Submitted by Itinntpeg, CAI'iada

A PERSPECTIVE ON TT1E UI{ITED T\-ATIONS APPLTCAT]ON OF SA}]CTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA I965-L979

A TI]ESTS Submitted by

GODI^7I}J TYOAIINE ABARI

THE I¡ACLILTY OF GRADUATE STUD]FS IN PARTIÃL FLILFILL}IENT OJI TFIE F.EQLTIREI,IEIITS FOR TI]E DEGTìEE OI' }ß.STER OF AF.TS

DEtrART}4EN{T OF trOLITICAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF I"1ÀNITOBA itINNTPEG, CAI'IADA

OCTOBER 19BO A PTRSPTCTIVE ON THE UNiTED NATIONS

APPLICATIOI! OF SANCTIONS AGAINST

RHODES IA I 965-I 979

GOD|/IIN TYOAPINE ABARi

A thesis subluitted to the Faculty of Gradr¡ate StLrdies of the Uuiversity of lvlanitoba in ¡:artial fì¡lfillment of the requirerr-rents of thc' dcgree of

I'IASTER 0F ARTS

o 1980

Pernrission has been granted to the LIBRARy oF TI-IE UNIVER- SITY O[ì MANITOBA to le nd or sell copics ol this ihesis, to the I''IATIONAL LIIIRAIìY OF CANADA ro nricrofilrn tliis the sis and to lend or selì copics of'the lilm, and UNiVERSITy i\{ICROFtrLMS to publish an abstract ol this ilresis.

The author reserves other prrblication rights, ancl 'either the thcsis'or extensivc extracts lrorn it may bc prirted or other- rvise reilroclLrced withoLrt the aLrthor's rvrittell pernrission. T4? r,E_ _oE _c_Oi'r'l,jj flr s

-ABSTRÀCT f

AC KN OI^] I,E DGE¡1]]}I T iii

P R]JI¡,ACE iv c_UlrPltlE¡ PAG]JS

OIJE .ryllloD_uc'¿':l_q\ I A Shott Polii,jcal IJistory of Rhodesia" I Rhoclesi-a's f nteL:nati-onal Status Bef ore UDf 2 Summary and Conclusion 5 Stateirent of i-he Research Pr obl.em 7 Jusl-ification for 1-l-le'Iì-iree Cases CÌ¡r:r;en t0 filioor-l-ance of- i:he'il-lcsi,s 1I

Peri odi zation IZ l'ietl-iooology l3

'lli'Jo Ti]E 'I}iEOR].ES O}- SA}]CT]ONS r6

Lni-rocluction - . 16 The 'iÌ-leories of Sancti- ons L7 A Rcr¡iew of the Pas-u Airplj ca{:ion of SancLions LL')'l Staccs in í-he ¡-pplicai- ion of Sanctions ¡eainst Rirodesia 25 Riroics.ia's lìr:sponse to l-he UfJ Appl j ca ti on of S¿:¡'rci.,i-ons acai-rrst Fer and Co¡rcl-usi-on ?(

ììREE : POI,I.,IILìAL AìJD D] PI,O}/A,I] C x]iI,zYIIONS I^]IìICH ÌìI]ODJ-ìSIA I''/\]NTÄ ]-NJìD i!ITI'J OT]II'R COLIìì I}ìI}IS A}iD OJìGA}ìI ZÀT ]-ONS 40

- Intr ocluction 40 'liie PoIj tical Philosophv of 1,he I'rÌhite it{inor:i1-y r,1,1 r\L:jI ìr ìrr^rru . . 4L I/hf i-he i'il-iit'-e lfi nori';1r regime fef t i:he Ay:pJ i ca1-ion of S:¡lrc't,ions agai nst Rhodes j a r','as Tll cgitrira'ce 43 ì'iìry i he Lrl-iii c IÍ:iloril-y r cgì ire f clt j t rlr:se rved '.!::j:1' -.: :';'i,-:::f"'",". Ri-' tto ¡ lt.i l-,'i on ..:.. . ,. , .. . 4 6 _ -'- .. '-: ' " !-: -, \ ::.::'::.,'t-. _,t: \, , .1.r, .:j t i,ì it: ,á r;3.. tti/ i:. , :'. -i . - :j /"¡r *r_';ì.:ï: : ,,-¿;r PÄG]]S

Fo::mal and Informaf Pol i ti cal I-i nk ages Phodesia maini-ained r¿ith other Couni-ries and Organizations 50

(1) Official and Unofficial Visits s0 (2) Overseas Infornration Offlces 55 ( 3 ) I'ri en ds of Rhodes i an Soci ei-y 56

tro Regional and I1i litar:y Co-o¡:eration. . . JJ 'Iìre Problens of Rhodesia. o¿a^ A1,ti t-ude of Couni-ries that haC pof itical Relations witn iìhodesia 67 Cor-l c.l-us ion 72

Ì¡ouF. : BCONO}{IC AND SOCIAL RELAI]IONS IIÌJ]CH RIJODESIA }.IAINTA]NED I{ITH OT]J]IR STATPS ÀND ORGAII I ZA ]',I ONS Õz /ri-m of tìre Chapi-er B2

Problenrs of ILhodesi a B5

( 1) tr ro}¡ I em wi th Sou-uh Af ri ca B5

(2) Prob.'l.em ivj-ih l,iozambique B6

(3) Pr,oblem of Guerrilla I'Jarfare OOoo

The Byrd A-nend"ment: A Case Study l-:oz (1) Argu:nents in favour and against the Byrd Änrendment 104 (2) Interests i-hat Supported the Bizrd Àmendnent 106 (3 ) Ef fects of the B)rr:d Ar,rendment on lhil-e RhoCcs,i ans 107 (4) Rcne,.^,'ed Debate on the tsyrd 1tmcnclnent I0B SociaI Rel ations ivl-ricl-r Rhodesia rnai ntai ned rvith o{-her Staì:es and Organi zations . . .11-'1 (I) Aim of t.his Section llI (2) Iin¡:oriance of Sporl-s 1-o iìhodcsia r_13 (3 ) Rhodes.ia' s Attempt to Parti cioat.e i n the 19 6 B and I9l2 Olyrnpì c Game s 116 (4) pitodcsia's Probfelrrs in her al-tcr,r.ot to ¡rarticipa't-e in tÌte O11,1¡tr1" G¿ines .ll.B

Cor-l c -1 rrs i on 122 i) /-Lrc ^

¡.IVE : TIIE ROLE OF THE I'iU],']'INATTO}JAL COI{PATJIES IN RHODESTA L29 Justification for examining the role of the llultinational- Companies in Rhodesia \29 Genera] Comments on t.he l{ultinational Comoanies . 130 The Main Multinational Companies in Rhodesia after UDI L32 Muftinational Companies and Sanction- breaking in PJrodesi a af ter LIDI :137

The Rhodesian Lobby .-I3B Conclusion -t46

CCNCI-Uq ]ON l_50

APPENDICES:

A Proclamation Broadcast of UDI By fan Smith on November 11, 1965. I6I

B UN Resol-utions. 164

C Transport and Communications llap of Southern Africa. 166

D Lists ef some important l.liultinational Companies operating in Southern Africa r67

E Tnterview questions. 168

BTBLTO_cR4!HY 112 ABSTRÀCT

The aim of the study is to identify and determine how, and unCer rçhat circumstances, the White l4inority regime in Rhodesia, on which t-ìre UN imposed sancLions, was able to maintain and establish international contacts with other countries and organizations inspite of these sanctions. ft is the assumption of this study 1-hat international contacts \.vere of great irnportance to Rhodesia for her diplomatic, political, and soci-o-economic survival. Tl-leref ore, the study v¡ill concentrate on the comÐlex processes of horv the UN tried to prevent lù-rodesia from having international- contacts on the one hancL, and how Rhodesia tried in a very subtle manner to avoid international isolation and thus avoid l-he total impacts of t,he UN sanctions on the other hand. The thesis is divided into five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one is an introductory one. It examanes the international s't-atus of Rhodesia before UDI and explains certain words and conce¡:ts used in the study" Chapter tr,uo reviews the general theories of sanctions and. refates them to the Rhodesian situation. Chapters three, four and five are cases chosen to demonstrate n"r" and under what circumstances, the tr^/lrite tlinory regi-me r,vas able to establish and maintain inl-ernational coni-ac1*s inspite of sc-ìnctions. tl

The Conclusion exanines the main argumenls of the Chapters, and explores how each actor, the lfhite I'iinority regir,ie and the U"N. r-.¡as. able to achieve its aims. Specific- ally, the study examines and discusses the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of U.N. policy. ll].

ACKNOWLEDGtrMENT

r would like to extend a special thanks to my Advisor, Professor o;P . st. John, who gave me direction and. encourage-

ment during the various stages of thís thesis; professor A. Lambert, who read the manuscript and gave me useful advice; my wife Esther and daughter Juliet who were my constant source of inspiration and were always present when r needed them. f would also like to express my thanks to al_l those people and organizations who have assisted in gathering data which have been used in this study, particularry, the Efizabeth Dafoe Library, university of Manitoba, winnipeg; university of Ottawa Library; University of London Library; Professor Arno1d smith of the Department of rnternational Affairs, carlton university ottawa; Ambassador chief Lukumburza, Tanzania Hígh commissioner, ottawat Mr. canas K. Ncube, winnipeg; Mrs. Jeba Loxley, chairperson, Manitoba Anti-Apartheid coalition for the Liberation of southe::n Africai and many students from East, centrar and southern Africa for kindly consenting to be interviewed and for providing information which has contrlbuted to a better understanding of this study. My thanks al-so gioes to the authorities of the Murtala college of Arts, science and Technology, Makurdi, Nigeria for the study leave they granted me, which has enabled me to conduct this study. The concrusions reached in this study, however, are entirely my own responsibility. -tv

PREFÄCE

A brief word of explanation is important concerning the words, "Southern Rhodesia" , "Rhodesia" , " ZíntbabvJe" , "UDf" and the period chosen in this study. After the Referendum of 1922, Rhodesia was renamed Southern Rhotfesia. The government of Southern Rhodesia re- assumed. the name Rhodesia early in l_965 (before UDI) "Rhodesia" is the prevalent usuagie. United Nations documents and British Constitutional documents retain the use of "Southern Rhodesia". African nationalists use the term "Zimbabwe" when referring to Rhodesia. On Aprit l-7, t9B0 Rhodesia gained independence tegally from Great Britain under the leadership of Mr. Robert Mugabe, one of the leading Rhodesian nationalists. The name "Zimbabwe" was adopted as the legal name of that country. In this study, the world "Rhodesia" and "southern Rhodesia" are used interchangeabry. Throughout this Study, t.he word "UDI", stands for the I'Unilateral Declaration of Independence. " This event resulted in t-he application of Sanctions against. Rhodesia by Great Bri- tain and the United Nations. "UN" stands for the United Nations. CHÄPTER OIJE; II.JTRODUCTION

The aim of the chapter is to examine Rhodesia I s international status before UDI" This is important to the

stucly because it was t,he inability of Rhodesia to obtain a status in international l-aw that caused successive tlhite Minority regimes in that country progressive frustration which event.ually culminated in UDI on November 1I, 1965 (see Appendix A). In addition, the chapter will examine and discuss, among other things, the statement of the research problem the justification for the three cases chosen, the

importance of the study, periodization of the study, and. the Methodology.

FHODESIAIS INTERNATTONAL STATUS BEFORE UDI

The first ColoniaI government of Rhodesia r¿as provided by Cecil Rhodes' British South African Company und.er .a royal charter granted to it. in IBB9. The British high commissioner for South Africa was charged with the responsibility of over- seeing the rule of the Company, which rvas responsible for the legrislative, executive and judicial functions of the territory. In 1898, a legislative council rvas formed in which the settlers and the company shared the legislat.ive functions. By l-913, the repiL-esentatives of the settl-ers gained a majority in the Council and agitai,ed for company rule. This agitation gave 2 rise to the referendum of Ig22L, which arnong other things , favoured self-governing status by the settlers instead of annexing Rhodesia to South Africa" So in effect from 1923, after Great Britain granLed Rhodesia her first Constitution, the army, the police force, the civil service and the judiciary rvere controlled by the P.hodesian '¡Jhite l4inority governrnent. Unlike other Brit.ish Colonies at Lhe time, responsibility for Southern Rhodesia rvas vested in the Dominion Office rather than the Colonial Office. According to Charl-es Marshal-I, the then Rhodesian Minister of Justice, "the ties between Great Britain and Rhodesia vrere quasi-dipiomatic in character rather than executive"2 with the two exchanging high commissioners. By 1923, Southern Rhodesia was provided with a consitu- tion b1' Great Britain which required the British Secretary of State for the Colonies to veto any legislation by the Southern Rhodesian government rvhich discriminated against the African population. Furthermore, wiLh regard to any law passed by the SouLhern Rhodesian legislature, the British governfiìent, represented by a governor, retained tìre general por+er of dis- allov¡ance within one year of the governor's assent to that law. Although the Rhodesian government ìrad 1egal and potit.ical control of its internal aÍfairs, nevertheless, it was not com- fortable r,vith this situation because Great Britain left R-hodesia in t.¡hat Mlambo aptly describes as "a tivilight position between dependence and inCependence".3 Rhodesia had Iega1 and political control of its internal affairs because of the rather complex relationship between Rhodesia and Great Britain. George Thompson, a former British Labour I'linister of Com¡nonwealth P.elations explained this complex relationship between Great Britain and Rhodesia in this way: Britain has responsibility in Rhodesia without povrer inside Rhodesia. History has made Rhodesia a legal and moral British responsibility, but as history has turned out rve have been denieo the physical power to control events on the ground if there were an o!)en cfash of ivills between Lon- don and Salisbury. Never during this century, neither before L923 nor since, have there been soldiers, policernen or public servants in Phodesia under the control of governm-ent in London. Tirere has never been direct rule in Rhodesia.4 Thus, without the formal application of the Statute of trIest- minster to Rhodesia b1z the British parliament, Great Britain

\.^/as and continued to be legitimate, but not actual- sovereign over Rhodesia- Ttre Rhodesian situation was very frustrating to the I.Ihite Minority governilìent because it ryas denied a status in international law by Great Britain. Under the L923 Constitu- tion, external relat.ions were the exclusive responsibility of Great Britain but vet. the factual situation v,'as more complex- After I933, the Prime lt{inisters of Rhodesia atLended Commonr^¡ealth Conferences at which all the other mernbers tvere prime ministers of Dominions. In the Nationality Act of q I948,- Southern Rhodesia i^¡as tisted along with the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New ZeaÌand, the Union of South Africa

Newfoundland, India, Fakistan and Ceylonr âs having the same status.

This Act gave Southern Rhodesia fuIl pov/ers to make its own lav¡s for conferring Rhodesian citizenship which automatically rnade the person concerned a British subject. Southern Rhodesia v¡as among the original twenty-three countries rvhich on October 30, L947, signed the general

Agreenent on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) .6 Accession to GATT \^/as evidence that southern Rhodesia was a separate customs territorlz, entirely responsible for its external relations. colonies and dependent territories, ,rowever, vJere included in the GATT when their controlling countries acceded to the agreement. This was Rhodesia's international personality until 1961 when a ne\^/ constitution for Rhodesia v¡as promulgated which among other things, comÞtetely eliminated the veto powers v¿hich Great Britain had over R:lodesia in interiial af fairs. In

1962, the General Assembly of the ut.J passed a resolution that southern Rhodesia lacked all the criteria of a self-governing territory and asked Great Britain to interfere with the political- structures of the Rhodesian government and to ensure among other things. the principle of "one man¡ one vote" in that territory.T Great Britain clisagreed with the view of the UN and pointed out that since 1923. Southern Rhodesia had legal and political control of its internal affairs and she did not v¡ant to reverse this position. Great Britain pointed out, however, that the ciuestion of majority rule \,/as'A-separqte issue rvhich the British government was pursuing with vigor. 5

From 1953 - Ì960f Southern Rhodesiats international personality vras merged in the central- African Federation of Rhodesia and l.lyasaland,B ishich started in 1953 but became Iuloribund in L963 as a result of political agitation by African Nationalists againsL its contj-nued existence. Tt is not the aim of thj s study to dig deenly into i-he reasons rvhy this federation collapsed because it does not contribute much to the i-hesis " rn exlernar arfairs, section 20 (2) the 196r constitution giave the legislative Assembly the power to rnake larvs having extra-territorial application. According to pa11ey, this meant that southern Rhodesiars courts coul-d take legal notice of southern Rhodesia's legisfation governing the Acts of southern Fhodesian subjects committed outside southern Rhodesia. Palley adds that rhe power to legislate extra- territorially had not previously been inserted in the consitu- t.ion of any dependent territory.9 This was Rhodesia's international status until November ll, 1965 when UDI v/as declared "

SU}1I{ÀRY The evidence present.ed in t.his chapter suggests that Fhodesiars status before UDI, resenrbled in many respects the status enjoved by the British dominions before the Statute of î{estmir,=t.rl0 r.¡hich granted comolet.e political and legal independence to the domini ons. The power to create their o\{n 6 nal-ionals I memÌrership in international organízations, negotia- tion of international treaties, control of foreign commerce, internal self-government, issuance of passports, maintenance of their armed forces, and a t.otal absence of colonial, civil and military presence are not attributes of non-self-governing territories no matter what the General Assembly of the UN said in L962" The British position vis-a-vis Rhodesia may be described as one which, over the years, involved a gradual devolution of authority vihile re'Laining ultimate responsibility without the power necessary to exercise that responsibility. This twilight position betrveen dependence and independence being neither colony nor dominion was viewed by the l^lhites of Rhodesia as a most unsatisfactory position for 'Lheir country. They had voted to join the federation with the hope that Great Britain would grant them dominion status. When Great Britain announced the dissol-ution of the federation, the European population felt betrayed by the British government, '"'hich they viev.'ed. as capitulating to "irresponsible" African d"*a.,ds. 11 The granting of independence to the "po1itically less mature" territories of }Jorthern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and lJyasaland (now l{a1av¡i) by Great Britain, the intense political pressure put on Great nritain by Lhe uN, t.he Common* iuealth, and. the Organization of African Unity (O.A"U. ) to change or suspend the 1961 Constitution; the uncerLainty surrounding entrustments, and the f eeling that. Fhodesia r,vas morally entitled to independence given the stable, peaceful 7 political millieu which had been maintained since l_923 these rvere some of the reasons used to just,ify Rhodesian independence. Thus¡ ofl liovember 11, 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent of Great

Britain (A,opendix A) "

STATEMEIiT OF TI]E RESEARCH PROBLE}{

With UDI, there were intense international pressì-lres put on Great Britain to act t,o put the rebel-lion down. Even before UDI, Mr. i,{ilson, the then British Prime Minister held many meetings with Mr. Smith to d-issuade him from taking his

illegal r"t.12 on October 25, 1965, Mr. Ivilson advised Mrr. Smit.h that although Lhe British government had rejected the use of force against Rhodesia in case there was UDI, it st,ood by its public staternents, and these meant that in case there was UDI, there would be economic war against Rhodesia: no Rhodesian tobacco rvoul-d be bought by Great Britain or by any other country" The fact that the UN exerted strong pressures in favour of the use of force against Rhodesian maCe it virtually certain l-hat international economic sanctions would be comprehensive and =",r....13 The previous year, the British SecreLary of State for Commonv¿ea1th Relations, Duncan Sandys, warned that "Commonwealth and foreign governments, with one or two exceptions, would almost certainly refuse to recognize Southern Rhodesiats independence or enter into relations with her. Thus isolated, SouLhern Rhodesia would increasingly uo become a target for subversion, trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activiti"s.f4 These vrarnings had no deterrent effects " uDr was proclaimed and the response of Great. Britain and the ul¡, among other things, wäs to comrnence sanctions aEainst Rhodesia. These sacntions, in the words of Prine }4inister Harold Vlilson "woul-d bring down the iVhite llinority regime in a matter of v¡eeks rather than months".f5 Prime l{inister Wilson was con- fident that international sanctions would isolate Rhodesia diplomatically, politically, socia1ly, economically and most important of all, psychologicarry. This total isolation was aimed at putting enough pressures which coul-d cause the disintegration of the politicar system of that country anc bring the lvhite Minority regime from the path of illegality to that of legality rvith complete allegiance to the British crown. Put as chapters two to five will unravel, the i^/hite lfinority regime adopted tactics anC strategies to avoiC total isolation by the internationar community and Great Britain. south Africa, Portugal and the multinational- corporations were most helpful to Rhodesia in its bid to avoid total inLer- national isol ation by Lhe internationar community. Rhodesia attempted to avoid international- isolation in order to render the uN sanctions ap-olied against her ineffect.ive and create a psychological boost for Rhodesian VIhit.es that thìngs vrere fine v¡ith the country because the uN had failed to isolate her internationally. Furthermore, with the attempts to avoid international isolation, the tr{hite Minority regime h_opéd that international sanctions might wither avrav in the face of P,hodesia's resolve and thís rnight be follov.red by diplomatic recognition v¿hich the country badly needed to survive.

The focus of the thesis is t,hen, to identify and determine how and under what circumstances, the t¡lhite Minority regime vras able to establish and rnaintain international contacts inspit.e of the uN sanctions. specificarry, t-he study will examine and discuss the tactics and strat.egies which Rhodesia adopted to establish and maintain diplomatic, political and socio-economic relations with other countries and organizations and the nature of these relations. Furthermore, the study rn'ifl examine and discuss the purpose of trying to rnaintain these relationships and the extent to which the White I{inority regime either succeecled or failed in their main goal of getting recognition of UDI from as many countries and organizations as possibre. The str-idy v¡ilI also examine to what extent sanctions as an instrument of the uN policy ivere successful in the Rhodesian case. But before examining and discussing how FJeodesia tried to avoid international- isolation, it is important to explore the theories of sanctions to place the study in the proper theoretical perspective. Furthermore, the study of the general theories of sanctions will help to explain what is meant by the term rtsanctiors", the rationale behind the use of sanctions, and Lhe intended outcome of 10

sanctions \^¡i11 att serve as a framework for tracing the steps in the application of sanctions against Rhodesia" Finally, an examination of sanctions theories vis-a-vis their practical application in Rhodesia from L965 L979 will throw more light on whether sanctions as an instrument of Ul'l policy is a suitabte option available for the UN in its pursuit of policy goals.

,]USl] I.]IICATION FOR THE THREE CASES CHOSETi

This study examines and discusses three cases to demonstrate how the l{hite Minority regime used tactics and strategies to estabfish and maintain inLernational contacts and thus tried to avoid international sanctions. These cases included diplomatic/political and socio-economic means as well as the activities of the multinational corporations. These three cases have been chosen for the thesrs because they have been fully documented in many sources and \,rere available. This is not, however, to suggest that these cases \rere the only ones v¡h'ich the White Minority regime used in i'i-s bid to try and avoid international i-solaLion and thus render the Ul{ sanctions ineffective. Rhodesia was under the

I-lN pressulres and most of her activities were clandestine and have not yet all been documented. l.loreover, the scope of the thesis is limited and in as much as it rvould be desirable to examine al} types of relations which R.hodesia had v¡ith other counLries and organizations, itiS t1 beyond the scope of this thesis to do son Furthermore. the cases cited are the ones considered to be important to

Rhodesia v¡hen she made desperate efforts to break the uN sanctions and thus survive as a nation.

I},IPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

This thesis is important for a number of reasons: first, it is the most comprehensive study so far undertaken on sanctions l-heories and their practicar application t.o individual cases but with particular reference to R-hodesia. This provides both the l-heoretical and empirical analysis of sancLions which witr contribute to the study of political science. Second, since many count.ries and the UN used sanctions as an instrument of their foreign-policy, the con- cl-usion reached in this thesis rvill herp policy-makers and administrators determine whether sanctions are a suitable opLion as an instrument of policy in the future. I2

PERIODT ZATION

The period l-965-L979 has been chosen in this study because it was on November 11, 1965 that the White Minority regime led by Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Douglas Smith, unilaterally decl-ared independence from Great Britain and this act resulLed in the UN application of Sanctions against Rhodesia. Therefore, it is relevant to begin this study from 1965. This is not, however, suggesting that l-he period which preceded the Ì965 should be fitted inLo a water-tight compart- menL. Obviously, relevant events leading up to UDI are examined to see how they contributed to UDI- The stud.y Lerminates in 1979 and this termination is not arbitrary for it was on December L7, L979 that Great Britain, the Patriotic Front leaders (Joshua' Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) and the then Prime lulinister of Rhodesia, Bishop Abel Muzorewa reached an agreement in principle that efection should be held in Rhodesia under the principle of "One Man, One Vote". EÌectior5lceie held early in April 19B0 and Robert Mugabe won fifty-seven seats out of eighty seaLs allocated to African parties. He was asked by Great Britain to form the government and on Àpril I7, 1980, he became the Prime Minisler of nhodesia and adopted the word "Zimbabrve" for his country. In December 1979, almost all the members of the Ul'I lifted Sanctions against Rhodcsia and many of them accorded diplomatic 13

recognition to the new regime" l_979, is therefore, a relevant date to stop this Study.

}lETHODOLOGY

For gathering the däta for 1_his Study , Lvto techniques of data collection have been used and fitted together. These \.'rere the examination of records and int.erviewing. Examinati-on of records served two purposes: First, the information gathered from it provided some kind of context in preparation for interviewing procedure and., '"e"ond, such information formed part of my primary analysis, In selecting the samples to be intervier.,¡ed in this study, individuals considered to have played a significant role in the phenomenon under study have been featured prominent.ly. As far as i-he interviewing process itsel_f was concerned, it should be stated that in some matters of detail, it was possible that some of the interviews might have contained slight in- accuracies here and there. The fact, hovrever, remains that a genuine attempt was made to conduct them in the best tradition of the method. i^ihere it was Dossible to cross-check materials, this was done. L4

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

The F.eferendum of 1922 was to decide on one option out of r,iany that v/ere avaifable for Rhodesia at the time with regard to her political developnent. The three options were, first, that F.hodesia should be annexed to South Africa as a fifth province,- second., she could also opt for a self-governing status; third, Rhodesia could as i,veIl becom-e a cro\,vn colony of Great Britain. The first option vras unpooular and a referendum held in 1922, gave P.hodesian an option of self-governingr status Charles B. Marshall, Crisis Over Rhodesia: A Skeptical View (Baltimore: The ,¡ 0 . Mlambo, E-, Rhodesia: The Struggle For À Birthright (London: C. H

¿J Great Britain, parliament, parliamentary Debates (Cornmons); Vot. 770 (October 22, 196B), Col-. 1096; hereafter cited as Great Britain Flansard (Commons). Palley Constitutional History and Lav,', p. 73I, notes a dominion in that Lhe convention that United Kinqdon military forces should not be stationed in her territory without the consent of the Southern Rhodesia government had been observed.. In 1948, the British parliament passed the lJationality Act Bifl- into law. This Act defineC the status of the various British colonies.

6- See I(enneth Dam, The GATT: Law and International Econornic Organi zation ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. I09-346. 7. ì4.ì-anù:o, E. Op" Cit" , p. L73. The UN Committee on decolonization also better knov¡n as the Committee of TVenty- Four defined eight criteria for a self-governing t_erritory and Southern Rhodesia lacked. alnost alt of these criteria and on the basis of these, it rejected Southern Rhodesia's claim that it was self-governing. B. The Central Af rican !'ederation which r.¡as made up of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, NyasafanC as partners came into exis{-ence in t953 and became l,Ioribund in 1963. ft was 15 seriously criticized. by the African nationalists in the three territories comprising it as a political gimick, cleverly fashioned out by the Whites to maintain continued hegemony over African population" For details of why it was dissolved, see Mlambo, E. Op. Cit" p. 25L arid also Rhodesia: Vtrhy the_Minoritl¿ Regime SurviJ¡esr' PP. B-11. o Palleyn Claire, Op. Cit", p. 74L. 10. The Statute of l^iestmÍnster was passed by tsritish parliament in 1931. It granted complete political and legal independence to- some British colonies. Il. For European attitudes toward the dissolution of the federation see Sir Roy Hellensky, i"lellensklzts 4000 Days (T,ondon: Collins, 1964) , pp. 34-48" L2. For details of what was discussed at these meetings see Rhodesia: i.lhy the Minoritv regime Survives ( London : Christian Action publication), pp. I2-l-5 " 13 Ibid. I p. 20

L4 Great Britain, Cmmd. 2807 , pp. 1 l3-I4 cited in Strack, R. Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia ( Syracuse : Syracuse Univ. Fress, 1978), p. 10" 15. Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Dent, l-9 69 ) , pp. 320-6 . 16

CHÄPTER TWO

THE THEORY OF SANCTIONS

fntroduction

Sanctions have become one of the most important foreign policy instruments of many countries "great" and "smal1" in the internationaf system. They have been applied against Cuba by the U.S. in L960, the Dominican Repuolic in 1960 and recently against lran in 1980. The Ieague of Nations also applíed sanctions against ftaly in Ì935 because of its invasion of A-byssinnia (now Ethiopia), despite a serious warning by the League of Nations that she shoutd desist from her aggressive intentio.r.l Then came the case of Rhodesia in November 1965, when the internatj-onal community felt that the White Minority's declaration of UDI constituted, "a threat Lo international peace and security.'2 The Security Council with the co-operatj-on of Great Brit-ain imposed sanctions on Rhodesia in 1966. The aim of this chapter is to review l-he theory of sanctions as well as looking at the past application of sanctions against various States and the effects of these sanctions on these States. The stages in l-he application of sanctions against Rhodesia wil-1 be examined together wi th the purposes of sanc- L1 tions against Rhodesia. Examining the purposes of the united Nations sanctions against Rhodesia will be important for an understanding as to whether sanctions against Rhodesia were effective or not. ff Lhey were not effective, their conLinued applicaLion may not be necessary/sensible" As would be expected, Rhodesia's response to t,he U.N. sanctions will also be examined to see how Rhodesia was reac+-jn9 tothese sanctions. Furthermore, âD examination of Rhodesia's response to these sanctions witl help throw more light on why these sanctions \.{ere not as effect,ive as they should have been, and, secondly, the tactics and strategies adopted by the White Minority regime in Rhodesia will be better understood by studying Rhodesia's response to the U.N sanct.ions. The chapter witl end with a surnmary and conclusion.

The Theory of Sanctions

In the context of inl-ernational relations, John Galtung defines Sanctions as "Actions initiated bv one or more o1-hers ("the senderso') with either or more otnat= ("the receivers") with either or both of two purposes to punish the receivers by depriving them of some values and (or Lo make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important. " Roger Fisher notes that the purpose of Sanctions is to exert influence on the "receiver" to make some decisions, LB ''i^/e want to cause them to change their mind.." 4 John Galtung defines negative and positive Sanctions. To him negative sanctions is punishment for devj-ance and positive sanctions as rewards for compliance. He does not attempt to discuss in detail, the ingredients of positive sanctions, rather he concentrates on negatÍve sanctior,=.5 l'largaret P. Doxey and Peter Wallenstein clearly dis- tinguish beLween economic warfare and economic sanctio.r=.6 Wallenstein defines economic warfare as a situation "where military as well as economic measures are used to inflict maximum damage to the economy of other nations. He cites examples of the blockades of the Napoleonic wars and world wars. lVhile l{affenstein focuses on the difference in techniques used, Doxey stresses that the techniques may l¡e similar, but the objectives or ends are different. In economic warfare, the target is perceived as an enemy, and accordingi to Doxey, "the objective is to hasten the enemy's defeat, to reduce or eliminate its capacity to wage war, to undermine morale, and generally to make fife for its citizens as dif ficul-t as possible. I{hen economic measures are used, the objective is to det,er states from pursuing policies rvhich do not conform to accepted norms of international conduct. Doxey views sanctions in a negative manner. The point is that Sanctions as "conformity - defending" 19 instruments of international- legal- enforcement (Doxey) may well have a better chance of being perceived as legitimate by the international community of actors than Sanctions which are used by one State to advance its national interests by compelling another State to do what it desires (Wallenstein) Besides punishment and compliance, Sanctions may serve expressive or symbolic funcLions. This point is reinforced by Galtung who points out t.hat "economic sanctions may serve the purpose of expressing moral disapproval best when they are of a symbolic nature and value of deprivation is kept low. " Moreover, he notes that "l-here are l.ess costly ways of expressions such as declarations, resolutions, demonstrations, or non-recognit.ion. "B The point that economic Sanctions may serve the Purpose of expressing moral disapproval best when they are of a symbolic naLure has been brought out more clearly and compre- hensively by Anna P. Schneiber. After studying U.S. Sanc- tions against Cuba and the Dominican Republic, she concludes that "it is mainly its symbolic function that makes economic deprivation or coercion a tempting policy Lo governments. She points out that regardless of its concrete impacts on the target state, a government may consider economic coercion useful if it serves to declare its position ì-o internal and exLernal policies, or helps to win support at home or o aÞroao - Baldivin examines in some/considerable detail the concept 20

of positive and negative sanctions and their impact on the study of political science. He assumes that there has been a bias towards the study of positive Sanctions in the literature of political science. such bias, he contends, is due to the influence of weber, Lasswell and Kaplan, to a desire to be considered "rearistic" enougrh to look the unpleasant fact of negative sanctions in {-he ey€, to a fascination with viorence, or to something inental in'the whole discipline. He points out that it is desirable to define power broadly to incrude post.ive sanc- tl-ons. l_0 He maintains that neglect of. positive sanctions in

political analysis has consequences for public policy as rvefl- as political theory Today, more than ever before, it is essential to describe the fu]I range of A's points, not just those based on negative sanctions, for today the unwise use of negative sanctions may put an end to all- life, poritical and otherwise. The nuclear age has not brought an end to inffuence attempts; indeed, it appears that Manrs conLinued survival wil-1 reouire more and more social control. rn such a worfd, there will be an increasing need. for imagination rvhen it comes to in- venting positive sanctions. The discipline of potitical science has a duty to make it crear to policy-makers that À can often get B to do x with postive sanctions as wel-r as with negative ones. Professor Arnord smith maintains that 2L both the positive and negative sanctions shoul-d have been used in Rhodesia. The use of negative sanctions isolated Rhodesia from the international community and thus closed all channels of communication between Rhodesia and thç international community, thus pushing her more and more to the wal1 of rebellion.11 This demonstrates the fact that the u¡wise use of negative sanctions will tend to have negative effects on the target state. The international community should learn to use both negative and positive sanctions on a target-state as this is a good way of ensuring that all avenues of communicaLion and persuasion have been exhaustively used on a target staLe.

A Review of Past Application of Sanctions

There is a high degree of concensus as to the abirity of sanctions to induce the target state to compry with the wishes of the senders. The prevailing view is as follows: aside from purery punitive or symbolic considerations, -srnc- tions have not been useful devices i-o j-nduce, persuade, or compel the target state to compry; secondry, sànctions may be dysfunctional by serving to make the target l-ess rather than more compliant; and thirdry, while some of the effects of sanctions may be deprivational, other effects may be beneficial and desirabl-e to the targe state, enhancing its inLernal politj-cal and economic situation in ways not perceived by the 22 Senders. This conclusion is shared by scholars in part or in who1e, not only by scholars like Doxey, Wallenstein, Baldwin, Galtung and Fisher, but by experienced diplomat.s like George W. BalI, A. Smith and Dean Archeson.12 The theory of Sanctions also postulates that within the

target, there is a linkage between economic deprivation and political change Galtung labels this as the "naive" theory of Sanctions whi ch asserts a divert, positive correlation betrçeen value deprivation and political- disentegration.13 T.R.C. (Curtin and David Murray claim that this theory depends on the notion that threatening people's incomes is as effective as threatening their lives and that, in the case of Rhodesia, a decline in real income of the country's inhabitanLs should fead either to the desired political change or substantial- European emigratio.r. 14 The effectiveness of Sanctions, however, is dependent, not only on its economic characteristics of the target population, but also to personalityr culture and social organization as the reaction to the economic att-ack is a function of personality, culture, and social organization. Many members of the British parliament expressed the view Lhat because of the psychological characteristics of l{hit.e Rhodesians, they rvould not easily compry with coercive measure=. 15 Far from pr-ovoking political change or dissension, Sanc- tions may do i-he opposite namely, enhance the solidarity, cohesion, and popr.rlar support of the target state. George 23

Baer after studying sanctions against rtaly in Ì935 and 1936 concrudes that "what was meant to be only instrumental_ economic pressure to elicit internal protest was transformed by the ftalian government into a cause for rapid intensifica- tion of integral economic and political nationarism. "l6 According to Professor Doxey,, "a siege psychosis, once en- gendered, can be a po\^/erfuf factor in sustaining the witt to resist, and it. will also enable the government to take unpopular measures such as rationing consumer goods or increasing Laxes.

Professor Doxey also points out that sancLions can have beneficial effect.s on tarqet if the target is having socio- economic and potiticat problems of maintaining internal coneslon. T7 This point is further butressed by Galtung who points out that "a society, when worked upon by the forces of cohesion, may draw on reservoirs of strength and ability not only to resist stress but also to act creatively gualities that 1ie latent in quieter periods."lB rn case of Rhodesia, one result of Sanctions has been stimulation of an indusl-rial revol-ution in manufacturing and general economic diversification that might have taken decades to achieve naturally. Besides linkage between economic deprivation and political change, the theory of sanctions posturates a second linkage; that bett,'een external trade and economic deprivation. Galtung describes an ideal target for economic Sanctions as a country 21 whose foreign trade represents a sizeable percentage of its gross national product, a foreign trade highry concentrated in one - trading partner, exports concenLrated in one product and Lhe country¡s economy dependent on orre product. such a state should idearly be susceptibre toosan"tio.,=.19

This is a sound theory, however, sanction theorists may underestimate the ability of the target to adapt itself and restructure its nationaf economy to minimize the damage and, on 1-he oLher hanc, may overestimate the degree of world compliance with Sanctions. There are many and varied counter-strategies available to the target, from sacrifice and smuggling to developing import substitutes and diversifying the economy. Thus, using Galtungrs criteria, Rhodesia in 1965 shoutd have been, in theory, extremery vulnerabre to the application of sanctions because:

I" Her percentage of domestic exports was concentrated in one product: 33t (tobacco); in two products: 40.5g

(tobacco and asbestos) . ? Percentage of domestic export-s concentrated in one trading partner: 25-33 (Zambia), in two trading partners: 47.22 (u.x. and Zambia). Percentage of imports concentrated in one product - area 32-08 (machinery and transport equipment). Percentage of imports concentrated in one trading partner: 30.49 (U.K. and South Africa). 25

rn addition. 3BB of Rhodesia's national income and 34e" of it was spent on impotts.20 According to Robert. B. sutcliffe, "these are startling figures for any country -"". considering this degree of Vurnerability, the application of sanctions was the b,est \day that the British government chose to show their disapproval of UDI.

stages rn The Äpplication of sanctions hgainst Rhodesia By the British Government and the United Nations

sanctions against Rhodesia will be considered to have been initiated in response to uDr which occurred on Novem- ber fl, 1965. These sanctions were highry escafat,ed starting wit.h 'selecLivet to tMancìatoryt and later on 'comprehensive,. on November L2, 1965 Lhe British Government unirateralry announced. selected sanctions against Rhodesia. These were as foÌlows: 1. The British High commissioner was withdrawn from salisbury and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London was asked to leave; Exports of arms, including spare parts were stopped; ? AlI aid l-o Rhodesia by the U.K. ceased; 4. Rl'rodesia was removed from the Sterling area; 5. ExporL of U.K. capil-aI to Rhodesia was prohibited; 6. Rìrodesia t s acccss to the London capital market was halted; 26

7. U.K. credits guarantee Department stopped further coverage of exporLs for Rhodesia; B. Rhodesia was suspended from the Commonwealth preference area 9. The U.K" government banned the purchase of Rhodesian sugar and tobacco stopping a set total of 7IZ (By val-ue) of Rhodesian exports to the U"K. I0. The U.K. no longer recognized. passports issued or renewed by the ilIega1 r.gi*"=.22 rn i-.g66, the Commonwealth Sanc- tions Committee23 r-= set up to monitor the activities of Sanctions--breakers. It was dissolved in May 196B in preference for the United Nations Sanctions Committee which it was assumed, would be more effective in carrying out the resolutions of the U.N, on Sanctions against Rhodesia. During the first mont-h of 1966, the U.K. escalated sanctions against Rhodesia. In January L966, BriÌ-ain assumed the power to embargo Rhodesia's trade in any specific product, making its purchase by anyone in the world a violation of British law.

The first product affected. was chrome (Jan . 20¡ ,t-nen tobacco (Feb- 7), sugar (It1arch L7), iron ore (April 7), asbestos and

pig iron (June 3). On January 30, 1966, Britain imposed a i,ol-al ban on imports from Rhodesia. Thus, rvith minor exceptions, all foreign trade between the two countries had been prohibited.. -7^ ' Up to the end of l-965, the British government viewed the 27 Rhodesian problem as her domestic matter and prevenLed the u.N., the commonwealth and the organization of African unity from interferring in it.25 This attitude changed after 1965 due to certain fa-ctors: Firstly, Great Britain realized that she alone woufd find it difficult to unilaterally enforce the economic Sanctions against Rhodesia because other nations would not allow their Sovereignty to be fimited by Britain in her bid to enforce the economic Sanctions against Rhodesia. secondry, t.he u. K. v;anted Lo in- volve the U.N. in the economic Sanctions against Rhodesia because she r¿anted to convince the Organization of African Unity; the commonwealth and the u.N. about how seriousry the u.K government viewed uDr. ThirdIy, the u.K. government believed that member staLes of the u.N. would comply with sanctions imposed against Rhodesia more if those Sanctions were imposed by the u.N. inst-ead of the unilaterar action of the u.K.26 The first direct involvement of the U.N. in the Rhodesian sanctions was at the reguest of Great Britain when she asked the u.N. Security council on Aprir 2,1966 to authorize her to use force to prevent an oil tanker discharging oil destined for Beira. On December 16., 1966, ât the reguest of the U.K. the Security Council ordered mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia to apply to the s'.:ppry of oil, armarnents, planes, motor vehicle parts and to the Rhodesian exports of asbestos, chronle, iron ore, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, meat and. meat zóaô products, leaLher, hides and skins; and ordered atl states to prevent shipment in vessers or aircrafts of their registration of any of these commodities originating from Southern Rhodesia and exports therefrom after the date of resolution. The only exceptions made to these economic Sanctions against Rhodesia \^.rere medical, educational and humanitarian materi uL=.27 (See Appendix B on U.N" Resolutions on Rhodesia). On Ì',l.ay 29 , 1968, again at the U.K. request, the U.N. Security council passed a furf-her resorution calling on atl member sLates Lo ban alt trade, financial dealings and air services with Rhodesia and cal1ed for co-operation with the United Nations Secretary-General- for the supply of information reguired for the implementation of the resolution. The resol-ution also cont,ained non-mandat,ory clauses recorTunending

that member states cease recogni zíng Rhodesian passporLs and should also withdraw all consular and trade representation in southern Rhodesia. on July 3r, 1968, the u.N. Security council sanctions committee was set up and with it coming into operation, Sanctions agai-nst Rhodesia became a complete U.N. affair.'B

IVhat were the Purposes of these Sanctions?

There IS now some concensus on the purposes of tÌre

Rhodesian Sanctions. Professor Smi th, I4r. Canas Ncube; 7- Ambas s ador Chief Lukumburzat and Zeba Loxley (.iqrs. ) point out 29 that the purpose of. the Rhodesia Sanctions was to bring Prime lrlinister Smith from the path of illegality to that of legaIity" Canas further adds that apart from bringing Smith back to the path of 1egality, Sanctíons were also meant to force the Smith regime to negotiate the constitutional future of Rhodesi a.-'2q He exptains that that was why the British government continued escalai-ing them" He maintains that, the purpose of Sanci-ions !{as not to give independence to majority Africans. That was why, he points out, Africans were never invited when the British government held a series of talks with smith's r.gi*".30 FurLhermore, from the review of the House of Commons Debates it became clear that t.he primary purPose of Sanctions in the -lJnited Kingdom adopted by the Labour government on Sanctions of November, l-965 was 'to restore Rhodesia to the rule of law, to allegiance to the Crown. " After making the itlegal UDf impossible and guaranteeing "untrammefled loyalty and aÌlegiance to the Crown," then independence could be discussed on a reasonable basis. This basis for independence rested on the famous "Five principles": l. The principles and intention of unimpeded progress to majority ru1e, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, rvould have to be maintained and guaranieed. 2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogres- sive amendment of the Constitution. 3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the poli- 30 tical- status of the African population Ã There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination. tr The British government wourd need to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the peopre of SouLhern Rhodesia as a rhol..31

These principles were endorsed by both the Labour and conservative part-ies. of course, what constitutional arrangements satisfy these principles are subject to differ- ing interpretations. Harold wilson added a sixth principre in 1966, which states: 6. rt would be necessary to ensure that, regardl_ess of race, there \das no oppression of the majority by minority, or of the minority by majority. rt is interesting Lo note that during the November debaLe, Do Mp advocated immediate

majority rule in Rhodesia as a purpose of sancLions to be achieved by the sanctions; guite the opposite, wilson, clearly stated on November 23, l-965, that Rhodesia was not ready for immediate majority ruIe. There were also secondary purposes of Lhe sanctions. Fredrick Hoffman concludes that by far the "most important prosanction argument is that '\,/e have to do this because of the reactions in the other parts of the worì-d, because other people demand ."tion.32 wirson was especiarry concerned. about the future of the commonwealth, British isolation at the united Nations, and the possibility of the chinese and 31 soviet communists taking advantage of the situatio.r.'3 Tþo other factors figuring prominently in the November debate were the morality of opposing uDr and t.he image of

Britain vis-a-vis world. public opinion" wilson viewed uDr as an offensive challenge to Britaints cherished democractic traditions. Britain could not eschew her "sacred trust" and "obligation" under the u.N. charter "Lo promote...the werl- being" of the Africansr âs wefl as the Eu;:opeans, of Rhodesia. In addition, a constant therne in the debate was that Britain's reputation, honour, and credibility \,çere at stake and had to be protected. One MP noted that since Britain had 1-hreatened sanctions against Rhodesia to deter uDr, "rf we fair to make Lhese deterrenLs credible no\.v, then Britaints words in the U-N. and firmness of purpose on a whole ran_qe of other issues in the world will fall to pieces." The same Mp then proceeded to quote an editoriar from the Economist l-o i-he ef fect that if Britain failed to respond 'Lo this "challenge of destiny;" it rçould signal the farelell of "a faded and foppish" .,-tion.34 In a debate in the House of Commons on December B, 1966, Labour Minister, Judith Hart succinctry stated that voting for sanctions woufd mean voting for non- racialism, for tìie future of the commonlvealth, for Britain's honour and integrity in the worfd. and for belief in democracy and human rights. T\do final purposes can be discerned. Some I'lp's worried that if Britain failed to act, reprisars might occur against JZ

Whit-es living in other parts of Africa; as one I'{P puts it, "the sins of Mr. Smith may be visited on our feflow country- .,35 men aÞroad."- " Wilson additionally noted in his memoirs, but not in parliamentary debates, that economic repercussions against gritain could come from Zambia. If Britain was denied Zambia's copper" either by virtue of a Rhodesian preemptive strike against Zambia or by "a Zambia made sulfen by our refusal to use force, we wourd have had two mitlion unem- ployed within a matLer of ronths.36 These purposes are regarded as secondary because they are

not directly related to the ending of UDI- Actuafly, many of the purposes were symbolic in nature, designed to persuade third parties that Britain recognizes the gravity of uDr, and that she will carry out her responsibility in this matter. The operative purposes of the Rhodesian sanctions poricy were muddled and confused and the termination conditions and procedures are unclear. This may undermine, from the outset, adherence to and respect for that poricy. Aside from purely operationar considerations, the competence of the u.N. to get involved in the matl-er, and the procedures fof lowed in the security council are open to guestion.3T Also important is the attitude of t-he Àctors invorved in the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. Their doubts lent credence to the Rhodesian position, which will be discussed in chapter three, that such UN action is iltegitimate. To the extent any policy is vierved as illegitimate, the effect,ivcness of 33 failure of the Sanctions program to persuade t,he Smith regiime to end its UDI. On the immedi aLe, tactical purpose of Sanctions, there does seeJn to have been general agreement among the Sanctioners. Since the imposition of comprehensive, mandatory Sanctions (wit.h exceptions of. communication and humanitarian needs) in May l-968, the tactical purpose has been to isolate Rhodesia from the rest of the wor1d.. While this isolation \^/as expected to cause economic stagnation, it was al-so expected to .ä.r=. psychological pressures in Rhodesia. For example, in the Security Council debate of May 24, 1968, (S/PV. :-42B), Denmark stated that the Sanctions are supposed to "persuade the men of Salisbury of their isolation from the rest of the world and convince them that there is no fuLure in persisting in their illegal course; the United Kingdom declared: we have to convince them that their rebellion can lead nowhere but to economic stagnation and political isolatiorr. " British Lord Chancellor. Lord. Gardiner, in referring to the travel restrictions, saidthat they were not intended to operate by way of punishment, but rather to bring home to the ordinary Rhodesian "t.he isolation and estrangement from the rest of the civilized ivorfd which the actions of their leaders have imposed on them-"39 Such isolation also serves to prevent recognition of legitimacy in any form, political or otherwise. In the Security Council debate of February 24, l-9'/2, Somalia stated.: "Sanctions must be preserved and intensified J.i1À that policy will be impaired" Furthermore , íf t,he Sanctioners themselves are in disagreement and confusion over the purposes and termination, how can the targent be expecl-ed to clearly perceive what it must. do in order to comply and have the pressì.rre removed? Finally, if the purposes are in flux and the demand on Lhe target changeable as was the case with the British position and the interpretation of the "Five principles" the target may anticipate that if it delays compliance, its position witl imr:rove over time, and its interests will be better served in the future. These kinds of problems associated with the Rhodesian Sanctions were alleviated somewhat by the announcement of the four pre-conditions by the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan in 1976. The new policy went a long way towards meeting African demands in the UN especially as Britain had now formally agreed to the principle of no independence before majority rule (NrB¡{AR). rmpressive unity on the Rhodesian i==-L ras demonstrated on April 6, 1976, when S/R-ES/3BB became the first uN security council resolution ever Lo be cosponsored by afl fifteen members. Aithough only a minor extension to the sanctions Programs, the resoru- tions with unanimous sponsorship was described by UN Secretary- General Kurt waldheim as a "welcome sign of the willingness of the international community to bring about majority rure in Rhodesiu.. "38 That such symbols were stilf n,:eded. ten years after the first sanctions were applied is indicative of the 35 to maintain the illegaI regime's present international isolation; if there were no sanctions, the drift Lowards recognizíng it de ju:e would follow as surely as day follows night . uAA

Rhodesiars General Response ¡

Obviouslyn the prime consideration of the Rhodesian government is to minimize in every possible way any adverse impact the sanctions may have on their country. To that. end, the Rhodesian government sought to maintain and develop international contacts and tried to avoid isolation from the rest of the world. The avoidance of isolation is necessary for Lhree reasons: First, it is necessary to avoid economic deprivation and stagnation that would result irom the inability to maintain international commercial contacts. BoLh the Sanctioners and the target knew thaL Rhodesia must trade with other countries in ord.er to survive. Second, it is necessary to strengthen public morale and to avoid., what l,fichaet Lake of Lhe Guardian caf 1s, the "Psychological Cancer of isotatio.r. "4l Third, it is necessary to demonst.rate to the worfd the legitimacy of the Rhodesian government's position, gain acceptance for that position, and demonstrate the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the Sanctions. Subsequent chapters are devoted to an invesLigation of how and in ivhat respect Rhodesia has been able to avoid isolation. Political, diplomatic, economic, social relation- 36 ships and the activities of the Multinationals are all discussed.. Empirical evidence is presented in order to offer explanations for Rhodesia's successes and failures and to judge the effectiveness, in general-, of t.he Sanctions as an instrument of the UN in achieving its goa1s. JI

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IT

1" Strack, R., Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia ( Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, L97B) xr Stephen, M., "Natural Justice at the UN: The Rhodesian Case. " American Journal of fnternational Law 67 (Juty, 1 3, Galtung u J., "On Effects of InternationaÌ Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. " I¡JorId Politics 19 (April L967), p. 379. Fisher, R., fnternationaf Conflict for Begineers (New York: I-larper

Ga1tung, J - , Op. Cit., p. 378.

Peter Waflenstein, " Characteristics of Economic Sanc- tions, " in a Multimethod fntroduction to International PoliticsPolitics, William D; and Coplin, C. W. Kegley (ed" ¡ , (Chicago: Markham, L97L), pp. f29-30 7- Doxey, M. F. Economic Sanction and fnLernational Enforce- ment (N-Y. o B. Galtung, J., Op. Cit., pp- 4IL-2. q Anna Schneiber, "Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," I{orld. Pofitics 25 (April L973): 413. r0. Bal-drvin , A. , "The Powers of Positive Sanctions in World Politicst't 25 (Apri1 1973): 4l-6 -

11 Professor Arnol-d Smith for-merly Commonlvealth Secretary- General 1965-I975, now professor of International Affairs at Carleton University Ottawa, interviewed at Carleton University 25/4/80.

12. George W - Bal I, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of Itlodern I^lorld. Stru p. 245 Testimony of Dean Archeson Before the U.S, Congress, House committee on Foreign ^Affairs, Rhodesia and the u Foreign Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa" 9lst Congi., Ist Sess.o L969, pp. IZ4-73- 13" John Ga1tung, Op. Cit."¡ p. 388" t4. T; R- C. Curt,in and David Murray, Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia_TT. (London: Institute of Economic Affairs , L967) , W l_5. Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Tndependence: A Study in eritish Cofonial , p- n7. f6. George W. Baer, "Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the ftalian-Ethiopia War , I935-1936. " International- Organization 27 (Spring 1973): L79. L7 Margaret P. Doxey, Op. Cit-o p. 26. l-8. J. Galtung, Op. Cit., p. 407 r9. rbid- , pp. 384-87 - 20. Figures calculated from Rhodesia, Central Statist ical Office, Annual St.atement.of Ex.l_ernal Trade, p. 26 in Strack R. op. Cit., p. ]5.

2L- Robert B. Sutcliffe, Sanctions Against nhodesia ( T,on don : Africa Bureau, f9 66) , 22- Strack, R., Op, Cit" " pp. 16-L7. 23. The commonweal-th sanctions committee was set up to monit-or the activities of Sanctions bursters- In May 1968, it \'ras dissolved in preference to the united Nations sanctions committee which was set up in May, 1968 to monitor the activities of Sanctions bursters and to recorrLmend what measures Lo be used by the u.N. Lo make these sanctions ef fective. see Andrew Boyd, FifLeen l'1en or a powder Keg. (Norwich, Norfolk: Fletchèr an 24. A¡drew Boyd, Ibid., p. 264" 25- rbid-, p 265. 26- These point,s are well discussed in Good, R.C. UDI: Inter- national Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton: Prrnceton Unrv. Press, 197J-), p. 7I. JJ?o

27. Eileen Hoddon, "Rhodesia's Four years of sanctionSr,, in Cofum Legum ed" African'Contemporary'Record, p" A2"

28. rbíd", p" A'3" 29. Professor Arno1d Smith was interviewed in Ottawa on the 25/4/80¡ canas K. Ncube interviewed on the 16/a/Bo; chief lukumbashi, interviewed at ottawa, 24/4/80, Þtrs. Jeba Loxley, interviewe.d Z0/ 4/80. 30. For a detailed discussion of these talks, see International Peace and Defense Aid Fund.s (London: christian action Publications Ltd. , L969) , pp"t2-I9. 3r" stal-ement by Harold wilson, Great Britain, Hansard. (commons) vol. 845 (tgov. 9, L972) , coI. 1234 in Harord wirson, A Personar Record.: The Labour Government Lg64-L970 (Boston: LitÈfe-e 32- Fredrik Hoppman, "The Functions of Economic sanctions: A comparative Analysis," Journar of peace Research 4 (L967 ) :149. 33. Wilson, Op. Cit., p. lBl.

34. Great Bril-ain, Hansard (Commons) , VoI. 720 (ruov . l-2, 1965) , Col- 584 in Keesing's Contemporary Record Archives, Decem- ber Ì965, p. ff30 35. Ibid.., p. 549. 36. Wilson, Op- Cit..¡ pp. fB2-83. 37 . see Zacklin, "challenge of Rhodesia' s pp. r-72 lJiggins, "rnternational Law 99 pp- 94-106; and other references in chffie of these considerations are noted in describing Rhodesia's attempt to undermine {-he regitimacy of the Sanctions policy.

38. uN, of fice of Public rnformation, press Release \,rs/757/ , Àpril 9, L977 in The New york Times, April ll, L977, p.4I. 39. "Rhodesia", (w survey of British and conmonwearth Ãffairs 2 40. Ibid., p. -/L9. 41. Tlg_SEIgfga, Irree]

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REI,ATIONS I,VHTCH R}IODESIA MÀINTAINED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATION.

Diplomatic a,nd politica I1 rel-ations which Rhodesia had with ot,her States and orqani za f-ions were often a sensitive and delicat-e matter because of the U.N. Sanctions imposed on her. The basic philosophy of the White Minority regime was aimed at demonstrating its o\ùn legitimacy and of trying to show that the U.N" Sanctions against Rhodesia were illegitimate and closely tied up with "Communist_lqyeltgr:ÊITr" against Southern Africa" By so doing, the former Rhodesian Prime Minister fan Smith hoped to whip up political sentiments and emotions on the part of the Western powers who traditionally abhor Communism. By constantly emphasizing the theme of a Communist threat t-o l{estern interests in Southern Africa, he hoped Lo get the support of the western powers who have enormous strategic, economic and political inl-erests in this -t.-.1 Rhodesia as a standard bearer of l^les1-ern Civilization in Southern Africa, if given the necessary capabilities, wiÌ1 sland up against the Communist threat in Southern Africa. Furthermore, Rhodesia had one of the most "Stable" political regimes in the rvhole of Airica which had a strong military capabi li ti es , rvhi ch , coupled wi.t-h the mi li tary might of South 4L

Africa, would be able to stand up against Cornmunist adventurism in Southern Africa. Rhodesia had also got strong economic and social bases and hoped to place all these capabilities in the hands of the western powers in their bid to eliminate communism in Southern Africa. This apparent stability and strength should not be confused with politicaf regitimacy which in t.he words of professor o¡connell of the Ahmadu Bell-o university, Zania, Nigeria means: "The right people ruling and ruling wel-I,,.2

obviously, the legitimacy of the white l4inority regime v,/as rejected both by Great Britain and the international community. Moreover, the "right peopre", who were the majority of Africans, were not ruling, and Lherefore, it would be reasonable to assume that the l{hit,e Minority regime was not ruling well because it had to suppress the African Majority so that it courd stay in power. rn other words, the government was not based on the consent of the majority of the governed. The basic philosophy of the White regime of Rhodesia wiII now be examined with the aim of understanding how ru1r. Smith used it as a stral-egy l-o try to avoid l-he int-ernational isol-ation of Rhodesia by the international con'Lrnunity.

The Philosophy oi the White Minority Regime in Rhodesia

Rhodesia subscribed to a "domino theory" - whj_ch suggests that if Rhodesia is subverted by the Communists, then full scale guerril-Ìa warfare could be launched against South 42

Africa. Should the entire region faI1 to gue rri1la warfare, the entire civilization of the non-conmunist rçorld would be threatened. The former president of Rhodesia, Clifford Dupont warned that: the battle for Southern Africa was part of the third worl-d war, which had already started and was being fought by international and commercial- blackmait, bV infil-tration and Lerror.4 Rhodesia's Foreign Minister Pieter Van der By1 explained in a private interview on August 2t 1917, that: what we are doing here and what we fully belíeve we're doing is defending the western world against Communist expansion and Soviet aggression.5 He added that he did not understand why countries like the Unil-ed Stai-es and Great Bril-ain did not appreciate this but instead actually aided nhodesia's enemies, According to Smitþ; it is a great irony that Rhodesia may be under- mined from within the free world, bY those *h9 are siding with the Communists against Rhodesia. 6- To demonstrate his hatred of Communism, in February l-966, Tan Smith made a tangible help in the Vietnam r"ar against Communism. rndeed, Rhodesia's Arti-communisi orientation rças frequently noted by those members of the United States Congress suppor-ting the Byrd Amendment of Lgl0,7 which supported resumption of limited trade with RÌrodesia in some strategic mincr-a1s in violation of the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia. Fr¡rthernìore, the domino 1-heory was used by the

1i /1 ') TJ

Rhodesian government to help maintain the internal solidarity of its white community by imputing a sense of "mission" to their defensive effort.s against sanctions and guerrilla warfare; allegedly, such efforts would not only save their community, but also the whole of I.niestern civilization. Rhodesia also needed 1-o demonstrate the iJlegality and illegitimacy as well as the ineffectiveness of the UN Sanc- tions v¡iLh the aim of influencing the UN so Lhat if these sanctions were ineffective, they should be lifted..

Why The VIhiLe Minority Regime Felt That Sancti ons Against Rhodesia By The IIN were Illegitimate The irtrite Minority regime in Rhodesia felt tha t Sanc- t-ions against its country by the UN were iltegitj-ma ì-e and based its argiuments on three main grounds: 1. That the UN was not competent in international law to handle the Rhodesian problem;

? That the principle of "natural justice" was not applied to the Rhodesian problem; That Sanctions were based on invalid premi=".8 Considering the competence of Lhe UN in international law ì-o handle the Rhodesian problem the Smith regime marn- tained that the UN r,vas not supposed to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states (vr¡ Art. 1I(V) of the uN Charter). The Rhodesian government felt that its problem was a domestic one and it rvas only G,reat Britain t.hat was 44

comÞetent in international law to consider the problem and

9 this view was held by many countries and organi zai-ion. -

Then on May l8t,h , l-966 t Rhodesia claiming to be a party to the dispute under consideration by the uN, petitioned the secretary General of the uN for an invitation io participate in the debates as provided for in Article 32 of the uN charter. This Petition was iurned down because Rhodesia had no status in inLernationar l-aw" rt was because of the turning down of the request by the Rhodesian government. t.o participate in 1-he uN debates concerning her problem that prompted J.A- Macdonald, the former Chief Justice of Rhodesia, to point out t.hat "the consideration of Britain's application before the uN rvas done without the established principle of natural justice, which allows a party to Lhe dispute to have a say in the disput.e under discussion. ,'I0

Rhodesia also needed to demonstrate the illegality of the uN sanctions against her by disavowing any aggressive intentions torvard her African neighbours - If Rhodesia coufd Prove that UDf did not constitute a threat to internat.ional- peace and security, then the premise on rvhich the uN sanctions \^rere based could be illegitimate. To this end., Rhodesia advocaLed non-interference in internal affairs of other states and tried as much as possibre t.o rive at peace with her neighbours. According to a spokesman for the Ministry of Ext.ernal Affairs, this principle of Rhodesia's Foreign poricy rendered the pr-emises on rvhich the Sanctions rvere based, invalid.ll 45

The Rhodesian government also rejected as valid the view that its domestic policies vis-a-vis African States constituted a threat to Lhe peace by provoking the sensibi- tities of other B1ack African sLates on the contÍnent. The Smith regime claimed that its foreign policy was non-aggressive and was aimed at bringing stability to Southern Africa. He pointed out that.:

my government could have ruined the Zambian , economy by blowing up the Kariba dam when- Zambia \{as aiding and abeting the guerrilla'movements against Rhodesia but instead, f took minor measures instead against Zambia, such as closing the border temporarily, At the same time f allowed continuance of shipments of copper because copper is a strategic metaf used by the wesLern world a I and r did nót want to prejtrãi.u this situation. rl This r.ras a good strategy to try and win the support of the rçes1-ern world by convincing them that the survival of Rhodesia was in their best inl-erests and they should co- operate with her instead of attempting to isolate her. The tactic of 1-rying to whip up sentiments from the wes'Lern world had to some exl-ent helped Rhodesia to survive as an independent country even though this independence had no basis in international law as it was British government Sovereign'i-y over Rhodesia that was recognized by the UN. The evidence of the success can be demonstrated by the passage of the Byrd Amend- ment Act of 197113 and. the House of commons debates in Great Britain, rvhich shorved sympathy for the White nhodesian government.--t4 Furthermore, South Africa and Portugal fearing 1-hat if Sanctions rçorked against Rhodesia, they could be 46

turned against them in r-he futureu stepped in to foil the effect of sanctions against Rhodesia by increasing trade, providing financial 1oans, transport and passage facilities at their harbours, for goods destined to and from Rhodesi-.15 But the inability of Black African States to severe commercial and communications links with Rhodesia made the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia even more ineffective and these factors helped Rhodesia to evade total world isol-ation. ft was Rirode- sia's ability t.o survive inspite of Sanctions that lent credence to the claim that she deserved diplomatic recognition from the international community because if she was abre to manage her affairs successfully insptie of sanctions, then the purPose of the UN Sanctions against her had been defeated and they shoutd be lifted, followed by diplomatic recoqnition. Some of the reasons which made the l{hite Rhodesian government

cl-aim that Hrodesia deServed diplomatic recognition wil-l be exanr-ined in the section below. why The i{hite Ftinorì-ty Government Fett That rt Deserved Recogni tion

The Rhodesian government claimed that it deserved. recognition for the following reasons: 1- rn terms of internationally accepted standards,

Rhodesia possessed alr attributes of statehood. A permanent poouration, a defined t,erritory; a stable and effective government; and the capacity to enter into 47 relations with other States" ,a= Foreign Minister claimed further that in international parlance, it is an accepted norm that the political existence of a State is independent of recognition of other State=.16' Despite the fact that the British Priwy Council upheld on June 23, 1968, the principle that the United Kingdom rvas the lawful Sovereign in Rhodesia; and all laws and orders made by the "illegal-" regime were without JegaI effect, the Rhodesian government still disputed tfr" fact that the Crown was the Sovereign in Rhodesiu..IT The conviction that the Brii-ish Crown was not the Sovereign in Rl-:odesia made the Rhodesian High Court, sitting in Salisbury declare in January 1968 that the Rhodesian government. was the de facto Sovereign of Rhodesj-a k¡ecause "since the revolution, the present government has been in complete legislative and administrative control of Southern Rhodesia." Ile enrxrìerated many legal arguments Lo support his stand but one need not dweÌI in detail on these legal arguments because they do not contribute so much to the development of this =trrdy.lB Eight months later the London Tir"sl9 reported that the. Rhodesian High Court ruled that Rhodesia

l',, i i had acquired de ju e status. The court claimed that it ruled in the rr'ay it did because Sanctions had failed to bring Mr. Smith's regime t.o the al-legiance of the British crown. Then on June 16, l-970, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack ljorr'man outlined for the Legislative Assembly Five tenets 4B

of Rhodesiats foreign policy: l" To maintain and develop the security of Rhodesia. 2" To maint.ain and foster cordial relations with alf friendly countries in the worId, conscious always of the fact that because of our geographicar position, our closest relations will be with the countries of Southern Africa. 3. To participate in regional, international, and other specialized agencies with other staLes on the basis of co-operation and understanding. To promote ^ such technical and other aids, within our capacity to do so, as may be sought by countries less developed than Rhodesia. ( To. consul-t and co-operate on a regional and bilat.eral basis wiLh countries in Southern Africa on problems of comrnon purpose or interestr.20 As can be noted in Howmanrs second and fifth tenets, Rhodesia stresses her role within t-he Southern African region. According to Tan Smith, "we are immediately part of, we five

in, our whole lives and our future are inextricably bound up with Southern Afri"-."2I Such inteqration would shelter

Rhodesia from more adverse effects of sanctions as werr as complicate efforts to isolate her, and Rhodesia could use the facilities of the other states in the region to gain access to the outside world- A major problem frustrating efforts to secure greater cohesion within the region especially on a formal_ level 49 is the fact that none of the stales within the region recognized the Sovereignty of Rhodesia. Lack of recognition precluded Rhodesia¡s participation in any formal corrmon market scheme and in a planned regional tourism organization. Referring now to tenet 4 of the Rhodesia's Foreign policy: In 1970, she announced that she was loaning R$ lM to an undisclosed country which was fater confirmed to be Gabon and was given "becar'rse", according to the Rhodesian HeraLd'22 1975, "of the very valuable help given 1-o Rhodesia in many fields by the recipient of the aid. " The loan was l-ater written off. This foreign aid program is an interesting example of the secrecy with which Rhodesia had to pursue many of its foreign policy objectives on the operational leve1 because of sanctions. ft was a good tactic whereby Rhodesia hoped to minimize efforts to isolate her internationally by stress- ing't-he useful contribution she coul-d make by sharing some of her assets with other countries in lJor,¡man's words "a spirit of goodwill and good fell-owshio" .23 Finally, aid programs gave credence to Rhodesia's claim that adherence to the Sanctions program was far from universal and that Rhodesia had managed to gain unofficial acceptance, if noL official recognition. In this context, Foreign Minister Howman stated in the Legislative Assembly on July 29; 1976, that he thought the l'IP's rçould be astonished at the extent to rvhich "we have established links and communications rvith other colrntries -'24 50

Having considered the tenets of Rhodesian Foreign policy as they were used to help Rhodesia evade international isolation, \re shall now examine formal and informal political linkages which sh'e had with other countries and how these political linkages helped her evade int,ernational isolation.

Formal Arld Informal Political Linkages l¡Ihich Rhodesia l'ler ntalned with Ot.her Countries and Orqanizations

(1) Of ficial- and Unof ficial Vi_sits Excluding meetings with the British officials as of Lgl6 ran smit.h had meetings with the heads of two governments Portugal twice in Lisbon one before uDr with sala zaar and again with caetano in Lisbon in rg72.25 smith fre-. quently made trips to south Africa to see John Vorster, the Prime Minister at the time. vorster \,ras the only head of government to visit Rhodesia after uDr when he met smith in May 1970, after an initial visit to Malawi" This visit was construed by the Rhodesian Herald of May 2L, L97o as an open condoning of independent Rhodesia, bestowed in person by the most porçerfuI man in south Africa. According i:o the sunday Mair of June 10, L974, "smith arivays took at least trvo holidays a year in South Africa to discuss matters of mut.ual- inLerest with his south African counLerpart. " Visits of Cabinet -1eveI officials between South Africa and Rhodesia r*'ere rouLine and freguent information about visits of Rhodesian Cabinet members to countries oi-her than 51

South Africa and Portugal was virtually non-existent. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack Howman, told the House of Assembly that on August 7, L973, he had been courteously received in two foreign countries, one in Africa, the other. in Europe. He refused to name the countries and noted that "so long as sanctions continue, there must remain this aura' this attitude of secrecy, however, unfortunate we may think it is. " He said that Rhodesia had "warm and positive" contacts with o1-her countries and that he had met foreign ministers "both inside and outside Afri c:a-"26 As the Rhodesia- Herafd of September 7, L973 further suggested., perhaps the countries Horvman visited were Portugal and Malawi. Ilov"man was in Malawi on August }Oth, L9'72 to confer unofficially wit.h Dr. Hastings Banda, and it is possible he made a subsequent visit to that country. Rhodesia also maintained some contacts with Gabon. Peter Nieseward., writing in the Guardian of Augtust 2':.Lin, Lg74, alleged that P.K. Vander ByI, I{owmants successor as Foreign Minister, made an unofficial visit to Gabon during the first half of I97I, artd met members of President Bongo's government. Rhodesia's interests in Gabon were related to bilateral trade and to the use of Libreville as an inLermediate "cover" stop for Rhodesian air freight shipment to Europe- rL was all-eged in the Sunday Times (London) September B, l-976, that Harry oxtey, âil Assisiant secretary in the Rhodesian l'linistry of Foreign Af fairs, helped alrange the 52

Rhodesian connections with Gabon although Gabonrs president denied this allegation in the Africa Magazine of November 7, rg75.27 A¡other country visiLed by the Rhodesian Foreign Minis- ter was the Ivory ao,å=a. According to peter Nieseward, he

greeted P.K. Vander Byl at Hotet Ivoire in Abidjan. A spokesman for the Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that "we have become expert under cover diplomai-s

in ref ations with other count.ri"s. "2B The Rhodesian government also encouraged visits by prominent people from other countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jack Howmanr explained his goverrìment's policy in the Legislative Assembry, thus: "rn the field of public relations, we deriberately adopted a policy of inviting prominent opinion -formers to come to this country. we have met them and shown them what there is and whatever they wished Lo see. Many British MP's, r believe, have taken a different view of our affairs following visits to this country which have enabted them to see for Lhemselves 1-he truth of the distortions made ?o against ìls."-- wit.h reference to the u-s. a Rhodesian l'fp told the r,egis- lature Assembry on september 9 , 1966, "we must be extremely careful to see that the peopre rvho put forward our case in the u.s. are people whose opinion count." According to him, "the most influential people are the senators and congressmen. I rvould suggest 't-hat money ivould be wefl spent in 53

bringing to Rhoclesia, both congressmen and senators, to see for themselves what the position is here.,,30 The Rhodesian government concent,rated its effort to break from its international isolation on the U.S, for the following reasons: by adopting the u.s. L776 rnde¡>endence preamble at uDr, (see Appendix A), the white Rhodesians viewed themselves as being in the same situation of rebel-lion against the United Kingdom as the Thirteen American Colonies \{ere in L176, and naturarry expected sympathy and solidarit.y from the u.s. Furthermore, they wanted to buitd a strong u-s. lobby to pressure Britain into capitulation and recognition of uDr. Additionalty, the u.s. is the strongest power in the "I-ree world" that can stand against the Soviet and Chinese threat in southern Africa. This explains why the whites of Rhodesia have been the most vocar in emphasi zíng the danger of the Communist threat in Southern Africa and had persistently drun-rned into the ears of the u.s. and the western powers that the existence of Rhodesia under the status guo was in their own best interests. To buttress t-he point that the exisl-ence of Rhodesia under the White government was a countervailing force against communist adventurism in Southern Africa, ran smith tried unsuccessfully to allow white Rhodesian sordiers to fight side by side with the u.s. in the vietnam war in 1966 against the Communists of North Vietn-*. tt

The effort of the l{hite lrfinority regì_me to act as a 54

counLervailing force against communism seemed to have a

lot of impact in the U.S. especiatty arTìor;g Senators and Congress- men: As Canas noted, it was as a result of strong lobbying by some u.s. senators and congressmen that led to the passage of the Byrd Amendment which al]owed limited trade in strategic minerals between the U.S- and Rhodesia in L97L. Since UDI some U.S. Senators and Congressmen have visit,ed Rhodesia either in delegation but usually in a private capacity and became convinced that the Byrd Amendment was in the best interests of the U.S. Prominent among influentiaf personali- ties that visited Rbodesia since UDI were: Reoresentative Graham Parcell (D-Texas); Representative paege (D-Texas), L97L. In December I972, Clark Macgregor, former White lìouse Advisor and close associate to President Nixon visited Rhodesia and gave an interview to the Rhodesian Television station Ltd. (RTV) , stating that the presence of sanctions against Rhodesia was an "unnaLural situation and Americans believe that unnatural situations were subject to change .,32 Then in L975, Representatives John Dent (D-pa), Richard f chord (D-IIO) , and IJaroId Runnels (D-N. l'1ex. ) , visil-ed Rhodes j a. Atl three men were leaders in the efforts in congress to retain the Byrd Amendment rvhich permit-l-ed limited trade with Rhodesia. This list is not exhaustive of important visitors from the U.S., but rather, if lustrat.es the fact that the R-hodesian governntent had evidence l-o reinforce its claim that the count.ry rvas not isorated and had friendry, if unofficial, 55 contacts with rnany prominent people overseas. In a broader sense, its claim is also reinforced by the visit to Rhodesia by many prominent people in the Arts, Music, Sports, Science, Religion, Education, and Business as well as Touri=*.33 The effect of the visits on the morale and psychology of the i'Ihite community in Rhodesia may be more important than any material benefits which these visits might bring to Rho- desia" Nevertheless, post UDI rRhodesia had fewer visible, formal, official inLernational contact than she had prior to UDI. The White Minority regime might try to de-emphasize the impact of Sanctions but there was enough eviden".t4 that they were biting hard and that was why the l{hite Minority regime tried Lo fight hard to evade total isolation from the international community. That was not the only tactic used by Lhe Rhodesian white government to avoid total isolation, it also made use of its information offices and friends of R-bodesian societies.

(2) Overseas Information Of fices .And The Friends 9E_ Rrrs d_e€_ÞL F_qsrela- Another means rvhich the R-hodesian government used to influence public opinion on UN Sanctions against her were the Overseas fnformation Offices (RIO), and the "Friends of Rhodesian Society."35 In 1966 Jack Howman issued a report on the formation of the Friends of Rhodesian Society as fol-l-ows: 56

Through direct action from Salisbury, there have now been created more than 60 Friends of Rhodesian Societies throughout the U-S.; through whom are lobbied Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, arLicles and letters submitted to the press, and full and active operation undertaken in serving our cause. In Britain, directly and also through the Anglo- Rhodesian Society, we have encouraged the formation of branches throughout the U.K. Europe foll-ows the sanìe pattern Societies now exist in France, Belgium, Norway, Ttal-y, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Sweden, and Malta. There now exist in South Africa I5O Friends of Rhodesian Societies and to channel, control and coordinate all various activities, wê created a nationa]- trust. 36 As Jack Howman explained further, the Society was to concentrate on the U.S. because of the pervasive nature of the public relations in that country. The Rhodesian government claimed that "the society helped Rhodesia have a better

undersianding and a wider circle of friends in the U.S. AS of i-976, litt1e was known of the activities of the Societies or even if they are still in existen"".37 Rhodesia also had Information (s) "l Centre in Melbourne, Australia in 1966, but was subsequently moved to Sydney. Professor Arno]d Smith points out that the Rhodesian fnformation of fice was concerned rvith informing Australian poì_iti- cians about developments in Rhodesia. The cenLre arso encouraged Australian politicians to visit Rhodesia. Mr.

Breadly, noted. in the New York llimes of 2L June , L9J 4 , that eight mcmbers of the Australian Liberal party visited Rho- desia at their own expense. IIe added that t-he Liberal party sl government of Prime Minister, McMahon tolerated the presence of the Centre. However, in 1975, the centre was closed down by the Labour government of the Prime Þlinister, Gough Whitlam and that was the end of RrO in Australia. Rhodesia also maintained an Information Office in Washing- ton D.C. This centre was operated by, and represented the Rhodesian government. The RIO is an agency of the Ministry of Infonnation to which the principat fnformation Officer, H.J.C, Hooper was responsible. The RIO was financed by the Rhodesian government via "free account" in various New York banks. Although the presence of RfO was opposed by Lhe UN as an iníringement of the UN Sanc- tions, the U-S. government had consistently denied having any business with RIo.38 However, it is difficult to accept the U-S. version because in the New York Times of January 2lst, L977, Bradely, pointed out that the Rhodesia Information of fice among other things, \,ras engaged in the following activities:

T. The RIO provides information on trade, tourism, and investment conditions in the host country.

? It is al-so used to help explain the Rhodesian case to the outside rvorld. , It could not deal with the U.S. government and other government directly but could deal with other social and political grouPs that are close to government circles. Since UDI rvas not recognized by any country in the rvorld, they became useful vehicfes for ex- 5B plaining the Rhodesian case to the outside world and lobby- itg for her recognition. 3. RIO were also used to gauge public opinion of the Rhodesian regime in the host country and this was transmitted ì'ack to Lhe White Minority regime for appropriate action. Despite pressure from the UN that the RIO should not operate in i^Jashington D.C", Kenneth Towsey told Bradley of Lhe New York Times on March 3rd, l-978 that as of that date, u'in a practical sense, the activities of my office have not been affected by the UN resolution S/RES/4Og of Lg'17." The

RTO was still being funded via the "base accounts". In view of {-he evidence avaitable, it is reasonable to suggest that the Rhodesian Information Office performed a useful íunction on behalf of Lhe White Minority reg'ime- Since UDI was not recognized by any country, it became one of the mosL important 'undercover' organizations for the Smithrs regime to make international contacts. It is also possible that it lobbied for the passage of the Byrd Amendment of L97L. The fact that UDf had many sympathizers in the U.S. more than any country could be explained partly by the presence of RrO in I{ashington. Perhaps the greatest threat to the l{hit-e Minority regime's survival rvas not so much the imposition of the UN Sanctions but due to the activities of the guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla âìiln1l \{aS equipped and trained by the Communist countries. Their pr-esence was a threat not only to the Smith s9

regime but to the White Minority re-oimes in Southern Africa as a whole. An attempt will- be made to see how the smith regime used the "domino theoryu' to get the military support of Portugal and South Africa to contain this guerrilla threat in Southern Africa.

(3) Regional and Military Co-operation rt was lJenry Maasdrop, a politicar analyst of the sunday Mail (Johannesburg) , ruho wroLe in this paper i_hat Rhodesia is experiencing guerril-la warfare: they are trained, encouraged and supplied by foreign powers. 39 one problem which the whit.e regimes of southern Africa face is the impossibility of preventing the frow of weapons to the guerrilla movements. General Antonio de spinola , former governor and command.er in-chief of the portuguese Army in t,he former Portuguese colony of Guinea (now Guinea Bissau) , wrote in his book, Africa and the Puture that "iL is impossible to deprive the guerrillas of their sources of suppJ-y indefinitely by military means: in exhaustible external support, together with the permeability of the frontier regions and the ideological support of neighbouring coun{-ries, make it Utopian to hope A^ for success in any atl-empt ì-o isorate the guerrirras.*' Rhodesia rvas faced wiLh the danger suggested by the

"domino theory" rvithin the southern African region. she rvas also faced with manpo\,rer shortages in the security forces, and faced ir'ith the possibility that the guerrillas of dif fer- ent countries could form tactical alliances to achieve their 60 ends " ft was perhaps natural therefore that Rhodesia sought to co-ordinate its defensive efforts with those of Portugal and South Africa" The Guardian of July 6th, 1966, described the white- ruled states as forming an entente cordiale: "Rhodesia and Mozambique are good neighbours, and our countries together with the Republic of South Africa, form an en'Lente cordiale on Southern tip of Africa, which is of immense muLua1 benefit" Recent years have proved i-hat continued Solidarity is vital for the survival of each one of the three countrie=- "41 This was not a formal defense treaty or military alliance because Rhodesia was not recognized by the UN. Air Marshall M.J. l"lcHaven of South Africa pointed out in the=Rhodesian commentary t,hat "there is considerable understanding and inter- change of ideas at afl levels of government betvreen Rhodesia and South Africa including the armed services. "42 whun asked by Michael Lake of 1-he Guardian on whether South Africa had a defense pact with Rhodesia, he flatly denied it saying that the military arrangement betrçeen the two countries was only temporarl,, and ad hoc in .,-trrt".43 James Barber also noted the effort at defense co-operation betrveen the three countries and pointed out that "they have moved closer together to creaLe an informal but increasingly integrated respons"- "44 Evidence of the "integrated response" could be seen in the joint. milit--ary operations. The South African police units 6L had been sent to Rhodesia in August L967, in order t.o help Rhodesia combat joint ZAPU A.N,C. guerrilla incursions across the Zambesi River, South Africa informed the UniLed Kingdom government of the'situation on September Bth, L967, thus recognizíng British Sovereignty over Rhodesia. The United Kingdom turned down the request of South Africa to allow its police to operate in Rhodesia, The U.N. Security Council in S/RES/277 of I970 "demanded" tÞe immediate wit.h- drawal of the South African police and armed personnel from

Rhodes ia - The South African government responded by officially informing the UN Security Council that the police would remain in Rhodesia while the threat posed to the Security of South Africa by Zambian-based "Terrorists remained..'45 Joint Military operations between Rhodesia and Portuguese security forces were far less obvious than the operations with South Africa. I^lorried by consLant guerrilla activities from Tete province of lulozambique the Rhodesian government offered to help Lhe government of PortugaÌ curb l-hese activities if asked. On December 23rð,, L9J2, a coñtmunique was issued from the Security force headquarters in Rhodesia describing "a successful operation carried out in conjunction with Portuguese forces on the Rhodesia-Mozambique border .u46 Then in December 1973, t.he Portugiuese Commander in Mozam- bique, Gen. Kaulza de Ariaga said that he was on the best of terms with the head of the Rhodesian armed forces. He added: 62

"\,ve have an agreement with Rhodesia that troops may only cross the border from eit-her side in hot pursuit of the Å.'1 enemy. tt "

Peter Nieseward and A¡tonio de Figueiredo reproduced a report in the Guardian on the 27th April, Ig74 prepared by the Portuguese army officers serving in Mozambigue which described the "inLimate collaboration in the military field between Mozambieuer Sout.h Africa and Rhodesia Security forces." This co-operaLion continued unti1- L976 when Mozambigue gained independence under Frelimo.

Rhodesian Problems Rhodesia had enormous problems when the Caetano regime vras overthrown in Lisbon in April L974, by a military junba that was ready to grant independence to t,he Port.uguese territories in Africa. The Junta ordered Rhodesia to stop hot military pursuit against the guerrillas in I{ozambique. Rho- desia was caught (in an embarrassing situation) because the domino theory on which t.he survival of Rhodesia depended was threal-ened.. Furthermore, the Rhodesia security problem was further compounded with the withdrarval of South African police in f975. While the South African government repeatedly stressed that. their police were not sent to Rhodesia to fight Rhodesia's war, it rvas obvious that the police were important to Rhode- sia's defense effort.4B The Rhodesian Minister of Defense 63 tol-d the Sunday Mail t,hat Lhe South Africa police involvement was "most welcome" and explained.: "v/erve got a very long border if we had ten times the number of troops we've 9ot, we'd probably sti11 have trouble traverssing the border ."49 Rhodesia's security f orces \,{ere stretched to t-he limit in L976 by President Machel's declaration that a "state of war existed between l"lozambique and Rhodesia." The entire 765 -rnile border now had to be patrolled. Nearly a1l able-bodied ìluropeans were subject to military call up, and a second Batta- lion of African Rifles \^/as formed. In lvlay 1917, President Kaunda also declared that a "si-ate of war" existed between Zambia and Rhodesia and guerrillas raids from Zambia to Rhodesia l-ncreased.. lihile qualified aliens are welcome into t.he Rhodesian security forces as reg'ular soldiers, Sanctions have made any widespread overseas advertizing almost impossible. According to the l{ew York Times of December L7 , L977, 208 of the police recruits originated from foreign countries compared to nearly BOU before UDI- Recruiting 't-akes place secretly by word of mout"h. Articles symoathetic to the Rhodesian Military appear in such American publications AS Guns and Allliilo (June L9l5) and.

Sol-dier of Fortune (august , 19 77 ) and these may help recruit- ment.

In a series of sympathetic articles written for the New York Times syndicate in L917, Robin Moore estimated that several hu¡rdred À¡nericans, many of t.hem veterans of 1-he Vietnam war, 64 were fighting for the Rhodesian Security forces. Tbe UN Sanctions Committee noted with concern on April L977 that increasing numbers of recruiLs from .Australia, West Germany, Greece, ftaIy, New Zealand, Portug:aI, South Africa, Great Britain and the United States were joining the Rhodesian armed forces. It is highly unlikely, however, that these new recruits would compensate for the loss of South African police and Portuguese Security forces" Furthermore, the Lurn of events in Southern Africa, where the former Portuguese African territories are no\d ruled by the guerrillas movement governmenLs, which became sympathei-ic 't-o t.he cause of African struggle in Rhodesia encouraged guerrilla infil"tration into nhodesia.50 The sudden turn of evenLs in Southern Africa when the majority Africans gained independence and coni-rolled the governments of Mozambique and Angola weakened the domino theory as these two regimes gained independence with the help of the Communist arms and political support at international arenas. This situation actually scared the Whit,es of Rhodesia because Communist infiltration into Rhodesia and. South Africa bccame very r"or.5r To add to the already worse situation, the Cubans who had fought. in Angola on the side of the Con-rnunist I{.P.L.4. (people's Þtovement for the Liberation of Angola) headed by the late Dr. A. Neto were ready to fight to liberate Rhodesia for African majority ru1e. The guerril-Ia movements and the Cubans became encouraged 65 in their radical aggressive intentions against Rhodesia because the tr{est, 1ed by the United States was tired of fighting in foreign countries, The war in VieLnam had just ended and it was unpopular with many Americans and unless the West primary interests were threatened, it would be difficult to start another war immediatety after i-he end of the VieLnam vrar. The Carter Administration that came to poider in L976 place human rights as a top foreign-policy goat to be pursued and was not read.y to start another war with the Cubans in Southern Africa" All these events were not in favour of the continued existence of the l{hite Minority regime in Rhodesia. I^7hiIe the giuerrilla movements were intensifying their armed struggle against Rhodesia wit h the hetp of the Com- munist arms, the UN had also intensified iis Pressure on the I{hite Minority regime t.o give up their itlegality and return to the path of legality ante UDI. The White Minority regime in the face of alÌ these pressures fashioned a political gimmick to neutralize these pressures. They introduced the "Internat Settlement",52 by January I, 197B. The Internal settlement was regarded as a sefl out by many African governments and the Rhodesian African majority. By December 3Ìst, I978, in a stage-managed election among the registered pólitica1 parties, Bishop AbeI Muzorewa won and became the Prime l{inister. The aim of this political transfer to Afri- cans was Lo persuade the guerrillas to lay down their arms 66 and at the same time, persuade the international community to lift t.he UN imposed economic SancLions on Rhodesia. Since the above aims were not achieved under the internal settlement, a further attempt was made by Great Britain and the Commonwealth leaders who attended the Commonwealth's Conference in Lusaka, Zambia f rom.l- t.o 7 August, L9J9 | to initiate another Constitutional Conference on Rhodesia which will be acceptable to the majority of h$r people. IJer Majesty's government issued invitations t,o Bishop Muzorewa and 1-he fea- ders of the Patriotic Front to attend a Constitutional Con- ference at Lancaster House on Ì0 SepLember, L979. At the end of the Conference, 1-he meeting agreed among other things on a need to campaign and hold elections on the principle of "one man/ one vote", In the election that was completed on the 2IsL February, L979, I'lr- Robert Mugabe won a l-andsfide majority of fifty seven seats of the contested eighty African seats. Bishop AbeI Muzorewa gained only three seaLs and 1"1r. Joshua Nkomo gained twenty-one. Tt became quite clear that all those who were associai-ed with the Internal Settlement \^Jere regarded as a sell- out by Africans in Rho- desia and this partly explained why they did noL do wefl in t'ne el.ectron- 53 The new Prime Minister, Mr. Mugabe, is sensible and has appointed tivo whites to important cabinet positions in his government to allay the fears of ivhites in Rhodesia. Mr.

Ir{ugabe is al-so trying to put into practice his theory of a 67

Multi-racial Society" If the Whites can be well accomnodated in Rhodesia, it is reasonabl-e to assLirne that the nationalist party of South Airica may change its apartheid policies towards more accomlnodation of Africans in that country.

Ho.vever, it is difficult ncx¿ to predict what will happen in Zi¡rbab¡e and

Soutl Africa because Mr. Robert }Í:gabe has recentty been elected Prjme

Minister oí RÌrodesia and no prediction can be made at tlús stagie.

Attitudes of Countries llaving Political Relations I,Iith Rhodesia Since UDI, Rhodesia had not been recognized by any country. No country, therefore, maintained formal diplomatic relations with her except informal and convent t.f-tlorrships which had helped her to evad.e the total ef f ects of the UN Sanctions. Furthermore, Rhodesia used these relations with other countries, and organizations to drum into the ears of the isolat,ed whites that their country was not toLâlly isolated and that this helped boost the morale of the Whit,es in Rhodesia.

Mr. Snow, writing in Lhe Rhodesian Hera1d of June 24t-L, , I976, pointed out that the following countries maintained some political link with Rhodesia: South Africa, PorLuoaì- before her independence in 1976. MâÌawi. The attitudes of countries that had political relations with Rhodesia seemed. to be based on the fol-lowing. premises: ideol-ogical beliefs, the geo- political position of the countries concerned, and economic dependence of some Black Stat,es on Rhoclesia and l-he desire to

leave in peace arTìong al-l- the countries of SouLhern efrica.54 6B

On ideological plane, SouLh Africa and Portugal maintained some political links with Rhodesia because of the belief that if SancLions worked in Rhodesia, they could be turned agasint them. ft was precisely for these reasons that South Africa and Portugal although refusing to recognize UDI, had persistently refused to vote for the UN resolutions imposing Sanctions against Rhodesia (see Appendix B). Hendrik Verwoed, the then South African Prime Minister, outlined his country's inLerests vis-a-vis UDf to the l{ouse of Assembly in the Sunday Mail, thus: it was clearly in South Africa's inierests not to be dragged into conflict if it. can avoid it. It is in South Africars interest not to make enemies unnecessarily, and it was in South Africa's interests for Anglo-Rhodesian settlement of the Rhodesian problem to succeed so that there could be peace in Southern Africa.55

Domestic considerations more than any ot.her factor con- strained South Africa to maintain good relations with Rhodesia. Prime Minister John Vorster said in L967 that "South Africa should be careful not to take action which would provoke a t{hite backlash" aqainst his Rhodesian policy; keep his Afri- kaaner nation ì-ogether; and above alI, not Lo be perceived as the man who "sold Rhodesia down the river.."56 Vorster admitLed to the House of Assembly on April 2L, l9-/5 that the

Rhodesian issue is. . - a particuarly delicate one "his government has to bring infl-uence to bear without exerting pressure' it has to avoidirrposjng Sanctions without making it appear that such avoidance constitutes approval or support- According 69 to Vorster, we have given warnings where it is necessary, and we have given advice where it was necessary" u57 Portugal maintained political relations with R-hodesia for t,he same reasons as South Africa. She did not believe that the UN was competent to deal with the Rhodesian problem and at the same time she refused t.o recognize UDf , claiming that t.he Rhodesian government did not ask for this recognition. She was also interesLed in the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement to avoid prot.racted conflict with Great Britain and the guerrilla army. Portugal claimed that S/RES/22I of Àpril 19 , L966, prohibiting the imports of oil through the port of Beira constituted a clear denial of principles of freeó,om of the seas, and of access to the sea by landlocked areas embodied in convenlions rrhich have the status of international l-*.58 Portugal wanted Anglo-Rhodesian settlement of the Rhodesian problem for economic reasons as well. The Rhodesian Sanctions had caused. a d.ecrease in traffic which affect,ed the Mozambique ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques. Mozambique earned a great deal of revenue from the porLs'railways and oi1 pipeline services provided by Rhodesia. The African Digest of August l2th, 1969 reported that Portugal had asked

the UN to provide US $2BM to her as indemnification for losses resulting from uDr.59 After the coup of April l-974 j-n Portugal, relations

between Portugal and Rhodesia remained unchanged for about a year ivhile the new government tried to stabilize politically 10 and move its .African colonies towards independence. In I975, with a transitional government made up of Afri-cans and the Portuguese, Rhodesia's diplomatic mission in Lisbon was down- gracled'to a consular mission but did not terminate its diplomat.ic mission in Salisbury. On October l4th, L976 Portug,al, under the new military junta accepted the obligatory nature of the UN Sanctions imposed on Rhodesia. In Àugust 1977, Portugal ceased to recognize Rhodesian passports and the Portuguese airline suspended its direct flight to and from Rhodesia. AdditionalIy, the Portuguese government closed its diplomatic mission in

Lisbon in SepLember, LglT -60 Malawi also maintained some political rel-ations with Rhodesia after UDI. I{aIawi maintained a consular mission an Salisbury to cater for the 500,000 migrant labourers' from l'lalawi that go to Rhodesia every year to work in the mines. I'falawi depends heavily on this source of foreign exchange, not only to provide unemployment for its citizens, but also to provide that government with the much needed foreign excnange., 61 This state of affairs came about. as a result of the historical tie in the Cent-ral African Federation which united the former Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Matawi), under one political leadership and integrated the highly complimentary economies of the Southern African sub- region. Nyasaland rvas the main supplier of cheap labour to 7L the two Rhodesias that were potentially rich in minerals, industry and agriculture. Malawi and Botswana did not hide their co-operation with Rhodesia especially in the political and economic. areas: While Banda sympathízed. with the policies of the O.A.U. to isolate Rhodesia and the l^Ihite regimes in Southern Afr:-ca, he maintained that "I do not want to cut my throat by applying t.he

UN Sanctions on Rhodesia, " Dr. Banda also claimed that he abhored violence against Rhodesia on moral grounds. ft would infl-ict sufferings on Africans as well as whites and would kitl "many liberal whites who genuinely want justice for Afri "u.u62 In keeping with the Foreign policy of maintaining stabitity in the Southern African region, Dr. Banda \Aras one of the Heads of States that strongly advocated for a dialogue beLween B1ack African States and South Africa. He advised a1l the Black leaders to learn to live at peace with the White Minority regimes of Southern Africa. He also advised them to accord fuI1 diplomatic recognition to South Africa as this would help change the problem of the apartheid syslem in South Africa. Dr. Banda has increasingly come under heavy attack by many B1ack leaders of Africa for his advocacy of dialogue with Vorster. He rvas accused of attempting to divide the

Organizalion of African Lrnity (o-4.U. ) in his quest for a dialogue with South Africa. Furthermore, the leaders of 72

Southern and Central Africa pointed out that an attempt was

made under the Lusaka Manifesto of Lg6g 163 to have díalogue with South Africa as an alternative to guerrilla warfare and bitterness between Black Africa and South Africa but that Mr. Vorsler, the then South African Prime Minister, did

not co-operate i-o make it achieve the desired goal" They saw Dr. Banda as a puppet of the White-ruled states and despite the fact that a't-tempts had been made t.o isolate him during the O-A-U. meeti-ngs, he has persistentJ-y held to his vj-ews, and uP to the time when the Rhodesian governìnent was transferred

to the African Majority under the Prime l4inislership of 1"1r. RoL¡ert Mugabe on April f B, 1980. Dr. Banda still mainl-ained his countryrs consulate in Salisbury.

Conc I us ion In this chapLer, some of the political relations and 1inka9es, offical and unofficial, have been pinpointed. A1- though many Western countries were sympathetic to UDI, none accorded formal recognition to Rhodesia even including South Afrj ca and Portugal. ft is Lrue that South Africa, Portugal and l"latawi maintained Consular offices in Salisbury, this did not mean formal recognition of UDI. Horvever, the former Rhodesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lardner Buike noting these kinds of relations and contacts asked tlre Legislative Assembly in Salisbury on }{ay 5th, L967, if they did not constitute a degree of recognition. Claiming that in- 73

dependence is a matter of degree for all countries, T-ardner- Burke maintained that "whiIe we may not have recognition in some fieldsr wê have it in others.u64 Prime }finister, fan Smith also claimed in the Legislative Assembly on February 1Oth, 1967 | that: practical recognii_ion has been adopted by many countries who are continuing to trade with U.S. whose sympathy lie entirely with u. s. of-a_nd He avoided Lhe guestion of the de jure recognition, however, considering the evidence presented in this chapter on political relations I. What assessment can be made of the claims of the Rhodesian government vis-a-vis recognition? rs it possible that certain countries by virtue of their conduct have implicitly recognized nhodesia? This is an important question because recognition is being withheld from Rhodesia as a sanction that, has psychological, political and economic conseguences for the Rhodesian government- This concern for official recognition is at the back of the l^Ihite Minority regime's thinking. Poritically, it has arready been noted that rack of recognition precluded Rhodesian involvemenL in any formal multilateral arrangements within the Southern African region. Economicalry, recognition rvourd permit Rhodesia to establish the necessary legat rel-ations with other countries to enabre her to borrow money and buy capital goods on credits - both of ivhich are badly needed by Rhodesia to salvage t4 key sectors of her infrastructure One scholar has claimed.that t.here is such thing as 'tacit consentt and recognition by implication in inLernational 1aw by exchanging diplomats, concluding treaties, and general- 1y treating a sLate as an inlernational 'Person'. This kind of recognition has already been given to Rhodesia by several coun1-raes. 65 D.J" Dewine carefully investigated t.his contention from the standpoint of South African relations with Rhodesia and concluded that such information as was available in ir969, favours the proposition that South Africa had not implicitly recognized UDI. The normal Lrade relations which South Africa had permitted to continue with Rhodesia since UDI comprised private trading by South African companies and citizens. Even the supplying of oil to Rhodesia was entirely in the hands of private individuals and companies. Devine claims that "such action on the part of the private indivj-duals cannot compromise the attitude of t-he South African government in the matter of Rhodesian recoqnition- He noted that although South African police forces were present in Rhodesia, "no implieations of recognition need necessarily be drawn from mere temporary arrangements or from agreements for l-imited purposes." fndeed, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa said in 1972, that, "South Africa had no defence agreement with any country in South Africa. " In any case, according to Devine, the question of recognition hinges on the intention 7s of 1-he parties concerned. Rhodesia makes no claim to recognition by South Africa; the staLement of principle by the Sout.h African government especially concerning non- intervention and thê need for an Angto-Rhodesian Settlement" - makes clear that the South African government¡s intention was not implicitly or explicitly to recognize the Smithrs re- grme,.67 On JuIy 6th, 1966, the Rhodesian Minister of External- Affairs, I-ord Graham, said in the Legislative Assembly that "just as in the past it is used. to be said that t.he flag followed trade, so today, I am cerLain Lhat recognition will not be long in following trade a1so".68 Lord Graham, äs the situation in Rhodesia is today, has been proved wrong, for up l-o the time when the Rhodesian government was transferred to Mr. Robert Mugabe, under the new narne of "Zimbabwe", no country recognized Rhodesia until lBth ApriI, 1980 after Great Britain legalty granted independence t.o Rhodesia under the name "Zimbabwe". ft was noted above that the viability of the economy in the face of the UN Sanctions was one of the reasons which 1ed the High Court of Rhodesia to rule that the Rhodesian government had attained de june status. In the next chapLer, an examinination of the economic and social relations of Rhodesia with other countries and organizatíons wil_1 be presented.. 76

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

T. For a detail preview of these interests, see Mariyawanda, N-, "Conflict Resolution In Zambabwe: Superpo\der Deter- minants To Peace Setttement'1 in Journal of Southern African Affairs 4 (October L979) @-has a section on the Liberation of struggle in Southern Africa where such western interests are always discus sed. - ) OfConneII, J., "The FragiliLy of Stability of the Nigerian n' Federal C,overnment, 19 6 6 in Rotberg, R. and Mazrui , A. (ed. ) Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York: O.U.P. ; reTo) O¡Connell- J., "Political fntegration: The Nigerian Case" in Hazlewood, A. (ed"¡ African fnLegration and Disintegra- tion: Case Studies in fc

? The "Domino Theory", rvhich was coined by the U.S. Adminis- tratibn duiÏng Ehã "cold. war" era, postulates that in any part . of the world where there was an attack or threat of intervention of the "Free world" by communism, the U.S. must intervene to conLain that threat by providing a countervailing force. This vras i-he philosophy b'ehind the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Guatemala in the l-950s and 1960s.

Å. Rlrodesia Hera1d, December 27tht 1973, p.4. Rhodesia IJeraId., August 1st, L977, p.I0 6. Rhodesia, Speech by Prime Minis ter, Ian Douglas Smith on Opening of Bloefontein Show in Rhodesia Herald, March 24|uÌlr, 197I, p-4. 7. Strack, R. , lgnctions t The Case of (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, l-978), pp.I40-146; and Lake, 4., The "Tar Babvt' tion: American policv Tov,'ard Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, J-976) - B. rbid.- , pp- 43-44. a iVhen the British government internationalized the Rhodesia problem rçhen UDI was declared, many British lr,lPs opposed the move. Apart fr-om the opposition that bitterty attack the move, many members of the House of Lord were particularly sympathetic. Portugal and South Africa also opposed t7

the intervention of the UN in Rbodesian affairs basing their arguments on the premise that it was a domestic affair. For details concerning' the internationaTíza- tion of the Rhodesian problem see A.T. ebari, Int_er- nationalization of t.he Rhodesian problem, 1962-L970 Manitoba, Canada; I9B0 also see Ken Independence as well as E. M1ambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, pp.L72-I76. t0 Strack, R., Op. Cit. , p.45. The establisf,ea prlnciple of "Natural Justice " postulates that a party to a dispute has @ heard.. Since Rhodesia was not given a chance to defend herself at the UN in l-965, after UDI, she stucked t,o her claim that the decision taken against her was unfair. II. UN News and Worfd Report, June, L9J5, pp.3I-32. 1) For a refutation of the Rhodesian arguments, See Rosalyn Higgins, "International 1aw, Rhodesia and the UN, " The Wor1d Today 23 (L967) , pp.9 4-LO6 ¡ Þlyres S. McDougal affi, "Rhodesia and l-he UN" The Lawfulness of International Concernr" American Journal of Internation- aI law and International ÞubIic po1icV," International -'72. For a de- ¡errce of n¡oaesian argiuments see Michael Stephen, "Natura1 Justice at the UN: The Rhodesia Caser" American Journal- of International Law 67 (;uty L973) ¡ pp.l-ì-9; and Ralph zaclcli@ of Rhodãsia: Toward an International public policy, " International Conciliation 575 (November .1969), pp I; testimony of Dean Acheson before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign policy, Hearings before the Subcommittees on Africa, 91st Cong; lst Sess., 1969, pp.124--13¡ and Charles Burton Marshall, Crisis Over Rhodesia: A Skeptical- Viel! (Baltimore: The .fofrn Hoptins estion which arises from the debate is: Are the traditional prerrogatives of Sovereignty, including the Notion of domestic jurisdiction" and "threat Lo the peacer" being transiormed or transcended by an emerging new stress by members of l-he international Community on the question and assurance of "human right" in all areas of the world? For a discussion of the guestion see Vernon Van Dyke, Human Ri'ghts, the U.S. and Inlorld Community (New York: O.U.P.; 1970). 13. On November I7, I97I, the U-S. Cong,resÈ passed t.he Byrd Amendment to the Strategicffi material S'Lock pilling Act, authorizing the imports of chromiLun ore, ferrochrome, and any other Material-s from Rhodesia which were of Strategic and Critical NaLure to t.he U.S. Security. The Justification was that continued observation of the UN 7B

sanctions adversely affected u.s. national interests because chromium and ferrochrome were critical to the defense industry. See strack, R. sanctions: The case of Rhodesia (syracuse: syracuse univ. press, rgTB), pp.140-164"

14. Kenneth young, Op. Cit., çp.Z0L-220.

15" M1ambo, E.8., Rhodesia: The British Dilemma ( London: Christian Actio . 2,)

16. Rhodesia, Hansard, Vol . 77 (June 16, Lg-lO) , Co.. 589 cited in Strack, R. Op. Cit. , p-47 . L7" rbid-, p-48. -to LO The argumeni_s \¿rere based on the fact that despite the imposition of the UN Sanctions, Rhodesia had survived, and therefore the premise on which the Sanctions were based did not justify their continued imposition. 19. The Guardian, September 30{_h , L96B , p. 31. 20. Rhodesia Herald June f6. 1970, pp -2I-23 )'l To The Point (South Africa) , June L7, L972, p -23 Cited in JournaÌ of Southern African Affairs 4 (October I9l9) pp, 33-37. )) Ibid.., p.38 ?-3. Ibid-, p-38- 24. Rhodesia Herald JuIy 29Lh, 1976, pp.tB-2L. 25" Portugar and south Africa were Rhodesia's most trusted and helpful allies: They refused to support the UN imposed economic sanctions Aoainst nhoãèsia in L965, 1966 and 1970- ?Ã Rlodesia l{era Id, August 16th , l-973, pp. 15 -l-7 . 27" President Bongo of Gabon made an extensive tour of Africa and Europe to refute t.he changes that he was breaking the UN Sanctions Against Rhodesia. 28- New York Times 20 September, L976, p.41 to I{est Àfrica JuIy 6th¡ l-966, p.f4" 30. Ibid., p. t5 l9 31. This request was turned down by the Johnson Administra- tion in 1965 32" Star (Johannesburg) December 2t L972. 33. The scope of the thesis will not allow me to examine all the socio-economic and political relations which Rhodesia maintain with other countries and organizations. 34. For example, in an excellent articre written by Eileen Hoddon, former editor of the central African Examiner, titled "Àn Evaruation of sanctions from 1965-r969" in colum Legum (ed" ¡ African contemporary Record L968/69 pp-3-I2, She has an iveness and non-effectiveness of j-he uN sanctions on Rhodesia. She concludes that from al-1 the evidence available, there is no doubt that Sanctions were biting Rhodesia very bard.. 35. rnternational Defence and aid rund. Rhodesia: why the Minority regime survives (London, 1969T, pp" 40:îT. 36, rbid-, p.42. 37. rbid-, p.45. 38. rbid-, p.46. 39. Sunday Mail (Johannesburg), April B, 1973. 40. statement quoted in: Africa Report 19 (March-April, 1972), pp. 37 -39 . 4r- This "entente cordial-" was of mutual benefits to the three "White Minority regimes to beat back guerrilla warfare. 42. Rhodesia Commentary, April 1lt,h, I974. 43. The Guardian May l2t.h, 1975. 44. James Barber, South African Foreign-Policy I945-1970 (London: o.u.p.W. 45. DaiIy Times (Wigeria), December 3rd, 1970, p.2L- 46. Ibid., Feb" 4th, L973, p.ì5- 47. This was reporì-ed in: African venture, January 5th, Lg14- 48. Soul-h Africa constantly pìayed down the role of the South African police in helping Rhodesia conLain guerrifla warfare. BO

49. Sunday MaiI, April Bth, I976, p.1I.

50. Portugal regarded her former African possessions as mere extension of her overseas provinces and there vJas no gùestion of granting them independence. This frustrated African Nationalists in these territories and the resul_t vras the beginning of guerrilla movement.s in Angola and Mozambigue in the early 1960's. By Aprir Lg74, there was a military coup in portugal and the junta there granted independence to Angola and Mozambigue. i¡ris change in the political configuration of southern Africa \das a ¡ig threat to Rhodesia and south African whíte regime that pruòtice apartheid.. 51 Refer above.

52 " TexL of Rhodesian Àgreement Preparing the Way for Majority Ru1e, o' Journal of Southern Affairs, VoI I II, No. I, Jan., T978, p"I23.

53. I?id- , p-r24. This was demonstrated during The l-ast election in zimbabwe when those who were involved in the "Tnternal settlement" with the former prime Minister, ran smith, did badly in the erection. of the B0 seats alIoca- ted to Africans, Bishop Aber Muzerowa scored 3; Rev. sithole Sco1ed nothing and Chief Jeremiah Chiram also scored. nothing. Robert lvlugabe who was in the bush fighting in guerrilla warfare won 57 seats out of B0; Joshua Nkomo wón Twenty- one seats, Bishop A. Muzerowa, Rev. N. sithote and chief chiram participated in the "rnternal settlement" government. ç¿ Strack, R., Op. Cit.. p.61. 55. Sunday MaiI, Jan. 25Lh, l-966, p.f4. 56. Ilid", p.16. 57. rbid , IÍay 22nd,, J-9'75, p.17. 5B- Mlambo, E. E. Rhodesia: The British Dilemma (London: Christian acti -

59. Strack, R. , Op - Cit. , pp. I43-6 . 60. See Africa Report August 21st, LgjB, p. 6I. 61" This parLry explains rvhy Malawi found it difficult to disengage herserf from Rhodesia. she rvas too much dependent economically on Rhodesia and south Africa to take any radical stand against the white Minority regimes wii_h- out causing irreparabl-e damage to her economy -na conse- quently creating conditions for political inita¡ility. B1

62. The main reason why Dr. Banda abhors violence is as explained above. 63. The Lusaka Manifesto was a meeting of Black African leaders from south, E,ast and centrar Africa, which was held in Lusaka, Zambia in f969. The aim of the Conference was to consider dialogue with South Africa and Rhodesia as an afternative to fighting. The Lusaka Manifesto achieved not.hing because south Africa refused to abolish apartheid in that country and moreover, there was much pressure from radicaf African leaders that having dialogue with South Africa was a sell out, 64. Rhodesia Herald, May 20th, 1967, p.16 65" rbid., p.18.

66 I"fy discussion with a law s1-udent at the Alimadu Bet,1-o University, Zanía, Nigeria on the 24Lh December, l-9791 in I'{akurdi, Nigeria. Also see Charfes W. petersen, "The Military Balance in Southern Africar " in SouLhern Africa in Perspective : Es =_gy_¡_f"_¡"g@. Ey chrimnd Richard Dare (New york: The Free Press, L972), p.313. 57" D.J- Devine, "Does South Africa Recognize Rhodesian fndependence?" tgO9) , p.443 -

6B Devine, Op. Cit-, South African Law Journal- 86 (Nov. 1969) p .442. B2

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONO}IIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IVHICH RHODESIA MAINTAINED I^]ITH OTHER STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS

The aim of chapter four is to explore the economic and social relationships which Rhodesia maintained with other countri es and organi zan-'íons. The chapter arso examines arguments which \dere invoked by countries which contravened the LrN sanctions on Rbodes.ia. Furthermore, this chapter investigates the cfose nature of economic integration of the southern African region and looks at the geopoliticar, economic and coinmunications problems which made it drfficult for countries to isofate Rhodesia and implement sanctions against her without causing hardships to Lhe southern African region as a whole. This may partiarly explain why inspite of sanctions/ the Brack African states of this region have been unable 1-o totally disengage themserves from economic co- operation with Rhodesia.

The chap'Ler wi1Ì conclude ivith an examination of Rho_ desia's effort t.o participar-e in the otympic games and the probrems she encountered in the process of this attempt. Irluch of the economic and sociar rerations which Rhodesia maintained with other countries and organizations had been kept secret because of the apprication of the uN sanctions againsL her. Iluch of the activities of sanctions- B3

breakers became known because of activities of the uN sanctions committee and the effort of individuals, states and organiza:-íorr=.1 Furthermore, in their effort to demonsLrate that Rhodesia \^ras not tot.a11y isorated f rom the world, the white l"finority regime sometimes exposed the activities of those countries and organizations that had contacLs with

her. This was a negative effort in the sense that. it made the international community avrare that some countries and organizations were -¡ioÌating the uN sanctions on Rhodesia and a 1ot of pressure \^zas brought to bear on such countries and organizations to stop such activities. Additionalry, many countries and organizations had to exannine more care- ful1y l-han before whetl.¡er the price of having political and economic contacts with Riodesia was sufficient Lo face the wrath of i-he international community. In a report published in f969 by the UN Sanctions committee, the following countries were reported to have maintained economic contacts with Rhodesia: south Africa, which was reported by the uN sanctions committee to be by far 1-he largest trader with Rhodesia in 1968, I,iest Germany, Zambia, Portugal, IIaIawi, Switzerland, Botswana, Australia, Zaire and the Netherlands. Later on Gabon v,¡as added i-o the ) list.- These economic relations courd be regarded as acknowledged trade because the uN sanctions committee had documented t,l-rem. Itlany other countries and organizations had secret economic and social contacts with Rhodesia. This B4 study will concentrate more on acknowledqed trade which the various actors had with Rhodesia as it is difficult to obtain the fact.s on secret trade.. ' South Africa had remained the most important trading partner of Rhodesia. The bitateral trade before and after uDr had continued uninterrupted. According to west Africa of 6 November 1964, South Africa signed a bilateral trade agreement with Rhodesia on December L, L964 and this provided preferential tariff treal-ment for trade in both directions between the two countries. A number of Rhodesian exports were allowed entry in the Souih African markets duty-free and some under restrictive quota system. The trade agreement had an initial five-year tern, after which it would be renewed on a yearly basis unless either government qave twelve months notice of termination. The volume of trade bei-ween South Africa and Rhodesia since UDI was secret because of the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia. The uN sanctions committee estimated that south Africa accounted for one-t-hird of Rhodesia's imports.3 This demonstral-es the importance of South -African trade with Rhodesia. Aside from providing the much needed foreign exchangie to Rhodesia, the availability of South African markets made feasible longer production runs for some Rhodesian goods; this in turn, held down unit costs and re- duced prices on the domestic markets. South Africa was Rhodesia's main export market for manufactured goods. B5

Problem Areas

The bilateral trade between the two counrries did have some problem areas. rn l-968, according to Africa Magazine 22 November r968, south African iraders comprained that their trade was being undercut in their domestic markets by cheaper Rhodesian goods. This led to the two governments agreeing to impose ceilings on exports to south Africa of a small range of products not formerry covered by quotas mainly radios and clothing articfes. Theodore Burl points out that the economies of the two countries in the product,s of light industry are generally

competitive rather than complementary, and p.B. Irarris men- tions that some south African firms have reft i_he ',co1d wind of competition" as Rhodesian manufacturers increased their output and sought to sell- them in South Africa.4 À¡other problem was generated by the several deval-uations of the South African rand. Lionel Disler explains that under the trade agreemenL, quotas \rere expressed in rand. Thus de-

valuation caused an immediate drop in volume which coufd be exporLed to south Africa. rn addition" those expor,ced goods woufd cost more and more.-and, since the Rhodesian market in south Africa was an elastic one, a price increase could cause a disproportionate drop in =.les.5

up to 1979, the economic ties between Rhodesia and. south Africa r{ere strong and south Africa loaned Rhodesia a lot of money to wage rvar against African guerrilla armies B6

that threatened the survival of Lhe t{hite Minority regimes with communist infiltration and ideology. According to the sunday Times (London), March 16, 1980" "Mugabe cannot afford to adopt radical policies because of the problems the new zimbabwe faces: " one of such probl ems, according to the paper, concerned external- debts which have been put at =-2501,j out of which Lt50 mil-l-ion is owed to south Africa for support of Smith during the guerrilla wars. considering the shaky economy of Rhodesia ravaged by the guerrilla wars and heavity dependent upon south Africa, as well as the friendly posture which the Mugabe regiime has taken Loward south Africa; it is reasonable to suggest that this economic co-operation wilr continue for a long time. The other country which had economic relations with Rhodesia was Portugal. Trade between Portucral and Rhodesia was govered by a bil-ateral- trade agreement concluded in l'larch 1965, which provÍded "most-favoured nation" treatment to be accorded by each party to the other's products.6 According to u.s. News and tr{orl-d Report of 24 March, l-975, Rhodesia's trade with the portuguese territories in Africa was insignificant. rt points out that the volume of trade expanded. after uDr but only accounted. for about z -22 of Rhodesia's imports and 4.58 of her exports by 1967. A report given to the uN sanctions committee by Mozambique at the time of the border closure in March r976, revealed that Itlozambique imported goods worth about US $f BM. fn addition, B7

Mozambique importecì 30,000 tons of Rhodesian maize l-ast year.

This sliows that Rhodesia -Mozambigue trade rose very much after UDI (1966-67). A UN Mission estimaLed Mozambique's losses from the border closure with RÏ¡odesia at approximately u: s.$31"1 per year and the increase in the price of imports at u-s. $10M. Mozambique deprived of such essential. products as maize and cement which had to be imported from other countries at increased transport costs, would also have to find alternative markets for the exports normalry sent to Rhodesia" The total physical loss resulting from Mozambiquets application of sanctions against Rhodesia would be be-i:ween U.S. $110M and U:S. $135Ff per y--t.7 This offers a partial explanation why some countries in the southern African region found it difficuft to disengage themselves from economic ties with Rhodesia. The cost of applying tot.al uN sanctions against Rhodesia by these countries is very high and this has made it increasingly difficult. for these countries to appry the uN sactions in toto. Furthermore, countries, lr'ke Zambia, Mozambique and Botsln'ana have learnt a bitter lesson over the'erlpty promises made by the uN for economic and to some of them that have been applying sanctions at a gireat cost to themselves. The promised aid hardly came at alt. Their promise has remained. rhetoric,,and hence some countries like Malawi and Botswana have pointed out that in as much,as they woufd rike to apply the uN sanctions, they ivould not 1ike "to cut their throats" oô ÕÕ

by totalry applying sanctions against Rhodesia and a1J_owi_ng their economies to crumble by Rhodesia's retaliatory measures. Furthermore, in a process of economic war between Rhodesia and other African countries, Rhodesia wourd be better off because she had outlet to the outside worrd thriough south Äfrica. rt would be reasonable to say that the Black Aírican countries of Southern Afri-ca needed Rhodesia more than Rhodesia needed them.

itzerland also maintained some rimited economic contact with Rhodesia and claimed that as a neutral country,

she coufd neither apply the ÞÍandatory sanctions of the uN against Rhodesia nor did she want to be used to circumvent the UN Sanctions agrainst Rhodesiu..B

However, according to Africa magazine of 24 May, L976, tÌle Swiss had a beneiicial- trade with Rhodesia. She provided

bank services to Rhodesia and this helped her get the much desired foreign exchange. Although the swiss claimed that trade between Switzerland and Rhodesia was insignificantr and that under the present swiss government, there was no further hope of expansi.on, in rg76, the uN sanctions commit-i,ee expressed concern that the current level of Swiss trade with Rhodesia was far in excess of the average volunt,arily undertaken by Slvitzerland and not to be exceeded annual_ry.9 swiss imports from Rhodesia consisted nrimarily of meat and tobacco products. siviss exports to Rhodesia corì- sisted mainl-y of machinery, uatches, and pharmaceutical pro- QO ducts,--10 Up to L978, the Swiss were engaged in a limited trade with Rhodesia. Malawi had close economic ties with Rhodesia and South Africa" According to Africari Development - 22 June, 1965, Mälawi concluded a t,rade agreement with the intention of promoting trade between tire i-wo count,ries. Af ter UDI, Malawi ter-minaied this agreement but continued to trade wiLh Rhodesia" Malawi did not charqe import duties on imports from Rhodesia except cement and a few items which are 1iable t.o excise dr-rty. 1l

From Ì965- L975, Rhodesia was one of I'lal awi ' s leading trade partners behind the U.K. and South Afrj .u.L2 Despite the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia, Malawi continued trading wiLh Rliodesia. A delegaiion of t¡usinessmen from Rhodesia regularly visited Malawi and the president of the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce told "Le lr[onde" correspondent in the lvory Coast on 3 September, L97L that Malawi was "an important export market which I am sure we coul-d expand. " Rhodesia's ideas of expand ing expori:s to llalawi v;ere stiffled by the'border closure in March 1976 between Mozam- bique and Rhodesia, which cut alf direct rai1, road, and finks between Rhodesia and Malawi . According to the Malawi Statisl-ical Year Book, Rhodesia's exports to Malawi declined by 658 beLrçeen 1975 and ì-976 and Rhodesia's imports from IrlaLawi declined by 63e.I3 90

Despite pressures from the organizations of African Unity (oeu)r orr Malawi to stop economic links with Rhodesia, Dr. Kamuzu Banda had found it. difficuÌt to do so because of his heawy economic dependence on Iìhodesia and South Africa. During the period of the central African Federation, the economies of southern African region \^iere highly integrated and became complimentary to one another. Total disengagement from Rhodesia by countries of the southern African region meanL economic and to some extent political suicide. The Central African Federation encouraged migrant labour from Ma1awi to work in the Mines of Rhodesia and South Africa.

According to West Africa, every year, the Ma1awi governrnent sends about 50,000 Migrant workers to work in Rhodesia and this provides a good source of foreign exchange for Malawi. u¡:'to rg7g, this labour agreement was in for".-14 This explains partly why Malawi had found it difficul_t to disengage it serf from economic, poriticar and sociar contacls with Rhodesia. As Dr- Kamuzu Banda, the president of Malawi himself pointed out to the r-egisf ative Assembly in December, 1978, rrf do not warit to cut my own throat by implementing the uN sanctions on RJrodesia indiscriminately. "l5 So in â \rrä| Ir{alawi maini-ained the refationship with Rhodesia out of necessity to survive economicalry, socially and pori- ticatry. This rel-ationship is more beneficiar to Rhodesia because it serve's three purposes: one, lt proved the White 91

Minority regimers case that their country was not isolated and this had a psychologicar impact on white Fhodesian that the uN sanc{-ions against their count.ry was not working; second., Malawi hetped Rhodesia t.o get the much-desired foreign exchange; and third, Malawi was used by Rliodesia as a "cover operation" to maintain covert relationships economic, political and social with oi-her countries. Another country that could have disengaged itsel-f from economic contact with Rhodesia but found it difficuft to do so was Botswana. Botswana is a landlocked country surrounded by south Africa, south-west Africa (Namibia) , and Rhodesia. rts onry rail connection to the outside world is owned and operated by the Rhodesian railways. rn reference to Rhodesia and south Africa, the late President seretse Khama, commented in a report t.o the Rhode- sian lJera)-d, Ilay 22, l96B that these , two countries are our neicrhbours and our existence in Botslvana is in- separably bound up with theirs- The extent of trade between Botswana and Rhodesia is unknown. Tl-re irnports and expori-s are included in the Staj-istics for south African customs union. The Botswana government had released det.airs of the 1965 trade with Rhodesia; and it was revealed that Rliodesia supplied 23.4å of Botswana's 't-otal imports, and Botswana shipped ]7. l_g of its exports to or through Nrodcsia. Bo'l-srvana was heavily dependent on Rho- desia for sugar, cigarettes; fert.i1izers, clothing, beer and 92 al_e._ l_6

In recent times, mining has become an important element in the Botswana economy and Rhodesia is weli placed to service orders for materials and eguipment. Thus, there

might have been an expansion of trade since 1965. The Botswana government acknowtedged to the uN that it might not be possible to avoid limited trade contacts with Rhodesia in connection with development projects and noted that: "as an integral part of the Southern continent whose economy is bound up with that of her neighbours, the Botswana government does not 1-hink it reasonabfe to cripple or destroy its own economy in order to comply wit.h the uN Sanctions.,, Specificalty the government no{-ed.: 1. shiftìng the source of suppry for such iLems as sugar to south Africa would increase transportation costs, which would in turn, cause a significant rise in the cosL of living due to the high level of poverty existing in Botswana. 2" rf Botswana applied sanctions more severely on Rhodesia, Rbodesia rçoufd retaliate by= banning arr exports from Rho- desia to Botswana; prohibiting the shipment of commodities from Botswana to or through Rhodesia; preventing the transhipment of pet-roleum products from Lourenco Margues to Botsrvana; and causing the withdrawar of equipment. and staff from the railway=.17 The government rearized that any retaliation restricting trade would be extremely harmfur to Botsrvana, but any retariation affecting rail operation inside Botsrvana could be disastrous. 93 Botswana is a good example of a landlocked country that had limited economic contacts with Rhodesia in order to survive. lier geographical position dictated that although in principle, she did not support uDr and was willing

to appry the uN sanctions against Rhodesia. But on t"he

other hand, total economic boycott of Rhodesia would mean economic and political suicide. This difficurty helped Rhodesia to some extent to evade Lotal economic, poritical-, and social isofation from the worl-d and Rhodesia exploited the difficulties of the landlocked countries to drum into t-he ears of the whites in Rhodesia that i-heir country rvas not internationally isolated.. This difficurt position has prevented countries rike Botswana from condóning the operation of the guerrilla armies in their territories because of their weak military and economic position. A Botsrvana student, in a countribution to a symposium, organized by the AfÈican students, university of Manitoba, orr 20 Àpril, 19 B0 def enrled his country, s position in not activellz implementing the UN Sanctions on Rhodesia. He pointed out that the applications of total sanctions against Rhodesia by his country rr,oufd be politicat and economic suicide because, untir Lg79, Botsrvana had no army and dependend for her economic and politicar survival_ on south Àf,rica and Rhodesia. rn effect, it means Rhodesia could attack Botsrvana if she r{as provoked and make her capitulate in a matter of hours. 94 Another country that. had limited economic contacts with Rhodesia as a result of her landlocked position as well as her close economic ties dictated by the historical tie in the centraf African Federation was Zambia. According to

Africa Report 22 February, Lg66, prior to uDr¡ Zambia was ihe largest'market for Rhodesia accounting for one quarter of all Rhodesia's exports and two-thirds of. all- Rl-rodesia's re-exports. Rhodesia's trade with Zambia helped produce a huge surplus in Rhodesia's favour which offset the trading deficit with south Africa. rt noted the implications for Zambia as one of the partners of Rhodesia in the defunct Central- African Federation as follows: the economies of the two territories became highly integrated, dependent and complinentary; for example, the Federation established coirLrnon services for air and rail transportation and for the supply of elec- l-ricity. The trading patte::ns established duÈing the Federation fixed and., as Hawkins noted., "it was more convenient as we]l as economic-*--for a whole range of Zambian import,ers, by f orce of habits , if nothing else, to continue to buy from Rhodesi+; unless physically prevenLed from doing so. "IB Upon achieving independence in 1964, Zambia adopt,ed a deliberat,e policy of disengagement from the Whit-e-controlÌed States of Southern Africa. This disengagement was accelerated after uDr. ZambiaIs urtimate aim was severe economic and trade connecLions with Rhodesia, lvhile giving maxirnum co- operation in the'impleirentation of the UN Sanction Resolutions. The gradual'raLe of decline in 1-rade indicated the time it took Zambia to develop alternative sources for these goods 95 which she formerly imported from Rhodesia, example coking coal and power distribution. One area in which the t¡¡¡o countries are extremely interdependent is in the supply of electricity. The central African corporation owned by Rhodesia and Zambia generates and transmits most of the erectricity used in these countries. The Higher Authority for power, composed of the Rhodesian and Zambian government officials supervised the operation of the corporation but this body was suspended by the i:wo count.ries after uDr. rt was replaced by a committee of four Rhodesian and four Zambian government officials which met arternately in Lusaka and salisbury. rn 1970 , 702 of the power generated carne from the Kariba dam, LJs" came from other power stations located i¡side Rhodesia and about 30ã of 1-he power was imported from z.ir-e.19 It has been the major aim of Zambia not to depend on this power over which Rhodesia had. a de:facto control. To this end., it started work on the Kafue Dam and on the Kariba North Bank power stations. rt is these power stations that supply almost '702 of Zambiats power reguirement today. The Zambian effort at disengagement reached a peak in January 1973 and March L977, when as a resul-t of Nationalist activities, rRhodesia closed her border with Zambia, exempting only personal travel and transportation of copper. The border rvas later on opened on the 4 Marcìr; l-973 assurances from Zambia not to al1ow Zaml¡ia to be used. 96

as a base for guerritla attack against Rhodesia. uN Mission sent to Zambia assessed the needs of Zambia in the light of the border closure on r0 January , rg73 ¡ appealed to member states of the uN to give Zambia-immediate assistance to avoid economic catast.ophy. 20

According to an informant in the Zambian High commission, ottawa, such assistance is årways a paper tiger because of lack of commitment on the,part, of ,the uN rviember Lo give such assistance- some of them from the third worrd.counl_ries lack resources to assist countries that suffered economic deprivation as a resur-t of applying the uN sanctions against Rhodesia- other rich countries of the tr{est do not find sufficient reason to herp the Front Line states of Africa as a resurt of their application of the uN sanctions on Rhodesia because of the enormous inLerests which their companies or nationals have in southern Africa. These interesLs which are politicar, sira-uegic, economic and military wil_1 be discussed in chapter Five. The difficufties confronting countries of southern Africa who appty Sanctions or partially attempt to apply sanctions against Rhodesia is important to the s-uudy because their inability to fully disengage themserves from contacts with Rhodesia herped her avoid the fulr impact of uN sanc_ tions against Rhodesia. The historical tie, to some extent, has contributed to the understanding of the Kationale behind the Frontline stat,es having limited economic contacts with 97

Rhodesia. For these Sanctions to work, the Frontline States

of Zambia, Marawi, Botswana and Mozambique needed Lo make some sacrifices for the greater goal of liberating Rhodesia

from the hands of the white Minority rul_e. .A.s Nkrumah said, "no African country shoutd consider itself independent until the rest of Africa has gained political indepen- )'l dence-"-- unress there is more commitment on the part of African leaders, totar riberation of southern Africa from the hands of Colonialism will remain a sham. Zaire is another country that had economic contacts with Rhodesia. Before uDr, Rhodesia suppried over Blz of Zairets meat and coal requirements. Trade between the two continued after UDI. . Despite border closure between Rhodesia and Zambia, zambia permitted transhipment of Rhodesian goods destined to Zaire over the Zambian railway system. Detai,ls of trade between the two countries are scarce but it. is known that Rhodesia supplied maize and coar to the Gacamines copper complex in the southern shaba region of Zaire. rn r976, officials of the Zaire railways, Zambia and Rhodesia met in Lusaka- and agreed to stabilize the flow of traffic on their lines. under the agreement, rz0 vragons of coal- and coke and B0 wagons of maize were sent from Rhodesia to zatre each week. The Gecamines, in return, exported 200r000 tons of minerals through Zambia, Rhodesia to south African port=.22 The Gacamines al-so bought power from the central African Power Corporation. 9B

The rationale behind the viofation of the UN Sanctions by Zaire is less obvious but it would be reasonable to suggest that t-he Zaíre government regarded economic contacts between

Rhodesia and zaire as being in the national interest. Þ1ore- over, zaíre is dominated by multinational corporations and these could put sufficient pressure on the Zairean government to maintain some economic contacts with Rhodesia. But more than anything, Rhodesia offered products at a cheaper price t.o African countries that traded with her L¡ecause of Iow wages that are offered to fabourers in Rhodesia. Trading

with Rhodesia also meant reduction in transport cost of 1-he imported products. Many African governments do not want to break sanctions on Rhodesia but es Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia point.ed out:

economic necessity dictates that we have limited trade with Rhodes ía.23 fnlest Germany had admitted having limited trade links rvith Rhodesia for reasons of economic necessity. The British government made known to the uN sanctions supervisory com- mii-t,ee in 1969 that west Germany r.ras importing graphite írorn

Ill-iodesia in violation of the UN Sanctio¡s. The l{est Gerinan government admitted the violation but pointed out as folfows:

A German Graphite Mining Company, Kropfuhl, established a graphite company in Rhodesia in May 1965 and agreed to buy the total production of the new company. The product mined in Rhodesia is cr)/stalline natural graphite which is not ol:tainable in any part of the worfd. If the Rhodesian Mines are closed down, that wiÌl mean the end of the 99

graphite company in Germany and all the economic conseguences this may entail-.24

Strack¡ âD author on Rhodesia notes several interesting points about this specific case of the graphite company: first, it illustrates the problem of vertical integration where an overseas secondary producer iniegrates with Rhodesian primary producer in such a way that if the arrange- :nent is broken, the secondary producer is hurt financially; second, it i1Ìustrates the point that secondary producers m4y have to become reliant on a Rhodesian product because of the unique physical and technical properties of that product. Kropfumbl was not alone in facing these kinds of problems. The British firm, Turner and Newall, was de-

I pendent upon Rhodesian mines to supply the rar,^J asbestos for their manuf ac'f:uring plants. Both Foote Minerals and union carbide, based in the u.s. refied upon suppries of chrome ore from their mines in Rhodesia to make ferrochrome. rn case of union carbide, its domestic ferroaltoy plants were specificatly designed and built to use the high grade lumpy Hnooeslan ore. 25 The I^lest German government, while adopting legislative and executive measures Lo comply with the uN sanctions, did permit trade contracts existing with Rhodesia in

February 1967, to continue subject to non-renewal. The uN Sanctions Committee noted that the I{est German businessmen hurried to negotiate long term contracts prior to t.he uN 100

Mandatory Sanctions. This is a demonstration of the fact that sanctions are difficult to enforce because sanction+ breakers have many v/ays of manipulating the resolutions of the uN to break uN sanctions against Fhodesia if continued economic ties are in their own interests. The case of west

Germany also demonstraLes how national governments can become helpless to control the action of. the companies and indi- dividuals in their own territories who have been known to contravene sanctions" They are faced with the diremma of

enforcing the LD{ Sanctions against Rhodesia and at the same time protecting the interesLs of their companies in Southern Africa. This is a contradiction which needs i-o be reappraised by members of the trN if they are t-o effectively enforce the resofutions of the uN. rt is too much to expect that countries with enormous interests in Rhodesia wilt be totally commited to the enforcement of Sanctions.

Australia hacl been exporting an average of 65rOO0 tons of i{heat to Rhodesia c}aiming that it did t_his out of humanitarian consi.derations. This was refrected by some members of ihe Ul'l Sanctions Committee ivho expressed doubts that the rvheat expor.r-s were of a humanitarian nature since Rhodesia rvas knorvn to be a net exporter of maize. Also since wheat had been exported to Rhodesia in non-drought years, it appeared to these members that it was a case of normal trade rerations which rvould be at variance with the spiri-t. of the security councir resolution. Hoivever, 101 other members of the committee stated that since the resolution did not clearly define what constituted humanitarian

exceptions, there was room for doubts in this matter. The sanctions committee did not pass any judgme.nt on the wheat

case, leaving it for consideration by the Security Coun "iL.26 In L972, the Labour Party of Gough Whitfam o-efeated the ruling Liberal party of William McMahon in the Austra- lian general Elections, and upon taking office, Prime Minister Whit.lam acted swiftly to end wheat exports i:o Rhodesia" Gabon was also known to have aided Rhodesia in the exportation of her products especialty meat. A 1ocal Gabonese exporter explained that: t.he plain truth is that we realize the geographical advanLages of importing cheaply from sources close at hand.. The country would pay more than double by bringing the same products in from, say, Europe.

A note from the United Kingdom government brought the Gaborrese case to the attention of l-he UN in Apri'1 Lg75.27 Reports from the Sunday Times (London) and the Guardian. August 27, l-973 suggested that Gabon's role \das far more important to Rhodesia than merely accepting Rhodesia's Beef. These papers pointed out that Libreville Airport, was used by Rhodesia to export many products including meat, sugar cane, asbestos and. chrome to western countries,- the most important of which were Greece, switzerl-and., I{est Germany and Kuwait. In 1978, Africa Magazine2B reported that President Bongo of Gabon was furious when he was .accused I02 by African Magazine having economic and pol-itical contacts with Rhodesia, He pointed out that many other Black African states had contacts wiLh Rhodesia but did not receive any

adverse publicity. At the end of May, Ig7B, he made an extensive tour of Africa and Europe to explain the stand of

his government on the uN sanctions against Rhodesia. He claimed that Gabon was observing the uN sanctions against Rhodesia as much as other countries and promised not to have anymore contacts with Rhode=i-.29

Ih"__åyjq Amendment: 4 Case SLudv In the Study of the UN Sanctions against R_hodesia, the u-s. holds a unique position in the sense that it was the only member-state of the uN to vote- in favour of sanctions, and tlren, enact domestic legislation thàt directly violated part of these sanctions. The Legislation is known as the Byrd Amendment of 1971, named after the initiation of the bi11, Senator Harry Byrd. The aim of this section i s Lo examine the stated reasons for its passage and the kinds of interests t,hat \,rere involved in lobbying in support of the enactment. Some of the ieasons offered in support of the legislation to con-ura- vene the Sanctions are unioue to tire U. S. other may have universal application. FinalIy, it was clear t,o all the acl-ors concerned that this piece of legislation did indeed contravene the UN Sanctions. 103

Because there are many arguments supporting the contravention of t,he UN Sanctions against Rhodesia by the U.S., an attempt will be made 9n1y- to summarize these arguments. This section is based on an 'informal content analysis of the speecìies of the participants involved as reported in the New York Tines of January f0, 1966 through September 25, 1975 But before examining the arguments in favour of the U.S, contravention of the LIN Sanctions / attempts will be made to look briefly at t,he history of the Byrd Amendment of I97L, to put the whole section in correct perspective The Byrd Amendment is named after Senator Harry Byrd (Ind. Virginia), who initiated this Amendment. After many arg'uments either in favour or against, it was finally passed by a vote of 251-f00 in favour of ihe.Amendment. The Conference Report then passed the House and the Senate and 30 \^ras signed into law by President Nixon on November 17 , L97 t. The Amendment authorized the U.S. from January 25, L972, to import chromium ore of Rhodesia origin, and any materia 1s of Rhodesian origin determined to be of "strategic and cri tical" value to the U.S Senator Byrd repeat,edly maintained that the only commodity that would be affected by this legisiation rçould be chrome ore. He pointed out tha.t: the clear reason for singling out this item is'simpie: it is the one item which could and should be imported from Rhodesia that is vital to the National Security of the U. S.3I The viol-ation of the UN Sanctions by the U.S. \ras so con- 104 troversial that arguments supporting the violation wifl now be examined. They run as follows: 1. some members of congress asserted that the uN sanctions

against Rhodesia were illegar. They claimed that the uN charter prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and that, in any event, Rhodesia's uDr did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. ? some members of the u-s. coirgress accused Brii_ain of a double standard. They poinLed c-rut that Britain traded with North vietnam and cuba against tÌre wishes of the u-s' but the u.K. had asked the u.s. not to trade with Rhodesia.

3. some claim that the u.s. presiderrt Johnson¡ usurped the powers of congress by issuing two executive orders wi1_h- ouL the approval of Congress. some ^ yet argued that Rhodesia rvas a friendry country which was against communism. since she shared this ideology with the I{est and the "Free hrorfd", it should not be isoÌated by the u.s. and the hresLern worId. B some argued that sanctions against Rhodesia caused economic harm to the u-s. because many u.s. mul-ti- nationars like union carbide depended on raw materiars from Rhodesia- 6. some were of the opinion that sanctions ivere conì:rary to American principles and heritage. 105 Another argument which was supported by many senators was that sanctions endangered the national security of the U-S"

o rt was the opinion of many congressmen that the Rhodesian

system of government had some merits: it is one of t-he most stabre politically and economically in t,he whore of Africa south of the saharar it is arso the defender

of western interests and varues in southern Africa. The u"s. t.he leader of the "Free world,' should not join other countries blindly to isolate Rhòdesia,

9. some of them argued that the uN sanctions aqainst Rho- desia had proved ineffective and should be scrapped.. 10. À few Senators, however, argued to the contrary that the contravention of the uN Sanctions r,voufd be an expression of hostility to the ulq and the u.s. as one of the founding fathers of the uN shourd not violate uN sanctions with I mpunl-ty..32

rnspite of this last argument, the sentime.nts that the national interest was more important than the interests of the uN prevailed and it h'âs this sent,iment -uhat rvon the d-y in Congress. rt is not the aim of this study to go into the sterile arguments to condemn or support the rationale behind the passage of the Byrd Amendment of Lg7r, rather, the.study

will- concentrate on the effects of the Byrd Amendment on the Rhodesian i{hites. But before doing this, it is important 106 to examine the interests that supported the contravention of the uN sanctions on Rhodesia. This will help to understand why they supported the Byrd Amendment and how their interests were tied up with those of the white r"Iinority. regiime in Rhodesia.

Interests That Supported the Byrd Amendment The inLeresi:s that supported the passage of the Byrd funendment were many and varied: According to the New-breed l1 Magaziner-' they included the conservative press and, an example of this would include the followíng De\rìSpapers: (Chicago Tribune, Indianapolis News, Cincinati Enquirer, Journal of commerce and many southern newspapers. Flagazines jncfude (u.s. and world Report, National Review); Columlists (WilIiam F. Bucktey). There were also ideological groups that supported 1-he Byrd Amendment of l-971. such ideological interest groups included the Liberty r,obby, American-southern Àfrican council; Amerrcan African Affairs Association; and American Legion. various poritical scientists made public statements or testified before the congressionar committees in favour of ending the sanctions on Rhodesia. rnfluential support was al-so provided by former secretary of s-uate Dean Acheson and nobel prize economist Mil-1-on Friedman. fndustry support came mostly from these sectors most affected by the boycott on the Rhodesian chrome, for example, 107 the Union Carbide.

The resumption of chrome exports to the U.S. helped Rhodesia to deal with its foreign exchange problems. l4r. 34 Sinith is reported in the U.S- News and l^iorfd Report,- - as saying that: we would be able to buy certain equipment t,hat we would like to buy f rom the U. S , v¿hich is at present denied us while it " is readily supplied to the Communist countries. There is no ,doubt that the White Minority regime overdramal-ized the effects of the Byrd Anendment and mixed it with a lot of propaganda to influence world opinion that sanctions against Rhodesia i"ere not working' and should be scrapped. The White lvlinority regime claimed that by re- suming trade with Rhodesia, the U.S. had given an independent country. This should sound as a warning to other. western countries that it was in their own interests to maintain political, economic, and social- finks with Rhodesia because ,it had a ]ot of resourcesÌ-o offer even'lro a"super power" like -uhe U.S. If the l{est could sef l- goods and arms to the Communi-st countries, it rvas morally wrong for them not to sel-l to Rhodesia which was one of their comrades in arms against Communist infiltration in Airica. ft should be noted how the l,ühite I'finority regime manipulated the "domino theory". To evade the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia, she interpreted every move to isolate her in terms of Communist threat to 108 southern Africa and this became an effective v/eaÞon for Rhodesia to avert the uN sanctions because the communist t.hreat was real- bo the economic, political, strategic interests of the West in Southern Africa. According to the political edit_or of The Rhodesian -?qJJ Herald, one of the most imoortant effects of the Byrd Àmendment was an increase in confidence among buyers of Rhodesian Minerals, rvhich in turn, could put Rhodes ia in a better position to demand higher prices for her products. i{hatever the economic giains achieved as a result of the Byrd Amendment, of far gr:eaLer significance were the

poriticar and psychological considerations. The Byrd Amend- ment reinforced the basic contention of the Rhocesian government that sanctions would eventually "wither away" in the face of the resolve of the Rhodesian people. The Rhodesian Herald editorialized on september 25, L97r, that the lifting of the embargo on chrome ore, "would be a wonderfur boast for the Rhodesian morale and bit.ter setback for those who stirt seek the countryrs

collapse. "

Renelved Debate on tÌre Byrd Amendment i{hen the Rhodesian issue was debated in congress in 1917, there rnras virtually no change from the previous debates concerning the support of the Byrd Amendment. I{hat had changed rvas the circumstances under which the Byrd 109 Amendment was being debated. Politically, Rhodesia had become a Iiability rather than an asset to the international corrrnunity with the escala- tion of the guerrilla warfare and the failure of the Angro- 36 Rhodesran - sei:tlement of June l-974 and. new diplomatic initiative by the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger together with Britain as wefl as the Frontrine stal-es to settle the Rhodesian crisis in June L976-

But. more than the above reason, the Democrats came to power in the U.S":i:n l-976 and from the outset, president Carter stressed the vigorous promotion of human rights throughout the worfd and lobbied on behalf of resioration of total- mandatory and comr:rehensive uN Sanctions against Rhodesia. Beset by the worsening economic and mititary situation, the smith regime deteriorated and t.he u.s, congiressmen wondered how a future majority African government of Zimbabwe might view countries rvhich had failed f-o appry the uN sanctions against Rhodesia and yet coniinued to seek access t-o the countryrs mineral wealth. Iforeover, the econo¡nic and straieclic reesons in favour of the enactment of the Byrd Anenoment in LgiL had been vitiated because the U"S. had a stockpile of the chrome ore to last for ten yeat=.37 The Byrd Amendment was therefore repeaLed because its existence was no longer in line with t.he political situation and the strategic threat to the U.S. by Russia, that rvas the main supplier of chrome to the U.S. 110 before the passage of Byrd Àirendment refusing to supply this strat.egic and critical mineral to the U.S. One lesson which the Byrd Amendment adds to the study of internaLional relations is to reinforce the basic assump- tions that "states as international actors will act in their own national interests. "3B If they discover 1-hat a collective decision taken by the international community wiIl affect their political, economic, military, strategic interests adversely no mat-t.er how much they have bound themselves to the collec'Live decisions, they will manipulate the resofutions to support their national interests. Further- more, it explains why many ldeslern countries had only half- heartedly applied the UN Sanctions against nhodesia. Some of them were aware of the activities of the mul-t,inationals in their countries that broke Sanctions against Rhodesia but pretended not to have known what was happening. The reality ir'âs that mdny multinationals from the trnlest benefitted enor- mously from the cheap labour and enormoLìs resources of Rhodesia and South Africa and it would have been unjustifiable for their governmeni-s to implement the UN Sanctions to the extent of crippling the activities of these companies. Such decisions: were not easy to take as it had economic, potitical and sociäl conseguences on the Western powers and hence they were accused of supporting the White Minority regimes in Southern Africa" A more rationale way to explain rvhy the i{estern powers did not support the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia 111 as their critics would have liked them do is to consider the fact that nations as actors in the international community have their interesls to support and defend. The western powers had enormous strategic, political and economic interests in the I'Jhite-controlled regimes of Southern Africa. Their interests wourd obviously be more secured if the status guo was maintained in Rhodesia and the rest of the white- rul-ed south. The white .Minority . regimes provided political stability which was ideal for massive investment from the

I{estern worl-d -

This explains why many of them supported the ultr sanctions against Rhodesia but did not seriousry inake sure that they became effective. This basic contradiction helped the i{hite Minority regime Lo avoid the totaf effects of the uN sactions and thus survived politicarry, economicalry and. sociarly. Arr attempt wilt now be made to see how Rhodesia used sports as a strategy t-o avoid the -u{.tr sanctions by trying to maintain internaLional contacts with other countries. social Refations IVhich Rirodesia Ì'iaintained wii-h other Countries and Orqanizations The aim of this section is to examine social reÌations r,vhich Rhodesia maintained with other countries and organi zations . Ef f orts wi ll- be rnade to examine Rhodesia's social relations with other countries and organizations wi rh special- reference 'l-o the Olympi c games. LL2 The choice of sports is not arbitrary: Rhodesians, but especially the Whites consider sports an important part of their iives. The Encyclopaedia Britannica notes that much of the adult life.is centred around ', ': sports clubs, while school children have ample opportunity to play organized sport throughout the year.39 Slorts also helped to boost the morale of the Whites in order that they might not become internationaliy isolated. Sports, therefore, constitute an inLegral part of the social life of Rhodesians and, Lherefore, international isolation of Rho- desia in sports would have a considerable negative psychological impacis on !ùhite Rhodesians. This explains why the White Minority regime continued to struggle to participate in the Olympic Eames in order to break this cancer of international isolation. The scope of the study will not aflow me a detailed analysis of all the types of social relations rvhich Rhodesia main-uained with other countries and organizations. At best, the study wil-l examine att,empts made by Rhodesia to participate in the Ol1,-mpic games and the problems she faced.. The Olympic games are the most prestigious and most publicized sporting event in the worl-d. .Attempts of Rhodesia to participate in these games set the stage for a significant coll-ision between divergent transnational interests and governmental aims - But before doing this, a cursory look at the importance of sports to Rhodesia, in general, will be 113 attempted and how Rhodesia tried to manipulate the orympic qames to demonstrate that she was not internationally isolated. The importance of. sports to Rhodesia as a weapon of avoiding international isolation cannot be emphasized enough. canas Ncube outlined t.he importance of sports to Rhodesia in an exclusive int-erview with me as fottor=r40 r. sports are important to Rhodesia because they do promote internaLional understanding and goodwill between Rhodesia amd other participating actors and do reinforce existing linkages and even creat.e new ones. ) He disagreed with Lord KiIlanin, the president of the Olympic aames who asserLed t,hat politics and sports do not mix. He argued that in practice, there is a close linkage between politics and sports. He cited the example of the U-S. go-.zernment boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow in I9B0 and pointed out how Hitler tried to manipulate the Olympic games in 1936 to reinforce his ideology of the "superiority" of the German people. He pointed out that Rhodesians as wel-l as other participants in sports compei-e under the banner of various States, sing their national anthems and the performance of individual sportsmen goes to add much.to t.he glory and pride of those States. 3. Additional-Iy, aLhletes, by meetinþ on individual basis can be great assets to a country like Rhodesia that was facing international Sanctions by explaining the case of tt4 their government to other international acLors and it is Iikely that they wifl attract sympathy and support for their country, He added further that Rhodesia by always presenting a multi-racial team, which usually performed well, \^/as aiming to show that there was no apartheid and racial discrimination in Rhodesia and t,hat people were judged according to their merits. Moreover, presenting a rrufti-racial teams was an indication that Africans were well treated in Rhodesia" 4. Sports will also make Rhodesia less internationally isolated. Professor Arnol,d Smith4I pointed out that participating in sports by the White Rhodesians boosted their r,,orale that they were not isolated. Furthermore, it would reinforce the point that the UN Sanctions are not only illegitimate but also ineffective against Rhodesia'and should also ineffective. The Tanzanian Hiqh Commi==io.,.t42 pointed out in ottawa in an exclusive interview that by struggling to participate in the Olympic games, the l{hite I'Iin.;rity regime was not only trying to gain international accepLabiliì-y but was trying to demonstrate that Rhodesia rvas an independent State and coul-d participate on an equal basis with other Sovereign states. "If Rhodesia was not independent, " he asserted., "why compete on an equaJ- footing with Sovereign states?" In other words, "she was seeking a de facto recognition from the international communiLyl', he asserted- 115

There is more evidence to support the above opinion that tìre Vlhites in Rhodesia manipuiated sports to try to avoid inte¡national isol-ation. InLernational sport serves to foster a sense of Rhodesian identity separate from other countries.' The sports editor of the Sunday Mail iroted the Rhodesian participation in the Olympic games and commented that: we like to consider ourselves a proud 4?tlo?1' ? country which has achieved won- derè wifh few resources. Competing in the Olympics is as essential a part of this nation-building as any political or economic development.43

Ilr. f an Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minisi:er, noted in January, Ì968 that: ft is a wonderful thing that Rhodesia is able to take its place alongside other nations of the world at the Olympic aames.44 This reinforces the claim that''iRhodesia was egual in international law and had t-he same status as any other independent nation, David tsutier, the l-ate Rhodesian yachtsman, told the Rhodesian Herald, May B, 1958, that: rt is imperative to have a 1-eam in Mexico City attending under the Rhodesian flag for the purpose of establishing a point 't-hat Rhodesians were runningi their own affairs, and doing it rvell. These statements indicate that. in as much as sporting activities are transnational relations, they nevertheless have important consequences for the inLernal if not external -political milieu in which the Rhodesian governnen-. rl6

Rlodesiars Attempt to participate in the i968 and l-972 Olympic cames ' The Olympic aiarnes are the most pretigious and mcst publicized sporting events in the wor1d. According to Rule I of the Olympic games charter, they are to asscmble amateurs of all_ nations in fair and equal competition. No discrimination is aÌlowed against any country or person on the grounds or race, religion or political af filiation. 46 Rhodesia was admit{-ed into the olympic games in l-960, as a separate countryi prior to that time, it had been treated as part of South Africa. Rhodesian teams participated in the 1960 olympic aames in Rome and the L964 qames in Tokyo. For ten years, according to the New Nigerian of March 24, 1976, Rhodesia remained a member in good standing of the olympic games and received invitations 't-o participate in all subsequent Winter and Summer games.

Problems of Rhodesia The problem arose, however, when Rhodesia accepted the invitation to t,he 1968 summer sames in trlexico city and the 19 '12 summer games in I'runich. Rhodesia was invited together with other members to participate in the games in Mexico city rvith the proviso that the athletes would sing the British National- A¡them and fly the Union Jack. The I'lexico city olympic organizing corunittee added that, II7 to overcome the passport problem for the Rlodesian team, all athletes would travel to New Mexico City on Olynpic credentials, which would act as passports to overcome any suggestion that Mexico had given a de facto recognition to Rhpdesia as an independent country. On May 28, Lg67, Ossie Plaskitt, Secre- 1-ary of the Rhodesian Natio¡ral- Commitl-ee (RNOC) , issued a statement indicating acceptance of the conditions. But the next dry, the UN Securi.,y Council passed S/RES/253 con- taining the Mandatory Sanctions relating to travel by Rho- desians. The substance of Lhe resofution was passed to the Otympic Organizaing CommitLee which issued a press statement on June 8, 1968 carried in the R-hodesia HeraId,47 stating that, "as a result of the resolution, the sports delegation of Rhodesia, which was invited to attend the Olympic games would find it impossible to participat.e in them." This communication was not sent to 1-he Rhodesian National Committee The Rhodesian at-hletes waited for a long time for an official written invitation to come irom the Mexico Nationaf Olympic Committee. This never calTìe, The Rhodesian National- Committee after waiting in vain for coirrmìlnication f rom its Mexico counterpart issued a press statement carried in the Rhodiesia Ilerald of June 20, 1968 deprecating the lack of direct and official communication from the I96B lrlexican Olympic authorities and accepting the enforced exclusion f¡-om the 196B ItJexican O1ympics. Rhodesia \das also invited to attend the J-972 Olympic t1B games in Munich, I^Jest Germany. Rhodesia as usuaI, accepted this invitation but again, a concerLed international effort, to exclude her, organized by the United Nations and ful1y supported by members of the organization for African unity and the Non-Aligned Nations started against this move. The UN Secretary-Generalr oD behaff of the UN Sanctions Commiti-ee and the uN special committee on Decolonization, made re- presentations to both the government of the Federal- Republic of i{est Germany and the rnternationar olympic commit.t-ee.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany rejected the reguest of the UN Secrelary-General that Rhodesia sbould be excluded from the games saying that the government had in March 1966, pledged to the rnternationar olympic committee that "it would grant unrestricted eni-ry, regardless of racial or potitical affiliation of the representatives of all National olympic committees recognized by the rnternational Olymic Coir'mittee at the time of the Oli'pp1" games in r972 an undertaking which had been a precondition for holding the games in Þfunich. The Federal government was in no position to influence the instructions of l-he olympic games which were binding on the organizíng committee nor to prevent the organi- zíng commiitee, rvhich ac1-ed independently of the government from extending the invitatiorr.4B tr{hen the Executive Committee of the International committee met in Luxembourg in september, 1971, it considered the problems of Rhodesia and ruled that she could compete 119

under the exact terms as it competed in Tokyo - This meant Rhodesia would fly t.he Union Jack and sing the British National A¡them. There wourd be no problem of passports as the olympic identity cards would be issued as travel documents. A senior official of the rnternational olympic committee was quoted in the Rhodesian Hqrald¡ âs saying: we cannot conceive of the Rhodesían government allowing t'he team to compete under such conditions. ft would effectively negate the Rhodesian decl_aration of independence from Britain. 49 Ä-braham Ordia, the President of the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa (CSSA), stated that: we are very pleased that the I-O.C. , executive commitl_ee had accepted this solution because we are sportsmetr.50 IJowever, the poritical pressure to excrude Rhodesia continued to mount both from f-he uN and the organization for African unity. Diallo Ta1i, former secretary-Generar of the organization for African unityr r€jected what he termed "simpfistic solutions" and pointed out that: The so-calIed Rhodesian government is completely illegal and has not been recognized by anyone and ivha.L she is trying to do is to obtain some sort of q-uasi- recognition by taking part in the games. We will never accept a decision such as that taken by the I=g-C. rvhich goes against Afri- can interests.5I

On December 10, 197I, the UN General Àssembly adopted Resofution 2796 (XXVI) which¡ among other things, deeply regr-etted the rnternational-,olympic committeer s decision and "called upon al-1 sLates to take appropriate st-eps to 120 ensure the exclusion of the so'-ca1led Rhodesian National OIympi c Committee from participating in the xxth Olympic

il 52 games - Due to these mounting pressures, the International Olympic Committee met on December 22, L97I in Ansterdam, and voted to withdraw Rhodesia from the g:ames. Avery Brundage, President of the International Olympic games gave the following reasons as reported in the ¡!gd"si"" H"r"Id of August 23, L972 for cancelling Rhodesia,s invitation: t. The West German government had. spent US g700M on the games and it woul-d be a waste of money if the crames are cancel led:

2. Rhodesian participation in Lhe Eames under any name would act as a morale-booster for {:he Whit.e.population, 3. It may well be that politics and games have become in- separable. On the positive side of Rhodesia's experience with the 1968 and :-972 games, they demonstrated that the application of Sanctions can be dysfunctional for the Rhodesian athletes rçho r.vere not al-1owed 1-o participate in the l"iunich games drew a great deal of sympathy among some of the participating actors at the games. The Rhodesian team was aflowed to stay on and watch the games as spectators at the expense of the I,lest German Organizíng Committee of the Munich games. They \.Jere invited to visit several towns in the vicinity of Itlunich and rvere the guests of Salzburg, an Austrian tourist I2I bureau. Even the Vatican Radio criticízed the decision of the Tnternationaf Olympic Committee indirectly on Rhodesia and wondered: wheLher all the nations scheduled to participate in the Munich games were free from the plague of racism and other vices--."53 Glen Byron, sports editor of the Rhodesian Herald commented on December fB, L972 that: we must be realistic - politics are entwined with sports and there is hypocrisy and double standards every- where - In assessing the I.O.C. impact on the Rhodesian politics, fan MiIls, noted that "the cro-settlement cause in Rhodesia has been damaged by the Olympic fiasco and has forced a hardening of opinion in the opposite camp -"54 Rhodesia's invitat.ion was cancelted at the Montreal games of l-976 on the grounds of non-recognition of UDI. From what has been discussed, it can be discerned why Sanctions have been more successful in their application against Rhodesia in sports than in economic areas. If countries were as diligent in applying Sanctions in economic areas, Rhodesia's viability woul-d have been seriously endangered.. Tïo major differences between the two areas are worthy of note: sports by their very nature, are public and open activities and hence the Rhodesian involvement is easily detectable. AIso the application of Sanctions against Rho- desia in spor-ts invol-ved very 1itt1e economic cost on the L22 part of the sanctioning countries. Indeed, it may be a very good way for countries that are finding it difficul-t to disengage from economic contacts with Rhodesia to demonstrate their fidelity towards the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia. and generate good publicity at very little actual cost to themselves. So one can conclude that in the field of sports, the application of the UN Sanctions against Fhodesia was successful- because by denying the Rhodesian athlete to participation in the 1968 and :-972 Olympic games, the attention of t.he international community was once again focused on the Rhodesian problem. Furi-hermore, the inability of Rhodesia to participate in the Olympic garnes re*oved the itlusions of the Whites in Rhodesia that their country was not isolated by the international community. The problem of interüational isolation and the reject.ion of UDf by Lhe UN became a real problem to the l'Ihite Rhodesians- ft i-s not unreasonable to suggest -,hat the dialogue which the Minority regime initiated with the British Conservative government between I970-:-97I l-eading to the setting up of the Pearce Commission in Lgl255 must have come about as a result of the UN pressure on Rhodesia Lo return to the path of le-oality. No matter what. achievement Rhodesia scored in the economic field by maintaining contacts with other countries, the UN rejected the political legitimacy of Rì-rodesia, ft rvas rather the legitimacy of Britain as the ultinate Sovereign in Rhodesia thaL was accepted. In other I23 words, i n the eyes of the international corïrnunity, the White Minority regime went contrary to t.he prevailing legitimacy and had to be returned to the path of legality at al_l costs. 124

POOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

For example, see Chief A.O. Lawson, the Chairnran of the powerful Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, rndustry, Ãgriculture and Ivlines in The New Nigerian (Kaduna) of 30th JuIy , L9'78 and lVigerian tribüne-libadan) of 31 JuIy, L97B; Africa 47 (Lonclon) JuIy L97 5 , p. 34 . 4{¡¿_gg Special Reports on Southern Africa 76 (London) December, L976; International Defence and Aid Fund Studies Rhodesia: Whv the l"tinoritv Reqime Survrves (London: Christian Action Press, L969) pp.:.9-25- Chief A-O. Lawson in August, l-978, condemned the foreign policy of Nigeria under Obasanjo's governrirent to the L^lhite- supramacist regimes of Southern Africa as beirrg "too dynamic" and that such policy of confrontation had been contrary to the economic well-being of Nigerian population. He argiued that on his recent tour of Southern African States he found that all of them including almost afl the frontline states had been doing good business with the White Minority regiimes with the help of the Western Multi- national corporations .

2 Eileen Hoddon, "Rhodesia's Four Years of Sanctions in African Contemporary Record (ed. ) by Colin l,egum L969,

? African Development 48 (London) 22 February, I978. Theodore 8u11, Rhodesia: Crisis of Colour (Chicago: ^ Quadrangle eress, 1968), ppry. Harris, Rhodesia: Sanctions, Economics and Politics' Canadian ffi .tT. Lione I Dis ler, "The Eifect of Rand Devaluation on Rhodes ia", pp. 20-23 6- Eileen Hoddon, Op. Cit., p 2L rbid., pp. 22-23.

Strack, R. Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia ( Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, l-978) , pp- ll9-l 27- q Ibid. , pp- ll-9-I20. 10. Ibid.., p. 121. 11. IÞid., p l-2T L25

12. Malawi Statisticaf year Book, November , I978, p. 6I. 13. rbid. , November, 1978,. p. Bl

L4. West Africa ( London) November. L976, p" 5 15. Strack, R., Op. Cit", p. IZB 16. UN Security Council, note dated 2l Feb. L967 from Botswana to the UN Secretary-General S/78L3, March g, 1961, pp" 5 -6. Cited in the -UN Monthly Chronicle (New York) 1968, p. 2L.

17. fbid., pp" 1_A

18. år-figg-¡g¡94 3 (London) r 22 February 1966, p. 2r and Hawkins "The Rhodesian Econony under sanctions" in Canadian Journal of Economics (august J967), pp_ 51-52. ffirceã-whiEE aescriÉe Rhodesian-Zambian int,erciependence in detail are, Richard Hall, The price of Principles; Kaunda and the i{hite South (f,ondon: Hodder and Stou t C. Cãoa, U.D.I. The -;-=fnternational Pofitics of the Rhodesian Reberlioã (Princeton Univ- lréss, O. I9 central African corporation, Annuar Report and Accounts for Lhe year ended 30 June, 1970, pp. l-3. Cited in Colin Legum (ed. ) African Contemporary Record., Novem- ber I97 4 ¡ p. 56.

20 rbid. , p. 57 . 2r- Kuwame, Nkrumah, r ratk of Freedom (London, Heinemann Press, 1963) p- 6ffikrumah advocated a radical foreign policy in Africa. He was one of those who calfed for a continenLar government..for Africa: An African High command as a means of liberating the remaining pockets of coloniar rufe òn Africa. His ideas were considered l-oo radical and Loo premature for Africa by many countries including Nigeria. For example, see the speech of Alhaji yusub Martania Sule, Nigerian Acting Foreign llinister in pan-Africanism (eá. ¡ by cotin Legum )) For detailed discussion of these rerations see star (Johannesburg), ApriI 15, L972. AIso see Hal_I, The High Price of principÌe, p. 162" 23. Strack, R. Op. Cit., p. 124. 24- 'À11 rel-evant materia ]s are found in the UN Security Council, Fourth Report, S/IO 229/Add. 1, June 16, l-971, pp. )-2B-33 Cited in Strack, R. :Ibid,' p. I27 . L26 25. rbid", p. I27

26. rbid. , S/L0229 , pp " I5-l_7 . 27. Materiar for this section was compiled from the various annuar reports of the sanctions committee of the uN security council including the Nineth Report released in August l-977 as UN, SCOR, 32nd yr; Sec. Supp. No.2, Vol- rrr' s/r2265t L977, pp- r-47 cited in eriica No. 41 August l-978, pp . 2I-25. 28- Africa (London) 27 l'1ay, 1978, p. 4I

29 - rbid" , 22 JuIy, l-978 t p. l-3. 30 The Byrd Amendment was one of the most co;:troversial bills that vras passed into law by the u.s- congress. rt was clear to Congress and a1l concerned that the ByrC Amend_ ment violated the uN sanctions aqainst Rhodesiá but was condoned on the ground that continuec support of the uN sanctions on this subject would adversely affect the security of the u-s. This was a-c]èar example of the u.s. manipulating the internationar system to protect and defend her national interests. 31- u-s- congress. senate committee on Foreign Refations, U-S- Sanctions Against Rhodesia chrome Hearings before the sub'conrmittee on African Af fairs , 92nd cong.; lst Sess; I97]-, p. 6 Cited in Strack, R. Op. Cit., p. i4B. 32- For a detailed argument for and against the Byrd Amend- nebt see U.S. Congress, House CommiLtee on International Relations, The Rhodesian sanctions Bill, Joint Hearings before the Subcomittees on Africa and International oigani- zations, 95th Congress; lst Sess; 1977, p" 54 fbid.; laB. For a review of this prior support see "controversy over :u'- s. policy Toward Rhodesia", Congresional Digest 46 ilI\rhite (tr{arch 1967) , and Raymond arsenãul-t, on Ch-roj-ne: southern congressmen and Rhodesia rg62-197L", rssue z (I{inter L972) ; pp. 4G-51 . 33 New Breed (Lagos) Vot. : No. 3 July 20, 1972, p.4, The- New Breed Foreiqn correspondenl pointed orl that the -u'-s- Congressmen especial-1y the more conservative right- ists supported the Byrd Amend.ment of 197r because the u-s- had enormous politicar, strategic and economic interests in Southern Africa and therefore, if power was transferred f rom the trtrhites to the Black Majority, these interests rvoul-d. be jeoparãîzed. transfer oÍ poruãr would also facilitate the penetration of communism ãnd communist inLerests in Southern Africa as the Àfrican nationalists rvho would take over from the whiLes were I2l

trained and supplied with arms for the Cornmunist countries. Transfer of power would mean a clear victory for Com- munism in Southern Africa. Both the U.S. Congress and Administ.ration reformulated African policy to ref l-ect this policy: that change would only come about in SouLhern Africa only through the iVhite Minority regimes and not Lhrough armed struggle. For a detailed of this policy see Kissinger, H. 'National Security Study Memorandum 39' (NSSM 39). This'waffint preparea r-rnAer tne direction of Henry Kissinger which revealed that the Nixon administration US policy towards Southern Africa was predicai-ed on the assumption that change in the region could only come through the Minority regimes. For a detaifed discussion of this policy, see Africa No. 40 (London) December I914, pp- 22-23. ?¿ U.S- News and Víorld Reoort 6 (New York) November 29, T 35. Rhodesian Herafd (Salisbury) ¡an. 27, L972 36. The former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took a diplomatic initiative to keep settle the Rhodesian crisis with the help and co-operation of the Frontline States, Britain and the White Minority regrimes in Southern Africa. With the change of government in Portu- ga1 in April L974, it became oh,vious to the U.S. government that power in Àngo1a and }fozambique would be transferred to the Black majority and this would be counter to the U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. The U.S. Ädministration wanted to adjust t.o the new changing circumstances by embarking on a new diplomatic move in June l-974 but it did not work because there was a wide gap beiween rvhat the African leaders woul-d and what the l{hite Minority regimes could concede in. terms of how power could be shared between Whites and Blacks in these count ri es . 37. For detail why the Byrd Amendment was recealed see Times (l-ondon) June 21, 1977. 3B; For a detailed discussion of what consLitutes national- interests, see Frederick H. Hartman, The Relations of Nations 4th ed. (London: Coflier-MacMm L-7 elso see Anatysing International Relations; edited by iVilliam O. C r. (New York: -/ Praeger Publi shers , l9 5) , pp . 9 6-113 . This gives a detailed analysis of Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations and it is relevant to the thesis. because it explains the basic contradictions between domestic and foreign policy behavior of Sl-ates. The hrestern world rvas caught in the horn of dilemma to supporting teh UN Sanctions which in many ways were at variance with the i{estern world's national interests. 12B 39. Encyclopaedia Britannica, I975, p. 2OI. 40. l4r. Canas Ncube, An inf luencial Rhodesian, working in Winnipeg, interviev¡ed on 9th Apri1, 19B0 at his residence. 4L. Professor Arnold Smith, former Commonwealth Secretary General from 1965-L975, vlas interviewed on the April 25 1980 at his office at the Carleton University Ottawa. ' 42. The Tanzania High Commissioner at OLtawa was interviewed in his office at Ottawa on April 24, l9B0'

(.lohannesburg) L967 p 76 . 43 - Sunday Mail october f 5, ' - 44. Tbid.-, p. 23. 45. Professor Smith, op. Cit." 46- Keesing's Contemporary Archives, l-968, p. 113I.

41 . Rhodesian Herald (Salisbury) June 9, l-968, p. 14.

4 B . Strack , R. _Op_. Ç. t. , pp - 228-229 . Also see the New York Times of Àugust 23, l-912 for detailed discussion of the problems Rhodesia faced when she attempted to participate in the Olympic games in both New Mexico in l-968 and Munich, l^Jest Germany, 1972. 49. Rhodesian Heral-d (Salisbury) June 24, L972. 50. The Morning Post (l-agos) august 20 , L972 , p. l-5. 51. ÐIggJ__lîâ11 (Johannesburg) September 19, l-971. 52. rbid., p. 19. 53. New York Times, August 24, 1972. 54. Rhodesian Herald (Satisbury) August 26, L972" 55. The Peace Commission, which was set up io determine whether Africans accepted "rnternaL Se't'tÌement" came out with a report that internaf settlement was r,ot acceptable to the majority of Africans.'lvith this revelation, the issue of internal settlement became highly poliòized and ',,'as popularly regarded. as sell out by the Conserva- tive government. 129

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL COI'{PANIES IN R}iODESIA

À separate chapter has been devoted to the activities of multinational companies in Rhodesia for the fotlowing reasons:

r. The acLivities of the rÉultinational companies are more pervasive than the aci-ivities of any other transnational linkage in Rhodesia. ) with Fiä¡yevidences that. had come to light as a resurt of the work of the uN sancl,ions supervisory commitee, it has come to light that without south Africa and the multinational companies, Rhodesia should not have survived Sanctions for so 1ong. 2 since sanctions-breaking has been blamed so much on the I{estern powers studying the -activities of the multinational companies will throw more light on whether there was a linkage between the multinationals operating in souther-n Àfrica and the strategic, economic and political inLerests of the Inlestern poweïs in southern Africa. The study of the multinaLional activities in southern Africa wirr also throw some right on the nature of conflict between the trrrestern por^rers and the communist countries I{hat is the nature of their conflict here? rs it ideological t ot economic? 130

The aim of the chapter is to examine the activities of the Multinational Companies in Rhodesia and how these were linked with the interests of the i,/estern powers. The chapter v¡ilI starL with the general comments on the Multi- national companies and will look at their operations in Rhodesia and the naLure of these operations. The activities of the Rhodesian lobby in Britain as well as the activities of the oil companies will be examined insofar as they were instrumental in helping Rhodesia Lo have int.ernational contacts and avoid the UN Sanctions against her. Àfter that, there will be conclusion to bring aI1 the points together.

çglerat Conxr'ents On Mu Multinational Corporations are defined by fan Robertson as "comÐanies that have become diversified in to a host of other industries by either buying controlling shares in other businesses or completely taking over existing foreign corpora- *l tions. " l'{any of them are wealthier than the host countrj-es ir, which they operate and 1,oday, they account for more than a guarter of the total economic production, a share that. wi t1 rise to over hal-f in the next l-wenty-five years (Sega1, 19 13) American corporate industry abroad is now the third largest economy in the rvorld, after the U.S. and the USSR

(Jacoby, 19 70) . Subject to the control of authority of no t31 one nation having a largely fictional responsibility to their far-fLung shareholders, dedicated to the pu¡suit of profit, and run by a tiny elite of managers and directors, these corporations are posing problems on a globaf,scale. Decision-taking by a small group of peopte in the U-S., U.K., and the U.S.S-R., can have far-reaching economic, social, and political conseguences and also can mean direct political interference in other couniries. American arma- ments, aircraft, and oil- companies, among others, have not hesit.ated to bribe government officiafs elsewhere in the world in order to win contracts or inffuence the policies of foreign governments. The International Telephone and Telegraph (I.T.T.), is known to have secretly requested the Nixon Administration to overthrow the Marxists government of Salvador Àllende of Chile because it threatened the company wit,h nationalizaLion of its assets. It offered up to $f Million to the U.S. government as a contribution towards the expense of overthrowing the Chilean government (Samoson, I972). These multinational companies have evolved much more quickly than have any means to apply socio-economic and political control over them; Since tl-rey are guided by profit motivation, it is easy to see rvhy they are active in southern Airica especiaì-ty in Rhodesia and South Africa the two Inlhite regimes that had the most buolr.a¡¡ economy based on the exploitation of minerals, agricultural produci-s and the processing of some secondary L32 industries. The greatest advantage which the Sout,h African and Rhodesiarr economies have over any other economy in the world is the fact that Africans who constitute the bulk of the unskilled and semi-skil-led labour are paid very low wages and this has helped the Multinational conpanies to make fantastic profits which are repatriated overseas. It is no wonder that the Multinational companies have been the r^¡orst Sanctions offenders because it is in their own interests {-o maintain the status quo so that they can derive a l-ot of benefits from Rhodesia. The main Multinational corporations will now be identified..

The I'lain Multinat.ional- Corporations in Rhodesia After UDI. ltj-nerals are the most important foreign exchange earner in Rhodesia. Even the founder of Rhodesia, Cecil- Rhodes, was att.racted Lo this area in l-890 as a resulL of its mineral wealth-3 It was his aim to build a huge empire extending from the Cape to Cairo, äD empire which did not materialize but nevertheless, did emphasize the economic potentials of this area According t-o the Times of London, March 17, l-980, under the caption "Cautious Optimism in Rhodesi d-,-ll the importance of mining to the economy of Rhodesia is identi fied

as f ol lorvs : The ltlining industry has a labour force of about 58,000 of rçhom about 5,500 are Whites, divided into six 133 categories, unski 11ed and semi-skilled, ffiddle, senior and top management. There is a solid blauk unskilled-and semi- skilled labour force, a sprinkling of blacks in the skilled and middle-manaqement qategories, with whites only in senior and top management. According to this paper, mining is important to the economy because it contribuLes 40e" to export s¿¡¡i ngs ¡ and I2Z to the total gross national product (g.n.p. ) , and is the nation's biggest employer after farming" The advance since l-965 has been imcressive. Produc- tion figures are still kept secret and comparison in real terms are hard to come by. But the fact that the mining output in 1965 was U.S.$65 Million and in I97B $3I5 Million gives an indication of the spurt made during UDI y"rr=.4 Tf one estimates the gold price at U-S. $550 an ounce, then by t9B0 mining exports should be irr the region of U-S. $410 Mil-lion. Mr. Harsh of the Guardian pointed out 1-hat since UDI, benefication and processing of minerals had increased. However, this figure was not included in mining but industry "So you have,,Lo',add. a.frlrther $300 million to essess the actual value of the mining secl-or".5 Lifting Sanctions rvilf m3an the country can sel-l- its output. through the nol--mal channels without going through the 'middlemen' , achieve rvorld standard prices and save the Sanction-brcaking micldLcrnen I s cost. Rl'lodesia has a range of about 40 }Iinerals and it was 134

this b¡oad base that enabled the mining secLor to increase output throughout. the uDr era. As world prices affected one mineral copper in the early l970sr so others rose in value Rhodesia's most import,ant minerals are asbestos, chrome, copper, coal, gold and nicker, The reading mining companies are:

1. Angro-American: rt has three nickel mines, Managers and secretaries to shamgani Mining, A Johannesburg consolidated rnvestments. some of its mines are chrome mines and the major trrranki coar ldines. rn terms of employ- ment, it is the largest company in the field. 2. Lonrho: rt has nine smaf 1 to medium goì-d mines , two of which produce copper.ras a by-product, copper (ineyati and Muriel) with gold and silver as a by- product in varying quantities at current prices.

This is a usefur asset.. The company also controls a smelter and eLectrolytic copper refinery.

3. Iic_Tfnto_lrne: This company has gold operations, some chrome hoIdjtrgs, nickels and emeralds.

4. union carbide: rt. has two major chrome mines and one gold ml_ne. 5. .åfrica AssociaLed Mines: Formerly controlled by Turner and Nervall, the company has l-wo large asbestos mines

and several smalI gold mines - 135 Messina T:'ansvaal: ft has Mangula copper mine (a large smel-ter, now constructing eLectroì-ytic copper re-

finery) . 7- Falcon Mines: The single largest gold mrne

B. Rhodesian Corporatj-on: gold mines. ô Asbestos Investments: This is based in South Africa" The company operat.es the Pagani Boss, Vanguard and Rex Mines. Rhodesia has important base mineral deposits, of which chrome and lithium are of strategic importar,"".6 The interesLs of Multinational companies are not limited to the exploitation of minerals. They also extend to farming and industry. Äccording to Ruth l"ieiss, writing in the Times of London 13 I'larch, 1980, "there are 6 r 000 white farmers, many of whom are absentee landlords- These include foreign-owned estates belonging to the British South African Corporations such as Anglo-American, Lourho, Rhodesian corporation and I-eibieas. Lonhro and Leibiegs together own two mil-lion acres of ranches. Stat.istics are not easily available for other corporations but their interes'l,s in Rhodesia must be ex- tnesive.

The interests of the multinational corporations , according to the international Defense and Aid FundT can be iclentified in the Tndustrial and Oi1 sectors. Today, according to this study, there are nearly 400 British companies wit-h subsidiary or associated companies in South Afri câ, and 136 more than 190 with subsidiaries or associated companies in Rhodesia. Among the latter are household names, t.n" giants of the British industries such as I.C;I., CourLaulds, Uni- lever, Shell and B.P.o British Leyland MoLor Holdings, Fisons, and. guest Keen (See Appendix C). There are also various British and American oit companies such as Shell and B.P. . Mobil which was associat,ed with the oil scandal in Beira, Mozambique, Texaco, Agip and B oLhers. These oi1 companies according to r"port=, more than any multinational corporations coflided with the Smith's regime t.o break the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia. This was to promote the enol:mous economy interests which they have in Rhodesia. By trying to protect their economic interests they helped t,he Smith regime to avoid economic, political and psychological deprivaLion imposed on his country by the United Nations because of his itlegat declaration of independence. It was because of the activities of the mul-tinational companies in breaking Sanctions t.hat has led distinguished scholars and diplomats to say 1-hat without the help of South Africa and the activities of the multinational corporations in Southern Africa. the Smith regime coul-d not have been able to survive the UN economic Sanctions for a very long time.9 It. is therefore the assumption of this Stud.y that the äpplication of'.sanctions by the UN against Rhodesia was detrimental to ihe profit motive of ihese companies and it was 137

precisely because of this that they tried to frustr,ate the

UN Sanctions so that they could have easy access to Lhe enormous resources of Rhodesia. The process of the Sanc- tions-breaking by the multinational companies will now be examined together with their interna tional financial linkages.

uüttinaLional Companies and Sancti ons Breaking in Rbodesia After UDI.

The Financial Times (l-ondorr) ,I0 described the operation of the British and American comoanies as follows: British companies operate in Rhodesia through subsidiaries of Sout.h AÍrican companies,' in others, British and South African Minority shareholders are combined with local Rbodesian capital, sometimes in private companies. The paper estimai,ed Lhat beLween 200 and 300 British llompanies had interects in

Rhodesia, wj th invest;nenr- of some L200 r,iif lion, aboui Ll 50 million of this in mines/ farms and property, Britain also supplied 309 of Rhodesia's overseas purchases - machinery transport equipment, chemicals and food valued at L40 million per year" British Financial interests a.ccording to Mlamboll also l-ink up with international interests, not only through the connections of the biq British and American firms such as Shel-l and B.P. but also through British finance in the great South African mining cornpanies, which in turn have I3B strong Àmerican, French, Víest German and African connections. Foreign investment in Southern Africa constitutes a considerable force, with a direct, interest in the status quo. It is a force not without the means to ¡lal

The Rhddesjan Lobby

According to an InLernational and Defence Aid Fund l? Study r " at the time of UDI o ât least two conservative shadow Ministers were directors of companies that had interests in Rhodesia. Mr. Reginald Maudling, depuLy leader of Opposition, and former chancellor of the Exchequer, was a Director: of both Dunlop and A.E.I., and Mr. John Boyd Carpenter, a former Cabinet Minister' v/as a Director of London County Freehol-d and Leasehold Company, whose subsidiary owns and manages fIat.s and offices in Salisbury, Rhodesia. Äccording to Director of Directo.=,13 membership of the United Kingdom parliament with direci-orships of Southern Africa connected firms include I'Ir. Anthony Barber (chairman of the Conservative party at the time), Mr. Niget Birch, Sir Cyril B1ack, Sir John Eden, the Rt. Hon. Hugh Fraser, È1r. Charles Gresham-Cooke, Sir Arthur Vene Harvey, Mr. Quintin Hogg, Sir Cyril Osborne and the Rt. Hon. Godfrey Rippon. These are all Conservative members of parlianent, and among them 139 are some of the most outspoken supporters of the 'lNoqotiated Settlement" or as others would see it, sell-out in Rhodesia. They also have their counterparts in the House of Lords Viscount Armory Watkins and Chandos are former Tory Ministers with directorshÍp of companies involved in Rhodesia. Perhaps the most outspoken and mosL committed to the cause of the whites in Rhodesia, are two infl-uential Con- servatives connected with the British South African Company: Lord Salisbury, director of the tsritish South African corn- pany from 1957-1965 and stifl a large shareholder, and 1"1r. Julian Àmery, former Minister of Aviation, a B.S.A,C. director at the time of {-he merger with Anglo-American, and leader of the right-win-o conservative tobby on Rhode=iu..14 As a prominent member of the right-wing Monday Club, he has made no secret of his sympathy with'Lhe Smith regime. According to the Guardian of November.25, L965, he told the British television viewers on November 14, 1965 that he saw no issue of orinciple dividing Wilson and Smit.h, and has since campaigned vigorously against t,he Sanct,ions policy of the

British government and the UN" According to hTho's lrrhor15 some of these companies involved in Southern Rhodesia also appear on the Council of the United Kingdom - South African Trade Asssociation, now adopted as official constituent of the government-backed British national export council -Among the Council members, according to the Who's Who, are Directors of African ex- r40 plosives (fhe South Af rícan Company joint,ly owned by 1. C.I. and De Beers which owns a subsidiary in Rhodesia) toget.her with Harvey of Bristol and Sta;rdard Bank are all actj.ve in Rhodesia. The owne.rs and directors of these companies have been active in campaigning to end the arms embargo against South Africa and Rhodesia because they view the UN Sanctions on Rhodesia as being detrimental- to their interests in Southern Africa" The present Rhodes ian lobby is '¡e11 organized and has friends in high places. Tt may be crediLed with the cracking 16 of the bi-partisan policy on Rhodesia, which broke down on the issue of Mandatory Sanctions through the UN. It may also be credited with the defeat in the House of Lords in .june 1968 of the government legislation imoosing Mandatory Sanc- tions. IJhatever may be its direct influence on government policy, some of its cenLral argur.ents that Britainrs trade with Southern Africa is essential to her economy may not be able to hold true {-oday according to recent siudy as countries like Nigeria with their enormous cil wealth are now even in a better position i-o maintain gainful trade with Britain and the !{est to the rnutual benefits of the countries concerned.. The recent statistics of contribution of crude oil to the U.S. in the Time Magazi.r"Ì7 (Canadian edition) places Nigeria figst on the list of atl the countries providing crude to the U.S. Tn fact Nigeria contributes 15.013 of the Lotal crude oil consumption in the U.S. There are I4I also impressive records of t¡:ade between Britain and Nigeria as well as ot,her African countries. rt will be politically unwise if trade beLween t"he west. and southern Aírica is conducted in such a way that it goes directly against the interests of African countries. This will drive them to trade with the communist countries. The resources in nhodesia wilf not disappear whether the government is controlled by whites or blacks" Inspite of the new economic potentials of the Black African states, the multinational companies have reacted unethusiastically over Lhe uN sanctions against Rhodesia. Among the British companies whose names have recurred in press and têlevision exposure about their connection with sanctions-breaking are Lonhro, vrhose British directors were apparently powerless to prevent the oit continuing to flow through Beira-Umtali pipelines for a long time after UDI because, according to them, they were out-voted by their Portuguese co-directors; Sheì-1 and B.P. whose South African subsidiaries built the Messina Petroleum Store; Turner and Newa11, who find themselves unable to control the export of asbestos from their own Mines in Rhodesia because it was sol-d through a Jsouth African subsidiary formed without the knorvledge of the parent company; Lancaster SLeel and Stervarts and Lloyds, v'ho have minoritlr shareholders in Rho- desian lron and Sl-eel Corporation, which is exporting iron ore. IB I42 rt is in fact open to any British firm to develop "normal relations" with its sout.h African Associate, and for that South -African Associate to act as agent for a R-hodesian comp"3ny" As long as elenrentary precautions are taken to disguise the origin of: the Rhodesian exports, and destina- tion of imports, a large proportion of internat.ional business can go on as ,-r=.r-1.19

As the 4frica MaEazine of September 10, 1976 has pointed out, evidence has come to light that five major oil companies have been secretly supplying the smith regime wii_h oil to support its economy and military adventures. This must have been known to the tr{esi-ern governments concerned., yet with their massive resources and poljtical powers:, they have been unwilling to stop it.. The "oi 1 conspiracy" is by far the most important sanction-breaking story in armost fifteen years. According to this Magazine speciar correspondent, oi1 is vitat to the Rhodesian economy. rt is one commodity that the country cannot do without, and cannot obt.ain within its borders. He asserted that "since uDrf the r{hi.l_e i"linority regime has been obtaining suppfies from south Africa. Now, however, for the first time, full-documentary proof has reveafed exactly how a number of lvestern companies have enabfed Lhe

Rhodesian white l'linority regime to survive sanctions. " The corresPonclent described in detail how this secret trade rvas carried out. The main evidence consists of a series 143

of highly secret policy documents which appear to show how Mobil has been sending petroleum to a Rhodesian government agency,

After UDI, Mobil set up what is described as a "paper-chase" to hide the fact that Mobil South Africa is supplying Mobil Rhodesia with oil p::oduct in contravention of the U-S. Sanctions regulations". According to t,he evidence, copies of which are produced in a r"po.tr20 confirm that safes Lo Rhodesia have actuarly taken p1ace. Soon after UDI, Mobil was asked by a Rliodesian government agency to set up a "paper-chase" for selling oil- to the rebel regime. This involved a nuinber of South African iniermediaries, some of t.hem bogus companies, which eventually sold the petroleum to Rhodesia. By 1968, it was reported

that a highry complicated system had been established. The secret Mobil memorandum stated that the aim of the complicated trade syst.em was "in the hope that it \,rill discourage an investigation . u2L ÞIobi1 was not the onry company involved in this secret deal. Four other l{estern oi1 companies are arso reported to have engaged in this profitable t¡ade; ShetI, B.p. Cal_tex and Total - operate both in South Africa and Rhodesia and it is likery that they l'lave al-I been invorved in Sanction- breakir,g. Professor Arnold Smith also supported the evidence that oil companies in the l{est did break sanctions against l.44 Rhodesia. He pointed out t.hat t.he Beit Bridge which connects South Africa and Rhodesia was the centre of oil distribution from South .African middlemen to Rhodesia. When he was the Commonwealth Secretary-General from 1965-L975, he advised the British government secretly to destroy the Beit Bridge but his advice was ,gnotuð,.22 Furthermore, Tony Row]ands, the chairman of Lonrho from t965-1978, frustrated by the cl-osure of Lonrho's Umtali-Beira oil pipeline, disclosed the activities of the British companies that were making enormous profiLs from the oil trade by breaking Sanctions. He poinied out that a number of British companies had increased their Lrade with Rhodesia since UDI. Rowlands singled out both Shetl and B-P. controfled by the Uniied Kingdom government as the worst offenders at breaking the UN Sanctio.r=.23 The Lonrho chief pointed out in December I976 that his company had shut,down its oil pipeline from Beira to Umtali immediately after UDI. Yet Rhodesia has continued to i-mport large quantities of oil indeed petrol consr.lmption

has risen by 3BB and both She1l and B,P. appear to k¡e involved in this trade. Until the closure of the Mozambique border -with Rhodesia in March L976, oil supplies had been rail-ed from l.laputo and Rowlands claimed to have supplied the British foreign office with chasis numbers of 300 railway tank--rr'agons rvhich had carried oil along this route but the British government did fittle to stop the tt.de.24 L45 )\ According to the New york Times special correspndent ¿) mcst of Rhodesiats oil reguirements lvere shipped from South Africa and then railed into Rhodesía; The paper added that since the border closure between Mozambique and Rhodesia .in March' L97 6 1 Rhodesia's pet.roleum has mainry sailed directry from south Africa. The most important rouLe has been the newly-compì-eted iail link through Rut,enga. But two problems arose for landlocked Rhodesia: first, the line has insufficient capacity to handle all the country!s foreign trade; and second, it has become vulnerable to guerrilla attack. some of the oil is therefore sent on the long meandering rairway through Botswana and it was being suggesied that the route may soon be closed by president senetse Khama of Botswana. South Africa and portug:al before the attainment of independence by Samora Machel were the greaLest assets to Rhodesia's survival. Fearing thàt if the uN sanctions succeeded in Rhodesia, they woul-d be turned on her, south Africa stepped in to foir the effect of sanctions on Rl.o- desia by increasing trade, providing financial roans, iransport and passage facirities at her harbours for goods destined,to and from Rhodesia. The activities of the five oir comoanies involved in sanction-breaking ltobil and cartex (American) , B.p. (Bri- tish), sherl (angto-outch) , and Totat (nrench) , must have been known Lo the Irrestern governmelits concerned.. These governments wii*h their enormous resources and judicial I46 powers, have surel.y known for years that their national oil companies have been sripplying Rhodesia. Yet for more than fifteen years have either been unable or unwilling to reveal how this trade was being been carried out. ft was this lack of political will on the part of the members of the international community to effectj vely control the activities of tbeir multinational corporations working in Rhodesia and South Africa that rendered the UN Sanctions against Rhodesia less effective. It was because of this that apparently it fooked as t,hough Sanctions did not achieve their objective and some people even advocated their scrapping. This is not l¡ecause Sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy is a useless Weapon, but because they are not being strictly applied.- L47

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

Ian Robertson" Sociology (New york: Worth publishers, L977) , p" 427 . For a detailed discussion of the complicity of the Central fntelligence Agencyt;: (C- f -A. ) , in the over_ throw of the Marxist chilean leader, late presiclent Àf1ende, see Ian Robertson, Tbid., p. 428-

Rhodes was Prime Minister of the cape from l-890. He was president of De Beers, the great diãmond mining and marketing monopoly which he helped to found.. He r.ras one of the richest rnen in the rçorld. Fhodes' dream was to i¡ush a 'red route' of British possessions up through õentrar- africå, to link up with the Great Lakes, the Nile and Egypt: British soii from caoe to cairo. He arso sav/ in nhocesia a source of imnense mineral wealth "the gold of fifty Rands,, he promised his investors.

Times (London) March L7 , f980, p. l_5 Guafdian (-l.lanchester) March 19 , rgB0. 6. For a detailed discussion of the range of minerals and their conLribution to the Rhodesian õ"o.ro*y see Times (London) March 17 , l-9 80, pp. 15 -24. 7" Tnternational Defence and Äid Fund, Rhodesia: why the Minority Regime survives (London: :----L - chiisti-an Actiån Publishers@Za-zl . B. See åItl.q (London) Sept,ember Ig76 Rhodesia: The OiI Conspirary. A correspðndent of Africa has reported in this paper that evidence has come toJight triåt five major oil companies have been supplying the smith regime with oil for its economy and mirilaiy activities. This must have been known to the I.Jestern gorrernments concerned,, yet, 'ivith their massive resources and judicial powers, they have been unwilling to stop it. ir,is is airother conflict betrveen domestic interãsts and uN obligations ivhich members states are constantly battling to reconcile. s Ralph urvechua, Editor-in-chief of Africa Magazine, Professor Àrnold Smith, Ambassador-salim saíim, rånzania perrnanent RepresentaLive at the uN and chairman of De_ colonization committee,- Dr. Edwin ogbu, former Nig.eria I48 permanent Representative at the UN and former Chairman of Anti-AparLheid at the UN contend that the Multi- national companies operating in Southern Africa had contributed immensely to the continued surviwal of Rhodesia and the ilhite regiimes of Southern Africa" See Africa (London) nec. L974.

',l 0. Financial Times (London) October 9, 1965" 1r. Mlambo, E. Rhodesia: The British Dilemma (London: Christian Action Publication, LglB) p. 15. 1) International Defence and Aid Fund., Op. Cit", p. 24-26. 13. Director of Directors (London) 1969, pp. 101-f03. 1^ Tbid " , p. l-03 . 15. IVho!s Who (London), I972 r pp. 3t*33. 16. The British parliament was divided on the internaliza- tion of the Rbodesian problem by Great Britain. Many members of parliament, but especially in the House of Lords felt that the Rhodesian problem was a iomestic issue and therefore, was beyond the competence of the UN to deal with. i{hereas the majority of the ltlembers of the House of Commons supported the labour government stand that Great Britain should co-operate with the iiN Sanctions against Rhodesia- For details of the argiuments for pros and cons of the inLernalizat.ion of the Rhodesian problem, see Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence (London: Hurst Publication, 1969), pp. 2L4-L7. r7. Time lriagazine (Canadian edition) Feb" 2L, f980. l_8 - International Peace and Defence Aid Fund, Op. Cit-, pp. 36-40. 19. This proccss of secret i:rade beirveen the Multinational- Companies and Rhodesia are rvell discussed in Africa Itlagazine December L97 4 -

20 The Lll{ Sanctions Committee r^¡rote a lengthy report in November 1973 and submitted to the UN Security Council in October, I974. The Report exposed those western oil companies that were constantly supplying oiI to Rhodesia. They include Shell and B.P.; I'iobil, Tota1 and Caltex" For a detail of this report see Africa, December 23, L97A, pp. 17-42. 2L" Ibid", p. 38. 149 22" Professor Arnold Smith, interviewed at t.he Carfton

UniversíLy, Ottawa , 25/4/80 " 23. Africa (London) December 25, I976"

24 L7 " rbid" , p" " 25- New York Times, Irlarch 24, 1977. t50

CONCLUSTONS

Until L974, the Rhodesian economy prospered in the face of united Kingdom and united t'lations sanctions - sanctions which Rhodesia and her international allied support such as South Africa, ând Portugal, to rrention but a fev¡ claired had failed to achieve their declared goal of causing enough internal political change to terminate the "i11egal rebellion" by the Smith regime. Furthermore, the White Minority regime claimed that not only did sanctions fai] to achieve t.heir major goal, but they had been a contributory factor to the deterioration of a situation ivhich 1-hey were desi-gned to alleviate" The position of the African population becanê \{ors€ in the nine years after UDI. Furthermore, the P.hodesian Front party consolidated its support and., as of L974, had never been stronger. But in L974, the overthrow of the Portuguese government b1' the army and the desire of subsequent governments to disengage Portr-igal- from Africa signarted a radical shift in the balance of power in the Southern African region. The guerrilla war waged against the Smith regime by black nationalists r,vas intensified as a result of the wiÌlingness of an indepencent Mozambiqrre to provice staging areas, sanc- tuaries, and support for the Rhodesian guerritlas. prior to L974, Rhodesian security forces backed by south African police 151

contained the guerrilla war with ninimal- co.st to the Rhodesian

economy" Þut tJre v¡iLhdrai,val cf the -qouLh African police in L975, the clcsure of Lhe Mozambigue bor:der in ).976, and the growing militancy of Zambia in I971, reguired a subbtantial diversion of Rhodesian .resources from domestic production to the ivar effort. The L917-78 estimates of expenditure published in the Rhodesian Herald of JuIy L, 1977, revealed that the war eff,ort v¡as consuming over 25 percent of the government bucaet or nore than R 5400,000 per day - an increase of 44 percent over the previous year. By L977, the Smith regiime not only had accepted the

principle of majority rule but was prepared to examine a joint Anglo-.American proposal to instal-l- a majority-ru1ed government in Salisbury by the end of LglB.2 The ccmbined effects of Sanctionsr. Mozambiquels hc:stilib,z, and guerrilla

war accomplished what ihe sa¡ctions progrram alone could not do, i.e. incìuce the Smith reg.ime +-o consider yieì-ding political

power to the African nationalists - As noted in the theories of sanctions irr chapter two, schola::s who have stuCied the use of sanctions 'uo secure

various policy objectives in the international system ha..'e

generally conclucled that t-he¡z are inef fective and r,ay even be counteroroduct.ive. A stu$z of the llhodesian case seers to confirm their concli-rsions . This does not suggest, however, that !Sanctions by themselves have faiied i-o achieve secondary goals or th.rt they have not hacl any adverse effecLs on Rho- 152 oesia. An African Bureau study fc'und that sa.nctions kept Rhodesia in a state of compfete d.iplomatic isoration, forced the re<;ime to struggle for economic survivar at ever rísing cosr- to itself , maintained'international_ concern over the Fhodesian issue, and sustained the world view sf the unaccepta- 'bility of the t"gl*".3 These are mainlv successes of a symbolic or punitive nature and were insufficient in or -of thenselves to end- Lhe rebelli-on or end the situation '¡hich tl-e Ull Secutity'Oor-:ncil found to be a "threat to international peace and security. " on a tacticar leve1, the ineffectiveness of sanctions \das a failure to isolate Rhodesia from international- contacts. The orohibitions contained in the sanctions applied by both the U.K. and the U.N. involvetl the isclation of Rhodesia from all international contacts except those concerning humanitarian needs and communications.4 The purpose of this study has been to identify, explain and determine how, and under what circumstances Rhodesia has been able 1-o mainiain and/or estabfish her international relaticnships in spite of the uN sanctions. CIearIy, from the evidence presented, Rhodesia had managed to avoid international isolation. But isolation is not an absolute variabre in the sense of either existing or not existing. rt is an especiarly difficult r-oncept to neasure in the case of Rhodesia. comparisons cannot be made to what Rhodesia's international position might have been j_n the absence of sanctions. Nor is it entirerl' appropriate to compare Rhodesiars internat.ional- position before and after ts3 the apprication of. sanctions. Rhodesia's inLernational identit.y was changed uniraterally by her doclaration of irr- dependence. Prie¡ to UDI, she was a "self-governing territory" of Great Britain, after uDr, she was a "self- proclaimed independent staLe.,' Many iirdices of inrvard or outward orientation or isolation of countries are thus not fully applicable to Rhodesia (e.g. the number of diplomats sent and received, and the number of international member- shipi. Moreover¡ Rhodesia was a separate political entity for less than two years prior to uDr. From 1953 to 1963, she had been part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and separate statistics rvere not kept for Rhodesia in many areas such as foreign trade. Charles Taylor and lr{ichael Hudson employ three indices to measure a country's external- dependence: l-. concentration of commodites within a a country's exports.

2 " concentration in the number of countries to which a country sends these exports. 3. Totar foreign 'i-rade as a percentage of gross naiional product; and foreign mail as a percentage of total- maiI. of course, since uDr, statistics are not avaitable to compute the first trvo indices. rt is reasonable to suppcse that since Rhodesiars economy had diversified since UDr, and the reliance on tobacco, Rhodesiats major pre-uDr export, âs an earner of foreign exchange has diminished, Rhodesia's trade had become less concentrated. since south Africa,s rol_e as a major tra- 154

ding partner had greatly increased, the concentration of countries to whi-ch Rhodesia sent her exports arso probably increased.. statistics were availabl-e through Lg72 for the third set of indices. Taylor and Hudson explain that "these series are desígned to show whether the country has an inward or outward orientation anc the degree of that orientation"5 t-bt" 2.r presents statistics which indicate that Rhodesia had developed a more inward orientation since uDr; they show that the foreign component in Rhodesia's i.otal- maif gradual-ly decl-ined since uDr and that foreign trade as a percentage of gross national product sharply declined in the first year after uDr and remained steady thereafter. compared to r25 other countries in 1965, however, Rhodesia had a very high ouLrvard orientation to begin with ranking 14th (see table below).

Table 2 "L Measures of Outward Orienr_at'i on of Rhodesia L964 1972

Foreigrr ¡'l.ai f as Year Year Foreigm Tlade as --- Percentage of Tbtaf rfail "* p.r*r,trg. of G.N.p.

1964-65 39 -26 1964 7L.84 1965-66 37.20 1965 75.72 l.966-67 36.79 1966 49. s8 1967-68 34.24 L967 47.I3 t96 B-69 32 -48 1968 45.60 1969-70 29 -84 l969 43. 13 1970-71 28.46 I970 46. 13 L97I-12 21 .BL L9]L 46.62 1972-73 26 -63 rgt2 45.03 sor.rrccs: Rhodesia, ?\rnuâI R:ports of the posL-,ester-Generar and the Posts and Tþlecc¡rumrniations Corporations 1964-1913; Rhodesia, Cerrtral statistical- office, Irbnthry Digest of statisLics, Febmarlz 1974, pp.4c-44 cited in strack, R. sa¡ctjons: The caseof Rìrodesia, qp. cit. p-.- 240. 155

rn any overal-l discussion of the degree to which sanctions have isolated Rhodesia, the essential question is: Has Rhodesia's isoration from international contacts been sufficient to provoke an internar politi ca1 change satisfac- tory to t.hose parties imposing-'sanctions? The answer is clearly in the negative. Avoiding isolation generated both material and symbolic benefits for Rhodesia, economic deprivation was averted, public morare v,/as enhanced., and subjective feelings of legitimacy were stimulated. The Rhodesian government claimed that internaiional- relations and. contacts would afso bring objective recognition of Rhodesia's legitimacy. The ?Jrodesian ìli¡ister of Ð

up to september L979r .o single state in the worr_d recognized Rhodesia. 1s6

SOME II"IPLICÀTIONS OF THE UN APPLICATIONS oF SANCTIoNS AGAINST RHODESTA

On August 2, 1963, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, in referring to the oossibility of-applying sa¡cbions against south Africa, noted in the security council (s/pví 1052) ttrat "the result of the adoption of such measlrres, particurarly if compliance is not widespread and sincere, would create doubt.s about the validity of , and diminish respect for, the authority of the uN and the efficacy of the sanctions process envisioned in the charter. "B seven years l-ater, the u.s" Ambassador to the uN, charles yost in referring to the extensions of Sanctions against Rhodesia, -"v'ärrì€d. LI that"impossible burdens must not be praced upon the uN, and care must be taken not to demand of it more than it can deliver.', To do so wifl only emphasize its shortcomings, bring it into contempt, and lessen public confidence and support on which its future growth and reinforcenent depend..,'9

The efficacy of the sanctions poliqf against Fhodesia is im- portaiit to the general perception of the uN as an instrument able to promote world peace and securit\'. Sanctions had been neither speedy nor particularly effective in achieving termination of uDr " conditions have been described some unigue to Rhodesia, some inherentJ-y a part of the present international poriticiar system - which impeded the sanctioning effort and cast doubts about the efficacy of sanctions in any future application by the UN. L5l

The Portuguese coup of ApriI I9741 and all its ramifications for SouLhern Africa vras the single most' lrnportant factor in persuading Frime Minister Smith to accept the principle of majority ru1e. The tenacity with which the idea of Rhodesianssanc- tions had been maintained at least on the governmental- l-evel was impressive. As noted above, Sanctions did not wither away, For most of the member-states of the UN; the effort against Rhodesia was an ideologjcal- a¡d s)¡mbolic struggle which was not easily forgotten. As the Finnish delegate to the UN noted in the Security Council on June f3, L969 (S,/pv. L4'76) , vrhile the illegal regime continues to survive in an economic sense, it survives as an outcast with no hope of ever gaining recognition. "ll Thus, r,vhat has been achieved so f,ar by the UN in the question of Southern Rhodesia is surely an impressive demonstration on beha1f of eguality of races and the rights of man." In L974, UN Secretary-General, Kurt I{aldheim observed that "the question of Southern Rhodesia wil-1 go down in history as the case in which the measures provided for in Article 4I of the UN Charter were implemen- 12 ted. "*.- Alt,hough the authority was there, practical- ex- perience in applying. Sanctions was completely lacking" It is understandable that it had taken time to develop the sanctions procedure and gradually perfect the machinery by use. ft may be that ganctions are a long-l-erm means of t5B

influence whose synbolic achievemenis become apparent

before their political achievernents. Iìclvever, sanctions ¡.ust be regarded as marginar instruments of influence best employed in conjunction with other means of infruence such as armed force especialry if politicar resul-ts are desired in the short-terrn.

Whether or not the sanctions program aqainst Rhodesia wil-l- diminish respect for the uN is specurative. But now that the majority rure has been achieved mainry through constitutional talk in London, the uN will stifl be ab]e to claim success for its sanctions program as having been a contributory factor. Finalry, sanctions as an instrument of policy of the uN are not useless, it is the machinery for enforcement that needs to be strengthened,. The question then may be justifiably asked whether, if another country finds itsetf in the position which Rho- desia found herself in, it r¿ould alr,¡ays react the sane \À/ay did PJr'odesia. This sort of prediction is not possible or even necessary in social sciences for the simple reason that human (and arso group) l:ehavior is the outcome of several- motives some rational- others not. But at least this stud.y suggests how and why Rhodêsia inspite of the uN appfication of sanctions against her, was able to maintain international contacts with an aim of beating these Sanctions. ]s9

Yet Rhodesia really did not become nore viable in the lzears that sanctions vrere in effect. rnitial prosperity after UDI \^/as due in large measure to the basic soundness of the Fhoclesian economy at that tir¡e ancj the ability to tair the countryrs reserves such as excess industrial ca¡:acity, import-substitut,ion, increased productivity, and mineral_ exploitation. Sanctions hinCered the ability of the RhodesÍan government to cope with these problems - a fact acknowledged by the P.hodesian oovernment. The Föodesian econom)/ has been rer'¡arkably resilient in the face of the enormous costs which had to be expended in order to evade the sanctions, but there \ry-as a question as to how long this resifence would last in the face of not only the sanct,ions but the pooulation explosion in Rhodesia and g'uerri1Ia problems. Prime l,linister Ian Smith, provided onej ans\,'rer on ììovember 25, L97L, to the House of Assembly: Things seem Lo be doinq pretty wetl, and I cannot, by any st.retch of imagínation, say that if v¡e had failed to reach agreement this rvoufd have prejudiced Rhodesia's position this year¡ or next year. But it is our assessment that in ten or twenty years time the position would not be so qood for our childien. l-0

Sniithrs assessment rvas correct in the short-term, 197L-L974, but rvas incorrect in the long-terrn. He could not foresee that Rhodesia's economic viability would be called into question as early as L976, because of disintegration of witt and determination not in Salisbury, but rather in Lisbon. 160

FOOTNOTES FOR CONCLUSIONS

1" For understanding the performance of.the Rhodesian economy after UDI, see Strack, R. Op. Cit., pp. 85-93" 2. By December, 1978, Prime I'Iinister f an smith relinguished power at least theoretically to Bishop Ã-beI Muzorewa who was a leading member of those B1ack Rhodesian who participated in the "fnternal Settlement"" The oLher leading black l-eaders we Chiran and the Rev. Ndabamingi Sithole. In the "so-called election,' that was org,anized, Bishop Abel Muzorema won with an over- ivherming majority and became the prime Minister. Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, leaders of the patriotic Front Party refused to participat.e in the "internal Settfement. " 3- Guy Arnord and Aran Baldwin, Rhodesia: Token sanctions or Total Economic Warfare (f,o

4. rbid., p" 3I. 5. Charles L. Taylor and Ir1.C. Hudson, I.Iorld Handbook of Political and Social rndicators (¡¡effi.

6. Strack, R, Op. Cit¡ p. 24A. 1 " rbid. , p. 240. B- Ibid., p- 25L. 9. The Department of St.ate Bulletin 62 (April f3, 1970). l-0. Rhodesia Herald, November 27 , J-97I, p. 15. 1I. Strack, R. Op. Cit., p. 252. 12. fssue 6 (January-March l_974), p. 28, 161

APPtrNDIX A

? no c!-amaÍ.io n Bno a.dca,s t b U Ian Smitl't on Nov¿mb¿n- 11, lg65

I'fhereas, in the course of human af f airs , history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to dissolve the political affiliations which have connecLed them with another people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled, and Ii/hereas, in such event, a respect for opinions of mandkind reguires them to declare to other nations the causes v¡hich impel them to assume full responsibitity for their own affairs, Norv therefore, wê the Government of Rhoclesia, do hereby decLare: That it is an indusputable and accected. historic fact that since 1923 the Governments of p.hodesia have exercisec_ the powers of serf-government and have been responsible for the progress, development, and rçelfare of their people. ThaL ì-he peopj-e of Rhodesia, having demonstratecj their loyalty to the crown and to their kith and kin in the united Kingdom and eÌsev¡here throughout two rvorld wars and having J:een preparec. to shed their bfood and give their substance in what they believed to be a nutual- interest of freedom- loving peopre, no\.d see all- that they have cherj-shed about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency. 162

That the people Õf Rhodesia have ivitnessed a process which is destructive of those very aspects upon which civiLiza- tion in a primitive country has been bui1t, they have seen the principles of r¿Iestern Democracy and responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere; nevertheless they have remained steadfast. That the people of Rhodesia fu1ly support the request of their Government for sovereigin independence and have wit- nessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accgde to their entreaties. That. the Governments of the United Kingdom have t.hus demonstrated that they are not prepareo to grant sovereign inde¡>endence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, thereby .oersisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other StaLes in the conduct of affairs wiLh other nations and refusal of assent to necessarv lav¡s to the public good, all this to the detriment of the fuiure peace, prosperitlz and good government of Rhodesía. That the Governments of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Governments of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining fini- tations placed upon them for the grant of sovereign independence " That in the l:e1ief that procrastination and delay strike and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of I63

Rhodesia considers it essential that Påodesia shoul-d obtain without delay sovereign independence, the justice of v¡hich is

}:eyond ques ti on . Now therefore, vJe the Governrnent of Phodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God, who controfs the Cestiny of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have ah.rays shown unswervingi loyalty and devotion to Her llajesty the Queen and earnestly praying tirat we the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exer- cising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion in seeking to promote the corrìflon good so that the digniti' and freedom of all men may be assured, do by this proclamation adopt, enact and give to the people of R-hodesia the Constitution annexed hereto.

God save the Queen!

SOURCE: FJrodesia: The Struggle for Freedom (New York: Orbis Book, L974) , p, 169. L64

APPENDIX B

SECUBITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

The failure of British policy lies embedded in the numerous Security Council resolutions, tailored to suit Britain, none of which have had any effoct upon the Fhodesian situation.

@ Resolution S/2L6, passed by the Security Council on November L2, 1965, by I0 votes to none, r,"rith one abstention, condemned LÐr and called upon al-f states not to recognise the i1lega1 racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and Lo refrain from rendering any assistance to it. @ rResolution S/2Ll of llovember 20, 1965, adooted by I0 votes to none rvith one abstention, determined that R|odesia "constiiutes a threat to international Ðeace and security". ït cafled upon "all states to refrain from any action which ivoufd assist and encourage the illegal reEime and., in particular, Lo desist from providing it with arms, eguipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all econor.ric relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products". The econornic sanctions of this resolution rvere voluntarlr and very few countries carried out its intention.

@ P.esol-ution S/22L of April 9 | L966, also adopted by I0 votes to none v¡ith one abstention, expressed the Security Councilrs "grave concern at reports that substantial supplies 165 of oil may reach Rhodesia as the resur-t of an tanker "iI having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker, which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the cpj\fR pipeline with the acquiescence of the portuguese authorties". The resolution further considered that "supplies ivill afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegat regime in southern P.hodesia, thereby enabling it to remain ronger in being". The Security Council therefore determined that "the resulting situation constitutes a threat to peace". @ Resolution s/232 of December 16, 1966, was brought to the uN by the British government after the Tígen "settlement" had been rejected by the P.hodesian regime. fn this resolution the Securitv Council acknoi,vledgeC that the situation const.i- tuted a 1-hreat to peace and securitlz as envisaged by the UN charter under chapter vrr, Articles 39 and 4r. ¡Ír. George Brown, then Foreign secretary of the united Kingdom, urged. the Security Council to impose selective mandatory sanctions on the importation into their territories of Rhodesian asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins and feather. The resol-ution rvas designed to prevent nationals of nember states from promoting exports, transfer of funds, shiprnents in vessers or aircraft of their registration, sale or shipment sr arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles and equioment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of erms and ammunition to Rhodesia. /\l'I'+t'-Y rr\ (-.' t66 Ct rrl fi'tL( tli c f,-lt ¿>N -n¿Arus A,V¡ DcB¡- Sc,t t-t C'F HÈ¿tui A f ¿r¿A.

'l tron Zo8re '-.-._ ,.\, t J-O 6l'*; F# :-J ^(à ì ^(È t'- Ge -ø \\ Tonu onûo t r-L \_.-¡

Zou¡b0 iril*¡,ozhi'

-.-.-.-.-.-\ )$È-o ---;:É-;1'-f\ - '1^L ! lÞ *i* Nomñbflo i

ø;lncoR{rrqo6 (&4a go t o)

--'i . '. ;)l

.. ( ti . + :- ..':.---!!:ti Psrt EII¿9¡th

Malor Ruilways oF SCIuthern Å'frico ;t f.R- tå¡*r

,.'l ', S L fct c , \¡utÈcÈ li , 1l " Sc'wi c vuv,tV115: C c+s p- ,.r o Rliuikoia P i1z /tft);N)rx'lÐ) - **,*,-r::.I-_< : uNt r-.1 vx.l\t. tN\lltun()N\ r67

IE L^RcLsr lNt)usrRlÀL coN(pÂNrLs rN THE wor\LD (Raruxrr> nv sales) Fi,gttn' IB.ll Tlrc rcottotttit:s oJ ll,.r.:rcrtt tt,trr,r¡ atrd of,,,tt,rlt of of rl,c trorll, S:r lcs Nct Illcor:rc !,t.rt:t ,trt. ¡1,,¡,,,-' , n t,r,',1 1,,)',u l, t,, rft t I rrf i,t t t ( tt )f,n y Hcedq tr:r rrc rs ,g t r tt rrt t i tt t t (S Thousrrrds) (S Thousends) : ¡) :. 7. 11 ¿ Dulk ÒJ IltL'tC (ùfpttrttttùns ¿rt U.S.-ott,,t,.i. Ncrv York #,86+,82J 2,503,0 t 3 rl Morors t I)c ¡o ir 35.72{,9 I I I,25..t,092 Durch/Slrcll Group Londorr/Thc Hrguc 32, I 05,096 2,t t0.927 ) Ncw York ' 24,507,+5+ 830,583 loror Dc¡rborn, Mich. 21.009, I 00 322,700 oil Ncu'York 20,620.392 809,877 rrl Irrnien Oil Tchcrrn 18,85t,517 16,9ü,a7 t Pctrolcum London 17,285,851 369,202 rd Calilornì¡ Oil San Frrncisco 16,822,077 772,509 er Londo n 15,015,99{ 322, l0B 'tionrl Busincss :hincs /trnlonK. l\.Y. 14..{36,5{ I 1,989,877 ,il Pirrsbu rgh 14,268,000 700,000 I Elccrric Frirficld, Conn. 13,399, I 00 s80,800 :t Highhnd P¡rk, Mich. r I,699,305 (2se,s3s) rionrl Tel. & Tcl. Ncw York tl,367,U7 398,17r Eindhovcr¡ ilenrpcnftbrickcrr (Ncrhcrlr nds) 10,716,185 152.r90 d (lnd-) Oil Chicego 9,955,2+8 786,987 nclisc dcs Pitrolcs Prris 9.145.718 168,472 Stcel Tokvo 8,196,902 r r 1,935 Thysscn-Hütre Duisburg (Gcrnrrny) 8,7U,899 99,926 l, Frenkfurr on M¿in 8,+62.322 lw,972 Romc 8,334,132 ( 134,86e) :- Bcnz Stu rrge rr 8,191.271 125,768 'cl Pittsburgh 8.167.269 559,6 I I Ludrviohrlcn on Rhine 8.r52,3I8 I 52,83 I I Housron 8, 113,445 5t4,827 Bo ulogrrc - Billr nco u rr (Frerrcc) 7,83 1,330 (128,702) Munich 7,759,9t9 20t,275 rgcn wcrk Wollsburg (Ccrnreny) 7,680,786 (63.971) Richñcld Los Angclcs 7 307,8s4 350,395 nt¡l Oil St¡mlord, Conn. 7,253,80 t 330,851 [¡r'crkuscn (Gcrmeny) 7 223,302 128,229 )onr de Ncmoun Wilmingron, Dcl. 7,221sffi 27 t,8A0 Motor Toyode-Ciw (Jepan) 7,t94,139 250,8'r8 uiraine Paris t 7, r 65,390 1 99,875 Vcvcy / (Su,irzcrl"nd) 7,080, r 60 309,365 ¡criel Chcmicel lri cs ) London ó,88{,219 Á)4 )A.t s (Pctrólco :iro ) Rio dc Jrncìro 6,625,516 703,586 t.lcctnc Ncw York ó590, I t6 107,308 ,mcdcrn Tobecco London 6,145,979 314,04 t k Cllnbl. Cincinn:ri 6,08 1,675 333,862 Tokvo 5,9 I 6,135 94.084 rrr,¡r. Mrgrzinc (Auguc, 197ó), p. 2a3. 168

APPET.]DIX E

''A PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.N. APPLTCATION OF SANCTTONS AGAINST R-r-tOD.ESTA tg 6 5- L9 7 g "

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

(T) ON THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF R}IODESIA BEFORE UDI.

(a) vlhy rvas the international- status of Rhodesia so controversial before UDI? (b) tr{hat functions do collective legitimization perform in general and what lvas the inplication of non- recognition of the R-l-lodesian internationar status before and after UDI? (c) How far diC the "reserved poler" which Great Britain had over Rhodesia limit her international action before UDI? (d) woulc it be correct to describe the internationar status of Rhodesia before uDr as being in "twilight zone" betrveen Cependence and indepenCence?

(2) THE U.I\. ECONO¡.IrC SANCTIOT'IS . (a) I^Ihat were the purposes of the Fhodesian sanctions? (b) I{ourd the purpose have been achieved if Britain had girarrted. independence on the basis of the "I,vhite minority" regime monopolizing Ðo\^/er in Rhodesia? (c) lYhy did Britain decide to escar-ate sanctions against Rhodesia and rvhat \.rere the implications of the escala- L69

tion on the "l'thite minority" regime? (d) f/hy did Britain refuse to use force against Rhodesia? (e) Did the U-N. sanctions have any positive contribution to the development of the Rhodesian economy? (f ) To what extent did the U.S. Byrd Ã,mendment oi L97I violate the U.¡1. sanctions? (g) I^7hat arguments are advanced by countries that have trade links rvith Rhodesia after UDI? . (h) I,{hat role does communication (Te1ex, Lelephone, telegraph) pfay in helping Rhodesia avoid violation as the result of the U.l.l. sanctions? (i) i^trhat are the implications of constant visitors, tourists, entertainers, labourers, and migranLs to Rhodesia?

(3 ) SOCIAL REI,ATIONS (a) Rhodesia pays much a-u'uention to international sports and is a member of many sporting organizations. îIhrat role do sports play in general in boosting the inage of member states? (b) Lord Killianin, the president of the International Olympic committee m-aintains that politics and sports do not rnix, If so, rvhy has PJrodesia been unable to particioate in the Olympic games after UDI? (c) Itrhat arguments are ad-vanced by countries tìrat maintain s,:orting links r¡ith Rhodesia? L70

(d) i'iìrat impacts do educational exchange visits, enter-, tainments have on Firodesia in the light of the attenpt of the U.t'T, to isolate her? (e) The v¡hite minority regime has adopted a deriberate policy to encourage U"S. congressmen, senators, businessmen and influential peol:1e to visit Rhodesia after UDI. llhat does the government hope to gain by such visits and why is the emphasis on the peopre from the United States?

(4) POLITTCAL AIJD DIPLOIVIÀTIC RELATToNS

(a) I'lhat argiuments are advanced by countries that maintain political rerations with p-hodesia inspite of the u.N. sanctions? (R.elations include fornal and informal

relat.ions ) . (b) Rhodesia operated overseas information offices Ì:efore sone of them were cfosed when she declarecl a Republic. i'ihat functions ctid these Inforr¡ation Offices perform? (c) IVhy did Smith oppose the move of Vorster to have dialogue v¡ith Bl-ack African States? (d) l{hat strategies and tactics did the v¡hite minority regime aclopt in evading U.N. sanctions?

( 5 ) }.IULTINATIONAL COFPORÀ.TIONS

(a) ifhat are the conseguences for phodesian firms to be associated r,vith external comr:anies? (b) To what extent do the activities of multinational_ L7L corporations 1ir¡it the soyereignty of their host country in general and Firodesia in particular?

CONCLUSION - I'/hat lessons (if any), can be learnt from the practical applícation of sanctions by the ll-ìJ. on Rhodesia from Ì966-L979? L72

BIBLTOGRAPHY

A. PRIMÄ,RY SOURCES

(i) PUBLIC DOCLJMENTS

".An Fnalysis of the ll1ega1 Regime's Constitution For Zimbabwe, " Commonwealth Secretariat, London, April L978. Documents on Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, September-December, L979, Report, Commonwealth Secretariat, December L979. Text of Commonwealth Conference Agreement on the Rhodesia fssue, August 6, L979, Lusaka, Zambia, Commonwealth Secretariat, London VoI . 32 No . 15 6 (August 6 , L97 9ì.-- Yost, C. "Extension of Sanctions Against Rhodesia should be proceeded with Caution, " The Departmenl of State Bufletin, VoI. 32 No. ZZf fS.

(ii) INTERVIEWS

Jeba. L. (It4rs . ) , Chairperson, Manitoba Anti-Apartheid Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa, tr{innipeg, April 23, 1980. Chief Ambassador Lukumburza, Tanzania High Commissioner to Ottawa, April 24, t980. Canas K. Ncube, À Zimbabwean nat.ionalist now working in l^iinnipeg, Canada, Aprit l-9, f 980. Professor Arnotd Smith, Department of International Affairs, University of Carlton, Ottawa, Canada, April 25, 1980" Intervierved several students from East, Central and Southern Africa studving at the University of Manitoba, Canada informally from Mid-February - May l-980. L73

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

(i) BOOKS Arrighi , G. The Po1itical Economy of Rhodesia (The Hague: The Hague l"louton Press, L967) . Arn and Neva Seidman, United States Multinationals in South Àr ri ca. Bowman, L.W. Politics in Rhodesia: I^/hite Ðo\^/er in an African State Barber, J" Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (London: Oxford univ. press, I967) . Bal-i, G.W. The Discipf ine of Power:- Essential of a Modern Structure (Boston: Little Brown, 1968). Barber, J. South African Foreign-Policy L945-I970 (London: Oxf Barber, J. Rhodesia and Interstate Relationship in Soiith Africa.

Berham, J"Vtr. National Interests and Multinational Enterprise ( erin

BuIl, T. Rhodesia: Crisis of Colour (Chicago: Chicago Qua- d

Boyd, A" Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg (tJorwich: Fletcher and Son Ltd.. l97I).

CÌements, F. R.hodesia: The Course to Cof lision (London: part ¡.larrpress,re69). Cl-ark, D"G. Contract T^Jorkers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia ( Gwet Cockram, G. Vorsterr s ForSign:tr_o_l¿s}¡ (Pretoria: Academia press, 1970). Coetzee, J"A. The Sovereignty of Rhodesia and the Law of. Nation Curtin, T.R.C. Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia (London: In- stitute õ 174

Dam K. i'ü The GATT: Law and Economic Orqanization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970). Doxey, M.P. Economic Sanctions and InternaLional Enforcement (l-ondonl oxford Univ, Press , L97I) . Davies, D.K. Race Relations In Rhodesia (London: Rex Collings, LsTs ) Fisher, R. InLernational Conf lict For Beginners (l.lew York: Harper and Row, 1969). Grant, G.C. The African Predicament in Rhodesia (London: Benj GeIfand, M. Diet and Tradition in African Cullq¡e (Edinburgh and

Good, R.C. U.D.I.: The fnternational Politics of Rhodesian RebelFon {pi;=¡rcetoñ: Princeton Univ. Press " L97 3) - Grundy, K.W. Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Afric iv.

Guy, A. SancÈl-ons Against Rhodesia (L,ondon: African Bureau, London, 1972). Holleman, J.F. Chief, Council and Commissioner (London: Oxford Hall-, R. The High Price of Principle: Kaunda an4 the vlhrite South Tlondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969) " Haz1ewood., A. (ed") African Integration and Disinteg{ation: The Case in Economic and Political Union (London:

Jollie, M.L.A- The ReaI Rhodesia (Bulawayo: Book of Rhodesia Ltd.,I97r- Kapungu, L. T. Rhodesia: TÞe_ É!¡rìggle lor Freedom (ttew York: Orbis K-y, c. ¡!_gqesia: Man Geography (new York: Af ricana, 19 70 ) . Lake, A. The Tar Bab)': American Poliöy Towards Southern. ffi York: col-umbia univ. Press, New York, 19761 . 175

Levy , !V. J " The Economics and istics of an Embarqo on Oil and Petrol-eum Produc'ts for Rhodesia ( Reports ior t.he Office of th 12, Lg66 , New York: W.J" Levy, L966). l4l ambo , E. E . nhodes i a : The Bri ti sh Di lemma (London: Christian Action Press, f971). Marshall, c.B. crisis over Rhodesia: A skeptical view (Bal- timore: liiacMaster, C. Malawi: Foreign-policy and De (New York: Metrowich, F.R. Rhodesia: Birth of a Nation (pretoria, Africa fnstitut Mezerik (ed"¡ Rhodesia and the UN (New york: Tnternational Review-serffi

O'Meara, P. Rhodesia: RaciaI Conffict or Coexistence (rthaca( and t97Ð . otconnel-1 J. The rnevitabitity of rnstability in Hazlewood Integration and Disintegration. Petersen, c.w. "The Military Bafance in southern Africa" in Southern Africa i-l Èqf=pective: Essays in Regional lNêw York: The ¡'iee press, Lg67). Ranger, T.O" The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia lBgB-1930 (r,on¿

Revoìt in Southern Rhodesia IB96-1 (London, Heinemann, 1967).

Rayner, I{. The Tribes and rts successors (London: Faber and Faber, L962) . Rhoodie, E.M. "southern Africa: Towards A New commonwealth?,' _i"_ 99 Politics (ed. ¡ By potholm, C.p. and nate, n.--(liew Vækî TI-e Free press, 1967) . Sithole, N. Obed Mutezo (Nairobi: O.U.P;, 1970).

Speck, S .I'V" Jr. "Malawi and Southern African Complex', in Southern Africa in Perspective (ed.¡ by potholm C.q. e tressl Lg67). L76 "Southern African Foreign Policy: The Outward Iulovement" in southern Africa in perspective: Essavs in Rgglenal P , e press, Lg67). studcliffe, R.B" sanctions Against Rhodesia (London: African Bureau, I Strack, R. Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia (Syracuse: Syra- cuse Univ. press , l-97B).

Tredgord, sr R. The Rhodesia that vras _}4y___L-¡þ (London: George Al-len ""auffi Todd, J. rTThe Right To Say No (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Vambe, L. A4 I1Ì-Fated People: Zimbabive Before Independence (L From Rhodesia To Zimbabwe (pittsburg: Univ. of Pi Ls76) . Inleinrich, A-K.H. chief and councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarbh to Bureaucratic power (Colunìbtã : Univ.

Black and i{hite elites in Rhodesia (j'ãnchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1973). wilson, H. A Personar Record.: The Labour Government 1964- 1970 (Boston: Little Brown, I97I) Windrich, E. The Rhoclesian Problem: A Documentary Record 1923 , 195l . trn/ellensky, R. IVellensky's 4000 Days (London: collins press, re64).

Young, K. Rhodesia and Independence (I_,ondon: Deut, L969) . Taylor, C.L, and Hudson, M.C. World Handbook of political and Social Science fnd l-77

(ii) JoURNAL ARTIcLES

Arsenault, R. "WhiLe On Chrome: Southern Congressmen and Rhodesia L962-L97L." Issue 2 (lJinter L972) , pp" 46- 57. Baer, G.W. "Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and Italian-Ethíopian war, 1935-1936. " International organization 27 (Spring 1973) pp. I65 - 7- Baldwin, D.A. "The power of positive Sanctions." iVorld Politics 24 (October L97I), pp. 20-38.

Barber, J. "The Impact of Rhodesian Crisis on the Commonwealth. " ¿ournaf of Co*onwealt.h political Studies 7 (JuIy 1969), pp. B3-95" Boczek, B.A. "Permanent Neutrality and coltective security: The Case of Switzerland and the UN Sanctions Against the Rhodesian Case." International Law Journal I (Spring L969), pp. l5-I04.

Bovrman, L. "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa. " rnternat.ional studies euarterly 12 (september, 196B), pp. 231-61. Devine, J. "Does south Africa Recognize Rhodesian uDr?" South African Law Journal B6 (November, L969) , pp. 438-

Ga1tung, J" "On the Effects of International Economic Sanc'uions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. " VJorld Politics f9 (eprit L967 ), pp. 378*416. Haggins, R. rrlnternational Law, Rhodesia and the UN.'r The World Today 2 (1967), pp. 94-106.

Harris, P.B. "Rhodesia: sanctions, Economic and politics. " Canadian Journal of Economic 2 (September 196B), pp. 5-20. Hitl, C.R. "UDI and South African Foreign-policy." Journal of Commonwealth pof itical Studies (;uty I969f , ppJ6-

Hoffman, F. "The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Com- parative Ana1ysis. " Journal of peace Research 4 (L967), p" l-49. 17B

Kaiser, K. "The rnt.eraction of Regionar subsystems. " I¡Ior1d politics 2l- (October, I974) , pp" 84_l-O7 " Kearns, F. "tr^/hy oil sanctions Fail-ed. " Africa Report ll (ApriI 1976), p" 24 " Nye, J.S. Jr. and Keshane, R.O" "Transnational- Relations and World politics. International Organization 25 (Summer I97L) , pp. 329-

Rake, A. "Black Guerrirras ín Rhodesia. " Africa Report 13 (December l96B), pp. 23-5" Schreiber, A.P. "Economic Coercion as an Intrument of Foreign- Policy." World potitlcs 25 (April I973), pp" 387-4t3. stephen, lr{. "Natural- Justice at the uN: The R}iodesian case. " American Journar- of rnternationar- Law 67 (Jury Lg73), pp. 4BB-90.- sutcriffe, R.B. "The political Economy of the Rhodesian sanctions. " Journal of commonwealth potiticar studies T (JuIy Nzuwah, M. "confrict Resorution rn Zimbabwe: superpower Determinants To The peace settlement. " Journal of southern Rhodesian Af fairs 4 (oct. 1979 ) , pp:-l€9-400.

(iii) OTHER PERIODICALS

Africa Nov. 22,1968; May 24, Lg76; Feb. 22, Lg66; July 3I, 1975; - Dec . 7 6; Aùgust Lg77; lvlay 27 , t97B; Deceirber, ¡'97 4; September. L976; December 12, L966" African Affairs June 22, 1965, Feb. African Contemporary Records lüov. L974" African Development June 22, 1965; Feb. 22, Lg7B. Africa Digest Africa Today African Venture Feb. 2I, 1969. The Communist L79 '1'ne Economr-st' Keesing's Contemporary Archives Time (Toronto) UN Monthly Chronicle t968. U.S. News and I,üorld Report" March 24, L975"

I'lest Af rica November, L97 6 . New-Breed July 20, 1972 The Rock December, L9'75.

(iV) NEI,JSPAPERS

The DaiIy Times (Lagos) The Guardian (London) August 27, L973; November 25, 1965; - t'tãy ZZ, 1972. Financial Time (London) New Nigerian (Kaduna) March 24, L976; July 30, 1978. The New York Times Jan. 10, 1966 through September, I9l5 æ,Ls72. Rhodesia Commentary (Salisbury) Rhodesia llerald (Salisbury) September 25, L97L¡ June 20, 196B; Jan. 27, I972¡ June g, 1968; August 26 , L972. Sunday lr1ail Ociober 15, Lg67; September L9, Lg7L. Sunday Times (London) March 16, 1980; August 27, 1973" Nigerian Tribune July 3L, 1978. The Morning Post (Lagos) August 20, L972. tB0

C" THESES ÃND DISSERTAT]ON ON SOUTHERN R]IODESIA

Chadimipour, F" Southern Rhodesia and the UN: A Problem of Colonization, ph.D. University of Utrecht, Netherlands L97L. Doxey, M"P" Economic Sancì-ions and the fnternational Enforce- ment process, ph.D. University of London (nxternal) L97T Kapungu, L.T. UN Economic Sanctions as an fnstrument of Peace Enforcement Process with reference to Rhodesia, ph. D. University of London (Ext,ernal) I97L. Rostedt, C. International Response to the Rhodesian Decl-aration of Independence. M.A, Univ. of Southern California,

Los Angieles " Silvera, D. The political Behavior of some Interest groups Regarding UDI in Rhodesia: A Study of Political Strategies" M.A. Univ. of South Africa, Pretoria, T97 L.