MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MARITIME SCIENCE MASTER DISSERTATION

Academic year 2018 – 2019

The downfall of the port of in the 20th century: causes and consequences

Maxime Brackeniers

Number of words: 28,268

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements Supervisor: Professor. dr. Frank Maes

for the degree of:

Master of Science in Maritime Science Assessor: Klaas Willaert

Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat. Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.

This page is not available because it contains personal information. Ghent University, Library, 2021. Acknowledgments

In this preface I would like to thank everyone who helped me making this master dissertation possible.

First of all I would like to acknowledge Prof. dr. Frank Maes for his guidance and advice throughout the writing of this master dissertation. Secondly, I would also like to thank Prof. dr. Christian Koninckx and Prof. dr. emeritus. Georges Allaert for their time and helpful advice. Thirdly, I would like to thank my family and friends for the support and guidance throughout the writing of this master dissertation.

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Table of content Permission ...... i Acknowledgments ...... ii Introduction ...... v Glossary of abbreviations ...... viii List of tables ...... ix List of figures ...... xi 1. A better understanding of the importance of the Belgian ports ...... 1 1.1. Importance of Belgian ports ...... 1 2. The history of the port of Ostend ...... 4 2.1. The early period (800 AD. – 1600 AD.) ...... 4 2.2. Ostend in the 17th and 18th century ...... 5 2.3. Ostend in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century ...... 8 2.4. Conclusion ...... 10 3. Different causes for the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century . 11 3.1. The emergence of Zeebrugge as a port and its impact on the goods handled in the port of Ostend ...... 11 3.1.1. History of the ...... 11 3.1.2. A comparison between the evolution of the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend in figures ...... 13 3.1.3. Important investments done in the port of Zeebrugge during the second half of the 20th century ...... 19 3.1.4. Important investments done in the port of Ostend during the second half of the 20th century ...... 22 3.1.5. The favourable conditions of the port of Zeebrugge over the port of Ostend 25 3.1.6. Conclusion ...... 27 3.2. Shifting of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge 29 3.2.1. History of the Belgian Royal Marine and its connection with the port of Ostend 29 3.2.2. Importance of the Belgian marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century ...... 31 3.2.3. Possible impact of the shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge ...... 34 3.2.4. Conclusion ...... 35 3.3. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry and the disappearance of Ostend as the main fishing port of ...... 36 3.3.1. History of the Belgian fishing industry ...... 36 3.3.2. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry ...... 38 3.3.3. The impact of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry on the port of Ostend 41 3.3.4. Conclusion ...... 46 iii

3.4. The downfall of the RMT ...... 48 3.4.1. The history of the Ostend- line ...... 48 3.4.2. The downfall of the RMT ...... 50 3.4.3. The impact of the downfall of the RMT on the port of Ostend ...... 54 3.4.3.1. The impact of the RMT on the port of Ostend during the period from 1991 until 1998 ...... 54 3.4.3.2. The impact of the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 on the port of Ostend during the period from 1997 until 2002 ...... 56 3.4.4. Conclusion ...... 60 4. A glance at the future...... 62 4.1. The evolution of the port of Ostend since the end of the 20th century ...... 62 5. Final conclusion ...... 65 6. Reference list ...... 66

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Introduction

Since their existence, ports have always been important gateways for the exchange of goods, people and ideas. These exchanges have determined the importance that specific regions have attained in world history throughout time by creating contacts with foreign societies (Antunes, 2010). Thus, it can be said that ports have been centres of commerce for both Coastal states and certain land bound countries. Regardless of the harbour’s main marine activity, ships are obliged to leave from one port and arrive at the same or another port. Thus, ports can be perceived as entry and exit points of a certain country. The reason for entering or leaving a port can differ however. Common reasons are fishing, trading, cruising or even to conduct a war (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). These reasons are showing that ports can play an important role in the long-term growth of a state and in the regional development of a region. Despite the fact that ports conduct an important role in the economy of a country and the fact that ports are often seen as connection points with overseas countries, these ports can still face periods of decline in their existence. The decline of ports can be caused by multiple macroeconomic or microeconomic factors or by a confluence of factors which may for example depend on the current economic situation of a country or on the competition between ports.

This master dissertation examines the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century and the main causes and consequences of this decline. The focus will primarily be put on the last three decades of the 20th century, since the decline was at its peak during this period. To find an answer on our research, the decline of Ostend in the 20th century will be proven by asking different questions. The questions are as follows: - Can the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge have had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century? - Can the shifting of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge have had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century? - Can the decline of the Belgian fishing industry have had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century? - Can the abolishment of the Regie voor Maritiem Transport have had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century?

To provide an answer to the main research question, a qualitative research has been used, but for some assumptions numbers and figures are used. The information is gathered from sources obtained from the internet, libraries, the archive of Ostend, interviews with Prof. dr. emeritus. Georges Allaert and Prof. dr. emeritus. Christian Koninckx and a presentation given by Jan Allaert, commercial director of the port of Ostend. v

This master dissertation will consist out of four chapters and each of these chapters will handle a specific subject. By creating certain chapters, it will be easier to give an answer to the research question in a structured and well-ordered way.

In the first chapter “A better understanding of the Belgian ports”, the definition of the word “seaport” that will be used throughout this master dissertation will briefly be explained. Furthermore, a context around the importance of the Belgian ports for the economy will be created by using figures of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB).

In the second chapter “The history of the port of Ostend”, the history, from the earliest period until the first half of the 20th century, of the city of Ostend with the main focus on the port of Ostend will be explained.

In the third chapter “Different causes for the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century”, several causes which all have contributed to the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century will be presented and proven. The first cause which will be explained is the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge. In this chapter, the impact of the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge on the goods handled in the port of Ostend will be analysed. Firstly, the history of the port of Bruges and Zeebrugge will explained. Secondly, a comparison will be made between the evolution of the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge during the second half of the 20th century. Subsequently, the important investments done in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend during the second half of the 20th century will be analysed and to conclude this chapter, three reasons will be given why the Belgian government decided to invest in the port of Zeebrugge over the port of Ostend in the 20th century. The second cause which will be explained, is the shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge during the 20th century. An important side note in regard with this chapter is the fact that almost no data was available concerning the employment and added value of the Belgian marine during the 1970’s and 1980’s (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview). Due to this, conclusions concerning the shift of the naval base from Ostend to Zeebrugge will be drawn solely on data from the last decade of the 20th century. Firstly, the history of the Belgian Marine and its connection with the port of Ostend will be briefly explained. Secondly, the importance of the Belgian Marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century will be explained by means of the employment and added value. Thirdly, the impact of the shift of the naval base from Ostend to Zeebrugge will be analysed.

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The third cause that will be explained, is the decline of the Belgian fishing industry during the 20th century. Firstly, the history of the Belgian fishing industry will be explained. Secondly, the decline of the Belgian fishing industry and the causes will be analysed. Consequently, the impact of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry on the port of Ostend will be analysed. However, an important remark has to be made concerning the availability of data regarding the added value generated by the fisheries before 1990 in Belgium. No data was available in terms of the added value generated by the fisheries in Belgium before 1990. As an alternative, the total value of landings until 1990 will be taken. The fourth cause that will be analysed is the downfall of the Regie voor Maritiem Transport in 1997. In this chapter, first of all the history of the Ostend-Dover line will be explained. Secondly, the downfall of the Regie voor Maritiem Transport itself will be analysed and explained. Finally, the impact of the downfall of the Regie voor Maritiem Transport on the port of Ostend will be analysed. This will be done by looking at two different periods. The first period will cover the years between 1991 and 1998 and the second period will cover the years between 1997 and 2002.

The fourth and final chapter “A glance at the future”, will give a better inside in the evolution of the port of Ostend towards a blue port in the 21st century.

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Glossary of abbreviations

BEF = Belgische Frank CFP = Common Fisheries Policy CTV = Crew Transfer Vessel DWT = Deadweight tonnage FTE = Full Time Equivalent GDP = Gross Domestic Product GIC = General Indian Company NBB = National Bank of Belgium RMT = Regie Maritime voor Transport RORO = Roll-on-roll-off SOV = Service Operation Vessel TAC = Total Allowable Catch

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List of tables

Table 1.1: Set of important figures of Belgian ports in 2012 and 2017 with the added value and direct investments (in million euro). Table 2.1: Amount of ships entering the port of Ostend between 1776 – 1782. Table 3.1: Loading and unloading for Ostend and Zeebrugge between 1961-1979 (in thousand ton gross weight). Table 3.2: Loading and unloading for the port of Ostend between 1980-2000 (in thousand ton gross weight). Table 3.3: Loading and unloading for the port of Zeebrugge between 1980-2000 (in thousand ton gross weight). Table 3.4: Investments done in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend in 1963 and 1964 (in million euro). Table 3.5: Investments done in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend between 1977 and 1986 (in million euro). Table 3.6: Difference between the old and new lock in the port of Zeebrugge Table 3.7: Investments done in the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge between 1990 and 2000 (in million euro). Table 3.8: Added value of the port of Ostend and the share of the Marine (in million euro). Table 3.9: Added value of the port of Zeebrugge and the share of the marine (in million euro). Table 3.10: Employment in the port of Ostend and the share of the Marine employment. Table 3.11: Employment in the port of Zeebrugge and the share of the Marine employment. Table 3.12: Number of fishing vessels in the Belgian coastal ports and fishing communities in 1913. Table 3.13: The landings for the port of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Newport for the period between 1974 and 2000 (in tonnes). Table 3.14: The value of landings in the port of Ostend for the period between 1974 and 1990 (in million euro). Table 3.15: The added value and employment (in amount) generated by the fishery and the total added value and employment generated (in amount) by the private sector in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991 and 2000 (in million euro). Table 3.16: The most important results of the RMT during the period 1985-1993 (in million euro).

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Table 3.17: The added value (in million euro) and employment (in amount) in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991-1998. Table 3.18: The added value (in million euro) and employment (in amount) of the RMT in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991-1998. Table 3.19: The total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend between 1990 and 2002 (in thousand tonnes). Table 3.20: Number of employees at the RMT, and in total in the port of Ostend between 1991-2000 (in amount).

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List of figures

Figure 3.1: Landings of Belgian fisheries in Belgian (dark) and foreign (light) ports in the period 1929-2008, including Dunkerque and Gravelines (). Figure 3.2: Direct employment in fisheries in Belgium: absolute number of fishers, and proportion by age class, 1954-2012.

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1. A better understanding of the importance of the Belgian ports

Before going deeper into the main topic of this master dissertation, it is important to clear out an important definition that will often be used throughout this master dissertation. This concerns the definition of “a seaport”. When defying a seaport, a variety of definitions can be used. However, in this master dissertation, a definition will be used produced by Prof. dr. Theo Notteboom. He states that:

A seaport is a logistic and industrial node accommodating seagoing vessels and characterised by a functional and spatial clustering of cargo transport, storage and transformation processes linked to global supply chains. The handling of maritime cargo at specialised terminals remains a core function of seaports. Seaports and their maritime freight terminals can be located on an island or an offshore location, along a coastline, in a natural bay, a delta or a river estuary, or upstream along a river (Notteboom, 2016, Introduction, par. 1).

1.1. Importance of Belgian ports

(Sea)ports constitute an important activity in coastal areas and certain inland areas. Where ports play an important role in the support of economic activities in the hinterland by being a crucial connection between sea and land transport, they also bring varying degrees of benefits to the economy and to the country. These benefits are created by a higher throughput of goods and passengers every year, which leads to more infrastructure, provisions and an increase in associated services. Next to these economic benefits, ports also have a social function. This function is created by being a supplier of jobs (Dwarakish & Salim, 2015). By means of figures provided by the NBB, which are represented in Table 1.1, the growing importance of the Belgian Ports in current times will be shown. Table 1.1 represents a five- year comparison between a set of important figures. The figures are the added value (direct and indirect), the employment (direct and indirect) and the direct investments of the Belgian ports in 2012 and 2017. Under the Belgian ports we understand the , the port of Zeebrugge, the port of Ostend, the , the port of and Liège port complex.

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Table 1.1: Set of important figures of Belgian ports in 2012 and 2017 with the added value and direct investments expressed (in million euro). YEAR 2012 2017 ADDED VALUE 30,198.7 35,302.4 Direct 16,445.1 19,367.6 Indirect 13,743.6 15,934.9 EMPLOYMENT 258,895 254,779 Direct 117,562 116,311 Indirect 141,333 138,468 DIRECT INVESTMENTS 3,420.3 4,825.4 Adapted from “The economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the – Report 2012”, by Mathys, C., 2014, p. 13-16, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels. And from “The economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of Brussels – Report 2017”, by Gueli., E., Ringoot, P., & Van Kerckhoven, M., 2019, p. 1-8, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels.

When looking at the five-year comparison between the added value in 2012 and 2017, a separation can be made between the direct and indirect added value. In a timespan of five years, the direct added value produced by the Belgian ports increased from 16,455.1 million euro in 2012 to 19,367.6 million euro in 2017. This is an increase of 17.70%. When looking at the indirect added value produced by the Belgian ports, it can be stated that in a time span of 5 years, the indirect added value increased from 13,743.6 million euro to 15,934.9 million euro. Or in other words, an increase of 15,94%. When keeping in mind the rise of the direct and indirect added value during the period of 2012 until 2017, it is only logical that the total added value has also risen during this period. The total added value rose from 30,198.7 million euro in 2012 to 35,302.4 million euro in 2017. This is an increase of 16,90%. To emphasize the importance of the Belgian ports in regard with their added value, this figure will be compared with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Belgium. In 2017, Belgium’s GDP was 440.12 billion euro and the total added value of the ports was 35,302.4 million euro or around 8% of the GDP. In other words, this means that around 8% of the market value of all final goods and services produced in Belgium during the year 2017 came from the Belgian ports.

When looking at the five-year comparison between the employment in 2012 and 2017, another separation can be made concerning the direct and indirect employment provided by the Belgian ports. In a timespan of five years, the direct employment provided by the Belgian ports has decreased from 117,562 people in 2012 to 116,311 people in 2017. This is a decrease of 1,06%. When looking at the indirect employment provided by the Belgian 2 ports, it can be stated that in a time span of five years, the indirect employment decreased from 141,333 people in 2012 to 138,468 people in 2017. This is a decrease of 2,03%. By putting these two figures together, a slightly negative evolution can be seen for the figures of the employment in Belgian ports from 2012 to 2017. Where in 2012, the Belgian ports provided work to 258,895 people, this decreased to 254,779 people in 2017. In other words, in a timespan of five years there was a decrease of 1,59%. Despite this small decrease in jobs provided directly or indirectly by the Belgian ports, the Belgian ports are still an important employer in Belgium. Out of the 4,743,500 (Nationale Bank van België, Online statistieken, 2019) working people in Belgium, 254,779 people are working in one of the Belgian ports. In other words, 5.37% of the total employment in Belgium is provided by the Belgian ports.

When speaking about figures concerning the investments done in the Belgian ports, one must keep in mind that these figures are more volatile than other the figures provided Ut supra due to the fact that often investments are done in patterns which can be linked to projects (Gueli, Ringoot & Van Kerckhoven, 2019). Despite the volatility of the figures, figures concerning the investments done in the Belgian ports can tell something about the economic situation in Belgium and can be a reason for an increase of the two other factors, being added value and employment, in the future. When looking at the evolution of the direct investments done in the Belgian ports during a five-year timespan, it can be stated that the direct investments in the Belgian ports increased from 3,420.3 million euro in 2012 to 4,825.4 million euro in 2017. This is an increase of 41.08%. This increase indicates that the Belgian ports are economic areas where investors are keen to invest in.

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2. The history of the port of Ostend

To situate the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century in the right context, it is necessary to first describe the long and fascinating history of the city and the port of Ostend. This chapter focuses on the history of the port of Ostend and its peaks and lows throughout its history as a European seaport.

2.1. The early period (800 AD. – 1600 AD.)

The first time Ostend was mentioned somewhere in history dates back from the time when the Roman Empire ruled the European continent. During this period there was no permanent inhabitation in Ostend, but it was considered as a place where small boats were pulled into sea. By 814 AD., Ostend was mentioned for the first time as a township, which was situated on the Eastern end of a long sandy island called “Ter Streep”. Despite Ostend’s history as a township at the edge of the sea, it was only until the 11th century that a genuine link between the township of Ostend and its small port became noticable (Allaert, 2013). During these early centuries in the existence of the township of Ostend, the city was often struck by natural disasters which would destroy important parts of the township from time to time. Despite these setbacks, the township of Ostend prospered and kept growing in size and by the year 1267, the township of Ostend received its city rights from the countess of . This prosperity in the early period of the city of Ostend was made possible by the fishery in Ostend, which was Ostend its main activity (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). By this time, half of Ostend its population depended on the income of fishery, this fish was already in that time exported to cities as far as Rouen and Paris in France. This period of prosperity allowed the city of Ostend to build a wall around the city at the end of the 14th century, however due to consecutive floods in the 14th century, the city was obliged to abandon its original location and rebuilt the city more southwards on the mainland (Basisgegevens uitrusting Oostende, 2016). This new city of Ostend became a fortified city, which meant that also the port area became a much safer place. In the middle of the 15th century, during the Spanish Period, the city of Ostend requested and received the permission of their king Philip the Good to build a new harbour. This harbour, which was situated to the west of the actual channel, was built between the old and the new district of the city and became very important to the fishing industry of Ostend and to the further growth of the city (Masschalck, 2011).

Halfway the 16th century, the city of Ostend was pushed into a religious war between the Spanish Catholics and the Dutch Protestants. The involvement of Ostend in this war was

4 not a surprise due to the strategic-economic, military and political importance of the city of Ostend. This involvement turned the city of Ostend and its harbour, which were already fortified, into an even more fortified city. Between the years 1584 and 1585, the Spanish army under the command of General Farnese, conquered all the Flemish cities for one exception which was the city of Ostend (Allaert, 2013). The city of Ostend had chosen the side of the Dutch Protestants. This was important for the Protestants due to the fact that after the fall of Antwerp in 1585, the Western Scheldt, The Sassevaart and the Zwin had been closed off to all Flemish trade. The Scheldt remained closed for two centuries. This meant that either a toll charge had to be paid or that the cargo had to be transferred onto Dutch ships (Masschalck, 2011). This led to the fact that by this time, the city of Ostend became the only access to the sea for the Southern Netherlands and thus the importance of the city of Ostend and its harbour grew tremendously. Eventually by the end of the 16th century, Ostend became a stronghold of the Sea-Beggars (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). The Sea-Beggars removed a dune strip northeast of the city for strategic reasons. This removal had as a consequence that a new channel was created by the sea to the northeast of the city called “The Geule”. Without being the intention of the Sea-Baggers, this strategic operation would have a major impact on the history of the port of Ostend due to the fact that in this new channel the current port of Ostend is located (Strubbe, 1987). On the 5th of July 1601, the Spanish army started with the siege of Ostend. During this siege, Ostend was cut off any other cities. This meant that everything had to be imported by sea into the city of Ostend and due to this evolution, the newly dug channel “The Geule” transformed into a full connection to the sea. After a siege of three years, which ended on 20 September 1604, the capitulation of Ostend was a fact and the siege had left the city once more completely in ruins (Masschalck, 2011).

2.2. Ostend in the 17th and 18th century

After the siege of Ostend, the 17th century became a century of relative peace in the history of the city of Ostend. Soon after the demolition of Ostend, the city was rebuilt as well as the port of Ostend. The port of Ostend was now located in “The Geule”, which had been deepened and broadened (Masschalck, 2011). Along with the city, the port of Ostend also experienced a century of relative peace and expansion. Reason for this is that, as mentioned Ut supra, the Western Scheldt was closed off and thus the port of Antwerp was cut off the sea. This made the port of Ostend the only accessible seaport in the Southern Netherlands and thus of great importance. Despite being an important seaport, the port of Ostend did not had a well-developed connectivity with the hinterland of Flanders. This point of weakness was tackled in the coming years and the city of Ostend received a

5 connection with important cities such as Ghent and Bruges, by means of a canal. On the third of September 1613, the excavations for this canal started and lasted until 1622 (Masschalck, 2011). This canal allowed sea-going vessel to sail up to the cities of Ghent and Bruges once again, but now through the city of Ostend (Allaert, 2013).

Since the city of Ostend received the permission to build their first real harbour, at the end of the 15th century, the first signs of Ostend as a place for privateering were noticed. The art of privateering would be executed throughout the following centuries and saw its peak in the first half of the 17th century. After two centuries, the city of Ostend had built up a privateering tradition, which was considered as an industry that employed directly and indirectly a great amount of people (Magosse, 1999). The reason why privateering was so important for Ostend can be found in the fact that the fishermen of Ostend were almost obliged to undertake privateering operations to survive due to the fact that they could not fish anymore without any risk. Despite being around for around two centuries, the art of privateering in Ostend slowly disappeared throughout the second half of the 17th century. With the disappearance of the privateering, the power of the port of Ostend also started to faint (Magosse, 1999).

In 1713, the war of the Spanish succession ended. The former Spanish Netherlands, to which the city Ostend belonged, were given to the Austrian Habsburgs and were meant as a shield to protect the Northern Netherlands against France. In the first few decades of the Austrian reign, Ostend enjoyed a rapid but short-lived growth. This growth was a direct outcome of the first Southern Netherlands trading company. This company was the General Indian Company (GIC) or better known as the Ostend Company. The fact that the first Southern Netherlands trading company only saw its daylight in the early decades of the 18th century is due to the fact that the Spanish government, which ruled over the Southern Netherlands in the 16th and 17th century, feared competition and had never allowed a colonial trading company operating in the Southern Netherlands (Serruys, 2007). In sharp contrast with the Spanish philosophy, the new Austrian rulers did not have the same objections and allowed the creation of a trading company in the Southern Netherlands. Already from the year 1715, the first ships sailed to Asia, but it would take until 1722 before Emperor Charles VI established the GIC. To finance the Company, actions were sold and the majority of the money came from Antwerp. This had as a consequence that the headquarters of the GIC were located in Antwerp, but that the home base of the fleet had to be somewhere else due to the Dutch-enforced closure of the Scheldt (Serruys, 2007). The home base of the fleet would eventually become Ostend for the simple reason that it was still the only available seaport in the Southern Netherlands

6 at that time. By the year 1724, the first ships sailed to China (Canton) and India (the Bengals) (Baels, 1972). The ships brought back cotton fabrics, saltpetre and caliatour- wood from India, but especially the goods brought back from China such as silk, porcelain and tea determined the success of the GIC. Around 1725, half of the tea consumption in Europe came from tea that was brought to land in the port of Ostend. This transformed the city of Ostend within a few years into a colonial trade city (Serruys, 2005).

The enormous success of the GIC would however be short-lived. The reason can be found in political pressure organized by the Dutch, the French and the British (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). Only five years after the establishment, the GIC was temporarily suspended and ten years after the establishment, the dissolution of the Ostend Company was a fact. Due to the existence of the GIC, Ostend became the most important port at the continental North seacoast (Allaert, 2013), but soon found out that keeping this title for a long period of time is proven to be difficult.

As mentioned Ut supra, the port of Ostend gained a lot of power during the period of the GIC. However, after the dissolution of the GIC, the port of Ostend found itself in decline and hit rock bottom around 1750. This year can be seen as a turning point in the decline of Ostend during the 18th century due to the mercantilism policy of the Austrian government. Due to this new policy a lot of investments were done in the next decade in the area around the port, in the port itself and in connecting Ostend with the hinterland of Flanders. Eventually by the year 1760, the Austrian government also took measures to get the fishing industry back on the rails after it had received some setbacks due to wars and the instable economic situation in the past centuries (Allaert, 2013).

The revival of the port of Ostend in the second half of the 18th century met its peak in the year 1781 when Emperor Joseph II signed a decree in which he stated that from that point onwards, the port of Ostend had to be considered as a freeport. This entailed that the port was exempted from general custom duties and that ships from all nationalities could enter the port without paying customs. Along with the title of a freeport, the port of Ostend experienced an economic boom due to the American Revolutionary War which started in 1775 and ended in 1783. This was due to the fact that the freeport of Ostend was perfectly situated between the two countries at war namely and France (Allaert, 2013). The growth of the port of Ostend and the growth in commerce that came along with it, can be shown by the amount of ships that entered the port of Ostend on a yearly basis between 1776 and 1782.

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Table 2.1: Amount of ships entering the port of Ostend between 1776 – 1782. YEAR AMOUNT OF SHIPS 1776 526 1777 529 1778 644 1779 1,037 1780 1,560 1781 2,941 1782 2,636 Reprinted from “Passé et avenir des anciens ports flamands chambres de commerce transformation des constructions nautiques question de Terneuzen (6th edition)”, by Bortier, P., 1875, p. 10, Brussel, Decq et Duhent.

Due to the increase in the number of vessels entering the port of Ostend throughout the years, the city decided to build two new docks south of the city of which one with a lock gate (Masschalck, 2011). The creation of the new docks to expand the port could not be timed worse. As the American Revolutionary War ended in 1783, so did the revival of Ostend in the second half of the 18th century. The activities in the port declined every year and in the year 1787, only a thousand ships entered the port of Ostend on an annual basis. This is a decline of 62% compared to the last boom year, which was 1782. Eventually by the year 1794, the port activity was close to non-existing. This decline also meant the end of Ostend as one of the most important European ports, excluding certain periods, between 1650 and 1800 (Allaert, 2013).

2.3. Ostend in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century

After the decline of Ostend in the second part of the 18th century it took until the first decades of the 19th century before a new period of increased activity and economic growth became noticeable in Ostend. The economic boom of the city of Ostend and the port of Ostend in the 19th century was a growth only made possible by a combination of various factors.

A first factor which made this growth possible was the fishing industry in the port of Ostend. Due to the Belgian Independency in 1830 and under the command of the first King of Belgium Leopold I, the newly formed Belgian government decided to implement a premium system. This system had a direct effect on the number of fishing vessels entering the port of Ostend and an indirect effect on the employment opportunities in the fishing industry in Ostend. Between the years 1832 and 1864 the amount of vessels doubled from 145 to

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274. Eventually the premium system was abolished in 1867 since the costs of such a system were too high (Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee, 2016).

A second reason for the economic boom of Ostend in the 19th century was the fact that from this point onwards, the city of Ostend did not only had a port which brought in economic wealth, but it also started to present itself as a seaside resort. The first signs that Ostend would become a seaside resort were already visible in the 1780’s when the first eating houses and places where bathers could get a drink started to develop along the beach of Ostend. In 1834, King Leopold I of Belgium made Ostend his summer residence, but the real start of Ostend as a seaside resort only started in 1865. Not coincidentally the year in which Leopold II was coronated as King of Belgium. The year 1865 marked the start of a flourishing period in the history of Ostend, which lasted until the beginning of the First World War and is referred to as “The Belle Epoque”. Until 1865, the city of Ostend was still a fortified city, but a decree exempted Ostend of its function as a fortress. By the year 1875, all the fortifications were torn down and during the Belle Epoque the city was further expanded westwards and eastwards. These expansions were characterized by their scale and luxury (Allaert, 2013). All along the western Dyke, magnificent villas and luxurious hotels were being built by the high-class (Masschalck, 2011). The purpose of these ambitious investments was to attract tourists and to turn Ostend into a fashionable seaside resort. To cope with the inflow of tourists, the city of Ostend had to create new modes of transport or enlarge and optimize their existing infrastructure. Already in the year 1838, a railroad line was built between Ostend and Brussels and in 1846, the official connection between Dover and Ostend was opened, which allowed tourists from England to visit Ostend on a regular basis. In 1883, a connection was made between London and Constantinople called the Orient Express and in 1896, an additional connection was made between London and St. Petersburg called the North Express. Both trains passing via Ostend (Masschalck, 2011). This variety in modes of transport allowed national and international tourists to visit the city of Ostend.

After a century in which the port of Ostend experienced an economic boom, the foresights were promising that this boom could be prolonged in the 20th century. This due to a series of port investments, such as the building of “the Houtdok”, “the Vlootdok” and the “Demeysluis” in the late 1890’s and the early decades of the 20th century. The main purpose of these investments was to enlarge and deepen the port of Ostend in order to cope with the fact that during the 19th century ships became bigger, which also had as an implication that their draft increased as well. The last real port investment in the first half of the 20th century, other than repairments after the First and Second World War, was

9 done in the year 1934 when a new fishing dock came into use (Strubbe, 1987). Despite the investments in the early decades of the 20th century, the port of Ostend could not prolong the economic boom on which it had ended in the 19th century. This was on the one hand due to a lack of further investments and on the other hand due to the First and Second World War, which broke the economic march on which the city and port of Ostend were surfing on. This eventually led to the end of the city of Ostend as a “belle époque city”. After this economic rupture and the collapse of Ostend as a “belle époque city”, the city of Ostend changed its philosophy and decided to focus more on mass tourism over the luxurious seaside resort it had become during the 19th century. To cope with this new philosophy, the city of Ostend decided to develop itself into a modern seaside resort where the old buildings disappeared and were replaced by modern apartment buildings and new projects such as the casino and the post building. Lastly, to deal with their new plan to attract more tourists, the city of Ostend decided to extend the highway up to the city centre (20ste eeuw, n.d.).

As mentioned Ut supra, the city and port of Ostend were not able to prolong the economic success, which it had known in the 19th century, in the first half of the 20th century. And despite the change in philosophy, a further downfall of the port of Ostend was noticeable in the second half of the 20th century. Possible reasons explaining the further downfall of the port of Ostend will be explained in chapter 3 “Different causes for the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century”.

2.4. Conclusion

By looking at the long history of the city of Ostend and its port, it becomes clear that the city and the port of Ostend established itself several times as a vibrant node in the national, European and international trade. The city of Ostend and its port’s most flourishing periods were the during the period of the General Indian Company, the obtainment of the title of freeport in the 18th century and during the period of the Belle Epoque in the 19th and 20th century (Allaert, 2013). Despite the fact that the 20th century started well, the city of Ostend and its port failed to prolong this flourishing period due to a lack of investments in both the city of Ostend and the port of Ostend and due to the First and Second World War, which broke the economic march on which both the city and the port were surfing on. Without knowing it at that time, the flourishing period at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, would be the last major flourishing period the city of Ostend and its port will have known until today.

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3. Different causes for the decline of the port of Ostend in the 20th century

3.1. The emergence of the port of Zeebrugge

Under part 3.1. “The emergence of the port of Zeebrugge”, the question will be asked whether the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge in the second half of the 20th century, was one of the factors for the decline of the port of Ostend during the 20th century by looking at the impact it had on the goods handled in the port of Ostend. Firstly, a brief history of the port of Bruges and the port of Zeebrugge will be given. Secondly, a comparison will be made between the evolution of the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge. Thirdly, the investments done in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend during the second half of the 20th century, will be analysed. In the last part of this chapter, the different reasons why the government decided to build the new port of Zeebrugge and not expand the port of Ostend, will be given.

3.1.1. History of the port of Zeebrugge

When writing about the history of the port of Zeebrugge, it should be kept in mind that the port of Zeebrugge was originally a subdivision of the city of Bruges. This city has always had a close connection to the sea and due to the interaction between the city of Bruges and the sea, the city was able to develop itself into a cultural and trade centre during the Middle Ages (Strubbe, 1987). Despite the exceptional boom during the Middle Ages, the port of Bruges and its city experienced a severe retrogression which lasted until the end of the 19th century. The four main reasons for this decline can be found in the silting up of the Zwin, political frictions, lack of flexibility of Bruges’ city council and guilds (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016) and the religious wars during the 16th and 17th century (Traen, 1985).

As mentioned Ut supra, the city of Bruges was in decline until the end of the 19th century. The turning point for the city of Bruges and its port occurred in the middle of the 19th century and had two causes. Firstly, the ports of Ostend and Newport were desperately in need of an expansion but were restricted by the limited possibilities. Secondly, the city of Ghent looked for an additional outlet to the North Sea. These two causes were the main drivers why at the end of the 19th century, a new plan was introduced in which a new Belgian seaport with an additional fishing port had to be built. The final intention of this plan was to reconnect the city of Bruges with the North Sea once again. The first function of the new port, named “the port of Zeebrugge”, was to act as an outer port for the city of

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Bruges and was connected with the city by a 12-kilometre-long canal named “the Boudewijn canal”. It was also agreed that the city of Bruges would be the owner of the areas on both sides of the canal and around the newly built port (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). In 1907, the port was officially opened and the expectations were tremendous. Notwithstanding the expectations, the port of Zeebrugge could not redeem these expectations during the first fifty years of its existence and would only play an important role from the 1960’s onwards. The reason behind the slow evolution of the port of Zeebrugge, during its first fifty years, is the result of three events which occurred in the first half of the 20th century.

The first reason can be found in the stagnation in the movement of goods. This stagnation is the direct result of a decrease in the amount of investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge between 1907 and 1950 (Strubbe, 1987). The only worth mentioning investments made by the government during this period were investments made to rebuild the port after the two World Wars.

A second reason for the slow evolution of the port of Zeebrugge is the presence of the First World War between 1914 and 1918 and the Second World War between 1939 and 1945. The two World Wars had a disruptive impact on most of the economic processes in Belgium and this was no other for the economic activity in the port of Zeebrugge. These wars implied a temporary closure of the port and a partial demolition of the port, which eventually resulted in an economic loss. During the First World War, the German forces, who occupied the port of Zeebrugge, transformed the port into a submarine base due to the strategic position of the port of Zeebrugge (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). By the end of the First World War, the Germans were forced to leave the port of Zeebrugge. After the Germans had left, the port was completely swept away by the German forces. Only after an intense clean-up operation, the port of Zeebrugge welcomed its first commercial vessel, in the post-war period, in 1920 (Traen, 2007). Where the impact of the First World War on the port of Zeebrugge was more than significant, this was less the case during the Second World War. During the Second World War, the port of Zeebrugge could not be used as a submarine base as it was during the First World War. Reason for it is that right before the arrival of the German forces, the citizens of the city of Zeebrugge blew up several lock gates and sank several vessels purposely on strategic places. The German forces eventually restored the damage and used the port of Zeebrugge as a fortified fortress in their “Atlantikwal”. By the end of the second World War, the port of Zeebrugge was once again destroyed by the German forces, which had as a consequence that the port had to be rebuilt once again and that no economic activities were possible after the Second World

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War until 1951 (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2006).

A third reason can be found in the economic recession of the 1930’s, which kept the economic world in a stranglehold. The recession eventually led to a temporary decrease in the importance of the port of Zeebrugge and led to a temporary increase in the importance of the inner port of Bruges (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). As mentioned Ut supra, the port of Zeebrugge was not considered as a big seaport until the 1960’s. Since then, the importance of the port of Zeebrugge increased rapidly, which had a negative impact on the port of Oostende.

3.1.2. A comparison between the evolution of the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend in figures

To emphasize how much the port of Zeebrugge expanded in the second half of the 20th century in comparison to the port of Ostend, it is necessary to provide certain figures. As mentioned before, the real breakthrough for the port of Zeebrugge only came in the 1960’s of the 20th century. The reason behind this breakthrough can be found in a series of investments done in the port of Zeebrugge by the government, which allowed the port of Zeebrugge to expand and handle more capacity of goods. During its evolution in the second half of the 20th century, the port of Zeebrugge faced two key moments which had an undisputed impact on the amount of goods handled in the port. The first key moment occurred in the second part of the 1960’s when the second maritime revolution took place. This revolution meant a scaling-up of the vessels and the emergence of new techniques concerning the treatment of loads such as RORO and containers (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). The second key moment started in 1968, when a special committee was established with the purpose to investigate whether there was a possibility to expand the port of Zeebrugge. Eventually, the committee decided that a further expansion of the port of Zeebrugge was necessary and possible. The enlargement of the new port lasted from 1972 until 1985 and had an impact on the port of Zeebrugge for the rest of the 20th century (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2006).

To show the evolution of both ports, a comparison will be made between the evolution of the goods handled by both ports. To clearly show the two key moments in the evolution of the port of Zeebrugge in the second half of the 20th century, a separation will be made between the two ports for the periods between 1961 until 1979 and 1980 until 2000.

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Table 3.1 “Loading and unloading for Ostend and Zeebrugge between 1961-1979” Ut infra, gives a better understanding of the evolution of the sea freight between 1960 until 1979 in the port of Oostende and the port of Zeebrugge. The figures in Table 3.1 represent the sum of the unloading and loadings, expressed in thousand-ton gross weight, for the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge. By analysing this Table, it becomes clear that during this period, the port of Zeebrugge handled a significant amount of goods more than the port of Ostend. When looking at the figures in 1961, the difference between the two ports was only 0.6-million-ton gross weight in favour of the port of Zeebrugge. When looking at the figures for the year 1979, it can be stated that the difference in goods handled between the two ports has increased significantly. Where the port of Ostend only handled 1.9-million-ton gross weight of goods in 1979, the port of Zeebrugge almost handled a tenfold of the goods handled by the port of Ostend. More precisely 10.7-million- ton gross weight of goods. This evolution is also reflected by the total amount of goods handled by the two ports between 1961 and 1979. It can be stated that during this period, the port of Ostend handled a total of 15.6-million-ton gross weight of goods, while the goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge throughout the years increased at a much faster pace. Certainly from 1968 onwards, which is one of the two key moments of the port of Zeebrugge during the second half of the 20th century. This resulted in a total of 117.5- million-ton gross weight of goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge for the period between 1961 and 1979.

Table 3.1: Loading and unloading for Ostend and Zeebrugge between 1961-1979 (in thousand tonnes gross weight). YEAR OSTEND ZEEBRUGGE 1961 300 900 1962 300 1,200 1963 400 1,600 1964 400 1,600 1965 500 1,900 1966 500 1,800 1967 500 1,300 1968 500 4,300 1969 600 8,400 1970 600 8,200 1971 500 7,800 1972 700 8,500

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1973 1,000 9,900 1974 1,000 11,100 1975 1,300 8,700 1976 1,500 10,300 1977 1,400 9,300 1978 1,700 10,000 1979 1,900 10,700 TOTAL 15,600 117,500 Adapted from “De Belgische zeehavens: erfgoed voor morgen”, by Strubbe, J., 1987, p. 175, Tielt, Lannoo.

When looking at the growth factor of the goods handled in the Belgian ports and from a national perspective, both ports grew at their own pace and were two of Belgium’s best ports. The overall growth factor for the Belgian ports for the period between 1961 and 1979 was 2.61, which was an increase from 40.2-million-ton gross weight of goods handled to 104.9-million-ton gross weight of goods handled (Strubbe, 1987). When comparing the national growth factor with the growth factor of the port of Ostend (6.33) and the growth factor of the port of Zeebrugge (11.88), it can be stated that both ports were growing faster than other Belgian ports, with the only exception being the port of Ghent, concerning the goods handled between the years 1961 and 1979.

When looking at what the impact was of the second maritime revolution on the port of Zeebrugge, it can be stated that the scaling-up of the vessels and the emergence of new techniques concerning a better treatment of loads, had a positive impact on the amount of goods handled in the port of Zeebrugge during the period between 1961 and 1979. Despite the fact that during this period the port of Zeebrugge expanded a lot and handled a lot more goods than before, the port of Ostend also grew steadily during this period. This meant that until the 1980’s, the port of Ostend did not really felt the investments done in the port of Zeebrugge during the second maritime revolution and this even though that there were almost no investments done during this period in the port of Ostend.

As mentioned Ut supra, both the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge grew during the period between 1961 and 1979, be it at their own pace. By looking at Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 Ut infra, which are showing a detailed overview of the goods handled by the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge during the last two decades of the 20th century, a different phenomenon from the 1980’s onwards in the growth of goods handled by both ports became noticeable. Where the goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge increased throughout the period between 1980 and 2000, this was not the case for the port of

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Ostend.

When looking at the figures for the port of Zeebrugge between 1980 and 2000, an increase of the goods handled by the port during these two decades is noticeable. Where in the year 1980, the total amount of goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge was 14,188 thousand ton of gross weight of goods, this rose to 35,475 thousand ton of gross weight of goods handled in 2000. This is an increase with a factor 2.5.

When looking at the figures for the port of Ostend during the same period, a stagnation in the goods handled during the period between 1980 and 2000 is noticeable. Where in the year 1980, the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend was 3,759 thousand ton of gross weight of goods, this figure only rose to 4,307 thousand ton of gross weight of goods handled in 2000. This is an increase with a factor 1.14, which is less than half the factor of the port of Zeebrugge.

When comparing the figures of the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge, it can be stated that the investments done in the 1970’s and 1980’s had a positive impact on the goods that were handled in the port of Zeebrugge during the last two decades of the 20th century. Due to the new harbour infrastructure in the port of Zeebrugge, a few major transhipment companies opened new terminals, where all types of vessels with all types of products could moor. Next to transhipment companies, different shipping companies used Zeebrugge as their homeport for their European and international lines (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). On the one hand, this evolution in the port of Zeebrugge was possibly one of the causes for the stagnation of the goods handled by the port of Ostend during this period.

On the other hand, despite handling a bigger amount of goods every year, the added value created by the port of Zeebrugge was lower in comparison to the added value generated by the port of Ostend until 1989. The fact that the added value of the port of Ostend surpassed the added value of the port of Zeebrugge until 1989 indicates that the investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge during the 1970’s and 1980’s, would only generate a return on investment after a longer period (Allaert, 2013).

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Table 3.2: Loading and unloading for the port of Ostend between 1980-2000 (in thousand tonnes gross weight). YEAR DRY LIQUID CONTAINERS RORO GENERAL TOTAL BULK BULK CARGO 1980 877 498 0 2,310 74 3,759 1981 848 482 0 2,467 38 3,834 1982 709 531 0 2,899 29 4,168 1983 450 457 0 3,191 21 4,120 1984 531 440 0 3,619 39 4,629 1985 572 361 0 3,564 16 4,513 1986 532 370 0 3,106 29 4,036 1987 555 344 0 3,120 21 4,040 1988 613 390 0 3,783 41 4,827 1989 663 383 0 3,594 22 4,661 1990 727 486 0 3,315 25 4,552 1991 752 475 0 3,220 59 4,506 1992 872 431 0 3,581 39 4,923 1993 1,067 305 0 3,692 26 5,090 1994 1,135 278 0 3,480 7 4,900 1995 1,041 214 0 3,315 23 4,593 1996 1,040 238 0 3,170 19 4,466 1997 1,181 225 0 2,847 25 4,278 1998 1,296 39 0 2,573 29 3,938 1999 1,401 37 0 1,640 30 3,108 2000 1,604 30 0 2,644 29 4,307 TOTAL 18,466 7,014 0 65,130 641 91,248 Adapted from “Ladingen en lossingen Oostende: overzicht naar verschijningsvorm sinds 1980”, by Vlaamse Havencommissie, n.d. Consulted from https://www.vlaamsehavencommissie.be/vhc/pagina/ladingen-en-lossingen- oostende-overzicht-verschijningsvorm-1980

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Table 3.3: Loading and unloading for the port of Zeebrugge between 1980-2000 (in thousand tonnes gross weight). YEAR DRY LIQUID CONTAINERS RORO GENERAL TOTAL BULK BULK CARGO 1980 2,188 5,512 1,988 4,331 169 14,188 1981 1,841 4,549 2,228 4,029 194 12,841 1982 1,980 1,216 1,799 4,135 226 9356 1983 2,125 871 2,110 4,939 258 10,303 1984 2,231 709 2,155 6,573 333 12,001 1985 3,165 816 2,292 7,709 184 14,166 1986 2,645 967 2,270 8,900 342 15,124 1987 3,403 1,995 2,337 9,509 369 17,613 1988 4,010 3,365 2,915 9,307 452 20,049 1989 6,088 4,170 3,574 11,386 588 25,806 1990 8,807 4,578 3,946 12,291 726 30,348 1991 9,820 4,739 3,790 11,498 1,007 30,854 1992 9,338 4,939 6,440 11,595 1,128 33,440 1993 6,871 4,903 6,132 12,284 1,247 31,437 1994 5,568 4,918 7,397 13,623 1,380 32,886 1995 4,207 5,166 6,355 13,374 1,472 30,573 1996 3,445 4,811 6,263 12,791 1,190 28,500 1997 4,156 5,142 7,636 14,654 819 32,408 1998 4,368 4,801 9,148 14,361 605 33,283 1999 4,913 5,030 9,957 14,761 779 35,440 2000 2,456 5,070 11,610 15,358 981 35,475 TOTAL 93,625 78,267 102,342 217,408 14,449 506,091 Adapted from “Ladingen en lossingen Zeebrugge: overzicht naar verschijningsvorm sinds 1980”, by Vlaamse Havencommissie”. n.d. Consulted from https://www.vlaamsehavencommissie.be/vhc/pagina/ladingen-en-lossingen- zeebrugge-overzicht-verschijningsvorm-1980

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3.1.3. Important investments done in the port of Zeebrugge during the second half of the 20th century

Now that the evolution of the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend has been analysed, it is clear that, as mentioned Ut supra, the two key moments in the history of the port of Zeebrugge, were the reason for the increase of the goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge and the stabilization of the goods handled by the port of Ostend. The two key moments in the history of the port of Zeebrugge were both made possible by investments done in the port of Zeebrugge by the Belgian government. Ut infra and under “3.1.4. Important investments done in the port of Ostend during the second half of the 20th century”, a more detailed overview of the investments done will be given.

As mentioned Ut supra, during the first half of the 20th century no real investments, except investments for the reparation of damage during the two World Wars, were done in both the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend. This changed in the second half of the 20th century when the government mainly focussed on investing in the port of Zeebrugge over other ports in Belgium, among which the port of Ostend. This investment policy of the government led to the fact that the infrastructure of many other ports in Belgium were not expanded anymore and became insufficiently modernized (Strubbe, 1987). To show that the evolution of the goods handled in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend can be linked to the investments done by the Belgian government, a comparison will be made between the figures of the investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend during the first and second investment wave. Table 3.4 “Investments in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend in 1963 and 1964” Ut infra, shows the first investment wave done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge, and Table 3.5 “Investments in the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend between 1977 and 1986” shows the second wave of investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge.

Table 3.4: Investments done in the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend in 1963 and 1964 (in million euro). YEAR ZEEBRUGGE OSTEND 1963 1.49 0.56 1964 2.08 0.59 TOTAL 3.57 1.15

Adapted from “De miskende haven”, by Georges Allaert., 2013, p. 63, Gent, Academia Press.

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When looking at the port of Zeebrugge and its investments in the second half of the 20th century, two main waves of investments done by the government are noticeable. The first wave of investments was done in the 1960’s. As mentioned Ut supra, these investments were focussed on two aspects. Firstly, there were the investments done by the government to allow ships with a maximum of 50,000 dwt to enter at high tide and to allow a tanker up to 35,000 dwt to enter at all time (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). These investments were necessary due to the scaling-up of the vessels, which was a result of the closure of the Suez Canal, as a result of the war situation in the Middle East (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). Next to the investments done in deepening and widening the port of Zeebrugge, the scaling-up of the vessels and the closure of the Suez Canal also led to some other investments needed to attract these kind of vessels and the industry that they brought along. Examples of such other investments are the new artificial peninsula called “the Westerhoofd” on which a petroleum terminal was built and a pipeline to connect the tanks in the port of Zeebrugge with the refinery in Ghent (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2006). Secondly, certain investments were done during this period to facilitate the port with the right infrastructure and prepare it for the emergence of new techniques concerning the treatment of loads such as containers and RORO traffic (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). Due to these investments, the port of Zeebrugge was able to conduct business with countries far away.

The second wave of investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge began in the early 1970’s and would end in 1985. It was considered as one of the biggest construction projects in Belgium for that time. These investments were necessary due to the progression that the port of Zeebrugge made in the previous decade. In essence, the government appointed a committee, named “Committee Verschaeve” in 1968, to assess whether it was possible to build a port at sea or along the Belgian coast for ships with a bigger tonnage. This study experienced resistance from the port of Antwerp and the port of Ghent, but also from Wallonia, which claimed some economical compensation. Finally, in the year 1970, all the issues were solved and the contract to expand the port of Zeebrugge into sea and on land was issued by the government (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2006).

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Table 3.5: Investments done in the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend between 1977 and 1986 (in million euro). YEAR ZEEBRUGGE OSTEND 1977 134.2 / 1978 81.7 3.4 1979 210.0 0.9 1980 174.6 1.1 1981 220.9 0.6 1982 246.7 1.4 1983 207.2 0.4 1984 208.2 7.8 1985 157.7 1.0 1986 102.8 1.5 TOTAL 1,744.0 18.1 Adapted from “De Belgische zeehavens: erfgoed voor morgen”, by Strubbe, J., 1987, p. 172, Tielt, Lannoo.

The construction of the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge can be divided into three separate projects, namely the building of a new sea lock, the building of a new rear port with docks and the building of an outer port into sea.

As mentioned Ut supra, the first project contained the building of a new bigger sea lock namely the Pierre Vandamme Lock. The construction works started in 1972 and lasted until 1985. This lock would, together with the old lock, connect the outer and inner port of Zeebrugge.

When looking at the difference in size between the old lock of Zeebrugge and the new Pierre Vandamme Lock in the port of Zeebrugge, shown in Ut infra in Table 4 “Difference between the old and new lock in the port of Zeebrugge”, the real magnitude of the new sea lock becomes clear. Where the old lock, which was in service since 1907, had a length of 210 meters, a width of 19.70 meters and a depth of 9 meters, the new Pierre Vandamme Lock became more than twice as big as the old lock: a length of 210 meters, a width of 57 meters and a depth of 18.5 meters. Due to its size, ships up to 125,000 dwt are able to enter the lock (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.), which allowed access to the rear port.

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Table 3.6: Difference between the old and new lock in the port of Zeebrugge. Locks In service Length in m Width in m Depth in m Old Lock 1907 210 19.70 9.00 P. Vandamme Lock 1984 500 57.00 18.50 Reprinted from “Port history”, by Koninckx, C. & Serruys, M., 2016, p. 120, Brussels, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

The second expansion project was the construction of a new rear port. The new rear port would consist out of docks and port areas and would be as big as 1,300 hectares (Port of Zeebrugge, n.d.). The third expansion project was the expansion of the outer port. This was the most technical and challenging project out of the three projects since the whole outer port was reclaimed from the sea by using raised sand (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). This new outer port was necessary to protect the preamble of the new lock and made it possible, due to its size, to construct docks and port areas over a total surface of approximately 550 hectares (In het raam van de energetische rol van onze havens, n.d.). The outer port consists out of two moles which are built into sea. The western mole has a length of 4,450 metres and the eastern mole has a length of 4,300 metres. Both moles extend two kilometres into the sea. Between the two newly built moles, an area is created where big sea ships can navigate without having to pass a lock. Due to this, the area became an ideal area for handling containers and RO-RO traffic (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2006).

3.1.4. Important investments done in the port of Ostend during the second half of the 20th century

As mentioned Ut supra, the coronation of King Leopold II in 1865 was the beginning of a flourishing period in the history of the city of Ostend. This was not only the case for the city of Ostend, but also for the port of Ostend. This was because Leopold II decided to invest much more in the port of Ostend than in the larger ports such as Antwerp and Ghent. Examples of the investments done during this period are “the Vlokdok”, “the Houtdok” and the “Demeysluis”. After this period of investments, the port of Ostend faced a period of many years in which almost no major investments were done to facilitate or modernize the port with new or bigger infrastructure or equipment. The last real investment, until 1994, was done in 1934 with the building of “the Visserijdok” (Allaert, 2013). All the other investments done during this period were small investments or were investments done to repair the port of Ostend after the two World Wars. After the two World Wars, certain investments were done to facilitate the Belgian naval power but just as before the second World War, these were no big investments. The port of Ostend did not even construct new 22 docks for the naval power but gave them a part of the deep water quay. On top of this, the port even lost more space for economic activities when foreign naval powers moored in the port of Ostend due to the fact that these foreign naval powers were also given a place along the deep water quay or in the Vlotdok and Houtdok (Allaert, 2013).

No further initiatives to invest in more modern and better infrastructure and equipment in the port of Ostend were undertaken until the 1960’s. The whitepaper concerning the port of Ostend during the mid 1960’s was a clear demand for a profound renovation and restructuring of the port. Despite the necessity, this demand was not followed by the (local) government and thus denied. As mentioned Ut supra, in Table 3.2, during this period all the attention, both budgetary and politically, went to the building of the new port of Zeebrugge (Allaert, 2013). Where the politicians in Belgium did not want wanted to invest in the port of Ostend in the 1960’s, this was not the case anymore in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Together with the business community, the notion grew that the port of Ostend generated a considerable economic surplus for both the city of Ostend as well for the region around Ostend. This notion was fed by the growth of the RO-RO traffic, coast traffic and car ferry traffic during the 1970’s and 1980’s in the port of Ostend. Investments in these domains were an absolute necessity due to the fact that the old infrastructure was too small and above all worn-out. This all was the result of the fact that no real investments were done in the past concerning the port infrastructure (Allaert, 2013).

The growing notion of the necessity to invest in the port of Ostend was eventually captured in a master plan, which was announced by the Direction of the Coast of the Ministry of Public Works on 29 February 1988. The cost of this plan was estimated at around 161 million euro and had to be realized in ten years (Allaert, 2013). However, by the time the construction works began in 1994, the costs already increased with 17 million euro to a total of 178 million euro. This investment program was mainly focussed around three objectives. The first objective was the adjustment of the front port to handle bigger vessels, the second objective was the building of a new sea lock between the front port and rear port and the third objective was to create a rear port out of the canal area “Slijkens- Plassendale” (Basisgegevens uitrusting Oostende, 2016). This new rear port would consist out of four zones totalling 160 hectares of industrial ground.

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Table 3.7 Ut infra, shows the investments done by the government during the last decade of the 20th century in the port of Ostend. When comparing the figures in this Table with the figures found in Table 3.4 and 3.5, a clear change in the investment policy used by the government is noticeable.

Table 3.7: Investments done in the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge between 1990 and 2000 (in million euro). YEAR OSTEND ZEEBRUGGE 1990 8.09 32.86 1991 16.90 50.63 1992 2.15 41.08 1993 3.77 40.64 1994 17.06 31.49 1995 15.79 20.41 1996 23.58 22.85 1997 25.44 17.93 1998 22.31 34.84 1999 22.69 35.75 2000 24.74 32.51 TOTAL 182.52 366.99 Adapted from “Overheidsuitgaven voor havens, miljoen euro, 1989-2018 (in prijzen 2018)”,by Mobiliteitsraad. n.d. Consulted from http://www.mobiliteitsraad.be/mora/thema/kerncijfers/vlaamse-havens/overheidsuitgaven

Six years after the announcement of the master plan in 1988, the construction works finally started with diverse renovation works in the front port of Ostend. In the early years from 1994 until 1998, the investment program was focussed on widening the harbour channel, the renovation of the Zeewezendok, strengthening the quay walls, the deepening of the deep water quay and the deepening of the Cockerillkaai. As mentioned Ut supra, these works were done to adjust the front port and thus to complete objective one. From 1994 until 1998, the government invested 57 million euro in the port of Ostend and out of these 57 million euro almost 50 million euro went to the adjustment of the front port (Allaert, 2013). In 1999, the signal was given to start the construction of the new rear port of Ostend. The first zone to be developed was the zone named “Passendale I”, which was around 125 hectares big and was destined to become a zone for maritime-industrial activities and maritime-logistical activities. The total investment in this project was estimated at 14.87 million euro and by the year 2000, investments for a total sum of 7.9 million euro out of the 14.87 million euro were already been made (Strubbe, 2000). Later, in the 21st century, 24 the development of the other four zones in the rear port of Ostend started and brought the port of Ostend closer to the completion of the third objective of the master plan. When looking at the second objective namely the building of a new large sea lock with the dimension to allow ships up to 10,000 dwt, it must be said that this project has been put to a hold. Instead of building a new sea lock, the responsible bodies have decided to renovate the already existing Demeysluis. This renovation started in 2004 and costed 3.3 million euro (Basisgegevens uitrusting Oostende, 2016).

3.1.5. The favourable conditions of the port of Zeebrugge over the port of Ostend

As mentioned Ut supra, both the port of Zeebrugge and the port of Ostend have known one or more periods of investments in their port during the second half of the 20th century. Where the government only decided to invest during the last decade of the 20th century in the port of Ostend, this was not the case for the port of Zeebrugge. The government decided to invest intensively during the 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s in the port of Zeebrugge. These investments meant a rise in the goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge and a stabilization of the goods handled by the port of Ostend, as shown by the figures in Table 3.1, and Table 3.2, Ut supra. Thus, it can be said that the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge as an international seaport due to the investments done by the government was not a direct factor for the downfall of the port of Ostend in the 20th century, however it surely stopped the growth of the port of Ostend from the 1980’s onwards. However, the question arises why the government decided to invest in the building of a new port of Zeebrugge and not in the historically more famous port of Ostend. The answer to this question can be found in three different reasons.

The first reason can be identified in the lack of space in both the city of Ostend and in the port of Ostend. As mentioned Ut supra, the Belgian government ordered the committee Verschaeve to assess whether it was possible to build a port at sea or along the Belgian coast which could handle ships with a bigger tonnage. To handle ships with a bigger tonnage, a location had to be found which could be expanded and where bigger docks could be built or where a completely new harbour could be built. Out of the seven possible locations, the port of Zeebrugge was considered the best option due to its already existing infrastructure and the possibility to expand the port of Zeebrugge inland, but also into the North Sea (Vanneste, 1985). When looking at the total surface of the port of Zeebrugge after the expansion in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the surface was totalling 2,870 hectares (Koninckx & Serruys, 2016). Out of

25 these 2,870 hectares, 1,165 hectares were the area enclosed by the two newly built moles and 1,300 hectares were the new rear port of the port of Zeebrugge. Such an expansion is only possible when there is enough space available. In the case of the port of Zeebrugge, this was possible because the port only existed since the end of the 19th century and thus can be considered as a fairly new port. This had as an implication that historically, there was no real relation between the city of Zeebrugge or Bruges and the port of Zeebrugge and thus that the port has never been built “within” the city. When looking at the situation for the port of Ostend, it is safe to say that this kind of expansion would never have been possible. Reason for it is the historical relation between the city of Ostend and its port and that the port of Ostend is built “within” the city of Ostend. Due to the position of the port of Ostend, space for expansion is limited. This can also be seen when comparing the scale of expansion for the port of Zeebrugge in the 1970’s and 1980’s and the port of Ostend in the 1990’s. Where the port of Zeebrugge was totalling 2,870 hectares after their expansion in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the surface of the port of Ostend would only total 475 hectares (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2005) after a partial completion of the investments for the expansion of the port in 2000. Where the historical relation between the city of Ostend and the port of Ostend was an urban reason why the port of Ostend could not expand, there could also have been some ecological factors which could potentially have played an important role. Even though the city of Ostend and the port of Ostend are surrounded by ecological, agricultural and valuable polders (Copejans, 2015), the ecological factors have never played a role in the decision of the government to not built a new port in Ostend. This for the simple reason that in the 20th century, the environment was subordinate to the socio-economic aspect (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview).

A second reason why the government chose to invest in the port of Zeebrugge over the port of Ostend, is also historically based. At the end of the 19th century, two phenomena have changed the further development of coastal harbours. These phenomena are Zeebrugge and tourism. The emergence of tourism was an important source of steady revenue in a number of cities along the Belgian coast, such as the city Ostend. Due to this, the interest of the coastal cities was more focused on investments which would enhance the attractiveness of the city towards tourists (Koninckx, 2018 – personal communication, interview). Where the city of Ostend has always played a prominent role in being one of Belgium’s most popular seaside resorts and a lot of money was invested in infrastructure to facilitate the tourists, this was not the case for the city of Zeebrugge. The lack of being a popular seaside resort meant for the city of Zeebrugge that they were less dependent on tourism and that they were able to respond more flexible on the demand

26 of the government for an expansion of the port of Zeebrugge (Strubbe, 1987).

A third reason is a politically loaded reason. As mentioned Ut supra, despite the fact that already in the 1960’s there was a demand for a profound renovation and restructuring of the port, no real investments were done in the port of Ostend. This would last until the 1970’s and especially the 1980’s and 1990’s. The reason why all the investments were done in the port of Zeebrugge and not in the port of Ostend can be found in an old conflict between the Belgian government and the former King of Belgium Leopold II. Not the Belgian government, but King Leopold II was the driving force behind the port of Ostend in the second half of the 19th century. He invested in the port of Ostend with his own money and as a counteraction, the Belgian government decided to invest in the port of Zeebrugge. This is the reason why the port of Ostend was not included in the port budgets until 1988. This situation changed in 1988 when Georges Allaert and Johan Sauwens pointed out the fact that the port of Ostend was not included in the port budgets. Due to Georges Allaert and Johan Sauwens, the port of Ostend became included in the port budgets and investments were done in the port of Ostend as can be seen Ut supra in Table 3.7 (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview).

3.1.6. Conclusion

With the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge in 1907, the port of Ostend received a new competitor only 30 kilometers further to the east. Despite the high expectations, the port of Zeebrugge only gained importance from the 1960’s onwards. Two key moments in the development of the port of Zeebrugge were the cause for the revival of the port of Zeebrugge. The first key moment was the second maritime revolution which took place in the second part of the 1960’s. After analyzing the impact of the second maritime revolution in the port of Zeebrugge, it can be stated that the scaling-up of the vessels and the emergence of new techniques concerning a better a treatment of loads, which came along with the second maritime revolution, had a positive impact on the amount of goods handled in the port of Zeebrugge during this period. Despite this positive impact for the port of Zeebrugge, the port of Ostend also grew steadily during this period. This meant that the investments done in the port of Zeebrugge during this period, did not really affect the port of Ostend. The second key moment was the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge. The construction works ended in 1985. From this moment onwards, a clear increase in the goods handled by the port of Zeebrugge and a stabilization in the amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend is noticeable. This means that the expansion of the Port of Zeebrugge had an impact on the volumes handled in the port of Ostend.

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The key moments in the history of the port of Zeebrugge were only made possible due to the investments done in the port of Zeebrugge by the Belgian government. Between 1977 and 1986, 1,744.0 million euro of investments were done in the port of Zeebrugge compared to only 18.1 million euro in the port of Ostend. Only in the last decade of the 20th century, the government decided to invest in the port of Ostend as well which led to 182.52 million euro of investments done in the port of Ostend by the Belgian government, compared to 366.99 million euro of investments done in the port of Zeebrugge by the Belgian government during the same period. This unequal treatment led to an increase in the goods handled in the port of Zeebrugge and a decline in the goods handled by the port of Ostend in the second half of the 20th century. Reasons for this unequal treatment can be found in the availability of space in the port of Ostend, the fact that Ostend was a well- known seaside resort with a flourishing tourism industry and in an old political dispute between the government and King Leopold II. Overall, it can be stated that due to the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge, the goods handled by the port of Ostend stabilized and stopped growing.

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3.2. Shifting of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge

Where the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge during the second half of the 20th century was a cause for the stabilization of the goods handled in the port of Ostend during the 20th century, as mentioned Ut supra, another possible cause for the decline of the port of Ostend during the 20th century can also be linked to the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge. Due to the emergence and the expansion during the second half of the 20th century, the Belgian government decided to shift the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge. In this part of the master dissertation, it will be investigated whether the shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend during the 20th century. First of all, a brief history will be given of the Belgian Royal Marine and its connection with the port of Ostend. Secondly, the importance of the Belgian Marine for the port of Ostend will be shown and finally, it will be identified why the shift of the Marine towards the port of Zeebrugge was a bad thing for the port of Ostend.

As mentioned Ut supra in the introduction, figures concerning the added value and employment generated and created by the Belgian marine are very rare for the 1970’s and 1980’s. Thus, to formulate conclusions concerning this part of the master dissertation, the focus will be put on figures of the 1990’s (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview).

3.2.1. History of the Belgian Royal Marine and its connection with the port of Ostend

When looking at the history of the Belgian Marine corps and fleet, it can be stated that its existence went not without its difficulties. Already in 1831, one year after the existence of Belgium as a country, the Congress of Belgium decided to establish a Belgian Royal Marine. The decision to establish a Belgian Royal Marine was made in a reaction to the aggressive behaviour of the Dutch Marine towards Belgian merchant vessels. In the year 1839, The Netherlands finally recognized the independency of Belgium as a nation and in the same year, the Belgian government decided to spread the naval fleet over two ports, namely the port of Ostend and the port of Antwerp. Already in 1862, thirty-one years after the creation of the Belgian Royal Marine, the Belgian government decided to dissolve the Belgian Royal Marine due to a lack reasons for its existence (Jansoone, 2005).

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After the dissolution of the Belgian Royal Marine in 1862, it took more than five decades before Belgium had a Marine again. The trigger for the reintroduction of the Marine was the First World War. However, only a decade after the First World War, the Marine was dissolved once again (Jansoone, 2005). During the Second World War, the Marine was introduced once again, but it would take until 1946 before the Marine as we know it today came into existence.

Since the existence of the Belgian Marine in 1946, Ostend was the main base for the Belgian Marine. Different activities took place in the city or the port of Ostend such as the maintenance of the naval vessels and the training of the new recruits. Even though the port of Ostend was considered as the main marine base, there were several other bases in Belgium such as the marine bases in Antwerp, Bruges, Newport and Zeebrugge, but these were all Marine bases of minor importance (Marinebasissen, n.d.). The situation wherein the port of Ostend was considered as the main base of the Belgian Marine lasted until 1976. The reason for the decline of the port of Ostend as the main base of the Belgian Marine can be found in a problem which was not new for the port of Ostend, namely the lack of space. During the fifth and sixth decade of the 20th century, the Belgian Marine expanded and space became an issue in the port of Ostend (Marinebasissen, n.d.). Where space was an issue for the port of Ostend, this was not the case for the port of Zeebrugge, where already in 1969 the start for the building of a new marine base was given. The new basis was officially opened in 1976 and consisted of a new dock with two quays. The western quay measured 410 meters, whilst the eastern quay measured 430 meters. Further expansion to the marine base in the port of Zeebrugge was done in 1978 and 1981 and between 1983 and 1985 when a second dock with a quay length of 1,000 meters was built (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2019). From 1968 onwards, the Marine slowly shifted towards the port of Zeebrugge and as mentioned Ut supra, from 1976 the port of Zeebrugge was considered as the main base of the Belgian Marine. Despite the fact that since 1976 the port of Zeebrugge was the main base of the Belgian Marine, the Belgian Marine was still located in the port of Ostend, being it in smaller numbers. This would last until 1994 when the Belgian Marine decided to centralize its activities in the port of Zeebrugge and leave the port of Ostend. The reason for this centralization can be found in a shrinkage of the Belgian Marine and a restructuring of the Belgian Marine (Clerinx, Merckx & Schurmans, 1995).

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3.2.2. Importance of the Belgian marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century

Even though most of the Marine activities had left the port of Ostend by the year 2000, added value and jobs were still created by the Marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century. To show the importance of the Marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century, figures concerning the added value and the employment of the Marine during this decade will be analysed. These figures are represented under Table 3.8. and 3.9. Ut infra.

Table 3.8: Added value of the port of Ostend and the share of the Marine (in million euro). YEAR ADDED SHARE OF ADDED TOTAL VALUE PUBLIC VALUE ADDED PUBLIC ADDED PRIVATE VALUE VALUE MARINE 1991 30.2 16.5 203.1 233.3 1992 31.0 17.3 187.5 218.5 1993 28.8 15.6 160.8 189.6 1994 25.5 12.2 142.8 168.3 1995 28.0 14.0 146.5 174.5 1996 26.6 11.4 123.8 150.4 1997 34.5 11.4 123.8 143.9 1998 32.7 9.0 116.0 148.7 1999 33.9 10.1 114.2 148.1 2000 35.7 8.7 98.8 134.5 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens, Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend.

When looking at the total added value of the port of Ostend throughout the last decade of the 20th century, as represented in Table 3.8 Ut supra, it can be seen that there is a decrease of the total added value throughout this decade. There is a percentual decrease of 42.35% from 1991 until 2000. When looking at how the total added value is created, it can be seen that the majority of the total added value is created by the private sector and that a minority is created by the public sector. However, it has to be mentioned that the added value generated by the private sector is declining and the added value generated

31 by the public sector is increasing throughout the last decade of the 20th century. When looking at the percentual change of the added value created by the Marine in regard with the total added value, it can be observed that it fluctuates between 6.0% and 8.2% despite the fact that the created added value of the Marine decreases throughout the decade. The reason why the added value created by the Marine stays reasonably stable is due to the decrease of the total added value of the port of Ostend throughout the last decade of the 20th century as mentioned Ut supra. Finally, when comparing the added value created by the Marine in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century with the added value created by the Marine in the port of Zeebrugge for the same period, which is represented in Table 3.9, it can be stated that a different phenomenon can be noticed. Where the added value decreased for the port of Ostend, this is not the case for the port of Zeebrugge. An increase of the added value created by the Marine is noticeable throughout the last decade of the 20th century, especially from 1995 onwards. A possible reason for this remarkable increase is the fact that in 1994, the Belgian government announced the centralization of the Belgian Marine in the port of Zeebrugge.

Table 3.9: Added value of the port of Zeebrugge and the share of the Marine (in million euro). YEAR ADDED SHARE OF ADDED TOTAL VALUE PUBLIC VALUE ADDED PUBLIC ADDED PRIVATE VALUE VALUE MARINE 1991 73.9 44.3 588.1 662.0 1992 70.6 40.1 586.9 657.5 1993 66.7 35.9 584.7 651.4 1994 68.1 35.2 629.6 697.7 1995 76.7 39.3 643.0 719.7 1996 83.3 45.3 616.7 700.0 1997 85.8 47.6 595.2 681.0 1998 113.5 73.6 641.6 755.1 1999 118.0 76.0 649.7 767.7 2000 116.2 72.8 707.1 823.3 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Brugge – Zeebrugge, 1991-1995”, by The National Bank of Belgium., 1997, National Bank of Belgium, s.l. And from “Economisch belang van de Zeehavens – haven van Brugge- Zeebrugge – Boekjaar 2001”, by National Bank of Belgium., 2003, National Bank of Belgium, Ghent.

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Table 3.10: Employment in the port of Ostend and the share of the Marine employment. YEAR PUBLIC SHARE OF PRIVATE TOTAL EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT MARINE 1991 1.215 713 4.783 5.998 1992 1.202 710 4.678 5.880 1993 1.076 622 4.376 5.452 1994 922 475 4.278 5.200 1995 914 475 4.184 5.098 1996 801 358 3.862 4.663 1997 940 355 3.280 4.220 1998 805 232 2.456 3.261 1999 835 259 2.438 3.273 2000 1.016 397 2.090 3.106 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens, Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend.

When looking at the employment created in the last decade of the 20th century, a similar conclusion can be drawn regarding to the added value. Looking at the total employment in the port of Ostend throughout the last decade of the 20th century, as represented Ut supra in Table 3.10, a percentual decrease of 48.2% from 1991 until 2000 can be noticed. Many of the jobs in the port of Ostend during this decade were provided by the private sector and a minority by the public sector. When looking at the amount of jobs provided by the Marine regarding to the total amount of jobs provided by the public sector, it can be stated that until 1995, more than half of the jobs in the public sector were provided by the Marine. From 1996 onwards, it can be seen that this is not the case anymore and that the amount of jobs provided by the Marine is decreasing more rapidly than the total jobs provided by the public sector in the port of Ostend during this decade. When looking at the percentual change of the amount of jobs created by the Marine in regard with the total amount of jobs, it can observed that the amount of jobs created by the Marine fluctuates between 7.11% and 12.78% of the total jobs throughout this decade. When comparing the employment created by the Belgian Marine in the port of Ostend with the employment created by the Belgian Marine in the port of Zeebrugge throughout the last decade of the 20th century, the same phenomenon as to the evolution of the added value between the two ports is noticeable. As can be seen in Table 3.11, an increase in 33 the employment created by the Belgian Marine in the port of Zeebrugge throughout this decade is noticeable, whereas there was a decrease in the employment created in the port of Ostend during the same decade. Once again, a remarkable increase is noticeable from 1995 onwards and the reason behind this increase can once again be found in the fact that in 1994, the Belgian government announced the centralization of the Belgian Marine in the port of Zeebrugge.

Table 3.11: Employment in the port of Zeebrugge and the share of the Marine employment. YEAR PUBLIC SHARE OF PRIVATE TOTAL EMPLOYMENT PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT MARINE 1991 2.751 1.906 9.733 12.484 1992 2.504 1.672 9.553 12.057 1993 2.328 1.482 9.470 11.798 1994 2.262 1.408 9.229 11.491 1995 2.222 1.379 9.448 11.670 1996 2.356 1.541 8.645 11.001 1997 2.515 1.750 8.321 10.836 1998 2.653 1.888 8.260 10.913 1999 2.733 1.956 8.418 11.151 2000 2.712 1.982 8.663 11.375 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Brugge – Zeebrugge, 1991-1995”, by The National Bank of Belgium., 1997, National Bank of Belgium, s.l. And from “Economisch belang van de Zeehavens – haven van Brugge- Zeebrugge – Boekjaar 2001”, by National Bank of Belgium., 2003, National Bank of Belgium, Ghent.

3.2.3. Possible impact of the shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge

By generating an added value between 6% and 8.2% and generating between 7.11% and 12,.28% of all jobs in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century, as shown Ut supra, it can be stated that the Belgian Marine still played an important role in the port of Ostend during this decade.

The shift of the marine base from the port of Ostend to the port of Zeebrugge had definitely had an impact on the decline of the port of Ostend during the 20th century or at least for the last decade of the 20th century. When only looking at the last decade of the 20th century,

34 it can be stated that in ten-year time, the added value created by the Belgian Marine in the port of Ostend has decreased by 47.3%, which is a decrease from 16.5 million euro to 8.7 million euro, and the employment by 44.2%, which is a decrease from 713 to 397. Although that these numbers are already significant, the true impact of the relocation of the marine base from Ostend to Zeebrugge will remain unknown due to a lack of figures concerning the employment and added value in the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, under normal circumstances, the impact of the relocation of the marine base towards the port of Zeebrugge, must be higher. This due to the fact that the majority of the Marine had already left the port of Ostend by 1976.

3.2.4. Conclusion

Since the existence of the Marine as we know it today, in 1946, the port of Ostend was the main marine base in Belgium. This situation lasted until 1976, when the port of Zeebrugge became the main marine base in Belgium due to a lack of space in the port of Ostend. Already in 1986, the Marine slowly started to switch towards the port of Zeebrugge. Almost 20 years later, in 1994, the switch was finalized. The shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend towards the port of Zeebrugge led to a decrease of the added value in the port of Ostend generated by the Marine, of 7.8 million euro, representing a decrease of the added value of 47.3%, in the last decade of the 20th century. Next to the decrease of added value in the port of Ostend, the shift of the marine base towards the port of Zeebrugge also led to a decrease in the amount of jobs provided by the Marine in the port of Ostend. The amount of jobs provided by the Marine in the port of Ostend, declined from 713 in 1991 to 397 in 2000. In other words, this is a decline of 44.2%. Thus for this part, the conclusion can be drawn that the shift of the naval base towards the port of Zeebrugge was a factor for the downfall of the port of Ostend during the 20th century. However, as mentioned Ut supra, the true impact of the shift of the marine base from Ostend to Zeebrugge will remain unknown due to a lack of figures concerning the employment and added value in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Logically speaking, the impact of the disappearance of the Belgian Marine in the port of Ostend, must be much higher than the figures of the last decade are showing. This because in the last decade, the Marine component in the port of Ostend was already much smaller than it used to be. The major part of the Marine had already left by 1976, when the port of Zeebrugge became the main basis of the Belgian Marine.

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3.3. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry and the disappearance of Ostend as the main fishing port of Belgium

In this part of the master dissertation, the question will be asked whether the decline of the Belgian fishing industry and the disappearance of Ostend as the main fishing port in Belgium, have had an impact on the downfall of the port of Ostend during the 20th century. Firstly, the history of the Belgian fishing industry will be explained. Secondly, the decline of the Belgian fishing industry and its causes will be analysed. Thirdly, the impact of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry on the port of Ostend will be analysed. However, as mentioned in the introduction, an important remark has to be made in regard to the availability of data concerning the added value generated by the Belgian fisheries before 1990. No data was available concerning the added value for this period. As an alternative, the total value of landings until 1990 will be taken. For the last decade of the 20th century, the real added value will be taken.

3.3.1. History of the Belgian fishing industry

Although the Belgian fishing industry plays a minor role today in the European fisheries context with only 0.35% of the total EU production of fish in 2012 (Lescrauwaet, 2013), several Belgian ports have played an important role in the national and international fishing industry in the past.

The history of the fishing industry in several ports, located in what is now called Belgium, goes far back in time. Already in the early medieval period, the ports of Ostend and Newport were already well known for their trade and fishing industry. Whilst the fishing industry in the county of Flanders developed further throughout time, the golden period of the fishing industry in the county of Flanders began in the 15th century and ended in the 17th century due to political instability in the county of Flanders (Vlaams Instituut voor de zee, 2016). During the following centuries, the fishing industry in the county of Flanders was characterized by its many peaks and lows. Eventually the fishing industry flourished once again after the independency of Belgium in 1830. As mentioned Ut supra under “2.3 Ostend in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century”, the newly formed Belgian government decided to implement a premium system. This system had as a direct effect that the amount of fishing vessels doubled from 145 vessels to 274 vessels in only three decades and that the employment in the fishing industry rose. Eventually the premium system was abolished in 1867 since the costs of such a system were too high (VLIZ, 2016). During this whole period and up until the first World War, the port of Ostend was the most important fishing port. Other important ports were the fishing port of Newport and 36 the newly built port of Zeebrugge. Next to these ports, some important fishing communities such as Heist, Blankenberge, Adinkerke, Oostduinkerke, and , also harboured an important number of vessels. Most of the vessels used by the fishermen living in one of the fishing communities, were stranded on the beach to disembark the produce or used the coastal ports (Lescrauwaet, 2013). By analysing the amount of fishing vessels harboured per port or per fishing community in 1913, provided in Lescrauwaet (2013), the importance of the port of Ostend over the other ports and fishing communities, at the eve of the First World War can be shown.

Table 3.12: Number of fishing vessels in the Belgian coastal ports and fishing communities in 1913. PORT AMOUNT OF VESSELS Ostend 327 De Panne/Adinkerke 87 Heist 67 Blankenberge 67 Newport 37 Oostduinkerke/Koksijde 26 Zeebrugge 20 TOTAL 631

After a flourishing period in the 19th century, the Belgian fishing industry once again prospered during a large part of the 20th century. The first reason for the growth of the fishing industry in Belgium can be found in innovations, such as the diesel engine and sonar, which were made possible due to technological innovations during the First World War (VLIZ, 2016). The diesel engine, which had much more power than the other alternatives at that time, replaced the traditional sailing vessels and steam trawlers and due to the power of the diesel engine, the fishers could pull a bigger net and thus increase the amount of fish caught (Polet & Vanderperren, 2011). The shift from traditional vessels towards vessels which were driven by a diesel engine required a considerable investment. This led to the fact that the fishing industry moved away from being a more family-oriented industry towards big shipping companies. Due to this evolution, the fishing activities became concentrated around the bigger coastal ports in Belgium, which were Ostend, Zeebrugge, Newport and Blankenberge (Lescrauwaet, 2013). After the innovation of the diesel engine, which had changed the fishing industry, an innovation at the end of the 1950’s once again had a major impact on the fishing industry. This time, the invention of the beam trawl changed the industry. Due to this innovation,

37 the fishing industry was able to fish more efficiently and fish in more remote areas (Polet & Vanderperren, 2011). Between 1950 and 1970, the Iceland Sea became an important fishing ground for the Belgian fishing industry. The new evolution in the fishing business at the end of the 1950’s, did not only meant a change in the way fishing was done, but also changed the competition between the different ports along the Belgian coast. Where the port of Ostend was the most important fishing port since at least the 18th century, the port of Zeebrugge took over this title in 1968 as the most important port in terms of fleet size and in 1985 in terms of landings (Lescrauwaet, 2013). Despite the innovations done in the first decades of the 20th century, the Belgian fishing industry once again faced a period of decline towards the end of the 20th century. The reasons for this decline will be further explained Ut infra under “3.3.2. the decline of the Belgian fishing industry”.

3.3.2. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry

As depicted Ut infra in Figure 3.1 (Lescrauwaet, 2013, p. 97), in which the dark blue colour depicts the landings in tonnes in the Belgian harbours by Belgian vessels and the light blue depicts landings in tonnes in foreign harbours by Belgian vessels, the Belgian fishing industry was at its peak just after the end of the Second World War. In the year 1947, a total of 75,370 tonnes (Lescrauwaet, 2013) of fish was landed in the Belgian ports. When looking at the evolution of the amount of fish, expressed in tonnes, that has been landed ever since a steady decrease is noticeable with an exception of the first years of the 1950’s, when an increase is noticeable. When comparing the total fish landed by Belgian fisheries in the Belgian ports in 1947 (75,370 tonnes), with the total fish landed by fisheries in the Belgian ports in 2000 (17,580 tonnes), a decrease of 76% in 53 years is noticeable.

When looking at the total amount of fish caught by Belgian fisheries, an important part of the total amount of fish caught by Belgian fisheries, is the fish caught by Belgian fisheries but landed in foreign ports. A part of this fish is then transported using refrigerated transport to the fish auctions in Belgium. Where a decrease in the amount of fish landed in the Belgian ports by Belgian fisheries is noticeable for the period between 1947 and 2000, an increase in the fish landed in foreign ports by Belgian fisheries is noticeable for the period between 1950 and 2000. In 1950, the first year with data concerning the fish caught by Belgian fisheries and landed in foreign ports, a total of 668 tonnes was caught by Belgian fisheries and brought to land in foreign ports. When comparing the amount of fish caught by Belgian fisheries and landed in foreign ports in 1950, with the amount of fish caught by Belgian fisheries and landed in foreign ports in 2000, an increase is noticeable. In 2000, the Belgian fisheries caught 8,942

38 tonnes of fish which were landed in foreign ports. This is an increase of 1,238.62%. This increase is caused by the restrictions and quotas imposed by the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which will be further explained Ut infra. This led to the fact that fishers went to fishing grounds further away, which resulted in an increase of the landings in foreign ports by Belgian vessels (Crijns, 2001).

Despite the increase of fish caught by Belgian fisheries and landed in foreign ports, the total amount of fish caught by Belgian fisheries decreased throughout the 20th century as depicted Ut infra, in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Landings of Belgian fisheries in Belgian (dark) and foreign ports (light) in the period 1929-2008, including Dunkerque and Gravelines (France).

Reprinted from Belgian fisheries: ten decades, seven seas, forty species. Historical time-series to reconstruct landings, catches, fleet and fishing areas from 1900, by Lescrauwaet A.K., 2013, retrieved from http://www.vliz.be/en/imis?module=ref&refid=228661

The decrease of the landings during the 20th century, is a clear indicator of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry during the 20th century. Another indicator which can also indicate the decline of the Belgian fishing industry during the 20th century, is the employment in the fishing industry throughout the 20th century. As depicted Ut infra in Figure 3.2 (Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee, 2014), the employment in the fishing industry in Belgium decreases throughout the second half of the 20th century. Where in the year 1954

39 more than 1800 fishermen were active in the fishing industry, this decreased to around 900 active fishermen in the fishing industry in 2000. When keeping in mind the decrease of the total landings in the second half of the 20th century, the decrease of the employment during the same period is only a logical consequence, but it shows and proves once again the decline of the Belgian fishing industry during the second half of the 20th century.

Figure 3.2: Direct employment in fisheries in Belgium: absolute number of fishers, and proportion by age class, 1954-2012.

Reprinted from Fishing past and present: Belgium, by Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee, 2014, retrieved from http://www.vliz.be/wiki/Fishing_past_and_present:_Belgium

The decline of the Belgian fishing industry throughout the second half of the 20th century can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, there are the restrictions and quotas (also referred to as Total Allowable Catch or TAC) through the EU CFP. At the start of EU CFP in 1983, there were hardly any regulations concerning the fishery at sea. A fisherman was free to fish where he wanted and how much he wanted. This has changed since 1983 with the instalment of restrictions and TAC’s through the EU CFP (Lescrauwaet, 2013). These TAC’s and restrictions were necessary to protect this important food source from the ever- increasing productivity of the fishing industry (Crijns, 2001). A second reason can be found in the fishing restriction in the Iceland Sea, which was enforced by law in 1972 (Lescrauwaet, 2013). As mentioned Ut supra under “3.3.1. History of the Belgian fishing 40 industry”, the Iceland Sea became an important fish area for the Belgian fishing industry. The importance of the landings done in the Iceland Sea can be shown due to the fact that The North Sea central-west waters, The North Sea central-east waters and the western waters could not make up for the losses in landings that occurred by the fishing restriction in the Iceland Sea (Lescrauwaet, 2013). A third reason for the decline of the Belgian fishing industry, is the struggle to find capable manpower (Versluys, 2013). A fourth reason, especially important for coastal fishing, is the fact that towards the end of the 20th century, the activities, performed by other businesses than the fishing industry, in the proximity of the coast increased. By other activities, activities such as nature reserves or sand extraction activities are meant (Versluys, 2013).

3.3.3. The impact of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry on the port of Ostend

As mentioned in the introduction and under “3.3. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry and the disappearance of Ostend as the main fishing port in Belgium”, added value before 1970 was not important. Only from 1970’s onwards, the first calculations concerning the added value in the fishing industry in Ostend started to happen. However, to measure the impact of the fishing industry in the port of Ostend, the value of the landings of Belgian fisheries in the port of Ostend can be taken for the period where figures concerning the added value are missing. (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview ). To get consistent data, the total landing values will be used as an alternative for the added value up and until 1990. For the last decade of the 20th century, the landings value will no longer be taken, but the real added value will, due the availability of the numbers.

As mentioned Ut supra under “3.3.2. The decline of the Belgian fishing industry”, a decrease of 76% of the total fish landed in the Belgian ports from Belgian fisheries for the period from 1947 until 2000 was noticeable. In Table 3.13 Ut infra, the evolution of the landings by Belgian fisheries in the Belgian ports between 1974 and 2000 will be analysed. The year 1974 and not 1970, has been chosen as the first year, this due to the fact that from this year onwards the data is consistent and complete. When looking at this evolution of the landings for the major part of the last three decades of the 20th century, a similar decrease is noticeable as to the evolution of the landings since 1947. Between 1974 and 2000, the total landings in the Belgian fishing ports decreased from 38,961 tonnes in 1974 to 17,581 tonnes in 2000 or in other words a

41 decrease of 55%. This means that the landings of fish decreased at a faster pace in the fifth and sixth decade of the 20th century than in the last three decades. To get a better view on the evolution of the landings in the port of Ostend, a separation for each of the Belgian fishing ports individually has to be done. Table 3.13 “The landings for the port of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Newport for the period between 1974 and 2000” Ut infra, illustrates the decrease of the landings for each port individually over the period from 1974 until 2000. The fact that all the ports are showing a decrease in the amount of fish landed in their port between 1974 and 2000 is not so much of a surprise. However, the amount of decrease for the port of Ostend during this period, is surprising. In a period of only 26 years, the landings in the port of Ostend have decreased by 80% from 23,360 tonnes in 1974 to 4,589 tonnes in 2000. This is eight times more than the decrease in landings during the same period for the port of Zeebrugge. As mentioned Ut supra under “3.3.1 History of the Belgian fishing industry”, the port of Zeebrugge overtook the port of Ostend in 1985 as the biggest fishing port in Belgium in terms of landings (Lescrauwaet, 2013). A reason for this can be that the newly built port of Zeebrugge, finished in 1985, gave a boost to the fishing industry in Zeebrugge and provided better fish handling infrastructure and other facilities. This argumentation can be corroborated by looking at the landings in the port of Ostend in the twelve years before 1985 and the twelve years after the opening of the new port of Zeebrugge. From 1974 until 1985, the total amount of landings (in tonnes) in the port of Ostend decreased from 23,360 tonnes in 1974 to 16,253 tonnes in 1985. This is a decrease of 30%. From 1985 until 1996, the total amount of landings (in tonnes) in the port of Ostend decreased from 16,253 tonnes in 1985 to 6,685 tonnes in 1996. This is a decrease of 58%, or in other words a doubling in the decrease of landings in the port of Ostend in comparison with the period between 1974 and 1985 and also twice as much as the port of Zeebrugge for the period between 1985 and 1996. This only strengthens the argumentation as mentioned Ut supra.

Table 3.13: The landings for the port of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Newport for the period between 1974 and 2000 (in tonnes). YEAR LANDINGS IN THE LANDINGS IN THE LANDINGS IN THE PORT OF PORT OF PORT OF OSTEND ZEEBRUGGE NEWPORT 1974 23,360 13,961 1,634 1975 23,387 13,320 1,579 1976 20,918 13,168 1,549

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1977 19,257 14,164 1,994 1978 20,904 15,682 2,725 1979 16,170 14,705 2,686 1980 16,092 14,300 2,371 1981 21,395 14,970 2,340 1982 21,252 16,173 1,490 1983 19,458 17,024 1,250 1984 18,217 17,353 1,525 1985 16,523 17,758 1,276 1986 14,049 15,919 1,349 1987 13,789 16,263 2,027 1988 12,200 17,888 2,123 1989 11,500 17,074 1,724 1990 11,744 17,464 1,561 1991 10,421 16,553 1,208 1992 8,229 15,269 1,181 1993 7,653 14,233 1,011 1994 7,819 12,461 1,091 1995 7,026 12,684 809 1996 6,685 12,698 817 1997 6,407 12,089 821 1998 5,558 11,796 790 1999 5,277 12,218 709 2000 4,589 12,457 535 TOTAL 369,879 399,644 40,175 % CHANGE - 80.36% - 10.77% - 67.26%

Adapted from “De Belgische zeevisserij: aanvoer en besomming, 1985”, by Welvaert, M., 1986, p. 12, Ministerie van Landbouw. Bestuur der Economische Diensten: Oostende. And from “De Belgische zeevisserij: aanvoer en besomming, 1991”, by Welvaert, M., 1992, p. 13, Dienst voor Zeevisserij: Oostende. And from “De Belgische zeevisserij: aanvoer en besomming, 2014”, by Tessens, E., & Velghe, M., 2015, p. 9, Departement Landbouw en Visserij: Brussel.

When looking at the evolution of the value of the landings in the port of Ostend for the period between 1974 and 1990, illustrated Ut infra in Table 3.14, a positive evolution is noticeable. Where in 1974, the value of the landings in the port of Ostend amounted to 15.48 million euro, the value of the landings increased to 26.41 million euro. This is a percentual increase of 70%, in only a limited amount of time.

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Table 3.14: The value of landings in the port of Ostend for the period between 1974 and 1990 (in million euro). YEAR THE VALUE OF LANDINGS 1974 15.48 1975 14.26 1976 15.56 1977 15.73 1978 16.60 1979 15.26 1980 16.01 1981 18.46 1982 20.53 1983 22.05 1984 22.86 1985 26.94 1986 29.25 1987 31.21 1988 24.98 1989 26.27 1990 26.41 Adapted from “De Belgische zeevisserij: aanvoer en besomming, 1985”, by Welvaert, M., 1986, p. 26, Ministerie van Landbouw. Bestuur der Economische Diensten: Oostende. And from “De Belgische zeevisserij: aanvoer en besomming, 1991”, by Welvaert, M., 1992, p. 30, Dienst voor Zeevisserij: Oostende.

The significant increase of the value of the landings in the port of Ostend, indicates that the price of the sold fish has increased as well. The increase in price of the fish sold throughout the period between 1974 and 1990, has several reasons. Firstly, there is the decrease in the amount of fish landed, which increases the price of the fish. Secondly, there is the increase of the demand for fish. Thirdly, there has been an optimization of the techniques for catching the more expensive fish such as sole, which increases the price (Struyve, 1994). In theory, the positive evolution of the total value of landings is a positive affair for the port of Ostend. However, some caution is needed in reality when analysing these figures. This increased price, which causes an increase in the total value of landings, can partially or completely compensate the decline of landings and can give a distorted view of what the reality is. The positive evolution of the value of landings, give a false sense of economic activity in the port of Ostend. The reality is that there is less activity in the port of Ostend due to a decrease in the total amount of fish landed in the port of Ostend. This decrease in activity will also have an impact on all the sectors relying on the 44 fishery and on the real purchasing power of the fishermen, who are selling less fish every year.

When looking at the evolution of the added value generated by the fishing industry in the port of Ostend for the last decade of the 20th century, illustrated Ut infra in Table 3.15, overall, a stabile added value can be observed for the major part of the 20th century with an exception for the year of the 20th century. From 1991 until 1999, the added value fluctuates between 7.6 million euro and 12.6 million euro, with an average added value of 9.1 million euro. Due to the fluctuating figures, no real positive or negative evolution is noticeable. However, when comparing added value generating by the fishery with the total added value generated by the private sector in the port of Ostend, a positive trend is noticeable, with an exception for the last two years of the 20th century. This positive evolution can be attributed to the stabile fishing industry in the last decade of the 20th century, and a decline of the total added value generated by the private sector in general. The conclusions drawn for the added value in the last decade of the 20th century, can also be drawn for the employment provided by the fishery in the port of Ostend, during the same period. The figures, represented in Table 3.15 Ut infra, represent the amount of jobs provided by the fishery in the port of Ostend and do not include the employment in sectors relying on the fishery in the port of Ostend. During the first eight years of the last decade of the 20th century, the number of employees created by the fisheries in the port of Ostend, fluctuates between 152 and 203 people. Only in the last two years a decrease is noticeable.

Table 3.15: The added value and employment (in amount) generated by the fishery and the total added value and employment generated (in amount) by the private sector in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991 and 2000 (in million euro). YEAR ADDED % SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT % SHARE OF VALUE THE FISHERY OF THE THE FISHERY IN GENERATED IN THE FISHERY THE EMPLOYM- BY THE ADDED ENT OF THE FISHERY VALUE OF PRIVATE THE PRIVATE SECTOR SECTOR 1991 9.9 4.9% 184 3.8% 1992 7.6 4.1% 187 4.0% 1993 8.7 5.4% 197 4.5%

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1994 10.0 7.0% 198 4.6% 1995 9.7 6.6% 203 4.9% 1996 9.7 7.8% 177 4.6% 1997 10.3 9.4% 152 4.6% 1998 12.6 10.1% 167 6.8% 1999 7.8 6.8% 108 4.4% 2000 4.9 5.0% 91 4.4% Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens: Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend”.

3.3.4. Conclusion

The first conclusion that has to be drawn is the fact that during the 20th century, the Belgian fishing industry was really in decline. The decline is proven by looking at the amount of fish landed by the Belgian vessels and the number of fishermen. Between 1947 and 2000, a decrease of 76% is noticeable in the amount of fish landed by Belgian vessels in the Belgian ports. This decrease could not be compensated by the amount of fish caught by Belgian vessels and brought to land in foreign ports. When looking at the number of the fishermen active from 1954 until 2000, a decline from 1,800 fishermen to around 900 fishermen is noticeable. There are several reasons for the decline of the Belgian fishing industry. Firstly, there are the restrictions and quotas implemented by the European Common Fisheries Policy. Secondly, there was the fishing restriction in the Iceland Sea. Thirdly, there was the struggle to find capable manpower. Finally, there was the increase of activities performed by other businesses than the fishing industry. The second, more logical, conclusion that can be drawn is the fact that the decline of fish landed by Belgian vessels in the Belgian ports also meant a decline of the fish landed in the port of Ostend. However, what is worth mentioning is that the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge, which was finished in 1985, was a reason for the increased decline of the fish landed in the port of Ostend during the last 15 years of the 20th century. Where from 1974 until 1985, the total amount of landings (in tonnes) in the port of Ostend decreased with 30% from 23,360 tonnes in 1974 to 16,253 tonnes in 1985. The total amount of landings (in tonnes) in the port of Ostend decreased with 58% from 16,253 tonnes in 1985 to 6,685 tonnes in 1996. In other words, a doubling in the decrease of landings in the port of Ostend is noticeable from the moment the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge was completed in 1985. A final conclusion that can be drawn concerns the evolution of the value of landings, the added value and employment generated by the Belgian fisheries in the port of Ostend. 46

When looking at the evolution of the value of landings in the port of Ostend for the period between 1974 and 1990, a percentual increase of 70% is noticeable between 1974 and 1990. This increase indicates that the price of the sold fish rose as well. This increase can compensate the decline of the landings partially or fully. Although that this seems as a spectacular increase, some caution is needed when analysing these figures. The increase of the fish price, which causes the increase of the value of landings, can give a distorted view of what the reality is. It can give a false sense of economic activity in the port of Ostend. The reality is that there is less activity in the port of Ostend due to a decrease in the total amount of fish landed in the port of Ostend. This decrease in activity will also have an impact on all the sectors relying on the fishery and on the real purchasing power of the fishermen, who are selling less fish every year. This means that despite the positive evolution of the value of landings, the decline of the Belgian fishing industry could still have had a negative impact on the port of Ostend during this period. When looking at the evolution of the added value generated by the fishing industry in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century, a stabile added value can be observed. Over the last ten years of the 20th century, the added value fluctuated between 7.6 million euro and 12.6 million euro, with an average added value of 9.1 million euro. The same conclusion can be drawn regarding to the employment provided by the fisheries in the port of Ostend, where during the first eight years of the 20th century the number of employees created by the fisheries in the port of Ostend fluctuated between 152 and 203 people. Only in the last two years of the 20th century, a decline in the number of employees created by the fisheries in the port of Ostend is noticeable. The fact that the figures concerning the added value and the employment provided by the fishery in the port of Ostend remained stable and even gained importance in the total added value and employment provided by the private sector in the port of Ostend, means that during the last decade of the 20th century, the fishery in the port of Ostend has managed to keep its position as a relevant industry in the port of Ostend. This despite the decrease of landings and the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge as the main fishing port in Belgium.

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3.4. The downfall of the RMT

Under part 3.4. “The downfall of the RMT”, the question will be asked whether the downfall of the port of Ostend during its last years, was one of the factors for the decline of the port of Ostend during the 20th century. Firstly, the history of the Ostend-Dover line will be explained. Secondly, the downfall of the RMT itself will be analysed. Thirdly, the impact of the decline and abolishment of the RMT will be analysed. To give a full overview of the impact that the RMT had on the port of Ostend, two periods will be analysed. The first period is situated between 1991 and 1998 and the second period is situated between 1997 and 2002.

3.4.1. The history of the Ostend-Dover line

In the early years of the 19th century, more precisely in 1815, the first official postal service between The United Kingdom and Flanders came into existence. Only three years later, in 1818, an agreement was made between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and The United Kingdom to invoke a connection by boat which occurred once every two weeks. The connections were made between Harwich and Hellevoetsluis and between Dover and Ostend (Coulier, 2007). In 1834, only four years after the Belgian independency, a new agreement was made but now between The United Kingdom and the newly formed Belgian State. The agreement stated that The United Kingdom became responsible for the transport of the mail across the channel and that Belgium had to pay The United Kingdom an annual fee of 1000 ponds to do so (Humbeeck, 1994). Soon after the agreement in 1834, the Belgian government realised that it was better to have its own service between Ostend and Dover. The reasoning behind this idea was to gain control over the service and to become less dependent from The United Kingdom. Eventually in 1845, a law made this possible and the Belgian government decided to buy three vessels for the transportation of goods and passengers. On the fourth of March 1846, the first trip under Belgian flag had been made (Humbeeck, 1994). This trip meant the real start of the connection between Dover and Ostend from Belgian side. The importance of the Ostend-Dover line would be amplified in the following years by the expanding railway infrastructure in Europe (Coulier, 2007). The expansion of the railway infrastructure meant that travellers could travel further and faster. In their urge to explore Europe, travellers often used the Dover-Ostend line which had as an implication that the city of Ostend became a well-known city in Europe at the time. The outbreak of the First World War meant the first setback in the growth of the Dover- Ostend line. With the prospect of the First World War, the port of Dover became a naval

48 port, which meant that the vessels could no longer moor in the port of Dover and had to moor in the port of Folkstone. This situation lasted until the city of Ostend was conquered by the Germans in October 1914, which meant the end of the connection between Ostend and England until after the First World War (Humbeeck, 1994). Despite the setback occurred by the First World War, the years between the First and Second World War were considered as “the golden times” for the Dover-Ostend line. Where the First World War is observed as the first setback for the Dover-Ostend line, The Second World War was the second setback due to the war. Dover became once again a naval port and the vessels normally used to transport goods, cars and passengers were now used to transport money and gold from the National Bank (Coulier, 2007). This situation lasted until the end of the Second World War. After the Second World War, the Dover-Ostend line needed some time to recover but would eventually go back to its situation before the Second World War.

The start of the 7th decade of the 20th century meant a major change for the Dover-Ostend line. Where previously the line was under control of “The Zeewezen”, this was not the case anymore from 1971 onwards. In 1971, the control of the Dover-Ostend line was given to the state-owned company named “Regie voor Maritiem Transport”, also known as the RMT. The daily management was given to a Director-General, but the end responsibility was with the (federal) minister of transport (De Swaef, 1985). The reason for the change in control from the Zeewezen to the RMT can be found in the fact that by giving the control to the RMT, a more flexible commercial exploitation became possible (Humbeeck, 1994). At the end of the same year, the RMT joined Sealink which was a collaboration between British Rail, the French railway and the steamship company Zeeland. Due to this collaboration, the RMT was still able to moor at the port of Dover (Coulier, 2007). However, the end of the Dover-Ostend line was near. In 1985, fourteen years after the collaboration between the RMT and Sealink, the agreement expired and the RMT decided not to prolong the agreement. The reason why the RMT did not wanted to prolong the agreement, was due to the fact that the RMT thought that the terms demanded by Sealink were not acceptable (Coulier, 2007). The terms demanded by Sealink would have been disastrous for the exploitation and employment of the RMT (Vanassche, 1989). From 1985 until 1993, the RMT had found an agreement with Townsend Thoresen, which would later be bought by P&O European Ferries. As mentioned Ut supra, this agreement ended in 1993 and after long negotiations, the RMT found an agreement with Sally Line for a period of five years, which started on January the first 1994. The agreement with Sally Line had as a consequence that the vessels of the RMT could no longer moor at the port of Dover, thus another port of destination had to be found (Coulier, 2007). The change in the port of

49 destination meant the end of the Dover-Ostend line which had lasted 147 years.

3.4.2. The downfall of the RMT

Where the Dover-Ostend line existed for almost 150 years, the history of the RMT is much shorter. In 1997, only 26 years after its emergence, the RMT was abolished by the Belgian government and the line was taken over by Holyman-Sally. For the abolishment of the RMT, three main reasons can be identified.

The first reason for the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 was the change in the connection between The United Kingdom and Ostend as a result of the agreement between the RMT and Sally Line. As mentioned Ut supra, because of this agreement, the vessels of the RMT could no longer moor at the port of Dover from 1 January 1994 onwards. As the new port of destination in the United Kingdom, the port of was chosen. This was the home port of Sally Line. However, already after some time it became clear that the new line was no financial success (Coulier, 2007). The main reason why this new destination did not turn out well, was because the connection between Ramsgate and London was not as good as the connection between Dover and London (Coulier, 2007). This inferior connection led to the fact that passengers still preferred to travel to London via Dover and thus to a lower number of passengers using the RMT service.

The second reason for the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 was due to one of the most famous projects in Europe during the 20th century, namely the digging of a tunnel from Dover (The United Kingdom) to (France). This tunnel was dug under the channel which separates mainland Europe from The United Kingdom. The tunnel would eventually be named “The Chunnel” which is an agglomeration of the words “channel” and “tunnel”. After a period of over 200 years in which several companies and individuals wanted to create a tunnel under the channel, the project as we know it today finally saw its daylight in 1985. In this year, the government Thatcher in The United Kingdom and the French president Mitterrand found an agreement for the building of the so called Chunnel which had to be completed by the year 1993 (De Swaef, 1995). Eventually, the construction of the Chunnel took one year extra, which meant that the Chunnel only opened in 1994 (Verheye, 1989). When finalizing the plans for the construction of the Chunnel in 1985, it became clear that once the Chunnel would be finished, the monopoly situation of the ferry companies and airline companies concerning the transportation of passengers and goods across the channel would end (De Swaef, 1995). This new situation led to a situation in which the

50 ferry companies would transport fewer passengers and goods across the channel. This decline and the fight for their market share increased the competition amongst the ferry companies and led lower prices and thus lower profit.

A third reason for the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 by the Belgian government can be found in the mismanagement of the RMT. When the control of the Dover-Ostend line was given to the RMT in 1971, the RMT directly found itself in financial difficulties. The RMT received an outdated fleet which meant that all the expenses to renew this fleet had to be paid with operating revenues and loans. This led to a severe imbalance between the equity capital and the liabilities (Vanassche, 1989). This imbalance and the shortage of equity capital remained the weak point of the RMT throughout the years and led to bad operating results. In 1984, the minister of transport decided to reorganize the RMT. The purpose of this reorganization was to improve the operating results (Vanassche, 1989), stay competitive against the competitors and foremost to prepare itself for the Chunnel (De Swaef, 1995). The reorganization of the RMT was based on three pillars namely the reduction of the operational costs, the comfort of the passengers and an adjustment of the labour methodology and a reduction of the number of employees (De Swaef, 1995).

As mentioned Ut supra, one of the pillars to improve the operational results and to make the RMT competitive again was to reduce the operational costs. The strategy to reduce the operational costs was to operate bigger vessels and reduce the amount of departures. Only three years after the plan to reorganize the RMT, the first and last new big vessel was ordered in 1987. Delivered in May 1992, eleven months past the original delivery date, the vessel named the “Prins Filip” was with a length of 163.4 metres and a breadth of 27.7 metres twice as big as the previous car ferry vessels of the RMT. The Prins Filip was capable of transporting 1,350 passengers and was next to being a very large carferry vessel also a very luxurious vessel. The Prins Filip was equipped with around 300 cabins, special seats, a bar and a discotheque. The gigantic vessel and the luxury did not come without any cost. The total cost price of the Prins Filip came to around 4.5 billion BEF, which is around 111.5 million euro. Knowing that in 1985, only two years before the ordering of the Prins Filip, the debt ratio of the RMT was 97,1%1 (De Swaef, 1995). These kinds of investments are only appropriate when a certain return can be expected. However, by the time the vessel got ordered in 1987, the number of passengers transported by the RMT across the channel was already seriously in decline. During the period from 1982 until 1987, the RMT saw a decline of 22% (Verheye, 1989) in the number

1 The debt ratio is the liabilities of a company divided by its total assets. It thus shows how much of the total assets are financed by debts. 51 of passengers transported across the channel. This could have been not an issue if the amount of cars and trucks transported across the channel had increased for the same period, but we can see that the number of cars transported during the same period decreased with 14.63% and that the number of trucks transported during the same period decreased with 7.01% (Verheye, 1989).

Another big component in the reorganization plan of the minister of transport, was to adjust the labour methodology and to reduce the amount of employees working for the RMT (De Swaef, 1995). When looking at the first of the two components, namely the attempt to adjust the labour methodology, the plan of the RMT was to follow the method used by their competitor’s. Where all of their competitors labour methodology was based on a contract in which the employees stayed on board of a vessel for several days in a row, this was not the case for the employees of the RMT. The employees of the RMT worked under a contract which allowed them to leave the vessel after each trip (De Swaef, 1995). This evidentially led to a higher labour cost for the RMT and a lower profit. However, when trying to adjust their labour methodology by copying the labour methodology of their competitors, the RMT conflicted with the Union who stated that this new and more competitive labour methodology was not family-friendly and that it could endanger the safety of the vessel (De Swaef, 1995). The second component was to reduce the number of employees working at the RMT to reduce the labour cost. This was a necessity since most of the employees working at the RMT were classified as statutory personnel, making them 20% more expensive as their English colleagues. This plan also received a lot of negative feedback throughout the years and eventually none of the two components were executed (De Swaef, 1995). This meant that the RMT was stuck with a labour methodology which was not competitive and high labour cost.

Next to the use of larger and more luxurious vessels, the adjustment of the labour methodology and the reduction of employees working at the RMT, the reduction of the amount of departures introduced in 1987 was another method to reduce the operational costs. The plan was to cancel the departures with the lowest number of passengers, cars and trucks. The reason behind this plan was to get a higher occupancy rate which would eventually lead to a higher return due to the fact that less departures would lead to lower costs such as fuel and crew costs. The RMT decided to reduce the amount of departures with 260 in 1987 compared to 1986 (De Swaef, 1995). Where the method of operating bigger vessels is questionable and the method to adjust the labour methodology and reduce the number of employees had failed, the method to reduce the operational costs by reducing the amount of departures, seemed to work at first. This assumption can be

52 made by making a comparison between the evolution of the profits or losses and several important components which determined the profits or losses of the RMT during the same period. When looking at the evolution of the profit and loss of the RMT during the period between 1985 and 1994, three different periods can be distinguished. The first period is the period between 1985 and 1986, during which the RMT incurred losses between 7.5 million euro and 10 million euro. The second period is between 1987 and 1991, during which the RMT only incurred small losses and in some years even generated small profits. The third period is between 1992 and 1994. During this period, the results became worse every year. In 1994, the incurred loss was almost 50 million euro (De Swaef, 1995). When looking at the other components, illustrated in Table 3.16 Ut infra, together with the profit or losses during the period of 1985 until 1994, we can state that during the years 1987 and 1988, the two major costs of the RMT, namely labour cost and diverse costs, declined. This together with an increase of the turnover in 1989 declares the better results for the RMT during the period between 1987 and 1991. Despite the initial positive results, the labour cost and diverse costs started to rise against from 1989 onwards, as can be seen in Table 3.16 Ut infra. This increase was the result of the rejection of the new labour methodology by the Union and the failed reduction of the labour cost (De swaef, 1995). The failure to implement the new labour methodology and to reduce the labour costs, together with a decline of the turnover, led to a serious increase in the losses of the RMT, which would eventually lead to the abolishment of the RMT on 28 February 1997 and its official liquidation in 2000 (Lagneaux, 2004).

Table 3.16: The most important results of the RMT during the period 1985-1993 (in million euro). YEAR TURNOVER LABOUR COST DIVERSE COSTS 1985 89.89 39.60 26.42 1986 120.82 40.04 58.68 1987 116.09 39.02 53.48 1988 110.64 38.83 49.87 1989 129.10 40.86 57.93 1990 128.54 44.13 57.41 1991 128.43 47.75 59.19 1992 124.56 48.22 65.25 1993 109.85 48.31 63.45 Reprinted from “De weerslag van de kanaaltunnel op het kanaalferryverkeer”, by De Swaef, P., 1995, p. 73, University of Ghent.

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3.4.3. The impact of the downfall of the RMT on the port of Ostend

Looking at the impact of the abolishment of the RMT on the port of Ostend, two different analyses will be made. The first analysis will look at the impact that the RMT had on the port of Ostend during the period from 1991 until 1998. The second analysis will look at the impact that the abolishment of the RMT in 1997, had on the port of Ostend during the first five years after the abolishment.

3.4.3.1. The impact of the RMT on the port of Ostend during the period from 1991 until 1998

The last decade of the 20th century was not the easiest decade in the history of the port of Ostend. This statement is shown Ut infra in Table 3.17 “The added value, employment and investments in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991-1998”, which shows the total added value, employment and investments for the period between 1991 and 1998.

Table 3.17: The added value (in million euro) and employment (in amount) in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991-1998). YEAR ADDED VALUE EMPLOYMENT 1991 233.3 5,998 1992 218.5 5,880 1993 189.6 5,452 1994 168.3 5,200 1995 174.5 5,098 1996 150.4 4,663 1997 143.9 4,220 1998 148.7 3,261 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens, Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend.

As mentioned Ut supra, the last decade of the 20th century was not the easiest one for the port of Ostend. As can be seen Ut supra in Table 3.17, the added value and the employment in the port of Ostend declined steadily between 1991 and 1998. Between 1991 and 1998, the added value in the port of Ostend declined from 233.3 million euro to 148.7 million euro. This is a decrease of 84.6 million euro or 36%. Where the added value decreased with 36% between 1991 and 1998, the number of people working in the port of 54

Ostend declined even more during the same period. Where in 1991, 5,998 people were working in the port of Ostend, this declined to 3,261 people in 1998. This is a decrease of 2,737 employees in the port of Ostend or 45.6%.

Now that the decrease of the added value and employment for the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century has been analysed, the share of the RMT in this decrease can be investigated. This will be done by comparing Table 3.17 with the same three elements over the same period, but now only for the RMT, which will be represented Ut infra in Table 3.18.

Table 3.18: The added value (in million euro) and employment (in amount) of the RMT in the port of Ostend for the period between 1991-19982. YEAR ADDED VALUE EMPLOYMENT 1991 78.8 2,094 1992 70.4 2.028 1993 58.1 1.956 1994 35.0 1.851 1995 32.7 1.796 1996 21.4 1.641 1997 1.7 1.117 1998 10.8 320 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens, Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend.

When analysing Table 3.18, a decrease in the added value and employment can be found for the period between 1991 and 1998. The added value decreased with 68 million euro during this period and the employment decreased with 1,774 employees. To emphasize the importance of the RMT for the port of Ostend, the figures of the added value and employment mentioned in Table 3.18 will be compared with the figures of the added value and employment in Table 3.17.

Looking at the decrease of the added value in the port of Ostend, a decrease of 84.6 million euro is noticeable in the period between 1991 and 1998. When deducting the amount of the decrease of the RMT during the same period, which was 68 million euro, it

2 The added value and employment is the sum of the added value and employment of the RMT and Wagon-Lits, which was their catering company on boards of the vessels. 55 becomes clear that only 16.6 million euro of the total decrease of the added value in the port of Ostend during the period between 1991 and 1998 was not caused by the RMT but by all the other sectors combined. This means that 80% of the decrease of the added value in the port of Ostend between 1991 and 1998 was caused by the decline of the RMT.

Looking at the decrease of the employment in the port of Ostend, a decrease of 2,737 employees is noticeable in the port of Ostend between 1991 and 1998. When deducting the decrease of employees working for the RMT during the same period, which was 1,774 employees, it can be stated that the RMT was responsible for 65% of the decrease in the number of people working in the port of Ostend between 1991 and 1998.

3.4.3.2. The impact of the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 on the port of Ostend during the period from 1997 until 2002

Under “3.4.3.1. The impact of the RMT on the port of Ostend during the period from 1991 until 1998”, it became clear that the decline of the RMT in the last decade of the 20th century had a significant negative impact on the port of Ostend. However, the disappearance of a big actor in an environment is not always a bad case. This will be shown Ut infra by analyzing the period between 1997 and 2002.

When the biggest company in a port ceases to exist, it often has a negative impact on the traffic volumes of a port. However, in some cases the presence of a big company which dominates a certain part of a port or the entire port, can also be oppressive towards the well-functioning of a port. When analysing the figures concerning the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend during the years before and after the abolishment of the RMT, such an oppressive behaviour was noticeable in the port of Ostend. This can be derived from the evolution of the total goods handled by the port of Ostend during the period between 1990 and 2002, as represented Ut infra in Table 3.19.

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Table 3.19: The total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend between 1990 and 2002 (in thousand tonnes). YEAR TOTAL OF PASSENGERS RORO GOODS (amount) HANDLED 1990 4,552 1,904,375 3,315 1991 4,506 1,869,204 3,220 1992 4,923 2,181,874 3,581 1993 5,090 1,880,296 3,692 1994 4,900 1,844,494 3,480 1995 4,593 1,762,952 3,315 1996 4,466 1,622,766 3,170 1997 4,278 1,374,389 2,847 1998 3,938 1,149,539 2,573 1999 3,108 983,201 1,640 2000 4,307 905,235 2,644 2001 4,828 710,671 3,223 2002 6,239 394,107 4,579

Reprinted from “Ladingen en lossingen Oostende: overzicht naar verschijningsvorm sinds 1980”, by Vlaamse Havencommissie, n.d. Consulted from https://www.vlaamsehavencommissie.be/vhc/pagina/ladingen-en-lossingen- oostende-overzicht-verschijningsvorm-1980

The positive evolution of the goods handled in the port of Ostend from the year of the abolishment of the RMT onwards until 2002, is clearly noticeable when looking at the figures represented in Table 3.19. Before the abolishment, the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend were stable and a small decrease in the number of passengers is noticeable. However, the decrease in the number of passengers is not a new phenomenon, but one which started in the mid 1980’s. When focussing on the years from the abolishment until 2002, the real effect of the abolishment of the RMT becomes noticeable. Where the goods handled in the port of Ostend declined in 1998 and 1999 as a result of the abolishment of the RMT, they started to rise again from 2000 onwards. This increase is the effect that the abolishment of the RMT had on the port of Ostend. After the abolishment of the RMT in 1997, private operators such as Holyman Sally and Hoverspeed took over the connection that was previously in the hands of the RMT. These private operators were not as big as the RMT and thereby they required less space. Where the RMT dominated the whole front port of Ostend, the smaller private players only occupied a smaller portion of the front port of Ostend. The free space, created by the 57 disappearance of the RMT in the port of Ostend, led to a revival of the port activity and a diversification in the RORO-traffic (Lagneaux, 2004). As a consequence, an increase of 45.84% in the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend during the period between 1997 and 2002, was identified. Together with the increase of the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend, an increase in the RORO-traffic is noticeable. From 1997 until 2002, an increase of 60.84% is observed. This increase is due to a rise in the departures on Ramsgate by Transeuropa Ferries and the opening of new connections on Ipswich in 2000 (National Bank of Belgium, 2002) and Killingholme in 2002 by Ferryways (Lagneaux, 2004). Despite the increase in the total number of goods handled in the port of Ostend and the increase in RORO-traffic, a decrease of 71.32% in the number of passengers transported during the same period is noticeable. This decrease however, is not caused by the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 or because private operators took over the business. The decrease, which already started in 1985, can mainly be linked to the heavy competition, the opening of the Chunnel in 1994, the disappearance of the duty-free shopping in 1999 and the heavy competition of low-cost airline companies (Lagneaux, 2004).

Where the abolishment of the RMT was clearly a factor for the economical revival of the port of Ostend between the year 1997 and 2002, it surely was not the only factor. Another contributor to this revival were the investments done by the government in the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century. As shown Ut supra in Table 3.7 “Investments done in the port of Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge between 1990 and 2000”, the government invested up to 182 million euro in the port of Ostend. Mainly to improve the existing facilities and in a later stage to enlarge the port to generate more business.

Where the impact of the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 on the total goods handled in the port of Ostend between 1997-2002 was positive, this was not the case for the impact of the abolishment of the RMT on the employment in the port of Ostend as shown Ut supra under “3.4.3.1. The impact of the RMT on the port of Ostend during the period between 1991 until 1998”. With the abolishment of the RMT in 1997, the port area of Ostend saw the disappearance of the biggest employer and the most iconic company in the port area of Ostend. The importance of the RMT for the employment in the port of Ostend is represented Ut infra in Table 3.20. This Table tells us something more about the number of employees working for the RMT3 during the period from 1991 until its abolishment in

3 The number of employees are the sum of the employees working for the RMT and the employees working for Wagon-Lits, which was their catering company on boards of the vessels. 58

1997. The Table also shows something more about the companies “Holyman Sally” and “Hoverspeed”, who were the successors of the RMT, and about the total employment in the port area of Ostend.

Table 3:20: Number of employees at the RMT, Hoverspeed and in total in the port of Ostend between 1991- 2000 (in amount). YEAR EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT TOTAL RMT HOLYMAN SALLY EMPLOYMENT HOVERSPEED 1991 2,094 - 5,998 1992 2,028 - 5,880 1993 1,956 - 5,452 1994 1,851 - 5,200 1995 1,796 - 5,098 1996 1,641 - 4,663 1997 797 320 4,220 1998 - 320 3,261 1999 - 330 3,273 2000 - 242 3,106 Adapted from “Het economisch belang van de havenzone van Oostende – Boekjaar 1997”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 1999, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend. And from “Economisch belang van de zeehavens, Haven van Oostende – Boekjaar 2000”, by the National Bank of Belgium., 2002, National Bank of Belgium, Ostend.

When analysing the total employment in the port area of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century, a steady decline is noticeable. From 1991 until the abolishment of the RMT in 1997, the total employment in the port area of Ostend declined with 29.64%. This decline can be explained by the decrease in the number of employees working at the RMT during the same period (National Bank of Belgium, 2000). Where in 1991 the RMT employed a total of 2,094 employees (35% of the total employment in the port of Ostend), this declined in only seven years to a total of 797 employees in 1997. In other words, a decline of 61.94% was noticeable in only seven years time. To better understand the importance of the RMT in the port area of Ostend and the impact of the abolishment of the RMT on the employment in the port area of Ostend, a comparison has to be made between the number of employees working for the RMT during the period between 1991 and 1997 and the total employment in the port area of Ostend during the same period. When comparing these figures, it can be seen that between 1991 and 1997, the RMT was responsible for around 34% to 35% of all the jobs in the port area of Ostend. 59

As mentioned Ut supra, more than a third of all the employees working at the port of Ostend were working for the RMT in 1996, which was the RMT’s last entire year. The real challenge was not so much to help the port of Ostend to recover economically from the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 as already show Ut supra, but to create a social plan to help the employees find another job or to find a solution for the employees who did not qualify anymore for a job. This social plan was captured under the Royal Decree of 18 February 1997 (Lannoo, n.d.). Eventually, 300 employees could start at the successor of the RMT. A new job was found for the statutory employees in a public institution and for the personnel older than fifty years an early retirement arrangement was made (Vandeputte, 2017).

3.4.4. Conclusion

Despite some good initiatives taken, such as the reduction in the amount of departures and the plan to reduce the number of employees, to safe the RMT from further declining, the abolishment of the RMT in 1997 was a fact. With the abolishment of the RMT, the port of Ostend saw the disappearance of its most iconic company. When analysing the effect of the decline and the abolishment of the RMT on the port of Ostend, two main conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion concerns the decline of the RMT during its final years from 1991 until 1998. Looking at the impact of the decline of the RMT on the port of Ostend during this period, it becomes clear that the decline of the port of Ostend during the last decade of the 20th century can be linked to the decline of the RMT in its final years. This is proven by analysing the evolution of the added value and employment of the port of Ostend with the evolution of the added value and employment of the RMT during the same period. By doing so, it becomes clear that 80% of the decrease of the added value in the port of Ostend between 1991 and 1998, is caused by the decline of the RMT during the same period. When looking at the employment, it becomes clear that 65% of the decrease in the number of employees working in the port of Ostend between 1991 and 1998, is caused by the decline of the RMT during the same period. The second conclusion concerns the impact that the abolishment of the RMT had in 1997 on the port of Ostend between 1997 and 2002. It can be stated that where the decline of the RMT was a disaster for the port of Ostend during the largest part of the 1990’s, this was not the case for the years after its abolishment. Since the abolishment of the RMT, the port of Ostend saw a positive evolution of the total goods handled by the port. This positive evolution can be linked in two ways to the abolishment of the RMT. Firstly, the abolishment of the RMT meant an increase of the space available in the port of Ostend,

60 which led to a revival of the port activity. Secondly, due to the abolishment of the RMT, a diversification of the RORO-activity took place in the port of Ostend. To conclude this part of the master dissertation, it has to be said that the downfall of the RMT was a factor for the downfall of the port of Ostend during the 20th century, but it was also an opportunity for the port of Ostend at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. However, in general, the real victims in this story are the employees working for the RMT which lost their jobs.

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4. A glance at the future

Now that the different causes for the downfall of the port of Ostend in the 20th century and its consequences for the port of Ostend have been illustrated, a short and final chapter will explain the current vision of the port of Ostend.

4.1. The evolution of the port of Ostend since the end of the 20th century

Since the end of a very turbulent 20th century in which the port of Ostend started as the biggest port in Belgium, but slowly drifted towards a port with less influence, the port of Ostend has changed its vision for the 21st century. Where in the past, the main focus was put on the more traditional port activities such as the handling of dry bulk, liquid bulk, RORO and general cargo, this is not the case anymore in today’s vision. This change in vision can be linked to two main reasons. Firstly, the port of Ostend had to change its vision since the traditional idea says that ports grow and prosper by bringing in more and more transshipment with always bigger vessels. This idea caused serious doubts concerning the viability of the port of Ostend (Port of Oostende, 2018). Secondly, due to the disappearance of the RORO in the port of Ostend in 2013, with the bankruptcy of Transeuropa Ferries. Without neglecting the traditional port activities, the port of Ostend changed its course since C-Power installed the first six wind turbines in the North Sea in 2008. The building of six wind turbines in 2008, by C-Power, turned out to be a trigger moment for the port of Ostend. The port authority of Ostend, named “Het Autonoom Gemeentebedrijf Haven Oostende (AGHO), decided that the core business of the port of Ostend had to be concentrated around the service provided to the offshore wind farms (Haven van Oostende, 2018). The ambition of the port of Ostend was to become “The Flemish service port for the Blue Growth economy” (Stubbe, 2016). This all led to the set- up of a Public-Private partnership between the port of Ostend and four different companies namely, ARTES constructions, Deme Blue Energy, Offshore & Wind assistance and Participatiemaatschappij Vlaanderen. The partnership received the name NV REBO, which stands for Renewable Energy Base Oostende, and has as a goal to become an efficient and cost-effective offshore terminal for handling, lifting, storing, assembling and transporting all kinds of offshore components (Stubbe, 2016). To do so, the port of Ostend had to invest in the modification of existing infrastructure or the building of new infrastructure. This happened in 2011, when the port of Ostend and NV REBO decided to invest 5,000,000 million euro in the construction of a heavy load quay, storage space (Stubbe, 2016) and in the first building of what needed to become a cluster for blue energy

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(Haven van Oostende, 2018). Several service companies, mainly for the operations and maintenance of the windmills, have established themselves in this newly created area in the port of Ostend. Next to these companies, more companies have asked to open a representation in the Ostend offshore village. The presence of these companies attracted a number of smaller subcontractor services (Stubbe, 2016), ranging from training, technical and technological companies, metal construction companies to IT (Port of Oostende, 2018).

All of these companies are generating employment in the port of Ostend and the companies focused on the building and maintenance of the windmills are also generating a lot of ship movements (Port of Oostende, 2018). Two different types of ship movements have emerged due to the blue energy industry in the port of Ostend. Firstly, there are the Crew Transfer Vessels (CTVs). These are vessels operated by shipping companies who organize the transport of technicians to wind farms. These companies depend on contracts with offshore operators and thus change constantly (Port of Oostende, 2018). Secondly, Service Operation Vessels (SOV’s) are being used when windfarms are being build further at sea. Around 25 technicians stay on these vessels for a period of around two weeks and are transferred to the windmills with smaller vessels (Port of Oostende, 2018). When looking at the evolution of the ship movements4 generated by these shipping companies, it can be stated that in 2012, the first year with data concerning this type of transport, 5,564 movements were conducted. In 2018, the last year with data concerning this type of transport, 10,200 (Haven van Oostende, 2019)5 movements were conducted. This is 29% of all the movements done by commercial vessels in the port of Ostend in 2018. According to the port of Ostend, a total of 12,000 movements per year will be reached once all active wind farms have become operational (Port of Oostende, 2018). As mentioned Ut supra, a lot of different types of companies are active in the blue energy. This implies that the employment in the blue energy industry is very diverse. However, most of the time, the jobs created in this industry are high-quality jobs that require continuous training (Port of Oostende, 2018). In only 11 years time, the blue energy industry in the port of Ostend has become a significant employer. Where in 2008, the blue energy industry, only employed 12 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) employees in the port of Ostend (Haven van Oostende, 2016), this increased to 466 FTE employees in 2017 (Haven van Oostende, 2018). In 2017, a total of 1350 employees worked in the outer port of Ostend (Port of Oostende, 2018). This means that in 2017, 34.52% of all the employees in the outer port were working in the blue energy sector. Eventually, the number of

4 One ship movement equals one ship entering or leaving the port. 5 Powerpoint source derived from a visit to the port of Ostend (not publicly available). 63 employees working in the blue energy sector rose to 510 in 2018 (Haven van Oostende, 2019). This number will increase to more than 1000 employees once all wind parks are operational (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, presentation). Next to the production of energy at sea, the blue growth strategy, followed by the port of Ostend since 2008, also offers other opportunities within the blue growth strategy. Examples of these opportunities can be found in the offshore aquaculture. More precisely in the management of the seabed, cultivation of algae or the promotion of marine biotechnology (Stubbe, 2016).

Where the switch towards blue energy and the blue growth economy in general seems to be positive with an increase in employment and ship movements, some critical remarks have to be made. The first remark concerns the competition with which the port of Ostend is dealing with regarding to blue energy. In Belgium, the port of Ostend has real no competition concerning blue energy (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, presentation). The port of Zeebrugge still focusses on their traditional activities, but what if they decide to invest in blue energy? The port of Ostend has one major disadvantage in comparison with the port of Zeebrugge, which is the lack of space available in the port of Ostend. The port of Ostend cannot expand further inland, which means that the only way to expand is by expanding in sea. However, this is very expensive and the question is whether this is worthwhile when knowing that the port of Zeebrugge is only located 30 kilometres away (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, presentation). In the case the port of Ostend eventually decides to expand in sea, this will never be allowed by the city of Ostend due to the fact that this will have a negative impact on the city of Ostend as a seaside resort (Koninckx, 2018 – personal communication, interview). This lack of space is not an issue for the port of Zeebrugge. Together with having a lot of space available, the port of Zeebrugge also has a modern infrastructure, which can be adapted to the blue energy industry if needed. A possibility for the port of Ostend, in case the port of Zeebrugge also decides to invest in blue energy, is to work together with the port of Zeebrugge (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview). The second remark concerns the vision of the port of Ostend. At this moment, their vision is too much focused on blue energy. This can lead to the missing of opportunities in other industries such as tourism or aquaculture (Allaert, 2019 – personal communication, interview). However, during the last years, the port of Ostend started some initiatives concerning the aquaculture. The remarks mentioned Ut supra, are only a critical reflection on the change of vision by the port of Ostend and could be subject to future research. Up until this day, the switch towards the blue energy industry seems to be a positive case for the port of Ostend.

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5. Final conclusion

When writing a final conclusion about the downfall of the port of Ostend in the 20th century, two main causes of the downfall are noticeable. The most important cause for the downfall of the port of Ostend during the 20th century, is the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge. When analysing all the possible causes, except for one which is mentioned Ut supra during this master dissertation, the port of Zeebrugge always played its role in all of these causes. When looking at the impact of the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge on the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend, a stabilization in the total amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend is noticeable after 1985. Without the port of Zeebrugge, or without the investments done by the government in the port of Zeebrugge, the amount of goods handled by the port of Ostend could potentially have kept growing. Looking at the shift of the naval base from the port of Ostend towards the port of Zeebrugge, the same reasoning can be made. Where the port of Ostend was considered as the main naval base of the Belgian Marine, this was not the case anymore from 1976 onwards. The reason for this can once again be found in the port of Zeebrugge, which had more space available and a better infrastructure due to investments done by the government previously. Looking at the impact of the decline of the Belgian fishing industry in the port of Ostend, it can be stated that even here the impact of the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge is noticeable. From 1985 onwards, the port of Ostend saw a decline of fish landed in its port by Belgian vessels much higher than before 1985. The impact of the port of Zeebrugge is clear one knowing that in the year 1985, the constructions concerning the expansion of the port of Zeebrugge were finished. Next to the emergence of the port of Zeebrugge, a second main cause which caused the downfall of the port of Ostend in the 20th century, is noticeable. This second cause was the downfall of the RMT during the last decade of the 20th century. The downfall of the RMT was both an economical and social disaster for the port of Ostend in the 1990’s. Both the added value generated by the port of Ostend and the employment created by the port of Ostend plummeted during the last years of the RMT. However, it has to be said that despite this disaster, the abolishment of the RMT also meant an economical revival for the port of Ostend in the years after the abolishment. Thus it can be said that the downfall of the RMT was a factor for the downfall of the port of Ostend in the 20th century, but that the aftermath of the abolishment of the RMT was a positive event for the port of Ostend.

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6. Reference list

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Lescrauwaet, A.K. (2013). Belgian Fisheries : Ten Decades, Seven Seas, Forty Species. Historical time-series to reconstruct landings, catches, fleet and fishing areas from 1900. Universiteit Gent (UGent), (PhD thesis). Retrieved from https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/4143013

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Figures

Lescrauwaet, A.K. (2013). Belgian Fisheries : Ten Decades, Seven Seas, Forty Species. Historical time-series to reconstruct landings, catches, fleet and fishing areas from 1900. Consulted from http://www.vliz.be/en/imis?module=ref&refid=228661

Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee. (2014). Fishing past and present: Belgium. Consulted from http://www.vliz.be/wiki/Fishing_past_and_present:_Belgium

Personal communication

Interview, Christian Koninckx, Prof. dr. emeritus, 10 December 2019.

Interview, Georges Allaert, Prof. dr. emeritus, 14 May 2019.

Presentation, Jan Allaert, Commercial Director of the port of Ostend, 22 March 2019.

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