DOCSLIB.ORG

THE CRIME of ALL CRIMES: GENOCIDE's PRIMACY in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE CRIME of ALL CRIMES: GENOCIDE's PRIMACY in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate S THE CRIME OF ALL CRIMES: GENOCIDE’S PRIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Conflict Resolution By Chloe R. Edmonds, B.A. Washington, DC April 25, 2016 Copyright 2016 by Chloe R. Edmonds All Rights Reserved ii THE CRIME OF ALL CRIMES: GENOCIDE’S PRIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW Chloe R. Edmonds, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Molly Inman, PhD. ABSTRACT In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s final judgment of Prosecutor v. Akayesu, genocide was declared to be “the crime of all crimes.” Since Raphael Lemkin’s conceptualization of the crime of genocide in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944), the crime of genocide has gained primacy within international law. Taking into account the historical and political incentives of the creation of the United Nations Genocide Convention, the research conducted analyzes how genocide gained primacy in both international and national tribunals, and how this primacy impacts witnesses, victims, and defendants in genocide tribunals. Case studies examined include the ad hoc UN tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the national tribunals in Cambodia and Argentina. Using both statistical and qualitative analysis, the research strongly suggests that genocide’s primacy is imbedded within international criminal law, and as such, is prosecuted with more fervor and seen to be of greater importance than other crimes. The impact of genocide’s primacy on defendants include altered duration of trial proceedings and lengthened sentences. Additionally, civil societies seek prosecution of genocide rather than crimes against humanity or war crimes for their suffering to be validated. This paper ascertains that legally genocide has primacy over other crimes, but further explores if genocide should have primacy over crimes against humanity. iii The research and writing of this thesis is dedicated to everyone who helped along the way. A special thanks to my thesis committee, Dr. Molly Inman, Dr. Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Brian Kritz, J.D., and Dr. Gregory Stanton, J.D., for shaping the creation of this thesis and inspiring me to pursue justice in the darkest of places. Many thanks, Chloe R. Edmonds iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Literature Review .........................................................................................................................2 Theory .......................................................................................................................................10 Methodology ..............................................................................................................................12 Analysis .....................................................................................................................................15 Results ........................................................................................................................................16 THE EFFECT OF GENOCIDE’S PRIMACY ON DEFENDANTS ............................................18 THE EFFECT OF GENOCIDE’S PRIMACY ON VICTIMS AND WITNESSES .....................35 CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................43 WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................................51 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Frequency of Charges in the ICTY and ICTR...………………………………………22 Figure 2: Frequency of Charges between ICTY and ICTR……………….……………...……...22 Figure 3: Difference in Means Test for Trial Days (ICTY)……………………………………...23 Figure 4: Difference in Means Test for Trial Days (ICTR)……………………………………...23 Figure 5: Momir Nikolic, ICTY………………………………………………………………….28 Figure 6: Zdravko Tolimir, ICTY…………………………………….………………………….28 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Conviction Frequency in the ICTY and ICTR……………………………...………….19 Table 2: Frequency of Conviction Comparison………………………….………………………20 Table 3: Days Arrest to Appearance in Court (ICTY)………………………………….………..24 Table 4: Days Arrest to Appearance in Court (ICTR).…………………………………………..24 Table 5: Difference in Means Test (Trial Days for ICTY)...…………………………………….25 Table 6: Difference in Means Test for Initial Sentence in Years………………………...……...26 Table 7: Difference in Means Test for Appealed Sentence in Years…………………………….27 vi INTRODUCTION With the creation of the Genocide Convention of 1948 came a new phase of international law: a phase that protected the autonomy of group life and the right of individuals to exist and identify as a part of a group. As the crime of genocide was implemented into legal frameworks outside of the treaty into international and national tribunals, the original intent of the crime of genocide began to shift, prioritizing criminalizing genocide as the most heinous crime, rather than to expand international criminal law to protect the rights of group autonomy. This research is not concerned with debating if there is a perception that genocide has primacy over other crimes; the international community at large has already accepted genocide to be what the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) calls “the crime of all crimes.” Rather, this paper seeks to question whether this primacy has embedded itself in international criminal law and case law through United Nations ad hoc tribunals and by the perceptions of civil society involved with national genocide tribunals. It equally seeks to explore if and how this primacy impacts witnesses, victims, and defendants in genocide trials. A literature review will expand upon the origins of this perception and its implementation into international criminal law through case studies in both international and national tribunals. International tribunals essential to this study include the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where it is argued that genocide’s primacy among other international criminal laws began to present itself in trial and through sentence durations. The second is the ICTR, where Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Prosecutor v. Akayesu included in its statements that genocide is the “crime of all crimes.” National tribunals for this study include both the tribunals in Cambodia and Argentina, and portray the impact of genocide’s primacy at a 1 national level. These national case studies both have a civil party presence in their court system, allowing this paper to explore the connotations of genocide’s primacy and its impact of civil society. Three key actors in the legal system will be addressed: witnesses, victims, and defendants. Explored in this research is the impact of genocide’s primacy on parties directly affected by the violence and the retributive justice system. The perceived moral weight of genocide as opposed to crimes against humanity establishes its primacy in international criminal law extending the proceedings and significantly increasing sentence duration for any genocide conviction in comparison to individuals convicted of crimes against humanity. The research conducted strongly suggests that genocide’s primacy is imbedded within international criminal law, and as such, is prosecuted with more fervor and seen to be of greater importance than other crimes. LITERATURE REVIEW Raphael Lemkin’s book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, was published in 1944 at the same time as the liberation of many of the concentration and extermination camps in Poland. It was the first literature to introduce the term genocide as “an old practice in its modern development” (Lemkin 79). Using the Greek word genos meaning race or tribe and the Latin word cide for killing, Lemkin coined the term genocide. In his publication, he defines genocide as follows: … a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political 2 and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups (Lemkin 79). Genocide was created to protect against the destruction of group life, ensuring that all individuals have the right to belong to a group without fear of persecution and to provide space for cultural diversity and tolerance in international law (Irvin-Erickson 156). By doing so, Lemkin defined a crime that protected people within a group as well as the social fabric and culture of the group. Different from other international crimes, it “is organisation, training, practice, legitimation and consensus that distinguish genocide as a social practice from other more spontaneous or less intentional acts of killing and mass destruction” (Feierstein 14). Lemkin was not the only one known to champion the fight against human rights abuses in international law. Herschel Lauterpacht, the Polish lawyer known for the creation of the concept of crimes against humanity, also sought to protect against similar forms of destruction. In fact, both
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Guide to Critical Legal Studies
    BOOK REVIEW A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES. By Mark Kelman.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1987. Pp. 360. $30.00. Reviewed by David L. Gregoryt I A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies,1 written by Professor Mark Kel- man of Stanford Law School, definitely has merit but will nonetheless disappoint many. For those unfamiliar with the academic legal literature of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, the book fails as an an- nounced guide. At the same time, for those who are more informed, the book does not say enough that is new. The book is grossly mistitled; no attempt is made to initiate the novice gradually into the complexities of critical legal theory. Professor Kelman, a very sophisticated and erudite scholar,2 makes the mistake of presuming that his audience will already be familiar with the major tenets of critical legal theory. The previously uninformed but intellectually curious prospective reader will find the book an intimidating baptism by fire, more closely akin to total immer- sion than to serving as any sort of road map or guide. These readers are better advised to explore critical legal studies literature through prior law review articles; Professor Kelman's extensive footnotes 3 handily refer the * Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., 1972, J.D., 1976, Harvard University. t Kenneth Wang Research Professor of Law, St. John's University (1987-1988). B.A., 1973, Catholic University of America; M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State Univesity; J.D., 1980, University of Detroit; L.L.M., 1982, J.S.D., 1987, Yale University.
    [Show full text]
  • Defending Miranda Paul Marcus William & Mary Law School, [email protected]
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 1989 Defending Miranda Paul Marcus William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Marcus, Paul, "Defending Miranda" (1989). Faculty Publications. 577. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/577 Copyright c 1989 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs University of Wyoming College of Law LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW VOLUME XXIV 1989 NUMBER 1 Defending Miranda* by Paul Marcus** INTRODUCTION I write to defend the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1 It may seem odd to feel the need to defend a well-established Supreme Court decision issued more than twenty years ago. In recent years, how­ ever, a strongly critical drive led by representatives of the United States Justice Department2 has received much publicity in the call to overrule Miranda. I believe Miranda is good law, is good policy, and has an impor­ tant and positive impact on our society. Before turning specifically to the Court's decision, however, it is important to consider generally the de­ bate over the use of confessions in criminal cases. After all, that really is what Miranda is all about. What are we to do about confessions? Some would say they are a vi­ tal part of our criminal justice system and all should be done to encourage them. Indeed, on a panel recently with a police chief of a major metropoli­ tan area, I heard the chief speak about how Miranda has interrupted the developing ''art of interrogating and eliciting confessions.'' I am not sure exactly what the "art" is, but he spoke in glowing terms of confessions as the cornerstone of our criminal justice system.
    [Show full text]
  • Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning
    Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning William N. Eskridge, Jr.* Philip P. Frickey** In the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an im- portant topic of academic theory and discussion.' This development is welcome, since few topics are more relevant to legal craft and educa- tion than the interpretation of statutes, now our primary source of law. The recent theoretical views, however, contrast with practicing lawyers' strategies of statutory interpretation. When practitioners give advice to clients about what a statute means, their approach is usually eclectic: They look at the text of the relevant statutory provisions, any legislative history that is available, the context in which the legislation was en- acted, the overall legal landscape, and the lessons of common sense and good policy. But when law professors talk about statutory interpre- tation, they tend to posit a more abstract, "grand" theory that privi- leges one or another of these approaches as "foundational."' 2 The commentators' grand theories contrast with the more ad hoc, fact- based reasoning of the practicing lawyer. How do judges interpret statutes? How should they? Many com- mentators argue that judicial interpretation is, or at least ought to be, inspired by grand theory. We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judges' approaches to statutory in- terpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, * Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. ** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. We thank Daniel Farber, Dennis Patterson, Richard Posner, Suzanna Sherry, and Peter Strauss for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
    [Show full text]
  • Keep Reading Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting The
    PAPERS Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right GREGORY KLASS* ABSTRACT Interpretation determines the meaning of a legal actor's words or other sig- ni®cant acts, construction their legal effect. Using contract law and two nine- teenth century theories of constitutional interpretation as examples, this Article advances four claims about interpretation, construction, and the relationship between the two. First, many theorists, following Francis Lieber, assume that rules of construction apply only when interpretation runs out, such as when a text's meaning is ambiguous or does not address an issue. In fact, a rule of con- struction is always necessary to determine a legal speech act's effect, including when its meaning is clear and de®nite. Construction does not supplement inter- pretation, but compliments it. Second, there exists more than one form of inter- pretation, and correspondingly more than one type of meaning. The meaning a text or other speech act has depends on the questions one asks of it. Third, which type of meaning is legally relevant depends on the applicable rule of con- struction. Rules of construction are in this sense conceptually prior to legal interpretation. This priority has important consequences for how legal rules of interpretation are justi®ed. Finally, because there exist multiple types of mean- ing, when one form of interpretation runs out, another form might step in. Whether that is so again depends on the applicable rule of construction. These four claims apply to legal interpretation and construction generally. This Article supports them with a close examination of the interpretation and construction of contractual agreements.
    [Show full text]
  • Randy E. Barnett* Whether Or Not They Are Originalists, Most Constitutional
    THE MISCONCEIVED ASSUMPTION ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS Randy E. Barnett* INTRODUCTION Whether or not they are originalists, most constitutional scholars and observers assume that the basic assumptions held at the time the Constitution was enacted or amended are relevant to ascertaining its original meaning. Some originalists use constitutional assumptions to constrain judges in their interpretations of the more abstract passages of the text. Others reject originalism precisely because they object to the outmoded assumptions that prevailed at the time of enactment, and they assume that these assumptions must shape the original meaning of the text. For example, some claim that because of widespread concern about the continued vitality of the militia, the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is limited to those who are in service to the militia. Others think that because many in the Thirty-Ninth Congress and elsewhere assumed the continued existence of segregated government schools or the inferiority of women, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment must be consistent with segregated schools and the common law rules of coverture. Still others claim that because people assumed at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted that laws regulating private morality were within the police power of the states, such laws must be consistent with its original meaning. In this article, I challenge this misconceived assumption about the constitutional status of basic assumptions, which derives from a mistaken conflation of constitutions and contracts. Because the shared background assumptions of the parties are relevant to the enforcement of written contracts, it seems natural to treat written constitutions the same way.
    [Show full text]
  • Shaping the International Criminal Court
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore Pardee RAND Graduate School View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS) dissertation series. PRGS dissertations are produced by graduate fellows of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, the world’s leading producer of Ph.D.’s in policy analysis. The dissertation has been supervised, reviewed, and approved by the graduate fellow’s faculty committee. From the Outside In Shaping the International Criminal Court Brian Rosen This document was submitted as a dissertation in May 2006 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent Russell Pannier
    William Mitchell Law Review Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 15 1992 An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent Russell Pannier Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr Recommended Citation Pannier, Russell (1992) "An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 18: Iss. 3, Article 15. Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/15 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact [email protected]. © Mitchell Hamline School of Law Pannier: An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL INTENT RUSSELL PANNIERt I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 696 II. To WHAT QUESTION IS THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL INTENT AN ANSWER? ............................... 697 A. The Concept of a Legal Rule ..................... 697 B. The Linguistic Formulation of Legal Rules ......... 698 C. Causes of Uncertainty in the Application of Legal R ules .......................................... 699 1. Semantic Vagueness .......................... 699 2. Semantic Ambiguity .......................... 701 3. Amphiboly .................................. 703 4. Unreasonableness of Applications to Apparently Clear Cases ................................. 703 D. The Question Which the Theory of Original Intent Is Intended to Answer .............................. 705 III. WHAT IS THE THEORY OF ORIGINAL INTENT? ........ 706 A. Underlying Motivations and the General Proposal ... 706 B. Application of the Original Intent Theory ........... 707 1. Case of a Single Rulemaker Who Left Accurate Records .................................... 708 2. Case of a Single Rulemaker Who Either Left No Intent Records, Left Incomplete Records, or Left Records Which Cannot be Trusted ............
    [Show full text]
  • International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 Conference in the Hague, June 29 – July 1, 2015
    International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 Conference in The Hague, June 29 – July 1, 2015 Annex B - Documents Cited Pre-1991 Date Title Author Cable #/Link 6/26/45 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the n/a Link International Court of Justice 12/9/48 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the UNGA Link Crime of Genocide 8/12/49 Geneva Convention IV: Relative to the Protection of n/a Link Civilian Persons in Time of War 1991 Date Title Author Cable #/Link 6/29/91 Mladić Diary 6/29/91-8/25/91 Mladić Link 8/27/91 Mladić Diary 8/27/91-11/23/91 Mladić Link 9/25/91 Resolution 713 (1991) UN Security Council Link 9/25/91 “European Peace Talks Offer Little Hope of Yugoslav Moseley (Chicago Link Settlement” Tribune) 11/23/91 Mladić Diary 11/23/91-12/29/91 Mladić Link 11/25/91 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 3 de Cuellar S/23169 of Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) 12/11/91 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security de Cuellar S/23280 Council Resolution 721 (1991) 12/15/91 Resolution 724 (1991) UN Security Council Link 12/30/91 Mladić Diary 12/20/91-2/14/92 Mladić Link 1992 Date Title Author Cable #/Link 1/5/92 Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Boutros-Ghali S/23363 Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) 2/14/92 Mladić Diary 2/14/92-5/25/92 Mladić Link 2/15/92 Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Boutros-Ghali S/23592 Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) 2/21/92 Resolution 743 (1992) UN Security Council Link 4/2/92 Report of
    [Show full text]
  • Of Srebrenica Into a Global Problem 41 4
    VU Research Portal Lost in Srebrenica Rijsdijk, E.A.C. 2012 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Rijsdijk, E. A. C. (2012). Lost in Srebrenica: Responsibility and Subjectivity in the Reconstructions of a Failed Peacekeeping Mission. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 Lost in Srebrenica Responsibility and Subjectivity in the Reconstructions of a Failed Peacekeeping Mission ISBN: 9789086595938 © Erna Rijsdijk, 2012 All rights reserved. Save exceptions stated by the law, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, included a complete or partial transcription, without the prior written permission of the proprietor.
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina | No 3 | May to June 2007
    Bosnia and Herzegovina | No 3 | May to June 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina| Trends in Conflict and Cooperation May and June brought no relief from the ill-tempered exchanges between supporters and opponents of further centralization in Bosnia-Herzegovina as demanded by the European Union integration process. On the one side is the government of Republika Srpska (RS) under Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, which adheres to the literal and static reading of the 1995 Dayton peace accords and insists on the RS retaining as much real power and as many attributes of sovereignty as possible, notably including its own police force. Police reform, a precondition for a preaccession Conflictive International and Domestic Events in Bosnia and agreement with Brussels, remains stalled for that reason. On the other side are Bosniak Herzegovina (Bosnian Muslim) leaders such as Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak representative of the country’s tripartite presidency who publicly advocates scrapping the RS based on the fact that genocide was committed by the RS army in Srebrenica in July 1995. Because Silajdzic is not interested in considering constitutional changes falling short of a massive loss of power for the entities, attempts to amend the Bosnian constitution have not materialized ever since a package of modest amendments was defeated in parliament in April 2006. The most serious disagreement came in June, when Silajdzic and his Bosnian Croat counterpart Zeljko Komsic wrote a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to demand that the RS be abolished. The third presidency member, a Bosnian Serb representative (and current presidency chairman), Nebojsa Radmanovic, denounced the letter and said he had not been consulted about it.
    [Show full text]
  • Hunting Ratko —Belgrade & the Hague
    War-crime hunters Hunting Ratko —Belgrade & The Hague Preface Ratko Mladic is one of the world’s most wanted men. Monocle meets those trying to arrest the Bosnian Serb general so the UN can try him for war crimes and genocide. We also look at the damage his fugitive status is doing to Serbia’s chances of joining the EU. writer Adam LeBor photographers Simon de la Court JeroenToirkens Even in his dreams Vladimir Vukcevic cannot forget Ratko Mladic.the Serbian war crimes prosecutor sees the former Bosnian Serb commander standing in a Yugoslav army base. the imagined 01 Mladic is taller and younger than the real one. But his freedom taunts Vukcevic in his dream, just as it does in his waking life. the prosecutor has been coordinat- ing the hunt in Serbia for Mladic since 2006. it is his job to ensure Mladic is arrested and sent to the international Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (iCtY) in the Hague, where he is charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. a psychologist would doubtless interpret Mladic’s tall and youthful figure as symbolising a more difficult adversary than Vukcevic had expected. “i thought this job would be finished in three or four years, but i was wrong,” he says. grey- haired, neatly barbered with a trim beard and moustache, even at 60, Vukcevic re- tains a youthful vigour. Mladic is accused of the worst atroc- 02 ity in Europe since 1945. in the days after 01 War damage in the Bosnian Serb army captured Sre- downtown Belgrade 02 Judge’s bench at ICTY brenica in July 1995, soldiers under his in The Hague command massacred up to 8,000 Bosnian 03 Vladimir Vukcevic, Muslim men and boys.the eastern Bosn- Serbian war crimes ian town was a UN-declared “Safe area”, prosecutor with a garrison of Dutch peacekeepers.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary of the Appeals Chamber Judgment in the Case of Prosecutor V
    Summary of the Appeals Chamber Judgment in the Case of Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir , Case No. IT-05-88/2-A 1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“Appeals Chamber” and “Tribunal”, respectively) is seised of an appeal by Zdravko Tolimir (“Tolimir”) against the judgment rendered by Trial Chamber II of the Tribunal (“Trial Chamber”) on 12 December 2012 in the case of Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case. IT-05-88/2-T (‘Trial Judgment’). 2. Following the practice of the Tribunal, not all points discuss in the judgment will be mentioned in this summary which only focuses on central issues. This summary does not constitute any part of the authoritative written judgment of the Appeals Chamber. It is intended for academic consumption. I. THE APPEAL OF ZDRAVKO TOLIMIR 3. During the events that unfolded in Srebrenica and Žepa enclaves, in Eastern Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995, Mr. Tolimir was Assistant Commander and Chief of Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska (“VRS”). 4. He was charged with eight counts (Genocide (Count 1); Conspiracy to Commit Genocide (Count 2); Extermination (Count 3); Murder (Count 4 and 5); Persecutions (Count 6); Inhumane Acts through Forcible Transfer (Count 7) and Deportation (Count 8)) pursuant to Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal (“Statute”) and two distinct joint criminal enterprises (“JCE”) that is ( “JCE to Murder” and “JCE to Forcibly Remove”) pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the Statute.
    [Show full text]