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7Rslfv &Ryhuhg

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7Rslfv &Ryhuhg &RPSXWHU9LUXV 7RSLFV &RYHUHG ͻͻͻͻͻŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ sŝƌƵƐ DĂůǁĂƌĞ ͲŵĂŝů sŝƌƵƐ ZĂŶƐŽŵǁĂƌĞ sŝƌƵƐ ŶƚŝǀŝƌƵƐ WƌŽŐƌĂŵ ͻ WƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌsŝƌƵƐ &RPSXWHU9LUXV s/Zh^ ƐƚĂŶĚƐ ĨŽƌ sŝƚĂů /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ hŶĚĞƌ ^ĞŝnjĞ͘ sŝƌƵƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůLJ ƚŽ ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĂƚĂ͘ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĐĂŶ ďĂĚůLJ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ Žƌ ŝŶĨĞĐƚ LJŽƵƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ LJŽƵƌ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ ĂůƚĞƌ ŝƚƐ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ͘ŶŐ KŶĐĞ ĂǀŝƌƵƐŝƐŝŶLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͕LJŽƵƌĨŝůĞƐĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƐLJƐƚĞŵŵĂLJŐĞƚĞŵŵĂLJ ĚĂŵĂŐĞĚ͘ ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ǀŝƌƵƐĞƐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ďLJ ĐŚĂŶĐĞ͘ dŚĞŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƌ ŽĨ ĂĂ ǀŝǀŝƌƵƐ͕ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ Ă ǀŝƌƵƐ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ͕ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůLJ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ Ă ǀŝƌƵƐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ŵŽƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ĚĂĚĂŵĂŐĞĚĂƚĂĚĂŵĂŐĞ ĚĂƚĂ Žƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘tƌŝƚŝŶŐĂǀŝƌƵƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƵƐƵĂůůLJƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐŝŐŶŝƐƵĂůůLJƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐĂůůLJƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐŝŐŶ ĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐƐŬŝůůƐ͘ sĞƌLJĨĞǁǀŝƌƵƐĞƐĂƌĞŚĂƌŵůĞƐƐ͘dŚĞLJĚŝƐƉůĂLJŽŶůLJĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞƐƐĂƐƉůĂLJŽŶůLJĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ͘ůLJĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞƐƐĂŐŐĞ͘ƵƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŝƌƵƐĞƐĂƌĞ ǀĞƌLJ ŚĂƌŵĨƵů͘ dŚĞLJ ĚĞƐƚƌŽLJ ĚĂƚĂ Žƌƌ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚŝƌĞ ŚĂƌĚ ĚŝƐŬ͘P sŝƌƵƐĞƐ ĂƚƚĂĐŚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĨŝůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŵŽǀĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŵŵ ĨƌŽŵ ĚŝƐŬ ƚŽ ĚŝƐŬ͘ ^ŽŵĞ ǀŝǀŝƌƵƐĞƐ ĂƚƚĂĐŚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ƚŽ Ă ĨŝůĞ ĂŶĚ ůŝĞ ĚŽƌŵĂŶƚ͘ Ƶƚ ǁŚĞŶ Ă ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŝŶ ĚĂƚĞ Žƌ ĞǀĞŶƚ ŽĐĐƵƌƐ͕ƚŚĞLJŐĞƚƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞƐŽĐĐƵƌƵƌ ĂĐƚŝǀĞ͘ KŶĞ ƐƵĐŚ ŶŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŝƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ &ƌŝĚĂLJ͕ ƚŚĞ ϭϯƚŚϭ sŝƌƵƐ͘ /ƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ĐĂůůĞĚ :ĞƌƵƐĂůĞŵ sŝƌƵƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĨŝƌƐƚƐƚ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚLJhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚ ŽĨ :ĞƌƵƐĂůĞŵ ŝŶ ϭϵϴϳ͘ /ƚ ŐĞƚƐ ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ĞǀĞƌLJ&ƌŝĚĂLJƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƐŽŶƚŚĞϭϯƚŚŽĨĂŵŽŶƚŚ͘ƌƐŽŶƚŚĞϭϯƚŚŽĨĂŵŽŶƚŚ͘ 7<3(62)9,586(6 &ŝůĞ/ŶĨĞĐƚŽƌ͗ dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚŵŽƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚLJƉĞ ŽĨ ǀŝƌƵƐ͘ /ƚ ĂĚĚƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĐŽĚĞ ƚŽƚŚĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌƉƌŽŐƌĂƉƌŽŐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐ ĐŽĚĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĨŝůĞƐ͘ ^Ž͕ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ PMP ,73/$1(7 3(7$%<7( ŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ŝƐ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĞĚ͕ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĨŝůĞƐ ĂůƐŽ ŐĞƚ ŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ͘ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĐĂŶ ĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞ ĚĂŵĂŐĞ ƚŽ ĨŝůĞƐ ďLJ ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůLJ ĚĞƐƚƌŽLJŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ͘ ŽŽƚ^ĞĐƚŽƌsŝƌƵƐ͗ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĂƚƚĂĐŚĞƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐŬ͘ dŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐŬ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƐƚĂƌƚͲƵƉ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝůĞͲĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĂďůĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŬĞƉƚ͘ dŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ŝƐ ƌĞĂĚ ĂŶĚ ůŽĂĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵŽƌLJ ĞǀĞƌLJ ƚŝŵĞƚŚĞĚŝƐŬŝƐƚĞĚ͘ǀŝĚĞŶƚůLJ͕ƚŚŝƐǀŝƌƵƐŝƐĂůƐŽǀĞƌLJĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ͘ džĞĐƵƚĂďůĞ&ŝůĞsŝƌƵƐ͗ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ƐƚŽƌĞƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĂďůĞ ĨŝůĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨĞĐƚƐ ŽƚŚĞƌĨŝůĞƐĞĂĐŚ ƚŝŵĞƚŚĞĨŝůĞŝƐƌƵŶŽƌĞdžĞĐƵƚĞĚ͘ DĂĐƌŽsŝƌƵƐ͗ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŝŶĨĞĐƚƐ ĨŝůĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ Žƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ ŵĂĐƌŽƐ͘ dŚĞƐĞ ŵŝŶŝͲƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ŵĂŬĞ ŝƚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚĞ ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞLJ ĂƌĞ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ϱ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞďLJ ƐĂǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞƌ ĨƌŽŵ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĐĂƌƌLJ ƚŚĞŵ ŽƵƚ ŽŶĞͲďLJͲŽŶĞ͘ (;$03/(62)9,586(6 tŽƌŵ͗ tŽƌŵŝƐ Ă ŚĂƌŵůĞƐƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŝŵƉůLJ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ͘ Ƶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐ ƌƵŶ͕ ŝƚ ƚĂŬĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ƐLJƐƚĞŵ͕ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůLJ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ͘ tŽƌŵƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚLJ ƚŽ ƚƌĂǀĞů ĨƌŽŵ ƐLJƐƚĞŵ ƚŽƐLJƐƚĞŵǀĞƌLJĞĂƐŝůLJ͘ dƌŽũĂŶ ,ŽƌƐĞ͗ dƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞ͕ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ 'ƌĞĞŬ ŵLJƚŚŽůŽŐLJ͕ ǁĂƐ Ă ŚƵŐĞ ŚŽůůŽǁ ǁŽŽĚĞŶ ŚŽƌƐĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ďLJ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĞŬƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝĚ Ă ƐĞůĞĐƚ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ŝŶƐŝĚĞ͘ dŚĞLJ ƵƐĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŚŽƌƐĞ ƚŽ ŐĂŝŶ ĨƌŝĞŶĚůLJĞŶƚƌĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŽdƌŽLJĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞdƌŽũĂŶtĂƌ͘ /Ŷ ĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ dƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĐŽŵĞƐ ĂƐ Ă ĨƌŝĞŶĚůLJ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ;ĂƐ Ă ŐĂŵĞ͕ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĞƚĐ͘Ϳ͖ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ŝƚ ŝƐ ǀĞƌLJ ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ĂƐ ŝƚ ĚĞƐƚƌŽLJƐ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ĚĂƚĂ ŽŶ LJŽƵƌ ƐLJƐƚĞŵ͘ dƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞƐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ďƵƚ ƚŚĞLJ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ǀĞƌLJ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ͘ dŚĞ dƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ǁĂLJƐ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨŵĂŝů͘ŝŽŶ ZŽŽƚŬŝƚ͗ ZŽŽƚŬŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝĚĞƐ ŝŶĂ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĂůůŽǁƐ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ƌĞŵŽƚĞ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ĨƵůů ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŶƚƌŽů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘ĐŽŵĐŽ KŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ZŽŽƚŬŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶƐƚĂůůĞĚ͕ ƚŚĞ ZŽŽƚŬŝƚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŽƌĐĂŶĞdžĞĐƵƚĞƉƌŽŐƌƌ ĐĂŶ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ͕ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐ͕ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƐƐĨŝůĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƌĞŵŽƚĞĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘ĞƐƐĨŝůĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƌĞŵŽƚĞĐŽŵĞƐƐĨŝůĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƌĞŵ ^ǁĞĞƉĞƌ͗ ^ǁĞĞƉĞƌ ŝƐ Ă ĨĂŬĞ ĂŶƚŝǀŝƌƵƐ͕ǀŝƌƵƐ͕ƌƵƐ͕ ĂůƐŽ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ ƌŽŐƵĞ͘͘ /ƚ ŝƐ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ǁĂLJ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ůŽŽŬƐ ůŝŬĞŝŬĞ ĂŶ ĂŶƚŝǀŝƌƵƐ ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞƐŽĨƚǁĂƌ ďƵƚ͕ďƵ ŝŶ ƌĞĂůŝƚLJ͕ ŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ǀŝƌƵƐ͘ WĞŽƉůĞ ĚŽǁŶůŽĂĚĚ ŝƚ ƵŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůLJ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐǁĞĞƉĞƌƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ĞŶƚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐLJƐƚĞŵĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƐLJƐƚĞŵĨŝůĞƐ͕ďƌŽǁƐŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚLJ͕ĞƚĐ͘ŝůĞƐ͕ďƌŽǁƐŝŶŐŝůĞƐ͕ďƌŽǁƐ ^ůĞĞƉĞƌ͗ dŚĞƐůĞĞƉĞƌĞƌǀŝƌƵƐŝƐŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƐƚĞĂůLJŽƵƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǀŝƌƵƐŝƐŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƐƚĞĂůLJŽƵƌƐŝƐŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƐƚĞĂůLJŽƵƌ ͘ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐƌƵƐ ŝƐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĚ ƚŽ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƚĂƌŐĞƚƚĂƌŐ ůĂƌŐĞ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ŽŶůLJ͘ dŚŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŚĂƐ ŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚŵŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĂƌ͘ƚĞĚŵŝůůŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĂ ůĂďĂŵĂ͗ ůĂďĂŵĂĂďĂŵĂĂďĂŵ ŝƐĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǀŝƌƵƐǁŝƐĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǀŝƌƵƐǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĨĞĐƚƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǀŝƌƵƐǁ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĂďůĞ;͘ĞdžĞͿĨŝůĞƐ͘dŚĞǀŝƌƵƐŝƐ ůŽĂĚĞĚĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵŽƌLJ ďLJďLJ ĞdžĞĐƵƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŵƉƵƚĞƌŵƉƵƚĞƌ ƌƵŶƚŝŵĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ͕Ž ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ Žƌ ŽǀĞƌůĂLJ ĨŝůĞƐ͘ dŚĞ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐŝƉƵůĂƚĞƐŝƉƵůĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ &ŝůĞ ůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ dĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ƐǁĂƉƐ ĨŝůĞŶĂŵĞƐ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŝůĞƐ ŐĞƚůŽƐƚƐůŽǁůLJ͘ǁůLJ͘PMP >ŽŐŝĐŽŵď͗ůŽŐŝĐ ďŽŵď ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ͕ Žƌ ƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ůŝĞƐ ĚŽƌŵĂŶƚ ƵŶƚŝůĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉŝĞĐĞŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĂŵůŽŐŝĐŝƐĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂLJ͕ĂůŽŐŝĐďŽŵď ŝƐ ǀĞƌLJ ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐ ƚŽ Ă ƌĞĂůͲǁŽƌůĚ ůĂŶĚ ŵŝŶĞ͘ dŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŽƌ ĨŽƌ Ă ůŽŐŝĐ ďŽŵď ŝƐ Ă ĚĂƚĞ͘ dŚĞ ůŽŐŝĐ ďŽŵď ĐŚĞĐŬƐ ƚŚĞ ƐLJƐƚĞŵ ĚĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ƵŶƚŝů Ă ƉƌĞͲƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĚ ĚĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŝŵĞ ŝƐ ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ͘ ƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽŝŶƚ͕ƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐďŽŵďĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĞdžĞĐƵƚĞƐŝƚƐĐŽĚĞ͘ ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐsŝƌƵƐ͗ ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞŵĂŝů ǁŽƌŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƉƌĞĂĚƐ ǀŝĂ ĞŵĂŝů ĂƐ Ă ƐŵĂůů͕ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĂďůĞ ĨŝůĞ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ǀĂƌŝĞƚLJ ŽĨ ŶĂŵĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĞdžƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ͘ dŚĞ ǁŽƌŵ ŝƐ ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂƚĞĚ ďLJ ĐŽƉLJŝŶŐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŽŶƚŽ ůŽĐĂů ĂŶĚ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚ ĚƌŝǀĞƐ͕ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ 30 38%/,6+(56 /7' 397 ĞŵĂŝůŝŶŐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĂŶLJ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ͘ /ƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďƌĞĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ Ŭ ĂŶĚ ĨŝůĞƐ ƐƚŽƌĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ͘ /ŶĨĞĐƚĞĚĞŵĂŝů ϲ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ĂƌƌŝǀĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ͞DĞƌƌLJ ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ͊͟ ĂŶĚ ďŽĚLJ ͞,ĂƉƉLJ ,ŽůŝĚĂLJƐ͊͘͟ dŚĞ ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂŵĞ ͞ƉŽƐƚĐĂƌĚ͟ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ďLJ ĂŶ ĞdžĞĐƵƚĂďůĞĞdžƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ͘ ĚǁĂƌĞ͗ĚǁĂƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŝƐƉůĂLJƐ ĂŶ ƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚ ĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ Ă ďĂŶŶĞƌ͕ ƉŽƉͲƵƉ ǁŝŶĚŽǁ ŽŶ ǁĞď ƉĂŐĞƐ͕ ĞŵĂŝů ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ͕ Žƌ ŽŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͘/ĨLJŽƵĐůŝĐŬŽŶƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝƚǁŝůůƚĂŬĞ LJŽƵƚŽĂǀŝƌƵƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƐŝƚĞ͕ĂŶĚǀŝƌƵƐǁŝůůŝŶƐƚĂůůŽŶLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘ ^ƉLJǁĂƌĞ͗ ƐƉLJǁĂƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ Žƌ ŵŽďŝůĞ ĚĞǀŝĐĞ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞƌ͛Ɛ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞĐƌĞƚůLJ ĐŽůůĞĐƚƐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞƐ Žƌ ƐĞŶĚƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƐŽƵƌĐĞǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞƵƐĞƌŝƐŽŶůŝŶĞ͘ 6285&(62)9,586(6 sŝƌƵƐĞƐĂƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚŽŶLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝŶŵĂŶLJĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂLJƐ͗ ͲD/>͗ ͲŵĂŝů ǀŝƌƵƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƐƉƌĞĂĚ ďLJ ĨŝůĞƐ ĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚ ƚŽ ĞͲŵĂŝů ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ͘ zŽƵ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ŐĞƚ ĂŶ ĞͲ ŵĂŝů ǀŝƌƵƐ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ ŽŶůLJ ƚĞdžƚ͘ tŚĞŶ LJŽƵ ŽƉĞŶ ĂŶ ĞͲŵĂŝů ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ Ă ǀŝƌƵƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ǀŝƌƵƐ ƐƉƌĞĂĚƐ ƚŽ LJŽƵƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘ /Ĩ LJŽƵ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞ͕ƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƐǁŝůůĂůƐŽŐĞƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞLJŽƉĞŶƚƉĞŶ ŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ͘ /EdZEdKtE>K͗ dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ůŽƚ ŽĨ ƐƚƵĨĨ ƚŽ ĚŽǁŶůŽĂĚůŽĂĚĨƌŽŵ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ͘ Ƶƚ ŝĨ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƵĨĨ͕LJŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽǁŶůŽĂĚ͕ŝƐŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚďLJǀŝƌƵƐ͕ƚŚĞŶƌƵƐ͕ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǀŝƌƵƌƵƐ͕ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǀƚŚĞǀŝƌƵƐĐŽŵĞƐƚŽLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ƐLJƐƚĞŵ͘ EŽǁ ǀŝƌƵƐ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨĞĐƚƐ ŽƚŚĞƌŚĞƌĨŝůĞƐŽŶLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉĞƌĨŝůĞƐŽŶLJŽƵƌ ĨŝůĞƐŽŶLJŽƵƌĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͘dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐŝĨLJŽƵƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝƐŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚďLJǀŝƌƵƐƚŚĞŶǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌĨŝůĞLJŽƵƐŚĂƌĞǁŝƚŚĞLJŽƵƐŚĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐĐŽƵĞLJŽƵƐŚĂƌĞǁŝƚŚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞǀŝƌƵƐ͘ /^dZ/hd/KE K& ^K&dtZ͗ /Ĩ LJŽƵƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƉƵƚĞƌƵƚĞƌŝƐǀŝƌƵƐͲŝŶĨĞĐ ŝƐ ǀŝƌƵƐͲŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ LJŽƵLJŽ ĐŽƉLJ Ă ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ŽŶ Ă Žƌ ƉĞŶĚƌŝǀĞ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ͕Ğ͕ ƚŚĞ ǀŝƌƵƐ ŽĨ LJŽƵƌ ĐŽŵƉĐŽŵĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƵƚĞƌ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĂůƐŽ ŐĞƚ ĐŽƉŝĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ Žƌ ƉĞŶĚƌŝǀĞ͘ dŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ͕ ǁŚŽŽ ŝŶƐƚĂůůƐ ƚŚŝƐŚŝƐ ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ŽŶP ŚŝƐŚŝŚŝƐ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ͕ ƵŶŬŶŽǁŝŶŐůLJ ŐĞƚƐ ŚŝƐĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚďLJƚŚĞǀŝƌƵƐ͘ 0DOZDUH DĂůǁĂƌĞ ;ƐŚŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐŝĐŝŽƵƐ ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞͿ ŝƐ Ă ƚĞƌŵ ƵƐĞĚƵƐ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ǀŝƌƵƐĞƐ͕ ǁŽƌŵƐ͕ ƚƌŽũĂŶ ŚŽƌƐĞƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƌŽŽƚŬŝƚƐ͘/ƚ ŝƐ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĐƚƐ ǁǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ Ă ƵƐĞƌ͛Ɛ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůLJ ĂůƚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͘ ^ŽŵĞ^Žŵ ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƌƐŽƌǀŝƌƵƐ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ǁƌŝƚĞ ŵĂůǁĂƌĞ 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