Cambridge Histories Online http://universitypublishingonline.org/cambridge/histories/ The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought Edited by Gareth Stedman Jones, Gregory Claeys Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521430562 Online ISBN: 9780511973581 Hardback ISBN: 9780521430562 Paperback ISBN: 9781107676329 Chapter 7 - Radicalism, republicanism and revolutionism pp. 200-254 Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521430562.009 Cambridge University Press 7 Radicalism, republicanism and revolutionism From the principles of ’89 to the origins of modern terrorism gregory claeys and christine lattek 1 Introduction Modernity has been quintessentially defined by the revolutionary impulse, and our judgement, whether laudatory or critical, of the French Revolution of 1789. In the nineteenth century it would be associated with virtually all radical, republican and revolutionary movements, and, by the end of the First World War, the overthrow of many of the leading crowns of Europe. Yet the course of events which produced the overthrow of Louis XVI was not at its outset inevitably anti-monarchical, and would indeed culminate in imperial dictatorship. In association with American independence, how- ever, the idea of revolution came to be identified with the principle of popular sovereignty as such. It was also linked to the explosion of nation- alist aspirations which became definitive of the period, as well as to the causes of reaction and the creation of modern conservatism in the works of Burke, Bonald and others.1 If the British model of limited, constitu- tional monarchy resting on the principle of the rule of law was central to eighteenth-century reformers elsewhere, thus, it was increasingly sup- planted during the nineteenth century by the ideals which emerged from the revolutions of 1776, 1789 and 1848. ‘Revolution’ itself, which had once meant a restoration or rotational return to previous conditions, came to mean the violent overthrow of established regimes in the name of popular sovereignty, ethnic and national self-assertion, or both; and the conscious framing according to the principles of reason of an edifice hitherto regarded 1 The literature on the legacy of the Revolution is considerable. A starting point is Baker 1987 and Hayward 1991. We would like to thank Pamela Pilbeam in particular for comments on this essay, and the Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, for supplying one reference. 200 Downloaded from Cambridge Histories Online by IP 128.103.149.52 on Tue Feb 16 15:57:51 GMT 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521430562.009 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2016 Radicalism, republicanism and revolutionism largely as a natural, organically derived and divinely inspired order.2 To i t s opponents it was also often linked to an obsessive demand for individual autonomy, the growth of commercial and societal individualism, and the wish to break from traditional forms of authority, particularly paternalism and religion. In the first half of the century the revolutionary ideal was invoked by liberals against autocrats; in the second half, increasingly, it was by socialists, anarchists and other democrats against both autocracy, monarchy in prin- ciple, aristocratic oligarchy, and eventually, as consideration of the ‘social question’ gained ascendancy, liberalism in principle. Made initially largely in the name of liberty – the principle which continued to define its develop- ment in the United States – it came elsewhere to give increasing preference to equality, justice and the relief of poverty, though these too could be seen in terms of restoration as well as novelty and innovation. Driven under- ground, often excoriated by liberals and conservatives alike, reformers who sought a wide extension of manhood suffrage – the first and principal aim of most democrats in this period – came increasingly to link their demands to ‘social’ issues such as a fair wage and improved working conditions. From 1848, these were often viewed in a ‘socialist’ light, and the end of revolution construed not as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ as such, negatively defined against despotic political rule, but as some variation of the principle of ‘association’, as opposed to individual economic competition (Proudhon 1923a, pp. 75–99). Originally conceived as a sharply defined and delimited act of rebellion, revolution came to be construed as a state of mind, a continuing process to maintain a sense of virtue and self-sacrifice en permanence. (Negatively this would be come to be seen as an Orwellian orgy of constant agitation aimed at securing conformity by a constant threat of crisis, thus justifying dictator- ship by the constant fear of threat from without.) Inspired by a Rousseauist conception of the General Will, revolutionaries would claim that that will could be represented by an elite party of committed revolutionaries rul- ing in the name of the majority. For some that party could in turn be represented by a charismatic or quasi-millenarian leader. Invoking histor- ical, constitutional or moral rights of resistance to tyranny, democrats also came, often by necessity, to embrace conspiratorial approaches to political 2 Most modern accounts of the idea of revolution commence with Arendt 1963. For examples of varying uses of the language of revolution, see Kumar 1970. 201 Downloaded from Cambridge Histories Online by IP 128.103.149.52 on Tue Feb 16 15:57:51 GMT 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521430562.009 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2016 Gregory Claeys and Christine Lattek change, and sometimes the use of individual violence, ‘terror’ and assassina- tion to achieve this. The pressure for democracy, as well as increasing social equality, were thus inexorable in nineteenth-century Europe, and eventu- ally elsewhere. The Restoration of 1815 brought only a temporary lull in this pressure from below for political democracy. Reaction thus became, as it was described in the most classic statement of contemporary revolution- ism, itself the further cause of still further revolutions (Proudhon 1923a, pp. 13–39). This chapter examines the evolution of the main European radical and republican traditions in this period; their involvement in revolutionary underground movements; and the emergence of the strategy of individ- ual violence or ‘terrorism’ as a means of fulfilling revolutionary ends, and thus the mutation of the idea of collective struggle into that of individual violence. While the focus here is principally on the major European and North American traditions, some consideration is also given to their bearing on imperial and anti-imperial developments elsewhere, and on the origins of parallel, and particularly anti-imperial, non-European movements and strands of thought. 2 Radical and republican traditions Despite the American and French revolutions, and earlier examples like Switzerland, republicanism failed to become established in most of Europe throughout the nineteenth century. Indeed on the eve of the First World War it had made little progress since 1870, France being the only major European republic. After the Restoration of 1815 the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia wedded the ideals of throne and altar and aimed to suppress all anti-autocratic movements. Kingship also proved popular in a number of newly formed states, such as Belgium. Nonetheless there were powerful republican currents in several European nations throughout the period, and distinctive if less vibrant movements in others. Republican- ism throughout the period was initially often associated with the creation of a constitutional or limited monarchy, and rule by law as opposed to arbitrary will, where the republican component was thus the reposing of ultimate sovereignty in the people, though often with a limited suffrage based on property ownership. Opposition to aristocratic privilege, though not necessarily elite guidance, and support for formal legal equality of all cit- izens, were also prominent republican themes. Resistance to increasing eco- nomic specialisation as threatening intellectual capacity and moral integrity, 202 Downloaded from Cambridge Histories Online by IP 128.103.149.52 on Tue Feb 16 15:57:51 GMT 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521430562.009 Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2016 Radicalism, republicanism and revolutionism a prominent theme for eighteenth-century republicans like Adam Fergu- son, declined thereafter, though it reappeared in socialism. Throughout the nineteenth century, republicanism came increasingly to mean democracy, with an elected executive, and an increasingly extensive suffrage. But while the American model thus gained in importance throughout the century, that model itself underwent substantial alteration. Based initially on the ideal of a society of independent small farmers and freeholders, coexisting with slavery in the South, it evolved into an agglomeration of mass, urban, party-based political machines in which corruption was widespread, plu- tocracy increasingly evident, and liberty threatened by the stifling power of what Tocqueville described as the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Tocqueville 1835–40; for the later period see Bryce 1899). Unlike European republi- canism, American republicanism was rarely anti-clerical, and gave a marked preference to liberty over equality and fraternity, except where diluted by immigrant radicalism (Higonnet 1988). Most forms of republicanism dwelt