Public Perception Survey 2019/2020

Electoral Risks Management PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 2019/2020

Capacity Enhancement in Electoral Risk Management through a Multi-Stakeholder Coordinated Approach to Contribute to Peaceful and Credible Elections in Nepal

National Election Observation Committee (NEOC) National Secretariat Satoaki Memorial Building, Kupondole-10, Lalitpur, Nepal G.P.O. Box: 26550, Phone: + 977 (1) 5541502, Fax: 977 (1) 5541503 Email: [email protected]/[email protected] www.neocelection.org PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 1 2 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Electoral Risks Management PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 2019/2020

Capacity Enhancement in Electoral Risk Management through a Multi-Stakeholder Coordinated Approach to Contribute to Peaceful and Credible Elections in Nepal

National Election Observation Committee (NEOC) National Secretariat Satoaki Memorial Building, Kupondole-10, Lalitpur, Nepal G.P.O. Box: 26550, Phone: + 977 (1) 5541502, Fax: 977 (1) 5541503 Email: [email protected]/[email protected] www.neocelection.org PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 3 Electoral Risks Management PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY

Executive Editor : Gopal Krishna Siwakoti, PhD Advisory Panel : Surya Prasad Shrestha Prof. Kapil Shrestha Bhawani Prasad Kharel Expert Team : Shanti Ram Bimali Diwas Pant Roshma Rai Support Team : Deepa Luintel Binda Nepali Year of Publication : 2019/2020 No. of copies : 1500 © Copyright : NEOC/International IDEA Financial Assistance : International IDEA Printing : Ganga Jamuna Press Pvt. Ltd.

Disclaimer National Election Observation Committee (NEOC) informs readers that the views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to NEOC and not neces- sarily to the International IDEA. 4 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Acknowledgement

On behalf of the National Election Observation Committee (NEOC), I would like to extend my special thanks to our Secretary General Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti for his sterling performance in coordinating the project and generating such a brilliant knowledge product in a very short span of time. Credit goes to our resource partner International IDEA for providing necessary financial and technical support in carrying out the perception survey on the risks factors of electoral process. A special gratitude we give to Antonio Spinelli, Shanti Ram Bimali, and Diwas Pant of International IDEA whose contribution in stimulating suggestions and encouragement, greatly helped us accomplish the Survey especially in the area of data collection technique and protocol. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Coordinators of NEOC Provincial Committees Dr. Kamal Prasad Limbu, Ms. Urmila Yadav, Mr. Moti Ram Phuyal, Mr. Binod Paudel, Ms. Tika Bista, Mr. Suresh Kumar Gautam and Mr. Debi Prasad Khanal and the Surveyor Team members late Mr. Sanjiv Meheta, Mr. Kamal Prasad Shah, Ms. Pushpa Bhandari, Ms. Kunjani Pariyar 'Pyaasi', Mr. Bhupendra Pokhrel, Ms. Sunita Sharma and Ms. Sushma Regmi from Province No. 1, 2, Bagmati, Gandaki, 5, Karnali and Sudur-paschim respectively for their successful coordination of the field assignment. Our special thanks go to Ms. Pranita Thapa and Mr. Sachin Shrestha for their expert contribution for data processing, tabulation and interpretation. Without the hard work, dedication and continued support and effort of our field surveyors, despite adversarial monsoon season, this Perception Survey would not have been a success. I would also like to express my earnest gratitude to all Province-based stakeholders, trainers and the respondents, who gave their precious time and willingness to promote our endeavor and fill the questionnaire that we have developed and disseminated.

Surya Prasad Shrestha Chairperson

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 5 6 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table of Content

TITLE Page No. Context and Rationale ...... 1 Potential Areas of Risks • Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies ...... 4 • The Legal Framework ...... 5 • Voter Registration ...... 6 • Electoral Education ...... 6 • Political Financing ...... 7 • Compliance with Code of Conduct ...... 8 • Campaign Financing ...... 9 • Electoral Administration ...... 10 • Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution ...... 11 • External Voting Provisions ...... 12 Scope of the Survey Project ...... 14 Diagnosis of Risks on Electoral Process 1. Background characteristic of the respondents ...... 18 2. Potential Risks ...... 22 3. Most potential risks identified by the respondents by Province ...... 26 Recommendations for Future Direction ...... 33 ANNEX: Province-wise Potential Risks Identified by Respondents ...... 38

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 7 Abbreviations

ANFREL : Asian Network for Free Elections CoC : Code of Conduct CRPD : Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CSO : Civil Society Organization ECN : Election Commission, Nepal EDR : Electoral Dispute Resolution EOCG : Election Observation Coordination Group ERM : Electoral Risk Management EVM : Electronic Voting Machine FPTP : First-Past-The-Post GESI : Gender Equality and Social Inclusion IDEA : International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance JEOC : Joint Election Operation Centre NEOC : National Election Observation Committee PR : Proportional Representation

8 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Context and Rationale

Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition are a common phenomenon. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, acts of electoral risks with or without the use of violence may be employed to influence the process of elections–such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll–and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions.

In this connection, based on NEOC’s more than two and half decade-long nationwide field-tested overall experience in the implementation of electoral education and conducting election observation in all elections held in the country after 1991, NEOC’s central leadership as well as its local chapters (provincial and district) have realized that it is vital to closely understand and assess the causes of prevalent social, political and cultural conflicts and further identify newly emerged structural causes of electoral risks (pervasive and long standing factors that become built into policies, structures and culture of a society and may create the preconditions for such risks). Also, assessing the proximate causes of risks (signs likely to trigger subtle or violent conflict or their further escalation and can be symptomatic of structural causes.

In the past, we have experienced through our filed-based constant engagement that electoral risks have various dynamics at different levels: national, provincial and local. Such risks emerge in different forms and formats depending on the local political, social, cultural and other related factors. Understanding and explaining outbreaks of election-related violence is obviously a complex task; and predicting triggering factors for a possible violence-ridden elections and measures to effectively and timely curb such a scenario can’t be prescribed in advance. In this context, the electoral risk management tool (ERMT), which is designed as a software-based

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 1 program is extremely instrumental in empowering the concerned agencies with immediate responsibility to prevent violence and ensure peaceful and credible elections. ERMT helps build the capacities of users (in our context Election Commission, security sector, CSOs and other state and non-state institutions) to closely understand, analyze and mitigate electoral risks.

As part of trust-building and dialogue process, a proper context overview is critical to ensuring that the ERMT is customized to allow the user to focus on the most important risks during the implementation (data retrieval, processing, validation and dissemination) phases—pre-election, during election and post-election. This process of training, coordination, information exchange and overall empowerment of the concerned agencies through the use of the Tool entails an analysis of the history and dynamics of conflict and, in this respect, an assessment of the potential risks to the forthcoming elections.

The context overview aims to identify:

(a) geographical regions that face increased electoral risks; (b) relevant risk factors for electoral violence, fraud and fraudulent activities; (c) those phases of the electoral cycle that face increased risk; (d) possible perpetrators and victims of election related violence, and (e) possible strategies to prevent and mitigate violence.

NEOC understands that early warning and early response methods are key to mitigate electoral risks for which programmatic development through identification of priorities, using ‘do no harm approach’, mainstreaming of the marginalized through coherence of support is also essential. NEOC has also experienced during its programmatic engagement both in the sector of electoral education and election observation that electoral risks are linked to the legal, operational, technical, and political and security aspects of electoral processes. When these risks finally become certainties, the consequences can be serious in both well-established and transitional democracies. The Nepali electoral management context cannot be treated in isolation.

Besides, while assessing the risks, NEOC’s past experience in conducting broader electoral education with massive grassroots outreach and observation of all three phases of elections with professionally trained monitors across

2 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY the country vividly demonstrates that the first and foremost component of a risk-free and credible election depends on the legitimacy of the state along with the state of the rule of law, inclusion and mainstreaming of the traditionally excluded, marginalized communities, minorities, and economically challenged section of the society, respect for fundamental rights, space and position of the civil society and media as well as relations between communities and the existing dispute-solving mechanisms. Other equally important factors are equal economic opportunity, gender justice, social and regional equalities and geopolitical situation.

In the given context, it is vital to establish and enhance coordination, partnership and exchange of information between the Election Commission, Nepal (ECN), State Security Agencies (SSAs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to effectively address challenges around electoral risks factors. In the meantime, in the given context of freshly federated state structures, it’s also eminent to improve the ability of the sub-national level staff, provincial and local ECN chapters, security apparatus and local civil society organizations working at grassroots level, to better anticipate and identify risks and to produce solutions to mitigate and minimize electoral risks. In sum, being the constitutional body entrusted to conduct elections, the ECN is the primary linkage for our engagement under this project.

It is to be noted that the ERMT is not limited to utilize for overt incidences of violence but overall electoral components and non-compliance of which may trigger risks ultimately jeopardizing the credibility of elections. The ERMT is a multi-purpose instrument and has an asset to Nepalese user agencies as a knowledge resource or conflict early-warning and response tool. The ERM Tool can systematize and display data in different formats. This makes it a convenient platform for NEOC which is working in the areas involving potential risks as mentioned below with a view to alerting the concerned agencies as well as informing the general public about electoral risks and violent incidents.

Gopal Krishna Siwakoti, PhD Secretary General

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 3 Potentional Areas of Risks

Impending Area of Risk #1: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies

Contextual Reference: Scientific, transparent and practical electoral districting is the foundation for a fair election. Electoral constituency delineation usually refers to the process of drawing electoral district boundaries. However, it can also be used to denote the process of drawing voting areas (also called polling areas, districts or election precincts) for the purposes of assigning voters to polling centers. The periodic delimitation of electoral boundaries is necessary in any representative system. If electoral boundaries are not periodically adjusted, population inequities develop across districts resulting in unfair representation character. The case of Nepal is a perfect example of how the electoral districting is concluded with contentious elements.

Current Status: In 2016, the Constituency Delineation Commission revisited previous existing electoral districts in the changed context of federalization of the state and adopted new delimitation portfolio. The Commission came up with 165 electoral constituencies through largely desk work. Neither public consultation was organized to seek general opinion mechanism, nor did they paid field extensive trips to closely understand geographic and demographic structures of the country. The choice of methods largely followed a historical tradition, but the delimitation wasn’t carried out based on meticulous and scientific factors that would consider the geographic size of the country, its physical features, or its financial resources and demographic structure.

Risk Factors: Provisions in the new Constitution prevent a review in the delineation of the electoral boundaries until 2035 AD, with no room for court challenge. Thus, the conflicting constitutional provision with global practice that electoral boundaries have to be periodically re-drawn to accommodate population changes (demographic landscape) unfortunately demonstrates the sign of gerrymandering with a colossal risk to credible electioneering in the long-run.

4 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Impending Area of Risk #2: The Legal Framework

Contextual Reference: A comprehensive (covering all major components of electioneering), consistent, open, transparent and democratic regulatory framework is vital asset of constitutional, legislative, regulatory, jurisprudential and managerial rules that together establish the rights of citizens to participate in all phases and stages of the election in conformity with international benchmarks. Such legal framework is generally derived from international human rights instruments, regional arrangements and agreements around freedom of elections. Beyond the selection of public officials, citizens should be allowed to discuss about the legislative bills, governmental decisions and resolutions apart from the parliamentary process with informed discussion. The core components of universal franchise such as periodic elections, secrecy of ballot, opportunity for expression of free will and access to governance without discrimination are key to adoption of a legal framework founded on democratic values.

Current Status: Nepal has freshly restructured its territorial, political and governmental system, which affects the design of their electoral frameworks. The dynamics of such a legal framework in the changed context has not gone through meticulous assessment of the criterion in its development. Similarly, the legal instruments and traditions upon which electoral frameworks may rest vary but such structures are yet to be seen as fully democratic, human-rights-friendly, transparent, inclusive structures with high level of acceptability. The electoral legal framework is not strongly founded on international treaties that Nepal is a part to. The constitutional spirit and provisions, judicial precedents, and the notion of inclusive characters in all phases and tiers is also missing in many instances.

Risk Factors: The above-mentioned status has triggered potential risk of compromising the freedom of elections and developing the risks of derogated electoral procedure such as electoral management, electoral boundary redistribution, voter registration, registration of political parties and candidates, voting operations, vote counting. The non-compliance with the above elements also jeopardizes observation, voter and civic education, media and elections, elections and technology, electoral campaign, political financing and electoral dispute resolution.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 5 Impending Area of Risk #3: Voter Registration

Contextual Reference: The first and foremost factor to determine electoral risk among the technical electoral themes is the voter registration process. A clean voter roll is the source of a clean election. Voter registration, an inalienable part of universal adult franchise, establishes the eligibility of individuals to vote. As one of the costlier, time-consuming and complex aspects of the electoral process, it often accounts for a considerable portion of the budget, staff time and resources of an election management authority since voter roll is a round the year process. If conducted well with proactive outreach by the concerned authority, voter registration is key to confer legitimacy to the process. The entire electoral process may be perceived as illegitimate should the registration system be flawed and dirty.

Current Status: The bio-metric voter registration system has been introduced under which a perspective voter must appear in person for photograph and thumbprint. Eligible citizens without citizenship certificates are prevented from voter roll in a context where a considerable number of people do not possess citizenship certificates. Similarly, there is no advance and external voting facility to date although a huge portion of voting age population is outside of the country especially as overseas contractual laborers. Similarly, a significant number of young voters with over 16 and below 18 years are registered but prevented from voting due to prescribed age bar which is 18. The voters are denied casting vote from their temporary residences inviting a risk of non-participation in the voting due to time and resource factors. In addition, security officials, polling staff, including observers (due to restrictive measures) inmates are also debarred from franchise.

Risk Factors: Such a deliberate and insensitive practice of disenfranchisement of a huge section of eligible voters both within and outside of the country will obviously pose a serious risk of developing feeling of exclusion, isolation thereby potential dis-ownership of hard-earned democratic process in the country.

Impending Area of Risk #4: Electoral Education

Contextual Reference: Uninformed and uneducated citizenry is one of the biggest risks in electoral regime. Voter education takes place not only to assist the election administration in its task of delivering a free, fair, efficient and 6 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY cost-effective election, it includes a process of preparing informed citizenry with sovereign choices and options. Gone are the days simply to offer basic voter information that every voter must have in order to arrive prepared at the voting station and vote on the dedicated polling day. Attitudes, behaviors, and knowledge among citizens that stimulate and consolidate democracy are the core thrust behind empowerment of citizens through electoral education not only to reduce the risks of spoilt votes but at the same time empower voters means ensuring of effective organization and activism by citizens in support of parties and/or causes, that is essential to a peaceful, free, fair and credible election, including acceptance of results and tolerance of the competition and opposition.

Current Status: The current voter education package is limited to voter information which covers purely logistic aspect of elections such as information about the date of e-day, type of ballot papers, polling stations and centers, method of voting etc. There’s no connectivity with empowering a voter to make him/her able to choose the candidate with informed knowledge. It does not offer the civic educator a comprehensive toolbox for outreach with comprehensive education.

Risk Factors: Uninformed, uneducated and marginalized population means they have absolutely no say in the democratic development which may lead to the risk of indifference, exclusion and gradual dissociation with the democratic development process. An uninformed citizen is someone who, is prevented from searching for information, and actively participating in society and put his/her knowledge to a good collective use for promoting democratic culture. Uninformed citizen mean he/she is unable to help make decisions for the government. Inability to express opinion by voting for who the citizen believes has form a potential risk of bad representation and ultimately ill-governance.

Impending Area of Risk #5: Political Financing

Contextual Reference: Clean, open and transparent financial integrity is key to run any political party to continue to stabilize public trust and confidence. Financial management is a delicate issue and a slight deviation could damage the entire credibility of a political party. Today, in Nepal’s context, many

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 7 instances, the values and principles that are important to election integrity are at stake in the area of political finance. Development of policy goals, adoption of a legal/regulatory framework, implementation, enforcement, and definition of the role of the public has become a critical agenda even among stabilized democracies. Party financing is divided in two main categories: funding related to the parties’ maintenance, which is used to cover their regular expenses, and funding in relation to the electoral processes, which is used to cover the expenses of their election campaign. In several contexts, it is mostly funneled through secret channels instead of transparent source and means.

Current Status: In Nepal, financing of political parties is a contentious issue. The financing of political parties in terms of their economic resources at the disposal of the party and for the achievement of their mission has not been explicitly regulated in the law. The regulation of political party funding has no solid constitutional status. It also brings the question of transparency of political party organizations. Enactment of clear laws and regulations; establishment of independent political finance regulator; oversight powers of political finance regulator in the areas of disclosure, audits and investigations; and enforcement powers of political finance regulator in the areas of material incentives, administrative and civil and criminal are missing in the process to ensure integrity of the political parties.

Risk Factors: The prevalent absence of proper monitoring and control over political finance from the viewpoint of ethics, fairness, equity, accountability, transparency and accessibility is reflected in the election integrity throughout the electoral process. Such a precarious context warrants for an enormous electoral risk against the mandatory notion of a ‘leveled playing field’ in electoral contest. The ultimate results are that the voters will lose confidence with political parties in question and the risk of the culture of democratic practice derails becomes eminent.

Impending Area of Risk #6: Compliance with Code of Conduct

Contextual Reference: Compliance with the electoral Code of Conduct (CoC), a set of written rules that govern the behavior of public officials or private individuals or organizations, is one of the most neglected electoral components in Nepal. In our context, the code of conduct for political parties

8 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY is usually a voluntary agreement on rules of behavior for political parties and their supporters during an election campaign. Especially in transitional context of Nepal, where the rule of law is not yet fully developed and trusted, the goal of establishing a CoC has been to help political parties agree on accepted rules of the game and increase confidence in the electoral process. CoC that involve encouraging or requiring political parties and candidates to meet regularly during the election campaign can contribute to avoiding violent conflicts and increase public support for the democratic process. Generally speaking political parties are more likely to feel bound by commitments into which they have freely entered, and therefore may be more likely to fulfill those commitments. Although compliance with the CoC is generally a voluntary act founded on moral authority, gross violation of such CoC should constitute legal liability which is sadly a state of absenteeism in Nepal.

Current Status: Although the electoral laws and directives provide for the CoC that apply to electoral officials, security organs, other public officials carrying out election-related responsibilities, political parties, candidates, observers, CSOs and the media, prevalent unethical behavior especially among political parties and candidates is rampant. Although technically, it has been considered to be binding, individuals and entities subject to violation of such codes have rarely been held legally accountable for their actions with sanctions and punitive action for non- compliance.

Risk Factors: Due to obvious and multiple incidences of non-compliance with the CoC, it has been hard to keep the election campaign within acceptable limits, thereby it has posed serious risk of exacerbated tension between political parties/candidates and/or their supporters with occurrences of rift and even violence, disorder and disruptions during the campaign period and thereafter. This has triggered a high level of risks of deeply entrenched frustration among general public and other ‘conventional’ electoral contestants which has also triggered security related risks.

Impending Area of Risk #7: Campaign Financing

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 9 damage the entire credibility of a political party. Today, in Nepal’s context, the values and principles that are important to election integrity are at stake in the area of campaign finance. Development of policy goals, adoption of a legal/regulatory framework, implementation, enforcement, and definition of the role of the public has to become a critical agenda for a country like Nepal. Party financing is divided in two main categories: funding related to the parties’ maintenance, which is used to cover their regular expenses, and funding in relation to the electoral processes, which is used to cover the expenses of their election campaign.

Current Status: In Nepal, financing of political parties is a contentious issue. The financing of political parties in terms of their economic resources at the disposal of the party and for the achievement of their mission has not been explicitly regulated in the law. The regulation of political party funding has no solid constitutional status. It also brings the question of transparency of political party organizations. Enactment of clear laws and regulations; establishment of independent political finance regulator; oversight powers of political finance regulator in the areas of disclosure, audits and investigations; and enforcement powers of political finance regulator in the areas of material incentives, administrative and civil and criminal remain major risks to ensure integrity of the political parties.

Risk Factors: The deficiency of ethics, fairness, equity, accountability, transparency and accessibility are deeply associated risk factors. In several contexts, the campaign financing is mostly funneled through secret channels instead of transparent source and means, which is another big risk from financial health perspective of the nation as a whole.

Impending Area of Risk #8: Electoral Administration

Contextual Reference: Proper electoral management is key to consolidate democratic institutions. Election management is beyond technical administration; thus, it encompasses both the entity responsible for governing elections and the various mechanisms, roles and functions this entity may have. From only being responsible for the polling, conducting and tabulating of votes, the responsibilities of the Election Commission, Nepal (ECN) are extended to also include registration of political parties, oversight of

10 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY campaign finance, design of the ballot papers, resolution of electoral disputes, and civic and voter education. Since the ECN is ultimately responsible for safeguarding the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the peaceful transitions of power, they need to ensure that all aspects of any electoral contest meet global norms and follows the fundamental guiding principles of elections, including independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness.

Current Status: As per the 2015 Federal Constitution, the President shall, on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, appoint the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners. Prior to that, the Commissioners are nominated by the government and pass through parliamentary hearing. The ECN shall, subject to the Constitution and other laws, conduct, supervise, direct and control the election of the President, the Vice-President, Federal Parliament, Provincial assemblies, and local bodies and shall hold referendum on subject of national importance as per this Constitution and Federal laws. The ECN shall be responsible for preparing the voters’ list for the purpose of election

Risk Factors: Various risk factors are associated due to the absence of the provision for an open and competence-based selection process of the officials to ensure objective independence of the ECN. Since elections in the recent years have taken place using ‘fast track’ process, the elements of deficiency in electoral administration in ensuring key universal principles and good practices to promote professional, impartial and accountable administration has to some extent contributed to erode the expected autonomy of the ECN especially due to the governments’ high-handedness. This has raised speculation about its sterling administrative performance to serve in the best interest of the voters through effective, independent and self-governing approach.

Impending Area of Risk #9: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution

Contextual Reference: There has been increasingly priority focus on election disputes worldwide in recent years. In Nepal’s context too, political controversy and sense of distrust surrounding the complaints and appeals procedures is prevalent. In Nepal, electoral disputes have been potential

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 11 factors to grossly undermine the integrity of the electoral process and lead to social and political conflict which may lead to a massive civil strife in the absence of an effective election related grievance redress mechanism EDR should be considered as an integral part of the electoral justice which covers all stages and phases of electioneering rather than merely confining to post-election dispute management.

Current Status: In Nepal, EDR has become a less intensity agenda in the electoral process. Although complaints are received but investigations are rarely done, and adjudication is tediously slow. Transparent mechanism for verification of final results and certification, acceptance for adjudication of serious complaints, an appropriated is put ere solution mechanism which operates in an impartial and non-partisan manner, settlement of court disputes without undue delay, a timeframe for constitution of parliament prescribed by a legislation and a complainant with a reasonable case able to pursue the case without unreasonable personal or financial risk that are key to a competent EDR process, have been either deficient or entirely missing.

Risk Factors: In the overall in-action and absence of faster and effective EDR with legality, certainty, objectivity, impartiality, authenticity, clarity and justice, often the EDR has been just a showcasing process resulting in gross public distrust in the election administration, government and the designated mechanism. This has resulted in substantial risks in ensuring credibility of the election process, including post-election security related hazards.

Impending Area of Risk #10: External Voting Provisions

Contextual Reference: The right of expatriates to vote in elections in their country of origin varies depending on the legislation of an expatriate’s country of origin. Some countries grant their expatriate citizens unlimited voting rights, identical to those of citizens living in their home country. Other countries allow expatriate citizens to vote only for a certain number of years after leaving the country, after which they are no longer eligible to vote. Other countries reserve the right vote solely to citizens living in that country, thereby stripping expatriate citizens of their voting rights once they leave their home country. Rapid globalization of political, personal and professional life, the spread of democracy throughout the world and an increase in migration have

12 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY all contributed to an increasing interest in voting rights for migrant workers, diplomats, members of the security institutions serving overseas and other people who are temporarily or permanently absent from their own country, including refugees. The ability of these people to exercise their right to vote when an election in their home country takes place has long been an issue in electoral design and management with progressive success. In Nepal, the ECN has conducted a pilot study in some of the countries of origin and destination in connection with the status of external voting. The Supreme Court of Nepal has recently issued magnums in favor of external voting.

Current Status: There is no external voting law in Nepal although millions of eligible voters live out of country both as migrant workers and other forms of diaspora. Generally speaking, to proceed with external voting is a herculean task with full of challenges and risks. Comparative review of different contexts, types of election to which external voting applies, determining persons eligible to out of country voting, voting procedures in use for external voting, political representation for external voters are important factors to consider. Accordingly, legal framework of out of country voting, structural problems of external voting, entitlement to out of country voting entitlement to out of country voting conditions for entitlement to vote, registration of external electors also needs to be taken into account. Finally, arrangements concerning the host country issues in terms of legality and negotiating with host countries, data collection and costs factor, special political and logistical requirements and "e-voting" should form solid homework before entering into external voting regime. In the beginning, perhaps, it can be done through introducing registration in various viable spots and mechanisms with advance voting facility.

Risk Factors: Isolation and constant non-participation of a considerable section of eligible voters, who are mostly contractual migrant workers and the source of a major remittance economy, is a considerable risk of exclusion of millions of eligible voters to a fragile democracy like in Nepal. Such an unequal treatment of the country’s own citizens will not only erode legitimacy of transnational citizenship but also pose air reparable risk of total alienation from the democratic development of the nation.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 13 Scope of the Survey Project

In the given context of electoral dynamics in the country and associated factors contributing to risks for electoral conflict remains an obstacle to the consolidation of democratic institutions. Even in a stable political environment, elections can fall victim to conflict. Although a problem that is global in scope, electoral conflict and its root causes, profiles and intensities differ in Nepal’s context. Various forms of elections risk are becoming venues for violence and intimidation and conflict is also employed as a political tactic to influence electoral outcomes. The electoral risks are not confined during the climax of electoral campaign but in all related components such as voter registration, campaign finance, code of conduct and so on. The prevalent culture of immunity in the country allows the perpetrators of electoral conflict often to act without legal consequences, engendering a culture of impunity for such crimes.

The scope of the survey project is to widen the support for the more effective use of the multi-stakeholder approaches in national and local level policy formulation and implementation. This moves beyond the “stakeholder consultations” techniques around already stated plans and programmes, to ensuring serious engagement of different actors to help articulate those very plans and programmes to begin with, so that they are framed in multi-sectoral development content and processes to ensure shared ownership.

Another important scope of the survey project is to enhance capacity of key stakeholders – especially security sector, ECN and CSOs - to engage effectively in handling the information on electoral risks. The information received from the field has been disseminated to these institutions asan exercise of ensuring access to knowledge on the issues at hand, and sharing of good practices of electoral risk management.

The survey project also aims to ensure participatory accountability and transparency, and the creation of partnerships and networks amongst different stakeholders for improved dialogue and decision-making in all stages of planning and implementation. For this, the security sector and the ECN has been engaged right from the beginning and throughout the entire process

14 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY in information sharing, consultation, decision-making and, implementation with a desired or perceived impact of their participation (e.g. mobilizing popular support, creating ownership in the use of ERMT).

On technical and practical fronts, the survey project aims to closely look into all direct and indirect risk factors-both internal and external-soft and high intensity- direct security as well as undercurrent electoral maneuvering tricks. For this, the scope of the project in terms of data collection and dissemination is to focus on overall contextual analysis as mentioned above in setting thematic risks benchmarks. The first and foremost elements of assessment are the prevalent socio-political and legal grounds and potential associated risk factors. The assessment of the electoral security is another important element including electoral security planning protocol in active consultation and engagement with the security sector and electoral justice mechanism. The perception survey and data retrieval has looked into the aspects of electoral security programming and targets in which the security sector has been appropriately consulted and engaged. Examining the various form of conflict that may lead to electoral conflict and violence has been an important component of NEOC’s data collection endeavor.

Overall Objective of the Survey

To empower intended users, namely the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN), state security agencies and concerned civil society organizations to contribute to more peaceful and credible elections with an aim to build their capacity to understand, prevent and mitigate electoral hazards through collection and analysis of both the prevalent and potential internal and external risk data at the different phases of the electoral cycle

Specific Objectives

• To identify the context profile and track-record of conflict and risks in terms of political, economic, socio-cultural contexts in connection with emergent contributing factors to electoral risks issues;

• To unveil the structural and proximate causes possible triggers and factors for peace in different geographic and social contexts;

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 15 • To identify and engage with the stakeholders and explore their interests, goals, capacities, relationships, including capacities for peace and potential spoilers; and

• To better understand and take stock of the dynamics, current trends, windows of opportunities, and scenarios in relation to risks management.

Expected Outcomes (Related to ECN)

The following are the key output and outcomes from the information retrieved, cross-checked, verified, validated and disseminated through NEOC:

• The leadership and high-level management of the ECN will be able to honor and endorse risk management as a means of strengthening its capacity and operation to deliver credible elections.

• The ECN leadership will be able to recognize the advantages of addressing the risks at their early stage and, institutionalizes the risk management strategy with a built-in approach as an integral component along with all other simultaneous activities.

• The ECN will be able to make an advanced effort to embed risk management approach into all parts of its work through the information received from this project with sustainable structures.

• The ECN, regardless of its financial and human resources, will take initiation towards stocktaking of available organizational resources that can be best utilized in risk management endeavor.

• The ECN will revisit the pre-existed multi-agency forum, namely Joint Election Operation Coordination (JEOC) in order to revitalize it for effective exchange of risk data and coordination of prevention and mitigation efforts.

• The ECN will re-orient itself in terms of revising the factors such as voter roll, policy on Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI), media monitoring, election observation, electoral administration and management, civic and voter education, compliance with code

16 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY of conduct, political and campaign financing, electoral justice and dispute resolution with a view to curbing electoral risks.

Expected Output (Related to Security Sector and CSOs)

• The concerned state apparatus, especially the security sector will be acquainted with information, facts, data and statistics regarding the overall risks of the electoral process.

• Various non-state actors, including civil society organizations, observer groups and stakeholders of electoral regime will be sensitized on issues of different dimensions of electoral risks in Nepal.

• An initiation will be materialized to establish a network of ERM tools users, with both the ECN and security sector involved, in the Provincial Chapters, in order to monitor gaps/risks associated to freedom of election from local to central level.

• The security sector and other ERMT users’ capacities will be enhanced to better appreciate the risk factors and analysis of the risk data in local context.

• The ability of the sub-national level staff of the ECN, security sector agencies and relevant civil society groups will be enhanced in order to better anticipate and identify risks and to produce solutions to mitigate and minimize electoral risks.

• The use of ERMT will be an integral component of election observation drive in the future for the Election Observation Coordination Group (EOCG).

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 17 Public Perception Survey Diagnosis of Risks on Electoral Process

A two-month long survey was carried out from 1st June till 31st of July 2019 to congregate the public opinion on gaps and pitfalls around Nepal’s electoral risks in general and the future electoral process and system in particular from risk response perspective. A questionnaire containing at least 40 questions were developed to measure various risk factors that in the past may have compromised electoral credibility. The questions were multiple choice close-ended (structured). A random (but targeted in terms of diversity) sampling of 150 respondents from each province were carried out. The survey was conducted by the designated provincial staff(s) with the support of assistant(s), who were hired for collecting data for a period of two months. Tracking social survey data has been a promising approach to predicting electoral risks. In the course of conducting the survey, we did realize that the development of a high-quality risk-analysis tool will require smart perception survey questionnaire with conceptual, empirical, and interpretive work. Such an exploratory sample survey results may call attention to specific red flags to electoral risks. The survey can be a first step on the long road to reliable risk identification and, longer still, risk management. In this regards, necessary orientation for data collection staff (surveyors) was organized by the NEOC technical staff to ensure that the ‘new data’ collection effort is consistent and standardized across the country. 1. Background Characteristic of the Respondents The vulnerability in election survey interviewed 1050 respondents who registered themselves on the voter roll and/or casted their votes in the election. This consisted of 58 percent of male and 42 percent of female respondents.

Table 1: Background Characteristics of Respondents Characteristics N % Gender Male 607 57.8 Female 440 41.9 Other 3 0.3

18 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Age 18-24 170 16.2 25-31 253 24.1 32-38 215 20.5 39-44 151 14.4 45 and above 261 24.9 Education Illiterate 23 2.2 Literate 86 8.2 Below SLC/SEE 52 5.0 Secondary 172 16.4 Higher Secondary 230 21.9 Bachelor 269 25.6 Masters 199 19.0 Vocational 19 1.8 Occupation Academic 197 18.8 Business 145 13.8 Informal Sector 302 28.8 Labor 19 1.8 Politician 11 1.0 Professionals 297 28.3 Marital status Married 812 77.3 Unmarried 230 21.9 Divorced/Separated 7 0.7 Other 1 0.1 Total 1050 100.0

One-fourth of the respondents was in the age group 45 years and above, followed closely by those in the age group 25-31 years (24 %). Sixteen percent of respondents were young voters of 18-24 years age group. Academically, a little over one-fourth (25.6 %) had completed Bachelors level of education,

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 19 five percent have studied up to grade nine (below SLC/SEE) while 19 percent of them have passed Master’s level. Few respondents (2%) were illiterate. Twenty eight percent each of the respondents are engaged in the informal sector and different professions, while one percent were politicians. A majority of the respondents (77 %) are married (Table 1).

Table 2: District-wise Distribution of Respondents in Provinces Characteristics N % Province 1 Bhojpur 1 0.7 Dhankuta 6 4.0 Jhapa 12 8.0 Khotang 1 0.7 Morang 17 11.3 Panchthar 1 0.7 Sunsari 112 74.7 Province 2 Dhanusa 94 62.7 Mahottari 23 15.3 Rautahat 2 1.3 Saptari 1 0.7 Sarlahi 12 8.0 Siraha 18 12.0 Bagmati (Province 3) Bhaktapur 22 14.7 Kathmandu 52 34.7 Kavre 27 18.0 Lalitpur 19 12.7 Sindhupalchowk 30 20.0 Gandaki (Province 4) Syangja 28 18.7 Baglung 4 2.7 Gorkha 3 2.0

20 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Kaski 59 39.3 Lamjung 11 7.3 Myagdi 1 0.7 Nawalparasi-east 1 0.7 Parbat 27 18.0 Tanahu 16 10.7 Province 5 Banke 109 72.7 Bardiya 22 14.7 Dang 19 12.7 Karnali (Province 6) Dailekh 21 14.0 Jajarkot 26 17.3 Rukum-West 2 1.3 Salyan 15 10.0 Surkhet 86 57.3 Sudur-Paschim (Province 7) Achham 5 3.3 Baitadi 3 2.0 Bajhang 17 11.3 Bajura 8 5.3 Dadeldhura 4 2.7 Darchula 4 2.7 Doti 9 6.0 Kailali 54 36.0 Kanchanpur 46 30.7 Total 150 100.0

Distribution of respondents according to the districts in all seven provinces shows that the majority of respondents are from Sunsari (74.7 %), Banke (72.7%) followed by Dhanusha (62.7%) and Surkhet (57.3%) districts. Less than 1 percent each are from Bhojpur, Khotang, Panchthar, Saptari, Myagdi, Nawalparasi-east districts (Table 2). PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 21 Figure shows a significant difference among male and female respondents in Province 2, in which for every female respondent there are almost 3 male respondents (112 male and 38 female respondents). This difference in Province 2 is followed by Province 3, in which there are 91 male respondents and 59 female. In all the Provinces, there are more male respondents than females, except in province five, where there are more female respondents as compared to males. 2. Potential Risks The survey collected information on certain indicators related to potential risk for electoral system. In this regard, the respondents was asked their opinions on four topics on the delimitation of electoral constituencies as potential risk area, 44 and 43 percent agree on the credibility and transparency of the process respectively, 40 percent agree that delimitation of electoral constituencies is scientific, while 47 percent disagree that there is any form of gerrymandering (Table 3) involved in the process.

Table 3: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % agree % know % Total % Scientific 420 40 303 28.9 244 23.2 83 7.9 1050 100 Credibility 465 44.3 217 20.7 309 29.4 59 5.6 1050 100 Transparency 452 43 225 21.4 299 28.5 74 7 1050 100 Gerrymandering 225 21.4 494 47 154 14.7 177 16.9 1050 100

22 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 4: Civic-Electoral Education Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Effectiveness 388 37 345 32.9 293 27.9 24 2.3 1050 100 Diversity 288 27.4 281 26.8 369 35.1 112 10.7 1050 100 Inclusiveness 397 37.8 278 26.5 315 30 60 5.7 1050 100 Coverage 229 21.8 335 31.9 364 34.7 122 11.6 1050 100 On the topic of civic/electoral education, around 37 percent each of the respondents agree that it is effective and inclusive. On the other hand, about 35 percent each moderately agree on the diversity and good coverage of civic / electoral education (Table 4).

Table 5: Voter Registration Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Effectiveness of 397 37.8 292 27.8 322 30.7 39 3.7 1050 100 information flow Degree of access 305 29 274 26.1 417 39.7 54 5.1 1050 100 Registration of 162 15.4 527 50.2 155 14.8 206 19.6 1050 100 ineligible voters Registration of 350 33.3 352 33.5 189 18.0 159 15.1 1050 100 all eligible voters Table 5 reflects the respondent’s view on voter’s registration as potential risk area. About 38 percent agree that the information flow regarding voters registration is effective. On the other hand, one-third of the respondents each agrees (33.3 %) and disagree (33.5 %) that all eligible voters are registered. One-half of the respondents however, disagree that even the ineligible voters are registered.

Table 6: Political Financing Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Financial governance 249 23.7 435 41.4 244 23.2 122 11.6 1050 100 Transparency 233 22.2 418 39.8 297 28.3 102 9.7 1050 100 Disclosure of source, 219 20.9 371 35.3 254 24.2 206 19.6 1050 100 audit and documentation Effectiveness of 198 18.9 359 34.2 351 33.4 142 13.5 1050 100 monitoring

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 23 Table 6 shows that a majority of respondents disagree on all the indicators associated with good political financing. Four in ten respondents disagree that a good financial governance and transparency exist (41.4%and 40% respectively). Thirty four percent of them also disagree that a system of disclosing the financial source, audit and documentation (35.3 %) along with effective monitoring (34.2 %) exist in the political system. Table 7: Compliance with Code of Conduct Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % agree % know % Total % Effectiveness of monitoring 373 35.5 371 35.3 254 24.2 52 5 1050 100 Influence of ruling party 319 30.4 345 32.9 271 25.8 115 11 1050 100 Punitive measures 142 13.5 554 52.8 199 19 155 14.8 1050 100 Effectiveness of compliance 187 17.8 310 29.5 376 35.8 177 16.9 1050 100 The respondents were asked whether or not code of conduct is being followed during the election process. Thirty five percent of respondents each agree (35.5 %) and disagree (35.3 %) that there is effective monitoring of compliance with the code of conduct. Over one-half of the respondents (53%) disagree that any punitive measures exist or are implemented for non-compliance compared with 13 of them who agree that punitive measures are implemented (Table 7). Table 8: Campaign Financing Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % agree % know % Total % Compliance with expenditure cap 217 20.7 582 55.4 130 12.4 121 11.5 1050 100 Vote buying 413 39.3 309 29.4 116 11 212 20.2 1050 100 Effectiveness of monitoring 195 18.6 400 38.1 346 33 109 10.4 1050 100 Audit, documentation and reporting 197 18.8 262 25 252 24 339 32.3 1050 100 More than 55 percent respondents disagree that campaign financing is in compliance with the expenditure cap in contrast to less than half percent of them (21%) who agree with the statement. Additionally, 38 percent of the respondents also disagree with the presence of any effective monitoring mechanism. Thirty nine percent agree on the prevalence of vote-buying in contrary to 29 percent of them who do not agree such practice exist in the electoral system. Only 19 percent each of the respondents agree on the existence of effective monitoring system and audit, documentation and reporting (Table 8).

24 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 9: Electoral Administration Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Competence and fairness of 579 55.1 169 16.1 251 23.9 51 4.9 1050 100 administration Adequate security 598 57 121 11.5 302 28.8 29 2.8 1050 100 measures Adequate, trained and inclusive 415 39.5 215 20.5 342 32.6 78 7.4 1050 100 human resources Adequacy of materials, polling center and voting 528 50.3 97 9.2 342 32.6 83 7.9 1050 100 process management More than 55 percent of the respondents agree on competence and fairness of administration and that adequate safety measures prevail during election. Fifty percent agree that there are adequate materials, polling center and voting management process (9% disagree), while almost 40 percent agree that there are adequate trained and inclusive human resources (21% disagree) (Table 9).

Table 10: External Voting Provisions Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Database and registration of 208 19.8 504 48 96 9.1 242 23 1050 100 external voters Legal and policy 241 23 363 34.6 256 24.4 190 18.1 1050 100 provisions Feasibility study 230 21.9 274 26.1 231 22 315 30 1050 100 State's affirmative 274 26.1 213 20.3 308 29.3 255 24.3 1050 100 initiative Forty eight percent of the respondents deny that database and registration of external voters exist while 35 percent of them disagree on existence of any legal and policy provisions. Twenty six percent of the respondents however agree that the state is taking affirmative initiatives on external voting provision while 30 percent of them moderately agree that there is feasibility study on external voting provision (Table 10).

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 25 Table 11: The Legal Framework Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Availability of 468 44.6 268 25.5 209 19.9 105 10 1050 100 unified laws Democratic 568 54.1 147 14 273 26 62 5.9 1050 100 features Non-discrimination 358 34.1 355 33.8 264 25.1 73 7 1050 100 Simplicity and 438 41.7 176 16.8 366 34.9 70 6.7 1050 100 handiness Over one-third of the respondents (34%) each agree as well as disagree that a non-discriminatory legal framework exist. However, over one-half of the respondents (54%) agree on the existence of a legal framework with democratic features (Table 11).

Table 12: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution Moderately Don't Agree % Disagree % % % Total % agree know Easy accessibility 496 47.2 262 25 245 23.3 47 4.5 1050 100 Credibility 419 39.9 245 23.3 330 31.4 56 5.3 1050 100 Undue influence 259 24.7 414 39.4 241 23 136 13 1050 100 Decision procedure 264 25.1 245 23.3 408 38.9 133 12.7 1050 100 and swiftness Forty seven percent of the respondents consider electoral justice/dispute resolution system is easily accessible while 40 percent of them consider it credible. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents however disagree that the system faces undue influence. Same proportion of the respondents moderately agrees on the prevalence of swift decision procedure (Table 12).

3. Most potential risks identified by the respondents by Province

Province-wise, a higher percentage of respondents from Province 2 disagree that delimitation of electoral constituency is scientific (24%), credible (29%) and transparent (31%). Comparatively, a higher percentage of respondents from Province 2 than the rest (34.2%) again agree that gerrymandering exist in the process. Few respondents from Province 3 (5%) agree on gerrymandering as associated factor with delimitation of electoral constituencies.

26 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY A relatively higher proportion of respondents from Province 1 (28%) followed by Province 2 (23%) do not consider that civic-electoral education is effective. Nineteen percent of the respondents from Province 5 disagree on diversity of civic-electoral education while 31 percent of the respondents again from Province 1 disagree on the inclusiveness of the education. Twenty three percent of the respondents from Province 3 and 22 percent of them from Province 1 disagree on good coverage of the civic-electoral education. On the other hand, 27 percent of the respondents from Karnali region agree on good coverage of the electoral education (data not shown in the figure).

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 27 A higher percentage of respondents from province 1(27%) followed by those in province 3 (21%) disagree that voter registration system disseminate information effectively. An almost similar percent of respondents in province 2 (20%) however consider that the system is effective (data not shown in the figure). More respondents from Karnali region (25%) disagree that voters registration is easily accessible, and that ineligible voters are also registered (21%). Similarly comparatively more respondents in province 1 disagree that all eligible voters are registered (34%) followed by those in province 2 (24%).

28 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY More respondents in Province 1 (25%) and those in Province 2(21%) than in other province disagree on the existence of good financial governance and transparency of the system (16 % and 21%). More respondents in province 2(23%) also disagree that disclosure of source; audit and documentation exist in the system. Additionally, more respondents in Province 1 and 2 (24% and 22%) disagree on the effective functioning of the political financing monitoring system than other provinces.

Twenty four percent of respondents in Province 1 disagree that compliance of code of conduct is effectively monitored; an equal proportion of the respondent (24%) in Far-West (data not shown in figure) agree that the monitoring system is effective. More respondents in Karnali region (21%) disagree that he compliance with code of conduct is influenced by the ruling party in contrast to 19 percent of respondent who think it otherwise in Province 2 (data not shown in figure). More respondents in Province 1 (22%) disagree on the existence of punitive measure on non-compliance of code of conduct than other provinces. An equal proportion of respondents in Province 1 and 2 (22%each) disagree that compliance with the code of conduct is effective.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 29 More respondents from Province 2 (22%) disagree on existence of compliance with expenditure cap, this province represent least proportion of respondents (5%) who disagree on vote buying as part of campaign financing. Comparatively more respondents in Province 1 (24%) followed by those in Province 2 (22%) disagree that an effective monitoring system of campaign financing exist. Over one-third of the respondents in province 1 (38%) agree on the existence of audit, documentation and reporting of campaign financing (data not shown in the Figure).

30 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY More respondents in Province 5 than other provinces disagree on the existence of competent and fair electoral administration system (28%), adequate security measure (29%), and adequate materials, polling centers and voting process (29%); while more respondents from Province 2 (23%) disagreed on the availability of adequate, trained and inclusive human resource in the electoral administration system.

More respondents from Province 1 (21%) disagree that database, registration of external voters exists and there is legal and policy provision for external voters.Respondents from Province 3 largely (20%) disagree that a feasibility study is conducted for external voting provisions while those in Province 3 (24%) disagree the state is taking affirmative initiative on external voting provisions. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents in Province 1 on the other hand, agree that the state’s initiatives towards this direction are affirmative (data not shown in the figure).

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 31 Twenty seven percent of the respondents in province 3 disagree on availability of unified laws compared to just 9 percent of them in Gandaki Province. Over 20 percent of respondents in Province 1, Province 5 and Far-West disagree that the legal framework has democratic features while over 10 percent of the respondents in all the regions except in Gandaki Province disagree that the framework is non-discriminatory. Twenty percent of the respondents in Province 2 and Far-West Province disagree that the framework is simple and handy.

One in 10 respondents in all provinces disagree that electoral justice/dispute resolution system is easily accessible to the people. Twenty percent of the respondents in Province 5 disagree on the credibility of the dispute resolution system. Two in ten respondents in province 1 and 2 (22 and 21%) disagree that an undue influence prevail in the electoral justice/dispute resolution system. Fewer respondents in Province 3 (7%) disagree that the decision procedure is swift.

32 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Recommendations for Future Direction The following recommendations have been mostly drawn and formulated based on the public perception survey:

No. Areas Recommendations Government of Nepal 1 Constituency ● Ensure a scientific, transparent, and credible approach in Delineation delineation of constituency to strike a correct balance between Accountability demographic and geographic components Administration ● Ensure that all eligible voters are given equal opportunities of political representation by corroborating with the latest National Census with no room for gerrymandering. 2 Electoral ● Review the ECN’s functionalities in order to ensure its autonomy in Administration entirety and guaranteed its independence with election stakeholders’ confidence. For example, voter registration, the fixing of threshold and announcement of election date (except for by-election), and fixing the timeline for party registration should be made entirely under the independent jurisdiction of ECN. ● Refrain from interference with the works of ECN-be it by the government, the political parties, or any other entities. ● Ensure fiscal autonomy with a stable, adequate and timely source of funding that allows the ECN to fulfill its mandates effectively and independently. ● Make sure that the commissioner’s position is not made entirely vacant and the trend of the frequent transferring of ECN staff is stopped to ensure institutional continuity. ● Ensure fully transparent and depoliticized appointment of the officials including of the Secretariat staff to enable them to perform their functions free of outside interference at all times. 3 Safety and ● Provide adequate sense of security to all concerned beyond Security radius of layered physical presence of the security personnel. ● Ensure appropriate security to candidates, electoral staff and observers especially women in all phases of elections. ● Induct more women into government services and security agencies to ensure effective inclusion in the security protocol.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 33 4 Code of ● Employ thorough measures to educate election stakeholders about Conduct the details of the CoC and the importance in following them. ● Monitor and expose all unethical behavior in connection with non-compliance of the provision under the CoC and prosecute a violation constituting a breach of electoral law to the full extent of the provision. ● Formed a high level mechanism that includes representatives from political parties, CSOs, ECN, security agencies, and Home Ministry officials to monitor the effective implementation and adherence to the CoC. 5 Electoral ● Revisit the current electoral model—especially the provision System related to Proportional Representation system as it has become Reform very controversial and inappropriate—to prevent possible distortions and deviations in the competitive and representative democracy. ● Enforce democratization of parties first to ensure diversity and inclusion within their rank-and-file so that they can field a diverse and inclusive array of candidates for elections. ● Strike a correct and judicious balance PR and FPTP Representation system to promote a link between constituencies and their representatives, as well as to enhance the accountability of the elected representatives to their electorate. Election Commission, Nepal 1 Voter ● Improve current system/procedure in order to increase Registration transparency and effective management of voter registration, and Voter ID voter list and issues of identity document. ● Consider the adoption of year-round voter registration system from anywhere so that people who work outside of their home districts can register without any difficulties. ● Explore the possibility of advance voting and out-of-country registration to ensure enfranchisement of overseas contractual laborers and diaspora community. ● Review the current citizenship and voter registrations laws to ensure that married women, indigenous people, the landless and other vulnerable categories do not face obstacles to register. ● Consider to explore an amicable solution to the problem of Nepali nationals being unable to register due to their inability to provide necessary documentation of citizenship. ● Delegate authority to the local bodies in each municipality to carefully check the publication of the voter lists. ● Forge cooperative approach among the municipalities, civil society as well as the in search of the deceased and migrants as well as witnesses and other evidence.

34 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 2 External ● Given the considerable number of eligible voters who live and Voting work outside of the country, initiate database of all eligible voters residing out of country. ● Explore the possibility of introducing a system of out-of-country voting to ensure enfranchisement of overseas contractual laborers and the diaspora community in compliance with the Supreme Court’s ruling. 3 Voting, polling ● Provide easy physical access to voting facilities when and delineating the constituencies. Post-Election ● Provide proper training of polling officials on ensuring secrecy Management of the vote through the provision of adequate training on the CoC, process laws and guidelines and the right to information to those officers involved in the polling process. ● Organize briefings in each constituency for candidates, party agents, and observers prior to Election Day, to ensure that voting and counting process is understood in advance by all participants and is conducted uniformly nationwide. ● Consider use of “pre-ink” stamps or employing EVM alternative since the use of ink and wet ink on Swastik stamp for fingerprinting tend to smudge the ballot paper. ● Arrange Braille script for visually impaired voters and necessary aids for other voters with disabilities as per the provision of the CRPD-2006. 4 Political and ● Legal provisions on campaign financing should be strengthened to Campaign ensure increased transparency in campaign funding, realistic campaign Finance spending limits, and increase enforcement power for ECN. ● Make mandatory provision for audit report to be made public with proper mechanism to monitor income and expenditure of political parties to be in place. ● Develop and amend (as necessary) laws on political campaign finance (Or law on political party finance) to ensure transparency and accountability of political parties and candidates. ● Closely monitor financial statements of all parties competing in elections (income and expense) during the election campaign and make provision to announce the financial statements again before the election. ● Bring to justice with punitive measures all political parties and candidates that make fraudulent income and expense statements. ● Make provision that political parties must prepare campaign financial statements for the ECN, and announce these statements to the public, especially to their members.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 35 5 Gender and ● Make genuine efforts and ensure to include a greater number of Social women on the commission and among ECN secretariat leadership Inclusion positions, district election officials, and returning officers. ● Ensure gender-sensitive and socially inclusive electoral procedures and activities in the process of appointing employees, forming monitoring teams, issuing permission for observation, recruiting temporary staff, procuring expert services, registering political parties, fielding candidates, issuing CoC, and operating voters’ awareness campaigns, among others. ● Initiate special programs to enhance involvement of women and other marginalized community to ensure their involvement in politics by ensuring affirmative action at all levels. ● Ensure at least 33% women representation and participation in overall electoral process at all levels of the party organogram. ● Embrace gender perspectives in the entire cycle of election based on the ECN’s Gender and Inclusion Policy, 2013. 6 Election ● Create conducive environment that facilitates both domestic Monitoring and international observation missions to carry out their and activities without undue restrictions. Observation ● Set out clear rules for timely accreditation of domestic and international observers and apply them fairly and consistently. ● Refrain from imposing any undue restrictions on observers to witness any of the electoral activities, including printing and dispatch of ballot papers and counting of the ballots. 7 Electoral ● Establish the EDR system as a credible mechanism that ensures Dispute active, impartial and timely adjudication and enforcement Resolution ● Ensure enough investigative independence to the concerned agencies to examine allegations of election fraud or other illegal activities, and to initiate legal proceedings. ● Ensure that investigators are objective, professional and shielded from any political interference with their work. ● Guarantee for protection of the rights of whistle-blowers, witnesses and the accused to uphold integrity in the EDR process. ● Ensure access to defendants to legal representation and to the information that has been gathered against them. Political Parties 1 Intra-Party ● Strengthen the participation and representation of women, Democracy Dalits, people with disabilities and other members of other marginalized groups as candidates and in decisions making and leadership positions within political parties. ● Devise intra-party rules on quotas for members of such groups in party leadership positions at all levels and as candidates in both the local, provincial and national elections.

36 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 2 Code of ● Political parties should publicly commit to this set of regulations Conduct and adhere by it with no excuse under any circumstances. ● Mandatorily comply with the code of conduct on the election campaign trail and the law on elections. ● Remove all campaign materials used during the election campaign, after the election is over so that the public space looks clean with proper monitoring. ● Strictly impose fines or disciplinary action on any individual, party or other agencies who violate the code of conduct and the law on election. Rights Groups and CSOs 1 Engagement ● Use the period between elections to coordinate and conduct voter in Civic and education campaigns, as well as training programs for voter Electoral registration, participation of women and historically marginalized Education groups and other electoral issues, well before the next elections. ● Prioritize and conduct broader civic and electoral education beyond mere voter education targeting especially in underprivileged, remote, and indigenous areas, clusters and communities. ● Organize training courses on law, human rights and democracy to the local areas with the participation of citizens and local authorities, and prepare public forums to disseminate laws to local areas and allow citizens to express their opinions. ● Regularly participate in monitoring or auditing of electoral process and provide information to eligible voters as part of built-in human rights education. ● Provide home-based education, especially to women, people with disabilities and senior citizens, with easily-understood and clear pictures of the election. The Media 1 Accountability ● Widely and openly broadcast and provide equal access to political of Print, parties for campaign broadcasting for each political party and ensure Electronic and that both state and private media does not violate the law on elections. Social Media ● Prepare journalists early for efficient ways to locate and understand required disclosures from candidates, including campaign promises, and how to assess their validity during the limited timeframe of the election. ● Stay up-to-date with the political developments with critical analysis skills and sound knowledge on election affairs. ● Report more comprehensively and avoid chronicling the campaign of a single candidate in a single story but incorporate coverage of a candidate’s opponents, including an opportunity to comment, and reaction from voters into reporting alongside analysis by recognized experts. ● Dedicate significant space for interviews of women candidates, their backgrounds and personalities and present reasons for women’s role in politics. ● Uphold gender sensitivity and make use of gender sensitive terminologies while publishing and broadcasting issues related to elections.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 37 ANNEXES (Province-wise Potential Risks Identified by Respondents) Table 1: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies [Scientific Character] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 101 24.1 30 9.9 17 7 2 2.4 Province No. 2 24 5.7 73 24.1 44 18 9 10.8 Province No. 3 50 11.9 50 16.5 36 14.8 14 16.9 Gandaki 44 10.5 29 9.6 45 18.4 32 38.6 Province No.5 63 15 55 18.2 29 11.9 3 3.6 Karnali 63 15 45 14.9 39 16 3 3.6 Sudur-Paschim 75 17.9 21 6.9 34 13.9 20 24.1 Total 420 100 303 100 244 100 83 100 Table 2: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies [Credibility] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 102 21.9 25 11.5 23 7.4 0 0 Province No. 2 32 6.9 63 29 47 15.2 8 13.6 Province No. 3 59 12.7 28 12.9 48 15.5 15 25.4 Gandaki 67 14.4 13 6 55 17.8 15 25.4 Province No.5 55 11.8 51 23.5 42 13.6 2 3.4 Karnali 80 17.2 18 8.3 50 16.2 2 3.4 Sudur-Paschim 70 15.1 19 8.8 44 14.2 17 28.8 Total 465 100 217 100 309 100 59 100 Table 3: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies [Transparency] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 102 22.6 22 9.8 19 6.4 7 9.5 Province No. 2 35 7.7 69 30.7 33 11 13 17.6 Province No. 3 78 17.3 28 12.4 37 12.4 7 9.5 Gandaki 57 12.6 15 6.7 56 18.7 22 29.7 Province No.5 50 11.1 37 16.4 57 19.1 6 8.1 Karnali 65 14.4 24 10.7 58 19.4 3 4.1 Sudur-Paschim 65 14.4 30 13.3 39 13 16 21.6 Total 452 100 225 100 299 100 74 100 Table 4: Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies [Gerrymandering] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 31 13.8 108 21.9 6 3.9 5 2.8 Province No. 2 77 34.2 39 7.9 13 8.4 21 11.9 Province No. 3 12 5.3 95 19.2 14 9.1 29 16.4 Gandaki 24 10.7 54 10.9 29 18.8 43 24.3 Province No.5 27 12 56 11.3 44 28.6 23 13 Karnali 22 9.8 77 15.6 17 11 34 19.2 Sudur-Paschim 32 14.2 65 13.2 31 20.1 22 12.4 Total 225 100 494 100 154 100 177 100

38 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 5: Civic-Electoral Education [Effectiveness] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 39 10.1 95 27.5 16 5.5 0 0 Province No. 2 19 4.9 79 22.9 50 17.1 2 8.3 Province No. 3 64 16.5 31 9 50 17.1 5 20.8 Gandaki 68 17.5 24 7 51 17.4 7 29.2 Province No.5 59 15.2 58 16.8 32 10.9 1 4.2 Karnali 60 15.5 31 9 57 19.5 2 8.3 Sudur-Paschim 79 20.4 27 7.8 37 12.6 7 29.2 Total 388 100 345 100 293 100 24 100 Table 6: Civic-Electoral Education [Diversity] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 35 12.2 32 11.4 75 20.3 8 7.1 Province No. 2 33 11.5 39 13.9 64 17.3 14 12.5 Province No. 3 53 18.4 34 12.1 46 12.5 17 15.2 Gandaki 38 13.2 35 12.5 40 10.8 37 33 Province No.5 32 11.1 54 19.2 49 13.3 15 13.4 Karnali 50 17.4 43 15.3 48 13 9 8 Sudur-Paschim 47 16.3 44 15.7 47 12.7 12 10.7 Total 288 100 281 100 369 100 112 100 Table 7: Civic-Electoral Education [Inclusiveness] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 36 9.1 85 30.6 17 5.4 12 20 Province No. 2 39 9.8 50 18 52 16.5 9 15 Province No. 3 64 16.1 26 9.4 55 17.5 5 8.3 Gandaki 73 18.4 19 6.8 45 14.3 13 21.7 Province No.5 46 11.6 47 16.9 48 15.2 9 15 Karnali 72 18.1 17 6.1 60 19 1 1.7 Sudur-Paschim 67 16.9 34 12.2 38 12.1 11 18.3 Total 397 100 278 100 315 100 60 100 Table 8: Civic-Electoral Education [Coverage] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 24 10.5 75 22.4 45 12.4 6 4.9 Province No. 2 23 10 51 15.2 57 15.7 19 15.6 Province No. 3 9 3.9 78 23.3 39 10.7 24 19.7 Gandaki 44 19.2 28 8.4 57 15.7 21 17.2 Province No.5 31 13.5 38 11.3 60 16.5 21 17.2 Karnali 62 27.1 25 7.5 58 15.9 5 4.1 Sudur-Paschim 36 15.7 40 11.9 48 13.2 26 21.3 Total 229 100 335 100 364 100 122 100

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 39 Table 9: Voter Registration [Effectiveness of Information Flow] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 29 7.3 79 27.1 41 12.7 1 2.6 Province No. 2 80 20.2 32 11 36 11.2 2 5.1 Province No. 3 28 7.1 62 21.2 49 15.2 11 28.2 Gandaki 62 15.6 21 7.2 53 16.5 14 35.9 Province No.5 59 14.9 54 18.5 36 11.2 1 2.6 Karnali 64 16.1 17 5.8 64 19.9 5 12.8 Sudur-Paschim 75 18.9 27 9.2 43 13.4 5 12.8 Total 397 100 292 100 322 100 39 100 Table 10: Voter Registration [Degree of Access] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 44 14.4 20 7.3 85 20.4 1 1.9 Province No. 2 82 26.9 31 11.3 34 8.2 3 5.6 Province No. 3 20 6.6 36 13.1 79 18.9 15 27.8 Gandaki 42 13.8 27 9.9 62 14.9 19 35.2 Province No.5 29 9.5 54 19.7 64 15.3 3 5.6 Karnali 33 10.8 67 24.5 49 11.8 1 1.9 Sudur-Paschim 55 18 39 14.2 44 10.6 12 22.2 Total 305 100 274 100 417 100 54 100 Table 11: Voter Registration [Registration of Ineligible Voters] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 12 7.4 103 19.5 15 9.7 20 9.7 Province No. 2 40 24.7 65 12.3 21 13.5 24 11.7 Province No. 3 10 6.2 88 16.7 18 11.6 34 16.5 Gandaki 23 14.2 44 8.3 36 23.2 47 22.8 Province No.5 41 25.3 45 8.5 43 27.7 21 10.2 Karnali 13 8 109 20.7 10 6.5 18 8.7 Sudur-Paschim 23 14.2 73 13.9 12 7.7 42 20.4 Total 162 100 527 100 155 100 206 100 Table 12: Voter Registration [Registration of all Eligible voters] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 16 4.6 121 34.4 9 4.8 4 2.5 Province No. 2 33 9.4 83 23.6 23 12.2 11 6.9 Province No. 3 88 25.1 21 6 23 12.2 18 11.3 Gandaki 48 13.7 20 5.7 37 19.6 45 28.3 Province No.5 31 8.9 42 11.9 44 23.3 33 20.8 Karnali 85 24.3 30 8.5 28 14.8 7 4.4 Sudur-Paschim 49 14 35 9.9 25 13.2 41 25.8 Total 350 100 352 100 189 100 159 100

40 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 13: Political Financing [Financial Governance] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 12 4.8 109 25.1 25 10.2 4 3.3 Province No. 2 15 6 91 20.9 35 14.3 9 7.4 Province No. 3 21 8.4 62 14.3 33 13.5 34 27.9 Gandaki 42 16.9 30 6.9 44 18 34 27.9 Province No.5 43 17.3 60 13.8 37 15.2 10 8.2 Karnali 52 20.9 41 9.4 47 19.3 10 8.2 Sudur-Paschim 64 25.7 42 9.7 23 9.4 21 17.2 Total 249 100 435 100 244 100 122 100 Table 14: Political Financing [Transparency] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 34 14.6 66 15.8 47 15.8 3 2.9 Province No. 2 16 6.9 88 21.1 37 12.5 9 8.8 Province No. 3 37 15.9 62 14.8 23 7.7 28 27.5 Gandaki 36 15.5 34 8.1 53 17.8 27 26.5 Province No.5 25 10.7 67 16 48 16.2 10 9.8 Karnali 52 22.3 35 8.4 56 18.9 7 6.9 Sudur-Paschim 33 14.2 66 15.8 33 11.1 18 17.6 Total 233 100 418 100 297 100 102 100 Table 15: Political Financing [Disclosure of Source, Audit and Documentation] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 70 32 38 10.2 28 11 14 6.8 Province No. 2 8 3.7 85 22.9 16 6.3 41 19.9 Province No. 3 13 5.9 66 17.8 17 6.7 54 26.2 Gandaki 29 13.2 31 8.4 53 20.9 37 18 Province No.5 21 9.6 55 14.8 53 20.9 21 10.2 Karnali 43 19.6 49 13.2 48 18.9 10 4.9 Sudur-Paschim 35 16 47 12.7 39 15.4 29 14.1 Total 219 100 371 100 254 100 206 100 Table 16: Political Financing [Effectiveness of Monitoring] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 15 7.6 86 24 43 12.3 6 4.2 Province No. 2 11 5.6 78 21.7 35 10 26 18.3 Province No. 3 20 10.1 57 15.9 34 9.7 39 27.5 Gandaki 33 16.7 29 8.1 62 17.7 26 18.3 Province No.5 34 17.2 39 10.9 55 15.7 22 15.5 Karnali 44 22.2 30 8.4 68 19.4 8 5.6 Sudur-Paschim 41 20.7 40 11.1 54 15.4 15 10.6 Total 198 100 359 100 351 100 142 100

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 41 Table 17: Compliance with Code of Conduct [Effectiveness of Monitoring] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 33 8.8 90 24.3 25 9.8 2 3.8 Province No. 2 35 9.4 65 17.5 44 17.3 6 11.5 Province No. 3 34 9.1 59 15.9 34 13.4 23 44.2 Gandaki 61 16.4 29 7.8 45 17.7 15 28.8 Province No.5 57 15.3 61 16.4 32 12.6 0 0 Karnali 65 17.4 31 8.4 52 20.5 2 3.8 Sudur-Paschim 88 23.6 36 9.7 22 8.7 4 7.7 Total 373 100 371 100 254 100 52 100 Table 18: Compliance with Code of Conduct [Influence of Ruling Party] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 28 8.8 44 12.8 69 25.5 9 7.8 Province No. 2 62 19.4 54 15.7 24 8.9 10 8.7 Province No. 3 31 9.7 40 11.6 48 17.7 31 27 Gandaki 47 14.7 36 10.4 35 12.9 32 27.8 Province No.5 38 11.9 60 17.4 44 16.2 8 7 Karnali 55 17.2 71 20.6 19 7 5 4.3 Sudur-Paschim 58 18.2 40 11.6 32 11.8 20 17.4 Total 319 100 345 100 271 100 115 100 Table 19: Compliance with Code of Conduct [Punitive Measures] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 6 4.2 119 21.5 14 7 11 7.1 Province No. 2 17 12 97 17.5 21 10.6 15 9.7 Province No. 3 7 4.9 79 14.3 24 12.1 40 25.8 Gandaki 19 13.4 62 11.2 27 13.6 42 27.1 Province No.5 33 23.2 51 9.2 50 25.1 16 10.3 Karnali 23 16.2 100 18.1 20 10.1 7 4.5 Sudur-Paschim 37 26.1 46 8.3 43 21.6 24 15.5 Total 142 100 554 100 199 100 155 100 Table 20: Compliance with Code of Conduct [Effectiveness of Compliance] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 23 12.3 69 22.3 57 15.2 1 0.6 Province No. 2 7 3.7 68 21.9 48 12.8 27 15.3 Province No. 3 23 12.3 51 16.5 34 9 42 23.7 Gandaki 31 16.6 31 10 46 12.2 42 23.7 Province No.5 26 13.9 35 11.3 62 16.5 27 15.3 Karnali 35 18.7 29 9.4 76 20.2 10 5.6 Sudur-Paschim 42 22.5 27 8.7 53 14.1 28 15.8 Total 187 100 310 100 376 100 177 100

42 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 21: Campaign Financing [Compliance with Expenditure Cap] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 18 8.3 108 18.6 19 14.6 5 4.1 Province No. 2 6 2.8 129 22.2 9 6.9 6 5 Province No. 3 25 11.5 79 13.6 15 11.5 31 25.6 Gandaki 36 16.6 57 9.8 25 19.2 32 26.4 Province No.5 35 16.1 81 13.9 22 16.9 12 9.9 Karnali 46 21.2 73 12.5 26 20 5 4.1 Sudur-Paschim 51 23.5 55 9.5 14 10.8 30 24.8 Total 217 100 582 100 130 100 121 100 Table 22: Campaign Financing [Vote Buying] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 76 18.4 26 8.4 23 19.8 25 11.8 Province No. 2 116 28.1 16 5.2 7 6 11 5.2 Province No. 3 29 7 54 17.5 21 18.1 46 21.7 Gandaki 53 12.8 42 13.6 11 9.5 44 20.8 Province No.5 37 9 54 17.5 33 28.4 26 12.3 Karnali 50 12.1 63 20.4 9 7.8 28 13.2 Sudur-Paschim 52 12.6 54 17.5 12 10.3 32 15.1 Total 413 100 309 100 116 100 212 100 Table 23: Campaign Financing [Effectiveness of Monitoring] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 24 12.3 94 23.5 28 8.1 4 3.7 Province No. 2 12 6.2 86 21.5 45 13 7 6.4 Province No. 3 23 11.8 56 14 29 8.4 42 38.5 Gandaki 28 14.4 34 8.5 65 18.8 23 21.1 Province No.5 33 16.9 50 12.5 51 14.7 16 14.7 Karnali 35 17.9 41 10.3 70 20.2 4 3.7 Sudur-Paschim 40 20.5 39 9.8 58 16.8 13 11.9 Total 195 100 400 100 346 100 109 100 Table 24: Campaign Financing [Audit, Documentation and Reporting] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 74 37.6 33 12.6 27 10.7 16 4.7 Province No. 2 7 3.6 47 17.9 17 6.7 79 23.3 Province No. 3 11 5.6 43 16.4 30 11.9 66 19.5 Gandaki 30 15.2 29 11.1 32 12.7 59 17.4 Province No.5 18 9.1 39 14.9 47 18.7 46 13.6 Karnali 30 15.2 42 16 58 23 20 5.9 Sudur-Paschim 27 13.7 29 11.1 41 16.3 53 15.6 Total 197 100 262 100 252 100 339 100

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 43 Table 25: Electoral Administration [Competence and Fairness of Administration] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 110 19 19 11.2 13 5.2 8 15.7 Province No. 2 103 17.8 25 14.8 20 8 2 3.9 Province No. 3 83 14.3 9 5.3 49 19.5 9 17.6 Gandaki 50 8.6 19 11.2 67 26.7 14 27.5 Province No.5 61 10.5 47 27.8 36 14.3 6 11.8 Karnali 76 13.1 26 15.4 44 17.5 4 7.8 Sudur-Paschim 96 16.6 24 14.2 22 8.8 8 15.7 Total 579 100 169 100 251 100 51 100 Table 26: Electoral Administration [Adequate Security Measures] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 110 18.4 9 7.4 30 9.9 1 3.4 Province No. 2 110 18.4 12 9.9 24 7.9 4 13.8 Province No. 3 82 13.7 11 9.1 56 18.5 1 3.4 Gandaki 83 13.9 14 11.6 42 13.9 11 37.9 Province No.5 60 10 35 28.9 47 15.6 8 27.6 Karnali 81 13.5 10 8.3 58 19.2 1 3.4 Sudur-Paschim 72 12 30 24.8 45 14.9 3 10.3 Total 598 100 121 100 302 100 29 100 Table 27: Electoral Administration [Adequate, trained and Inclusive Human Resources] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 105 25.3 13 6 25 7.3 7 9 Province No. 2 50 12 49 22.8 43 12.6 8 10.3 Province No. 3 75 18.1 10 4.7 52 15.2 13 16.7 Gandaki 40 9.6 35 16.3 60 17.5 15 19.2 Province No.5 36 8.7 41 19.1 54 15.8 19 24.4 Karnali 60 14.5 30 14 58 17 2 2.6 Sudur-Paschim 49 11.8 37 17.2 50 14.6 14 17.9 Total 415 100 215 100 342 100 78 100 Table 28: Electoral Administration [Adequacy of Materials, Polling Center and Voting Process] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 121 22.9 11 11.3 17 5 1 1.2 Province No. 2 93 17.6 15 15.5 36 10.5 6 7.2 Province No. 3 87 16.5 3 3.1 48 14 12 14.5 Gandaki 59 11.2 14 14.4 60 17.5 17 20.5 Province No.5 39 7.4 28 28.9 54 15.8 29 34.9 Karnali 65 12.3 15 15.5 67 19.6 3 3.6 Sudur-Paschim 64 12.1 11 11.3 60 17.5 15 18.1 Total 528 100 97 100 342 100 83 100

44 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 29: External Voting Provisions [Database and Registration of External Voters] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 12 5.8 107 21.2 5 5.2 26 10.7 Province No. 2 20 9.6 96 19 8 8.3 26 10.7 Province No. 3 16 7.7 74 14.7 8 8.3 52 21.5 Gandaki 35 16.8 38 7.5 22 22.9 55 22.7 Province No.5 32 15.4 67 13.3 27 28.1 24 9.9 Karnali 54 26 54 10.7 18 18.8 24 9.9 Sudur-Paschim 39 18.8 68 13.5 8 8.3 35 14.5 Total 208 100 504 100 96 100 242 100 Table 30: External Voting Provisions [Legal and Policy Provisions] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 26 10.8 81 22.3 26 10.2 17 8.9 Province No. 2 30 12.4 67 18.5 22 8.6 31 16.3 Province No. 3 19 7.9 60 16.5 22 8.6 49 25.8 Gandaki 43 17.8 22 6.1 50 19.5 35 18.4 Province No.5 31 12.9 50 13.8 53 20.7 16 8.4 Karnali 52 21.6 31 8.5 43 16.8 24 12.6 Sudur-Paschim 40 16.6 52 14.3 40 15.6 18 9.5 Total 241 100 363 100 256 100 190 100 Table 31: External Voting Provisions [Feasibility Study] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 75 32.6 21 7.7 36 15.6 18 5.7 Province No. 2 7 3 43 15.7 21 9.1 79 25.1 Province No. 3 23 10 55 20.1 18 7.8 54 17.1 Gandaki 31 13.5 18 6.6 41 17.7 60 19 Province No.5 30 13 48 17.5 46 19.9 26 8.3 Karnali 41 17.8 48 17.5 34 14.7 27 8.6 Sudur-Paschim 23 10 41 15 35 15.2 51 16.2 Total 230 100 274 100 231 100 315 100 Table 32: External Voting Provisions [State’s Affirmative Initiative] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 79 28.8 17 8 43 14 11 4.3 Province No. 2 16 5.8 36 16.9 31 10.1 67 26.3 Province No. 3 14 5.1 50 23.5 32 10.4 54 21.2 Gandaki 44 16.1 17 8 53 17.2 36 14.1 Province No.5 39 14.2 37 17.4 53 17.2 21 8.2 Karnali 49 17.9 21 9.9 55 17.9 25 9.8 Sudur-Paschim 33 12 35 16.4 41 13.3 41 16.1 Total 274 100 213 100 308 100 255 100

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 45 Table 33: The Legal Framework [Availability of Unified Laws] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 77 16.5 43 16 26 12.4 4 3.8 Province No. 2 113 24.1 13 4.9 19 9.1 5 4.8 Province No. 3 35 7.5 73 27.2 29 13.9 13 12.4 Gandaki 56 12 25 9.3 44 21.1 25 23.8 Province No.5 64 13.7 39 14.6 34 16.3 13 12.4 Karnali 62 13.2 42 15.7 31 14.8 15 14.3 Sudur-Paschim 61 13 33 12.3 26 12.4 30 28.6 Total 468 100.0 268 100 209 100 105 100 Table 34: The Legal Framework [Democratic Features] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 105 18.5 33 22.4 10 3.7 2 3.2 Province No. 2 110 19.4 13 8.8 24 8.8 3 4.8 Province No. 3 81 14.3 15 10.2 46 16.8 8 12.9 Gandaki 69 12.1 14 9.5 52 19 15 24.2 Province No.5 53 9.3 31 21.1 56 20.5 10 16.1 Karnali 90 15.8 11 7.5 46 16.8 3 4.8 Sudur-Paschim 60 10.6 30 20.4 39 14.3 21 33.9 Total 568 100 147 100 273 100 62 100 Table 35: The Legal Framework [Non-discrimination] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 65 18.2 69 19.4 11 4.2 5 6.8 Province No. 2 59 16.5 64 18 18 6.8 9 12.3 Province No. 3 33 9.2 45 12.7 58 22 14 19.2 Gandaki 58 16.2 29 8.2 42 15.9 21 28.8 Province No.5 38 10.6 44 12.4 59 22.3 9 12.3 Karnali 52 14.5 59 16.6 39 14.8 0 0 Sudur-Paschim 53 14.8 45 12.7 37 14 15 20.5 Total 358 100 355 100 264 100 73 100 Table 36: The Legal Framework [Simplicity and Handiness] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 113 25.8 13 7.4 24 6.6 0 0 Province No. 2 73 16.7 35 19.9 34 9.3 8 11.4 Province No. 3 39 8.9 11 6.3 90 24.6 10 14.3 Gandaki 58 13.2 31 17.6 45 12.3 16 22.9 Province No.5 35 8 31 17.6 60 16.4 24 34.3 Karnali 63 14.4 20 11.4 64 17.5 3 4.3 Sudur-Paschim 57 13 35 19.9 49 13.4 9 12.9 Total 438 100 176 100 366 100 70 100

46 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Table 37: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution [Easy Accessibility] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 103 20.8 33 12.6 13 5.3 1 2.1 Province No. 2 105 21.2 27 10.3 14 5.7 4 8.5 Province No. 3 37 7.5 39 14.9 63 25.7 11 23.4 Gandaki 58 11.7 33 12.6 44 18 15 31.9 Province No.5 69 13.9 50 19.1 29 11.8 2 4.3 Karnali 55 11.1 43 16.4 46 18.8 6 12.8 Sudur-Paschim 69 13.9 37 14.1 36 14.7 8 17 Total 496 100 262 100 245 100 47 100 Table 38: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution [Credibility] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 89 21.2 44 18 16 4.8 1 1.8 Province No. 2 92 22 32 13.1 22 6.7 4 7.1 Province No. 3 54 12.9 32 13.1 46 13.9 18 32.1 Gandaki 43 10.3 27 11 68 20.6 12 21.4 Province No.5 47 11.2 49 20 48 14.5 6 10.7 Karnali 47 11.2 19 7.8 81 24.5 3 5.4 Sudur-Paschim 47 11.2 42 17.1 49 14.8 12 21.4 Total 419 100 245 100 330 100 56 100 Table 39: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution [Undue Influence] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 26 10 92 22.2 24 10 8 5.9 Province No. 2 40 15.4 85 20.5 10 4.1 15 11 Province No. 3 20 7.7 47 11.4 48 19.9 35 25.7 Gandaki 41 15.8 40 9.7 30 12.4 39 28.7 Province No.5 41 15.8 50 12.1 47 19.5 12 8.8 Karnali 38 14.7 62 15 41 17 9 6.6 Sudur-Paschim 53 20.5 38 9.2 41 17 18 13.2 Total 259 100 414 100 241 100 136 100 Table 40: Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution [Decision Procedure and Swiftness] Province Agree Disagree Moderately agree Don't know Name / No. N % N % N % N % Province No. 1 59 22.3 48 19.6 35 8.6 8 6 Province No. 2 51 19.3 36 14.7 47 11.5 16 12 Province No. 3 28 10.6 17 6.9 87 21.3 18 13.5 Gandaki 30 11.4 40 16.3 49 12 31 23.3 Province No.5 26 9.8 36 14.7 50 12.3 38 28.6 Karnali 37 14 29 11.8 77 18.9 7 5.3 Sudur-Paschim 33 12.5 39 15.9 63 15.4 15 11.3 Total 264 100 245 100 408 100 133 100

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 47 Province Surveyed

District Surveyed

48 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Delimitation of Electoral Constituencies Scientifics

Gerrymandering

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 49 Civic/Electoral Education Effectiveness

Inclusiveness

50 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Voter Registration Effectiveness of Information Flow

Degree of Access

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 51 Political Financing Financial Governance

Disclosure of Source, Audit and Documentation

52 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Compliance with Code of Conduct Effectiveness of Monitoring

Influence of Ruling Party

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 53 Campaign Financing Compliance with Expenditure Cap

Vote Buying

54 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY Electoral Administration Competence and Fairness of Administration

Adequate Security Measures

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 55 External Voting Provisions Datebase and Registration of External Voters

Legal and Policy Provisions

56 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY The Legal Framewoek Availability of Unified Laws

Democratic Features

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 57 Electoral Justice/Dispute Resolution Easy Accessibility

Credibility

58 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY National Election Observation Committee (NEOC) Central Executive Committee Chairperson : Mr. Surya Prasad Shrestha Vice-chair : Prof. Kapil Shrestha Vice-chair : Ms. Stella Tamang Vice-chair : Prof. Dr. Kushum Shakya Vice-chair : Mr. Tej Bahadur Sunar Vice-chair : Mr. Sudarsan Subedi Secretary General : Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti Treasurer : Mr. Bhawani Prasad Kharel Deputy Secretary General : Adv. Ran Bahadur Thebe Member : Mr. Shobhakar Budhathoki Member : Mr. Devika Nanda Timilsina Member : Adv. Ram Krishna Kafle Member : Dr. Sameer Mani Dixit

Advisory Committee Dr. Ayodhi Prasad Yadav Dr. Gauri Shankar Lal Das Dr. Durgesh Man Singh Dr. Netra Timsina Ms. Shanti Adhikari Mr. Charan Prasai Mr. Shanta Lal Mulmi Mr. Bishnu Pukar Shrestha Ms. Shanta Laxmi Shrestha Ms. Menaka Shrestha

National Secretariat Staff/Volunteer Ms. Roshma Rai : Project Coordinator Ms. Deepa Luintel : Admin and Finance Manager Ms. Binda Nepali : Program Assistant Ms. Parwati Paudel : Office Assistant

PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY 59 National Election Observation Committee (NEOC)

Formally established in 1991, NEOC is a heterogeneous rainbow coalition consisting of human rights groups, civil society organizations and distinguished individuals. It has come into being in pursuant to the values and principles of universal suffrage, adult franchise, periodic elections, secrecy of ballot, voter’s informed choice and citizens’ access the government as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and related human rights instruments such as International Convention on the Rights of Peoples with Disabilities (CRPD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and others. The major objective behind NEOC’s inception, among others, was to observe the first ever post-Panchayat General Elections of 1990. NEOC has since then continued its historical practice of systematically observing elections through deployment of both the national and international observers.

Registered in 2007 with the Local Administration, it has 77 district chapters and seven provincial focal points. NEOC is governed by a democratically elected Executive Committee which is responsible for policy guidance and decisions-making process. NEOC, by virtue of being a founding member of Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), a regional alliance of elections monitoring groups, serves in the organization’s Board of Directors since 2008. NEOC has participated in many international observation missions in Asia and beyond, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia, Taiwan, Philippines to name few. NEOC was also involved in the drafting process of the Bangkok Declaration on Free and Fair Elections under the auspicious of ANFREL. NEOC has been playing a leading role to convene series of Asian Electoral Stakeholders Forum to advance electoral freedom in the region. Apart from election observation, NEOC has been engaged as a democracy watch flagship organization primarily focused in the field of research, education, advocacy, lobbying, training and social interaction on all major components of electoral freedom. NEOC is also entrusted to coordinate all domestic and international organizations through Election Observation Coordination Group (EOCG) dedicated to electoral education, election observation and other related programs in the country.

NEOC Financial Assistance: National Secretariat Satoaki Memorial Building, Kupondole-10, Lalitpur, Nepal G.P.O. Box: 26550 Phone: + 977 (1) 5541502, Fax: 977 (1) 5541503 Email: [email protected] / [email protected] 60 PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY www.neocelection.org