公募論文 VIII

Nishida’s Nothingness and Nagarjuna’s Emptiness: Descriptions and Comparisons MEGILL Ian Christopher

イーエン・メギール （新潟青陵大学准教授）

Section 1: Nishida’s Nothingness Nishida’s“Basho” essay, first published in 1926 in the journal Tetsugaku （１） Kenkyu, has often been described as a clear turning point in the maturation and independent exposition of Nishida’s philosophy. Although he had already acquired philosophical status and popularity with his first book Zen （２） no Kenkyu, the essay “Basho” is often considered to be the place where he finally, at the age of 57, commenced in earnest to present and develop his ideas in a truly original fashion. In this essay, he integrates and refines European philosophical ideas（especially of the Neo-Kantian school）and introduces in a fundamental way the concept of Absolute Nothingness, or zettai mu. Although Nishida had sometimes entertained the idea of （３） Nothingness before, it is in the “Basho” essay that this Nothingness assumes its full role as the Ground of Existence, the final “place” or topos （basho） where Being itself arises. （４） After the “Basho” essay was published, the title of a review of it by Kiichiro Soda（1881-1927）, although not uncritical of Nishida’s ideas, referred to “Nishida Philosophy.” This was the first instance, in the history of Japanese philosophy, of a Japanese thinker having presented a philosophical paradigm so fundamentally original that it warranted public recognition by being connected with his name. As the English-speaking world has not yet had access to the original （５） article, a variety of presentations have been given of the Basho concept in books attempting to explain Nishida’s ideas in English. Some of these presentations focus on building bridges to analogous concepts already in the （６） Western philosophical tradition, while others principally offer elucidations （７） of Nishida’s own ideas, grounded in his original texts. The present article follows the latter approach, and proposes a visual paradigm to assist in the comprehension of Nishida’s concept of Zettai Mu no Basho, as set out in his seminal essay.

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Logical Foundations of Nothingness: a Concentric Circle Paradigm Nishida starts from the proposition of subsumption,（housetsu-teki handan, e.g. “This book is red”）with a grammatical subject（“book”）and a grammatical predicate（“red”）. The copula（“is”）indicates the inclusion of the subject（“this book”）within the predicate（“red”）. We can therefore visualize two concentric circles, the outer one of the grammatical predicate （“red”）containing the inner one of the grammatical subject（“book”）. However, it is not impossible for this outer circle（“red”）to itself become the subject of another logical proposition of inclusion（e.g. “Red is a colour”）, and thereby to itself be surrounded by an even larger circle （“colour”）. On the other hand, the inner circle（“book”）could also become the predicate of another proposition（e.g. “This novel is a book”）, and thereby include a yet smaller circle inside itself as well（“this novel”）. We can therefore see in our mind’s eye a whole series of concentric circles, going from the most specific subject at the center, outward to the most general predicate. We will see that this most general predicate will even contain all of Consciousness itself. On the other hand, the most specific subject will correspond to the Aristotelian hypokeimenon, the underlying substrate that gives an object its constant identity, even though its accidental characteristics may undergo （８） significant changes. Aristotle also points out that this substrate may only function as the grammatical subject of any proposition about it. Illustrating this idea with the circle imagery above, we can easily see how no smaller circles can be drawn inside it, because it has been reduced to a simple point. The hypokeimenon therefore cannot be the predicate of a further subsumption: we cannot say that anything else is “this,” only this is what it is.

The Outermost Circle Going outward in the opposite direction, when we reach the outer circle, no further circles may be drawn around it; i.e. nothing else may be predicated of this outermost circle. Strictly speaking, similar to the way the innermost circle was reduced to a dimensionless point, this outermost circle cannot actually be considered a circle, because it could have no outer surface（as there could be no area surrounding it）, and so it must actually be conceived as an unreachable（in practice, indescribable and even

― 202 ― 公募論文 X unthinkable）mathematical limit-circle. Why should we be unable to conceive of any qualities for this outermost circle? Because, as Nishida stipulates, “everything that exists, does so （９） with respect to something else”（with respect to a background field or basho）. Using the circle paradigm, we can “say what something is” when we know “what circle to put it in”（logically speaking, when we can predicate something of it）. However, this outermost limit-circle has no further outer circle, and we therefore cannot say “where”（i.e. what）it is. Furthermore, unlike the dimensionless-point hypokeimenon at the center, we also cannot even maintain that this outermost limit-circle even exists, as Nishida has defined the conditions for existence above. The innermost point exists with respect to at least one predicated background basho（at least one circle surrounding it）: this is the necessary condition for its existence, as defined above. However, if there can be no further basho for the outermost limit-circle, how can we say that it “exists” in the same way as the other circles in the paradigm? Nishida has therefore found a logical basis for the creation of the world ex nihilo: the outermost circle, the basho of all that exists, itself cannot be said to exist in the same sense as everything it contains. We therefore here have a description, founded on simple logical principles, of（as Nishida （10） maintains, “Eastern”）Absolute Nothingness, that allows for the appearance within itself of both relative nothingness and relative being.

Comparisons of Inner and Outer Circles In order to gain a better idea of the implications of this logical vision of Absolute Nothingness, we can investigate the modes of existence of the innermost “circle”（actually a point）and the outermost “circle”（actually a limit）, implied by this hierarchy of subsumptions. First, carefully considering this paradigm of concentric circles as given above, for any two given circles in the series, the inner circle is ― the grammatical subject of the subsumption which contains both it and its surrounding circle, as described above, ― the object of attention, i.e. the outer circles “look at it” and define it by predicating things about it（in this way, all the circles look inward as it were, which illustrates once again why the outermost circle cannot be “seen,” because there can be no larger circle outside it）, and

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― usually considered to be more “objective”: we associate to it what are commonly thought to be more “subjective” predicates（“colour,” “perceptibility,” etc.）.

The outer circle, on the other hand, is ― the grammatical predicate of the subsumption involving it, ― the place（basho）from where the inner circle is seen, as its object of attention. In this sense, the outer circle is the perceiving subject, and therefore a kind of nothingness, which is the standpoint of Consciousness: Consciousness becomes “nothing” so it can perceive “something,” i.e. the （11） object of its attention. Furthermore, in this way, the outer circle is usually also considered to be ― more “subjective” than the “objective” inner circle. In the common- sense view, we all see the “same object,” but we each see it in our own different ways（i.e. we attach various predicates to it）, which makes these predications more “subjective” than the object they are predicated of: although we may disagree about our predications, we all agree that there clearly is an object under discussion. However, it is important to realize that although Nishida recognizes the use of the words “subjectivity” and “objectivity” in this way in common practice, this concentric circle paradigm does not allow for such a clear-cut distinction between these two. As a moment’s thought will reveal, any circle in the paradigm（except the outermost one）can be the object of attention of the circle outside it, and hence be “objective”; equally, any circle（except the innermost one）could also be the perceiver of a circle inside it, and hence “subjective.” Finally, as both the outermost and innermost circles are actually mathematical limits and not really circles as such, we could consider them as either relatively existent or relatively non-existent, i.e. as either objective or subjective. For the above reasons, we could call the whole system of circles either objective（“It’s all Concrete Reality”）or subjective（“It’s all Consciousness”） or both. In this way, Nishida stands firmly in the Hegelian tradition of the identity of the Ideal and the Real, i.e. of subjectivity and objectivity. This non-dualism between Consciousness and Reality allows Nishida to use such surprising terms as Concrete（i.e. objectively existing）Universals（gutai-teki ippansha）. Ordinarily, we might consider concrete objects（e.g. books）and

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universals predicated by a perceiving consciousness（e.g. colour）to exist in two unconnected realms, but for Nishida, as we see above, there can be no such clear-cut division between them.

Reality as the Activity of Concrete Universals And so it is that such Concrete Universals give rise to the phenomenal world of our ordinary experience, through a process of “self-limiting”（jiko gentei）. The above concentric-circle paradigm shows that any one circle （which is both conscious, and possesses concrete, objective Reality）can give rise within itself to smaller circles. These smaller circles are then able to do the same, and so on, until the dimensionless points（the hypokeimena of the “things” we perceive）are reached, after which no further “self-limiting” is possible. Taking the above process in reverse order, it becomes obvious that there can also be drawn new circles outside any given circle, with subsumptions defining it in terms of other predicates. For example, “red” can become a circle in the larger circle of “colour,” “colour” itself can be defined in terms of “perceptibles,” and so on outwards in this process of further definition. As we reach the outer boundaries of this paradigm, however, we find that the third-last circle is what we would usually refer to as all Existence, （12） or all objective realities in the Universe. The second-last circle will be that of Pure Consciousness, which perceives （13） this Existence. It may be worth remembering here that, in relation to the Universe（i.e. all Existence）which it perceives, this basho of Consciousness （14） is a relative nothingness. So, as there is no longer the possibility of any further perception outside of the circle of Consciousness, what further circle could we draw outside it? What is it that could thereby provide the basho for the existence of Consciousness itself?

The Basho of Absolute Nothingness The answer given by Nishida to the above question is: the “basho of Absolute Nothingness”（zettai mu）. Here, we at last reach the final limit- circle of Nothingness, which does not even possess the relative existence of the next-to-last circle（the basho of Consciousness, which is still inside ― exists relative to ― the final limit-circle of this Absolute Nothingness）. As

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mentioned above, for this final limit-circle to possess any kind of relative existence, there would have to be another perceiving circle outside it, but we have here exhausted that possibility, by placing all of Consciousness inside it. And so, although this final limit-circle is necessarily the same as every other circle in the paradigm in both its absolutely Concrete and Conscious realities, it can possess no relative existence. We can say that it is, but we cannot say what it is: it completely transcends all thought and expression because we not only cannot predicate anything of it, we also cannot even claim that it exists as the other circles do. However, because we have been moving outward in the circle-paradigm to arrive at it, there are a few things we can say which will gesture at it. One helpful idea is to remember that when each circle perceives a circle inside itself, for that moment of perception, the outer circle is the perceiving Subject（subjective nothingness）and the inner circle, the perceived Object （objective existence）. We can therefore say that the outermost circle can only ever be Subject（it could never become an Object, of the perception of a yet greater Subject）, and therefore Absolute Nothingness also has to be Absolute Subject. Also, if we remember the logical process used to move outwards from circle to circle, we will recall that the inner circle of a subsumption is （15） the grammatical subject of this subsumption, and the outer circle is its grammatical predicate. The outermost limit-circle, therefore, can never be the grammatical subject of any logical subsumption（as there is no further circle to act as the predicate of such a subsumption）. Hence, this outermost limit-circle of Absolute Nothingness can also only ever be Pure Predicate, i.e. we can never attempt to define it, because we can never say “Absolute Nothingness is...” In the basho of Absolute Nothingness, Nishida has therefore discovered the complement to the Aristotelian hypokeimenon: Aristotle had focused on the dimensionless point of the “grammatical subject（of the subsumption） which could never be a predicate.” As we have seen above, Nishida’s outermost limit-circle of Absolute Nothingness is its complement, i.e. the （16） “predicate which can never be a grammatical subject.” We therefore here witness the great value of complementing the （17） traditional position of “Western” philosophy with “Eastern” thought: whereas the “Western” tradition had often focused on individual things,

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“Eastern” tradition always emphasized the existence of such things within some context. Far from existing as independent entities, cut off from their surroundings, there is always a very closely-knit mutual relationship between whatever exists and the context which surrounds it, the basho in which it appears. We also witness Nishida here attaining one of his stated personal goals: the expression, in modern philosophical terms, of that which lies at “the （18） foundation, for thousands of years, of the Eastern culture of our ancestors.”

Section 2: Nagarjunian Emptiness We now turn our attention to the second concept of this essay, the Buddhist concept of Emptiness, specifically as presented, defended and developed by Nagarjuna（ca. 150―250）in his commentary on the Mahayana （19） Wisdom Sutras called the Mulamadhyamaka-Karika. These Karika also exist in a Chinese version called the ZhongLun（Japanese: Churon）, but their contents do not exactly correspond, as the ZhongLun contains extra material interpolated by an anonymous commentator now known only to （20） us “Blue Eyes”（Chinese: QingMu）.（The Sanskrit Karika were extensively （21） commentated in India.） Because the concept of Mahayana-Buddhist Emptiness is more widely understood than Nishida’s ideas about Nothingness, this second section will simply offer a summary description of Nagarjuna’s philosophical approach to Emptiness, as the central theme of his Mulamadhyamaka-Karika. Each of the many chapters of the Karika deals with a specific element of the Buddha’s teaching（e.g. Karma, the Four Noble Truths, Nirvana, and so on）. Finally, however, it demonstrates how they are all pervaded by this one main concept, Emptiness.

Logical Foundations For Nagarjuna, the logical underpinnings of the concept of Emptiness lie further back than the Mahayana Wisdom Sutras, in a central teaching given by the original Buddha, Gautama Shakyamuni himself: the fact of Dependent Arising, or pratitya-samutpada. In its simplest form, this teaching can be expressed as “when this arises, that arises; when this ceases, （22） that ceases”, i.e. that everything arises and disappears based on causes and conditions. This simple original formula, expressing the general principle

― 197 ― XV of universal causality, was also expanded into a developed form in the early Buddhist Abhidhamma tradition, which described in careful detail the specific arising of birth, suffering and death, based on a twelvefold cycle of （23） causally-related elements. However, although Nagarjuna devotes an entire chapter of his Karika to this detailed chain of twelve causes and effects, he is not as interested in these individual elements as he is in the more fundamental, general principle of causality: that everything in Reality simply arises dependently on causes and conditions. This general principle of Dependent Arising is what then allows Nagarjuna to propose the concept central to his whole Karika, that of Emptiness. If we take a moment to think about the fact that nothing arises independently on its own ― and that therefore nothing possesses an existence separate from its causes ― then we can see how nothing can exist in an independent, separate way.

Concrete and Abstract Objects A book, for example, is simply the product of a written text, the paper it is printed on, and the materials used to bind it. In a sense, we can even say that the book is nothing but the text, paper and binding, and if we try to identify a “book” outside of these individual components, there will be nothing left to be found as the basis for our designation. The word “book” therefore simply refers to a specific configuration of text, paper and binding, and if we try to point to something outside of these three as the meaning of （24） the word “book,” there is nothing left for us to refer to. In the above sense, then, we could even say that there is no “book” in front of us: there is only the text, paper and binding. The word “book” therefore refers to a certain Reality-configuration, one of a series of many configurations in time. There is no separate “book” which exists as an entity independent from this process in time. As we have seen above, it does not even exist in this very moment, independent from its present components of text, paper and binding. Abstract things（such as ideas or values）can also be understood as not existing independently. We can see that concepts do not exist in isolation, but rather only in dependence upon many other concepts and referents: in order to comprehend（or even think of）a concept, we must also have opposites and component concepts, referent-instances of this concept, and so

― 196 ― 公募論文 XVI on. And so in order to refer to the fact that everything exists in the dependent way described above, Nagarjuna makes use of the Mahayana expression “Empty”: everything in Reality is Empty of an independent, permanent Self. Put less technically, Emptiness underlines the fact that nothing is “simply what it is,” independent of its causes and conditions. We can never say that a book is “just a book,” independent from its text, paper and binding; similarly, we can never insist that the concept of the Good exists independently from the concept of Evil. In this sense, therefore, we can say that both a book and the concept of the Good are Empty of any independent self-nature.

The Soteriology of Emptiness On the face of it, it may seem that Nagarjuna is here simply replacing the concept of Dependent Arising as taught by the Buddha, with his own label of “Emptiness of Self-Nature.” However, this shift, from an understanding of Dependent Arising to a vision of Emptiness, has a powerful soteriological purpose: when we truly understand that not only do things arise in dependence upon their causes and conditions, but that they do not even exist as the independent entities we usually think of them as, this further assists us in not clinging to them and not giving rise to further desire-based actions. The fact is that we usually see the objects of our attention in a kind of reified, permanent way, and this incites us to react to these things based on aversion or desire. A deep vision of the Emptiness of the objects of our desires can therefore be of great value in not perpetuating our karmic cycle（i.e. desire-based actions leading to suffering later on）. Thanks to Nagarjuna, we can learn to see that not only does each object of our desires arise dependently, in a certain sense it doesn’t even arise at all; it is just a conglomeration of causes and conditions, with no independent existence of its own. The stated purpose of the Buddhist teachings, from Shakyamuni to the present day, has always been to alleviate the suffering of sentient beings, and we see that Nagarjuna also stands firmly in this tradition, with his presentation of Emptiness. Nothing exists independently, so there is nothing to grasp, no reason to give rise to desire-based action, and future

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repercussions（i.e. suffering）may therefore be avoided.

The Emptiness of Emptiness As a final observation in this section, we may note that the concept of Emptiness has the logical character of an uroboros, a snake eating its own tail. Nagarjuna’s presentation of the Emptiness of all things is based on the fundamental Buddhist tenet of Dependent Arising, but a moment’s thought will reveal that Dependent Arising itself will then have to be Empty, i.e. if no independent things arise because all is Empty, where is the place for Dependent Arising? （25） Finally, even the concept of Emptiness is itself Empty as well. As a concept, it has no independent existence of its own, because it only exists with reference to the existence of Empty “things,” and as the logical opposite （and soteriological antidote）to our illusions of the permanent, independent existence that we perceive in these things. Through careful analysis of a wide spectrum of elements comprising both the teachings of Buddhism and our everyday Reality, Nagarjuna therefore demonstrates in his Mulamadhyamaka-Karika that all the things （both concrete and abstract）in our lives are Empty, in the sense of being devoid of any self-established, independent existence. They can therefore only be truly understood as momentary configurations of an all-encompassing, seamless and continuous flow of Reality.

Section 3: Nothingness and Emptiness: Similar Words,Different Paradigms We now arrive at the question of comparing and contrasting the two concepts described in the two previous sections, Nishida’s Nothingness and Nagarjuna’s Emptiness. In trying to do so, the first problem we immediately encounter is one of incommensurability: the two concepts derive from very different logical foundations, and although both purport to be descriptions of Reality, they are developed and presented as keystones within the contexts of completely different paradigms.

Logical Origins of the Two Concepts As for their logical foundations, we have seen that Nishida derives his concept of Nothingness from the logical principle of subsumption（“This book is red”）. Nagarjuna, on the other hand, finds his logical foundations

― 194 ― 公募論文 XVIII for the concept of Emptiness in the Buddhist tenet of Dependent Arising（“All things arise based on causes and conditions”）. Hence, Nishida’s Nothingness is firmly rooted in the Western philosophical tradition（and depends especially for its elaboration on a Hegelian correspondence of the Ideal and the Real）, with Nagarjuna’s Emptiness instead clearly finding its footing in the traditional teachings of Buddhism.

Soteriological Implications We also saw above that Nagarjuna, firmly rooted in the Buddhist tradition, purposely intends his presentation of Emptiness to have clear soteriological value: such a vision can be instrumental in leading directly to less grasping and desire-based action, because a clear understanding of the concept of Emptiness can strike at the root of our fundamental assumptions about what there is to grasp at, and therefore our motivations to do so. On the other hand, at this point in the development of his thought, Nishida does not yet illustrate the immediate practical applications of his presentation of Absolute Nothingness. In later works, Nishida will proceed to draw out the connections that an understanding of Nothingness can （26） have to soteriological concerns as well, but in this initial presentation, Nothingness is simply shown to lie at the logical foundations of all Reality, including our Consciousness and everything perceived by Consciousness. Of course, it is not impossible to think that Nishida may here be attempting to give philosophical footing to his Zen experience ― he （27） reportedly passed the koan Mu in 1903 ― by logically demonstrating the necessity of the existence of a basho of Absolute Nothingness underlying the basho of Pure Consciousness. This is in accord with the teaching of Zen, which does not deny the Yogacara notion of a fundamental Storehouse （28） Consciousness or Alaya-consciousness, but insists that the meditator proceed one step further, into the Absolute Nothingness beyond even this （29） Pure Consciousness. It may also be argued that such an experience of Nothingness ― perhaps in a satori-breakthrough accompanying prolonged Zen meditation practice ― could have great soteriological value indeed, and this is of course undoubtedly true. However, at this stage in the development of his thought, Nishida’s principal intention in his initial presentation of Absolute Nothingness seems to be an overtly philosophical one, i.e. to demonstrate the

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viability in the “Western” philosophical tradition of the “Eastern” concept of （30） Absolute Nothingness.

Nothingness as“First Cause” vs. All-Pervading Emptiness As we have seen above, Nothingness lies at the basis of all Reality, at the outer limit of a series of subsumptions, visualized as a series of concentric circles. In this sense, it can also be said to “give rise to” all the Reality we （31） experience, as the fundamental context-basho for everything that exists. We can see that Emptiness, on the other hand, is the way of existing of each of the circles in this paradigm. Nagarjuna would insist that Emptiness is simply a quality which inheres in all of them, from “this”（the Aristotelian hypokeimenon）, through “book,” “red” and “colour,” all the way to the outer limits: Reality, Consciousness and finally Nothingness itself. If Nagarjuna were to use such a concentric circle paradigm, he could claim that each of the circles, except the outer limit of Nothingness, has been defined as requiring a basho（an outer circle）to define and perceive it. This very definition means that each circle does not exist independently, and that it is therefore Empty of any independent self-nature. Finally, the last limit-circle of Absolute Nothingness may exist（or rather may be logically postulated）as the fundamental Ground from which everything else arises including Consciousness, but Nagarjuna could still argue that even such Nothingness itself would have to be defined in contrast to the Things which arise within it（at least as not being them）, and that it must therefore, in the last analysis, be Empty of an independent self-nature as well. Nishida might still maintain, however, that by the very fact that Absolute Nothingness does not Arise but rather acts as the ontic Ground for all such arisings, it is exempt from the otherwise universal tenet of Dependent Arising. The very fact that it is Absolute Nothingness would seem （32） to allow it to escape the application of such a tenet to it.

“Subjective” Nothingness vs.“Objective” Emptiness We saw in the presentation of the circle paradigm that except for the innermost point（the hypokeimenon）, each of the circles can give rise to and perceive other circles inside themselves. Hence by “looking inward,” they can have the quality of subjective perceivers, and when“perceived

― 192 ― 公募論文 XX from the outside,” they have the quality of objective perceptions. However, the outermost limit-circle of Nothingness, which is never perceived by a further circle outside it, logically must absolutely subjective: it can perceive all the other circles inside itself, but it can never itself be the object of the perception of another circle outside it. Furthermore, as Nothingness provides the Ground-basho for Consciousness itself, we saw how Consciousness is not able to grasp it: another reason why it could never be an object of perception. Emptiness, on the other hand, applies to both subject and object in every case: one can immediately see that the terms “subject” and “object” themselves are mutually complementary, as one cannot be logically defined without the other. It may also be interesting to note here that the initial teaching of Buddhism deconstructed the “subjective perceiver” into five （33） objective components, thereby providing the philosophical underpinnings for the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of non-Self. Buddhism, at least in its initial presentation by Gautama Sakyamuni, would therefore seem to be at odds with the possibility of a Absolute Subject which could never be an Object, such as we have seen in the context of the （34） logical presentation of Nishida’s Absolute Nothingness. This seems to underline the clear opposition between the traditional Buddhist tendency （35） toward reductio ad objectum, vs. streams in modern Western philosophy （36） tending toward reductio ad subjectum.

Complementary Paradigms From the above discussion, we therefore see that Nishida’s “Nothingness” and Nagarjuna’s “Emptiness,” in spite of their seeming similarity at the verbal level, acquire completely different meanings within the contexts of their fundamentally divergent worldviews. They both occupy central positions within their own respective paradigms, but these paradigms themselves involve completely different, complementary ontological approaches toward understanding just what we call “Reality.” With his logical presentation of Absolute Nothingness, Nishida provides an ontological ground-basho for all our perceptions and experiences, and a thought-provoking, fertile ground for potential philosophical and even soteriological applications and developments, as we witness even in the post- “Basho” writings of Nishida himself. His sense of satisfaction, expressed in the preface to his essay, was therefore not unjustifiable: his concept of a

― 191 ― XXI basho of Absolute Nothingness was indeed an original concept woven into the fabric of the Western philosophical tradition, a valuable addition and complement to everything that had gone before. Nagarjuna’s Emptiness, on the other hand, with its universal applicability outside the bounds of Buddhist philosophy per se, is a clear expression of a fundamental epistemological truth. It therefore retains its universal soteriological power to limit our desire-filled grasping and consuming, thereby helping us live more in harmony with each other, as well as more lightly on our fragile earth.

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version with modernized characters, see: Nishida, Kitaro（Shizuteru Ueda, ed.）. Nishida Kitaro Tetsugaku Ronshu I. Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko （1987）, pp. 67―151 Saigusa, Mitsuyoshi. Churon（The Discourse on the Middle Way）. Tokyo: Regulus Library, Vol. 158（1984）. Sartre, Jean-Paul. L’Etre et le Néant: Essai d’Ontologie Phénoménologique. Paris: Editions Gallimard（1943）. Takakusu, Junjiro. The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii,（1947）.

注 （１） See, inter alia, Koyama, Iwao. Nishida Tetsugaku（“Nishida Philosophy”）. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten（1937）, p. 3 ff. Koyama only chooses to deal in his book with Nishida’s philosophy starting from the time around the publication of the “Basho” essay. （２） The most recent translation of Zen no Kenkyu can be found in Abe, Masao and Christopher Ives（trans.）, An Inquiry Into the Good, New Haven: Yale University Press（1990）. （３） See, inter alia, Nishida, Kitaro. Nishida Kitaro Zenshu（hereafter indicated in footnotes as Zenshu）. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten（1965）, Vol. III, p. 156. （４） “Nishida Tetsugaku no Hoho ni tsuite”（“On the Method Used in Nishida Philosophy”）, originally published in the 127th issue of Tetsugaku Kenkyu in 1926, and now available in Fujita, Masakatsu（ed.）. Nishida Tetsugaku Senshu （“Selected Writings on Nishida Philosophy”）. Kyoto: Toeisha（1998）, pp. 44‒ 65. （５） It is disappointing to note that, in spite of its pivotal importance in the development of Nishida’s thought and its contribution to Japanese philosophy in general, the “Basho” essay still remains unpublished in English, more than 80 years after its initial publication. （６） For example, Carter, Robert E. The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro. St. Paul MN: Paragon House （2nd ed. 1998）. （７） For example, Dilworth, David A. Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press（1987）. （８） For example, although one may change the tires on one’s car, or even replace the engine and various other parts and give it a new coat of paint, we still think of it as “the same car.”

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（９） Zenshu, Vol. IV, p. 225. （10） Zenshu, Vol. IV, p.6 （11） It may be instructive to note the contrast in this regard between Nishida’s understanding here of the “negating” function of consciousness, and that of Jean-Paul Sartre, seventeen years later, in his L’Etre et le Néant: Essai d’Ontologie Phénoménologique. Paris: Éditions Gallimard（1943）: Sartre conceives of consciousness as “negating” things in order to imagine “how they were” or “how they might be” instead of just perceiving（or “affirming”） them （with the senses） “as they are.” This understanding of consciousness stresses its functions of thought and imagination（le néant）, as dualistically opposed to the world of the senses（l’être）.  Nishida, however, does not start from this dualistic stance of consciousness vs. the world, but rather integrates conscious functioning and the concrete world into one holistic system. Thus, the “negating” activity of consciousness （including both what Sartre considers above as “sense perception,” as well as the perception, by thought and imagination, of abstract ideas or alternative possibilities）is actually a “self-negating” as it were, a “becoming nothing” in order to be able to perceive the “something”（the object of its attention）which becomes just such a something in contrast to the relative nothingness of this conscious functioning.  It should be noted, however, that this perceiving itself may also become the object of attention of the next moment of consciousness, and then in becoming such an object, be invested with existence, relative to this new moment of consciousness, which then becomes a relative nothingness perceiving the previous perception. Hence, consciousness and its functions are not absolutely nothing（néant）, but rather in each moment of perceiving, there is the relative nothingness of the perceiving consciousness and the relative existence of the perceived object（which may often be a previous functioning of consciousness itself）.  Although such a comparison between the positions of these two thinkers on the “nothingness” of Consciousness could obviously warrant a whole article on the topic, suffice it to note for our present purposes that although the “nothingness” terminology may seem similar, there exist important differences between their views of the “negating” activity of Consciousness; the most important being that Sartre’s Consciousness is absolute and negates things, whereas Nishida’s Consciousness is relative and negates itself in the perceiving of things. （12） This includes not only concrete objects, of course, but also abstract ideas, i.e.

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anything that could be perceived by Consciousness. （13） Similar in nature to Kant’s Bewusstsein ueberhaupt, independent of any particular perceiver. （14） In the same way as every perceiving circle becomes a “subjective nothing” in order to perceive the “objective something” within it, as described above. （15） It is of course confusing to have the same English word “subject” for the grammatical “subject” of a logical proposition, as well as the perceiving “subject” of a moment of perception. Fortunately, in Japanese, this confusion is avoided by using two different words for them（shugo and shukan, respectively）. However, in English one is often forced to specify either the “grammatical” or the “perceiving,” in order to avoid mixing up these two “opposite directions” on the circle paradigm. （16） Incidentally, the concentric circle paradigm also illustrates Aristotle’s claim to the Absolute Existence of the hypokeimenon: we see that it can never act as the relative nothingness of Consciousness, perceiving the relative existence of something inside itself; it can have no relative nonexistence, and therefore must exist absolutely. （17） Quotation marks around “Eastern” and “Western” are here used advisedly, in recognition of their obviously stereotypical meanings. For a fuller discussion of this kind of “East vs. West” stereotyping（found, unfortunately, even in the thought of Nishida himself）, see Dilworth, David A. op. cit., pp. 127-149. （18） Zenshu, Vol. IV, p. 6. （19） In Sanskrit, prajna-paramita sutra, lit: “perfection of wisdom scriptures” （20） A comprehensive study of the differences between the Chinese ZhongLun and the Sanskrit Mulamadhyamaka-Karika can be found in Saigusa, Mitsuyoshi. Churon. Tokyo: Regulus Library（158）, 1984. Translations into English of the Chinese and Sanskrit versions can be found in Bocking, Brian. Nagarjuna in China. Lampeter: Edwin Mellen（1995）, and Kalupahana, David. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: SUNY（1986）. （21） One of the most famous of these commentaries still extant is the Prasannapada by Chandrakirti. The original Sanskrit text of the Karika, lost in its original version, was actually reconstructed from this text, as Chandrakirti helpfully quotes Nagarjuna’s original verses in full, before appending his commentaries to them. （22） See the Pali Tipitaka, Majjhima-Nikaya, Maha-tanha-sankhaya-Sutta （PTS ref. i,262-3） For an excellent translation of this Nikaya, see Nanamoli and Bodhi. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom Publications（1995）（p.355ff.）.

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（23） The twelve individual elements of this causal chain are, in order: Ignorance, Karmic Activity, Consciousness, Name-and-Form, Six Sense Bases, Contact, Feeling, Craving, Clinging, Becoming, Birth, and finally Old-Age-and-Death. See, for example, the clear presentations of this cycle in Nanamoli and Bodhi, op.cit. （24） For a powerfully convincing presentation of this important Buddhist principle, see Hopkins, Jeffrey. Emptiness Yoga. Ithaca: Snow Lion（1987）. （25） For a more extended discussion of this, see Huntington, C.W., Jr. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika. Honolulu: U. of Hawaii（1994）. （26） Most notably in his last major essay, Nothingness and the Religious Worldview,（see Zenshu, Vol. XI ）, where the religious implications of his philosophical ideas finally become the focus of his attention. See Dilworth, David A, op.cit. （27） See Zenshu, Vol. XIX, p.675 （28） Indeed, one cannot help noticing the striking similarities between the concept of the Alaya, or “Storehouse,” Consciousness in Yogacara Consciousness-Only Buddhism, and Nishida’s idea of a basho of Pure Consciousness which could give rise to all of objective Reality within itself. （29） See, inter alia, Takakusu, Junjiro. The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii（1947）. （30） As mentioned above, in a preface later written for the book containing the previously-published Basho essay, Nishida expresses his satisfaction at having been able to assign a place in the Western philosophical tradition to “the foundation, for thousands of years, of the Eastern culture of our ancestors.” （31） Nishida will proceed in later works to more carefully elucidate the process of just how Absolute Nothingness gives rise to Reality: as mentioned above in Section 1, this happens through a process of “self-limiting”（jiko gentei）, as the more metaphysical “outer circles” give rise to more concrete “inner circles”― down to the various phenomena of our everyday lives ― by “drawing smaller circles within themselves.” Absolute Nothingness（being the “largest circle” in the paradigm）is therefore understood as giving rise, through this process of jiko gentei, to all perceptible Reality within itself, and could therefore be considered as both the Ground and “First Cause” of all Consciousness and Existence. See Nishida’s. The Self-Aware Limiting of Nothingness, Zenshu, Vol. 6. （32） Indeed, the oldest strata of the Buddhist scriptures are peppered with tantalizing references to nibbana（nirvana）not being subject to the Law of

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Dependent Arising. See, inter alia, the Nibbana Sutta, in the Udana of the Khuddaka-Nikaya in the Pali canon, which begins: “There is, monks, that base where there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of nothingness, nor dimension of neither perception nor non- perception; neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither passing away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without any support（mental object）. Just this is the end of suffering”（emphasis added）.  Although Nagarjuna does his best, in Chapter 25 of the Mulamadhyamaka- karika, to apply his concept of Emptiness to Nirvana anyway, one can see problems here, because Nirvana is unequivocally declared by the Buddha himself to be the one exception to the Law of Dependent Arising, on which Nagarjuna’s whole treatise hangs. It may therefore also be that a similar exception would allow Nishida’s Absolute Nothingness to escape criticism from Nagarjuna’s standpoint of Universal Emptiness. （33） Forms, feelings, perceptions, karmic factors and consciousnesses （34） There is of course insufficient space here for an extended discussion of later, seemingly more “subjective” developments in Buddhist philosophy（perhaps influenced by dialogue in India with the philosophical-experiential traditions of Yoga）, such as the later appearance of such schools as the “Consciousness- Only”（Skt. Yogacara, Jap. Yuishiki）school, which later influenced the Zen school, both independently and via the Huayan school（see Takakusu, Junjiro. op.cit.）. It would seem on the face of it that such developments tended to turn the focus of Buddhism from its initial “deconstructive”（analytic, objectifying） approach toward a “synthetic”（unifying, even subjectifying） one, by reifying Consciousness into the（only） metaphysical Absolute（viz. such powerful statements as the Huayan（Avatamsaka）Sutra’s "This Triple World is only One Mind,” san jie wei yi xin）.  Nevertheless, when such developments are interpreted in the light of the fundamentally-unchanged Buddhist doctrine of Non-Self, it becomes clear that the concept of Consciousness or Mind as Absolute Reality must still correspond more to a Kantian Bewusstsein ueberhaupt than to a Cartesian Res cogitans. Consciousness is still “objectified,” in accordance with the initial Buddhist approach, although it may be expanded into a universal metaphysical Ground. In other words, the Universe is not just my Consciousness, it is not a Cartesian “I” which can “doubt the existence of the world.” It is rather “I” who am “It”: there is once again an objectification of the “self” into something non-

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“subjective,” i.e. a localized manifestation of Universal Consciousness. （35） As just one example, even in the Zen school we have Bodhidharma’s answer to a request for teaching from Huike, its second patriarch in China: “Bring your mind out here in front of me, so I can pacify it!” Clearly one’s “mind”（the most subjective aspect of oneself） cannot be “brought out in front of” anyone （in an objective, physical sense）, and so Bodhidharma is clearly demanding that Huike do something impossible. This may have soteriological value （indeed, it is claimed that their subsequent interaction, based on this demand, led to Huike’s enlightenment）. However, in philosophical terms, Bodhidharma is making a category mistake here: the very subjectivity of a subject is its essential defining attribute. Bodhidharma’s insistence that Huike’s subject be made objective（and thereby lose its defining attribute） and yet simultaneously remain what it is, is an obvious logical impossibility. However, we can clearly see how such a demand would stand firmly within the Buddhist tradition, with its overall tendency toward deconstructing and objectifying the subject. （36） The example which immediately comes to mind is of course Descartes’ doubting of the external, objective world, until he can prove, to his own satisfaction, that it exists, based on a logical proof that he himself exists.

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