captures a certain aspect of these skeptical arguments demonstrate that there is no epistemic merit Hume’s engagement with skepticism in Treatise 1.4. But each of them in reasoning as we do — even if it is impossible to stop reasoning in also suffers from serious problems. The Radical Skepticism Reading this fashion.8 We can call this the Radical Skepticism Reading. But this echoes the despair with which Hume’s discussion of the implications interpretation has been challenged in a number of different ways over of his skeptical arguments in 1.4.7 begins. But it also faces several the last century or so of Hume scholarship. For example, according to challenges — none more serious than that posed by Hume’s appar- what we might call the No Epistemology Reading, Hume does not fall ently untroubled acceptance of ordinary forms of empirical reasoning prey to radical skepticism of this sort, but only because he turns his throughout the Treastise, both before and after the skeptical passages back on the normative questions that have been one of the traditional in 1.4.11 The No Epistemology Reading, on the other hand, rightly focuses of epistemology.9 Alternatively, according to what we might stresses Hume’s interest in the functioning of the human mind, natu- call the No Resting Place Reading, Hume simply has no stable or all- ralistically conceived.12 But it faces severe difficulties in accounting for things-considered attitude towards these sorts of skeptical questions — passages in which Hume appears to engage in the normative evalua- tion of certain forms of reasoning — passages which are most common (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). As will become clear, an important el- at the close of Book 1.13 Finally, given the manner in which Hume’s at- ement in Hume’s response to skepticism is the insistence that a way of forming beliefs may be epistemically virtuous even though no further piece of non- circular reasoning supports it. 10. For an example of this reading, see Robert J. Fogelin’s Hume’s Skepticism in 7. In the following, I will focus on Hume’s views in the Treatise — bracketing the Treatise of Human Nature (Boston: Routledge, 1985). As the case of Fogelin for the most part the question of whether his views on these issues shift sub- makes clear, one can endorse this last reading while also endorsing various stantially by the time he composes the Enquiries. Still I will say a bit along the other readings as true from some particular perspective. Thus, there are various way about why I think the view I am outlining here remains central to Hume’s possible combinations of these views in the literature. Similarly, the points I will response to skepticism there as well. be making below could be regarded by a proponent of the No Resting Place 8. For example, see Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reading as articulating the nature of one of the perspectives Hume assumes ed. Derek R. Brookes (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, with respect to these skeptical arguments. 1785/2002), and Bertrand Russell’s The History of Western Philosophy (New York: 11. For cases in which Hume appears to endorse one way of reasoning as op- Simon & Schuster, 1967), as well as Barry Stroud’s Hume (London: Routledge, posed to others, see the passages of 1.4.7 cited below, as well as the “Rules by 1977). For the psychological impossibility of radical skepticism, see, e.g., T which to judge of causes and effects”, which he describes as providing him 1.4.1.7 / SBN 267–8. with all the logic he needs (T 1.3.15 / SBN 173–6). Also compare his famous 9. It is not clear that anyone has actually advocated such a reading in an un- argument against miracles in the first Enquiry. restricted form, but the spirit of it is plainly active in a good deal of work on 12. See, for example, Hume’s claim that his main intention in presenting the Hume’s relationship to skepticism. For example, an emphasis on the naturalis- skeptical argument against reason in 1.4.1 was “only to make the reader sen- tic and descriptive, as opposed to the normative, aspects of Hume’s epistemol- sible of the truth of his hypothesis, that all our reasoning concerning causes and ogy is prominent in Norman Kemp Smith’s work — for example, in his The effects are deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941). Nonetheless it is plain of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 1.4.1.8 / SBN 183–4, that Kemp Smith does not think that there are no normative dimensions to emphasis in text). And compare his insistence that his main concern in 1.4.2 Hume’s engagement with these issues. For a view that also heavily empha- is “the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body” (T 1.4.2.2 / sizes the descriptive, naturalistic elements in Hume’s discussion of these issues SBN 187–8, emphasis in text). over the normative, see William Edward Morris, “Hume’s Scepticism About 13. See again the passages noted in response to the Radical Skepticism Reading Reason”, Hume Studies 15.1 (1989), 39–60. — as well as the passages that appear to support this reading. philosophers’ imprint - 2 - vol. 14, no. 1 (january 2014) karl schafer Curious Virtues in Hume’s Epistemology titude towards skepticism shifts with his “mood” in 1.4.7, the No Rest- On its face, the Title Principle appears to represent the articulation of ing Place Reading is surely very natural.14 And yet it faces the obvious a distinction between (i) the ways we ought to reason and (ii) the ways complaint that, by the close of Book 1, Hume seems to have achieved we ought not to reason — a distinction which is supposed to avoid the a point of view that is sufficiently stable and reflective to allow him to “dangerous dilemma” that Hume raises at 1.4.7.6–7 (SBN 267–8).18 And continue his investigation of the human mind in the manner he does while there is considerable debate about whether the Title Principle for the remainder of the Treatise.