CEU eTD Collection Balancing and Complex Interdependence: Ukraine between Russia and the EU the and Russia between Ukraine Interdependence: Complex and Balancing In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts Department of RelationsInternational andEuropean Studies Submitted to: Central University to: Submitted European Supervisor: Professor Julius Horvath Word Count: 13 338 Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Sanja Tepavcevic 2009 By CEU eTD Collection compromises in its foreign policy seen through the balancing between the EU and Russia. making in constantly is economy its sustain and sovereignty its remain to way only Ukraine’s that provides explanation of Ukrainian foreign Russiapolicy istowards and main theEU.The argument analysis longitudinal The Ukraine. towards policy foreign EU the and Russian examines thesis this Russia, such as national identity and interests of business groups.Using the method of agreement this thesis explores also other factors that determinateanalysis Ukraine’s foreign of policydifference towards the EU and in2009 periods. Such isan explanation needed because policy tobe seems controversial. distribution Through the of power between The of explainpurpose thesisthis is Ukraine’s foreign to EUandthe policy towards Russiain 1991- the EU and Russia as international actors, Abstract i CEU eTD Collection to my face. mood with; Teddy,to David and Elena, always there to give an advice when needed and bring smile bad and good share to there always Martina and Sasa Jana, Neno, Dina, from Starting friends. my notonly but tomeetbecame also my whowere yearcolleagues, Iwasfortunate people, During this challenge. this throughout my motivation were They difficult. more much been have would year unconditionalWithout love and of mysupport family, my friend with along close Sanja Pesek, this International Relations. my for providingdepartment me with understandingthroughout of complexthe of world have helped make this a far more readable and coherent work. I am also thankful to the faculty of my I am John instructor whoseimmensesupport to grateful academic writing patience and Harbord me in with my advice research. intremendous findingsupport between myway relationsaround Russia and theEUand providing of been have Papkova Irina and Csaba Laszlo Professors Horvath. Julius Professor supervisor and providing me with advice on many occasions, I wouldlike first andforemost to thankmy thesis guidingFor me notonly writingthe through dissertation, this butthrough entirethe academicyear are many it people’s to contributions tobeacknowledged. there thus, and development, my personal symbolizes that year a of product final is the thesis This Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection Bibliography...... 43 Conclusion...... 41 Chapter 3 – The evidence ...... 27 of balancing Chapter 2 – Political and economic importance of Ukraine ...... 14 for the EU and Russia Chapter 1 – A Framework for Discussion...... 5 ...... 1 Introduction 3.3. Yuschenko’s balancing between 33 Russia and the EU...... 3.2. 30 Balancing during Kuchma’s ...... presidency 28 3.1. Balancing during ...... Kravchuk’s presidency 2.2 The EU’s and Russia’s 18 policies toward Ukraine...... 2.1 The EU and Russian Federation 14 as different kinds ...... of international actors 9 1.2 Theoretical framework...... 1.1 Explanations 5 by the existing literature...... 3.3.2. The Ukrainian-Russian 38 Gas Dispute in 2009...... 3.3.1. The Ukrainian-Russian 35 Gas Dispute in 2006...... 2.2.2 Russia’s 22 view on Ukraine...... 19 2.2.1 The EU view on Ukraine...... Table of contents: of Table iii CEU eTD Collection 3 research. this from excluded therefore, is, which category separate represents Moldova Thus, the in Transnistria. conflict country, ofthe region of frozen developed most issue the an is industrially there second, and Russia with border common have not does Moldova Ukraine, and 2 Economic Nationalism in Globalizing World 1 Although itwhen independence gained Ukraine’s in 1991, authorities claimed integration with CIS. visafreejoins and within freethe zone member that trade it associated is an only technically common with both. Ukraine does Russia,in after Europe largest second CISand Western the within largestcountry Territorially the not fit eitheridentity, consistinglanguage, of traditions andhistory of two national of sense the by mainly determined was categories choice This States. Independent of Commonwealth in withreintegrate formerdependencethe Soviet asthe onRussia reason to through republic question, categoryisBelarus,soughteconomicand significantexampleNATO.however, which Themost second of it economies away from Russia,has searching for the integration to the Western structures, such as the EU their certainreoriented Russia, on dependence economic overcome to in order which States, Baltic elements the comprises category first The states. of the clear categories two created choice this In general, in enlarging European Union ortoreunify(EU), Russia. with states geographicallynewly independent with integrate make in situated to to anattemptEurope: the the to choice uneasy an brought dependence energy of question The energy. its on mainly - extent economy. Hence, other and and industry most the with developedthe innatural biggest, energy richest the and resources former Soviet developmentrepublics toall former republics: Russia was the political center of the former Union, territorially economic and social further for were challenge brought superpower dependent Soviet the of dissolution The on Russia – even if to different Edwin Bacon, Matthew Wyman, “Contemporary Russia”, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, Chapter 8 Moldova is also Western Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country, but opposite to Baltic States, Belarus Rawi Abdelal, “Nationalism and International Political Economy in Eurasia” 2 Ukraine, along with Russia and Belarus is the cofounder of is CIS the of Belarusthecofounder Russia and Ukraine, along with , Ithaca, Cornell University 2005,Press, pp.118-138 Introduction 1 1 . in Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel Andreas and Helleiner in Eric 3 . However, CEU eTD Collection 5 4 explanation its foreignof exhibitspolicy. Ukraine path dependenceit on Russia, but seek did not astheoretical balancing factof the neglect they same Atthe time, both. with compromise in Eurasian balancingbetween tomake integrations politico-economic and European order a internal international and Ukraine’s generally factof, speaking, the These studies valuable recognize policies. and institutions state-building works analyses throughout the of explanation system Ukraine’s through political political andof in Nordberg Kuzio,D’Anieri alsoofferpolicy in their oftransition. Taras and Paul Marc period foreign Ukraine’s in creating factor main the as elites political and business Ukrainian of interests economic andpersonal propose suchNygren BalmacedaandBertil Margarita authors other as Ukrainian national identities on history. to Inattempts explain international Ukrainian behavior and Russiaafter dissolution the UnionSoviet of hisgrowing explanation of overlapping Russian and Ukraine between relations examines Solchanyk sametime, the At independence. of yearsUkrainian perestroika, and identity early glasnost, periodsfragmentation national of of the Ukraine’s during nationalism after the dissolution of USSR, Bohdan Nahaylo examines political reasons of regional national identity the as reason for pro-Western and pro-Russian in shifts Ukrainian economic in explanation of Ukrainian foreign policy. foreign Ukrainian of in explanation in Eurasia. nationalism realistthrough liberalthrough or approaches, which are summarizedin his study of economic either explanation the find not does it out points Abdelal Rawi as However, affairs. economic and Existing literature on Ukraine anumber offers of explanationsin behavior international of Ukraine’s reforms. Western economic andsecurity structures, they neither economic appropriate undertook nor political Abdelal: 2005, Eichler: 2005, Nahaylo: 1999,Solchanyk: 2001 Abdelal, pp.118-138 4 Many scholars focus issue on fragmented nationalthe of identity Ukraine’s 5 For instance, while Abdelal focuses on fragmented focuses on Abdelal while instance, For 2 CEU eTD Collection geopolitical and historical place between them and comparing European to and investments comparing European historical geopolitical them between andRussian place and country in between. Analyzing the European Union and Russia as regional Ukraine’s powers, show how economic relations between the EU and Russia reflect on Ukraine as the most significantand Russia, both bilateral and multilateral betweenUkraine agreements and Plan, Action asEU-Ukraine EU,aswell andthe between Ukraine - in the framework of the CIS. In thisdocuments such as of Agreement,Partnership whichCo-operation establish official relations thesis, therefore, I and official literature existing on I grow question research the answerto it. The on influence Russian Ukraine for purpose the of mymainthis isthesis focus and energy on Ukraine’s sector the EUand EUand the of Russia, relations between indicator mostsignificant the and also Ukrainian economy defined in mindimportantdifferent However,keeping ways. thatenergy is in sector most of the be can benefits Economic are. it of benefits economic the what and is contradictory behavior this and the in investigates reasonsthesis roots for Ukraine’s toanswer international behavior order why foreigncontradictory both policy Russiatoward andis the EU anintriguing Therefore,matter. this mainthe country Russia between and the transitenlarged largest andthe EU, Ukraine’s Ukraine the as through eighty and centof go Ukraine supplies these per that andthe EU, supplier to neighbours great its of both are with cooperation the thefrom has Ukraine which focalbenefits economic the particularly points of this thesis. Considering Theoretical economicprospective Russia of cooperation andUkrainian more andwith the EU, the fact that Russia is thebetween pro-Russian and Ukrainian pro-Western foreign policy. main energy betweensituated bethem. precise, To balancingin this thesis isseen as find way the to compromise countries other and powers regional two between these relations as as well power, military and and EUaseconomic as Russia betweenthe power inenergy depends onrelations situation Ukraine behavior interestingboth from –theoretical andpractical perspectives: andpolitical economic fullmembership any kind makes rejected CIS. in of reunification and Ukraine’s even This the 3 CEU eTD Collection in longitudinal analysis. Finally,conclusion and summary is provided. evidence of sustainable beneficial balancingUkraine’s asthe economically andstate foreign policy analysis istheir to variable. with devoted dependent as the Ukraine relations of the The third chapter and actors political as Russia theEUand of importance explores chapter The second framework. Hence, the first chaptermainin shifts Ukrainian foreign and discoursespolicy of inUkrainian leaders longitudinal analysis. of this thesis analyzesRussia as the thetwo different existing powers in literaturethe In ordertotestfirst this hypothesis, of all method of comparingrelationI usethe agreement, EUand the to Ukraine. and Testing proposes the theory I analyzethe thetheoretical toUkraine. brings benefits economic domesticand international factors between balance five Ukraine’s includingenergy sector, theinfluence of groups, interest my main hypothesis is only that 4 CEU eTD Collection 8 7 Ukraine, 6 andstrategy”. nointernational independencein endof the 1991, and“itinherited that aquasi nounitedstate, nation, fewexperts, for ready psychologically nor professionally, neither was it that wrote he Ukraine about particular, stressing ofUkrainianidentity. national the question mostlydictated by its Abdelaland affairs, domestic Eichlerforeign explainUkrainian policy, is country any of policy foreign the that assumption the Taking nationalism. economic of prism the Rawi Abdelal shiftsMaya Eichlerindependence explorethrough present. in1991tothe and these early of sincetheperiod foreign policy Ukrainian in shifts and pro-Eastern pro-Western refers tothe mainly This behavior. international Ukraine’s of in characterization used frequently most the are ‘multivectoral’ and ‘incompatible’ adjectives The institutionalism. and constructivism of lenses the through policies economic and foreign Ukrainian explains literature academic existing of most The 1.1 Explanations by the existing literature policy. economic and foreign Ukraine’s of explanation the for framework theoretical the Ioffer chapter of this section In second gap. identify theoretical the to attempt section, I first in the literature existing of analysis the Proposing policy. economic and foreign Ukraine’s of explanations guideall states appliedto in made them to […] process”. theories transition their postcommunist In his “Ukraine: work A Transition”,Four-Pronged Kuzio Taras “thereargued that areno ready- Ukrainian national identity: especially in Easternand Southern national Ukraine identity is rather Ukraineof center and and west the to Polish) Russian (mainly European - players major two by influenced is toUkraine the east and south, Abdelal argues that there is no distinct and exclusive Abdelal, pp. 21-43 Ibid, p.167 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition” in Transition” A Four-Pronged “Ukraine: Kuzio, Taras edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, New York, 1998, p.165 Chapter 1 – A Framework for Discussion for – AFramework 1 Chapter 7 By now the post-Soviet experts have offered the number of number the have offered experts post-Soviet the Bynow Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation. Contemporary 5 8 As through history, the territory of today’s 6 In CEU eTD Collection Contemporary Ukraine, Helleiner’s and Pickel’s 10 9 explanation that both the first and second Ukrainian presidents in their attempts of nation-building of attempts in their presidents Ukrainian second and first the both that explanation EU. the in membership – orientation international their of direction common a choose misunderstandings in between relations Russia and can Ukraine be if solved Russia and Ukraine perspectives. Russian and it emphasizes the role of common history, but provides different views on itfrom Ukrainian and and in Russia the is transition post-Soviet based on national question identity the of Ukraine, within Ukraine between relations the of explanation Solchanyk’s Roman Eichler, and Abdelal to Similarly interesteconomic prevailedauthorities Ukrainian membership and agreedon associate CIS. inthe during the period of strongyears economicin Ukraineinthefirst decline independence, of choice, political European and Russia from sovereignty for leadership Ukraine’s of claims initial despite that, it. argues on Eichler dependence Russia path and economic into particularly relation making, decision policy foreign of in explanation economy political with identity national purely pro-Russianpro-European or foreign AbdelalBoth policy. issue and connectthe Eichler of either choosing Ukraine to obstacle is the claims, Abdelal identity, national of perception in division 13 12 11 Kuchma. formerof Leonid “middle-of-the-road-policies” Kravchuk Ukrainian presidents, and Leonid for reason the as identity national Ukrainian observes also Motyl state-building. of question the to is given place central the Ukraine” in Independent Elites and Nation “State, work Motyl’s Ukraine’s internal balancing is evidentin all aforementioned studies. Furthermore, in Alexander regional.” and Soviet Pan-Slavic, between overlapping and “multiple Ibid, p.38 Maya Eichler, “Explaining Postcommunist Transformation. Economic Nationalism in Ukraine and Russia”, in Alexander Motyl, “State, Nation and Elites in Independent Ukraine” in Ibid, p. 211 Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine Russia.and Post-SovietThe Transition”, Rowman andLittlefield Publishers, Inc, 2001 13 In his study, the fact of internal balancing between regions can be recognized through the through recognized be can regions between balancing internal of fact the study, his In Economic Nationalism in aGlobalizingWorld edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, New York, 1998, p.6 11 Important place in his analysis is given to the argument that the question the that of argument is tothe given his analysis place in Important 6 , Cornell University Press,2005, pp.69-87 Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation. 9 Therefore, this internal this Therefore, 12 The fact of 10 CEU eTD Collection 19 New York, 2007,pp. 139 - 145 oligarchs’ profits and Ukraine’s missing energy policy 1995-2006”, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London and 18 17 16 Contemporary Ukraine, structural structural new resetits in hegemony and dependences to the CIS. uses Federation Russian that way and the by transition created for enrichment space: opportunities analysis of Ukraine’s public contextthe of policy through importanttwo onpost-Soviet trends throughout appoints Balmaceda instance, For elites. economic and political Ukrainian of interests and Bertil inNygren. They examine incompatibility Ukraine’sforeign illustrating policy the 15 14 corruption that started in this sector spread to the other sectors of Ukraine’s economy. of Ukraine’s sectors other spread to the in thissector started that corruption is forshe arguesthatthe lackof Ukraine’sand As exactly economy, central sector transparency this and of in Ukraine’s effects sector energy political management system situation on energy Ukraine. a fragmented parliament.” and law enforcement, selective parties, suchas weak in government, problems Ukrainian immediate imbalance“the in fundamental hasraw political been power of underlying the moresource the in weakandargues madevery that democracy Ukraine factors model, to Western these democratic beforesystem and although OrangeRevolution. Heclaims after is that, this system madeaccording interestsidentity fragmented political weaknessof national of elites examiningUkrainian and the elites, unnoticed bythe Alongauthors. with them, Paul intoaccount both– D’Anieri takes possible”. building Motyl saw the interest of elites and relations within them as the factor that paradoxically “made state preventregionalism from growing” butit“has UkraineNordberg, whoarguedthat byconstitution littleto done state, unitary remained emphasized “civic and territorial loyalty downplaying ethnic allegiance”. ethnic downplaying loyalty territorial and “civic emphasized Ibid, p. 139 power, Russia’s Union. Soviet Former the in Corruption and Politics Dependency, “Energy M.Balmaceda, Margarita Paul D’Anieri, “Understanding Ukrainian Politics”, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, Motyl, 2007, p.9p.12 Marc Nordberg, Marc “State and InstitutionBuilding Ukraine”in in Ibid, p.7 16 edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, New York, 1998, p.45 Thisis another proof therethat is thebalancing within country’s the regional 17 Similar explanations are presented in the works of Margarita Balmaceda 15 concerning the struggle for power on regional andlocal levels, 7 Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation. 18 Balmaceda’s main focus is on focus main Balmaceda’s 14 In contrast to Marc to contrast In 19 Balmaceda CEU eTD Collection 24 23 Gongadze and followed anti-Kuchma demonstrations in Ukraine. 22 Taylor and Francis Group, London andNew York, 2007, pp.49-65 21 20 have significantrole played national in Ukrainian since 1994. elections explains that money from energy rents, contribution from Russian energy companies and corruption Soviet Union. emphasized Nygren’s analysis inBertil Russian-Ukrainian relations after of the dissolution the of also are policy foreign Ukrainian in the shift the for reason the as elites political the of interests a 180 degree turn in security relations away from from NATO”. away insecurity relations a 180degreeturn particular. This was thereason whyKuchmaRussiafor even “turnedto comfort, offering foratime ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal the sametime, the At countries improved. two between ties andeconomic trade the term when personal betweenKuchma good Putininfirst presidential and of early the period relations Putin’s Otherwise, some authors mentioned Ukraine’s “hard balancing” “hard Ukraine’s mentioned authors some Otherwise, policy. internal and foreign Ukraine’s study contributions tothe balancinghaveof disregarded thetheoretical Ukraine explanation as of The authors’ counterbalance. Russia astheir integration and of structures Western between policy on behalf of personal interest of political elites - serves as the fact of Ukraine’s balancing country aRussian-styletoward democracymanaged wouldthat for post-the oligarchsin provideits haven asafe “Ukraine’s divergent path away from Russia hadcome into conflict with attempts of Ukraine’s elites to move the that: Kuzioargues Taras interestsin with Ukraine strikingthe example Orangeof in Revolution 2004. Inthelight of lastthe however they were more focused on political relations between the EU and Russia and their clashing Caiser: 2006, Dragneva and Dimitrova: 2006 Ibid, p. 52 ‘Kuchmagate’ refers tothe 2000 Kuchma’s involvement in disappearance of the investigative journalist Heorhiy Bertil Nygren, “The Rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s foreignpolicy towards CIS the countries”, Routledge Ibid. 21 According to Nygren, the important factor in Ukrainian-Russian relations was the was relations in Ukrainian-Russian factor important the Nygren, to According 22 of 2000 worsened Ukrainian relations with the West in general, and USA in 8 23 The lastin variable –shift foreign 24 between the EU and Russia, 20 Furthermore, personal Furthermore, CEU eTD Collection 27 26 25 international politics and theory of foreign policy. In his view, the first is based on assumptions that assumptions on based is first the view, his In policy. foreign of theory and politics international states”. other with cooperation forms of butexpedient anything capabilitiesagainst ageneral and predisposition enhance state seen as “guided ultimately by national relatedsurvival, the objective of exploiting opportunities that system. the international within capabilities is thatbehavior distribution constrainedIn neo-realism by of the suggests general, states the of as well as Ukraine’s economic balancing between its regions and interestdifferent groups. in of governance, systems their and difference interdependence their economic and EUregarding the Ukraine Russia, between relations of explanation the interdependenceproposes complex theory that counterbalance Iargue hegemony same to Ukraine Atthe Russia’s time, endeavors theCIS. within cooperating independent state: with the EU, tosurvive best attempts explainsasnewly Ukraine’s of balance of power and theory of complex interdependence. Namely, I argue that balance of incompatiblepower international behavior, Isuggestthatthis inclination can be best explained bysynthesis identifiedHaving for agapinreasons the of offered explanation theoretical Ukrainian the 1.2 Theoretical framework understanding of internationalUkraine’s behavior. for better andbackground framework set uptheoretical to theoriesconnect inorder two to attempt in this study. I argue that it deserves attention in the terms of theory. Therefore, in the next section I act ofbalancing important’ asthe singlephenomenon ‘most of Ukrainian foreign is itpolicy as done Hence, authors other are dealing with aspects ofbalancing, buttheir emphasis is notfocused on the convergence.” than rather divergence reinforce will Yushchenko of Kuchma world. Of these two conflicting trends of divergence away from Russia and moves towards Russia, the election Ibid:p.21 Mark Weber and Michael Smith, “Foreign Policy in Transformed World”, Harlow, Prentice Hall, 2002, p.21 Taras Kuzio, “Russian Policy toward Ukraine during Elections”, 27 Waltz also emphasizes the difference between theory of theory between difference the emphasizes also Waltz 26 According to Kenneth Waltz, foreign policy can be can policy foreign Waltz, Kenneth to According 9 25 Demokratizatsiya 13,4 (Fall 2005), p.516 CEU eTD Collection 30 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989,p.82 29 28 governmental governmental product. variations in conditions external states push to pullor them in various directions”, while second is “how itexplains survive; therefore motiveto wish with –the single areunitary actors states the essentially for self-interests of particular states, in other as community objection in interests of ininterests objection ascommunity in other states, of particular self-interests for essentially cases created balance wasinsome history Through process. or situation, itpolicy that can describe valuable.for Assuch,EvanLuard is the concept ofbalance ofpower more even Heargues fluid. explanationin applicable most the ofis probably power of Ukraine’s balance of summary in Bull’s point second The relations with the EU and Russia; however other definitions are equally who argued that (1977) meaning ofbalanceand referSummarizingHedley Ordeshook power, Rose the Niou, of to Bull is that balance of power as a ‘self-help system’. They argue that important feature of the balance of of and referpower Ordeshook characterization Waltz’s Gregory Rose Emerson Peter (1979) Niou, to Ibid, p.82 systems”, international in Stability ofpower. balance “The Rose, Gregory and Ordeshook Peter Niou, Emerson Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy”, Security Studies 6, 1996, p.54 are able to operate” to able are present, help to provide the conditions inwhich other institutions onwhich international orderdepends at exist as balances local a such and power, of balance general the both Third, power… preponderant protect to serve – exist they where – power of balances local Second, the empire… universal a into conquest independence“ of states in particular area state”. a single fromthan absorption more threatens dominance hegemonic that understanding the by enforced states, among relationships or dominationthe balance of power necessarily embodies, implicitly orexplicitly, anexus of “mutual security” “it is not merely by the equating of one of combination of resources against another combination.a Rather, locally First, the general balance of power serves to prevent the system of states from being transformed by 28 . 29 30 Studying themeaning of balance in of internationalpower politics, 10 CEU eTD Collection economic and social transactions and claims the decline of military force. The second is realists’ The second force. military of decline andclaims the transactions andsocial economic material used with the author’s permission(Accessed from perspectives. opposite from two isseen world politics that considers It and societies. states between connections complex refers the that liberaltransnational to 1970’s as andsynthesis of realistthought the the introduce complex interdependenceKeohane by theory developed andRobert JosephNyein the able to explain merely certain viewsaspects on Ukraine’s foreign policy. However,of all of mentionedUkrainian different above generally have forms which of balance regions, of powerbetween are balancing relationsinternal - third and self-interest, state’s with the EU and Russia. Therefore,counterbalance toRussia, –membership second inpro-Russian regional organizations onbehalf of I –regional first balancing: of indicators These Ukraine’s West. are clear andEuropean Center regionally Ukrainianand and society pro-Russian andfragmented divided South pro- on East The form third of balancingUkraine’s is aforementioned community –the interestobjective of Space. Single the CIS–the within organization Economic economic oriented integration pro-Russian clearly of member is the Belarus and Kazakhstan lensesthe through self-interest: ofthe state’s Russia, simultaneously, alongUkraine with 34 6 for Prepared Space”, 33 32 31 regional_promise_in_id_cons-turin.pdf in 2005. established Choice Community Democratic of organizations that counterbalance Russia’s hegemony within hegemony CIS:GUAM within Russia’s the counterbalance that organizations leader founderthe Ukraine of and the isalso CIS, member dominated of an Russia’s the associated casethe balance of Ukraine,its in against Russian domination post-Soviet spaceis Being obvious. mostfrequently used means of the balance was the prevention of domination of the certain states. In society as a whole, but it was also used as the mean of securing peace. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence”, Longman, New York, 2001, p.3 Mikhail M. Molchanov, “Regional Promises inState Moldova Social Identity Azerbaijan, Construction:Ukraine, The Rhetoric Georgia, of a Single Economic Evan Luard, “The Balance of Power”, Macmillan Academic and Professional LTD, Hong Kong, 1992, p. 21 34 The first is the modernist approach focused on the importance of of importance increasing is focused the Themoderniston the approach first the th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Torino, Italy, 12-15 September2007; , May 6 2009),p. 12 11 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Molchanov- 33 Also Ukraine’s balancing can be seen 31 According to Luard, the 32 since 1997and CEU eTD Collection 38 37 36 35 governmental bankersgovernmental shape foreignthe […]seekto central states”. policies of EU example of Russian-American space cooperation, and “transnational relations” such as “non- an with relations” “transgovernmental ESDP, or such asNATO organizations” “intergovernmental into them divided and societies” among contacts of channels “multiple as influences structures. domestic political policy; and third –the formulations of foreign policy is influenced from bythe actors outside foreign with issues economic of link especially policy, foreign in politics domestic of importance of process adaptation of traditional the foreign policy institutions; second, complexity increased the continuous needs events international the of complexity increased – the first grounds”: separate make “theandlink offoreign between policy processesonthree a changing nature and political system international in changes of importance the emphasize also Smith Michael and Weber Mark ofinterdependence. concept the formulate Nye and them, Keohane gapbetween bridging the placepolitics. world inthe take that changes the of undervaluation aswellrealists’ power, military of importance the of underestimation high dominatespolitics international relations. third, and policy; foreign of instrument effective most is the force the second, level; international the on actors units arethe main considered ascoherent states first, that, with approach assumptions the have a costly effects on both of actors. Keohane’s and Nye’s general point about these consequences these about point general Nye’s and Keohane’s actors. of both on effects costly a have between two internationalin arelation Namely, costly effects. to mutually exposed are actors orwhen the actors, international actors any change the between mutual when dependence interdependence is there exists that Keohane argue andNye provoked by one of the actors or a third actor, may Ibid: pp.64-65,with references toRobert Putnam(1988) and Keohane and Nye (1989) Ibid:p.63 Ibid, p.4 Ibid, pp. 23-24 37 According to Weber and Smith, Keohane and Nye defined the last the defined Nye and Keohane Smith, and Weber to According 36 35 12 Connecting the values of two approaches and approaches two of values the Connecting Keohanemodernists’ andNyethe recognize 38 In addition, In CEU eTD Collection ‘power’ is subjected to analysis”. of dimension relational “the when ‘influence’ or ‘control’ with and resources, possessed or attribute to references to avoid conceptual confusion,Rosenau suggests replacing wordthe ‘power’ with ‘concept of capabilities’ when it Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs 40 39 the regional actors and the impact of their relations on Ukraine as the country in between. country asthe Ukraine on and impactof their relations the regional the actors Thus, in order to test this theory, in the policy. foreign economic and next chapter I compare the power of theforUkraine’s theexplanation of framework theoretical anappropriate determines interdependence, EU and Russia as in complex balancing symbolically or interdependence, complex and theory power of prosperity,for butalso its survival as Therefore, asIhave state. the argued,synthesis of balance the not country’s for only the is significant regions Ukraine’s between interdependence economicas the In accordance to thisview, economic interdependence on the axis Russia –Ukraine - the EUas well other”. each ‘powerize’ not do they but other, each affect otherwise or deter, enhance, subvert, maintain, alter, they other; each over control they exercise other; influence each “nations that Rosenau states actors. isitself,important ofis source notthe but wayhowthe it andpower by directed responded to other most the view, in his however, energy; or economy military, through - differently viewed be can power aspowers. Heargues that of state states perceptions of examining different interdependence complex debateover to the contributed (1980) Rosenau James definitions, these In addition to relations. the in role important an play to continues power and exists still interdependence complex them”. careabout “people is that James Rosenau, “Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World” in World” Interdependent in an Control and “Capabilities Rosenau, James Keohane and Nye, p.236 40 40 For accuracy withdefinitions in this thesis I accept his suggestion. 39 Therefore, according to the authors, confrontation of interests in interests of confrontation authors, the to according Therefore, , Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, London, 1980, p. 37; In order 13 The Study of Global Interdependence: CEU eTD Collection 43 42 E. Vinokurov’s E. 41 focus on regulatory policies of low political salience. political low of policies regulatory on focus cooperation within them is non-hierarchical and bottom-up policy-making environment, with a semiannual presidencybetweenrotating member states.The strong supranational institutions and with element supranational has EU the out, points Lynch Dov As governance. of systems is inthe actors international them between as difference significantmost the Hence, organization. economic and is political EU the while state, sovereign is the Russia foremost and First them. between relations economic and political on focuses thesis This interaction. and perception mutual their analyze to important isit As also argued, Rosenau actors. asinternational Federation define the EUand Russian the forinternationalits thewhich explanation of is is behavior,it thesis, crucialthis puzzleof the to aclearFor understanding of Ukraine’s position itsand importance for EUand the Russia,butalso 2.1 The EUand Russian Federation asdifferent kinds ofinternational actors political area that are ablepolitical achieve area that independently theEU’sdeclaredends”. to institutions,sovereignty, unclear aweak interests, sense of common in andfewinstitutions the EU is“as much a union interests of values”.as acommunity shared of the diluted, is territoriality and is pooled EU the in sovereignty the as sovereignty: and territoriality usefulness, dialogue the rarely helps in bringing which togetherstates, are still defensive about their strength and weakness in international arena. In contrast, the Russian Federation is presidential RussianFederation the In contrast, arena. ininternational and weakness strength analysis it can be assumed that supranational element of the EU occurs simultaneously as its Ibid, p.112 Dov Lynch, “Russia’s Strategic Partnership with Europe”, Holger Moroff, “Russia and CIS and the EU: Secondary Integration by Association?” in K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest and Chapter 2 – Political and economic importance of Ukraine for the EU the for of Ukraine importance economic and 2 –Political Chapter The CIS,the EUand Russia. Challenges of Integration and Russia 14 The Washington Quarterly 41 , Palgrave Macmillan, 2006,p.96 At the same time, “[i]t has divided has “[i]t time, same the At , Spring 2004, pp.112-113 43 Thus, from Thus,from Lynch’sthe 42 Despite its Despite CEU eTD Collection http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/4378205/bartuska-kradnu-vela-a-rychlo.html 46 45 44 49 48 47 oil exports. Russia is energy giant. Its economy is based mainly on the natural resources, in particular on gas and world” part of the it, richest “the characterized Bartuska Vaclav security, energy European for Ambassador-at-large thecurrent and, as and strategic giant”. and strategic actor unified a politically but dwarf economic an as Russia and dwarf political but giant economic “the EUasan characterized Moroff Holgerreasonably USA Therefore, after and China. partner sixty arewith per centof Russian exports EU.the For EURussiathe is the thirdbiggest trade Russia. in reforms economic in terms of trade,mainly on energy exports to the EU. According to Lynch, Russiabuilt is is dependent economy on Russian Europewhile not gas, only and but oil Russian on relies economy European alsointerdependent: because economically make EUandRussia the power political tools of different these In addition, the EU provides essential expertise and assistance for might. of tools havedifferentthe Federation EUandRussian the Second, actor. Russiaasaninternational strengthens desired goals. methods of reaching coordinate system. Leadership is devoted to improvement of the interests of the state, while institutions serve to has solidifiedthat andmilitary political, by republic and constitution state sovereign its economic IvanStulajter, Lubos Jancik, “Bartuska: Kradnu vel’a a rychlo”, Ekonomika.sme.sk, Ibid, p.113 News Website, Ibid, p.112 Moroff, p.97 Lynch, pp.112-113 Edwin Bacon, Matthew Wyman, “Contemporary Russia” , Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p.107 47 Therefore, the EU and Russia recognize each other as important international international actors. asimportant each other recognize theEUandRussia Therefore, 49 48 For Russia the EU is the most important trade partner: more than partner: trade important most is the EU Russia the For 46 15 dueits toproduction Unlikecapabilities. the EU, 44 This arrangement of governing undoubtedly (accessed onApril 6 2009) 45 The EU is economic giant economic is EU The CEU eTD Collection perspectives-journal/rrp-volume-1-issue-3/eu-enlargement-and-and-neighbourhood-policy/ Strategic Studies (IISS) border is about 2000km. Vincent Piket, “EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, 50 Federation a status of the ‘key partner of EU’ the of partner ‘key of the astatus Federation itself as incoherentan ‘post-modern’ idealist softpower. Union international regards whiletheEuropean of relations, perception game geopolitical zero-sum reflectingthat realist image state” as“de-democratizing of consideringvalues”, the Russia As Marius Vahl argues, between misunderstandings. certain itsurprisingproduces often not and is of relations nature theircomplex the EU and Russia there is thea actors, international important as andRussia EU the between problem differences all considering However, of the “lack of common of equivalence whichboth, is theevidence of mutual theirdependence. form neighbourhood”. each other’s part of includingaspects. Research cultural and Education, and Security; External & Justice; Security Freedom, Space; Economic Common common spaces: four a Strategic covering through Partnership developedinstead with Federation are Russian Policy theEUrelations (ENP), European Neighbourhood areregulatedthrough the its neighbours in K. Malfliet, L. Verpoest and E. Vinokurov’s 52 51 inThe difference between EU’svisionsand the Russian entails of also partnership the strategic considers in participation the international and organizations regimes the integration.as premise of also EU The policies. security and foreign and justice and affairs home of domains the in integration notis able develop relationsto in only thefieldof ifitiseconomy, simultaneous not with the on countries,other which became thenew EUneighbours. in onRussia EU 2004differently than of reflected In the Easternenlargement constellation,this the The CIS, the EU and Russia. Challenges of Integration 54 53 Macmillan, 2006, p.78 Before the EU Eastern enlargement only Finland was Russian EU neighbour. Since 2004 the lengthof the EU-Russia Tom Caiser, “The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow Effect of the Enlarged EU on its Eastern Neighbours” Eastern its on EU Enlarged of the Effect Shadow The Processes? of Integration Clash “The Caiser, Tom www.europe.eu Marius Vahl, “EU – Russia Relations in EU Neighbourhood Policies” in K. Malfliet, Ibid. L. Verpoest and E. Vinokurov’s http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm Website, http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/copyof-russian-regional- The CIS, the andEU Russia.Challenges ofIntegration 53 This considers that Russia and the EU acknowledge the , Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, Chapter3 16 52 (Accessed onApril 23 2009) recognizes that“Russia andtheenlarged EU 51 The Strategy Paper that grants to Russian 54 50 According to Vahl, European Union According the to While the EU relations with majority of The International Institute for (Accessed on31 May 2009) , Palgrave , CEU eTD Collection 57 56 55 remains Russia’s joining the World TradeOrganization (WTO). also conditions main the of one but EU, the of standards to policies and laws domestic its align to building, Russia European Common Union for the Practically,expects Space(CES) the Economic rights. and obligations of balance” “fair in and outside, the from threats without making decision integration, own its in is Union European the for priority time, same At the policy. development furtherstrategic partnershipison Russian domestic also dependent argues that partnership. He leadersRussian states’ larger causesthe“sympathy”of of to perception the out, as Vahl points power”. discretionary Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), system. Concerning in international Russian the traditionalof cooperation modesperception Westphalian based state on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as well as the Common state. Analyzing the relations between the EU and Russia as the main political players on the on players political main the as Russia and EU the between relations the Analyzing state. in and territorially the military,largest memberthe strongest terms of and governance economy political Commonwealth organization, the Independentof States, which is dominated by Russia as is It place takes inEurope. integration that process EU is tothe theparallel behavior, international for Ukraine’s find explanation the is which to thesis, ofthis forimportant thepurpose most The relationship with Russia. Thus, in many issues the EU and Russia “simply talk past each other”. internalinstitutions.making theEU This inprojection EU governing among different of onto results decision- of power of the by dispersion isinfluenced Moscow with strategically interact ability to affair.The EU’s in Yukos the law of application aboutthe in declarations and conflict Chechnya affairs. This was the most significantin two cases: the EU statements about the Russian policy inin Russian the interfere which values and interests mixed sees Federation Russian rhetoric, and policy Lynch, p.113 Ibid. Ibid:p.137 55 Theidea of Russia policy the division towards within Union, European the the European hasUnion European and the competences “limited 17 56 On the other hand, in the EU in the hand, other the On 57 CEU eTD Collection 60 59 58 rather to cooperate with the post-Soviet countries on the one by one basis. but process, integration CIS the of development the support to ready not is Union European the that European continentit is and Russianhegemony considering theCIS, within emphasize important to the EU. the and between wereestablished”shifted East “strongly and CIScountries the to the secured borders EU the of border external an paradoxes: two created EU the of enlargement Eastern The EU. the CISand – integration the processes decidetwo between have to Azerbaijan Armenia and Georgia, Union of Former Soviet the Caucasus states the andMoldova, and Belarus Russia -Ukraine, between the EU situated andculturally ideologically and are geographically recently countries that overcome the hegemony Russiaof incommon neighbour states. This generates a situation in which and in offinancing programmes rights market passive asthe EUcommon the to participation tool Eastern Neighbourhood Policy EUisthe of important with its possibilities partial of granting and between between EUand in the interests Russia Western clashing their the considering CIS. outcome of the ENP in theoverlapping neighborhood on Russian foreign interestspolicy inand conflict incountries between; Eastern Europe;of effect importance: crucial areof and threedevelopments light, this In Western CIScountries. the finally – the success of the strategic partnership neighbour in common EU-Russian neighbourhood for incountry neighbour both largest common EUandthe asthe EU-Russian neighbourhood Russia important second the appears Ukraine east, on EU the for neighbour important most the is Russia andthat neighbour western important is the most currently EU Russia’s the fact that the Concerning 2.2 TheEU’sand Russia’s policies toward Ukraine EUandthe Russian policies towardUkraine will be throughoutdiscussed further. of analysis the with along which Ukraine in Revolution Orange the was last the of example striking Ibid, p.91 Casier, p.90 Morrof, Chapter2 59 On the other hand, European Neighbourhood Policy has the task of creating stability with 18 58 In this sense, the role of 60 Themost CEU eTD Collection 62 61 provoked by change any one actors international of two between therelation in a that argued actors who Nye, and Keohane or a third actor, mayby interdependence the complex as explained situation, is Thisthe powers. exactly havetwo between a costly effects on both of actors. Eastern members of members so-called EU,the EU-11, of Eastern the On each of these issues two broadState. positions can be seen.The second is theOn disagreement the Ukraine. with relationship asits one toenhance whether to ought it which hand, with themeans the and EU extent shouldthe to as dispute mainly accept Ukraine as a Northernpotential Member and divisive question within the organization. There are two interrelated problems for the EU. First is the countries for the EU. At the same time in Since theEnlargement European Eastern 2004, Ukraine hasbecome one of neighbour largest the Ukraine EUviewon The 2.2.1 focus sphere. on economic Ukraine with the towards EU’sattitude the identifies subsection next towards the Orange Revolution was remarkable. In particular, the two things standFirst, out. the EU shown have States Member EU that unity the divisions, internal aforementioned the of light In EU andRussia. the between membership is factors,importantone of which Ukrainian foreignputs intopolicy balancing stage Ukrainian foreign policy. In other words, the absence of consensus within the EU towards Ukraine’s of direction multi-vector influenced this Simultaneously, Russia. towards policy EU the to connected closely been have Ukraine on divisions these particular, In policy. foreign EU’s the over divisionsbroader within EU the reflect thesedisagreements Indeed, engagement. the are against states member EU Western broadly and Southern the hand, other the On Ukraine. with engagement Scandinavia, Baltic States, Visegrad States and Austria and States Visegrad States, Baltic Scandinavia, Keohane and Nye, p. 236 the EU’s relations with Ukraine have become increasingly an havebecome with Ukraine EU’srelations the 19 62 supportapro-active EUpolicy of the 61 The CEU eTD Collection 65 64 May 2005, Chapter 2, p.15 Revolutionbearfruit? EU-Ukraine relations in 2005 and the beginning of Stefan2006”, Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 63 66 operation”. goingbeyondgradual co-operation, to integration economic and adeepening co- of political Furthermore, official claimEU sources is thethat EU in interested “close withrelationship Ukraine, the EU and Ukraine in key areas of Ukraine’s reform. will continue duringyear this asnegotiations began only had a decision once been fortaken Ukraine on the majority issuesof concerning economic and sectoral cooperation. Talks on a Free Trade Area and areas two all first on the has been reached Provisionalagreement havebeen conducted. rounds in ninebeginning negotiations Free Area.comprehensive negotiating of 2007, Since Trade the freedom andissues; of andsecurity andsectoral cooperation a deepand establishment economic the justice, dialoguepolicy; foreign and security and political areasof four covers agreementactivity: inFebruary Plan 2005. was ratified Partnership Agreement andCo-operation which isin (PCA), force 1998,EU-Ukraine since Action of status the Policy Basedon the European priority partner. Neighbourhood gained Ukraine which they were willing tosupport”. oppression state from freedom for lawandadesire of rule the adhere to to willingness a democracy, in belief “a values: European fundamental demonstrated Revolution Orange the that collectively and individually both concerned been had States Member EU the that fact in the lies points these Dutch very that of the revolution.Thepresidency preparedwaspublished significance early during EU statement the Second, of Ukraine. Court Supreme the to according falsified as were considered of which results the elections, of presidential the round second the after official the results rejected opportunity actas a opportunity strong politicalto playerandBrussels grasped thisopportunity. www.europe.eu Ibid. Grzegorz Gromadski, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk, Roman Wolczuk, “Will Orangethe Ibid. 66 The is tothis evidence Agreement,replace Association the whichserves PCA.to The Website http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/index_en.htm 65 It provides framework for It thorough articulation the between 63 In turn, the Orange Revolution presented the EU with an with EU the presented Revolution Orange the turn, In 20 (Accessed on3May 2009) 64 Within the CEU eTD Collection 67 3 May 2009) 73 72 (Accessed June 1 2009) www.magisters.com 70 69 2009) 68 May 2009) inby of percent 2009. 38 last 2008 and percent quarter during the to Odessa in the South (to be shipped further West by tanker), that is, from be direction inOdessa shipped opposite the inWestbytanker),that (to further to South the transitinfrom andBrody oil Russian North the to pipeline reversal the Odessa-Brody-Poland the of policy. this into fit July Western interconnected "Burshtyn 2002, of European to the Island" networks, UCTEelectricity with Poland on of developmentthe Odessa-Brody-Polandthe oil the connection,pipeline and since TACISthe through programme connections with Union.EUoffersthe The support reform to the includingof gassector, the transit, network energy its enhance to and position transit this strengthen to wishes It EU. the to gas and oil sector of Ukrainian economy. is Ukraine a key forstrategic transit country the of (mostly Russian) Ukraine. into FDI all of 75% approximately for account states member EU from originating investments Ukraine reachedover€34billion in 2007 between EUand inyears.the The trade investor recent the foreign andlargest partner trade largest http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1424&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=516156 71 and13 partner For the EUUkraineis its 16 for the EU. important arevery Ukraine with relations join into World May the TradeOrganization 2008. www.europe.eu www.europe.eu (TACIS) States of Independent Commonwealth to Assistance Technical EU The Andrew Mac, “Foreign Direct Investment Drives Growth in Ukraine”, Magisters – Ibid. Leading CIS based Law Firm, www.europe.eu “Ukraine, Dealing with the Financial Crisis”, Kennan Institute, Kennan Crisis”, Financial the with Dealing “Ukraine, 70 However, global economic crisis hits Ukraine severely itsand declined exports by 16 th , Website, Website largest export market. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf p.22 , http://www.magisters.com/insight/2008-1/fdi-drives-growth-in-ukraine/ 73 However, by July 2004 Ukraine’s government accepted Russia’s proposal for However, government Russia’s byJuly accepted 2004 Ukraine’s proposal http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/556 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/556 72 . The signature, under the auspices of the EU, of an Agreement 68 The EU’s official sources show that the EU is Ukraine’s 69 , while according to Ukraine’s State Statistics Committee 21 67 The last serves as the evidence that the trade 71 Furthermore, energy is the main the is energy Furthermore, (Accessed 3May 2009) (Accessed on 3 on (Accessed th (Accessed 3 May 3 (Accessed largesttrading (Accessed , CEU eTD Collection Taylor and Francis Group, New 2007,York, Part II, Chapter 3 77 Oxford, 2001, pp. 1-7 76 Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2008, p.33 75 74 Wojciech Kononczukimportant is Wojciech for Russia arguedthatUkraine former mostSovietthe state. Ukraine’s economy has a pathdependencestrong Russia in on especially of terms supplies.energy on Ukraine view Russia’s 2.2.2 policy. foreign in Russian place of Russian economic influenceonUkraine.Therefore, next subsection the Ukraine’s is to devoted intended. oneoriginally the Russian economy, economic dependence has largely been unidirectional in the relationship; in the in relationship; the in unidirectional been largely has dependence economic economy, Russian asthe had the similarproblems in Ukraine of independence, early period the Despite the factthat founder of CIS. wasthe Ukraine ‘abroad’. Ukraineconsider as Ukrainian national influences identities and statehood most Russians and many Ukrainians to extent Ukraine.Russian towards attitude Inaddition, historical overlappingRussian and of second, name the inRussianUkraine has themeaning“borderland”. of This alarge determines to and Russians claim Ukraine’sillustrate mention of importanceenough Ukrainians both for two First, Russia.them to to Kyivan Rusisitbut historical reasons, number of alsoa totheEU.Thereare exports Russian gas percent of as the origin Ukraineof in1954),andimportant –economically – Ukraine most the isthe transit country for 80 their own statehood(whichbecamenavy Black with Russian the part of the Crimean peninsula port seatogether and national inas Sevastopol Ukraine, Russianminority argument: behindthis reasons arethree there present, identity, and Bertil Nygren, “The Rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s foreignpolicy towards CIS the countries”, Routledge Inc, Publishers, Littlefield and Rowman Transition”, Post-Soviet The Russia. and “Ukraine Solchanyk, Roman Wojciech Kononczuk, “Difficult ‘Ally’. Belarus in Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Bialorus w Balmaceda,Polityce p.73; the issue of Odessa-Brodypipeline Rosji, will be Centerthroughout analyzed for in the third chapter. 74 This fact is in line of the argument that there is still sufficient evidence sufficient is still there that argument the of line in is fact This 76 After the dissolution of USSR, along with Russia and Belarus, 77 22 75 At CEU eTD Collection 79 78 http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_214895.php 80 2008) Ukrainian independence”. significant ‘other’ to Ukraine was defined in his central idea of state-building: the “Russian threat to 84 83 82 81 oil and gas reconsiderKravchuk compelledsupplies ties to with andUkraineRussia became Russian on reliance strong Ukraine’s division. regional with along decline economic strong Ukraine up customsUnion control. andset of Soviet independent states newly other to exports increase with Russia, trade currency, national reduce the identity. national Ukrainian of contestation widespreadwere not among allUkrainians: fragmentation thereasonfor this isstrong and West. the integration to and Ukraine’s claimed Russia with all toreject ties attempted Kravchuk that argues leader.as a Eichler Leonid Kravchuk independencecame power whennationalistwith inearly with 1990’s political to stream came Soviet Union. These shifts of dissolution the the foreign since policy shifts inUkraine’s werethree there speaking, Generally had the significant question balancingof between EUandthe Russiain foreignUkraine’s policy. impact on Russo-Ukrainiancapital going relations. throughinvestments are Cypriotmost argueUK RussianandUkrainian time, of and that some experts Cypriot The first and oneBritish periodthe of in invested 377.6m 1999-2003 Russia the officially At Ukrainianeconomy. samethe offshore centers. since1999. has been only active in Russiancapital Ukraine privatization scramble imports incremented from from Russia toUkraine in1997-2007decade increased from sixty eightto fourbillion USD, while to twelve billion USD. www.russiaexport.net Ibid, p.51 “Russian investments inUkraine top $ 377.6m”, Gateway to Russia Website, Ibid. Eichler, p.81 Abdelal, p. 31 Eichler, p.81 , Russia Export/Import Website, Export/Import Russia , 83 Looking autonomyfrom the for Kravchuk tocreate Russia, attempted (Accessed 3 May 2008) 84 82 However, independence in the first stage broughtto first stage independence inthe However, http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~chegeo/ 81 Kravchuk’s attempt to definemost as to Russia Kravchuk’s the attempt 23 However, as Abdelal points out, nationalist ideas nationalist out, points Abdelal as However, 79 In terms of foreign direct investments for 80 This assumption also deals with the (Accessed 3May 78 The exports The CEU eTD Collection material used with the author’s permission(Accessed from Space”, Prepared for 6 for Prepared Space”, 88 87 86 85 regional_promise_in_id_cons-turin.pdf and Yushchenko. Viktor candidate pro-Western poisoning as pamphlets “temnyky” – instructionscensorship mass for media, opening Clubin Russian Kyiv, Kuzio, accordingpurposes, Russian to technologistspolitical wasknown thefirst usedthreeways: authorities attempted to interfere on the side of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich. For these Ukrainian the in2004Russian elections duringCIS. Therefore, plans thepresidential towards and policies Russia’s for acceptable completely was that one –the policy foreign in Ukrainian shift nudging”counterbalance serve to Russian influence in region.the “with U.S. the established - organizations (ODED) Development Economic and Democracy Ukrainian leadership in “openly anti-Russian alliance” GUAM within CISthe for and Organization ‘trauma’. post-imperial of consequence the than as rather interests, state Russia’s of as defense forprices gas.However, striveinfluence Russian political to inidentified besituation Ukrainecan increasingthe by ‘punishes’Ukraine butstill of elections, results Russia the recognized occurred. failed in pro-Western elections foreignpolicy inUkrainian shift Ukrainian new of 2004 and byRussia”. situation than economic dismal more “bycountry’s threat security economicby Kuchma’s wasreplaced policies Eurasianunderstanding identity of and Ukraine’s and foreign and identity national Ukrainian of claim anti-Russian Kravchuk’s elections. the won Russia broughthim of support the key the economic associations from easternthe regions andhe 1994 Presidential in elections Ukraine. member associated CISin of the Eichler that relation1993. Russia argues was themainto of topic threat to Russian threat intereststo areattempts state of group to buildGUAM gasandoil in pipelines order Mikhail M. Molchanov, “Regional Promises inState Social Identity Construction: The Rhetoric of a Single Economic Taras Kuzio, “Russian Policy toward Ukraine during Elections”, during Ukraine toward Policy “Russian Kuzio, Taras Ibid. Ibid. th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Torino, Italy, 12-15September2007; , May 6 2009), p.8 85 Leonid Kuchma’s balanced program relationshipof with 24 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Molchanov- Demokratizatsiya 13, 87 Nevertheless, Russian ‘soft power’ ‘soft Russian Nevertheless, 88 What is What the seen biggest as Fall 2005,pp. 491-517 86 This was the second CEU eTD Collection material used with the author’s permission(Accessed from Space”, Prepared for 6 for Prepared Space”, 91 90 Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, August 2008, pp.1073-1088 89 regional_promise_in_id_cons-turin.pdf in international arena and adjust its economic benefits. Consequently, next chapter presents the presents chapter next Consequently, benefits. economic its adjust and arena international in sovereignty its remain to order in policy foreign in Ukraine’s significant more even is two between Balancing regions. its within identity national of perceptions different between balancing internal In addition, Ukraine’s circles from Russia to the out, points EU Molchanov As Mikhail andneighbours. great both its on dependent theUkraine other way around sum makes andtheirmutual betweendependence theEUandRussia To position up, geopolitical are not only its markets. energy to European eventual intoinclusion internal the EU’swould energy market enhancesecurity of transitof Russian membershipmake would EUevenmore also the Russian on dependent itssupplies,energy although EU rules from mostits Ukraine and Since of standards. Russia, receives Ukrainian energy EU constituency in favour of This may EUharmonization.the have consequences forRussia toadopt Russian growing a create will which compatible’, ‘EU become to forced be will in Ukraine Otherwise, according toVahl, as Ukraine attempts to adopt EU business standards, Russian business country. asenergy transit Ukraine announced inApril till befinished planned 2007 and meaningto 2016, will considerably lessen of which was project, This Ukraine. whichwillbypass Europe, andEast South Balkansand to the Ukraine country bottom by constructing asatransitStream the pipeline South the gas Black Sea on bypass territory.to Russian Mikhail M. Molchanov, “Regional Promises inState Social Identity Construction: The Rhetoric Vahl, p.135of a Single Economic Andrei Kazantsev, “Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region”, Caspian the and Asia Central in Policy “Russian Kazantsev, Andrei EU, it is safe to argue that the circle is far from being over”. EuropeanUniononce again. […]Looking Ukraine’sat previousexperience bothwithRussia and the “Redefinitionof identity Ukrainein passedhas full circle from Russia to Europe to Russia and to the th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Torino, Italy, 12-15 September2007; 90 89 Therefore, Russia makes attempts to decrease its dependence on dependence decrease its to attempts makes Russia Therefore, , May 6 2009),p. 12 25 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Molchanov- 91 Europe- Asia Studies. 60, 6 , CEU eTD Collection policy policy in between and periods early the the moment. independence current evidence of balancing inlongitudinal analysis five of main events shapedthat foreign Ukraine’s 26 CEU eTD Collection http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/05/198_21999.html 94 Amsterdam, 2000, Chapter 4,p.67 93 92 the EU. the and Russia of interests and elites political and business Ukrainian of interests in Ukraine, identity 2006 and secondin January 2009. Inmy analysis I usevariables such as issuethe national of in thatoccurred between Ukraine gasdisputes -one Russia and with Russiaand two EU,and the andfor Ukrainian impact consequences energy sector; of Orange Revolution on Ukraine’s relations maintwo aforementioned during shifts the presidency Kravchukof andKuchma and their reasons policy: foreign Ukraine’s indicated that events significant five the through balancing international Ukraine’s of phenomenon the explore I chapter this In EU. the and Russia between balancing itssustain economy Ukraine succeedto that here Iargue chapters, in Russia explained previous in mindboth Ukraine’s internal division and complexinterdependence it, between EU the and Keeping memberbecome EU. the of the totry to CIS,or indominated byRussia, the participating bleak if it partof remained USSRandsubject madeof the outside itsborders”. decisions its“looked economy was the factthat independence declaring for of one reasons Ukraine main the interest" Lord Palmerstone’s famous dictum that “Nations do not have permanent friends, only permanent trends towards regionalism” in early years of independence, the Ukrainian economy declined rapidly. This along with “global Ibid. Association, Publisher Overseas movement”, without change and change without Movement “Ukraine. Dyczok, Marta Interest”, National and “Alliance LeeByong-chul, 92 largely explains the essence of the present chapter. As Marta Dyczok points out, for Chapter 3 – The evidence of balancing of evidence 3 –The Chapter 94 brought up the question for Ukraine whether to go back to zonegobackfor to Ukraineup the question brought to whether The Korea Times 27 , 4 June , 4 2008, (Accessed 20May 2009) 93 However, CEU eTD Collection Chapter 9,p.373 101 100 in Orange, 99 98 97 96 Ukraine 95 As Kuzio out,Presidentpoints Kravchuk’smain focus and was onthe nation-building.state 3.1. Balancing during Kravchuk’s presidency production production had declinedsignificantly. reserves. since1970’scoal Nevertheless, between and 250years’worth country 200 possesses Coal sourcehas been always important of forenergy Ukraine: asBohdanHarasymiw argued, and only a soft constraint on their production cycle.” Soviet-wide energy balance, not aspecifically Ukrainian one, and, thus, of seeing energy inputs as basically unlimited “ directors so-called red therefore USSR, of dissolution the years after in early the allowed elite to consolidate its power locally. Moreover, the energy prices for Ukraine remained low post-Sovietother states and toEurope, andsetting upcustoms control. national with which included trade creation Russia, the to of currency, reorienting reducing exports and sovereignty”. independence the main guidance nationalin identity and European and terms of Ukraine’s cultural orientation. for state-building ‘other’ toachieve mosttoUkraine significant claimingattempted the firstof all these goals Russia efforts was the idea of the “Russian threat to Ukrainian figures had been youth communist (Komsomol) officials or state enterprise managers” enterprise state or officials (Komsomol) communist youth been had figures inemerged 1992 andearly end wereformed the after regime, of “though several communist leading that groups, –oligarchic elite and economic of political interests Ukrainian tothe corresponded carriedthem with Soviet-era waysof at looking thequestion of energy independence, the sense in of at a looking Andres Aslund, “The Ancien Regime: Kuchma and Oligarchs” in Anders Aslund’s and Michael McFaul’s Michael and Aslund’s Anders in Oligarchs” and Kuchma Regime: Ancien “The Aslund, Andres Ibid:p.82 Ibid. Eichler, p.81 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition” in Transition” A Four-Pronged “Ukraine: Kuzio, Taras Bohdan Harasymiw,“Post Communist Ukraine”, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Toronto,2002, Balmaceda, p.46 edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1998, p. 170 Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace,Washington D.C., 2006, p.10 97 In light,this Kravchuka program proposed of economic reforms 101 Therefore,for important support Ukrainian independence 100 Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation. 28 96 As Eichler argued, AsEichler 98 Contemporary These reforms Revolution 99 : they 95 He CEU eTD Collection the balance of power for the state’s survival. for balance state’s power the the of using idea of Waltz’s of evidence aclear serveas can This its territory. on processes economic over relations simultaneously trade maintain with control republics,with retaining its formerother Soviet 106 105 104 103 102 while willing Ukrainian citizens toacceptalso werenot the ayear realityKravchuk that proposed economy the his neglected KuzioKravchuk of reforms. presidency, economic argues that during only. membership associated an keep acounterbalanceattempt to Russiain to CIS,Kravchukthe not agreed full, on but ties with Russia resulted in Ukraine’s membership in free-trade zone CISthe in 1993. However, in economic Reestablishing anti-Russian. less to policy foreign also changing Russia, from autonomy for reconsider Kravchuk economic strategy -compelledto inindustry workers the the coal interests ofnew Ukrainian economic elites; second, economic decline, andfinally widespread unrest the to connected supplies and gas Russianoil first, on reliance factors: three these Therefore, main supplier of needed equipment for coal mining. of coal miners influenced Kravchuk’s economic policy decisions. policy economic Kravchuk’s influenced miners coal of unrest the energy, of Ukrainian source domestic only really was the coal wavesofAs strikes. staged industrially the developedmost regionsin Ukraine,of coal miners from which particular Donbas, economic decline inKravchuk’s resulted among lost support workers and managers industrial from crisis situation political manipulation in and opens to Ukraine policy”. foreign apermanenteconomic “creates policy dependence options, strong drastically on Russia compels therefore economy”, Ukrainian the is heel of Achilles “energy arguedthat Harasymiw However, improve working conditions and bring more subsidies and investments directly from Kyiv. camefrom also miners’ movementfrom whonationalhoped Donbas, that wouldstate be ableto Weber and Smith, p.21 Eichler, p.83 Ibid. Harasymiw with reference to Paul D’Anieri’s “Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-RussianRelations”, p.373 Eichler, p.82 105 This allowed Ukraine to achieve short-term goals, namely to 106 At the same time, Kravchuk failed in implementation failed Kravchuk time, same Atthe 29 104 Moreover, Russia has been the been has Russia Moreover, 103 In addition, rapid 102 CEU eTD Collection 107 112 111 110 109 108 and in attempts to decrease corruption inherited from previous regimes, he prosecuted two post- two he regimes, prosecuted inherited from decrease corruption previous to andinattempts companies”. trade monopolies, and each made hundreds of millions of dollars through small trading business.Aslund, “each businessmen Accordingyear, ahandful to of Ukrainian weregivenregional exports. chemical and agricultural and subsidies, coal money in includes commodity which firsttrading”, andforemost gas, oil then exports, steel trade, focused of andmademost “in their Aslundon 1990’sUkrainian oligarchs had that argues increased. By the time of his election as president however, identity national Russia and arguedthat isa partner. necessary strategic the influence of Ukrainianwith Western organizations Kuchma(such asIMFand World Bank), claimed Ukrainian Eurasian oligarchs on the state new national currency. national new reformsin liberalization resulted andmonetary of prices stabilization of through introduction the with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)in order to gain financial support from the West. These Russia. Ukraine’s second presidentsucceededimplementing in economic reforms in cooperation strategy: while Kuchmasoughtclosed Europe,he ties attempted tonormalizewith relations with itmightbeforeignHowever, tosay Kuchma the more balancing that accurate pursued policy AccordingNygren,initiated toKuchma continued byKravchuk foreign policy. West-oriented 3.2. Balancing during Kuchma’s presidency everything. And in ten years we won’t [accomplish everything].” accomplishing from far be still will we me, believe years, five another “In resignation: his after Kuzio, p.171 with reference to Ibid, p.11 Aslund, p.10 Eichler, p.85 Eichler, p.84 Nygren, p.50 112 Duringyear thefirst his of Kuchma presidency followed energy the market reforms 109 As I have argued in the previous chapter, simultaneously with cooperation Chas 22 August 1995 30 111 Moreover, the gas trade becameaspecific gastrade the Moreover, 107 110 108 CEU eTD Collection Kuchma’s private conversations…which [in demanded he] Gongadze’s abduction…”of President hours thousand one than more hadrecorded cohorts some and he that the revelation and Melnychenko Mykola of Major defection the for not if nowhere lead have would it but célèbre, cause international an became Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington, 2006, Chapter 2,p.33: “The journalist’s disappearance Revolution” in 116 115 114 113 opposition was not consolidated as the prime-minister of the time Viktor Yuschenko“hadconsolidated as not timeadopted the Viktor opposition was of prime-minister the anti-Kuchmaprovoked across demonstrations country the callingfor hisimpeachment. Though the journalist finallyfromGongadze, lost Heorhiy Kuchma hissupport West. the other. defined closer policy ties withtowards and Ukraine strengthening strategic partnership on the two former Sovietcrash influencedof negatively 1998 still economy Ukrainian the interdependence between regarding states onIn his second presidential term Kuchma faced newchallenges in foreign policy: Russia’s financialthe one hand, and Symonenko. new Russian Petro party Communist himselfthe leaderof andthe President to choice reducedthe and candidates Vladimirmaneuvering Yuschenko Viktor and as 1999: Kuchmaeliminated centrists between other oligarchs, Putin’sin bereelected him helpedto strategy a largeextentthis To another. againstone oligarch groups clearly but alsoincrease differentsector, to inKuchma economy his oncountry’s general,pitted influence System of Ukraine which mostly with gas. System which Ukraine traded of company Unified Energy headed theprivate Yulia Tymoshenko his business partner andLazarenko became corrupt. In 1995anew group of emergedoligarch in governorDnipropetrovsk: the Pavlo improved elites Kuchma’s relations newalready with the business established president, regime halfKravchuk’s of presidency.media Second wasthe oligarch Rabinovich.Vadim However, when independency oligarchs.Firstperiod wasYukhum Zviahilskiy, Prime the during Minister the second AdrianKaratnycky, “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange Nygren, p.51 Ibid, p.13 Ibid, p.12 115 Furthermore, in the 2000 the Kuchmagate scandal over disappearance of investigative of disappearance scandal over Kuchmagate in 2000the the Furthermore, 114 Revolution in Orange. The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough 31 113 In order to take control over country’s energy edited by Anders Aslund, 116 This event This CEU eTD Collection 118 117 120 119 of countries. of betweentwoSlavic neighbour economic relations gain eight-yearfor delaypayingdebt gas Nevertheless,deliveries. energy issue themainremained Kuchma andnormalization between countries inKuchma Putin and helpedof two relations 2000 to personal between relations good Gazprom, Russia’s company owned state to gasdebt increased Ukraine’s of view in a Moreover, economy. Ukrainian in the investment Russian as only simply it atthesamecan be Ukraine, on considered time Russianinfluence increasing of as threat Nygren Ukrainian Russiadependence interpreted andismostly on by scholars suchasKuzio, Aslund and CIS. the into integrate Kuchma EU-Ukraine the closerforcing toRussia.summit, accusedtheEUof Ukraineto In2003at foreign redirected policy authorities Ukrainian why reasons the economy, alsowasoneof which was in Russianfifty by “free zone” with Asthe result, economic industry of Russia. Ukrainian 2002 about percent hands. In hopedthe to keep them at that level.In spite of thatfact, in November 2001, Ukraine signed treaty forsame a yearUkraine in although form: very soft Ukraine’s Russia with relations were balanced and Kuchma the EU refusedjust normal”. cold, to grant is airwarm, overis us,the and –not clean too and to transparent, thetemperature appropriate nortoo Ukraine statusno“thereKuchma clouds meeting are their that inMay Putin declared 2002 awith During relations. of market influencing positively the sameside, Russia on NATOputUkraine with and and 2002accord the percent. Moreover, the2001September 11terrorist attacks,Russian anti-terrorist alliance with USA metalone,Kuchmatimes between eighttwenty Putin Russiaincreased and trade and Ukraine to Russiaa new shift inUkrainian foreigntowards year firstDuringpolicy. of the Putin’s presidency the stance of neutrality” stanceof the Nygren, p.52 with reference to reference with p.52 Nygren, Ibid. Ibid, p.60 Nygren, p. 58 118 Kuchma’s showed readiness statement counterbalance to influence Russian on 119 117 Although the flow of Russian capital to Ukrainian industry created new , protests proved unsuccessful. At the same time, these events influenced At events sametime, these proved the unsuccessful., protests RFE/RL Newsline 20 May 2002 32 120 It was related mainly to numerous CEU eTD Collection 122 121 also theWest in participationgeneral the of through differentNGO’s,interferedin elections these butasmany membernewbiggest argued,scholars state), Russia (mainly Poland asthe and the EU clashthe Russian andof Westerninterests in As Ukraine. was explained in chapter,both previous The Ukrainian 2004 presidential and elections subsequentOrange the Revolution showed practically 3.3.Yuschenko’s balancing between Russia and theEU economicto European and security integration structures. Russian newly by dominanceeconomy overUkraine’s recovered of process the enforcing Russian energy. main the Hence, goal of Ukraine’sthe post-Kuchma governmentwas toneutralize on new Ukrainian dependence itcreated However, security. forenergy European astate as Ukraine of importance the toemphasize in EU order the to as counterbalancing be explained can this one Kuchma’sallUkraine’s previous foreign balancing,contrary of decisions the policy government, to Interms i.e.by furtherfrom toEurope. of to south, tankers Odessaandshippingit Brody to Odessa-Brody the pipeline whichresulted in transiting Russianoil to opposite direction,north from aRussianfor reversal of the accepted proposal in government 2004Ukrainian summer Therefore, that when this project was completed in 2002, as an official version the government proposed that toEurope”. “return for Ukrainian the value hadsymbolic therefore, pump the EUand, builtCaspianinitially oil to to was Odessa-Brody issueoil pipeline that of allegations that Ukrainehad been stealing gasfrom Gazprom in gas transit the to EU, but also tothe Balmaceda, Chapter 4,p.73 Ibid. committing themselves to buy the oil to be supplied through the pipeline.” contracts import sign to ready were Europe) Western and Central in (refineries buyers no and “…no sellers of Caspian oil were available to supply oil tothe pipeline at an economically viable price, 33 121 122 Margarita Balmaceda argues Balmaceda Margarita CEU eTD Collection 128 127 126 2005, Chapter 9 125 124 123 Russia tobepart of drivethe for Europe”. wanted but alone, European’ “‘go not would Ukraine that claimed Yuschenko Parliament, European between two countries “would become ‘better, transparent’”. easy and ‘better, become countries “would two between relations strategic that partner eternal andPutin, promised RussiaasUkraine’s heproclaimed West. the to integration of goal the with i.e. uni-directional, it claimed and policy foreign Ukrainian environment. international on impact a profound had undoubtedly Revolution Orange the time same the at Wilson, Therefore, the aftermath largelyrevolution of Ukrainiandisappointed Andrewcitizens. According to fundamentally democratic changes to the country. However, as Paul D’Anieri points out, Domestically the expectationselections. the won and favorite western the was of Yuschenko Orange RevolutionViktor economy, Ukrainian of reformist main the and era wereKuchma’s of ministers prime of great: one while the revolution promised supported from candidatethe Yanukovych, traditionally of Viktor region pro-Russian Donetsk, to bring political sameby supporting in andatthe time different geographical Ukraine.streams Ibid, with reference to reference with Ibid, Nygren, p. 53 Ibid, p. 190 Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, St Edmundsbury Press Ltd, Bury D’Anieri, St Edmunds, p.3 North Yorkshire, Wilson: 2005, Aslund: 2006, Kuzio: 2005. 126 charismatic Yulia Tymoshenko.” a BMWin worthover $100,000. And Yushchenko bitterlysplit partnerwith his in revolution, the parliament,as required by law. Yuschenko’s owntwenty-year-oldwas son about driving seen Kyiv in seats their up give not did ministers cabinet of Yuschenko’s Several defeated. was Organization privatized companies boggedTrade down. legislation neededUkraine for to join World the Trade “… However, his first presidential trip abroad was to Moscow, where, during a meeting with corruption prosecutions against the previous leaders were delayed. The review ofillegally review The delayed. were leaders previous the against prosecutions corruption 125 First, Yuschenko rejected Kuchma’s term ‘multi-vector’ characterization of characterization ‘multi-vector’ term Kuchma’s rejected Yuschenko First, RFE/RL Newsline 124 24 February 2005 128 Thisdiplomatic gestureof thirdthe Ukrainian president 34 127 The same year in the year same The 123 Russia CEU eTD Collection 130 129 a reaction to the Orange Revolution, in 2005 Russia and more particularly Gazprom the moreannounced Gazprom particularly inand 2005 Russia Revolution, Orange the a reaction to more as obviously butin Russia, reform economic of of development the aconsequence as Partially 3.3.1. 2006 and 2009. subsections show the evidence ofUkraine’s balancing the gas during with disputes Russia inthe in next two Hence, the andRussia. Ukraine between in were gasdisputes actors question all for significant most The statehood. Ukrainian for challenges new created Yuschenko by claimed Orange Revolution Ukrainian internal strengtheneddivision uni-directional and foreign policy interdependence with Russia increasedinterests the through of business groups. Therefore, after the Ukraine. economic image Nevertheless,presidency duringUkraine’s the Kuchma’s to United States”. the of influence “under acting for interference Lithuanian and Polish privately attacked Fontelles, EU, the Spanishstates. While the perspective Poland Lithuania supported and Ukrainian full of membership in the Socialist chapter, also changedand thebalance of within EUitself,the power it shiftingfrom new to old member President leadership Ukraine morerole. active of the Europeanin Orangechangeinthe influencedthe of balance to Revolution spacegiving post-Soviet power the Parliament between West, andrejecting fluctuation emulating historical Russian considering polar opposites, of the time,make not international orientation andarena. Although Ukraine Yuschenko’s could Russia western Josep BorrellinSecond, reconsider OrangeRevolution the forced andits the Russiaoutcomes to role EU. andthe between Russia balancing indicated -in of terms interdependencecomplex –the Ukraine’s inevitable continuation of Ibid, p.190 Wilson, Chapter9 The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Dispute in2006 GasDispute Ukrainian-Russian 130 Obviously in OrangeRevolution the brought general new positive international 129 Third, the Orange Revolution, as was explained in second in explained was as Revolution, Orange the Third, 35 CEU eTD Collection http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4575726.stm 133 Ukraine: Post-Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with Russia 132 131 hearing 135 137 136 Affairs, Brussels, February 2007, p.4 134 supplies. goals. market,gas alsoits but Russia’sfor about supplier for European tendency useenergy political to supplies to the EU were normalized. However, this raised the EU’s doubts about Russia as gas andalready on 4January 2006 Russian and Russia Ukraine theended“gas war”between the main EU. the gasto Russian for transporting 47 percent to theprice increased same Ukraine paysis Atthe overall thatHence,time, $95for1000cubicmeters. the Ukraine price January 2006, butcompany much Ukraine gasfrom also supplies with Turkmenistan.cheaper Gazprom forRosukrenergo. meters from 1000cubic $230for Rosukrenergo sells Russian gas to Ukrainebuysfrom agreement: 50 percentownedby gas company Swiss-based Gazprom foreign policy.pro-western Bahgat, in Ukraine new Gazprom’s policy has been as “punishment”understood for Yuschenko’s Accordingintroduction with of in market formerrules Gawdat gastrade the states. Soviet to pipeline with aim to transit gas from Caspian region to Europe. forfor buildingtheNabucco Bulgaria) prioritizing also astatement signed theproject and Turkey Slovakia. Poland and supplies in between Simultaneously France,gas were reducedAustria,25 and Italy, 40percent previousthe $50 pricemeters perthousand of cubic gas, Gazprom reduced suppliestoUkraine. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4579648.stm “Russia Wows to End Gas Shortage”, January 2, 2006, Honchar’s Mykhaylo and Pavlenko’s Rostyslav Viter’s, in Olena conflict” and manipulation “Gas: Viter, Olena Gawdat Bahgat, “Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities”, International Affairs 82: 5, 2006, p.961 Eneko Landaburu, Keynote speech “Europe’s External Energy Relations: present and future challenges”, Public challenges”, future and present Relations: Energy External “Europe’s speech Keynote Landaburu, Eneko Ministerial Statement onNabucco pipeline project,Vienna, 26 June 2006, See Green Paper “A European Strategy forSustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, COM 2006, p.105 “Ukraine and Russia reach gas deal”, 4January 2006, 135 “Towards Common European Foreign Policy on Energy” Consequently, the EU issued a Green Paper for security and diversification of energy 136 The Ministers of Energy of several EU-member states (Austria, Hungary, Romania and Romania Hungary, (Austria, states EU-member several of Energy of Ministers The 133 After long After negotiations Gazprom reached adifficultcompromise 131 Whenaccept of authorities refusedthe $180instead Ukrainian the to (Accessed 1 2009)June (Accessed 29May 2009) BBC News Website BBC News Website 36 , GMB Publishing Ltd,London, 2006 pp.21-22 , European Parliament Committee on Foreign 137 , www.euractiv.com , 134 This agreement quickly Thisagreement 132 CEU eTD Collection Publishing Ltd, London,2006 , p.29 Pavlenko’s and Mykhaylo Honchar’s 141 140 139 138 Ukrainian authorities planned to buy all gas from Central Asian states reached. was “gas forparameters” and rest of 2007on the issues, todiscuss2006 anagreement Moscow gas fact whento benefits. inAugusteconomicYanukovych went that, isthe this The clearevidence of of Yuschenko’s Russia,era foreign balancing closerpolicy towards which broughtUkraine certain sign the was simultaneously country the within power of balance in shift significant but small This Yanukovych was elected Prime Minister of Ukraine and vowed to prioritize relations with Russia. Consequently, Minister. Prime elects Constitution Ukrainian by which parliament, Ukrainian in seats majority of the gained Regions (PRU) Yanukovych’s Party of Viktor elections parliamentary summerbut 2006, Yuschenkochange did not his view on newthe gasprice.in Thesame year, gas Ukrainian it and price the However, continued criticism deal domestic strong about was through and consequences its on Ukrainian economy and foreign policy. Ukraine and Russia between dispute gas recent most the to devote I subsection next the Hence, EU. the role of Ukraine as the gas transitdiminish to threaten pipelines These alternative Bulgaria. Russiawith country,connects bottom Sea Black hence, its energy importance forSea both bottom Russia and thethat would projects havebeen already gas pipelineon undertaken: North-European Balticthe the connect constructed directly Russiawould that bypassof transport Ukraine. ways EU,Russiaseeks gas supplies tothe the and Germany,for obstructions possible further prevent to intention firm andGazprom’s of light in the SouthNevertheless, Stream that through $130. These andagreements temporally decisions solved issue of forUkraine.gas supplies the Rostyslav Pavlenko, “Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Russia: peculiarities Uzbekistan ofand the triangle”Kazakhstan in Turkmenistan, Olena Viter’s, Rostyslav Ibid, p.62 Nygren, p.53 139 A month later, gas volumes for the period of of volumes alsowereagreed.Further, Amonth later, for gas period 2007-2009 the Ukraine: Post-Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with Russia 37 140 from from for price the 2007 of , GMB 141 Two 138 CEU eTD Collection Ukrayinska Pravda, 8 October2007, 142 states duringin NATOsummitin April Bucharest 2008 member topic inNATOwasthe membership Ukraine’s between of heateddebates Furthermore, the newPutin: that gas of price $179.5 for Ukraine will theremain same inthe year2008. http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-280400.html 146 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7034849.stm 143 Gazprom 90 cubiccut of meters gas supplies toUkraine, but transitdeliveries of 300 cubic to meters As RIANovosti on 1 January Russian newsagency beginning the reported of January 2009, at paid $1.5billion, howeverparties could not reach an agreement price the over for 2009. Gazprom refused to sign a Ukraine. Ukraine’sfornew Moreover, consumeddebt gasby timethe hadreached$2.4billion and contract before the repayment. by double was refused to again this newgasprice and proposed the in of 2009. Gazprom the eve gasprice flames overthe between reachedanew anddisputes The debts UkraineandRussia. peak unpaid debts. $1.3billion Ukraine becauseof cut gas Gazprom supplies to Yuliathreatened to Tymoshenko, http://uk.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUKLU15776220081230?sp=true 147 2008, 3 April Times, 145 http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-235920.html 144 when Yanukovych’s PRU voteslost 130,000 and 11parliamentary seats 2007, in September elections parliamentary Ukrainian after immediately However, minister. prime and cease between president the not struggle did At political sametime,eased. the somewhat were anddebts price Yanukovych gas Minister,tensions over was Prime Yuschenko. WhileViktor continuedof ‘de with presidency the Revolution changeable intensity facto’ Viktor during Orange the of in aftermath started early that andRussia Ukraine between The gasdisputes 3.3.2. Tetyana Nikolayenko, “YanukovychLoses 300,000 while Tymoshenko Receives 1,5 Additional Million”, “Gazprom Naftogaz signed new long-term cooperation deal”, UNIAN News Agency,November 20 2008, “Ukraine settles Russian gas row”, BBC News Website, 8 October2007, Dmitry Zhdannikov,"Ukraine says repaid gas debt,Russia says not yet".Reuters, 30 December2008, NewYork The Ukraine”, and Georgia on Bush Oppose Allies “NATO Lee Myers, Stephen and Erlanger Stephen “Ukraine,Russia settle gas debt dispute (Update)” UNIAN News Agency,12 February 2008, The Ukrainian-Russian Gas Dispute in2009 GasDispute Ukrainian-Russian 143 This dispute was resolved with the agreement between Presidents Yuschenko and http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html?_r=1 http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2007/10/9/9151.htm (Accessed28 May 2009) (Accessed 29 May 2009) (Accessed 28 May 2009) 38 145 , which so to speak added new oil on the 146 In late December2008Ukraine Inlate 142 . (Accessed 29May 2009) (Accessed 29May 2009) andby replaced he was (Accessed 28May 2009) 147 144 CEU eTD Collection Naftogaz, Alexei Miller and Oleh Dubyna, signed the ten-year agreement on natural gas supplies to not to use intermediary companies. use intermediary to not Ukraine’s feeunchangedyear. thetransit in for also Russiangas keeping Theparties assented this http://en.rian.ru/world/20090101/119302144.html 148 155 (Accessed 29May 2009) http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE5062Q520090107?sp=true 149 marketpricefull 2010. starting from European Ukraine natural that fordiscountpay forprices 2009andEuropean the wouldwith a 20percent gas Tymoshenko’s slightly action swung balancingbarometer Ukrainian the Russia: towards she agreed http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5062Q520090118?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 154 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7834796.stm 153 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7830517.stm 152 http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/4213/ 151 Tymoshenko. and Putin Ministers, Prime Ukrainian and Russian between continued Barroso. Manuel Jose EU in the settlement of the dispute, sending a letter to the President of the European Commission http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/4433/ 150 in Moscow. January andUkraine. Russia accusations between end on1January 2009. This in halt total resulted the gas supplies Ukraine of to mutual and had sincedelivers taken thatUkraine of gas amount by EUviaUkraine the the reduced suppliesto Instructed by Russian currentleft gasfor andMoldova more whichwere without than practically Bulgaria, a week. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,Poland and Bulgaria reported a thedrop of pressure in theirhead pipelines. The worst affected were Slovakia,of Gazprom, Alexeiwere continued. EU the Miller, “Russiafully cuts the gas to Ukraine, ups supplies to Europe”, RIANovosti News Agency, 1January 2009, Ibid. “FACTBOX – 18 countries affected byRussia-Ukraine gas row”,Reuters, 7 January 2009, “Russia and Ukraine aim to sign gas deal on Monday”, Reuters, 18 January 2009, “’Gas to flow’ after Moscow deal”, BBC News Website, 18 January 2009 “EU to attend gas summit in Moscow”, BBC News Website, 15 January 2009, dispute" gas ofUkrainian-Russian settlement in part take to EU asks "Ukraine “Kremlin wants Ukraine to stop diverting Russian gas, reopen transit”, Interfax Ukraina, 7January 2009, 152 151 This summit, however, didnotfind the solution to the crisis and negotiations 148 Russia, Ukraine and the EU held an international gas conference on 17 However, most countries of Eastern Europe such as Hungary,Romania, mostEurope of Eastern countries However, (Accessed 29May 2009) (Accessed 29May 2009) 155 (Accessed 29 May 2009) (Accessed 29 May 2009) Consequently, on 19 January the heads of Gazprom and Gazprom of heads the January 19 on Consequently, (Accessed29 May 29, 2009) 150 President Yuschenko proposed the involvement of the of involvement the proposed Yuschenko President 154 39 In return for discount Tymoshenko agreedto the Inreturn (Accessed 29May 2009) . Interfax Ukraine, 1 January2009, 149 153 This time This CEU eTD Collection http://www.ukranews.com/eng/article/174732.html 156 May 2009) http://euobserver.com/9/27358 158 159 horizon. European the is on crisis energy new that Naftogaz’s financial inability pay gasthe forfor to to Gazprom supplies May itseems likely 2009, namely Ukraine, and Russia between dialogue energy recent most the of light in the up, sum To generally it unsuccessful no was brought winner.and counterbalancing had Russia small gain -20percent on gas supplies discount for 2009,however, EU”. that if Ukraine wants tobe closer to the EU “it saida press inPragueheldon7January conference Jose ManuelBarroso at Commission President EU. for the partners asunreliable andRussia image Ukraine the of created In general, forboth countries the crisis had negative economic consequences and at the same time, it January 2009, whichsolved the crisis. http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE5091KI20090121?sp=true 157 in foreign anewpolicy. shiftUkrainian create consequently and elections, of outcome the influence significantly could crisis this in Ukraine, elections Ukraine of 2009-2019. period for the "Ukraine, RussiaAgree On GasSupplies To Ukraine For 2009-2019", UkrainianNews Agency, 19January 2009, Philippa Runner, “EU-Ukraine relations at risk over gas”, EUobserver.com News Website, EUobserver.com gas”, over atrisk relations “EU-Ukraine Runner, Philippa “Ukraine za gaz ne rasschitat’sya”, Vesti NewsWebsite, Vesti rasschitat’sya”, gaz ne za “Ukraine “A Russiangas riches Europe again”, Reuters, 21 January 2009, 158 Nevertheless, the fact remains that the last Ukraine’s attempt to benefiteconomically to attempt Ukraine’s last the that fact remains the Nevertheless, (Accessed 30May 2009) 156 Finally, gassupplies from RussiaUkraine to restarted on 20 (Accessed 29 May 2009) should not create any problems for gas to come to the 40 http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=287993 159 Considering coming also the presidential (Accessed 29May 2009) 157 Forinstance, European (Accessed 29 (Accessed CEU eTD Collection 160 lessen influenceRussian in region.the Ukraine achieve tries to this goal in the twoways: first, to attempt Ukraine’s of explanation the provides theory first The Nye. and Keohane by formulated interdependence complex and power of balance Waltz’s theories: two the of synthesis the through policy seen balancingthe through between theEUand balancing Russia.This wasexplained foreign its in compromises making constantly in is economy its sustain and sovereignty its keep on it suspiciously. ConsideringScandinavian and states Austria supportUkrainian membership in EU,olderthe member look states the interactionVisegrad Baltic, While EU. the of towards these policy in Ukrainian role important factors, also plays EU the I argue that Ukraine’s onlythe EU. Finally,as the evidence showed theway factor of the division in attitude totowards Ukraine within interdependence with Russia mainly and the EUseen UkraineRussian gasthrough supplies to and economic is third The Russia. on dependence economic Ukraine’s the increased which elites pro-European ThesecondCenter andWest. factoris of theinterests Ukrainian business and political and South and East pro-Russian between identity national Ukrainian divided is regionally first The This hasthesis argued thatseveral whichfactors, influence conundrum in Ukrainian foreign policy. Solchanyk’s “lookingwords watching west, east”. international actors as shown in second chapter, makes Ukrainian foreign policy complex, in Roman economic ties with it.considerimportanthand, most tostrategic continues Russiaasits Ukraine partner, close keeping The difference in distributionclaimed integration to the European and Western structures such as the EU and NATO. On the other of power controversial.between onehand,the On Ukrainehas since become anindependent its leadership state, the EU and Russiain the 1991-2009periods. As I argued,such an isexplanation needed because policy beseems to as the of The mainexplain purpose this wasto thesis foreign Ukraine’s Russiapolicy towards and EU the Solchanyk, p.89 Conclusion 41 160 CEU eTD Collection international actors, such as the United States of of America. such as UnitedStates the actors, international understandingbetter of Ukrainian foreign ifitpolicy inwas important examined other relation to even an for useful and interesting be would it Finally, Russia. and EU the between relations the and with Russia and relations its and policy theforeign Ukraine’s EU.of understanding Moreover, better the to contribute will thesis The it provides a basis for the actors. furtherinternational research as Ukraine and Russia EU, the of between theinteraction the of Westernunderstanding better a proposes CIS theory interdependence complex The organization. this in hegemony Russian counterbalance which CIS, the within alliances of creation the through second and EU, the with cooperation the through 42 CEU eTD Collection Kazantsev, Andrei. “Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region”, Sea Caspian the and Asia inCentral Policy “Russian Andrei. Kazantsev, Karatnycky,Adrian “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate Studies Ukrainian of Institute Canadian Ukraine”, Communist “Post Bohdan. Harasymiw, Oleksandr, Sushko, Marius, Wolczuk, Vahl, Wolczuk, Kataryna, Gromadski, Grzegorz, in Nationalism Economic Transformation. Postcommunist “Explaining Maya. Eichler, movement”, without change and change without Movement “Ukraine. Marta. Dyczok, D’Anieri, Paul.“Understanding Ukrainian Politics”, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 2007 Caiser, Tom. “The Clash of Integration Processes? The Shadow in and Corruption Soviet “Energy Politics Former the Balmaceda, Margarita. Dependency, Effect of the Enlarged EU “Europe’sBahgat, Gawdat. Energy andChallenges Security: International Opportunities”, Bacon, Edwin and Wyman, Matthew. “Contemporary Russia”, Palgrave Macmillan, New Aslund,Andres. “TheKuchma AncienRegime: and Oligarchs”in AndersAslund’s and Abdelal, Rawi. “Nationalism and International Political Economy in Eurasia” in Economy Political International and “Nationalism Rawi. Abdelal, Asia 2006 Washington, International Peace, Democratic Breakthrough in Revolution” Orange the to Press, Toronto,2002 beginningthe of 2006”, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, May 2005 Roman.“Will the Orange Revolution bear fruit? EU-Ukraine inrelations 2005and Globalizing World Pickel’s and in Helleiner’s Russia”, and Ukraine Overseas Publisher Association, Amsterdam, 2000 the EUand Russia. Challenges of Integration and its inon E.Vinokurov’s Neighbours” K.Malfliet, L.Verpoest Eastern 2006”, Routledge Taylor and Francis London and Group, NewYork, 2007 Union. oligarchs’ profits Russia’s andUkraine’smissingpower, energy policy 1995- Affairs 82:5, 2006 2006 York, Peace, Washington D.C., 2006 Michael McFaul’s Michael Cornell University 2005 Press, HelleinerAndreas and Pickel Studies.60,6 , Cornell University Press, 2005 , Routledge, Taylor and Francis August2008 Group, Revolution inOrange, Bibliography edited by Anders Aslund, Carnegie Endowment for Economic NationalisminGlobalizingWorld Revolution in Orange. The Origins of Ukraine’s TheOriginsof Revolution inOrange. 43 Carnegiefor International Endowment , Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 Economic Nationalisma in The CIS, The , Ithaca, Europe- in Eric in CEU eTD Collection Nordberg, Marc. “State andNordberg, Marc.“State Institution Buildingin Ukraine” Niou, Emerson, Ordeshook, Peter and Rose, Motyl,Alexander.“State, Nation and in Elites Ukraine” Independent in Gregory. “The balance of power.K. in Association?” Stability by Integration Secondary EU: the and CIS and “Russia Holger. Moroff, in Landaburu, Keynote speech Eneko. “Europe’s External Energy Relations: presentandfuture Kuzio, “Ukraine: Transition” Taras. AFour-Pronged in Molchanov, Mikhail. “Regional Promises in State Social Identity Construction: The Rhetoric The Construction: Identity Social in State Promises “Regional Mikhail. Molchanov, Lynch, Dov.“Russia’s StrategicEurope”, with Partnership Hong LTD, Professional and Academic Macmillan Power”, of Balance “The Evan. Luard, Kuzio, Taras. Kuzio, w Bialorus Policy”, Foreign in Russia’s Belarus ‘Ally’. “Difficult Wojciech. Kononczuk, York, New Longman, Interdependence”, and “Power Joseph. Nye, and Robert Keohane, international systems”, Cambridge University Cambridge,Press, 1989 Inc, NewYork,1998 ContemporarySoviet Transformation. Ukraine, Integration Vinokurov’s E. and Verpoest L. Malfliet, turin.pdf Energy” hearing Public challenges”, New York, 1998 Transformation. Contemporary Ukraine, Fall 2005 New York, 1998 Transformation. Contemporary Ukraine, permission material used with author’s Italy,the 2007; Conference, September Torino, 12-15 for 6 Prepared Space”, Economic of a Single Spring 2004 Kong, 1992 2007 Polityce Rosji, Center for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2008 2001 “Russian Policy toward Ukraine during Elections”, during Ukraine toward Policy “Russian , European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels, February Brussels, Affairs, Foreign on Committee Parliament European , , Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Molchanov-regional_promise_in_id_cons- “Towards Common European Foreign Policy on EuropeanForeign “Towards Common 44 The CIS, the EU The CIS,theEU and Russia.Challenges of edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, M.E. Kuzio, by Taras edited edited by Taras Kuzio, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, M.E. Kuzio, by Taras edited th Pan-European International Relations International Pan-European edited by edited Sharpe, Kuzio, M.E. Taras The Washington Quarterly in Dynamics of Post-SovietDynamics of Dynamics of Post-Soviet Dynamics of Demokratizatsiya 13,4, Dynamics of Post-Dynamics of , CEU eTD Collection Byong-chul, Lee “Alliance and National Interest”, National Lee“Allianceand Byong-chul, Vahl, Marius. “EU – Russia Relations in EU Neighbourhood Policies” in K. Malfliet, L. Solchanyk, Roman. “Ukraine andRussia.Post-Soviet The Transition”, Rowman and Rosenau, James.“Capabilities inand Control anInterdependentWorld” in “Ukraine,Pavlenko, Rostyslav. Turkmenistan and Russia: of peculiarities in triangle”the Nygren, Bertil. “The Rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s foreign policy towards the CIS “A Russian gas richesagain”, Europe 21 Reuters, January 2009, Availableon Online Sources Energy”, COM Competitive Secure and for Strategy Sustainable, “A Green Paper European Official documents Wilson,Andrew. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, St Edmundsbury Press Ltd, Bury St Weber, Mark and Smith, Michael.“Foreign Policy in Transformed World”, Harlow, Prentice Waltz, Kenneth. “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy”, Security Studies 6, 1996 and Pavlenko’s in Rostyslav Olena Viter’s, conflict” and Olena.manipulation “Gas: Viter, on Verpoest andVerpoest E.Vinokurov’s Littlefield Publishers,2001 Oxford, Inc, Frances (Publishers)Pinter Limited, London,1980 World of Affairs Global Interdependence: EssaysontheTransnationalisation 2006 Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with Russia Olena Viter’s, Rostyslav Pavlenko’s and Mykhaylo Honchar’s countries”, Taylor Routledge Francis and Group, New York, 2007 http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE5091KI20090121?sp=true 2006 Yorkshire,Edmunds, North 2005 Hall, 2002 Russia Honchar’s Mykhaylo Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/05/198_21999.html , GMBPublishingLondon, Ltd, 2006 Ukraine: Post-Revolution Energy Policy and Relations with The CIS, the The CIS, EU andRussia. Challengesof Integration 45 The KoreaTimes , GMBPublishing London, Ltd, , 4June 2008,Available Ukraine: Post- Ukraine: The Studyof , , CEU eTD Collection Runner, Philippa “EU-Ukraine relations at risk over gas”, EUobserver.com News Website, Nikolayenko, Tetyana “Yanukovych Loses 300,000 while Receives Tymoshenko 1,5 “Kremlin wants Ukraine to stop diverting Russian gas, reopen transit”, Interfax Ukraina, 7 “Gazprom Naftogaz signed new long-term cooperation deal”, UNIAN News Agency, 20 “’Gas to flow’ after Moscow deal”, BBC News Website, 18 January 2009, Available on “FACTBOX –18countries by affected Russia-Ukraine gas Reuters, 7Januaryrow”, 2009, Euractiv - “EU to attend gas summitin Moscow”, BBC News Website, 15 January 2009, Available on "Ukraine asks EU to take partin settlementof Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute" “Ukraine, Russia gas settle debtdispute (Update)” UNIAN NewsAgency, 12February 2008, “Ukraine settles Russian gas row”, BBC News Website, 8October 2007, Available on “Ukraine andRussia reach deal”,gas 4January 2006, The European Union On-line – “Russia toEnd Wows Gas JanuaryShortage”, 2, 2006, “Russia fully cuts the gas to Ukraine, ups supplies to Europe”, RIANovosti News Agency, 1 Erlanger, Stephen and Lee Myers, Stephen “NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4575726.stm Available on Available http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2007/10/9/9151.htm Additional Million”, Ukrayinska Pravda, 8October 2007,Available on January 2009, Available on November 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7834796.stm http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKTRE5062Q520090107?sp=true on Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7830517.stm Ukraine, 1January Available2009, on on Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7034849.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4579648.stm January 2009, Available on http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html?_r=1 Ukraine”, The New York Times, 3 April 2008, Available on www.euractiv.com http://euobserver.com/9/27358 http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-235920.html Available on Available www.europe.eu http://en.rian.ru/world/20090101/119302144.html http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/4433/ http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-280400.html 46 http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/4213/ BBC News Website BBC BBC News Website BBC , Available on , Available on . Interfax CEU eTD Collection Zhdannikov, Dmitry "Ukraine says repaid gas debt, Russia says notyet". Reuters, 30 on Available Website, Vesti News zagazne “Ukraine rasschitat’sya”, "Ukraine, Agree Russia On Gas Supplies ToUkraineUkrainian For 2009-2019", News “Russia and aim Ukraine signto deal gas 18Januaryon Monday”, Reuters, 2009, Available http://uk.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUKLU15776220081230?sp=t DecemberAvailable 2008, on http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=287993 http://www.ukranews.com/eng/article/174732.html Agency, 19January 2009, Available on rue 1&virtualBrandChannel=0 http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5062Q520090118?pageNumber= on 47