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Democratic Revolutionaries Or Pocketbook Protestors? the Comparative Salience of Personal Rule and Famine in the Nigerien Uprisings of 2009-2010

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Democratic Revolutionaries Or Pocketbook Protestors? the Comparative Salience of Personal Rule and Famine in the Nigerien Uprisings of 2009-2010 Democratic Revolutionaries or Pocketbook Protestors? The Comparative Salience of Personal Rule and Famine in the Nigerien Uprisings of 2009-2010 Lisa Mueller1 Ph.D Candidate UCLA Department of Political Science [email protected] DRAFT: 28 November 2011 Abstract Are supposed “pro-democracy” protests really about democracy? This paper compares the salience of political and economic grievances in Niger, a country that recently experienced mass demonstrations amidst a famine and President Mamadou Tandja’s attempt to defy the constitution and seek a third term in office. Using original survey data from a random sample of Niamey residents, I find that having low prospects of upward mobility is associated with a higher likelihood of protest participation, whereas opposition to Tandja’s anti-constitutional politics is not. Hence, the Nigerien uprisings of 2009-2010 seem to have been driven mainly by economic, rather than political, grievances. Membership in civic organizations is also associated with higher protest participation, confirming earlier findings. I explore the mechanism behind this relationship and show that group membership facilitates protesting via mobilization and not framing effects. 1 Many thanks to my colleagues at the LASDEL research institute in Niger for their generous assistance collecting surveys and hosting me during my fieldwork. Thanks also to my assistants Thierno Mamadou Sow and Susana Figueroa. Although the 2011 protests in North Africa and the Middle East had varied outcomes, most pundits and scholars agree that the citizens who took to the streets in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere in the Arab world wanted democracy. Dissent against authoritarian governments was overt and dramatic: a young Tunisian merchant set himself ablaze in front of a government building to protest mistreatment from municipal authorities (Howard et al. 2011, 2); for over two weeks, tens of thousands of Egyptians occupied Tahir Square in Cairo demanding a regime change (BBC News 2011). Despite autocrats’ demonstrated willingness to repress the opposition, high protest turnout and the long duration of the Arab Spring signaled a “democratic fervor” (Sly 2011) that seemingly arose from mounting frustration with longstanding restrictions on civil liberties and political participation. These events mirrored earlier waves of democratization, such as the one that swept Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Over that decade, nineteen African countries instituted multiparty politics and held their first competitive elections in the wake of mass demonstrations led by labor unions and student organizations. Although many of Africa’s new democracies remained weak and eventually reverted to authoritarianism (Kapstein and Converse 2008), research suggests that constraints on heads of state have tightened for good (Posner and Young 2007). Staffan I. Lindberg further asserts that elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, even if not perfectly free and fair, have promoted democratic behavior among rulers and “democratic culture” among citizens (Lindberg 2006, xii). This might explain why Africans seem ready to defend their hard-won democracies against abuses of executive power. Leaders seeking extra-constitutional means of 2 extending their terms in office often face public outrage and coup attempts, as did Guinea’s Dadis Camara and Niger’s Mamadou Tandja in recent years. But the question remains: How much do attitudes toward democracy really drive protests in transitional regimes? Emerging democracies with high protest participation rates tend to have other characteristics—such as bad economies and young populations— that could also account for uprisings. Could it be that some or most of the people who join pro-democracy movements see a political opening to pursue material gains? Answering this question is important, because if “democratic fervor” is weaker than it appears, then optimism for democratic consolidation may be misplaced. There are several reasons why researchers have yet to answer the above questions. First, the study of democratic transitions has traditionally occurred at a macro- institutional level (e.g. North and Weingast 1989; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) rather than an individual-behavioral level. Second, studies on why some people protest and others do not tend to focus either exclusively on economic grievances (eg. Golstone and McAdam 2002; Shapiro 2002) or on political grievances in countries that are already democratic (e.g. Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Morris 1981; Walgrave and Manssens 2000); this precludes researchers from comparing the salience of economic and regime-related grievances, making it difficult to explain protest behavior in the developing world. Third, few studies about attitudinal variables also consider structural variables—i.e. the ability of would-be protestors to overcome collective action dilemmas. Finally, surveys conducted during protests often overlook the possibility that different citizens might be protesting (or not protesting) for different reasons. 3 The present study attempts to overcome these problems by analyzing original data from Niger, an unstable democracy that recently underwent simultaneous economic and political upheaval. It addresses why some people protest and others do not, while paying attention to the specific grievances that drive protest participation. The main finding is that economic grievances, namely low prospects of upward mobility, had a more significant influence on Nigeriens’ decisions to protest than dissatisfaction with Mamadou Tandja’s efforts to circumvent presidential term limits. This finding, along with evidence that many Nigeriens actually supported the extension of Tandja’s tenure, contradicts international perceptions of the protests as a public cry for democracy. It also casts doubt on interpretations of other supposed pro-democracy movements, namely those that unfold in contexts where autocracy and poverty coincide. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the first section provides background on Niger’s famine, constitutional crisis, and subsequent protests; the second section reviews protest theories and outlines hypotheses; the third section describes data and methods; the fourth section summarizes main results and robustness tests; a final section concludes with policy implications and suggestions for further research. FAMINE, TAZARTCHÉ, AND PROTEST IN NIGER Niger, a landlocked and semiarid country whose neighbors include Nigeria, Libya, and Chad, is one of the least developed countries in the world. Although it has seen slight improvements in its Human Development Index (a composite measure of various dimensions of living standards), it consistently ranks far below the global average and even the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1). Life expectancy is 53 years; less than 4 a third of the population is literate; and two-thirds of the population lives below the international poverty line of US$1.25 per day (UNICEF 2011). Figure 1: Human Development Index 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 Niger 0.3 World Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2 0.1 0 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: United Nations Development Program 2011 One of Niger’s most profound and urgent development problems is food insecurity. Even in relatively bountiful years, food producers struggle with low rainfall and volatile markets. Niger has experienced successive famines as a result of droughts and locust invasions, including one that reached its height in 2005 and continues to the present day (Economist 2005; Tsai 2010). Supplies are often imported over long distances from coastal ports and more fertile regions, making the little food that is available extremely expensive for the average citizen. USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network estimates that over seven million Nigeriens are at risk for moderate to extreme food insecurity (USAID, cited in Tsai 2010). Meanwhile, international food aid 5 has been unable to compensate for the government’s mismanagement of the crisis, a fact that Niger’s leaders have tried unsuccessfully to conceal. While he was still in office, President Mamadou Tandja forbade public debate on the famine and accused journalists who covered the topic of being anti-patriotic (Nossiter 2010). He refused to distribute grain stored in state warehouses, vehemently denying the population’s urgent need for relief (Nossiter 2010). Despite his failure to alleviate the country’s food shortage, Tandja announced in 2008 that he would seek a third term in office “to satisfy the popular will” and to continue his development program (Baudais and Chauzal 2011, 298). To that end, he tried in 2009 to hold a referendum on revising the constitution’s two-term limit. This attempt, known as tazartché (or “continuity” in Hausa), prompted lawmakers and judges to invoke Article 49 of the constitution, which prohibits referenda on constitutional amendments. Tandja nevertheless dissolved the National Assembly and began ruling by decree, effectively dismantling the democratic institutions established at the National Conference of 1990. He eventually held and won a referendum to change the constitution, flouting condemnation from opposition members and the international community. The ruling MNSD party also swept local and parliamentary elections amidst an opposition boycott. During this period, thousands of anti-government protestors took the streets of the capital and labor unions declared a 48-hour nationwide strike. The government dispersed crowds with tear gas (BBC News
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