The Impact of School Choice on Enrollment and Achievement: Evidence from over 1,000 Randomized Lotteries* Julie Berry Cullen University of Michigan Brian A. Jacob Harvard University and NBER Steven Levitt University of Chicago and American Bar Foundation Current Draft: July 2002 * Extremely preliminary and incomplete. Comments appreciated. Please do not cite without prior permission of the authors. We are grateful to John Easton, Joseph Hahn, Jack Harnedy, Frank Spoto and John Quane for assistance in collecting the data, and to Patrick Walsh for excellent research assistance. We are especially grateful to Jack Harnedy and John Quane for answering many questions regarding the magnet school program in Chicago. We would also like to thank Bong-Joo Lee for his help in assigning CPS identifiers to students in the application files. Addresses: Julie Cullen, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109-1220,
[email protected]; Brian Jacob, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138,
[email protected]; Steven Levitt, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637,
[email protected]. All remaining errors are our own. Abstract School choice programs are an increasingly popular strategy employed by urban school districts seeking to attract and retain high ability and middle class students in the public school system. To test the effectiveness of this strategy, we utilize detailed administrative data from the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) that includes over 1,000 lotteries determining admission to magnet programs and schools. Those who win a lottery are on average six percentage points more likely to enroll in CPS the following year.