Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism

Edited by

Anne Peters Evelyne Lagrange Stefan Oeter Christian Tomuschat

LEIDEN | BOSTON Cover illustration: Gustav Klimt, Der Baum des Lebens / The Tree of Life (1909). Reproduced with kind permission of the MAK—Austrian Museum of Applied Arts / Contemporary Art, Vienna. Photo: © MAK/Georg Mayer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Immunities in the age of global constitutionalism / Edited by Anne Peters, Evelyne Lagrange, Stefan Oeter and Christian Tomuschat. pages cm ISBN 978-90-04-25162-5 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-25163-2 (e-book) 1. Immunities of foreign states. 2. Constitutional law. 3. Government liability (International law) I. Peters, Anne, 1964– editor. II. Lagrange, Evelyne, editor. III. Oeter, Stefan, editor. IV. Tomuschat, Christian, editor.

KZ4012.I46 2014 341.3’3—dc23 2014037416

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

Foreword ix Alain Pellet and Daniel Thürer List of Contributors x

1 Immune against Constitutionalisation? 1 Anne Peters

PART 1 State Immunity—National Practice

2 L’immunité souveraine de l’État : la pratique française 23 Pierre Boussaroque et David Lemétayer

3 Sovereign Immunities of States: A German Perspective 32 Martin Ney

4 Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity 40 Władysław Czapliński

5 The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated Pissarro Painting: Recent US Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 51 Thomas Giegerich

6 La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 70 Mathias Audit

PART 2 State Immunity before the ICJ—The Case Germany v. Italy

7 The Case of Germany v. Italy before the ICJ 87 Christian Tomuschat vi Contents

8 Remedies of Victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanities: Some Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States 99 Michael Bothe

9 L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes du droit et de la justice 116 Jerzy Kranz

PART 3 Commercial Activities and State Immunity

10 Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution 131 Anne van Aaken

11 State Immunity and Sovereign Bonds 182 Jürgen Bröhmer

12 Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 209 Jean-Marc Thouvenin

PART 4 Immunity and Impunity

13 Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État 223 Andrea Gattini

14 Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions to Immunity: Conceptual Challenges 236 Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack

15 Immunity of State Officials and the Obligation to Prosecute 244 Pierre d’Argent Contents vii

16 The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Immunity of States 267 Theodor Schilling

PART 5 Immunities of International Organisations

17 Immunités, responsabilisation des organisations internationales et protection des droits individuels 285 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes

18 Les immunités de l’Union européenne 301 Isabelle Pingel

19 Immunités des organisations internationales : développements récents à la Banque des Règlements Internationaux 316 Pierre Panchaud et Jean Abboud

20 Quelques réflexions sur les immunités des organisations internationales 333 Rémi Cèbe

PART 6 Conclusions

21 The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution of International Law 355 Stefan Oeter

Foreword

This volume collects the contributions to a colloquium which is the eighth edition of a biennial event of which Professor Christian Tomuschat had taken the initiative several years ago. Moreover, it is the first time that a Swiss- German-French conference of this type took place. The colloquium was orga- nized by Professor Anne Peters from the University of Basel, seconded by Professors Evelyne Lagrange (Paris I) and Stefan Oeter (Hamburg). Bearing upon “Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism” it offered an excellent occasion for outstanding scholars and practitioners coming from the three countries (and from elsewhere: two eminent participants were from Poland) to exchange views, to deepen reflections and to explore new tracks of this multi- faceted and virtually endless topic. It is not the purpose of this preface to reveal the rich content of this volume—and one page could not possibly give account of it, even partially. All the least so that both the regime and the very notion of immunities still spark passionate debates, and the Basel colloquium did not fail to respect the tradition. Ardours from the protagonists had even been revived by the recently given ICJ Judgment in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State between Germany and Italy, of which some participants took vigorously the defence, while others fiercely attacked it. We have no intention to take side in these skirmishes. Suffice it to remark that, like the Aesopian tongue, state immunities can be seen as the best or the worst thing. It preserves the capacity of the state to effectively fulfil its functions as the trustee of the public interest; it also permits it to escape its responsibility, even, maybe, in cases of averred abomination. This is probably the crucial question; but indeed not the only one and the readers will find in the proceedings of this most stimulating colloquium a lot of food for thought on the most “existential” questions to the most technical ones, on the most theoretical points of view as well as on the most practical considerations. These regards croisés contribute to the richness of this volume. We have full confidence that our timely debates will inspire interesting further discussions on this very challenging subject. And we, in advance wish “bonne chance!” to the next Colloque franco-allemand which, following the remarkable “decentralized precedent” of the Basel meeting will take place in Louvain (Belgium) in 2014.

Alain Pellet and Daniel Thürer List of Contributors

Anne van Aaken is Professor of law and economics at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.

Jean Abboud is a jurist at the Bank for International Settlements.

Mathias Audit is Professor of law at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre La Défense and Associate Professor at Sciences Po, France.

Laurence Boisson de Chazournes is Professor of international law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland.

Michael Bothe is Professor emeritus of public law at the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Pierre Boussaroque is the Deputy Director of the Legal Department at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Jürgen Bröhmer is Dean and Professor of law at the Murdoch University in Perth, Australia.

Rémi Cèbe is senior legal adviser at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and formerly a lawyer of the Paris Bar.

Władysław Czapliński is Professor of international and European law at the University of Warsaw and Director of the Institute of Legal Studies (Polish Academy of Sciences) in Warsaw, Poland.

Pierre d’Argent is Professor of public international law at the University of Louvain, Belgium. List Of Contributors xi

Andrea Gattini is Professor of international law at the University of Padua, Italy.

Thomas Giegerich is Professor of European law, international law and public law at Saarland University, Germany.

Jerzy Kranz was Ambassador of Poland and is Associate Professor at the Kozminski University, Poland.

Evelyne Lagrange is Professor of public international law at the University Paris 1 Panthéon- Sorbonne, France.

David Lemétayer is a legal consultant at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Martin Ney is German Ambassador and General Director of the Legal Department of the German Federal Foreign Office.

Stefan Oeter is Professor of public law, European Union law and public international law at the University of Hamburg, Germany.

Pierre Panchaud is the principal counsel of the legal department at the Bank for International Settlements and lecturer at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Alain Pellet is Professor of law at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre La Défense, France, Council, Associé de l’Institut de Droit International and is a former member and the former chairperson of the UN International Law Commission.

Anne Peters is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, and adjunct professor at the Universities of Basel, Switzerland, and Heidelberg, Germany. xii List Of Contributors

Isabelle Pingel is Professor of law at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France.

Theodor Schilling is Professor of law at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany.

Jean-Marc Thouvenin is Professor of law at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre La Défense, France.

Daniel Thürer is Professor emeritus of public international, European, Swiss and comparative constitutional law at the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

Christian Tomuschat is Professor emeritus of public international law and European law at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany and a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN International Law Commission.

Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack is Professor of public and international law at the University of Regensburg, Germany. CHAPTER 1 Immune against Constitutionalisation?

Anne Peters

1 Immunities and Global Constitutionalism

Immunities are a messy affair. They oscillate between law, politics, and comity. Throughout history, immunities have often been treated as a matter of “mere grace, comity, or usage”.1 The view that conferring immunity is an act of international “comity” (courtoisie) is still popular in common law countries (uk and usa), countries which have (ironically) codified immunities in domestic statutes which often form the primary or even exclusive legal basis of those countries’ court decisions.2 In its 2012 judgment, the icj confirmed that respect for immunity is required by international law, by stressing “that, whether in claiming immunity for themselves or according it to others, States generally proceed on the basis that there is a right to immunity under international law, together with a corresponding obligation on the part of other States to respect and give effect to that immunity.”3 Immunity basically means to be exempt from the jurisdiction of a national court, and from measures of enforcement and execution by the organs of states. Immunity is granted to states, state officials including diplomats, and international organisations. With regard to these different actors, the rationales of immunity differ, and concomitantly, the scope and the possible exceptions to immunity vary.

1 Lori Damrosch, “Changing International Law of Sovereign Immunity Through National Decisions,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2001): 1185–1200, 1186. 2 The us American judgment us S Ct, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, judgment of 24 February 1812, 11 us (7 Cranch) 116–147 is normally considered to be the first judicial decision on immunities worldwide. It granted immunity to a French public/national military vessel as “a matter of grace and comity” (us S Ct., Verlinden bv v. Central Bank of Nigeria, judgment of 23 May 1983, 461 us 480, 486). The judgment Samantar v. Yousuf did not even mention international law, but only the us American Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the “policy” of the State Department (us S Ct., Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yousuf et al., 1 June 2010, 560 us 305; 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2284). 3 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, para. 56.

Although these immunities are in principle anchored in international law,4 their precise legal implications are often unclear. The reason is the diversity of domestic case-law as just mentioned, the diversity of the practice of other national branches of government, the constant interaction between international and domestic law which is needed to apply the law of immunity, and the lack of a comprehensive international codification. Overall, the case law of national and international courts and the work of the International Law Commission continuously interact, and make this field of international law dynamic, complex, and partly inconsistent. The existence and extent of immunities, notably state immunity, are a reflec- tion of the structure of the international legal order as a whole. Therefore, any “study of State immunity directs attention to the central issues of the international legal system”, as the eminent authority on state immunity, Lady Hazel Fox, put it.5 This book takes up a number of new trends and challenges in this highly intriguing legal field and notably seeks to assess those within the framework of global constitutionalism and multilevel governance. Our book title, “Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism” seeks to place the study in the middle of the tension that is created by the persistence of immunities (which are, after all, an outgrowth of the Westphalian inter- state system based on coordination and cooperation among equal sovereigns) confronted with a trend of (or a least quest for) a constitutionalisation6 of the international legal system—a process which notably implies that human rights protection (not state sovereignty) should function as the Letztbegründung of the international order.7 By “global constitutionalism”, we understand an intellectual movement which claims that constitutionalist principles, together with

4 More than 25 years ago, a study found that relative state immunity was a rule of international customary law arising from converging state practice and opinio iuris since the end of the 1970s. In contrast, the practice of absolute immunity did not amount to a customary rule. Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, Les immunités des Etats en droit international (Bruxelles: Bruylant 1997), 4, 11 and 377. 5 “Ultimately the extent to which international law requires, and municipal legislations and courts afford, immunity to a foreign State depends on the underlying structure of the international community”. (Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup 3d ed 2013), 7, emphasis added). 6 “Constitutionalisation” is a process, a potential evolution from an international order based notably on that very organising principle of state sovereignty to an international legal order which acknowledges and has creatively appropriated and modified constitutionalist elements. 7 Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty,” European Journal of International Law 20 (2009): 513–544. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 3 institutions and mechanisms securing and implementing those principles, do play a role and should play a role also in the international legal order. The welcome constitutionalist elements are notably the commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.8 The duality of the (partly competing) rights holders—states and humans— has in the context of immunities been most relentlessly highlighted by icj judge Cançado Trindade in his individual opinions in the Jurisdictional Immunities affair, writing about “Jus gentium in the twenty-first century: Rights of States and rights of individuals”.9 Cançado Trindade called that case “a case which has a direct bearing on the evolution of international law in our times. There is no reason for keeping on overworking the rights of States while at the same time overlooking the rights of individuals. One and the other are meant to develop pari passu in our days, attentive to superior common values.”10 Suggestions to restrict the different types of immunity correspond to the “constitutionalist” agenda of international law of strengthening the international rule of law and protecting the most fundamental rights of individuals more effectively. However, the “conservative” tendencies regarding the immunities of states and of international organisations also seek to safeguard fundamental, even constitutional principles of the international legal order. Bearing this in mind, global constitutionalism does not only and not in an unreflected way propagate a human rights exception to immunities. A constitutionalist outlook is also wary of the constitutional principle of equality of states, and considers it a problem when (former) state officials of weak states are selec- tively prosecuted, while officials of allies or powerful states are left unpros- ecuted for reasons of foreign policy.11 Global constitutionalism places high value on the rule of law and equal protection of humans. From that perspective, it must be asked whether the closure of courts to plaintiffs solely because the respondent is a state infringes those plaintiffs’ right to equal protection of citizens in the forum state.12

8 Mattias Kumm and others have called this “the trinatarian mantra of the constitutionalist faith” (Mattias Kumm, Anthony Lang, James Tully, and Antje Wiener, “How large is the world of global constitutionalism?” Global Constitutionalism 3 (2014): 1–8, 3). 9 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), order of 4 July 2011, separate opinion of judge Cançado Trindade, heading before para. 9. 10 Ibid., para. 54. 11 Cf. Stefan Talmon, “Immunität von Staatsbediensteten,” in Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 46 (2014), 313–376, 372. 12 Sally El Sawah, Les immunités de l’Etat et des organisations internationales: immunités et procès équitable (Bruxelles: Larcier 2012), para. 1738. 4 Peters

The incoherencies in the immunity regime not only threaten to violate the right to access to a court, but more generally place the rule of law at risk. On the other hand, a constitutionalist perspective, especially taking into account the multi-level character of global constitutionalism, facilitates the insight that any further curtailment of immunities (in order to secure victims’ rights to remedy and reparation) is pre-conditioned on an effective guarantee of due process and fair trial (for impugned office-holders) before the courts of the world. Both (constitutional) elements are inevitably linked: You cannot have one without the other. A constitutionalist outlook also pays attention to the political undercur- rents of the law of immunities, because after all, constitutional law is the law facilitating and organising political processes. The granting of immunity by one state to another state or its organs is replete with considerations of opportuneness and foreign politics. But the sensitivity of the issue, especially when bringing a sovereign state before a national court, is being concealed by “ a— partially false—appearance of technicality”.13 It is often “behind the screen of [procedural] law”, that a politisation of the law suit takes place, and that judicial proceedings will be subject to pressure by the government.14 The “increasingly legalistic discourse” on the concrete details of granting or withholding immunity in a particular case, stands in contrast to its overall context of high politics.15 Finally, the constitutionalist perspective should not overlook that immunities are not only a hybrid between law and politics, and between international and domestic law, but also between public and private law. They display features of private international law or of a choice-of-law regime,16 because they result from the multiple domestic courts’ application of their proper (national) rules and principles on the scope of their jurisdiction and on the admissibility of complaints, resembling in their outcome the application of familiar private law principles such as forum non conveniens or ordre public.

13 Xiadong Yang, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: cup 2012), 461. 14 Horatia Muir Watt, “Une perspective ‘internationaliste-privatiste’ ”, in Joe Verhoeven, ed., Le droit international des immunités: consolidation ou contestation? (Paris: lgdj 2004), 267. 15 Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 461. 16 Jean-Flavien Lalive, “L’ immunité des Etats et des organisations internationales,” Recueil des Cours 1953-iii (84): 210: The matter “est à la limite du droit international privé.” See also Sadie Blanchard, case note on a Ghanaian court decision, American Journal of International Law 108 (2014): 73–79, 79. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 5

Against this foil, the underlying basic question of this book is whether the international or rather trans-national law of immunities has undergone modi- fications which might be interpreted as a manifestation of global constitutionalism. In the concluding Chapter 21 Stefan Oeter will return to that question.17

2 National Practice, the Comparative Approach, and the Role of Courts

To the extent that immunities do pertain to the legal realm, they are co-constituted by national law in its interplay with international law, or as an “application and interpretation of national law in the name of international law.”18 “[T]he law of state immunity is a mix of international and municipal law. This interaction complicates the law relating to State immunity and creates considerable tensions.”19 On account of this mix, the identification of a truly international legal corpus of rules on immunities requires a comparative approach,20 analysing national practice (Part One of the book). Importantly, we need not only compare the various domestic solutions in a “horizontal” manner, but also look “vertically” at domestic law and international law.21 For scholarly observers, it is an open question whether such comparison should be best conducted in an “inductive” fashion, starting from the inchoate court practice and seeking to isolate the lowest common denominator,22 or whether it should—inversely—“deduce” rules from more abstract principles (such as the primacy of human rights protection acknowledged in the international legal system). Probably a combined approach, both bottom up and top down, i.e. an examination of state (court) practice guided by principles in the style of a “better law” approach is warranted in order to identify and

17 Stefan Oeter, “The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution of International Law,” Chapter 21 in this volume. 18 Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 464. 19 Fox and Webb, State Immunity (n. 5), 1. 20 Lalive, “L’ immunité” (n. 16), 210: “Autrement dit, la technique du droit comparé se révèle ici indispensable.” 21 Cf. Aleksandar Momirov and Andria Naudé Fourié, “Vertical Comparative Law Methods: Tools for Conceptualising the International Rule of Law,” Erasmus Law Review 2 (2009): 291–309. 22 See in that sense Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 4. “[T]he received wisdom appears largely a result of repetition only, rather than of any mysterious principles.” (ibid., 5). 6 Peters develop the law of immunities.23 This approach is particularly incumbent on legal scholars who are in any case not law-makers but at best act as midwifes for the development of new and potentially better rules. A striking feature of the law of immunities is that it is driven by courts, not by the governments (the executive branch) of states. ngos are often crucial actors in motivating victims to sue, and supporting them as counsels, but these complaints still address courts. In the end, any legal evolution will therefore still be determined by state institutions, not by the non-state actors themselves.24 The relevant decisions have traditionally been rendered by national courts, not by international ones.25 Only in the recent years, a case-law of the ecthr developed, and the 2012 icj judgment on state immunity has effectively stunned the prior attempts to limit state immunity in proceedings concerning international crimes. The dialogue among those various international and domestic courts manifests the both “horizontal” and “vertical” interaction in this field of the law. For example, the icj in the mentioned judgment heavily relied on numerous states’ judicial pronouncements,26 and also on two judgments of the ecthr.27 The ecthr in turn recently cited “as authoritative” the icj.28 Inversely, the case law of the ecth, especially on the immunity of international organisations in employment disputes,29 has been overwhelmingly received by national courts all over Europe, even beyond the member states of

23 Cf. Lalive, “L’ immunité” (n. 16), 387, asking for “une synthèse des solutions jurisprudenti- elles les plus progressistes en la matière”. 24 Heike Krieger, “Immunität: Entwicklung und Aktualität als Rechtsinstitut,” in Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 46 (2014), 233–259, 233. 25 60 years ago, an eminent scholar noted that there existed no pronouncement of an international court or tribunal on the matter of immunities. Lalive, “L’ immunité” (n. 16), 205–389 (209). (Lalive mentioned as the sole exception the sentence of a tribunal mixte gréco-allemand, Greek Government v. Vulkan Werke, interlocutory decision of 12 Aug 1925, in League of Nations Official Journal Oct. 1927, 1342–1347, but this tribunal did not directly rely on immunity to declare itself incompetent). 26 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 3), para. 85. 27 ecthr, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), application No. 35763/97, judgment of 21 November 2001, echr Reports 2001-xi, p. 101, and Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, Application No. 59021/00, decision of 12 December 2002, echr Reports 2002-x, p. 417 (quoted in icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n.3), para. 90). 28 ecthr, Case of Jones and others v. uk, appl. nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06, judgment of 14 Jan. 2014, para. 197: The judgment of the icj in Germany v. Italy “must be considered by this Court as authoritative as regards the content of customary international law”. 29 ecthr, Waite and Kennedy, Appl. No. 26083/94, judgment of 18 February 1999. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 7 the echr.30 In the field of state immunity, national courts constantly refer to foreign cases; indeed “such references constitute a persistent feature in cases of State immunity”.31 In contrast, the conversation entertained among national courts on questions of the immunity of international organisations is more laconic: A recent serious comparative study of that domestic case-law found that the expected judicial dialogue among domestic courts on this question “hardly takes place”.32 The peculiar role and function of national courts in identifying or possibly developing international law seems unique in the field of immunities. The reason is of course that immunities by definition come into play when an issue is brought before a domestic court. From the perspective of the meta-law on international legal sources, national court decisions may be relevant for the formation of international law in three different ways.33 First, such court decisions might be constitutive of international customary law, as instances of state practice and/or as pronouncements of an opinio iuris. Second, national court decisions might constitute “subsequent practice” for the interpretation of treaty law (in the sense of Art. 31(3)(b) vclt), and arguably concomitantly for the “interpretation” of international customary rules. Third, “judicial decisions” by national courts are a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” in the sense of Art. 38(1)(d) icj-Statute. In reality, national court decisions play not only a supplementary, but even a primordial role in the area of immunities,34 as all contributions to this volume show. The unusual and to some extent controversial role that domestic judicial pronouncements play in international law thrusts into the limelight the shortcomings of international law’s fixation on “the state” as a black box. In reality, the attribution of one uniform legal “opinion” to the state is a legal fiction. And this fiction is becoming increasingly problematic in a global order that promotes the rule of law at

30 August Reinisch and Ralph ra Janik, “The Personality, Privileges, and Immunities of International Organizations before National Courts,” in August Reinisch (ed), The Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations in Domestic Courts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 329–337 (332–335 with further references). 31 Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 4. 32 Reinisch and Janik, “International Organizations” (n. 30), 329–337, 330. 33 See also Anthea Roberts, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60 (2011): 57–92, 62–63. 34 Scholarly treatment of the law of immunities has been dubbed as amounting to not much more than commentaries on the case-law (Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 6). 8 Peters the national and international levels,35 because the rule of law requires that states should be internally organised according to the principle of a separation of powers, and should be staffed with courts that are independent from the executive branch. From a constitutionalist perspective, the tendency of some courts to defer to the assessment of the executive branch when deciding whether to grant immunity or not is troublesome. The problem is that the executive’s assessment will be mostly influenced by concerns of foreign policy opportuneness and less guided by principled rule-of-law considerations. In this context, judicial self-restraint risks to end up in an abdication of the judiciary. The dispersed mode of formation has contributed to the complexity, inco- herence and legal uncertainty of the issue. One reason is that the different national courts are subject to diverging national procedural laws which influence their approach to immunities. Moreover, the courts of different states are not bound by the decisions of another state. Although courts, as just pointed out, do refer to other regime’s or legal orders’ affairs, the creation of a coherent corpus of international law has been hampered by the national idiosyncra- sies of each case. In result, the law of immunity can only be fully understood through the analysis of state practice. It is particularly this need for a comparative approach which warrants the examination of the topic under the auspices of two national learned societies of international law. In that sense, we have engaged in “comparative international law”, to use the felicitous phrase coined by Anthea Roberts.36 Last but not least, an examination of immunities is particularly appropriate for a colloquium held in Switzerland, a traditional host country of international organisations whose privileges and immunities are of eminent practical value for this country.37

3 State Immunity before the icj

The 2012 judgment of the International Court of Justice has made an important contribution to the law of state immunity, but has been received with regret by

35 un ga, The rule of law at the national and international levels, a/res/66/102, 13 January 2012. 36 Roberts, “Comparative International Law?” (n. 33), 57–92. 37 It may be added that Switzerland played an active role in the elaboration of the uncsi and belongs to the first states with a longstanding rule-of-law tradition which ratified the Convention (16 April 2010). Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 9 scholars.38 A number of commentators deplores the “stato-centrisme” of the Court.39 The icj was a “rear runner”; it “closed a door that stood open for a few years.”40 “[T]he highly politicized framework in which the icj has to operate and its relatively slow and low output of judgment compared with that of the icty or domestic courts has left the icj lagging behind in these fast developments [on a human rights exception to immunity]. Consequently this has put the icj in the position of slowing down rather than shaping as a front runner the developments in international law.”41 Virtually all commentators observe that the icj could have legitimately and lege artis presented a different, more prospective, more open reading of the law as it stands, or could have at least employed language indicating that the law is uncertain or in flux,42 and thereby leave more room for a possible future evolution of the law of immunities. In this book, analyses of specific aspects of that judgment reveal a wide gamut of viewpoints on the merits and flaws of the judgment (Part Two). It has been rightly pointed out that “the interests of the real victims were not present during the icj proceedings”.43 The Italian government was not keen on defending the decisions of its own courts against Germany, because it might have feared similar proceedings against Italy for crimes committed by its own military forces abroad. More generally speaking, it may be doubted

38 See only Rosanne van Alebeek, “Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy): On Right Outcomes and Wrong Terms,” German Yearbook of International Law 55 (2012): 281–317; Carlos Esposito Massimo, “Of Plumbers and Social Architects: Elements and Problems of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,” Journal of International Dispute Settlement 4 (2013): 439–456; Hermann- Josef Blanke and Lara Falkenberg, “Besteht Staatenimmunität bei Kriegsverbrechen im Lande des Forumstaates?” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 69 (2014): 5–38. On the rhetorical persuasiveness of the court Andrea Bianchi, “Gazing at the Crystall Ball (again): State Imunity and Jus Cogens Beyond Germany v. Italy,” Journal of International Dispute Settlement 4 (2013): 457–475. 39 Pierre-François Laval, “L’arrête de la Cour internationale de justice sur les immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat,” Annuaire français de Droit International (2012): 147–180, 178. 40 Markus Krajewski and Christopher Singer, “Should Judges be Front-Runners? The icj, State Immunity and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 16 (2012): 1–34, 30. 41 Nikos Lavranos, “National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law,” European Journal of International Law 20 (2009): 1005–1011, 1011 (referring to the law of immunities in tension with the desire to prosecute serious human rights violations). 42 Krajewski and Singer, “Should Judges be Front-Runners?” (n. 40), 31. 43 Ibid., 32. 10 Peters that a true legal evolution on questions of immunity can be expected as long as the law-making process rests firmly in the hands of the states that are guided by considerations of reciprocity. Krajewski and Singer suggest to admit amicus curiae briefs by victims before the icj in such a constellation.44 Such a mod- est procedural innovation which fits into the existing rules of the icj would alleviate the “stato-centrist” approach to questions of immunity while respecting the basic inter-state structure of the system. This proposal thus appears adequate for a (slowly) constitutionalising international system.

4 Commercial Activities and State Immunity

The entire field of immunity is in a flux, last but not least due to economic and technical developments and due to changing value judgments. The adoption of the un Convention on State Immunity in 2004 (unsci)45 is a milestone. But this convention does not simply codify pre-existing customary law. Quite to the contrary, it contains many negotiated compromises that have resulted in controversial provisions which raise difficult questions of interpretation. A remaining core problem is notably the criterion for distinguishing between immune and non-immune acts which is not satisfactorily solved in the definition of “commercial transaction” set out in Art. 2(2) unsci.46 The much increasing transnational economic activity of states, waves of privatisation, and hybrid public-private undertakings have made the line to draw between acta iure gestionis and acta iure imperii even more uncertain. Nevertheless, courts (including the ecthr47) have begun with the “provisional application” of unsci which might generate legitimate expectations.48 These issues are tackled in Part Three of the book.

44 Ibid. 45 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (unsci), 2 December 2004 un-Doc. A/59/508. The unsci is not yet in force; it has 16 ratifications as of July 2014 while 30 are needed for its entry into force. 46 Fox and Webb, State Immunity (n. 5), 4. 47 ecthr, Oleykinov v. Russia, app. no. 36703/04, 14 March 2013, esp. paras 66–72. The Court held unsci “as customary law” against Russia which signed but has so far not ratified unsci. 48 Fox and Webb, State Immunity (n. 5), 613. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 11

5 Immunity and Impunity

Immunities seem to stand in tension to another, newer, constitutional value of international law: the effective protection of human rights and the prosecution of international crimes. The potential human rights exception to (some types of) immunity is most discussed with regard to the core area of international crimes, but possibly also concerns other massive human rights violations such as torture, arbitrary detention, forced labour, extraordinary renditions, and extrajudicial executions.49 At stake are rights to physical integrity and dignity, and also the right to access to an independent tribunal in the sense of Art. 6 echr. Part Four of the book deals with this theme. For example, in a criminal proceeding in Switzerland against a former Algerian minister of defence, instituted for torture, the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal granted no immunity ratione personae for acts which the minister had allegedly committed when still in office. The court’s argument was that otherwise Switzerland, which committed itself to punish the gravest crimes by ratifying the Rome Statute, would behave in a self-contradictory way.50 Importantly, the issue of human rights violations is not limited to proceedings against states or state officials, but also concern diplomats and international organisations. Diplomats frequently employ migrant domestic workers; and there are instances of abuse bordering on inhumane treatment and forced labour (Art. 3 and 4 echr).51 International organisations and their bodies have the potential to violate human rights, too. Cases concern on the one hand the procedural right of access to an impartial tribunal in employment disputes, and on the other hand substantive rights to life, health, and bodily integrity

49 See in scholarship in favour of a human rights exception to immunity (in various varia- tions, concerning states, state officials, in civil or criminal proceedings, and relating to different types of crimes in quality and quantity) Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nihoff 1997), esp. 197–211; Annyssa Bellal, Immunités et violations graves des droits humains (Bruxelles: Bruylant 2011), 135–40 and 225–227 with question marks. Sceptically Maria Gavouneli, State Immunity and the Rule of Law (Athen: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers 2001), 118. Denial of a human rights exception by Christian Appelbaum, Einschränkungen der Staatenimmunität in Fällen schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2007). 50 Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal, decision of 25 July 2012, BBl. 2011, 140. 51 Cf. un Committee on Migrant Workers, General Comment No. 1 on migrant domestic workers, cmw/c/gc/1, 23 February 2011, para. 49: “(. . .) States parties should also ensure that migrant domestic workers can obtain legal redress and remedies for violations of their rights by employers who enjoy diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” 12 Peters which are threatened by the complicity of an organisation to crimes (e.g. the un peacekeeping force in Srebrenica), or by the organisation’s own negligence (as in the case of the outbreak of the Cholera in Haiti, possibly imported to the island by un peace keeping troops from Nepal employed in the un Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, minustah).52 The 1999 English House of Lords judgments in the Pinochet case,53 denying immunity to a former head of state has been a “watershed moment” in the struggle for accountability for human rights violations, but it has not, as recently demonstrated by Ingrid Wuerth, fundamentally changed the trajec- tory of immunity law.54 There still is no customary human rights exception in the law of immunities which would allow or even mandate domestic courts to entertain criminal proceedings against state officials, former state officials, or civil proceedings for damages against states, on account of serious international crimes which constitute massive violations of human rights.55 The much strengthened international legal status of the individual presses, as Hazel Fox had put it in 2008, “for the lifting of immunity for all claims arising from the conduct of the State’.56 But this sentence is no longer found in the 2013 edition of the book—it has been deleted presumably to accommodate the icj judgment of 2012 which had found that “under customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict.”57 The icj in this judgment put forward a procedural notion of state immunity, conceptualising it as a purely procedural plea58 and thus detaching immunity from any substantive

52 See three proceedings brought before New York Tribunals, among them the United States District Court Southern District of New York, Georges et al v. United Nations et al, civil action (class action complaint), filed 9 oct 2013; United States District Court Eastern District of New York, Laventure et al v. United Nations et al, Class action complaint, files 11 March 2014. See Rosa Freedman, “un Immunity or Immunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge,” European Journal of International Law 25 (2014): 239–254. 53 uk, House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others—Ex Parte Pinochet, judgments of 25 November 1998 and of 24 March 1999. 54 Ingrid Wuerth, “Pinochet’s legacy reassessed,” American Journal of International Law 106 (2012): 731–768, especially 765. 55 See the sceptical state pronouncements in the un ga 6th committee meeting of 2011 (referenced in Krieger, “Immunität” (n. 24), 241 note 51). 56 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 2nd ed. 2008), 5. 57 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 3), para. 91. 58 Ibid., para. 93: regarding “jus cogens, there is no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The two sets of rules address different matters. The rules of State Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 13 unlawfulness of state action which might form the material basis of the judicial proceedings against the state. This judgment had a “chilling effect”59 on the future evolution of international law on state immunity and perhaps other immunities as well. However, the tension between the legitimate demand to hold states accountable and to punish their officials for crimes committed against individuals on the one hand, and the importance of safeguarding peaceful intercourse and cooperation among sovereign states could not simply be defined away through judicial technique (or rather: judicial politics). The persistence of this tension is manifest in the discrepancy between the rising tide of law suits challenging immunities before domestic courts, and the small number of successful ones.60 The increase of such proceedings is in part due to the extension of the extrater- ritorial jurisdiction of domestic courts. However, most courts have so far not yielded to the claim that immunity must be lifted, but have confirmed immunity and thus denied the admissibility of the complaints. Ingrid Wuerth has pointed out that in many if not all instances where immunity was denied, the relevant state had not invoked it. And if immunity is not invoked, then court decisions do not count towards state practice. The failure to confer immunity when it is not pleaded means that there is no breach of the persisting customary law obligation to grant immunity.61 The conflict between granting immunity (to a state, its officials, or to an international organisation) and safeguarding human rights can be conceptual- ised in different ways, and these options again manifest the hybridity between the public law and private law-like features of the law on immunities. This conflict can notably be tackled with the private-law technique of subsumption, or with the public-law technique of balancing competing principles. The subsumption technique is to deliminate and narrow the scope of immunity and to carve out constellations in which it simply does not apply. In contrast, the balancing technique starts from the idea that the antagonist legal institutions represent legal goods which should be reconciled to the

immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. (. . .)”. 59 Esposito, “Of Plumbers and Social Architects” (n. 38), 455. 60 According to Heike Krieger, between 2012 and 2013, more than 20 proceedings relating to immunity have been instituted before national and international courts. Krieger, “Immunität” (n. 24), 233. 61 Wuerth, “Pinochet’s legacy” (n. 54), 733. 14 Peters largest extent possible in a concrete case. That approach is thus more case- sensitive and flexible than the subsumption approach. The resulting trade-off depends on the relative value ascribed to the antagonist legal goods. It seems fair to say that—as a general matter—participants and observers of the international legal process have placed a higher value on accountability which would make the balance tilt more to that side. I have the impression that the balancing-approach is gaining ground in the international and domestic case-law on the matter, and in scholarship.62 It could be said that this makes the issue of immunities a paradigmatic constitutional issue, because accomodating public interest or state powers with private interests is the very substance of constitutional law.63 Importantly, the ecthr in its seminal and widely received 1999 decision on the immunity of an international organisation in an employment dispute (Waite and Kennedy) balanced the granting of jurisdictional immunity against the availability of reasonable alternative dispute settlement mechanisms.64 Along a similar vein, the ecthr, in a case regarding state immunity, favoured a “harmonising” approach in which it insisted that both different issue areas of international law, the law of immunities, and human rights law, must be reconciled, acknowledging “the need to interpret the Convention so far as possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity”.65 This led the Court “to conclude that measures taken by a State which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court”.66

62 See only Raffaela Nigro, “Immunità degli stati esteri e diritto di accesso al giudice: un nuovo approccio nel diritto internazionale?” Rivista di diritto internazionale 96 (2013): 812–846 who favours a proportionality analysis in the concrete case. According to Horatia Muir Watt, we must “faire surgir de cette tension un nouvel équilibre.” We need to “concilier le besoin de protection de l’ Etat et les nouvelles exigences de transparence et de réparation auxquelles adhère la communauté internationale” (Muir Watt, “Une perspective ‘internationaliste-privatiste’ ” (n. 14), 265–274, 267 and 274). 63 I thank Evelyne Langrage for reminding me of this. 64 ecthr, Waite and Kennedy (n. 29), para. 68: “For the Court, a material factor in determining whether granting esa immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention is whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention.” 65 ecthr, Jones (n. 28), para. 189. 66 Ibid. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 15

It must not be forgotten that the driver of legal evolution in the area of immunities has so far been the economic rationale. For example, the restriction of state immunity (the elimination of immunity for commercial activity) was motivated by economic considerations. States, in their commercial relationships (with private actors of other states), were pushed to renounce on immunity in order to offer solid and fair commercial conditions67 to their trading partners.68 The same is true for international organisations acting in the commercial sphere, e.g. the World Bank.69 In order to be creditworthy, the organisations must ensure that financial claims against it are potentially judicially enforceable. Only through submission to national judiciaries these actors will be able to satisfy the societal expectations resting on them.70 There is no comparable incentive for a forum state to limit another state’s or state official’s immunity with regard to human rights violations allegedly committed by the latter. Quite to the contrary, forum states fear reciprocal law suits exposing their own officials to judicial proceedings abroad on the basis of claims of human rights violations. Importantly, such looming proceedings might be instigated in an abusive fashion, and/or in procedures which do not satisfy international standards of due process. Therefore, the negative reciprocity mechanism which incites forum states to continue to generously

67 In Swiss German, this consideration of equal terms (or level playing field) is called “gleich lange Spiesse”. 68 uk Supreme Court, nml Capital Limited (Appellant) v Republic of Argentina (Respondent), [2011] uksc 31, para. 11: “The absolute doctrine of state immunity could pose a disincen- tive to contracting with a state and some states attempted to avoid this disadvantage by including in contracts an agreement not to assert state immunity.” See in scholarship Krieger, “Immunität” (n. 24), 244. 69 See Art. vii (3) World Bank Statutes: “Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims from members. The property and assets of the Bank shall, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final judgment against the Bank.” (Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 27 Dec. 1945, unts vol. 2 (1947) pp. 134–199). See similarly, Art. 27 of the Protocol to the Statutes of European Investment Bank, 30 March 2010, eu oj 2010 C 83/251. 70 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern and Gerhard Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisa tionen einschliesslich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 7th ed. 2000), para. 1909. 16 Peters award immunity to other states and their officials is not inevitably “tainted” by parochial self-interest or sheer opportunism, but may be motivated by legitimate concerns for due process—a constitutionalist value. The recent icj’s deliberate choice to desist from taking up a discernible (but not uniform or linear) trend of not invoking state immunity in criminal proceedings concerning massive human rights violations has passed the bucket to other, potentially more legitimate actors in charge of developing international law. A main forum is the International Law Commission71 whose ongoing work on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is discussed and potentially endorsed by the state representatives in the General Assembly and its legal committee, and which might end up, like the unsci, in a new international convention.

6 Immunities of International Organisations

International organisations which enjoy immunity from domestic jurisdiction have expanded and intensified their activities and relative powers. This relative gain in importance and powers on the one hand calls for an effective protection of the organisations’ activities and of their independence notably from the host states, a protection which can be realised through the conferral of immunities. On the other hand, the intensified activity increases the dangers of an abuse of powers which in turn calls for better accountability mechanisms. Immunities stand in the way of holding organisations accountable. It is therefore no wonder that the so-called “absolute” immunity of international organisations is being challenged. This topic is dealt with in Part Five of the book. Heike Krieger has here identified a “catch 22” for the organisations’ member states: If the host state denies access to courts (by granting immunity to the organisation), the host state violates Art. 6 echr. If it does grant access to

71 See, inter alia, the work of two special rapporteurs on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur: Preliminary Report 29 May 2008 a/cn.4/601; Second Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin a/cn/4/631, revised 22 February 2010; Third Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin a/cn/4./646, 63rd Session of the ilc (2011); Preliminary Report prepared by special rapporteur Ms Concepción Escobar Hernandez of 31 May 2012, a/cn.4/654. A very useful overview over the existing law and case law is provided by the Memorandum by the ilc Secretary, 31 March 2008, a/ cn.4/596. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 17 court, it potentially violates the host agreement. For this constellation, Krieger suggests to construe Art 6 echr as an obligatio de negotiando, as a duty to re- negotiate the host agreement.72 Beyond international organisations, further actors might merit immunities. The Swiss Host State Act,73 in force since 1st January 2008, allows for the conferral of immunity to “quasi-governmental international organisations” (Art. 8);74 and “international non-governmental organisations (ingos)” may be privileged, e.g. through tax exemptions (Art. 24 and 25). It might be asked whether private military contractors that take over functions of armed forces should under some circumstances also be granted immunities.75 Another phenomenon in state practice are the extensions of immunity regarding special missions which is sometimes bordering on abuse of the legal institution.76

7 Conclusions

Are immunities, as “bastards” emerging out of an engagement of law with politics, of international law with domestic law, of public law with private law, illegitimate per se? We do not think so, because they protect legitimate values of both domestic and international societies. From the perspective of international law, it matters that the immunities of states, state officials, and of international organisation protect law and order (“Rechtsfrieden”), the stability of international relations, inter-state cooperation, and that they secure the discharge of public functions of the relevant actors. However, the immunities granted need not and should not extend beyond the true rationale of the

72 Krieger, “Immunität” (n. 24), 252–253. 73 Loi fédérale du 22 juin 2007 sur les privilèges, les immunités et les facilités, ainsi que sur les aides financières accordés par la Suisse en tant qu’Etat hôte (Loi sur l’Etat hôte, leh). Recueil Systematique (rs) 192.12 (an unofficial English translation is available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/192.12.en.pdf). 74 For example the Global Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria; see, e.g., the Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and that public-private partnership in view of determining the legal status of the Global Fund in Switzerland, of 13 Decembre 2004 which, inter alia, grant privileges and immunities to the Global Fund http://www .theglobalfund.org/documents/board/08/BM08_07Annex4AAgreement_Annex_en.pdf (I thank Heike Krieger for this example). 75 Talmon, “Immunität” (n. 11), 321. 76 Ibid., 344–347. 18 Peters regime, “au-delà de sa véritable justification”,77 so as not to degenerate into privileges which are inadequate to the contemporary global order. We should not overlook that sustainable order and peace will be achieved only when transitional justice has been done. Any stability covering up blatant injustices will not be sustainable. It is therefore unsurprising that the current state of the law on immunities—which is considered to be “unsatisfactory”78 by many observers—remains under tension and attack. I therefore conclude with a reference to the Strasbourg Court’s recent judgment Jones v. uk in a case on state immunity against allegations of torture. Here the Court observed that “in light of the developments currently under way in this area of public international law, this is a matter which needs to be kept under review”79—not only by the contracting states as the ecthr wanted it, but also by the college of international lawyers. In the spirit of global constitutionalism, a number of interesting reform pro- posals should be reconsidered. For example, it has been suggested to award victims of serious human rights violations reparations for the suffered nega- tion of access to justice, to be granted by the state conferring immunity.80 One problem here is how to determine the sum of those damages which would be formally detached from the material basis of the claim which gave rise to the controversy over immunity. A potentially effective proposal is to insist stronger on procedural requirements.81 This approach seems all the more promising as it would, firstly, not affect the current basic features of the law of immunities, and secondly, dove- tail with the icj’s recent emphasis on the “procedural” character82 of that legal institution. The idea is that states should be required to invoke immunity. If not invoked, then forum state courts may not award immunity. This approach would not even require an actual modification of the law because it can easily be argued into the existing legal structure: “The legal effect of failing to raise

77 El Sawah, Les immunités de l’Etat (n. 12), para. 22. Cf. Joe Verhoeven, “Avant-propos” ibid., ed, Le droit international des immunités: consolidation ou contestation? (Paris: lgdj 2004) 5–8, 5: “Si c’ est la souveraineté qui justife l’ immunité (. . .) il suffit que lui soit reconnue une portée conforme à sa raison d’être. » 78 Yang, State Immunity (n. 13), 440. 79 ecthr, Jones (n. 28), para. 215. 80 El Sawah, Les immunités de l’Etat (n. 12), para. 1735; Talmon, “Immunität” (n. 11), 357. 81 See, e.g., Krieger, “Immunität” (n. 24), 256. Wuerth, “Pinochet’s legacy” (n. 54), 766 points out that in a surprising number of cases, immunity is not raised in cases against defendants whose state is not willing to defend them. These cases should be welcomed and encouraged. 82 See above text with note 58. Immune Αgainst Constitutionalisation? 19 immunity is that the forum state has no obligation to confer it, at least in the context of individual functional immunity. The failure to raise immunity might therefore count as state practice or opinio iuris in the form of acquiescence” to the other state’s exercise of its jurisdiction.83 That approach would allow the state which is sued (or whose officials are sued) not only to consider its political interests, but also—more important from a constitutionalist perspective— the prospects of a fair trial or due process in proceedings of the forum state, for deciding to assert immunity in one state but not elsewhere. This leeway would offer protection against abuses and against unfair proceedings which do not satisfy international procedural standards. Finally, a stricter linkage of conferring immunity to actual prior pleading, i.e. the abandonment of its examination ex curia, would empower civil society actors to put pressure on states not to invoke immunity in proceedings based on claims of serious human rights violations by state organs. That procedural approach, too, appears adequate to a constitutionalising world order in which individuals and civil society actors have gained importance but in which states remain the gate-keepers.

83 Wuerth, “Pinochet’s legacy” (n. 54), 750.

Part 1 State Immunity—National Practice

∵

CHAPTER 2 L’immunité souveraine de l’État : la pratique française

Pierre Boussaroque et David Lemétayer

1 Introduction

La question des immunités d’État est une question passionnante car elle illustre la rencontre de la diplomatie et du droit. Elle est aussi une question délicate face à laquelle se dessinent des équilibres ardemment débattus, en particulier entre le principe de souveraineté et le respect dû aux droits individuels. En matière pénale, bien des questions restent encore à éclaircir quant à l’étendue des immunités d’État. En matière civile, les enjeux apparaissent certainement plus nettement balisés. Avant d’entrer dans le vif du sujet, notre propos se limitera, pour l’essentiel, aux immunités coutumières de l’État et de ses représentants. Les immunités conventionnelles résultant par exemple des Conventions de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques et consulaires ou des accords de siège relèvent d’un champ distinct. Comme on le sait, l’immunité se traduit soit par l’impossibilité de poursuivre une personne physique ou morale devant une juridiction, soit par l’impossibi- lité pour le bénéficiaire d’une décision de justice d’en obtenir l’exécution. Pour le dire brutalement, dans le premier cas, c’est le droit au recours qui se trouve écarté ; dans le second, c’est la chose jugée qui reste lettre morte. Nombre de juristes s’accommodent mal de ces restrictions. Si l’on aborde la question en termes de droits individuels (en se fondant par exemple sur l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme) ou si l’on raisonne en termes de lutte contre l’impunité, se développe une tendance naturelle à vouloir réduire le champ de l’immunité. Mais des notions telles que celles d’État de droit, de lutte contre l’impunité ou de droit au recours ne sont pas ici seules en cause. Dans l’ordre international, notre conception de l’immunité des États a été façonnée par la nécessité d’une coexistence, la plus harmonieuse possible, d’États souverains et égaux dont les systèmes judiciaires ne présentent pas toujours les mêmes garanties. La France, comme bien d’autres États, recherche un équilibre entre ces aspi- rations et ces contraintes peu aisées à concilier.

2 Les immunités de l’État étranger en matière pénale, une souveraineté préservée

Aucune convention ne régit actuellement cette matière, la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens – sur laquelle nous reviendrons – s’appliquant seulement à la matière civile et ne couvrant pas les poursuites pénales devant les juridictions de l’État du for. En matière pénale, le principe cardinal est ainsi celui de l’immunité de l’État devant les juridictions d’un autre État. Les conséquences qu’il convient de tirer de ce principe prêtent cependant encore largement à débat. En attestent les échanges auxquels nous assistons au sein de la Commission du droit international (cdi), voire en Sixième commission, à propos des travaux menés sous l’égide de Mme Concepcion Escobar Hernandez1 à propos de « l’immunité des représentants de l’État de la juridiction pénale étrangère ». La France suit de très près lesdits travaux. Notre position et nos attentes s’articulent autour de quelques lignes fortes :

– l’immunité pénale des représentants de l’État est fondée sur la souveraineté de l’État. La sauvegarde des intérêts de l’État justifie l’existence d’une immu- nité pénale à son bénéfice et à celui de certains de ses représentants ; – du point de vue de la méthode, la complexité et la sensibilité du sujet conduisent à une grande prudence. La méthode qui nous semble devoir être privilégiée pour aborder les questions de principe soulevées par la question consiste à identifier et à appliquer les règles qui relèvent du droit international positif, c’est-à-dire s’appuyer sur la pratique étatique ; – à cet égard, sur la question des éventuelles exceptions à l’immunité pénale des représentants de l’État, la France a exprimé ses préoccupations s’agissant de plusieurs des affirmations formulées au sein de la Commission

1 agnu, Rapport préliminaire sur l’immunité des représentants de l’État de la juridiction pénale étrangère, a/cn.4/654, 31 mai 2012. Voir également les trois rapports du précédent Rapporteur spécial R.A. Kolodkin : agnu, Troisième rapport sur l’immunité des représen- tants de l’État de la juridiction pénale étrangère, a/cn.4/646, 24 mai 2011 ; agnu, Deuxième rapport sur l’immunité des représentants de l’État devant la juridiction pénale étrangère, a/ cn.4/631, 10 juin 2010 ; et agnu, Rapport préliminaire sur l’immunité des représentants de l’État de la juridiction pénale étrangère, a/cn.4/601, 29 mai 2008, ainsi que le mémorandum du Secrétariat général : agnu, Immunité de juridiction pénale étrangère des représentants de l’État, a/cn.4/596, 31 mars 2008. L’immunité souveraine de l’État 25

quant au caractère coutumier de certaines exceptions au regard d’une pratique insuffisante et disparate ; – nous sommes, par ailleurs, favorable à ce que la distinction fondamentale entre immunité ratione personae et immunité ratione materiae soit main- tenue et affinée. S’agissant des immunités personnelles, il conviendrait que la cdi, à la lumière des arrêts rendus par la Cour internationale de Justice,2 s’attache à identifier les critères permettant de déterminer quels représen- tants, au-delà de ceux qui composent la « troïka » ou la « triade », pour reprendre l’expression de l’ancien rapporteur spécial Roman Kolodkin (à savoir chef de l’État, chef du Gouvernement et ministre des Affaires étran- gères), seraient susceptibles de bénéficier de l’immunité ratione personae. S’agissant de l’immunité ratione materiae, nous encourageons la cdi à examiner les critères permettant de déterminer si un représentant a agi à titre officiel et, par ailleurs, dans quelle mesure la notion d’ « acte accompli par un représentant de l’État en qualité de représentant », peut être distinguée de la notion d’ « acte relevant de fonctions officielles ».

Pour en venir à la jurisprudence française, on rappellera que la Cour de cassation a consacré la distinction selon laquelle l’immunité d’un représentant de l’État peut être soit de nature personnelle, soit de nature fonctionnelle. Outre le fameux arrêt Kadhafi de 2001, rendu à propos de l’affaire du dc 10 uta, dans lequel la Cour a jugé que « la coutume internationale s’oppose à ce que les chefs d’État en exercice puissent, en l’absence de dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernées, faire l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger »3 et ce, quelle que soit la gravité du crime dénoncé, la Cour de cassation a également considéré par deux arrêts (rendus à propos du naufrage du Joola en 2010 et à propos de l’Erika en 2004) que « la coutume internationale qui s’oppose à la poursuite des États devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger s’étend aux organes et entités qui en constituent l’émanation ainsi qu’à leurs agents en raison d’actes qui, comme en l’espèce, relèvent de la souveraineté de l’État concerné ».4

2 cij, Affaire relative au mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), Arrêt du 14 février 2002, cij Recueil 2002, p. 3 ; cij, Affaire relative à certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale (Djibouti c. France), Arrêt du 4 juin 2008, cij Recueil 2008, p. 177. 3 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. Crim., Kadhafi, Arrêt du 13 mars 2001, n° 00-87.215. 4 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. Crim., Joola, Arrêt du 19 janvier 2010, n° 09-84.818 ; France, Cour de cassation, Ch. Crim., Malta Maritime Authority, Arrêt du 23 novembre 2004, n° 04-84.265. 26 Boussaroque et Lemétayer

3 Les immunités de l’État étranger en matière civile, une souveraineté encadrée

En août 2011, la France a approuvé, sans réserve ni déclaration interprétative, la Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens.5 Si cette Convention n’est pas en vigueur, la France considère que ses stipulations codifient le droit international coutumier et reflètent la pratique fran- çaise telle qu’elle ressort de la jurisprudence.

3.1 Le principe de l’immunité de juridiction civile des États étrangers a été posé par la Cour de cassation dans un arrêt du 22 janvier 1849 aux termes duquel : « un gouvernement ne peut être soumis, pour les engagements qu’il contracte, à la juridiction d’un État étranger »6 Seules bénéficient de cette immunité les activités « spécifiquement publiques », c’est-à-dire celles menées dans le cadre d’actes de puissance publique ou d’une mission de service public.7 Une telle immunité peut s’étendre à des entités distinctes des instances gouvernementales ou administratives8 dès lors que celles-ci agissent par ou pour le compte d’un État étranger, même si elles possèdent une personnalité juridique propre. Conformément à une jurisprudence constante, l’immunité de juridiction de l’État ne peut donc être invoquée que pour les actes d’autorité et non pour les actes de gestion. Selon une formulation traditionnelle, « les États étrangers et les organismes qui en constituent l’émanation ne bénéficient de l’immunité de juridiction qu’autant que l’acte qui donne lieu au litige participe, par sa nature ou sa finalité, à l’exercice de la souveraineté de ces États et n’est donc pas un

5 Cette convention correspond dans une très large mesure à la pratique française. En particulier, elle repose sur la théorie de l’immunité de juridiction restreinte de l’État, fondée sur la distinction entre les actes d’autorité (iure imperii) et les actes de gestion (iure gestionis), telle qu’elle est consacrée par la Cour de cassation. De même, les dispositions relatives à l’immu- nité d’exécution des États sont en phase avec la jurisprudence française. 6 Jurisprudence Générale : Recueil périodique et critique de jurisprudence, de législation et de doctrine en matière civile, criminelle, administrative et de droit public, 1849, p. 9. 7 France, Cour de cassation, (Ch. Req., urss c. Association France Export, Arrêt du 19 février 1929, dp 1929 1, p. 73 ; France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Société Levant Express Transport c. Chemins de fer du gouvernement iranien, Arrêt du 25 février 1969, Bull. civ. I, n° 86. 8 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Avicha Blagojeic c. Banque du Japon, Arrêt du 19 mai 1976, n° 74-11.424. L’immunité souveraine de l’État 27 acte de gestion ».9 Un État étranger se comportant comme une personne pri- vée ne pourra donc valablement invoquer l’immunité de juridiction.10 Le droit du travail est une matière dans laquelle cette distinction a souvent trouvé à s’appliquer. Dans le contentieux du licenciement, la Cour de cassation apprécie l’existence d’une immunité au regard du travail exercé. Selon les fonctions et responsabilités de l’employé, l’État employeur, qui met fin au contrat de travail, accomplit soit un acte de gestion, soit un acte de souveraineté.11 Autrement dit, la Cour de cassation vérifie au cas par cas si les fonctions de l’employé participent, par leur nature ou leur finalité, à l’exercice de la souve- raineté de l’État étranger. Cette appréciation des juridictions internes est portée sous le contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Cette dernière, au nom du procès équitable, se montre particulièrement exigeante sur les motifs qui conduisent à retenir l’existence d’une immunité de juridiction au profit de l’État étran- ger. Saisie du licenciement d’un comptable français exerçant pour l’ambassade du Koweït, la juridiction strasbourgeoise a ainsi condamné, en 2011, la France pour violation du droit à un procès équitable, l’immunité retenue en l’espèce lui apparaissant insuffisamment justifiée.12 Mais la possibilité d’écarter l’immunité de juridiction en matière de droit du travail n’épuise pas le sujet dès lors que les salariés qui auraient obtenu gain de cause devant les juridictions judiciaires se heurtent ensuite aux immunités d’exécution de l’État étranger. On y reviendra à propos des évolutions de la jurisprudence du Conseil d’État en matière d’engagement de la responsabilité sans faute de l’État du fait de l’application du droit international.

9 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. mixte, Arrêt du 20 juin 2003, n° 00-45.629 et n° 00-45.630. 10 Par exemple, s’il signe un contrat comportant une clause compromissoire : France, Cour de cassation (Civ. 1ère), Société européenne d’études et d’entreprises, Arrêt du 18 novembre 1986, n° 85-10.912 et n° 85-12.112. 11 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., M. Saignie c. Ambassade du Japon, Arrêt du 11 février 1997, n° 94-41.871. 12 cedh, Sabeh el Leil c. France, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 29 juin 2011, Requête No. 34869/05. Un ressortissant français engagé comme comptable à l’ambassade du Koweït en France dans le cadre d’un contrat à durée indéterminée, avait été licencié pour motif économique. Il contesta ce licenciement devant les juridictions françaises. S’il obtint partiellement satisfaction devant le Conseil des prud’hommes de Paris qui considéra ledit licenciement comme dépourvu de cause réelle et sérieuse, ce jugement fut infirmé en appel, la Cour d’appel de Paris faisant droit à la fin de non-recevoir soulevée par le Koweït qui se prévalait de son immunité de juridiction. 28 Boussaroque et Lemétayer

Enfin, signalons l’arrêt du 9 mars 2011 de la Cour de cassation portant sur le volet civil de l’affaire du dc 10 uta.13 La première chambre civile a rejeté le pourvoi dont elle avait été saisie dans le cadre de l’affaire de l’explosion, le 19 septembre 1989, d’un aéronef dc 10 de la compagnie uta ralliant Brazzaville à Paris au-dessus du désert du Ténéré, provoquant la mort de 170 passagers et membres d’équipage. Cet arrêt confirme les décisions des juges du fond qui avaient déclaré irrecevables les demandes formées contre l’État libyen dès lors que ce dernier bénéficiait de l’immunité de juridiction devant les juridictions françaises. Par certains aspects, cette décision est à rapprocher de l’arrêt de la cij dans l’affaire relative aux Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Italie c. Allemagne ; Grèce intervenant) du 3 février 2012, qui fait l’objet de deux contributions approfondies au sein de cet ouvrage. En l’espèce, la Cour de cassation conclut que les juges du fond avaient pu considérer à bon droit « que la [Libye] pouvait opposer une immunité de juridiction dès lors que la nature criminelle d’un acte de terrorisme ne permet pas, à elle seule, d’écarter une prérogative de souveraineté ». Il est certes difficile de passer les actes en cause au tamis de la grille traditionnelle d’analyse distinguant les actes de souveraineté des actes de gestion. Pour autant, en l’état, il ne résulte d’aucun principe coutumier que les États ne pourraient prétendre à l’immunité civile devant les juridictions d’un autre État pour des actes de terrorisme perpétrés en dehors de l’État du for (cf., en ce sens, l’article 12 de la Convention de 2004 précitée sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens).14 La Cour de cassation rappelle donc le principe selon lequel, en l’état du droit international, le crime dénoncé, quelle qu’en soit la gravité, ne relève pas des exceptions au principe de l’immunité de juridiction des États étrangers. La Cour a pu paraître envisager l’hypothèse selon laquelle une norme de ius cogens aurait pu primer les règles relatives aux immunités, hypothèse qu’elle n’a finalement pas retenue. L’émergence de juridictions pénales internationales, au premier rang des- quelles figure la Cour pénale internationale, ouvre cependant la voie d’une conciliation de cette solution avec le principe de lutte contre l’impunité de certains représentants de l’État en cas de crimes particulièrement graves.

13 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., gie La réunion aérienne c. Libye, Arrêt du 9 mars 2011, n° 09-14.743. 14 Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, 2 décembre 2004, a/res/59/38, annexe. L’immunité souveraine de l’État 29

3.2 L’immunité d’exécution de l’État étranger est de principe Elle peut néanmoins être écartée « lorsque le bien saisi a été affecté à l’acti- vité économique ou commerciale relevant du droit privé qui donne lieu à la demande en justice ».15 Ainsi, la Cour de cassation affirme-t-elle le caractère relatif de l’immunité d’exécution des États étrangers sous condition de l’exercice d’une activité de souveraineté : par exemple, un État ne peut opposer son immunité d’exécution à une créance relative au paiement de charges de copropriété d’un immeuble qui certes, servait au logement du personnel diplomatique, mais n’était pas affecté aux services de l’ambassade ni ne servait de résidence pour l’ambassadeur.16 La Haute juridiction a en outre écarté l’immu- nité d’exécution d’un État (l’Allemagne en l’espèce) car « l’acte donnant lieu au litige, consistant pour l’État allemand, à ne pas faire démolir le mur mitoyen ni à le reconstruire, n’était qu’un acte de gestion privée, et ce, d’autant plus que l’immeuble était désaffecté ».17 S’agissant des biens appartenant à des organismes publics distincts de l’État, les juges estiment qu’il appartient à ces organismes de prouver que les biens en cause sont affectés à une activité publique afin de bénéficier de l’immunité d’exécution.18 Comme en matière d’immunité de juridiction,19 l’État peut renoncer à son immunité d’exécution. Les juges estiment qu’une clause d’une convention d’arbitrage prévoyant que l’État s’engage à se conformer à la sentence qui sera rendue et à l’exécuter emporte renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution20 mais la simple acceptation d’une clause d’arbitrage n’a normalement pas cet effet.21 Pour clore sur ce point, dans le cadre d’un contentieux lié aux tentatives de saisie des comptes bancaires d’une mission diplomatique, la Cour de

15 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Société Eurodif c. République islamique d’Iran, Arrêt du 14 mars 1984, n° 82-12.462. 16 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., République démocratique du Congo, Arrêt du 25 janvier 2005, n° 03-18.176. 17 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Arrêt du 19 novembre 2008, n° 07-10.570. 18 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Société Sonatrach c. Migeon, Arrêt du 1 octobre 1985, n° 84-13.605. 19 L’État peut ainsi renoncer à son immunité par le biais de l’acceptation d’une clause compromissoire (France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Arrêt du 18 novembre 1986, n° 85-10.912 et n° 85-12.112). 20 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., Société Creighton Ltd. c. Ministre des finances du Qatar, Arrêt du 6 juillet 2000, n° 98-19.068. 21 France, Cour d’appel de Paris, 1ère chambre, section A, Ambassade de la Fédération de Russie en France c. Société noga, Arrêt du 10 août 2000, n° 287. 30 Boussaroque et Lemétayer cassation, le 28 septembre 2011, dans un arrêt nml Capital c. Argentine,22 a jugé que « selon le droit international coutumier, les missions diplomatiques des États étrangers bénéficient, pour le fonctionnement de la représentation de l’État accréditaire et les besoins de sa mission de souveraineté, d’une immunité d’exécution autonome à laquelle il ne peut être renoncé que de façon expresse et spéciale ; que cette immunité s’étend, notamment, aux fonds déposés sur les comptes bancaires de l’ambassade ou de la mission diplomatique ».

4 Un exemple original de conciliation entre les immunités souveraines et le respect des droits individuels : l’engagement de la responsabilité sans faute de l’État français du fait de l’immunité civile reconnue à l’État étranger

À deux reprises, le Conseil d’État a récemment étendu sa jurisprudence Compagnie générale d’énergie radio-électrique du 30 mars 1966,23 suivant laquelle la responsabilité de l’État peut être engagée pour rupture d’égalité des citoyens devant les charges publiques lorsque l’application d’une convention internationale24 ou l’application de la coutume internationale dans l’ordre juridique interne causent un préjudice grave et spécial. Le 11 février 2011, dans l’affaire Susilawati, le Conseil d’État, reprenant le considérant de principe de 1966 et réintroduisant de la sorte la condition d’incorporation régulière de la convention abandonnée dans l’affaire Almayrac,25 a ainsi permis l’indemnisation d’une employée de maison qui ne pouvait obtenir

22 France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. Civ., La société nml Capital Ltd c. La République Argentine, Arrêt du 28 septembre 2011, n° 09-72.057. 23 France, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, Compagnie générale d’énergie radio-électrique, Arrêt du 30 mars 1966, n° 50515. 24 France, Conseil d’État, Section, Ministre des Affaires étrangères c. Consorts Burgat, Décision du 29 octobre 1976, n° 94218 ; France, Conseil d’État, Section, Almayrac et autres, Décision du 29 décembre 2004, n° 262190. 25 France, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, Compagnie générale (n. 106) : « La responsabilité de l’État est susceptible d’être engagée, sur le fondement de l’égalité des citoyens devant les charges publiques, pour assurer la réparation de préjudices nés de conventions conclues par la France avec d’autres États et incorporées régulièrement dans l’ordre juridique interne, à la condition, d’une part, que ni la convention elle-même ni la loi qui en a éven- tuellement autorisé la ratification ne puissent être interprétées comme ayant entendu exclure toute indemnisation et, d’autre part, que le préjudice dont il est demandé répara- tion, revêtant un caractère grave et spécial, ne puisse, dès lors, être regardé comme une charge incombant normalement aux intéressés ». Revenant sur cette jurisprudence, la L’immunité souveraine de l’État 31 d’être payée par son ancien employeur condamné aux Prud’hommes, ce diplo- mate en poste auprès de la représentation permanente du Sultanat d’Oman auprès de l’unesco se prévalant de l’immunité d’exécution dont il bénéficiait en application de l’accord de siège entre la France et l’Organisation. Le 14 octobre 2011, dans l’affaire Saleh et autres, la question se posait qua- siment dans les mêmes termes s’agissant du licenciement fautif de quatre employées de maison par l’ambassade du Koweït à Paris, celle-ci opposant cette fois l’immunité coutumière d’exécution des États pour ne pas s’acquitter de l’obligation financière mise à sa charge par les jugements du Conseil de prud’hommes et les arrêts de la Cour d’appel de Paris. Dans les deux affaires, le Conseil d’État a écarté l’exception de risque accepté (dès lors qu’un salarié ne saurait être réputé avoir renoncé à des règles protec- trices en matière du droit du travail présentant un caractère d’ordre public) et apprécié la spécialité du préjudice in concreto en prenant en compte le faible nombre de victimes avérées et non le nombre de victimes potentielles. Il a éga- lement considéré que le fait que les requérantes n’aient pas saisi le juge de l’exécution était sans incidence sur leur droit à réparation dès lors que cette abstention ne les avait pas privées d’une chance sérieuse de recouvrer leur créance eu égard à l’immunité d’exécution dont bénéficient soit les diplomates en application des conventions internationales, soit les États en application du droit international coutumier. Dans l’affaire Saleh, le Conseil d’État a en effet confirmé la place de la coutume internationale en droit interne.26 La règle de droit international coutumier est applicable en droit interne sous réserve de n’être contraire à aucune disposition législative. Dès lors que cette condition d’incorporation dans l’ordre interne est remplie, la responsabilité sans faute de l’État du fait de l’application d’une règle coutumière de droit international public peut être engagée sur le fondement de la rupture de l’égalité devant les charges publiques si le préju- dice subi par la victime revêt un caractère grave et spécial. Cette solution jurisprudentielle a bien sûr l’avantage de concilier le jeu des immunités souveraines en matière civile avec le respect des droits individuels. Elle met cependant l’État français dans une position potentiellement délicate, sauf à ce qu’il se montre suffisamment persuasif auprès de l’État débiteur indélicat.

décision Almayrac avait employé la formule de « préjudices nés de conventions conclues par la France avec d’autres États et entrées en vigueur dans l’ordre interne ». 26 France, Conseil d’État, Assemblée, M. Aquarone, Décision du 6 juin 1997, n° 148683. CHAPTER 3 Sovereign Immunities of States: Α German Perspective

Martin Ney

1 Introduction

Having chosen immunities as topic for the Swiss French German Colloquium on international law is an excellent choice. Immunities seem to be one of the most relevant questions of current international law. And this also goes for the practitioner. This chapter gives an overview on the German practice. When analysing the relevant practice two points are striking: first, the principle of state immunity is as essential for current international relations today as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth century. It is the indispensable basis for interaction between states. Second, there are very few cases, especially court cases, which deal with immunities. There seems to be a paradox. On the one side, state immunity is crucial, on the other side, there are not many cases where we see this principle alive in court. But this alleged paradox is easily explained; state immunity is of such importance that it is widely observed. Courts do not take lengthy decisions with detailed explanations on a principle the relevance of which is self-evident. For that reason, it is impossible to present a plethora of controversial cases. In order to elucidate the situation in Germany I have to go into history in order to find decisions on the substance. Many of them concern the controversy: absolute vs. restrictive theory. Yet they all prove that the core of state immunity—which is about acts iure imperii—is uncontested. This is the red ribbon throughout the 150 years or so of debate on state immunity. And I am firmly convinced that this will remain so in the future. To illustrate I would like to structure my brief analysis into three parts: starting from the general principle of sovereign immunity of states, its position in international law and its significance for states, I will turn to German state practice with regard to state immunity before concluding with a brief reference to the icj judgment in the Case Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. For Germany this is the most recent and authoritative expression of the law of state immunity. My main focus will be on the foundations of the principle

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_004 Sovereign Immunities of States 33 of state immunity, its development in German practice and its current content with regard to possible exceptions.

2 Sovereign Immunity of States as a Principle of International Law

The member states of the international community are equal to each other as subjects of international law. This is a consequence of their sovereignty.1 Hans Kelsen defined state sovereignty under international law as “State’s legal independence from other States”.2 The sovereign equality of states is and remains an underlying principle of the international legal order. A consequence of the sovereign equality of states is the rule according to which no state can claim jurisdiction over another, the famous dictum par in parem non habet imperium.3 Sometimes this rule is simultaneously deduced not only from the principle of sovereign equality but also from the principles of independence and dignity of states as did the French Cour de Cassation in 1849.4 The principle of sovereign equality of states is enshrined in article 2(i) of the United Nations Charter5 and among the seven principles of the “Friendly Relations Declaration”6 of the United Nations General Assembly. It is still the “principal ‘Grundnorm’ of the present-day international legal order”—to quote Professor Christian Tomuschat.7 Sovereign immunity of states as a principle serves an important purpose: to ensure the peaceful co-existence

1 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (New York: oup, 9th edn 1992), 339. 2 Hans Kelsen, “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization,” Yale Law Journal 53 (1944): 207–20, 208. 3 Jean-Flavien Lalive, “L’immunité de Juridiction des Etats et des Organisations internationales,” Receuil des Cours 84 (1953): 205–396, 213; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s (n. 1), 339; Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 3rd edn 1984), 763. 4 Gilbert Gornig, “Immunität von Staatsoberhäuptern,” in Jörn Ipsen and Edzard Schmidt- Jortzig, eds., Recht-Staat-Gemeinwohl, Festschrift für Dietrich Rauschning (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2001), 457–85, 459 et seq.; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim’s (n. 1), 342. 5 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 unts xvi. 6 un, General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, a/res/25/2625, 24 October 1970. 7 Christian Tomuschat, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century,” Recueil des Cours 281 (1999): 9–438, 161. 34 Ney and cooperation among states.8 Sovereign immunity operates in the politi- cally very sensitive area of delimitation of sovereign power of states. It is based upon the idea that states want to ensure in their international relations that no state can sit in judgment over sovereign acts of another state unless the state has consented to it. Friendly relations between states could be disturbed if the courts of one state undertake to exercise jurisdiction over another state. These arguments might sound old and traditional and one might wonder whether they suit an international order based on “constitutionalism”. But from the viewpoint of a practitioner it can be assured that they have not lost their relevance in today’s international relations. In my observation cases involving state immunity issues are a challenge for diplomacy due to their political sensitivity and the difficulty to establish the right facts in a given case. Therefore, clear, firm and universally established rules are necessary for the practitioner.

3 German Practice Relating to State Immunity

Similar to France and Switzerland, Germany has a long tradition and a relatively numerous (court) practice relating to state immunity.9 This practice reveals different epochs in dealing with state immunity and shows that the German practice underwent similar debates and changes as did the practice in our neighbouring countries. It also shows the changes in German legal and political thought towards the conception of the state and its role in international relations.

8 Christian Tomuschat, “The International Law of State Immunity and its Development by National Institutions,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 1105–40, 1107. 9 Compilations of German practice on state immunity with a focus on practice of the first half of the 20th century are provided by Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,” British Yearbook of International Law 28 (1951): 220–72, 261 et seq. and Carl-Hermann Paussmeyer, “German Court Practice on Sovereign Immunity with a Special Reference to Current Trends in the Federal Republic of Germany,” German Yearbook of International Law 25 (1982): 417–32, 419 et seq. A compilation of more recent practice is provided by Gerhard Hafner, Marcelo G. Kohen and Susan Breau, eds., State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 357 et seq. Sovereign Immunities of States 35

The first case to mention happened in 1885. The Bayerischer Gerichtshof für Kompetenzkonflikte10 was confronted with a case involving the Austrian state as the owner of a railway sued by an individual shareholder of the railway.11 The court stated “that in the theory of international law—a sovereign State is, as a rule, not subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign State”.12 This first court dictum in Germany on the issue of state immunity caused some irritation as to its result: the Bayerischer Gerichtshof für Kompetenzkonflikte assumed jurisdiction on the ground that Austria had acted iure gestionis, thereby diverging from the main trend in Europe where the so-called “absolute theory” was still dominant. The early German court practice was largely dominated by the question whether absolute or restrictive immunity with regard to acts iure gestionis should be accorded. From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards the doctrine of absolute immunity prevailed in German courts. It was applied for the first time in 1905 by the highest court, the Reichsgericht in a case concerning the Belgian state Railway.13 In the famous Ice King Case in 1921 the Reichsgericht14 discussed the question whether international law with regard to state immunity had changed into the direction of a more restricted approach. It held that state practice had not changed with regard to absolute immunity. The absolute doctrine was upheld until the first years of post-World War ii Germany. The pivotal change came in 1951 with a decision rendered by the Regional Appeals Court of Hamm (Oberlandesgericht Hamm). The court concluded from preceding inquiries into state practice: “[i]n international law, the principle has been developed that jurisdiction over a foreign state exists in principle when the latter appears in the transaction not as a sovereign, but as a subject of private rights and obligations”.15 Since then, German court

10 This particular court was established 1879 with the aim to decide about competence struggle within the Bavarian administration, see Richard Bauer, Handbuch der Bayerischen Ämter, Gemeinden und Gerichte 1799–1980 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983), 117. 11 Bayerischer Gerichtshof für Kompetenzkonflikte, Heizer v. Kaiser-Franz-Joseph Bahn ag, Judgment 1885, American Journal of International Law, Supplement 26 (1932): 534–35. 12 Ibid. 13 Reichsgericht, L’affaire du Département des chemins de fer de l’Etat belge, Judgment of 12 Decembre 1905, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (rgz) 62 (1906): 165. 14 Reichsgericht, Ice King Case, Judgment of 10 Decembre 1921, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (rgz) 103 (1921): 275 et seq. See also Lauterpacht, “Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities” (n. 9), 267. 15 Regional Appeals Court of Hamm (Oberlandesgericht Hamm),, Judgment of 6 June 1951, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 4 (1951): 258 et seq. 36 Ney practice has followed the restrictive theory. In the 1960s the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) was—for the first time— confronted with immunity issues in two cases. Especially the Empire of Iran Case is worth mentioning: it concerned the remuneration for repairs carried out to the heating system at the Iranian Embassy in Bonn. The Bundesverfassungsgericht confirmed that a general rule of international law, according to which foreign states were absolutely immune from national jurisdiction, no longer existed, implying that jurisdiction was not excluded in connection with non-sovereign dealings.16 It used the distinction between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis and underlined that the essential feature was whether the state had acted in exercise of its sovereign authority or not. It stressed that the general rule of international law, according to which immunity from national jurisdiction was granted to foreign states for their sovereign activities, did not become bereft of content or lose its character as a general rule of international law by making the necessary distinction between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis. It is noteworthy that the practice of the Federal Republic of Germany— which can be characterised by a rather limited emphasis on state sovereignty and a high importance given to international cooperation—has nevertheless always put an emphasis on the state immunity for acta iure imperii: The Bundesverfassungsgericht stressed that a nucleus of state activities must remain iure imperii at any rate, and the court included state acts relating to foreign affairs, military authority, the legislature, the exercise of police authority and the administration of justice into that sphere.17 This was confirmed in 2003 when the Bundesgerichtshof was confronted with the Distomo Massacre Case. The court held: “[t]here have recently been tendencies towards a more limited principle of state immunity, which should not apply in case a peremptory norm of international law (ius cogens) has been violated. According to the prevailing view, this is not international law currently in force; otherwise the principle of immunity would be of little use”.18

16 German Constitutional Court, Empire of Iran Case, Judgment of 30 April 1963, International Law Reports 45 (1972), 57–82; German Constitutional Court, Yugoslav Military Mission Case, Judgment of 30 Octobre 1962, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (bverfge) 15 (1964): 25 et seq. On the judgment see also Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 2nd edn 2008), 24 et seq.; Paussmeyer, German Court Practice (n. 9), 421; Tomuschat, International Law (n. 7), 177. 17 German Constitutional Court, Empire of Iran Case, Judgment of 30 April 1963, International Law Reports 45 (1972), 81. 18 German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), The Distomo Massacre Case, Judgment of 26 June 2003, International Legal Materials 42 (2003): 1033. Sovereign Immunities of States 37

This view was confirmed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 2006 which explicitly stressed that state immunity as far as acts iure imperii are concerned does not contain any exceptions.19 The same importance was given to the immunity from execution of judicial decisions: in 1977, the Bundesverfassungsgericht rendered a landmark decision in this field, the famous Philippine Embassy Case.20 The lessor of embassy offices had obtained a judgment for rent and tried to execute it by levying execution upon a bank account maintained by the embassy. The Court held that a bank account maintained by a foreign state for the coverage of day-to-day expenses of an embassy is immune from enforcement measures. Enforcement measures against a foreign state were also involved in the quite recent Sedelmayer Case. In a decision of 2005, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof ) underlined that enforcement measures may not be directed against such Russian assets in Germany that serve Russia’s diplomatic representation if the exercise of the diplomatic activities will be affected thereby. The Court held that German courts lacked competence to issue execution measures into the claims at issue to the extent that the claims were of a sovereign nature.21 Just to briefly depart from the German practice: the present dispute between Argentina and Ghana concerning the Argentinian frigate, Ara Libertad, arrested by Ghanaian authorities in a Ghanaian port at the request of an international hedge fund for non-payment of Argentinian bonds demonstrates the importance of this principle to ensure a smooth functioning of international relations.22 To come back to German practice: what does this historical survey of the practice show? I would offer three conclusions. First, notwithstanding different epochs and developments as regards state immunity, sovereign immunity for acts iure imperii still remains untouched. Second, German courts regard state immunity as a principle deeply rooted in

19 German Constitutional Court, Distomo Case, Decision of 15 February 2006, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 59 (2006): 2542. 20 German Constitutional Court, Philippine Embassy Case, Judgment of 13 Decembre 1977, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 46 (1978): 342, English excerpt in Hafner et al., State Practice (n. 9), 368. 21 German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Franz Sedelmayer (Germany) v. The Russian Federation vii zb 08/05, Decision of 4 October 2005, accessed 2 August 2013, www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/2/21311/franz_sedelmayer_v_russian_federation.pdf. See also Swedish Supreme Court, Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, Decision of 1 July 2011, American Journal of International Law 106 (2012): 347–53. 22 See also itlos, The “Ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Order for Provisional Measures of 15 December 2012, accessed 2 August 2013, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/ itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15_12_2012.pdf. 38 Ney the international legal order and have neither tried to question its legal foundations nor tried to question the principle as such. And finally, they have not attempted to discuss possible exceptions to the rule of state immunity.

4 The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State

This brings me to the recent judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening). In view of the fact that other chapters in this volume are devoted to the judgment in detail,23 three very brief points should be mentioned: First of all, the icj has underlined the importance of the rule of state immunity for international law and international relations, and has stressed that it derives from the principle of sovereign equality of states, describing the latter as a “fundamental principle of the international legal order”.24 Second, the icj concluded that under customary international law, a state is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of human rights law or international humanitarian law.25 It based this conclusion on a thorough analysis of state (court) practice, including German practice, which I have just described. I would regard the icj judgment in that respect as a confirmation of the German practice. Third, the icj also ruled on the distinct character of enforcement measures with regard to state immunity. This aspect has been continuously upheld by some of the German court decisions mentioned. Undoubtedly, the icj judgment is of major significance for states. It has reaffirmed the continued validity of the principle of state immunity in international law and it has clarified that state immunity, as procedural in nature, cannot be in direct conflict with fundamental norms of the international legal order, especially with human rights.26 There is no lack of legal protection due

23 See chapter six by Christian Tomuschat as well as chapter twelve by Andrea Gattini in this volume. 24 icj, Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, para. 57. 25 Ibid., para. 91. 26 Ibid., paras. 93, 97: “[a]ssuming for this purpose that the rules of the law of armed conflict (. . .) are ius cogens, there is no conflict between those rules and the rules on State immunity. The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to Sovereign Immunities of States 39 to state immunity because the state’s obligations and its state responsibility under international law remain untouched.

5 Conclusion

These observations show that state immunity as an important principle of the international legal order is still crucial for current international relations. In my view, discussions on state immunity in the last years were too much centred on the question whether exceptions are needed without fully taking into account the role and purpose of state immunity and its place within the international legal order. In the present international system, characterised by the absence of a generalised compulsory supranational jurisdiction, state immunity continues to play a crucial role in preserving the systemic stability of international relations and the maintenance of peace. We have to be aware of it when discussing state immunity in the framework of “global constitutionalism”. I do concede that apart from state immunity, there are many other challenging aspects in the field of immunities in international law. This volume entitled “Immunities in the Age of Constitutionalism” aims at addressing many of them.

determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. (. . .) Recognizing the immunity of a foreign State in accordance with customary international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a situation created by the breach of a ius cogens rule, (. . .). The Court concludes that even on the assumption that the proceedings in the Italian courts involved violations of ius cogens rules, the applicability of the customary international law on State immunity was not affected.” CHAPTER 4 Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity

Władysław Czapliński

1 Introduction

In recent years, notwithstanding a lapse of time since the end of the World War ii, and fundamental changes in international law, issues concerning claims based upon the war events became relevant again. Decisions of Greek and Italian courts, in particular in the cases Distomo1 and Ferrini,2 posed again the problem of Germany’s responsibility for war crimes. This new trend in the jurisprudence of domestic courts (which also gave rise to a dispute between Germany and Italy before the icj) led Mr. Natoniewski to present his claim for damages caused by members of the German Wehrmacht during the Nazi occupation of Poland. The claim was finally rejected by the Supreme Court of Poland that confirmed previous decisions by lower courts. The decision in the Natoniewski case3 is undoubtedly correct from the perspective of international law, and it constitutes an important evidence of a Polish practice in the domain of state immunity, although it causes some difficulties from a constitutional point of view.

1 Hellenic Supreme Court, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 4 May 2000, Case No. 11/2000. 2 Italian Supreme Court, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 11 March 2004, Decision No. 5044/2004, Rivista diritto internazionale 87 (2004): 539 et seq. (Italian) and International Law Reports 128 (2006): 658 fet seq. (English). 3 For a further discussion of the case see Marcin Kałduński, “State Immunity and War Crimes: The Polish Supreme Court on the Natoniewski Case,” Polish Yearbook of International Law 30 (2010): 235–62 and Roman Nowosielski, “State Immunity and the Right of Access to Court,” Polish Yearbook of International Law 30 (2010): 263–76.

2 The Legal Nature of Claims in the Natoniewski Case: The Competence of Polish Courts and Consequences of a Possible Application of eu Regulations

The Polish Supreme Court correctly emphasised that the Regulation No. 44/01 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters4 is directly applicable and enjoys supremacy over domestic law on the basis of principles of eu law and in accordance with article 91(3) of the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997. The supremacy also covers rules on the jurisdiction of Polish courts formulated in the Polish Code on civil procedure. A condition of the application of the Regulation to a specific case is however that the subject matter of the claim corresponds with premises provided by the Regulation. Therefore, a discussion of the nature of the claim by the Court is decisive for the jurisdiction of Polish courts.

3 State Immunity

The issues relating to state immunity are not sufficiently regulated in Polish law. Such an approach of Polish law-makers is surprising, in particular taking into account the evolution of that institution in developed market economy countries during the recent years, namely the passage from an absolute immunity to a limited immunity, strictly connected with acts of state (sovereign) powers. Immunity is excluded with respect to commercial (economic) activities and the evaluation is based on the nature of the specific transaction and on the will of the parties involved. This development has been confirmed by statutes adopted by most of the common law states after World War ii, and by the jurisprudence of most countries.5 International legal instruments elaborated and adopted in recent years also refer to a narrow concept of state immunity, limited to sovereign acts of states: the un Convention of 2004 on Jurisdictional

4 eu, Council Regulation (ec) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, oj 2001 L 12/1. 5 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 2nd edn 2004), 118 et seq.; Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau and Alain Pellet, Droit international public (Paris: lgdj, 2009), 498 et seq.; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, 2009), 327 et seq.; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: cup, 2008), 704 et seq., to mention just some references. 42 Czapliński

Immunity of States and Their Property,6 and the European Convention of 1972 on State Immunity.7 However, the circle of parties to these conventions is limited. There is no doubt that the general practice led to the emergence of customary international law in that field.8 The Supreme Court in Natoniewski referred to this customary development of law of state immunity, as it decided to base its ruling upon international law. It had no doubt as to the content of customary law, referring to the said conventions, as well as to the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts. However, it must be emphasised that the Polish legal system lacks any clear basis for a direct application of customary law. Provisions of chapter iii of the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997, and in particular articles 879 and 9110 limit a possible direct application of international law to ratified treaties. In this context we are astonished by the eagerness of the Court to state that the Polish legal system is based on a monist concept. Article 91 makes the direct applicability of international treaties depending upon a self-executing nature of specific norms. The monist system should also cover the application of customary law. Legal writers usually adopt the position that customary law should be applied in Poland in accordance with article 9 of the Constitution (“[t]he Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it”). However, this provision is situated in the introductory chapter of the Constitution, expressing basic principles of the state system, and it specifies neither any rules on the

6 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38, annex. 7 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, ets No. 074. 8 According to criteria established by the icj in the North Sea Continental Shelf case (Germany v. Denmark/Germany v. The Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969 icj Reports 1969, 3 para. 74, the practice leading to the creation of customary law should be universal, coherent and wide-stretched in time (or often repeated). These criteria are fulfilled for state practice on immunity. 9 Article 87: “1. The sources of universally binding law of the Republic of Poland shall be: the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements, and regulations. 2. Enactments of local law issued by the operation of organs shall be a source of universally binding law of the Republic of Poland in the territory of the organ issuing such enactments.” 10 Article 91: “1. After promulgation thereof in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw), a ratified international agreement shall constitute part of the domestic legal order and shall be applied directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. 2. An international agreement ratified upon prior consent granted by statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes. 3. If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws.” Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity 43 application nor on the place of custom in the hierarchy of sources. Moreover, customary law is not mentioned in article 87 of the Constitution (which contains a catalogue of sources of law of general application),11 so that the doubts as to a possible use of custom as the basis of judicial decisions multiply. The practice of the Supreme Court deserves attention. We agree with the Court’s conclusions that damages suffered by Mr. Natoniewski were caused by actions of German military forces, and therefore attributable to the German state as acta iure imperii. The Court also pointed out that the claims are based upon public law, and that a waiver of state immunity should be excluded—also pointing to the parliament provisions of the Basle and New York conventions. The changing nature of state immunity has two more important aspects. Firstly there is an inter-temporal issue: should the immunity issue be evalu- ated from the perspective of law in force in 1944 when damage was suffered? Secondly, the question is whether state immunity is of substantive or of procedural importance. The Court combined in a way both issues. It was aware that changes in approaching state immunity had occurred in the 1950s, but that fact did not have any direct (or indirect) impact upon the shape of state immunity in the present case, because this case would be covered by the exception anyway. The judges decided however that the issue was procedural, and therefore the law as of 2010 was applicable. This approach made the argument of the Court easier. In fact, although some commentators criticise such an approach, it is in conformity with the regulation of the Polish code of civil procedure of 1964. The stance of the Supreme Court is also in line with the decision of the ecj in Lechouritou,12 invoked by the Court at several instances. The Court decided that the statement by the ecj, namely that the matter is not a private law case in the sense of article 1 of the Regulation 44/01, did not allow a conclusion as to a possible application of state immunity. In our opinion, on the contrary, if the case is not covered by civil law, then a contrario it must be subjected to public law and by definition must be connected with state immunity, because it is based on the sovereign activities of state agencies. It seems also that there is a general agreement that claims resulting out of war are of a public character and that they should be subjected to a common regulation by the parties to the

11 See the wording in n. 9. 12 ecj, Irini Lechouritou and Others v. Germany, Judgment of 15 February 2007, Case C-292/05, ecR I-1519. 44 Czapliński armed conflict in question.13 By the way, we cannot agree with an opinion by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer that the ecj has no powers to interpret international law, as it constitutes part of customary law of the Union and its primary law, at least as far as the application of eu law is concerned.

4 Legal Nature of War-Related Claims

Speaking about problems of state responsibility for actions of its armed forces during the armed conflict, we have to look at premises of the responsibility. We have to discuss at first inter-temporal issues that play an important role in evaluation of past situations under international law, and are often neglected. The effects and consequences of facts should be interpreted in accordance with the rules in force when the events took place. In order to check the issues of responsibility for damages caused during the World War ii, we have to analyse the rules of international law of that time, in particular those governing the consequences of World War i. In any case, we cannot apply the rules of modern or contemporary international law, including ius cogens and human rights. The concept of peremptory norms was introduced to international law by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (entered into force in 1980),14 and it involved a lot of controversies among states. Although the icj in Barcelona Traction15 emphasised that certain norms of international law had a fundamental importance for the international community as a whole, it did not draw any practical consequences, including a possible right to bring international claims founded upon violations of these norms. The present author, like many others, is sceptical as to the practical application of the concept of ius cogens, even if they cannot be neglected any more, at least from a theoretical perspective. This concerns however modern aspects of the issue, and excludes its application to the effects of World War ii. The concept of human rights, which is often invoked in the context of war crimes (including resettle- ment of populations or property claims), was also introduced to international law after the War and cannot be considered in the framework of World War ii. The Supreme Court perfectly realised the threats connected with inter-

13 See Władysław Czapliński, “Pojęcie reparacji wojennych w prawie międzynarodowym (The Notion of War Reparations in International Law),” Sprawy Międzynarodowe No. 1 (2005), 66 ff., and the authors quoted therein. 14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331. 15 icj, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, icj Reports 1970, 3, 32, 37–38. Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity 45 temporal law and was extremely careful in discussing it, including a possibility of excluding the immunity with respect to delictual responsibility. Discussing the specific question of the waiver of state immunity, the Supreme Court took a position towards the widely known and commented decisions in Distomo and Ferrini.16 In the former case, the special Greek court decided in favour of the indemnity claims brought by relatives of victims of a “pacification action” on the locality of Distomo by German troops in June 1944. The latter concerned a claim by an Italian national sent to forced labour in Germany during the war; his claim based upon German domestic law was rejected by German domestic courts. The Supreme Court rightly rejected a waiver of state immunity, recognising both decisions as inadmissible. This position of the Court was subsequently confirmed by the icj in the Germany v. Italy judgment.17 In the context of the Al-Adsani case18 before the European Court of Human Rights, often invoked by domestic courts in order to justify a ius cogens character of certain norms, we have to bear in mind that the reference can be found

16 Ilias Bantekas and Maria Gavouneli, “Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany. Case No. 11/2000,” American Journal of International Law 95 (2001): 198–204; Elisabeth Handl, “Staatenimmunität und Kriegsfolgen am Beispiel des Falles Distomo,” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 61 (2006): 433–48; Andrea Gattini, “To What Extent are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’ Claims for War Damage,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003): 348–67; Andrea Gattini, “War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 224–42; Maria Panezi, “Sovereign Immunity and Violations of Jus Cogens Norms,” Revue hellenique de droit international 56 (2003): 199–214; Emilio Castorina and Edoardo Raffiotta, “Jurisdictional Immunity of a Sovereign State in Italy: frg vs. Italian Republic,” in Władysław Czapliński and Bernard Łukańko, eds., Problemy prawne w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich u progu xxi wieku (Warsaw: Scholar, 2009): 112–117; Pietro Franzina, “State Immunity in Respect of Serious Violations of Human Rights: The Case Law of the Italian Supreme Court in the Eve of its Appraisal by the icj,” in Władysław Czapliński and Bernard Łukańko, eds., Problemy prawne w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich u progu xxi wieku (Warsaw: Scholar, 2009): 118–130; Pasquale De Sena and Francesca Da Vittor, “State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision in the Ferrini Case,” European Journal of International Law 16 (2005): 89–112; Annalisa Ciampi, “The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over Germany in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War, The Civitella Case,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2009): 597–615. 17 icj, Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012. 18 ecthr, Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 35763/97. 46 Czapliński in a minority opinion only. Moreover, the icj, which is much more competent in international law than the Strasbourg Court, firmly respected the procedures and never rendered any decision on the merits that would establish consequences of the violation of peremptory norms of international law if such solution would violate formal requirements. We can refer here to Arrest Warrant (Congo v. Belgium)19 and East Timor.20 The unification of Germany on the basis of the treaty between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany of 20 September 199021 was possible thanks to the earlier treaty of 12 September 1990 known as 2+4 Treaty,22 concluded between the two German states and the former occu- pying allied powers. The 2+4 Treaty in its name deliberately used a terminol- ogy adopted in the Potsdam agreement of 2 August 1945. The latter agreement referred in many instances to the final settlement with respect to Germany (and not to a peace treaty as in the case of other allies of Germany), suggesting that other forms of terminating the War could also be considered. The aim of the 2+4 Treaty was to settle all problems connected with World War ii, and the reparation claims precisely constituted such a problem.23 Although Poland at least twice (in 1953 and 1957) renounced by unilateral declarations on any further war claims with respect to Germany, and while this renunciation has been subsequently confirmed several times, the Federal Republic of Germany made ex gratia certain payments in favour of selected categories of persons (victims of pseudo-medical experiments, prisoners of concentration camps, persons deported for forced labour), recognising its moral (and not legal) liability. We have to conclude that no substantive grounds for a recognition of the claims by Mr. Natoniewski could be found by Polish courts, notwithstanding the issue of state immunity. We have to stress also that according to international law, a local remedies rule should be applied. In our case, the claim should have been brought first to German courts. However, in the past this possibility was extremely limited, as a circle of persons entitled to claim reparations on the basis of the German

19 icj, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, icj Reports 2002, 3. 20 Cf. icj, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, icj Reports 1995, 90. 21 German Reunification Treaty, 31 August 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt ii S. 885, 889. 22 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, 29 ilm 1186. 23 To be honest, let us notice that in the legal writing a view can be found according to which the 2+4 Treaty did not necessarily mean a waiver of reparation claims on behalf of third States—see Pierre D’Argent, Les réparations de guerre en droit international public (Brussels: Bruylant, 2002), 226–227. Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity 47

Bundesentschädigungsgesetz of 195624 was very limited and excluded the possibility of presenting claims by persons residing in Poland. After 1969, claims were rejected by German courts due to prescription (expiration of pretentions).

5 Other References to State Immunity in Recent Polish Practice

The judgment of the Polish Supreme Court expressly referred to previous jurisprudence of domestic courts in matters involving state immunity. We do not intend to present all cases involving this issue, but we concentrate upon the most important and characteristic ones. It is interesting that the Supreme Court from the very beginning on accepted an obligation to refer to customary international law, as the matter was not regulated by domestic law (which only contains provisions dealing with the position of a diplomatic representations in domestic civil proceedings).25 For many years Polish courts adopted an absolute approach to state immunity, without making a distinction between acts de iure imperii or de iure gestionis. In some cases state immunity was wrongly identified with the immunity of diplomatic representatives or consular officers. Thus, in the judgment of 14 December 1948 in Aldona K v. uk,26 the Polish Supreme Court refused to apply the provisions of the code of civil procedure relating to diplomatic immunity. It emphasised that both institutions had common roots (anchored in state sovereignty), but that they served different purposes and should not be conflated. Their scope should also be differentiated. Similar decisions were passed in 1957 (in a case involving French consulate in Cracow)27 and 1987 (Maria B v. Austrian Cultural Centre in Warsaw).28 The Supreme Court modified its jurisprudence after 1990. A resolution of seven judges of the Court of 26 September 1990 (procedurally binding upon lower courts in the future) confirmed the absolute immunity of the Russian commercial representation, based on diplomatic immunity.29 In

24 Germany, Drittes Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundesergänzungsgesetzes zur Entschädigung für Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung, 29 June 1956, bgbl. i 559. 25 Polish Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, Judgment of 10 February 1928, Case ic 1680/27. 26 Polish Supreme Court, Aldona K v. uk, Judgment of 14 December 1948, Państwo i Prawo 4 (1949), 119. 27 Polish Supreme Court, French Consulate in Cracow Case, International Law Reports 26 (1958), 178–180. 28 Polish Supreme Court, Maria B v. Austrian Cultural Centre in Warsaw, International Law Reports 82 (1990), 1–5. 29 Polish Supreme Court, Resolution of 26 September 1990, Sygn. iii pzp 9/90, osncp (1991), No. 2–3, Item 17. The decision is in a way surprising, as it concerned a technological centre 48 Czapliński the judgment of 16 September 1992, the Supreme Court stated that it could not decide on the merits of a claim by an employee of the Swiss Embassy in Poland, as the embassy constituted the territory of foreign state and therefore was not subjected to Polish jurisdiction (sic!—in fact the theory of extraterritoriality of diplomatic representations had been abandoned by international lawyers many years before). A similar conclusion was reached in the judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 March 1998 (Marta K v. General Consulate of Germany in Cracow). The decisions of lower courts were equally divided. Some judgments were founded upon the diplomatic immunity (Maria K v. Embassy of Austria, of 30 May 1996)30 while others referred to a customary rule on state immunity. Generally the courts rather followed the theory of absolute immunity. The decision of the Supreme Court of 11 January 2000 was crucial for the further developments. It concerned a labour law dispute between an the Embassy of Chile and one of its employees. The Court rejected the decisions of the lower instances on the nullity of a termination of an employment contract, and concluded that those courts had wrongfully applied article 1111 of the code on civil procedure, by invoking diplomatic immunity instead of state immunity. It declared that the employer in the case (and the defendant in the proceeding) was the Embassy of Chile, and not the Chilean state, and subsequently limited the immunity to sovereign acts. As the employment contract was a commercial act, it was not covered by the immunity. The same reasoning was adopted by the Court in a claim against the Turkish Republic based upon a non-fulfil- ment of a commercial contract; according to the judges, the immunity did not cover acts connected with common commercial and civil activities. The case was extremely interesting from the Polish perspective, as it concerned a claim founded upon an expropriation by the Turkish government of a factory owned by the Polish holding Polska Energetyka, and as the confiscation was done on the basis of a governmental act, and not a statute. The Turkish government allegedly also breached a contract on cooperation. The Polish Court of Appeal rejected the claim for lack of jurisdiction, as the expropriation took place in Turkey. The Supreme Court shared this opinion, and supported its position by invoking state immunity—acts of confiscation of property should be regarded as the sovereign acts of the Turkish state.

for automobiles imported from Russia, but it was in conformity with a practice under communist rule, where commercial representations constituted part of the diplomatic missions. 30 Polish Supreme Court, Maria K v. Embassy of Austria, Judgment of 30 May 1996, Sygn. vii P 572/96, unpublished. Current Polish Practice in the Domain of State Immunity 49

Another interesting and complex case was discussed before the Polish courts including the Supreme Court in 2008. It concerned the proceedings against the Embassy of Serbia and the Republic of Serbia (jointly) on a return of an unlawfully possessed property.31 The former owner asked for a forcible execution of the judgment, notwithstanding the opposition by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, the Embassy of Serbia abandoned the building but the final decision concerning the motion by Serbia was never rendered. Finally, we would like to refer to a decision of the Strasbourg Court in Cudak v. Lithuania.32 Even if the case was brought against Lithuania, the matter indirectly concerned the Polish position in the immunity issue. A lady of Polish ethnicity and Lithuanian nationality worked for the Polish Embassy in Wilna. She was allegedly sexually abused by an embassy employer. After she returned to work, she was fired from the embassy for some minor offences against labour rules and regulations. She brought a claim against the employer (the Polish state) before Lithuanian courts, but her claim was rejected, as Poland refused to take part in the proceeding, arguing that the state was protected by immunity. The local courts accepted the exception stating that under Lithuanian law and practice the state immunity is absolute, in particular as the job of Ms. Cudak was connected with the exercise of sovereign competences (imperium) by the Polish state (although in fact she worked as a secretary). Moreover, according to the Lithuanian court, in order to render a judgment, the court would have to interrogate Polish diplomats as to circumstances of the case, and that would be impossible because of their diplomatic immunity. The judges also referred to the principle of sovereign equality of states and to the desire to maintain and promote friendly relations between the two states concerned.33 Finally, it granted immunity to the Polish state. The Strasbourg Court concluded that although the fundamental right to judicial review can be limited, i.a. because of requirements of international law, state immunity can be applied in private law proceedings in exceptional situations only. However in the current case

31 The seat of the Embassy of Serbia (formerly the Embassy of Yugoslavia) in Warsaw was owned by family Gawronski before the World War ii, and subsequently confiscated by the communist government. The courts decided upon a return of the property to the former owner, but the embassy rejected the claim and brought a motion on acquisitory prescription as a successor of Yugoslavia. 32 ecthr, Cudak v. Lithuania, Grand Chamber Judgment of 23 March 2010, Application No. 15869/02. 33 Surprisingly, the ecthr accepted this argument by stating that “[t]he Court considers that the grant of immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty”, ibid., para. 60. 50 Czapliński

Lithuania had not delivered evidence that the claimant’s employment had any influence upon the security of Poland. Consequently, the Court confirmed that Lithuania had violated article 6 of the European Convention. The story is interesting because Polish courts decided similar cases before and judged coher- ently that disputes concerning labour relationships involving Polish nationals and foreign diplomatic representations were covered by the provisions of Polish civil procedure code, and therefore inadmissible before Polish courts.

6 By Way of Conclusion

Instead of conclusions we would like to refer to another important problem of general importance highlighted by the Supreme Court in the Natoniewski decision in form of a kind of a guideline for domestic courts applying international law in future. The Court stated that no domestic court can modify international law by bending it to meet current needs. Such a method would be a clear manipulation, notwithstanding best intentions of the judges. This statement is correct but it requires a commentary. The case-law of the Permanent Court of International Justice emphasised that from the perspective of international law domestic law is only a fact, although giving rise to certain legal consequences.34 On the other hand, the domestic case-law constitutes an element of practice leading to the formation of customary law, and it can also identify international law, as stated by article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. If a domestic organ takes a decision contrary to international law in force, the evaluation of such a decision will depend upon the attitude of third parties. They can recognise it as a violation of international law involving state responsibility, or as a start towards a new practice leading to a creation of a new norm. This remark is pertinent also with respect to the acts of domestic courts.

34 pcij, Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Judgment of 25 May 1926, Merits, Series A Case No. 7, 19. CHAPTER 5 The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated Pissarro Painting: Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity

Thomas Giegerich*

1 Introduction: Foreign Sovereign Immunity as an Issue of us Law

State immunity or sovereign immunity has been one of the most debated topics of general international law of the last decades. On the initiative of the un General Assembly (ga),1 the International Law Commission (ilc) took up the study of the law of jurisdictional immunities of states and their property in 1978. It submitted a final set of articles with commentaries to the ga in 1991.2 After years of further discussions, the ga finally adopted the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (uncimm) on 2 December 2004.3 It has not yet entered into force.4 Although the European Convention on State Immunity (ecsi) of 16 May 19725 is in force, only eight of the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have ratified it. States are obviously reluctant to assume treaty commitments in this respect. In a recent judgment,6 the International Court of Justice (icj) elucidated certain aspects of state immunity under customary international law

* This contribution was first published in Dirk Hanschel et al., eds., Mensch und Recht. Festschrift für Eibe H. Riedel (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013), 371–87 and is reprinted here by permission of the publisher. 1 unga, Resolution 32/151, a/res/32/151, 19 December 1977. 2 un, “Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with Commentaries,” Yearbook ilc 1991 ii(2). 3 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38 (uncimm). 4 On 25 January 2012, the Convention had thirteen parties, seventeen short of the number necessary under its art. 30(1); eighteen more states had signed it. 5 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, 1495 unts 181. 6 icj, Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, 99.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_006 52 Giegerich such as the alleged exception for ius cogens violations7 and the territorial tort exception.8 The United States (us) has been the mainspring of progress in state immunity law since the Tate letter of 1952 in which the State Department announced that it would henceforth apply the restrictive theory according to which state immunity extends only to public acts (acta iure imperii) but not commercial activity (acta iure gestionis).9 That move came in reaction to the appearance of state enterprises from non-market economies. At that time, courts in the us consistently deferred to the State Department’s suggestion as to whether claimed immunity should be granted in a particular case.10 The granting of immunity was depoliticised and the pertinent rules were clarified when Congress adopted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (fsia) of 1976,11 the first national statute of its kind. That act transferred the decision on claims of foreign states to immunity to the courts, subject to the rules embodied in the fsia.12 This statutory regime was intended to incorporate “standards recognized under international law”.13 At the same time, the us district courts were given original jurisdiction for civil actions against foreign states not entitled to immunity.14 It is not yet clear whether the courts are required to grant defer- ence to the views of the State Department on the foreign policy implications any exercise of jurisdiction under the fsia might have.15 Since 1976, the fsia, which codifies the restrictive theory of state immunity, has provided the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state,

7 See Thomas Giegerich, “Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?,” in Christian Tomuschat and Jean Marc Thouvenin, eds., The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 203–38. 8 See uncimm, 2004 (n. 3), art. 12. 9 Reprinted in William W. Bishop, “New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity,” American Journal of International Law 47 (1953): 93–106, 93–94. 10 Ralph G. Steinhardt, “United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976),” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 29 July 2014, mns 2 et seq. 11 us, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (fsia), 21 October 1976, 90 Stat. 2891, ilm 15 (1976), 1388 et seq., codified as 28 usc §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (with later amendments). 12 28 usc § 1602. 13 us, Report of the Committee on Judiciary of the House of Representatives, hr Rep. No. 94–1487 (1976), reprinted in ilm 15 (1976), 1398 et seq., 1405. 14 28 usc § 1330. 15 This was expressly left open in us Supreme Court, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, Decision of 7 June 2004, 541 us 677 (2004), 701–2. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 53 including its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,16 in courts in the us.17 In the last thirty-five years, many cases have been decided by the federal courts on the basis of the fsia. 28 usc § 1604, the fsia’s central provision, as a rule grants immunity from the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts to a foreign state “except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607”, subject to international agreements. Apart from those agreements,18 the presumption of 28 usc § 1604 can thus only be rebutted by the exceptions exhaustively enumerated in the fsia; unless one of them applies, the courts will not have subject matter jurisdiction.19 Otherwise the foreign state will be liable as a private individual defendant under like circumstances,20 i.e. subject to substantive federal or state law rules of liability outside the fsia which is a jurisdictional statute only. The fsia applies retroactively to conduct preceding its enactment, on the theory that jurisdictional issues are governed by the law of the time when the jurisdiction is to be exercised.21 While the fsia cursorily mentions international law,22 not least because Congress enacted it for the purpose of bringing us law into conformity with international legal standards,23 it does not meticulously codify those standards. Rather, Congress assumed that “[a]lthough the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in international law, its specific content and application have generally been left to the court of individual nations”.24 When formulating the detailed rules on the exceptions to state immunity for the courts in the us, Congress therefore enacted whatever it considered politi- cally and legally appropriate without giving much thought to international law. Since then, the statute has developed an independent existence, becoming ever more detached from its international law roots. This holds true for both legislative amendments and judicial applications. Thus, when Congress added

16 28 usc § 1603(a) and (b). 17 us Supreme Court, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation, Decision of 23 January 1989, 488 us 428 (1989), 439. 18 The provison was intended to ensure that the enactment would not affect the provisions of the nato Status of Forces Agreement or similar agreements nor commercial agreements (us, Report [n. 13], 1407). 19 us Supreme Court, Austria v. Altmann (n. 15), 691; us Supreme Court, Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, Decision of 14 June 2007, 551 us 193 (2007), 197. See also Steinhardt, “Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (n. 10), mn 7. 20 28 usc § 1606. 21 us Supreme Court, Austria v. Altmann (n. 15). See also icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 6), para. 58. 22 28 usc § 1602 (“international law”), § 1604 and § 1609 (“international agreements”). 23 Steinhardt, “Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (n. 10), mn 13. See also n. 13. 24 us, Report (n. 13), 1405. 54 Giegerich the “terrorism exception” to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state in 1996,25 it obviously went beyond the exceptions recognised by current international law,26 using its power to override customary international law within the domestic legal order of the us.27 Courts in the us rarely refer to international law when interpreting the fsia, despite the early decision of the us Supreme Court that federal statutes are to be interpreted in conformity with international law where possible28—an approach suggesting itself with regard to a statute trying to codify the international law precepts on state immunity.29 One of the reasons may be a mistakable passage in the first us Supreme Court decision dealing with sovereign immunity which stated that the territorial jurisdiction of a state was absolute and susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself, for instance by implicitly consenting not to exercise its jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.30 This has led some publicists to conclude that the granting of state immunity was only a matter of political courtesy (comity) and not of legal obligation.31 The codification efforts of the ilc and the recent icj decision have proved them wrong: the rules on state immunity are part of customary international law, even though their exact scope is often controversial.32 Referring to article 2(1) un Charter, the icj explained that state immunity “occupies an important place in international law (. . .). It derives

25 28 usc § 1605A. 26 See uncimm, 2004 (n. 3), arts. 10–17. See also Ronald J. Bettauer, “Germany Sues Italy at the International Court of Justice on Foreign Sovereign Immunity—Legal Underpinnings and Implications for us Law,” asil Insight 13(22) (2009). 27 See American Law Institute, ed., Restatement of the Law (Third): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol. 1 (Washington: American Law Institute, 1987), para. 115. 28 us Supreme Court, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, Decision of February 1804, 6 us 64 (1804), 118. 29 See e.g. us Supreme Court, Permanent Mission of India (n. 19), 201 et seq. which cites the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, (18 April 1961, 500 unts 95) but does not mention the customary rules on state immunity. 30 us Supreme Court, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 us 116 (1812), 136 et seq. See also us Supreme Court, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Decision of 23 May 1983, 461 us 480 (1983), 486: “foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.” 31 See Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 741–81, 763 et seq. But see Jasper Finke, “Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?,” European Journal of International Law 21 (2010): 853–81, 870 et seq. 32 Peter-Tobis Stoll, “State Immunity,” in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia (n. 10), mn 2. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 55 from the principle of sovereign equality of States, which (. . .) is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order”.33 The practical operation of the fsia will be analysed below on the basis of three recent cases of considerable political importance that will likely generate further litigation. The first one concerns the question whether the Holy See enjoys immunity from actions in connection with sexual abuses of juveniles committed by Catholic priests.34 The second case deals with the immunity of former high foreign government officials who are sued for damages on account of human rights violations they allegedly committed while in office.35 The third case expounds the fsia’s expropriation exception to state immunity in the context of a suit to recover a painting confiscated by the Nazi government of Germany from a Jewish persecute.36 All three proceedings were initiated by victims of outrageous and inhuman treatment which partly explains their outcome.

2 Denial of Immunity to Holy See under Tort Exception in Sexual Abuse Cases

Doe v. Holy See37 concerns one important aspect of the extensive litigation in the us against the Catholic Church regarding allegations of widespread sexual abuse of youths by members of the clergy.38 Doe (a pseudonym) sued the Holy See for damages, alleging that while a juvenile he had been sexually abused by a Catholic priest in Oregon. That priest had been involved in similar incidents in other places before being transferred to Oregon. The plaintiff based his claims under Oregon law on the Holy See’s vicarious respondeat superior liability for its employee and also alleged direct liability for defendant’s negligent retention and supervision of the priest and its negligent failure to warn Doe of the priest’s dangerousness. The Holy See claimed immunity as a foreign sovereign.

33 icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 6), para. 57. 34 us, Court of Appeals, Doe v. Holy See, Opinion of 3 March 2009, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). See below section 2. 35 us Supreme Court, Samantar v. Yousuf, Decision of 1 June 2010, 560 us ____ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). See below section 3. 36 us, Court of Appeals, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, Opinion of 12 August 2010, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied on 27 June 2011, Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States (October 2010): 1014 No. 10-786. See section 4. 37 See (n. 34). 38 James Fantau, “Rethinking the Sovereign Status of the Holy See,” Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 19 (2011): 487–525, 488–89. 56 Giegerich

Assuming plaintiff’s factual allegations to be true, the District Court refused to apply the fsia’s commercial activity exception,39 but it denied the defendant’s immunity on the basis of the tort exception.40 The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in a per curiam opinion41 agreed with the District Court that Doe’s respondeat superior claim (but not his direct liability claims) came within the fsia’s tort exception. To that extent the Holy See was not immune from suit. While the per curiam opinion did not consider the commercial activity exception for jurisdictional reasons, refusing to inquire into “the arcane question of whether church functions are commercial activity because churches receive financial support from their parishioners, or otherwise”, both the partially dissenting opinion and the concurring opinion addressed that question. Without referring to international law, the per curiam opinion implicitly assumed that the Holy See qualified as a “foreign state” in the sense of 28 usc § 1604 and immediately proceeded to the tort exception. It held that the priest’s actions which could give rise to defendant’s respondeat superior liability under Oregon law were within the scope of his employment by the Holy See, as required by the tort exception.42 Accordingly, the Holy See was not immune from Doe’s respondeat superior claim. With regard to the plaintiff’s negligent retention, supervision and failure to warn claims, however, the court granted immunity to defendant on the basis of the discretionary function counter- exception which made the tort exception inapplicable. The Holy See’s decisions whether to retain the priest, how to supervise him and whether to warn his parishioners were of a kind that typically involved policy judgments the

39 28 usc § 1605(a)(2): “[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case—(. . .) (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state (. . .)”. 40 28 usc § 1605(a)(5): “[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case—(. . .) (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to—(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused (. . .)”. 41 This is an opinion by an appellate court which does not identify the individual judge who wrote it (Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West, 9th edn 2009), 1201). 42 The different conclusion in us Court of Appeals, O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied on 5 October 2009, Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States (October 2009): 12 No. 08-1384 was due to differences in the relevant state law. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 57 counter-exception was designed to protect. Having partially affirmed and partially reversed the district court decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its own opinion. In her partly dissenting opinion, Judge Berzon explained that she would have denied immunity to the Holy See also with regard to Doe’s negligent retention, supervision and failure to warn claims because these came within the commercial activity exception. In difference to the majority she thought that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to apply that exception which she interpreted broadly, relying on a us Supreme Court decision that had classified the issuance of bonds by Argentina to refinance its debt as commercial.43 She would consider as “commercial” all activities in which a foreign state engaged by exercising only those powers that could also be exercised by private citizens rather than powers peculiar to sovereigns.44 Every activity that was not sovereign in nature was commercial, regardless of its purpose or motive45 or profitability. On this basis, employment relationships between foreign states and their employees were generally to be treated as commercial unless the employee was a civil service, diplomatic, or military employee. The priest did not belong into any of these categories. Rather, he was hired for ecclesiasti- cal and parochial services which could be performed by non-governmental entities and indeed were, for example by the Mormon Church and the Greek Orthodox Church which also operated international religious institutions. While acknowledging the unique character of the Holy See as a sovereign, Judge Berzon insisted on applying the fsia to it in the same way as to states. The fsia was intended to protect only governmental activities and not religious activities. Having explained that Doe’s negligence claims were “based upon” the Holy See’s commercial activity (i.e. the employment relationship), the dissenter did not consider the fact as decisive that activity was tortious in nature. That did not make the tort exception exclusively applicable and the commercial activity exception inapplicable; rather, both could be applied to the same conduct.46 Judge Fernandez added a concurring opinion specifically for the purpose to refute the dissenter’s position on the commercial activity exception. He was obviously upset by the idea that holy activities like celebrating masses, hearing

43 us Supreme Court, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Decision of 12 June 1992, 504 us 607 (1992). 44 See Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 2nd edn 2008), 342 et seq. on the commercial activity exception in general. 45 See 28 usc § 1603(e). 46 But see us Court of Appeals, O’Bryan v. Holy See (n. 42). 58 Giegerich confessions or giving religious advice were market operations. Reading the us Supreme Court’s Weltover decision47 differently than his colleague, he pointed out that not every possible private activity was commercial in the sense of the fsia. Sovereigns only pursued a commercial activity when they performed the type of actions by which a private party engaged in trade and traffic or commerce. Priestly counselling to a faithful—the very service that the Holy See with its unique kind of sovereignty was designed for—was no market activity, nor could it be performed by any private individual. The Holy See filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. In an amicus curiae brief submitted upon the invitation of the us Supreme Court, the us recommended that the petition be granted, the decision vacated and the case remanded.48 The us argued that the Court of Appeals had misapplied the tort exception, but only for reasons of domestic law. The brief did not make any argument based on international law. It only included a general statement that the us had an interest in ensuring that courts in the us carefully applied the fsia “[b]ecause improperly subjecting a foreign state to suit can in some circumstances raise foreign-relations and reciprocity concerns”.49 The us Supreme Court denied the petition in an unreasoned order,50 presumably because the per curiam opinion did not conflict with any other court decision so that there was no need to intervene for the sake of legal certainty.51 It is well established that the purely discretionary denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as an endorsement of the decision below.52 The District Court has meanwhile made a jurisdictional discovery order53 upon which the Holy See released all the relevant documents in its archives.54 Had it refused, it would have become subject

47 See us Supreme Court, Argentina v. Weltover (n. 43). 48 us Supreme Court, “No. 09-1: Holy See v. Doe—Amicus (Invitation),” accessed 2 August 2013, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2009/2pet/6invit/2009-0001.pet.ami.inv.pdf. 49 Ibid., 20. 50 Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States (October 2009): 1008 No. 09-1. Currently six of the nine Justices are Catholic. 51 See us Supreme Court, “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,” accessed 6 August 2013, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf, rule 10. 52 See, e.g., us Supreme Court, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, Decision of 8 June 1959, 360 us 246 (1959), note 1 (per curiam); us Supreme Court, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Decision of 9 January 1950, 338 us 912 (1950), 917–19 (Opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 53 us, Oregon District Court, John V. Doe v. Holy See, Opinion and Order of 20 April 2011, Case No. cv 02-430-mo, Document 277. 54 “Release of Documents in Doe v. Holy See,” accessed 6 August 2013, http://www.scribd. com/doc/62488531/Documents-Doe-v-Holy-See. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 59 to the imposition (though probably not the enforcement) of civil sanctions for contempt of court which are not precluded by the fsia.55 This case which is likely to elicit further suits against the Holy See calls for a brief evaluation. Most states have recognised the Holy See, consisting of the Pope and the Roman Curia that form the universal government of the Catholic Church, as a unique (sui generis) sovereign or subject of international law which is distinct from the State of the Vatican City that has constituted its territorial basis since the 1929 Lateran Treaties.56 Of the two, the Holy See plays the principal role internationally while the Vatican City’s role is subsidiary.57 Over 170 states maintain diplomatic relations with the Holy See; the us has done so since 1984.58 The Holy See is a full member of several international organisations (e.g. the World Intellectual Property Organization [wipo] and the International Atomic Energy Agency [iaea]) and has observer status with several others, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe. It has signed and ratified a large number of important multilateral treaties such as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. In view of the Holy See’s international legal personality, its close nexus with the state of the Vatican City whose international relations the Holy See administers, and its recognition as an equal by most states, there can be no doubt that at least those states which maintain diplomatic relations with the Holy See are obliged to grant it the same immunity mutatis mutandis as they grant states. Accordingly, the us courts have as a matter of course applied the fsia to the Holy See as if it were a state. It is another matter if any of the internationally recognised exceptions to state immunity permitted the us courts to exercise jurisdiction in the instant case. While it can safely be assumed that the commercial activity exception of the fsia is part of customary international law,59 it is questionable whether

55 us Court of Appeals, fg Hemisphere Associates, llc v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision of 15 March 2011, 637 F.3d 373 (dc Cir. 2011). See “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,” American Journal of International Law 105 (2011): 568–611, 578–80. 56 Gerd Westdickenberg, “Holy See,” in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia (n. 10); Robert J. Araujo, “The International Personality of the Holy See,” Catholic University Law Review 50 (2001): 291– 360, 323 et seq. The Pope functions as the head of state of both these subjects of international law and thus enjoys personal immunity. 57 It is therefore impossible to consider the Holy See as an instrumentality of the state of the Vatican City (but see Fantau, “Sovereign Status” (n. 38). Rather, the latter is an instrumentality of the former. 58 See the Background Note “Holy See” by the us Department of State, “us Relations with the Holy See,” accessed 6 August 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3819.htm. 59 Stoll, “State Immunity” (n. 32), mns 26 et seq. 60 Giegerich priestly activities may be qualified as acta iure gestionis. The fact that those activities could also be undertaken by private (or public but non-sovereign) entities does not distract from the fact that the Holy See’s sovereignty has long been recognised precisely to enable it to conduct them on a par with the normal sovereign activities of states.60 Priestly activities are the quintessential acta iure imperii of the Holy See. Moreover, international law seems to recognise only a commercial transaction exception and not a general non-sovereign or private act exception to state immunity.61 Even if one does not categorise priestly activities as mutatis mutandis sovereign, they are certainly not commercial, neither regarding their nature nor their purpose.62 The fact that the actor (the priest in the instant case) may have exercised the “sovereignty” of the Holy See on the basis of an employment contract does not turn his “sovereign” acts into commercial acts. In making the contrary argument, Judge Berzon implicitly refers to but apparently misunderstands the employment contract exception to state immunity which covers only disputes between the state and its employee.63 This leaves only the tort exception which has been included in article 12 uncimm in rather sweeping terms.64 The ilc’s pertinent commentary explains that the exception is mainly concerned with insurable risks of accidents but formulated broad enough to cover even assassinations.65 It also indicates that it is questionable whether the provision codifies customary international law and that some ilc members had serious reservations in this regard.66 These reservations were shared by the European Court of Human Rights.67 When commenting on the draft uncimm in 2004, even the us stated that article 12 “must be read in the light of established State practice to concern tortious acts

60 See us, Court of Appeals, Doe v. Holy See (n. 34), 2604 fn. 2. 61 uncimm, 2004 (n. 3), art. 10. See also Antoine J. Bullier, “La cour suprême des États-unis refuse d’entendre un appel déniant au Saint Siège la pleine immunité de souveraineté,” Revue de droit international et de droit comparé 87 (2010): 398–401, 401. 62 See the definition in uncimm, 2004 (n. 3), art. 2(1)(c), art. 2(2). 63 uncimm, 2004 (n. 3), art. 11. The ilc’s pertinent commentary states that this exception had only recently emerged (un, “Draft Articles Immunities” (n. 2), 41). 64 See also ecsi, 1972 (n. 5), arts. 11, 31. See Fox, State Immunity (n. 44), 569 et seq. 65 By way of an example, the ilc referred to us Columbia District Court, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, Opinion of 11 March 1980, 488 F.Supp. 665 which had been based on the fsia’s tort exception (un, “Draft Articles Immunities” (n. 2), 45 fn. 149). 66 un, “Draft Articles Immunities” (n. 2), 44 et seq. 67 ecthr, Mc Elhinney v. Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 31253/96, para. 38. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 61 or omissions of a private nature (. . .), while preserving immunity for those acts of a strictly sovereign or governmental nature”.68 The icj has now made clear that there was no tort exception to state immunity in customary international law which would encompass torts allegedly committed by the armed forces or other organs of a state on the territory of another state in the course of conducting an armed conflict. While it left open the question whether other acts iure imperii on foreign territory might fall under such an exception,69 the icj judgment aggravates existing doubts. The only relatively safe assumption is that customary international law today excepts torts committed in the forum state from immunity to the extent that they constitute insurable risks.

3 Former Somalian Prime Minister’s Immunity not Governed by fsia

Samantar v. Yousuf70 is about the immunity which foreign officials enjoy under international law. Before the collapse of the Somalian military regime in 1991, petitioner Samantar was the Prime Minister and at other times the Minister of Defence and the First Vice President. Respondents claim that they, or members of their families, were victims of torture, extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions committed by military forces under the control of petitioner. Respondents sued petitioner, who now resides in the us, for damages under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (tvpa)71 and the Alien Tort Statute (ats).72 Petitioner claimed immunity under the fsia which the District Court affirmed after having long waited in vain for a statement from the us State Department. The Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit rejected the view held by the District Court and other Circuits that the fsia applied also to individual officials of a foreign state. It remanded the case to the District Court for a determination whether petitioner enjoyed immunity under the common law. In view of the split among the Circuits, the us Supreme Court granted certiorari73 and unanimously affirmed the position of the 4th Circuit.74

68 unga, Agenda Item 142: Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, A/C.6/59/sr.13, 22 March 2005, para. 63 (intervention by Mr. Rosand, usa). 69 icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 6), paras. 62 et seq. 70 us Supreme Court, Samantar v. Yousuf (n. 35). 71 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 12 March 1992, 106 Stat. 73, 28 usc § 1350 note. 72 Alien Tort Statute, 27 August 1789, 28 usc § 1350. 73 us Supreme Court, 557 us __ (2009). 74 us Supreme Court, Samantar v. Yousuf (n. 35). 62 Giegerich

The us Supreme Court held that the statutory text and history clearly showed that the fsia only applied to foreign states, their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities (i.e. entities) and did not cover individual officials. Congress did apparently not want to eliminate the traditional role of the State Department with regard to individual official immunity. Petitioner expressly invoked “the canon that a statute should be interpreted in compliance with international law”75 but the Court noted that its opinion did not deprive Samantar of any immunity to which he might be entitled under international law. It only meant that petitioner was not protected by the fsia and had to seek protection under the common law, a matter to be decided by the District Court on remand. That court would also need to determine whether the action against the official had to be treated as an action against the state, in which case it would have to be dismissed if the state enjoyed immunity under the fsia, irrespective of the common law immunity of the official.76 The us Supreme Court left undecided “whether declining to afford immunity to petitioner would be inconsistent with international law”. On remand, the District Court will now have to determine whether Samantar enjoys immunity pursuant to the federal common law which in this respect is informed by customary international law. Among the questions to be answered in this context are these:77 does Samantar enjoy (former) Head of State or Head of Government immunity ratione personae?78 Were the egregious human rights violations he is charged with committed in his official capacity so that he may enjoy immunity ratione materiae? Are there other reasons under international or national law to deny Samantar’s claim to immunity because of the gravity of the alleged human rights violations?79 Does it matter that Somalia has become a failed state with no government recognised by the us? Does the assertion of

75 Ibid., 14 fn. 14, citing us Supreme Court, Murray v. Betsy (n. 28). 76 See Chanaka Wickremasinghe, “Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International Organizations,” in Malcolm D. Evans, ed., International Law (New York: oup, 3rd edn 2010), 380–410, 396 et seq. 77 See David P. Stewart, “Samantar v. Yousuf: Foreign Official Immunity under Common Law,” asil Insight 14(15) (2010). 78 See Arthur Watts, “Heads of State,” in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia (n. 10), mns 12 et seq.; Arthur Watts, “Heads of Governments and other Senior Officials,” in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia (n. 10), mns 11 et seq. 79 See uk, House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, Judgment of 24 March 1999, accessed 6 August 2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/ jd990324/pino1.htm. See generally Rosanne van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (Oxford: oup, 2008). Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 63 immunity of a foreign official by the State Department bind the courts? Did Congress override any common law immunity by enacting the tvpa which has established claims for damages in favour of torture victims? If the State Department chooses not to intervene in the case,80 the courts will have to decide the immunity issue on their own.81 Presumably, they will follow the Pinochet case82 and point out that as a former official Samantar at best enjoys immunity ratione materiae which is intended to protect Somalia from interferences in its sovereignty by foreign courts. Somalia is under an international legal obligation to prosecute Samantar for his crimes and ensure that he compensates his victims. Being a failed state and thus unable to fulfil this obligation, it cannot invoke immunity to prevent the us courts from step- ping in.83 On the other hand, article 2(1)(b)(iv) uncimm equates representatives of a state acting in that capacity with the state for purposes of immunity without recognising any exception for international crimes.84 With regard to the substantive claims under the tvpa and the ats, further questions remain to be answered, including the statute of limitation.85

4 Nazi Confiscation of Pissarro Painting Deprives Spain of Immunity

The plaintiff in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain was the heir of a German Jew whose Pissarro painting had been confiscated in 1939 by the Nazis as an act of racist persecution. The painting was later successively bought by several art dealers before it ended up in the collection of Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza. The Baron ultimately sold his entire collection to the Kingdom of Spain which established

80 See Harold H. Koh, “Foreign Official Immunity after Samantar: A United States Government Perspective,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011), 1141–61, 1159 et seq. 81 On possible criteria see Chimène I. Keitner, “Foreign Official Immunity after Samantar,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011), 837–52, 849 et seq. 82 See (n. 79). 83 See also Sarah Andrews, “us Courts Rule on Absolute Immunity and Inviolability of Foreign Heads of State: The Cases against Robert Mugabe and Jiang Zemin,” asil Insight 8(27) (2004); Beth Stephens, “The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity,” Fordham Law Review 79 (2011): 2669–719. 84 David P. Stewart, “The Immunity of State Officials under the un Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 1047–71. 85 See Ernesto J. Sanchez, “Samantar v. Yousuf,” American Journal of International Law 105 (2011): 319–25, 324–25. 64 Giegerich the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation as an instrumentality running a museum in Madrid where the collection is on display. The Spanish Minister for Culture having refused to return the painting, the plaintiff filed suit in the us seeking either its return or recovery of damages for conversion. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of state immunity pursuant to the fsia. After a panel of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit had denied defendants’ state immunity claim, the Court decided to rehear the case before the full bench (en banc). In a 9:2 decision, the 9th Circuit concluded that defendants did not enjoy immunity under the fsia.86 The majority relied on the expropriation exception in 28 usc § 1605(a)(3) according to which a foreign state is not immune in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property (. . .) is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States”. Plaintiff’s claim as to the illegality of the expropriation was considered plausible which was sufficient at the jurisdictional stage. In all this, the majority assumed that the original owner had been stripped of her German citizenship before the confiscation took place; the District Court’s determination to this effect was not challenged on appeal. That assumption was legally decisive because the 9th Circuit had previously held that the expropriation exception did not apply where the plaintiff was a citizen of the state that took her property since such taking was of no international concern.87 The case raised three important issues: whether the expropriation exception extended to the instrumentalities of a state which had not taken the painting in violation of international law; whether the Foundation engaged in sufficient commercial activity in the us; and whether the exercise of jurisdiction was conditional on the prior exhaustion of remedies in Spain and Germany. The majority gave affirmative answers to all three questions without even mentioning international law. With regard to the first, the majority referred to the plain meaning of the statutory text which was written in the passive voice and thus required only that the property had been taken by any foreign state in violation of international law, not necessarily the state being sued. The text of the expropriation exception did not include an exhaustion requirement either. The defendants might later raise non-exhaustion at the merits stage as a reason to deny the existence of a taking in violation of international law, but it played no role at the jurisdiction stage.

86 See (n. 36). 87 us Court of Appeals, Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, Decision of 29 August 1990, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990). Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 65

The two dissenting judges, in spite of their sympathy for the victims of Nazi persecution, would not apply the expropriation exception to a state like Spain that had not taken the property in violation of international law. They found that the wording of the provision was ambiguous in this respect and should be read more narrowly.88 In support they cited the Hickenlooper Amendment of 1964 which provided that claims arising out of foreign expropriations in violation of international law were justiciable in courts in the us despite the act of state doctrine.89 In this context the amendment expressly stated that the defendant state must be the one which had taken the property.90 The majority countered that argument by pointing out that the act of state doctrine was a substantive defence on the merits whereas the immunity defence pertained to jurisdiction. Moreover, the Hickenlooper Amendment showed that Congress knew how to write “that state” when it wanted to. In its most interesting part, the dissent referred to the Congressional intention of keeping the fsia consistent with international law. Specifically, the expropriation exception was “based upon the general presumption that states abide by international law and, hence, violations of international law are not ‘sovereign’ acts”.91 On the basis of this obviously incorrect premise92 the dissent argued that when customary international law concluded that the taking of property which violated international law was no longer a sovereign act, the expropriating state was not entitled to sovereign immunity.93 But this did not support the exercise of jurisdiction over a state that had legitimately acquired property which had previously been taken in violation of international law by some other state. Penalising the innocent purchaser for a breach of international law committed by another state was not in conformity with international law either. The fsia should not be interpreted in this way.94 The conclusion which the dissent drew from its incorrect premise seems quite plausible.

88 For this they cited the American Law Institute, Restatement (n. 27), para. 455 comment c (1987). 89 On the act of state doctrine see ibid., paras. 443–44. 90 22 usc § 2370 (e)(2). 91 The dissent here quotes us Court of Appeals, West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., Decision of 6 January 1987, 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987), para. 22. 92 icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 6), para. 60. Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts,” European Journal of International Law 21 (2011): 815–52, 828 et seq. 93 See below on the question whether the expropriation exception could by justified as countermeasures (“reprisals”). 94 The dissent here invoked the us Supreme Court, Murray v. Betsy (n. 28). 66 Giegerich

In evaluating the decision, one cannot but question the assumption that the original owner had been deprived of her German citizenship before the painting was confiscated and she left Germany in 1939. As a Jewish German, the owner had definitely been relegated to second class citizenship by the racist Reichsbürgergesetz of 193595 which deprived Jews of their political rights but not their German citizenship as such. While there were also outright dena- tionalisations of Jewish Germans on the basis of other statutory provisions,96 it would have to be proven that the owner was subjected to such an individual act of persecution. It is also problematic to assume that the confiscation violated international law as it existed in 1939, an assumption that was not challenged on appeal either. Before the human rights revolution of 1945 the treatment by a state of its own citizens, including racial discrimination, was considered as an internal affair in almost all cases, and certainly with regard to expropriations without compensation. Even today, customary international law does not prevent a state from confiscating the property of its own citizens, nor is there any universal human rights treaty to this effect;97 at best, the prohibition of confiscations is among the minimum standards for the treatment of foreigners.98 If the original owner still had German citizenship when the painting was taken, the confiscation did not violate international law. If she had already been denationalised and thus in all likelihood become stateless, international law did not protect her from expropriations either. Even if the confiscation had been carried out in violation of international law, it is questionable whether that justifies the denial of immunity to the confiscating state, let alone an innocent third state. By enacting 28 usc § 1605(a)(3) in 1976, which has remained unique, Congress apparently wanted to send a clear political message to the Communist and other despisers of private property that their victims would be given a forum in the us as soon as the beneficiaries of the expropriations engaged in commercial activities in the us. The expropriation exception was intended to cover arbitrary or discriminatory expropriations and those made without payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation which Congress believed was required

95 Germany, Reichsbürgergesetz, 15 September 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt i (1935), 1146. 96 See Thomas Giegerich, “Art. 116,” in Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig, eds., Grundgesetz (München: C.H. Beck, 67th edn 2013), mns 97 et seq. 97 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 unts 171 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 unts 3, do not include any provision on the protection of property, in contrast to the three regional human rights treaties in Europe, Africa and the Americas. 98 See Ursula Kriebaum and August Reinisch, “Property, Right to, International Protection,” in Wolfrum, Encyclopedia (n. 10). Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 67 by international law.99 But present customary international law does not recognise any general illegal expropriation exception along the lines of 28 usc § 1605(a)(3); none is included in either the ecsi or the uncimm nor is one discernible from the practice of other states.100 Moreover, customary international law does not make the recognition of state immunity for internationally wrongful acts “dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress”.101 Expropriations are obviously acta iure imperii; they do not become subject to foreign court jurisdiction simply because of a later commercial activity somehow related to the expropriated property. The Congressional enactment could therefore at most be justified as an instance of countermeasures in the sense of articles 49 et seq. of the ilc Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001.102 However, 28 usc § 1605(a)(3) is much too broad and categorical to be qualified as legitimate countermeasures: the us is not an “injured state” in the sense of article 42 of the ilc Articles with regard to all expropriations that are carried out in violation of international law anywhere in the world and do not affect us citizens. Nor can the us resort to countermeasures in favour of one of its nationals before the latter has exhausted all available and effective local remedies (article 44(b) of the ilc Articles). Nor does the application of the expropriation exception have a temporary character, as required by article 49(2) of the ilc Articles. Rather, it tries to carry out a kind of execution by substitution for the benefit of the victim of the illegal expropriation. With the assignment of the decision-making power over the expropriation exception to the judiciary, the us is also no longer capable of adhering to the procedural requirements which have to be fulfilled before the use of countermeasures, such as prior notification and an offer to negotiate (article 52 of the ilc Articles). Finally, countermeasures are only permissible vis-à-vis the state responsible for the violation of international law that they are intended to bring to an end (article 49(1) of the ilc Articles). Thus, in the instant case Spain could never be legitimately targeted. When the 9th Circuit denied Spain immunity, it therefore violated international law, a result that could have been avoided by interpreting

99 Andrew Dickinson, Rae Lindsay and James P. Loonam, State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 2004), 258. 100 Fox, State Immunity (n. 44), 350. But see International Law Association, “Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity,” Report of the 66th Conference (Buenos Aires 14–20 August 1994), 22 et seq., art. iii(g). 101 icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 6), para. 101. But see also the dissenting opinion by Judge Yusuf. 102 unga, Resolution 56/83, a/res/56/83, 28 January 2002, annex. See Helmut Damian, Staatenimmunität und Gerichtszwang (Berlin et al.: Springer, 1985), 108 et seq., but also Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague et al.: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), 69 et seq. 68 Giegerich the expropriation exception of the fsia more narrowly, as suggested by the dissent.

5 Conclusion: International Precedential Value of National Court Decisions Ignoring International Law

From an international law perspective, of the three decisions above only Samantar v. Yousuf is unproblematic. For this case, the test will come when the lower courts decide on remand about Samantar’s immunity under common law, hopefully taking the international legal rules on the immunity of foreign officials adequately into account. The denial of immunity to Spain in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain is incompatible with international law, an unfortunate result which is to be blamed on both the legislature and the judiciary in the us: Congress enacted an expropriation exception to state immunity in disregard of international law which the majority of the 9th Circuit then interpreted more broadly than necessary, consummating the breach in the instant case. The result of Doe v. Holy See is less clearly incompatible with international law. But there again Congress formulated a tort exception to state immunity which the 9th Circuit unhesitatingly applied even though its permissibility under international law is controversial. Neither Congress nor the Court made any effort to fathom the permissible extent of the tort exception and formulate or interpret the provision accordingly. Admittedly, the result in both cases promoted the human rights of victims of persecution and abuse to whom justice had not yet been brought, but at the price of violating international law: two wrongs do not make a right.103 The us would certainly object, if in cases in which it was entitled to immunity under the rules of international law, the courts of other states exercised jurisdiction for the sake of bringing justice to the victims of alleged human rights violations by the us. How then should the international community react to national court decisions which demonstrate such utter disinterest in or even disregard for international law? National court decisions play an ambiguous role in the international law doctrine of sources.104 On the one hand, they qualify as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law pursuant to article 38(1)(d)

103 See the dissenting opinion in us, Court of Appeals, Cassirer v. Spain (n. 36). 104 Anthea Roberts, “Comparative International Law?,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60 (2011): 57–92. Recent us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity 69 icj Statute.105 On the other hand, they represent instances of state practice in the sense of article 38(1)(b) icj Statute. As the reference to article 59 icj Statute indicates, article 38(1)(d) icj Statute accords persuasive authority and not binding authority to icj decisions and a fortiori national court decisions.106 If the latter do not even mention international law, however, they are entirely unpersuasive in this regard and thus disqualify themselves as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. With regard to article 38(1)(b) icj Statute, national court decisions can only serve as evidence of a general practice accepted as law if they are based on the conviction that their holding is not only compatible with but positively required by international law.107 This conviction, although it may be based on state practice which is still fragmentary and at a formative stage,108 must somehow be expressed. If national judicial decisions do not demonstrate any effort at making at least a plausible argument on the basis of international law but completely ignore it, they are at best irrelevant for purposes of article 38(1)(b) icj Statute, at worst internationally wrongful acts. The latter of course applies a fortiori to judicial decisions that wilfully disregard international law. It is unimportant whether courts ignore or disregard international law on their own accord (perhaps because neither the parties nor the State Department presented pertinent arguments and the courts did not explore the international law context of the case ex officio) or driven by legislation which overrides the state’s international commitments for purposes of domestic law. From the perspective of international law, all these cases constitute failures of the national legal or judicial system. The proper reaction of the international community to such instances of ignorance or disregard of international law is to ignore or disregard them when it comes to gathering evidence of the development of international law. If national courts want to be taken seriously by international law, they need to take international law seriously and show it.

105 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 15 uncio 355. 106 It is controversial whether decisions of national courts are at all covered by icj Statute, art. 38(1)(d)—see Alain Pellet, “Art. 38,” in Andreas Zimmermann et al., eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford: oup, 2nd edn 2012), MN 321. 107 Ibid., mns 223 et seq. 108 Benedetto Conforti, “The Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of their State,” Preliminary and Provisional Report, Yearbook of the Institute of International Law 65(i) (1993), 327 et seq. and 386 et seq. (quoted approvingly in the dissenting opinion by Judge Yusuf (n. 101), para. 49). CHAPTER 6 La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution

Mathias Audit

1 Introduction

Sur le territoire d’États étrangers, les États bénéficient en principe d’une immunité d’exécution. Celle-ci leur permet de s’opposer à toutes mesures d’exécution forcée, provisoire ou définitive, que l’un de leurs créanciers enten- drait diligenter sur des biens ou plus généralement des actifs leur appartenant, directement ou indirectement. Sur ce dernier point, on sait que diverses théo- ries permettent à des créanciers de saisir, sur le fondement d’une créance à l’encontre d’un État, des biens relevant du patrimoine d’une personne morale distincte de celui-ci. Il faut simplement que cette personne juridique puisse être qualifiée, selon la théorie retenue par le système juridique du lieu de la mesure d’exécution, d’émanation ou d’alter ego.1

1 Royaume-Uni, Cour d’appel de Jersey (Privy Council), La Générale des Carrières et des Mines c. F.G. Hemisphere Associates llc, Décision du 17 juillet 2012, 2012 United Kingdom Privy Council 27 : la juridiction britannique présente une analyse très fouillée des différentes théories permettant en droit comparé d’étendre le champ de la saisie sur ce type de fondement. Sur la théorie de l’émanation en droit français : France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., Arrêt du 12 mai 2004, n° 02-12.920 ; France, Cour d’appel de Paris, Walker International Holdings Ltd c. République du Congo, 23 janvier 2003, Gazette du Palais, 31 mai 2003, p. 18 ; France, Cour de cassation, Ch. com., 23 novembre 1999, Droit Maritime Français, 2000, p. 719, note N. Molfessis ; France, Cour de cassation, Ch. com., 1er octobre 1997, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 1997, p. 751, rapport J.-P. Rémery ; France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 4 janvier 1995, Répertoire Defresnois, 1995, p. 747, note P. Delebecque ; Journal du Droit International, 1995, p. 645, note A. Mahiou ; France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., Navrom Romanian Maritime Navigation c. Buenamar Compania Naviera, 6 juillet 1988, Journal du Droit International, 1989, p. 376, note P. Kahn ; France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., Sté Benvenutti et Bonfant, Arrêt du 21 juillet 1987, n° 85-14.843, Journal du Droit International, 1988, p. 8, note P. Kahn ; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 1988, p. 744, note J. Mestre ; France, Cour de cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 2 novembre 1971, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 1972, p. 310, note P. Bourel ; Semaine Juridique 1972.ii.16969, note D. Ruzié.

Mais au-delà du périmètre possible de la saisie, chaque droit national défi- nit, selon des critères souvent très proches, le domaine de l’immunité d’exécu- tion. Certains États maintiennent encore à cet égard une conception absolue de l’immunité d’exécution, c’est-à-dire que celle-ci n’y souffre d’aucune exception, même en matière commerciale. Dans une récente décision rendue le 8 juin 2011 dans une affaire Democratic Republic of the Congo c. fg Hemisphere Associates llc, la Cour suprême de Hong Kong a ainsi jugé qu’en droit local, l’immunité d’exécution dont bénéficient les États étrangers est absolue.2 La solution est d’autant plus frappante qu’avant le rattachement de l’île à la République populaire de Chine, les juridictions locales faisaient application du United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act de 1978, lequel prévoit bien une exception pour les biens affectés à une activité commerciale. Cette dernière conception visant à exclure certains biens du domaine de l’immunité d’exécution est d’ailleurs, en droit comparé et à l’heure actuelle, la plus répandue. Ainsi, pour prendre l’exemple du droit français, l’immunité d’exécution portant sur les biens appartenant à l’État peut être levée lorsque le bien saisi est « affecté à l’activité économique ou commerciale relevant du droit privé qui donne lieu à la demande en justice ».3 Surtout, la Convention des Nations Unies sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des États et de leurs biens adoptée par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 2 décembre 20044 et ouverte à la signature des États le 17 janvier 2005 confère également à l’immunité d’exécution un caractère non absolu.5 Aux termes de

2 Hong Kong, Cour suprême de Hong Kong (Court of Final Appeal), Democratic Republic of the Congo and Others c. fg Hemisphere Associates llc, Arrêt du 11 juin 2011, 2011 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 41. 3 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. civ. 1ère, Société Eurodif c. République islamique d’Iran, Arrêt du 14 mars 1984, n° 82-12.462, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 1984, p. 644, note J.-M. Bischoff ; Journal du Droit International, 1984, p. 598, note B. Oppetit ; Recueil Dalloz, 1984, p. 629, rapport Fabre, note Robert ; Semaine Juridique 1984.ii.2025, conclusions P. Gulphe, note H. Synvet ; Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1985, p. 69, note G. Couchez ; B. Ancel et Y. Lequette, Grands Arrêts de la jurisprudence française de droit international privé, 2006, 832 p., p. 65. 4 Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, 2 décembre 2004, a/res/59/38, annexe. 5 Sur cette convention : I. Pingel, « Observations sur la Convention du 17 janvier 2005 sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des États et leurs biens », Journal du Droit International, 2005, pp. 1045-1066 ; G. Hafner et L. Lange, « La Convention des Nations Unies sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des États et leurs biens », Annuaire Français de Droit International, 2004, pp. 45-76. La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a jugé que ce texte appartenait au « droit coutumier international » : cedh, Cudak c. Lituanie, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 23 mars 2010, Requête no 15869/02, par. 66 ; cedh, Sabeh El Leil c. France, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 29 juin 2011, Requête no 34869/05, par. 54, Recueil Dalloz, 2011, act. 1831. 72 Audit ce texte, l’immunité est en effet levée pour les biens « spécifiquement utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés par l’État autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales » et « à condition que les mesures de contrainte posté- rieures au jugement ne portent que sur des biens qui ont un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée » (article 19[c]).6 Mais en dehors ce type d’exception, et quelle que soit la formulation retenue par le droit applicable en cause pour l’identifier,7 l’immunité d’exécution est acquise pour tous les autres biens et actifs appartenant à l’État concerné. Du moins l’est-elle si celui-ci n’y a pas renoncé. Comme l’ont pertinemment fait observer deux auteurs, une telle renonciation à l’immunité se conçoit sans difficulté « puisqu’elle n’est destinée qu’à le protéger ».8 Autrement dit, un État, fort de sa souveraineté, peut tout à fait décider de renoncer à ce privilège qui lui est offert devant les tribunaux étrangers. L’article 19 (a) de la Convention des Nations Unies de 2004 prévoit du reste expressément que l’immunité d’exécution soit levée lorsque l’État y a « expressément consenti », soit « par un accord international », soit « par une convention d’arbitrage ou un contrat écrit », voire « par une déclaration devant le tribunal ou une communication écrite faite après la survenance du différend entre les parties ». Ce type de renonciation est admis même dans les systèmes juridiques retenant encore une conception absolue de l’immunité d’exécution.9 Le droit français est, quant à lui, particulièrement libéral à cet égard puisqu’il admet qu’une telle renonciation puisse, implicitement, résulter de la souscription au Règlement d’arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce internationale (cci), en ce que son article 24 prévoit l’engagement d’exécuter sans délai la sentence à intervenir.10

6 L’article 21(1) de la Convention (n. 4) identifie ensuite des catégories de biens d’État qui, notamment, ne doivent pas être considérées « comme des biens spécifiquement utili- sés ou destinés à être utilisés par l’État autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales ». 7 Pour un panorama récent des droits européens en la matière : A. Reinisch, « European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures », European Journal of International Law, 2006, pp. 803-836. 8 P. Mayer et V. Heuzé, Droit international privé, Paris, Domat-Montchrestien, 2010, 820 p., p. 328. 9 Hong Kong, Cour suprême de Hong Kong (Court of Final Appeal), Congo c. Hemisphere (n. 2), la Cour entérine bien la possibilité d’une telle renonciation. 10 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. civ. 1ère, Société Creighton Ltd c. Ministre des finances du Qatar, Arrêt du 6 juillet 2000, n° 98-19.068, Journal du Droit International, 2000, p. 1054, note I. Pingel-Lenuzza ; Revue de l’Arbitrage, 2001, p. 114, note P. Leboulanger ; Gazette du La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 73

Mais au-delà de cette jurisprudence française, la renonciation intervient dans la très grande majorité des hypothèses à la faveur d’une clause contractuelle, laquelle figure généralement dans le contrat d’origine. Ainsi, dans des contrats d’émission d’obligations souveraines de l’Argentine en date des 3 février et 21 juillet 2000, pouvait-on trouver la clause de renonciation suivante qui, bien que fort mal rédigée, n’en est pas moins explicite :

Dans la mesure où la République ou l’un de ses revenus, avoirs ou biens aurait droit devant toute juridiction dans laquelle se situe tout Tribunal Spécifié, devant lequel toute Action Connexe peut à tout moment être intentée à son encontre ou à l’encontre de ses revenus, avoirs ou biens, ou devant toute juridiction dans laquelle se situe tout Tribunal Spécifié ou tout Autre Tribunal devant lequel toute poursuite, action ou procédure peut être à tout moment intentée dans le seul but de mettre en œuvre ou d’exécuter tout Jugement Connexe, à toute immunité de poursuite, de juridiction de tout tribunal de ce type, de compensation, de saisie préa- lable au jugement, de saisie à l’appui de l’exécution d’un jugement, d’exé- cution d’un jugement ou de toute autre action légale ou judiciaire ou de recours, et dans la mesure où, dans toute juridiction de ce type, une telle immunité lui serait accordée, la République a irrévocablement convenu de ne pas faire valoir et a irrévocablement renoncé à cette immunité dans toute la mesure permise par le droit de cette juridiction (et consent de manière générale, aux fins de la Loi sur l’Immunité souveraine des États étrangers à l’octroi de toute réparation ou à l’émission de tout acte de pro- cédure en relation avec toute Action connexe ou Jugement Connexe).11

Dans une lettre d’engagement relative à divers billets à ordre émis par la République du Congo en 1992, on trouve la clause de renonciation suivante :

Palais, 31 janvier 2001, p. 6, note S. Piedelièvre ; adde, France, Cour d’appel de Rouen, Sté Bec frères c. Office des céréales de Tunisie, 20 juin 1996, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1997, p. 263, note E. Gaillard ; France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Banque centrale de Syrie et République arabe de Syrie c. Société Papillon Group Corporation, 21 décembre 2002, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 2003, p. 245 ; voir également : P. Théry, « Feue l’immunité d’exécution ? », Gazette du Palais, pp. 161-163 (10-12 juin 2001), p. 18 ; J. Moury, « L’incidence de la stipulation d’une clause compromissoire sur l’immunité d’exécution de l’État étranger », Recueil Dalloz 27/7036, 2001, pp. 2139-2143. 11 Cette traduction en langue française de la clause de renonciation dont l’original est en langue anglaise figure dans l’arrêt suivant : Belgique, Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, nml Capital c. République d’Argentine, 21 juin 2011, rg n° 2009/ar/3338. 74 Audit

« Le signataire de la présente renonce définitivement et irrévocablement à invoquer dans le cadre du règlement d’un litige en relation avec les engagements objet de la présente toute immunité de juridiction ainsi que toute immunité d’exécution ».12 Comme on peut le constater à leur lecture, plus ou moins aisément en fonction de la rédaction retenue, ce type de clauses confère expressis verbis à la renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution une portée générale. Autrement dit, on devrait pouvoir en déduire qu’elles ont une portée générale, s’étendant à tous les biens et actifs détenus par l’État renonçant et situés sur le sol d’un territoire qui lui est étranger. Pourtant, tel n’est pas toujours, nécessairement, le cas. Il peut arriver que le droit local, celui du territoire concerné par la mesure d’exé- cution forcée, entende exclure certains biens spécifiques du champ d’application ratione materiae de la renonciation. Or, si une telle limitation par le droit local de la portée générale de la renonciation peut éventuellement se justifier en présence de biens faisant l’objet d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique (2.), elle devient en revanche plus problématique en l’absence de celle-ci (3.).

2 Renonciation et biens faisant l’objet d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique

En droit des immunités souveraines, il peut arriver que certains biens particuliers de l’État fassent l’objet d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique. La consé- quence est que l’acte de renonciation émis par l’État propriétaire doit alors expressément viser les biens en cause. À défaut, ils se trouveront exclus de la levée de l’immunité qui résulte de ce même acte. Une telle immunité d’exécution spécifique portant sur des biens en particulier peut être posée par la loi comme en droit australien (2.1.). Elle peut égale- ment résulter de la jurisprudence comme en droit français (2.2.).

12 La lettre comportait également une clause d’arbitrage en application du Règlement de la cci. Une sentence a été rendue sur ce fondement, laquelle a ensuite fait l’objet d’un recours en annulation devant les juridictions françaises : France, Cour d’appel de Paris, République du Congo et autres c. sa Commisimpex, 23 mai 2002, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 2002, p. 971, note J.-B. Racine. La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 75

2.1 L’identification d’une immunité spécifique par la loi : l’exemple australien Bien des droits nationaux disposent, à la différence du droit français notamment, d’une loi nationale en matière d’immunités souveraines. Toutefois, aucun d’entre eux ne consacre la nécessité d’une renonciation spécifique par un État à son immunité d’exécution pour les actifs relevant d’une activité de service public ou d’une activité souveraine, ou toute autre formule approchante. Dans la plupart de ces textes nationaux, non seulement le principe de la renonciation est bien évidemment acquis, mais en outre il s’agit pour lui confé- rer sa pleine signification de s’en remettre aux termes retenus par l’État dans son acte de renonciation. Tel est le cas, par exemple, de l’article 13(3) du United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978,13 l’article 12(1)(a) de la loi canadienne sur l’immunité des États14 ou encore l’article 401(1) du Code de procédure civile de la Fédération de Russie.15 Il est néanmoins avéré que, parfois, certains textes internes exigent une mention expresse pour certains biens de nature particulière. C’est le cas, par exemple, de l’article 31(4) de l’Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 198516 qui exige une désignation expresse dans l’acte de renonciation des « diplomatic property or military property » (biens diplomatiques ou biens militaires) pour que ces biens puissent être couverts par celle-ci. Autrement dit, en droit australien, ces biens particuliers font l’objet d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique. Il n’en résulte pas pour autant que l’État étranger propriétaire ne peut procéder à la renonciation de celle-ci, mais qu’elle doit être expresse. En d’autres termes, l’acte de renonciation doit explicitement viser ces biens pour qu’ils puissent être appréhendés par le créancier saisissant. C’est à cette condition que le créancier saisissant pourra bénéficier d’une levée de l’immunité sur le bien en cause. À défaut, c’est-à-dire si l’acte de renonciation a une portée générale et ne précise pas expressément qu’il s’étend éga- lement aux biens diplomatiques et militaires, la saisie ne pourra pas prospérer. Le droit français a récemment retenu, s’agissant des biens diplomatiques appartenant à des États étrangers, une solution similaire. La source ici n’est toutefois pas légale, mais jurisprudentielle.

13 Royaume-Uni, State Immunity Act 1978, 20 juillet 1978, 1978 c. 33. 14 Canada, Loi sur l’immunité des États, L.R.C. (1985), ch. S-18. 15 Russie, Code de procédure civile de la Fédération de Russie, 14 novembre 2002, n° 138-fz. 16 Australie, Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, Act n° 196 of 1985. 76 Audit

2.2 L’identification d’une immunité spécifique par la jurisprudence : l’exemple français En droit français, les règles sur l’immunité souveraine sont pour l’heure toujours d’origine prétorienne.17 Or, la jurisprudence française a identifié l’existence d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique pour les biens diplomatiques et elle en a tiré toutes les conséquences sur le terrain de la renonciation. En effet, dans une affaire nml Capital c. République d’Argentine où l’État avait contractuellement renoncé à son immunité d’exécution, la Cour de cassation a retenu le principe suivant : « Selon le droit international coutumier, les missions diplomatiques des États étrangers bénéficient, pour le fonctionnement de la représentation de l’État accréditaire et les besoins de sa mission de sou- veraineté, d’une immunité d’exécution autonome à laquelle il ne peut être renoncé que de façon expresse et spéciale ; cette immunité s’étend, notamment, aux fonds déposés sur les comptes bancaires de l’ambassade ou de la mission diplomatique ».18 Autrement dit, la Cour de cassation française ne prétend pas ici qu’un État étranger ne puisse, par principe, renoncer à l’immunité d’exécution attachée à ses missions diplomatiques et aux fonds déposés à cet effet sur les comptes bancaires de l’ambassade ou autres. En effet, une telle renonciation est, en elle-même, une manifestation de la souveraineté étrangère. Dès lors, si le juge français entendait imposer une limite au champ d’application ratione materiae de cette renonciation par ce qui constituerait finalement une sorte de règle impérative ou d’ordre public, il porterait frontalement atteinte à cette même souveraineté. Ce serait frapper d’une forme d’incapacité un être souverain, et le droit français ne pouvait s’y risquer. La Haute juridiction française prévoit donc qu’une telle renonciation est possible pour permettre la saisie de fonds déposés sur les comptes bancaires d’une ambassade ou d’une mission diplomatique, mais elle précise que celle-ci doit être « expresse et spéciale ». Toutefois, on peut noter que ce caractère

17 La France a ratifié la Convention des Nations Unies sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des États et leurs biens de 2004 (n. 4), mais faute d’un nombre suffisant de ratifications, celle-ci n’est pour l’heure pas entrée en vigueur : Loi n° 2011-734, 28 juin 2011, Journal officiel de la République française, 29 juin 2011, p. 10953. 18 France, Cour de cassation, Ch. civ. 1ère, La société nml Capital Ltd c. la République d’Argen- tine, Arrêt du 28 septembre 2011, n° 09-72.057, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 2012, p. 124, note H. Gaudemet-Tallon ; dans le même sens : France, Cour d’appel de Paris, 1ère chambre, section A, Ambassade de la Fédération de Russie en France c. Société noga, Arrêt du 10 août 2000, n° 287. Au Royaume-Uni, une solution semblable a également été retenue : Royaume-Uni, English High Court (Queen’s Bench Division), A Co. Ltd c. Republic of x, 21 décembre 1989, [1990] 2 Lloyds Law Reports 520, 87 International Law Reports 412. La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 77 exprès et spécial attaché à la renonciation n’est pas exigé in vacuo. Pour la Cour de cassation française, il est en réalité fondé sur l’existence, pour ce type de comptes bancaires, d’une « immunité d’exécution autonome ». C’est donc un fondement proche ici de celui que prévoit l’article 31(4) de l’Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, c’est-à-dire une immunité d’exécution spécifique portant sur les biens diplomatiques. Le droit français se démarque toutefois ici du droit australien, en ce qu’à la différence de ce dernier, la loi française ne prévoit pas expressément d’im- munité spécifique pour les biens de cette nature. Afin de pallier cette lacune, la Cour de cassation française a donc pris le parti de fonder sa décision sur le « droit international coutumier », ce qui est suffisamment inhabituel pour être noté. On peut s’interroger sur la référence exacte opérée ici. D’aucuns pourraient y voir un renvoi à l’article 21(1)(a), de la Convention des Nations Unies sur l’im- munité juridictionnelle des États et leurs biens de 2004, lequel vise effectivement « les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique de l’État ou de ses postes consulaires, de ses missions spéciales, de ses missions auprès des organisations internationales, ou de ses délégations dans les organes des organisations internationales ou aux conférences internationales ». Mais la Convention ne confère pas à ces biens une immunité d’exécution spécifique ou « autonome » pour reprendre les termes de la Cour de cassation. Elle précise simplement qu’ils ne sauraient être considérés comme des biens spécifique- ment utilisés par l’État autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commercial. Autrement dit, dans le système de la Convention, ces biens sont exclus du champ de l’exception de commercialité susceptible d’entraîner la levée de l’immunité d’exécution. La référence implicite la plus vraisemblable est très certainement plutôt la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961.19 Sans doute la Cour de cassation a-t-elle souhaité exciper de l’article 25 de ce traité une immunité d’exécution autonome pour les biens diplomatiques. C’est osé, en ce que cette disposition prévoit uniquement que « l’État accréditaire accorde toutes facilités pour l’accomplissement des fonctions de la mission », mais c’est le sens le plus probable qui peut être conféré à l’arrêt.20

19 Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques, 18 avril 1961, 500 Recueil des Traités des Nations Unies 95. 20 Dans la même affaire, et s’agissant cette fois de la saisine des comptes de la représen- tation diplomatique argentine en Belgique, la Cour de cassation de Belgique a rendu une décision identique, mais en se fondant expressément sur la Convention de Vienne 78 Audit

Indépendamment de la fragilité de ce fondement, il n’en reste pas moins qu’en droit français comme en droit australien, c’est l’existence d’une immu- nité d’exécution autonome, fondée sur une règle spécifique de droit international dans le premier cas et de droit national dans le second, qui impose, pour les biens qui en relèvent, une renonciation expresse et spéciale. Deux auteurs le relèvent d’ailleurs expressément en indiquant qu’il importe de « distingu[er] l’immunité d’exécution diplomatique pour laquelle seule une renonciation spéciale permet d’écarter l’immunité et l’immunité d’exécution de l’État étran- ger lui-même qui peut être écartée par une renonciation générale ».21 La question se pose alors de savoir si cette renonciation spéciale pourrait également être exigée en dehors de toute immunité spécifique portant sur les biens à saisir. Un vif débat existe sur ce dernier point.

3 Renonciation et biens ne faisant pas l’objet d’une immunité d’exécution spécifique

À l’heure actuelle, se développe une thèse aux termes de laquelle la renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution ne pourrait pas permettre la saisie de biens affectés à une activité souveraine, actae jure imperii en somme, sauf à ce que ceux-ci aient été expressément visés dans l’acte. Autrement dit, il ne s’agirait plus ici d’exclure du champ d’application d’une renonciation ces biens en raison d’une immunité spécifique dont ils disposeraient, mais au motif qu’ils sont affectés à une activité souveraine. On présentera cette thèse de la nécessité d’une renonciation spécifique pour ces biens affectés à une acti- vité souveraine telle qu’elle se développe actuellement en droit français (3.1.). Ensuite, on verra qu’elle n’est en revanche reçue ni en droit international et ni en droit suisse (3.2.).

du 18 avril 1961 sur les relations diplomatiques : Belgique, Cour de cassation, République d’Argentine c. nml Capital, n° C.11.0688.F. En cause d’appel, la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles avait en revanche considéré que l’Argentine ne pouvait pas se prévaloir de son immunité d’exécution : Belgique, Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, nml Capital c. République d’Argentine, 21 juin 2011, n° 2009/ar/3338. Le même jour, elle avait du reste jugé dans le même sens dans une affaire similaire à propos des comptes diplomatiques de la République du Burundi : Belgique, Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, République du Burundi c. S. Landau, 21 juin 2011, Journal des Tribunaux, 2002, n° 6070. 21 M. Menjucq et C. Séraglini, « Le contentieux du commerce international », in J. Béguin et M. Menjucq (dir.), Droit du commerce international, Paris, Litec, 2005, 1119 p., pp. 699-739, 729 nm 2074. La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 79

3.1 La thèse de la nécessité d’une renonciation spécifique pour les biens souverains en droit français Certains auteurs estiment qu’un acte de renonciation par un État étranger à son immunité souveraine ne s’étend pas a priori à ceux de ses biens qui se trouvent être affectés à une activité souveraine. Ce n’est pas ici l’existence d’une immunité particulière attachée à ces biens qui fonde cette règle, mais plus simplement leur nature propre en ce qu’ils sont reliés à l’exercice par l’État en cause de sa souveraineté. Aux termes de cette thèse, l’extension de la renonciation à ces biens ne peut alors se concevoir que s’ils sont expressément visés dans l’acte. Comme le disent des auteurs français de droit international privé, « l’exécution des biens affectés à une activité de souveraineté ne devrait être possible que si la renonciation au privilège vise de façon claire et non ambiguë de tels biens ».22 La jurisprudence française connaît au moins un précédent qui semble s’être engagé dans cette voie. Il s’agit d’un arrêt prononcé par la Cour d’appel de Versailles le 9 septembre 2010 à nouveau dans une affaire nml Capital Ltd c. République d’Argentine,23 par la suite confirmé en 2013 par la Cour de cassation.24 Fort d’une décision new-yorkaise condamnant l’Argentine au paiement de titres obligataires émis par cet État à la fin des années 1990 ou au début des années 2000 et dont il avait unilatéralement répudié le paiement en 2002 suite à la crise qu’il traversait alors, le fonds d’investissement demandeur – d’aucuns diraient « vautours » – avait entrepris de saisir des créances fiscales appartenant à son débiteur. Plus exactement, la tentative de saisie avait été pratiquée entre les mains d’une grande entreprise pétrolière française et elle portait sur des redevances dues par celle-ci à l’État argentin du fait de l’exploitation de champs pétrolifères sur place. Or, le contrat d’émission des titres obligataires fondant la créance du fonds comportait la clause de renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution dont le texte figure plus haut.25 La Cour d’appel de Versailles puis la Cour de cassation française ont toutefois exclu que cette clause puisse avoir pour effet de lever l’immunité de l’Argentine s’agissant de ses créances fiscales. On n’hésitera pas à

22 Y. Loussouarn, P. Bourel et P. Vareilles-Sommières, Droit international privé, Paris, Dalloz, 2007, 1025 p., 664 nm 483. 23 France, Cour d’Appel de Versailles, Sté nml Capital Ltd c. République d’Argentine, 9 septembre 2010, rg n° 09/09640, Revue Droit administratif, 2010, n° 12, chron. 5, spécialement n° 15, observations M. Audit. 24 France, Cour de cassation, 1re Ch. civ., Sté nml Capital Ltd c. République d’Argentine, 28 mars 2013, n° 10-25.938 ; Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2013, p. 195. 25 Voir (n. 11). 80 Audit qualifier la motivation retenue d’embarrassée et de juridiquement filandreuse. Mais il n’en reste pas moins que la décision retenue revient à considérer, sans l’énoncer expressément, qu’un État ne peut renoncer à son immunité d’exécution pour ce type de biens en particulier que sont les créances fiscales ou, a minima, que ceux-ci doivent être expressément visés. La solution retenue n’est pas fondée sur l’existence, pour ces créances en particulier et plus généralement pour les biens réputés souverains, d’une immunité d’exécution autonome, à l’instar des biens diplomatiques. Dès lors, l’identification de la règle ainsi posée est d’appréhension délicate. On pourrait éventuellement considérer que celle-ci repose sur une volonté implicite de l’État qui a renoncé à son immunité d’exécution. En d’autres termes, on considérerait que celui-ci n’a en réalité pas souhaité renoncer à son immunité pour ce type de biens. Une telle analyse fondée sur l’interprétation de la clause de renonciation est tout à fait admissible en son principe, mais elle suppose toutefois deux éléments. Le premier, et le plus essentiel, est qu’il puisse effectivement être induit de la volonté exprimée par l’État que telle a bien été sa volonté. Le second est que cette interprétation de la clause ne doit pas se faire au regard des principes posés en la matière par le droit du for, mais de ceux du droit, éventuellement étranger, applicable au contrat la stipulant. En droit international privé, l’interprétation d’une stipulation contractuelle s’opère nécessairement au regard de la lex contractus, c’est-à-dire du droit applicable au contrat. Ces deux ensembles de principes acquis, on peut alors se demander ce qui peut être induit, sur le terrain de l’interprétation contractuelle, d’une renonciation par un État en termes généraux à son immunité d’exécution. A priori, si un État étranger accepte de renoncer à son immunité d’exécution en termes généraux, c’est qu’il entend permettre la saisie par le créancier bénéficiaire de tous les biens que recouvre cette même immunité. De par sa formulation, une telle renonciation recouvre a priori tous les biens appartenant à l’État qui s’est engagé contractuellement, fussent-ils attachés à la souveraineté. Une interpré- tation différente devrait nécessairement se fonder sur des éléments liés à l’expression par l’État de sa volonté et tendant à démontrer qu’il a effectivement entendu exclure les biens attachés à la souveraineté du champ d’application de sa renonciation. Mais, en réalité, la thèse visant à imposer une renonciation spécifique à l’immunité en présence de biens attachés à la souveraineté ne repose pas sur une interprétation de la volonté contractuelle émise par l’État. Elle est plutôt fondée sur une règle du for, en vertu de laquelle de tels biens, par principe, ne peuvent être saisis sur le territoire de celui-ci en l’absence de renonciation expresse les visant spécifiquement. Or, une telle conception tend à dénaturer La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 81 la volonté même exprimée par l’État étranger, en ce qu’elle ne se fonde pas sur l’interprétation de celle-ci. Or, un État étranger n’est pas un consommateur ou un incapable soumis à un régime de protection ; c’est un être souverain qui s’engage en connaissance de cause et dont la plume ne saurait être contredite par une règle du for. Du reste, telle est bien l’opinion exprimée par M. le Juge Ronny Abraham dans les termes suivants : « En l’état actuel de la jurisprudence, et en l’état actuel du droit international, il n’y a pas d’obstacle à la renonciation totale ou partielle d’un État à son immunité d’exécution. Il ne me paraît pas établi qu’aujourd’hui, un État ne peut renoncer entièrement à son immunité d’exécution ».26 Le magistrat poursuit en relevant qu’il a « du mal, en second lieu, à suivre la thèse selon laquelle, même en cas de renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution, il faudrait rechercher l’affectation des biens saisis, ou destinés à être saisis, et notamment leur affectation à un usage commercial ».27 La thèse qu’un courant jurisprudentiel français tend à privilégier paraît donc être assez contestable. En l’absence d’immunité spécifique visant un type de biens en particulier, c’est uniquement sur le fondement de la volonté exprimée par l’État étranger que la renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution, les concernant, pourra être considérée comme acquise, ou non. Du reste, c’est la solution qui prévaut tant en droit international qu’en droit suisse.

3.2 La thèse de la nécessité d’une renonciation spécifique pour les biens souverains en droit international et en droit suisse À la lecture des textes internationaux les plus importants pris en matière d’immunités souveraines, il apparaît qu’aucun d’entre eux n’exige une mention spécifique, dans la renonciation des biens attachés à l’exercice de la souverai- neté. Ainsi en est-il de l’article 23 de la Convention européenne sur l’immunité des États signée à Bâle le 16 mai 1972,28 de l’article viii(A) du projet de convention sur les immunités élaboré sous l’égide de l’International Law Association29

26 Intervention lors du débat, in I. Pingel (dir.), Droit des immunités et exigences du procès équitable, Paris, Pedone, 2004, 162 p., p. 138. 27 Ibid. 28 Art. 23 : « [i]l ne peut être procédé sur le territoire d’un État contractant ni à l’exécution forcée, ni à une mesure conservatoire sur les biens d’un autre Étatcontractant, sauf dans les cas et dans la mesure où celui-ci y a expressément consenti par écrit ». Sur cette Convention : C. Vallée, « A propos de la Convention européenne sur l’immunité des États », Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, avril-juin 1973, pp. 205-241. 29 International Law Association, « Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity », Report of the 66th Conference (Buenos Aires 14–20 August 1994), art. viii(A) : « [a] foreign State’s property in the forum State, shall not be immune from any measure 82 Audit ou encore de l’article 5 de la résolution de l’Institut de droit international adoptée lors de la session de Bâle du 2 septembre 1991 sur « Les aspects récents de l’immunité de juridiction et d’exécution des États ».30 Cette position est du reste confirmée par les termes de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens.31 Certes, comme les autres textes cités, la Convention entérine la possibilité pour l’État de renoncer à son immunité d’exécution. Celle-ci figure à l’article 19 de la Convention relatif à l’« immunité des États à l’égard des mesures de contrainte postérieures au jugement ». Ce texte est rédigé dans les termes suivants :

Aucune mesure de contrainte postérieure au jugement, telle que saisie, saisie-arrêt ou saisie-exécution, ne peut être prise contre des biens d’un État en relation avec une procédure intentée devant un tribunal d’un autre État excepté si et dans la mesure où : a) L’État a expressément consenti à l’application de telles mesures dans les termes indiqués :

i) Par un accord international ; ii) Par une convention d’arbitrage ou un contrat écrit ; ou iii) Par une déclaration devant le tribunal ou une communication écrite faite après la survenance du différend entre les parties ; ou b) L’État a réservé ou affecté des biens à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de cette procédure ; ou c) Il a été établi que les biens sont spécifiquement utilisés ou desti- nés à être utilisés par l’État autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commercial et sont situés sur le territoire de l’État du for, à condition que les mesures de contrainte postérieures au jugement ne portent que sur des biens qui ont un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.

À sa lecture, on constate que la Convention entérine bien la possibilité pour un État de renoncer par écrit à son immunité d’exécution, mais, en revanche, elle n’impose absolument pas une renonciation spécifique ou particulière pour

for the enforcement of a judgment or an arbitral award if: 1. The foreign State has waived its immunity either expressly or by implication from such measures. A waiver may not be withdrawn except in accordance with its terms », reproduit in A. Dickinson, R. Lindsay et J.P. Loonam, State Immunity, Selected Materials and Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 542 p., pp. 194-200. 30 Art. 5(1) : « [U]n État étranger ne peut invoquer l’immunité de juridiction ou d’exécution à l’égard de compétences des tribunaux ou autres organes de l’État du for auxquelles il a expressément consenti [. . .] b) dans un contrat écrit ». 31 Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, 2 décembre 2004, a/res/59/38, annexe. La renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution 83 certains biens. Du reste, dans un commentaire de l’avant-projet de Convention, le Juge Ronny Abraham l’avait souligné dans les termes suivants : « L’article 19 présente deux cas alternatifs : il y a possibilité de mesures de contraintes contre l’État, soit que l’État y a consenti, soit lorsque ces mesures de contraintes portent sur des biens spécifiquement utilisés autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commercial. C’est clairement alternatif. Il suffit de l’un ou de l’autre ».32 Dès lors, la Convention des Nations Unies de 2004 n’exige aucune renonciation spécifique par un État à son immunité d’exécution pour les actifs relevant d’une activité souveraine. En droit suisse, le constat est identique. Dans un arrêt Moscow Center for Automated Air Traffic Control c. Commission de surveillance des offices des poursuites et des faillites du canton de Genève rendu le 15 août 2007, le Tribunal fédé- ral suisse a ainsi été saisi d’une renonciation à son immunité d’exécution émise en termes très généraux par le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie.33 Celui-ci avait par protocole d’accord indiqué qu’il « renonce expressément et sans réserves à toutes immunités de juridiction et/ou d’exécution dont il pourrait être bénéficiaire ». Or, le débat judiciaire a ici porté sur la question de savoir si cette renonciation en termes généraux était susceptible de permettre la saisie de biens appartenant à la Russie et affectés à une activité jure imperii ou souveraine. S’en tenant à la seule et simple interprétation de la volonté contractuelle de l’État, le Tribunal fédéral a retenu le motif suivant :

La recourante [i.e. l’État] ne peut donc échapper à l’alternative suivante : soit les biens saisis relèvent de l’activité iure gestionis de l’État russe et la clause de renonciation est superflue faute d’immunité ; soit il s’agit de biens de l’État affectés à l’exercice de la puissance publique, qui tombent sous le coup de la renonciation expresse du 31 juillet 2002.

Et le Tribunal fédéral de poursuivre : « Elle ne saurait en particulier prétendre que la renonciation ne vise que des actes iure gestionis pour lesquels précisé- ment aucune immunité n’existe. Cela reviendrait à priver la clause de renonciation de toute portée. Or, aux termes de celle-ci, la Fédération de Russie a « renoncé expressément’ et ‘sans réserve’ à ‘toutes immunités de juridiction et/ ou d’exécution ». Le cumul de ces expressions manifeste la volonté de donner

32 Intervention lors du débat, dans I. Pingel (n. 26), pp. 140-141. 33 Suisse, Tribunal fédéral Suisse, Moscow Center for Automated Air Traffic Control c. Commission de surveillance des offices des poursuites et des faillites du canton de Genève, Arrêt du 15 août 2007, 7B.2/2007. 84 Audit

à la clause de renonciation la plus large portée possible ; partant, elle ne peut que viser les biens affectés à une activité iure imperii ». Les termes retenus par le Tribunal fédéral suisse sont d’une logique impla- cable, en ce qu’ils reviennent finalement à affirmer qu’il n’y aurait aucun sens à considérer qu’une renonciation ne porte pas, lorsque ses termes le permettent, sur des biens souverains. La raison en est simple : c’est précisément pour ce type de biens que la renonciation a un sens.34 Dès lors, à l’instar de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens de 2004,35 l’examen du droit suisse confirme qu’une renonciation par un État à son immunité d’exécution en termes généraux recouvre les biens affectés à une activité souveraine. Dans sa décision du 15 août 2007, le Tribunal fédéral met même parfaitement en exergue que, finalement, il y aurait une forme d’illogisme à limiter la portée de la renonciation à une immunité d’exécution par un État étranger à ses biens non souverains, c’est-à-dire non affectés à une activité iure imperii, puisque pour l’essentiel ces biens ne bénéficient justement pas de ladite immunité. Or, si le principe d’une renonciation a un sens, ce ne peut être que pour les biens qui, par principe, sont précisément couverts par l’immunité d’exécu- tion. Ensuite, dans la mise en œuvre de la renonciation, tout est affaire d’in- terprétation contractuelle. Il s’agit pour le juge du for d’identifier le périmètre que l’État étranger a entendu contractuellement conférer à sa renonciation. En revanche, en l’absence d’immunité d’exécution spécifique pour les biens souverains, et à la différence de la solution qui peut être retenue en matière de biens diplomatiques, l’exigence d’une renonciation expresse et spéciale est ici très contestable.

34 Un auteur l’a encore récemment rappelé dans les termes suivants : « La renonciation de l’État étranger à son immunité d’exécution ne devrait donc pas avoir pour domaine que ses biens publics pour lesquels il pourrait, en l’absence de renonciation, invoquer son immunité d’exécution avec succès. Dans le même ordre d’idées, la renonciation d’un démembrement de l’État étranger ne devrait jouer qu’en ce qui concerne ses biens affec- tés à des fins de souveraineté » (S. El Sawah, Les immunités des États et des organisations internationales, Paris, Larcier, 2012, 878 p., 293 nm 707). 35 Convention sur les immunités juridictionnelles, 2004 (n. 31). Part 2

State Immunity before the ICJ—The Case Germany v. Italy

∵

CHAPTER 7 The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj

Christian Tomuschat

1 Introduction

The judgment of the icj in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening)1 does not need any outside support. It speaks for itself. I was a counsel for Germany in those proceedings.2 In this book, I engage in a kind of post-conflict discussion with one of the fiercest critics of the doctrine of state immunity.3 It is true that international law is not a static discipline. On the contrary, it has made enormous strides forward since 1945 when the un Charter came into force, not least under the influence of suggestions arising from legal doctrine. Indeed, not a single one of the principles of the “good old law” is untouch- able. It pertains to the professional duties of every lawyer deserving this name to review traditional concepts, asking whether what once belonged to the “acquis légal universel” still fits into the new framework established, or more precisely: initiated, by the un Charter in 1945. Human rights has become one of the most determinative forces and solid pillars of the international law of our time, shedding a new light on many concepts derived essentially from the principle of state sovereignty. Therefore, discussion is not only convenient, but moreover imperative in order to preserve the consistency of the legal order. Along these lines, the contention of the critics of the judgment of the icj of 3 February 2012 is simple. They argue that the icj has overlooked the new general orientation of international law by disregarding the paramountcy of the

1 icj, Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgement of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012. 2 For earlier observations on the issue see Christian Tomuschat, “Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 10 (2002): 157–84; Christian Tomuschat, “L’immunité des Etats en cas de violations graves des droits de l’homme,” Revue générale de droit international public 109 (2005): 51–74; Christian Tomuschat, “The International Law of State Immunity and its Development by National Institutions,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 1105–40. 3 Michael Bothe wrote a legal opinion for Amnesty International in which he advocated rejection of the German application against Italy.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_008 88 Tomuschat rules that were infringed by the German military and security forces during the period when Italy was placed under German occupation, rules which today are classified as ius cogens.4 In fact, no such inconsistency can be shown to exist. The judgment of the icj is justified not only from the isolated viewpoint of the classic rule of immunity, but also when viewed within a larger framework of systemic considerations underlying the immunity regime which, far from bestowing an illegitimate privilege on wrong-doing states, guarantees that the reparation of damage unlawfully caused proceeds in an orderly fashion, protecting the interests of all victims by ensuring equality and non-discrimination.

2 The Rule of State Immunity for Acts iure imperii Stands Firm

The position of the highest courts of Greece and of Italy, the Areios Pagos on the one hand5 and the Corte di cassazione on the other,6 was flawed from the very outset. Customary or general international law can be compared to a slow-moving convoy. It does not proceed by abrupt leaps. Admittedly, many developments were initiated at the national level by leading nations. But such initiatives—like the us claim to the continental shelf7—do not create new law overnight. They start a process in which the other nations intervene by either following suit, by rejecting the proposed innovation, or by reserv- ing their response until the consequential implications become clearer, thus

4 See Markus Krajewski and Christopher Singer, “Should Judges be Front-Runners? The icj, State Immunity and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 16 (2012): 1–34; Mehrdad Payandeh, “Staatenimmunität und Menschenrechte,” Juristenzeitung (2012): 949–58. The same line is pursued in the dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade. Stefan Talmon, “Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished,” Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 979–1002, 983, observes in this regard: “(. . .) Judge Cançado Trindade, in whose value- centred view of international law there is little room for conceptual thinking”. 5 See Hellenic Supreme Court, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgement of 4 May 2000, Case No. 11/2000, English translation in International Law Reports 129 (2007): 514 et seq. 6 See Italian Supreme Court, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgement of 11 March 2004, Decision No. 5044/2004, English translation in International Law Reports 128 (2006): 659 et seq. 7 “United States: Proclamation by the President with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 28 September 1945,” American Journal of International Law, Supplement 40 (1946): 45–48. The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj 89 permitting a considerate judgment about the relevant pros and cons.8 This determinative feature of customary law is well reflected in the definition given by article 38(1)(b) of the icj Statute, where its components are described as being a “general practice” and the “acceptance as law” of that practice. Both the Areios Pagos and the Corte di cassazione openly ignored the practice element. Indeed, there was simply no practice that would have permitted piercing the sovereign shield of a respondent state in instances where grave violations of human rights were in issue.9 Since practice was absolutely lacking, there could not be any opinio iuris to that effect either. The principle of state immunity had not been eroded by judicial activities anywhere else than in Greece and in Italy. Additionally, the judgment of the Areios Pagos had been discredited and deprived of its precedential value by the later judgment of the Special Supreme Court under article 100 of the Greek Constitution,10 a court entrusted specifically with delivering binding determinations on the existence and the scope of a rule of general international law, in the same vein as the German Constitutional Court under article 100(2) of the German Basic Law. Thus, it was the Corte di cassazione alone which fought a war against the rule of immunity, much to the displeasure of the Italian government which, in the course of the different proceedings pending on account of the same legal issue, had many times reminded its courts, through the Avvocatura dello Stato, of the true position under international law. Accordingly, the only possible life-saving device for Italy was to resort to the concept of ius cogens by arguing that in case of a breach of rules having that quality all the traditional rules would be displaced: only through such a revolutionary reconfiguration of the international legal order could justice be restored.11 Yet it has been said many times already and is still true, although it may sound tediously monotonous: rules of ius cogens are all rules of conduct. They aim at averting the evil consequences that specific acts or activities would entail. Genocide is undoubtedly the primary example of a rule of ius cogens. With a view to preventing genocide, article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties denies any legal effect to treaties providing for a

8 See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Das Reziprozitätselement in der Entstehung des Völkergewohn heitsrechts (München and Salzburg: Fink, 1970), 55. 9 This is convincingly shown in icj, Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening (n. 1), paras. 72–75. 10 Special Supreme Court of Greece, Margellos and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 17 September 2002, Case No. 6/2002, English translation in International Law Reports 129 (2007): 526 et seq. 11 See the observations in icj, Germany v. Italy (n. 1), paras. 92–97, rejecting this line of reasoning. 90 Tomuschat common undertaking of states to commit genocide to the detriment of any group of human beings.12 Significantly enough, however, the 1948 Genocide Convention draws only one consequence from the commission of genocidal acts, namely that the state on whose territory those acts occurred is obligated to prosecute the alleged perpetrator(s) (article vi). It does not provide for universal jurisdiction—which was recognised at a later stage only in response to the Israeli trial against Adolf Eichmann.13 Additionally, the jurisdiction of the icj is established solely for states parties to the Genocide Convention (article ix); under general international law, the icj has no power to adjudicate disputes where genocide is the subject-matter.14 A duty of extradition exists only under the Convention (article vii: “in accordance with their laws and treaties in force”), but not under general international law.15 In sum: rules of ius cogens confine themselves to regulating positive state conduct but do not specify what particular consequences are to be drawn in case such rules have been encroached upon. Primary rules of conduct and secondary rules governing the consequences of a breach operate on two different levels.16 It is therefore outright erroneous to argue that there exists a hierarchical conflict and that the “weaker” norm, namely state immunity, must yield.17 The gist of ius cogens is to prevent injustice from occurring. Once it has occurred, states have a wide-ranging panoply of possibilities how to deal with

12 Such treaties are “void”. 13 Israeli Supreme Court, Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Judgment of 29 May 1962, International Law Reports 36 (1994): 277 et seq., 298–303. 14 icj, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Order of 2 June 1999, icj Reports 1999, 768 para. 19; icj, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Order of 2 June 1999, icj Reports 1999, 923 para. 19; icj, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, icj Reports 2006, 52 para. 125. 15 See icj, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&k=5e&case=144 &code=bs&p3=4, accessed 30 July 2014, para. 55. The icj itself avoided the issue. However, Judge Abraham in his individual opinion concludes that no such duty under customary international law exists (paras. 32–40). 16 In the words of icj, Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening (n. 1), para. 93: “[t]he two sets of rules address different matters.” See also François Boudreault, “Identifying Conflicts of Norms: The icj Approach in the Case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening),” Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 1003–12. 17 This was the error underlying the minority opinion appended to the judgment of the ecthr, Al-Adsani v. uk, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 35763/97. The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj 91 the duty of reparation, customary international law abstaining from providing any specific commands in that regard. There can be no doubt that the general rules on state responsibility apply in any event. Yet, according to their codification by the ilc, special consequences are entailed only to a rather limited extent.18 Moreover, the ilc never thought of establishing a procedural regime of its own for instances where grave violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law are in issue.19 No departure has been introduced from the requirement of consent for international dispute settlement.20 It is certainly desirable to reflect on extraordinary measures of reparation in all instances where the breach of an international commitment is particularly serious. However, each of those consequences requires careful consideration. The concept of ius cogens is not a magic wand that would transform all traditional rules into a new ethereal substance, immune from any controversy, as soon as touched by it.21 Thus, the concept of punitive damages, often ventilated as a convenient form of sanction, has not found acceptance by the ilc when it drafted the ars. Punitive damages, imposed as an additional sanction after an armed conflict accompanied by grave breaches of international humanitarian law, would put a heavy burden not on the wrong-doing state as an abstract entity but on a people which may also have suffered under a dictatorship that acted on its behalf without any democratic legitimacy. Additionally, punitive damages would hit the younger generations and would subject them to a status of discrimination in the international community, thus creating new frictions and tensions. Lastly, punitive damages would presuppose a well-functioning international judicial system able to determine, without any arbitrariness, the additional amounts exceeding the actual amount of the damage suffered. The ilc was even as cautious as refraining from acknowledging a right of third states to take countermeasures against a state having committed such serious

18 See un, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ars),” Yearbook ilc 2001 ii(2), art. 41. 19 Talmon, “Jus Cogens” (n. 4), 988 et seq., focuses exclusively on the distinction between substantive and procedural law. However, the secondary law consequences deriving from a breach of ius cogens might, in principle, include a specific procedural regime as well. The underlying subject matter cannot be totally ignored. 20 Not even unga, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, a/res/60/147, 21 March 2006, suggests that proceedings may be brought against an alleged wrong-doing state in departure from the requirement of consent. 21 This is the method embraced by Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: oup, 2008), passim. 92 Tomuschat crimes (article 54 ars).22 In fact, although many valid reasons seem to warrant the imposition of countermeasures in the general interest of the international community, many issues remain to be considered. Should every state be entitled to pursue its own sanctioning strategy or is some kind of international coordination necessary? Is there not a vast potential for abuse which constitutes a great temptation for powerful states to enforce their national political purposes? In other words, the emerging constitution of the international community possesses a fragmentary set of appropriate procedural mechanisms only. The numerous questions that arise when trying to devise appropriate systems of relief after major cataclysms call for imaginative solutions. However, to entrust the requisite disciplinary powers to domestic institutions acting according to their own discretion, is fraught with many dangers which have become visible above all in the Italian jurisprudence concerning relief for victims of damages going back to World War ii. In conclusion, it is short-sighted to appraise the judgment of the icj of 3 February 2012 only from the viewpoint of the individuals who have sustained injury. In principle, justice would appear to require that their harm be made good again: this should be the point of departure of any analysis. But many of the premises underlying the reasoning of the advocates of pushing aside immunity are not tenable.

3 The Systemic Background of State Immunity for Sovereign Acts, in Particular Military Activities

Often, an analogy is drawn between the departure from complete individual immunity of governmental office holders and a similar departure from state immunity. Italy advanced this argument in the proceedings under review. However, any justification for an analogy is lacking since the two situations cannot validly be compared with one another. Since the trial of Nuremberg before the International Military Court, it is one of the achievements of international criminal law to hold everyone accountable, irrespective of his/her position in the official hierarchy of the country concerned. Even heads of state must answer for their misdeeds before international criminal courts. Currently,

22 See the commentary of the ilc in un, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States” (n. 18), 139 para. 7: “[t]he article speaks of ‘lawful measures’ rather than ‘countermeasures’ so as not to prejudice any position concerning measures taken by States other than the injured State in response to breaches of obligations for the protection of the collective interest or those owed to the international community as a whole.” The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj 93 the main example of this new approach is the arrest warrant issued against the Sudanese President Al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court.23 But the responsibility of individuals must be distinguished from the responsibility of a nation. Individuals should never be able to escape the consequences of their acts, their personal conduct. However, responsibility of states, which is tantamount to collective responsibility of peoples, requires an assessment which must take into account many factors, in particular also the fate of the people concerned. There is no such thing as an “evil” people deserving to live under abject conditions of misery as an outcast of the international community. Individuals may deserve being held under detention for long years and even decades, possibly until their death. However, no nation can be placed under quarantine or secluded from the outside world in a similar manner. Under the principle of self-determination, which is a non-derogable right, every nation is entitled to take care of its own matters, organising itself for that purpose as it sees fit. In particular, the people has a right to existence, which means that it may not be denied elementary conditions of a decent life for its members. It is true that in many instances the repercussions of a denial of immunity would not reach such frightening dimensions. However, a review of some systemic elements shows that sovereign immunity is a cornerstone in an edifice that is characterised by perfect logic—a logic much wiser than the results that would have to be expected from the admission of individual actions against alleged wrong-doing states. Many of the counter-arguments against the claim for restriction of immunity in case of grave violations of human rights pertain to the procedural level. That claim presupposes that the judges of the home country of actual or potential victims are well-suited to adjudicate any reparation claims. This is unfor- tunately a somewhat hollow assumption. It is undeniable that pursuant to all international treaties for the protection of human rights judges “shall be” independent. The stipulations to this effect are a core element of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 14(1)), the European Convention on Human Rights (article 6(1)) and the American Convention on Human Rights (article 25). However, practice has shown time and again that in legal disputes having armed conflict or organised violence as their backdrop, judges more often than not take sides with their governments or with public opinion surrounding them. Without discussing the judgments of the Greek Areios Pagos and the Italian Corte di cassazione, I confine myself to referring to some American judgments, rendered on the basis of the Antiterrorism and Effective

23 icc, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (“Omar Al Bashir”), Decision of 4 March 2009, Case icc-02/05–01/09. 94 Tomuschat

Death Penalty Act of 1996.24 In a case against Iran, where the victim was an American student temporarily residing in Israel, the District Court for the District of Columbia awarded damages in the amount of usd 247 million.25 In cases against Cuba, where Cuba had shot down small private planes trying to drop propaganda leaflets over Cuban territory, the amounts of reparation awarded were within a similar range. Obviously, patriotic feelings and a spirit of revenge were present when these judgments were rendered. They have nothing to do with a rational estimate of the injury caused. If generalised as a road map for cases of egregious atrocities, they would lead into astronomic dimensions. It is significant that none of these judgments has been honoured by the respondents. They would constitute serious obstacles should the us one day wish to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iran and Cuba. In fact, the basic principle of international dispute settlement is consent.26 Any proceeding aimed at resolving a dispute between two states is subject to that requirement. Consent extends, in particular, to the composition of the judicial body concerned. As a rule, international courts are constructed in such a way as to ensure perfect neutrality. Either the bench is of a permanent character, being complemented as may be required by ad hoc judges proposed by the litigating parties. Or else, in the case of arbitral bodies, the principle of equality prevails, each side appointing an arbitrator of its own choice, an umpire being selected by common accord or by an impartial institution like the President of the International Court of Justice. Never is the determination of such delicate disputes left to the judiciary of one of the parties alone. Therefore, to jump from the impossibility of enforcing presumed reparation claims to advocating the jurisdiction of the courts of the country of the victims amounts to a breach of a fundamental principle of international law, namely the principle of sovereign equality which manifests itself in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Individualising the settlement of war damages by permitting individual actions to be brought would generally lead to a total judicial impasse. Thousands and perhaps millions of individual claims would have to be adjudi- cated. Not only would the numbers bring the judicial machinery to a standstill.

24 us, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 24 April 1996, Pub. L. No. 104– 132, 110 Stat. 1214. 25 us, Columbia District Court, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Order and Judgment of 11 March 1998, 999 F. Supp. 1. 26 See Christian Tomuschat, “Comments on Article 2(3) un Charter,” in Andreas Zimmermann et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary (Oxford: oup, 2012), 81 mn 10; Christian Tomuschat, “Comments on Article 36 icj Statute,” in ibid., 647 mn 19. The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj 95

An additional factor is the complexity of the facts to be appraised. How can ordinary judges, located somewhere in a provincial town, succeed in eluci- dating occurrences that took place far away under ill-defined circumstances? Some of the occurrences that formed the subject-matter pending before the Italian courts did not give rise to such difficulties, in particular the unpar- donable massacres perpetrated by the German Wehrmacht at the end of the war, when withdrawing from the Italian territory. Likewise, the recruitment of civilians as forced labourers could be fully elucidated. It remains, however, that the great majority of war crimes occur under circumstances that cannot be brought to light many years later. The victim concerned would hardly ever be able to meet the burden of proof, having to shy away also from any attempt to do so because of the costs to be expected. Thus, individual actions could only succeed at random, with the help of good luck. A further point to be taken into consideration is the question whether states ordered by the courts of other states to make reparation in the form of tremendous amounts of financial compensation would ever be prepared to honour such judgments. This is not only a factual element, to be dismissed as not fit- ting into the logic of the legal system. Precisely in view of this difficulty, international law has developed an alternative system of settlement of financial consequences of war damages through agreements providing for collective relief, where all the relevant elements are taken into consideration, not only the amount of damage suffered by the victim state and individuals, but also the capacity to pay of the wrong-doing state. The ensuing lump sum arrangements avoid costly court proceedings.27 It is then left to the discretion of the receiving state equally to distribute the actual compensation amounts to the individual victims concerned according to criteria of justice. In fact, this system was resorted to in the case of Germany after World War ii. No peace treaty was concluded, the victorious Allied Powers consid- ering that Germany had forfeited the right to sit as an equal partner at the negotiating table. Instead, they met at Potsdam a few months after the German defeat, from 17 July–2 August 1945, to lay down the conditions they wished to impose on Germany. The Agreement they reached,28 which without any valid reasons is many times denied the character of a true international treaty, contains a large chapter on reparations (chapter iv). In that chapter, it was

27 See in this sense also Matthias Kloth and Manuel Brunner, “Staatenimmunität im Zivilprozess bei gravierenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 50 (2012): 218–44, 242. 28 Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, reprinted in: Ingo von Münch, Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1968), 32. 96 Tomuschat specified in detail in what form Germany was to make reparation “for the loss and suffering she has caused to the United Nations”. Large parts of the German industrial capital equipment were to be removed and sent to the countries entitled to reparation, all German foreign assets were to be confiscated, the ships of the German merchant fleet were to be distributed to the members of the victorious alliance, and lastly the participants agreed on the separation of the territories east of the Oder-Neiße-line from Germany, at first provisionally, but later to be confirmed in a formal peace treaty. All these planned measures were in fact carried out. Concerning the annex- ation of Germany’s eastern territories, which could not attain full validity without Germany’s consent, the final confirmation was effected through the Two-plus-Four Treaty of 1990.29 By virtue of this Treaty, Germany eventually recognised the Oder-Neiße-line as its definitive eastern boundary. It is not generally known that the area concerned had a surface of 107,000 square kilome- tres, almost a fourth of the national territory—the value of which, counted only in financial terms, is tremendous, entailing at the same time an enormous loss of cultural values forming part of the heritage of the nation. This is not the place to go into further details. But the conclusion is obvious: Germany was made accountable for its criminal wrong-doing during World War ii and paid a high price for it, a price much higher than any other nation that had stood by its side as a partner in its aggression against Eastern Europe and Africa. In other words, reparation was effected according to the classic inter-state model. In 1945 at Potsdam, when the modalities of the reparation scheme were negotiated, it was never envisaged that Germany could be made accountable twice, not only according to the terms of the inter-allied Agreement, but also at a later stage vis-à-vis individual victims. To pursue such a strategy of twofold responsibility is highly inconsistent inasmuch as it would amount to an unfair arrangement burdening the wrong-doer with incalculable reparation costs almost ad infinitum. Fortunately, Germany realised at the same time that it had a moral obligation to go beyond the settlement determined at Potsdam by providing reparation to all victims of racially motivated measures of persecution. Thus, in particular, the state of Israel received generous payments during its phase of consolidation. Likewise, Germany concluded a treaty with Italy that granted financial assistance to those groups of the population targeted by the racist policy of the Third Reich.30

29 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, ilm 29 (1990), 1186. 30 Treaty Concerning Compensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National- Socialist Measures of Persecution (Vertrag über Leistungen zugunsten italienischer The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj 97

It is true that Italy did not benefit from the reparations effected on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement. This was due to the waiver clause of article 77 of the 1947 Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers.31 The reasons warranting such discriminatory treatment were obvious. Italy had been the main ally of Nazi Germany in waging wars of aggression. Consequently, it was not considered as deserving reparation payments from Germany. After this short glance at the specific circumstances of the dispute between Germany and Italy, the present chapter shall revert to the systemic considerations supporting the reasoning of the icj. It has already been demonstrated that any attempt to settle the consequences of war, where unavoidably war crimes are committed on both sides, by permitting individual reparation claims to be introduced against wrong-doing states would lead into a situation that could not be handled by the judiciary of any state. Regarding World War ii, the contention that any grave violation of human rights or international humanitarian law is susceptible of discarding state immunity would inevitably have led to chaotic consequences. No binding settlement treaties could have been concluded. Each and every victim could claim, possibly even sixty-seven years after the end of World War ii,32 that notwithstanding a treaty providing for lump sum compensation, he/she is the bearer of an individual right to compensation which the states concerned cannot restrict through mutual agreement. This would be tantamount to re-opening World War ii at the judicial level, providing an opportunity for victims on both sides to bring claims against the alleged wrong-doers. Indeed, international law is a law of reciprocity. It does not structurally discriminate against specific states. Thus, German citizens, too, would enjoy an opportunity to introduce claims against the Allied Powers provided that allegations could be made that war crimes were committed. A truly frightening perspective would thus be opened which would hardly contribute to strengthening peace and security in Europe. Obviously, such claims presuppose that individual entitlements to reparation arise under international law, either international humanitarian law or human rights law. To date, the international legal order does not acknowledge such entitlements. The icj did not probe into the matter, which had not been submitted to it.33 Indeed, its jurisdiction was confined to occurrences arising after 18 April 1961, the date of Germany’s ratification of the European

Staatsangehöriger, die von nationalsozialistischen Verfolgungsmaßnahmen betroffen wor den sind), 2 June 1961, bgbl. ii (1963), 793. 31 Treaty of Peace with Italy, 10 February 1947, 49 unts 3. 32 Of course, statutes of limitation might impede successful action. 33 But it gave a cursory hint in icj, Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening (n. 1), para. 94. 98 Tomuschat

Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Apart from this limitation of their scope of review, the task of analysing Germany’s post-war situation in all its implications would have become an almost insurmountable challenge. While the icj expressed its regret that Germany had denied financial compensation to Italian prisoners of war to whom the Nazi authorities had denied that status,34 it could not concern itself with the fate of German prisoners of war many of whom were retained by the victorious powers for many years beyond the end of the hostilities, in some cases until 1955.

4 Concluding Observations

The preceding considerations on the relationship between jurisdictional immunity of states and grave violations of fundamental rules of the international community have focused essentially on mass injustices as they occur mainly during armed conflict. It remains open whether the rule of immunity in respect of acta iure imperii should also be kept with regard to minor breaches of such rules. Careful analysis of the empirical background should precede any such attempt at reforming the law as it stands. It is not helpful for international law to postulate rules which under the test of empirical practice prove to be purely utopian, without any real chance of becoming operative. Human rights law should be real law and not only a playground for activists where enormous resources are being squandered uselessly.

34 Ibid., para. 99. CHAPTER 8 Remedies of Victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanities: Some Critical Remarks on the icj’s Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States

Michael Bothe

Dans son “Faust”, Goethe confère le rôle de conseiller un étudiant au diable, à Méphistophélès. Quant aux études de droit, M. les déconseille en forts termes:1

Es erben sich Gesetz und Rechte Wie eine ew’ge Krankheit fort . . . Vernunft wird Unsinn, Wohltat Plage ; Weh dir, dass du ein Enkel bist ! Vom Rechte, das mit uns geboren ist, von dem ist leider nie die Frage.

Dénigrement injuste, venu de la plume d’un juriste médiocre comme Goethe ? Ou est-ce que le jugement de la Cour internationale de Justice que nous discu- tons est une preuve de ce que Goethe avait raison? À vrai dire, Goethe nous pose une question qui est aujourd’hui plus pertinente que jamais : celle de la légitimité de l’ordre juridique. Cette question devient d’autant plus importante pour l’ordre international que cet ordre a un impact direct pour les individus. Quelles sont donc les circonstances qui fondent la légitimité de cet ordre juridique ? Et est-ce le jugement de la Cour

1 Johann W. von Goethe, Faust. Der Tragödie erster Teil, Studierzimmer : “Les lois et les droits se succèdent Comme une éternelle maladie . . . Raison devient folie, bienfait devient tourment ; Malheur à toi, fils de tes pères, malheur à toi ! Car du droit né avec nous, hélas, Il n’en est jamais question.” Traduction française, accessed 30 October 2013, www.archive.org/details/lefaustdegoethet 00goet.

1 The Fundamental Question of Legitimacy

The central thesis of this chapter is that the International Court of Justice (icj) has in its judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State2 neglected fundamental requirements of the legitimacy of the international legal order. It will try to prove this point in three steps: First, on a more technical level, it will show that the reasoning of the Court is not as compelling and elegant as it admittedly appears at a first glance, and that therefore the Court could lege artis have decided differently, and second, that there are more profound reasons why the Court should have held in favour of Italy or at least limited the scope of its holding. Third, that by not doing so, the Court has damaged the legitimacy of international adjudication.

2 The Case: Some Facts and Contradictions

The events which are at the origin of the case before the icj are well known. Two different types of gross violations of the law of armed conflict are at issue: on the one hand, two horrible massacres, committed by German forces in Italy (Civitella) and in Greece (Distomo), and on the other hand the treatment of Italians deported to Germany as forced labour. Neither the events nor their qualification as gross violations of international law are in dispute. In contradistinction to other groups of victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Germany before or during World War ii, the victims of these violations have not received any compensation. When they claimed compensation by suing Germany before the Italian and Greek courts, Germany raised the defence of state immunity, and the governments of these countries supported the German claim. Thus, the three governments were in agreement on the issue of immunity. But not all courts abided by that agreement. In one case, the Greek Supreme Court,3 and in others, the Italian Corte di Cassazione denied

2 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, 99. 3 Hellenic Supreme Court, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 4 May 2000, Case No. 11/2000. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 101 immunity.4 Be it mentioned by the way that the latter court did so despite the fact that in cases involving Italy, it had denied the justiciability of claims arising out of acts of warfare.5 When Germany brought the case against Italy before the icj, the Italian government was in a somewhat awkward position: it had to defend the position of its courts despite the fact that it had and probably still espoused a different view and had said so before its own courts. On the other hand, one of the true parties in interest, namely the victims, was not before the Court to defend its position. These were “missing voices”.6 This constituted a somewhat awkward procedural situation—despite the fact that the academic agents did a very good job in defending the positions of the Italian courts and thereby of the victims. This procedural dilemma makes it a bad case, and bad cases make bad law. The legitimacy of the legal order is in jeopardy.

3 The Fundamental Approach

If one takes as a point of the departure the rule of immunity and tries to find exceptions to that immunity by counting cases which have so far, in deviation from the alleged rule, denied immunity concerning war crimes and gross violations of human rights, one cannot come to a result which is different from that reached by the Court. There are not enough cases having denied immunity. But was it the right way to put the question, even on level of legal technique? The first fundamental flaw in the approach of the Court (and of many authors) is to treat state immunity as an absolute structural principle of the international order. This is not true, neither conceptually nor historically. State immunity is an exception to territorial sovereignty which indeed is a principle at least as fundamental as state immunity. Sovereign equality also means equal territorial sovereignty. Historically, the us Supreme Court case Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon7 is generally seen as the point of departure of the judicial

4 Italian Supreme Court, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 11 March 2004, Decision No. 5044/2004, reprinted in: Rivista diritto internazionale 87 (2004): 539 et seq. (Italian) and International Law Reports 128 (2006): 658 et seq. (English); Italian Supreme Court, Criminal Proceedings against Josef Max Milde, Judgment of 13 January 2009, Decision No. 1072/2009, reprinted in: Italian Yearbook of International Law 18 (2008): 325 et seq. 5 Italian Supreme Court, Markovic et al., Order of 5 June 2002, Order No. 8157/2002. 6 Markus Krajewski and Christopher Singer, “Should Judges Be Front-Runners? The icj, State Immunity and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 16 (2012): 1–34, 31 et seq. 7 us Supreme Court, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, Judgment of 24 February 1812, 11 us 116. 102 Bothe recognition of state immunity. The essential argument of that case, however, does not rely on sovereign immunity as a structural principle of international law, but on implied consent. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: “All exceptions (. . .) to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent might be either express or implied.”8 The Schooner Exchange had entered us waters in distress. Chief Justice Marshall considered this to be an entry by consent. He argued: “The implied license therefore under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and, it seems to the Court, ought to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality.”9 This reasoning is a far cry from recognising a structural principle of inter national law requiring the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states. At least historically, the thesis of the Court that state immunity forms part of the principle of sovereign equality10 is thus not true. According to Marshall’s reasoning, state immunity is neither absolute nor comprehensive, it depends on the circumstances of the case. It is contextual. Therefore, a recent analysis of the Schooner Exchange case rightly called the doctrine of absolute immunity a “myth.”11 But during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it became customary to follow the Schooner Exchange precedent. However, the rule of state immunity has regularly been adapted to changing circumstances in international relations.12 New developments in international relations triggered new types of cases. Courts and legislators took a fresh look on state immunity. The rule of state immunity was adapted accordingly. State immunity was denied when the cases no longer corresponded to the Schooner Exchange rationale. The most important developments in this respect were the denial of immunity for acta iure gestionis13 since the end of the nineteenth century and for so-called local torts. The latest development of this kind is the us legislation excluding immunity in cases where the defendant state sponsors terrorism.14

8 Ibid., 136. 9 Ibid., 144. 10 Ibid., para. 57. 11 Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 741–81, 753. 12 Krajewski and Singer, “Should Judges Be Front-Runners?” (n. 6), 8 et seq. 13 Peter-Tobis Stoll, “State Immunity,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 30 October 2013, mn 6. 14 Public Law 104–132 and 110–181; 28 usc § 1605(a). Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 103

4 The Local Torts Rule

The acts for which the plaintiffs before the Italian and Greek courts claimed compensation were no doubt acts iure imperii. Thus, the first mentioned reason for denying immunity did not apply. But the massacres of Civitella and Distomo could fall under the local torts rule. That rule is formulated by the un Convention on State Immunity15 (article 12) in the following terms: “(. . .) a State cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before the court of another State (. . .) in a proceeding which relates to pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the State, if the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the territory of that other State and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or omission.” Read in the light of Marshall’s reasoning, that provision confirms the principle of territorial sovereignty and limits the construction of implied consent accordingly. Its scope of application is not restricted to particular activities (such as traffic accidents caused by service vehicles of a foreign state). It is broad and general. us courts have applied the local torts rule in cases of mur- der allegedly committed by foreign secret service agents.16 The Court deals with this rule,17 but leaves the question whether it constitutes customary law open. It maintains, instead, that even if it were a customary law rule, it would not be applicable in case of military activities, and that therefore the general rule of immunity applied to military activities.18 This is an oversimpli- fication. The Court’s analysis of the relevant state legislative practice19 is, with due respect, somewhat surprising.20 The Court notes that the overwhelming majority of states having a local tort clause in their state immunity legislation

15 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38, annex. 16 us District Court for the District of Columbia, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, Judgment of 11 March 1980, 488 F.Supp. 665, Judgment of 5 November 1980, 502 F.Supp; us Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Liu v. Republic of China, Judgment of 29 December 1989, 892 F.2d 1419. 17 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), paras. 62 et seq. 18 Ibid., para. 69. 19 E.g. us, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 October 1976, Public Law 94–583; uk, State Immunity Act 1978, 20 July 1978, 1978 ch. 33; Australia, Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, Act No. 196 of 1985; Canada, State Immunity Act 1980, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-18, as amended. 20 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), paras. 70 et seq. 104 Bothe has no exception clause for military activities. But it seems to be more important for the Court that two states have such a military exception clause. The Court also relies on the drafting history of the un Convention of State Immunity in the ilc. Its local tort rule, quoted above, does not contain an exception for military activities. But to prove its point, the Court relies on a half sentence in the ilc’s Commentary to show that it must nevertheless be understood as containing such exception.21 But this is an over-emphasis on one sentence in a commentary. The non-application of the local tort rule to military activities is not as self-evident as the Court seems to think. The European Convention on State Immunity,22 not applicable in the present case, indeed contains an exception clause for military activities. But it has a specific purpose which is important for European states, namely that of preserving the primacy of status of forces agreements. This is also the explicit purpose of limited military exception clauses contained in some national legislation quoted by the Court23 and of national court decisions referred to by the Court as well.24 Although the explicit provision of the European Convention is formulated in a general way, this is not really a compelling proof that the local torts rule has developed with a kind of tacit exception for military activities. In this connection, it must be emphasised that the status of forces agreements which the clause of the European Convention is intended to preserve do not deprive the victims of unlawful acts of foreign forces of their judicial remedies: they open the way for a different type of remedy, namely action against the victim’s own state.25

5 The Case Law

Beyond the local torts rule, the Court relies on an extensive analysis of the case law concerning the question whether there is an exception to the rule of state immunity in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of human rights.26 At a first glance, the reasoning of the Court is clear and convincing: only the Italian and Greek cases which in the case before the

21 Ibid., para. 69. 22 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, ets No. 074. 23 Canada, Australia and Israel, see icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), para. 71. 24 Ibid., para. 72. 25 nato Status of Forces Agreement, 19 June 1951, accessed 5 December 2013, http://www .nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm, art. viii(5). 26 In particular icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), para. 85. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 105

Court are alleged to be a violation of the rule of immunity have denied immunity. This, goes the argument, is not enough to establish a new customary rule providing for an exception to the old rule of immunity. But at a closer look, the true legal situation is not that easy to ascertain. First, in the light of what has been said concerning the true scope of the traditional rule of immunity, this approach means asking the question the wrong way around. The question is not whether there is a new exception to an otherwise absolute rule of immunity. In the logic of the historic origin of the rule, it must rather be asked whether the rule of immunity also applies to new types of cases which so far had not been before national courts. Furthermore, seen with a critical eye, the picture of the case law is much more differentiated than the approach of the Court might make it appear. At a closer analysis, there are five types of cases:

– cases not directly relevant for the question of customary law as they rather relate to the interpretation of national legislation concerning sovereign immunity, – cases not directly relevant because of their narrower scope, – courts granting immunity without internal dissent, – courts split on the question of immunity, but granting it by a narrow majority decision, – courts denying immunity.

The British and Canadian27 cases quoted by the Court28 fall into the “not relevant” category. In particular the cases of Al-Adsani v. Kuwait29 and Jones v. Saudi Arabia30 emphasised by the icj relate to questions of the interpretation of the uk State Immunity Act 1978. In the latter case, only one Judge, Lord Hoffmann,31 is of the view that customary international law requires the uk to grant immunity. If the majority is of the view that the national legislation entitles the foreign state to immunity, it expresses no view as to whether customary law does so as well.

27 Canada, Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bouzari v. Iran, Judgment of 30 June 2004, No. C38295. 28 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), paras. 72 et seq. 29 uk, High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, Judgment of 15 March 1995, 103 ilr 420 (qb 1995); 107 ilr 536 (ca 1996). 30 uk, House of Lords, Jones v. Saudi Arabia, Judgment of 14 June 2006, [2006] ukhl 26. 31 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), para. 101. 106 Bothe

The case of McElhinney v. Ireland,32 relied upon by the Court,33 is relevant for the conclusion that the local tort rule does not constitute customary law, but it is not relevant for the immunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It related to a rather small border incident, not to torture or similar violations of fundamental values. The decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court34 on which the icj relied, too, is also not really relevant because its holding is rather limited. In the first part, the yardstick of the decision on the constitutional complaint was whether the judgment of the ordinary court was “arbitrary” in rejecting the applicant’s claim because of the defendant’s immunity. This is not equivalent to a Constitutional Court’s holding that there is immunity. In the second part of the judgment, the Slovenian Constitutional Court considered immunity as a proportional limitation of the right to a judicial remedy, but that proportionality judgment was based on the erroneous premise that the plaintiff could claim compensation before German courts.35 The value of the Slovenian decision as an expression of customary law is therefore limited. In the most recent case in question, the judgment of the Polish Supreme Court in Natoniewski v. Federal Republic of Germany,36 there is an elaborate argument for maintaining immunity, and no report of a dissent. It is the only one which really falls into the second category.37 In the other cases quoted by the icj in favour of the doctrine of immunity, the courts were narrowly split: the us Court of Appeal in Princz (2 to 1),38 the Special Supreme Court of Greece in Margellos (6 to 5)39 and the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani (9 to 8).40

32 ecthr, McElhinney v. Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 31253/96. 33 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), para. 72. 34 Slovenian Constitutional Court, aa v. Germany, Judgment of 8 March 2001, Case Up-13/99–24. 35 German courts, with the approval of the German Federal Constitutional Court, have consistently held that no individual rights arise out of violations of the laws of war which occurred during World War ii, bverfge (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court) vol. 94, 318. 36 “The Supreme Court Decision of 29 October 2010, Ref. No. iv csk 465/09 in the Case Brought by Winicjusz N. against the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Chancellery for Payment,” Polish Yearbook of International Law 30 (2010): 299–303. 37 The French cases are too laconic to classify them. 38 us Court of Appeals, Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 1 July 1994, 26 F.3d 1166 (dc Cir. 1994). 39 Greek Special Supreme Court, Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 17 September 2002, 129 ilr 525. 40 ecthr, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 35763/97. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 107

This is the jurisprudence to which one has to add the Greek and Italian cases denying immunity (Voiotia,41 Ferrini,42 Milde43). Thus, the true overall picture of the case law is much more open then would appear from reading the icj’s analysis. Especially the fact of split courts indicates the existence of a tension, of new developments. This should have invited the icj to be at least more careful in its analysis and not to simply disregard the fact that there is law making in progress. The reasoning of the Court not being compelling on a technical level, we have to turn our attention to the fundamental issues, i.e. fundamental reasons for denying immunity.

6 Fundamental Reasons for Denying Immunity

The fundamental reason for denying immunity is the value orientation which currently characterises the international legal order. The characterisation of certain norms as ius cogens is an expression of this development, but not the only one. This is the essential point of what has been coined as constitutionalisation.44 Constitutionalisation implies the need to implement fundamental values of the international order, inter alia by increasing and strengthening the remedies available for that purpose. Implementation of fundamental values is a crucial element of the current international order. State immunity for war crimes and gross violations of human rights is incompatible with that idea. State immunity is no more accepted in the international legal order as, and to the extent that, it would shield gross violations of fundamental values of that order. Objections are raised against that kind of legal logic, and the Court accepts some of them. These objections, as they are developed in the reasoning of the icj,45 rely on two distinctions which, with due respect, are irrelevant: The first, it is submitted: irrelevant, distinction is that between primary, substantive norms on the one hand, and secondary, procedural norms on the other.46 That distinction is used by the Court to reject the ius cogens argument

41 See above (n. 3). 42 See above (n. 4). 43 See above (n. 4). 44 Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: oup, 2011); Martti Koskenniemi, “International Legal Theory and Doctrine,” in Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia (n. 13), mn 29. 45 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), paras. 92 et seq. 46 See ibid., para. 95. 108 Bothe often put forward as a basis for denying immunity in cases of gross violations of fundamental international norms: only the substantive, primary norms are ius cogens, but not the secondary, procedural norms necessary for the implementation and enforcement of those primary norms. Therefore, goes the argument, these secondary norm cannot override the traditional norm of state immunity. But does this type of logic which deprives fundamental norms of an effective remedy really correspond to the importance of these imperative primary norms? The second distinction, which is a question of the internal logic of the international legal order, plays a role in the doctrinal debate about immunity. It is not even discussed by the Court, but was argued by Germany:47 while it is recognised that the personal immunity of perpetrators who are state organs no longer exists in cases of war crimes and gross violations of human rights, the immunity of the state is held to subsist.48 True, both types of immunity have to be distinguished—but why should the wrong-doer state be obliged to leave its agents to the criminal jurisdiction of other states while that state’s pecuniary interests are preserved because the state still enjoys immunity? It would be an unacceptable contradiction of values if that distinction were to shield the state in contradistinction to the perpetrator. As far as immunity is concerned, that distinction must be considered as irrelevant. Quite to the contrary: denial of the immunity of state organs for official acts constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity, starting with the trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo, was the first step by which the international legal order accorded a higher rank to the implementation of basic values than to the regard for foreign sovereignty. This denial is now firmly established in international law. It is a matter of the internal consistency of that legal order not to exempt pecuniary claims against the state itself from this reliance on basic values. Both distinctions are rather formalistic. If they are used to hinder the enforcement of fundamental values of the international system, this puts the legitimacy of the legal order into jeopardy. This is so obvious that one has to ask why the Court is willing to derive such consequences from the said distinctions. Are there additional reasons behind these arguments?

47 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Public Sitting of 15 September 2011, cr 2011/20, 26, Christian Tomuschat. 48 Christian Tomuschat, “L’immunité des États en cas de violations graves des droits de l’homme,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public 109 (2005): 51–74, 56. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 109

7 The Real Pros and Cons of National Courts Dealing with Compensation of War Damages

The Court does not discuss an argument which is often found in the legal literature, namely that courts were unable to deal with mass claims after a war. It would result in chaos. This contention is not true: Courts nowadays are accus- tomed to dealing with mass claims. The practice of the un Compensation Commission adjudicating war damages of the Second Gulf War on a massive scale is a proof.49 In the United States in particular, the class action procedure has been developed to deal with mass claims.50 Had Germany won the case before the icj, no chaos would have resulted—especially in the light of the fact that most justified claims are indeed settled. But even if courts can do it—is it desirable that they have a role in this field? This raises the question whether state immunity is salutary because it reserves the possibility to settle the question of compensation for war damages, including compensation for gross violations of the law of armed conflict, to intergovernmental dealings which preferably result in treaties. There can be no doubt that after a war having caused massive damages, treaty making is useful to bring some order in a complex situation. The ius cogens argument must not, and does not, stand in the way of reasonable treaty making on the consequences of war, including the question of compensation for victims. A good regulation by treaty is the preferred solution. But this does not mean that this solution is exclusive of others. Solution by treaty means an arrangement between the state bureaucracies negotiating the treaties. The question must be asked, both in terms of efficiency and of legitimacy, whether it is appropriate to leave this question to the bureaucracies alone. The history of post-war treaty making has not been a general success story. A large part of the intergovernmental dealings after the World War i, in particular the reparations question, account for the disaster which followed.51 The record after the World War ii is better, but the regulation of compensation

49 unsc, Resolution 687 (1991), s/res/687(1991), 3 April 1991, paras. 16 et seq.; Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, 26 June 1992, s/ac.26/1992/10, annex. 50 For a concise and critical review of the phenomenon of class action see Burkhard Hess, “Kriegsentschädigungen aus kollisionsrechtlicher und rechtsvergleichender Sicht,” in Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg et al., eds., Entschädigung nach bewaffneten Konflikten: Die Konstitutionalisierung der Welthandelsordnung (Heidelberg: C.F. Mueller, 2003), 107–212, 193 et seq. 51 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, “Reparations,” in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2000), 178–80. 110 Bothe has been fragmented and disparate. This leads to the crux of the case before the icj. In its pleadings, Germany heavily relied on the fact that compensation was paid to many victims.52 But there is no or, in the case of forced labour, at least no good53 explanation of the reason why the particular plaintiffs before the Italian and Greek courts had not received any compensation. There is a loophole in the compensation schemes which has remained unexplained. This has rightly been called a “Gerechtigkeitslücke”54 (justice gap). The Italian and Greek cases are an indication of this justice gap which the relevant intergovernmental dealings have neither filled nor explained. The problem solving capacity of the united bureaucracies having thus proven questionable, national courts can and must step in. The role of national courts in securing the enforcement and implementation of international law has become crucial in many fields of international law.55 At least to fill these loopholes, a role for national courts is necessary. It can correct errors and inequities resulting from intergovernmental dealings and provide legitimacy for the entire system. The compensation for forced labour awarded by Germany during the World War ii, which is now granted through the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”, would not have been possible without the widespread litigation in the us. The existence of individual remedies finally forced governments to see to it that justice was done to the victims. In that particular case, it was rendered technically possible by the fact that there were numerous relevant defendants who could not claim state immunity. But should this coincidence make all the difference? That does not seem to be appropriate. State immunity as conceived by the icj prevents national courts from playing their necessary and salutary role.

8 Beyond Technicalities: The Value Orientation of Today’s International Order

This role of national courts advocated in this chapter corresponds to the value orientation of the international order which has become an important characteristic of that order. This is what is transported by the notion of

52 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Public Sitting of 15 September 2011, cr 2011/20, 12 et seq., Susanne Wasum-Rainer. 53 See below text accompanying n. 72. 54 Hess, “Kriegsentschädigungen” (n. 50), 198. 55 Francesco Francioni, “International Law as a Common Language for National Courts,” Texas International Law Journal 36 (2001): 587–98. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 111

“constitutionalization”.56 It requires the implementation of its fundamental values. This implementation is based on a divers system of remedies.57 Access to justice is a crucial part thereof. It is sometimes said that state immunity is a necessary condition for the good functioning of international relations. This argument was heavily relied upon by Germany.58 Yet how important must that good functioning be if it is accepted as preventing the implementation of the most important and fundamental values of the international community?59

9 The Appropriate Role of the icj

Had the Court recognised these developments it would have meant a certain amount of creativity. The Court would have contributed to the development of the law by promoting a norm which may still be in statu nascendi. Was it entitled to do so? Could the Court be a promoter, even a fore-runner of legal developments? Yes it can!60 To develop international law is not the exclusive prerogative of the states in the sense of state bureaucracies. These bureaucracies, internationally linked as they are, can no longer be regarded as the incorporation of “the state” in the manner of Louis xiv: “L’État, c’est moi!” That very concept was challenged by the Italian courts. Yet the bureaucracies stood together in defending their exclusive grip on the development of international law. But the reality of today’s international relations is much more diverse.61 Civil society plays a

56 See above (n. 44). 57 Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Die Geltungsbegründung der Menschenrechte (Weilerswist: Velbrueck, 2005), 129 et seq. 58 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Public Sitting of 12 September 2011, cr 2011/17, 55 et seq., Robert Kolb. He recognises the justice problem and takes refuge in stating that there can be no perfect justice! 59 On the notion of international community see Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2009); Georges Abi-Saab, “Cours général de droit international public,” Recueil des Cours 207 (1987): 9–463, 51 et seq. 60 Krajewski and Singer, “Should Judges Be Front-Runners?” (n. 6), 30. 61 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (Oxford: oup, 2012), in particular at 64 et seq.; Michael Bothe, “Private Normunternehmer im Völkerrecht: Gedanken zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts durch nicht-staatliche Institutionen,” in Holger P. Hestermeyer et al., eds., Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity, Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, vol. 2 (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2012), 1399–1422. 112 Bothe role. The impact of non-state actors in the development of international law (private norm entrepreneurs) is a reality. The increasing role of non-state actors in this field is a major element in the constitutionalisation of international law.62 Courts, both national and international ones, actively contribute to the continuous formation and reformation of international law. In doing so, courts yield at least as much legitimacy as the United States bureaucracies. Therefore, it is a role of the Court to give creative answers to current fundamental issues of the international order. This is a legitimate function of international courts and tribunals.63 This function characterises their practice.64 The history of the Court is full of examples for this function. It started with the bold decision to recognise the objective international personality of the United Nations and the right of “functional protection” of its agents.65 Further examples are the role of equity emphasised in the North Sea Continental Shelf case66 and the development of the notion of erga omnes obligations in Barcelona Traction.67 In these three cases, the Court developed the law by interpreting it on the basis of certain values: good functioning of the United Nations, equity, implementation of fundamental principles of the international order, e.g. the prohibition of aggression and of genocide as well as the protection of basic human rights. On the other hand, the inclination of the Court to fulfil this

62 Anne Peters, “Membership in the Global Constitutional Community,” in Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, Constitutionalization (n. 44), 153–262, 157 et seq. 63 For a deeper analysis, see Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “International Courts as Lawmakers,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Ina Gätschmann, eds., International Dispute Settlement: Room for Innovations? (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 161–214; contra Abdul G. Koroma, “An Investigation of International Courts, Public Authority and its Democratic Justification,” ibidem 215–220; a more elaborate version is published in the Special Issue: “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers,” German Law Journal 12 (2011), in particular Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers,” German Law Journal 12 (2011): 979– 1004, and Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, “On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking,” German Law Journal 12 (2011): 1341–70. 64 For some newer examples see Bogdandy and Venzke, “International Courts as Lawmakers” (n. 63), 165 et seq. 65 icj, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, icj Reports 1949, 174, 183 et seq. 66 icj, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment of 20 February 1969, icj Report 1969, 3, 45 et seq. (paras. 83 et seq.). 67 icj, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, icj Reports 1970, 3, paras. 33 et seq.; see Jochen A. Frowein, “Obligations erga omnes,” in Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia (n. 13). Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 113 law-making function has varied.68 Regrettably, the Court refused to play this role in the present case, too. It would at least have been appropriate for the Court not to bar the development of an emerging norm.69 In the past, the Court has indeed played its role in this sense. In the German-Icelandic Fisheries dispute,70 for example, it found a way to decide in favour of Germany without compromising the development of new rules which at the time of that judgment were about to see the light— and have become the new law of the sea only a few years later. But in the present case, the Court has refused to play its role in this salutary way. By closing the door to the necessary role of national courts in the re-establishment of a just order after conflicts, the International Court of Justice has damaged the legitimacy of the international system.

10 Conclusion and Perspectives

The problem of the justice gap or legitimacy gap has apparently been felt by representatives of Germany in that case. To dispel these doubts concerning the legitimacy of the procedure and the result, high ranking German officials repeatedly declared that this case was not a case against the victims, but dealt with an entirely different issue.71 From a formal point of view, this is absolutely

68 Bogdandy and Venzke, “International Courts as Lawmakers” (n. 63), 165 et seq. with further references. 69 Krajewski and Singer, “Should Judges Be Front-Runners?” (n. 6), 31. 70 icj, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment of 25 July 1974, icj Reports 1974, 175, paras. 42 et seq. The Court based its finding in favour of Germany in particular on an exchange of notes which had taken place between the parties, recognised the dynamic character of the applicable rules and invited the parties to settle their future relations by negotiations based on equitable principles. 71 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Public Sitting of 12 September 2011, cr 2011/17, 18 et seq. Susanne Wasum-Rainer. In a declaration issued after the judgment of the icj, the German Foreign Minister Westerwelle said: “Das Verfahren war nicht gegen die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus gerichtet. Ihr Leid hat die Bundesregierung stets voll anerkannt. Natürlich geht es auch nicht darum, die deutsche Verantwortung für die Verbrechen des zweiten Weltkrieges in Frage zu stellen oder zu relativieren” (available on the website of the German Embassy in Greece, “igh-Urteil zur Klärung des Grundsatzes der Staatenimmunität,” accessed 4 November 2013, www .griechenland.diplo.de/Vertretung/griechenland/de/08/Aussenminister__Westerwelle__ zum__igh__Urteil.html. 114 Bothe correct. But seen in the perspective of the victims, it meant that they were deprived of what they considered to be their last hope to obtain a compensation for their and their relatives’ suffering. For them it is hard to accept that the case did not really concern them. The icj itself recognises this justice gap. At two places in the judgment, the Court expresses doubts concerning the German policy of non-payment. Regarding the Italian forced labour cases, the Court addresses the reasons for the German refusal to pay compensation. It “considers that it is a matter of surprise—and regret—that Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims on the ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at the relevant time, Germany had refused to recognise, particularly since those victims had thereby been denied the legal protection to which that status entitled them.”72 This is as far as a critique of one of the parties to the litigation could go in an obiter dictum. What the Court had in mind was the German argument that no compensation was given to prisoners of war (as this is lawful detention) and that the persons subjected to forced labour were entitled to prisoner of war status. Thus, it was argued, they were not entitled to compensation although they were not treated as prisoners of war by Germany. That argument is difficult to understand, but apparently the Italian government was unable (or unwilling?) to achieve, in its dealings with Germany, the result required by justice. Further on, in an apparent effort to close the justice gap which the decision of the Court had maintained, the Court invites the parties to remedy the situation in which it had left the victims: “In coming to this conclusion, the Court is not unaware that the immunity from jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals concerned. It considers however that the claims arising from the treatment of Italian military internees referred to in paragraph 99, together with other claims of Italian nationals which have allegedly not been settled—and which formed the basis of the Italian proceedings—could be subject of further negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving the issue”.73 Is this a declaration of bankruptcy by the Court, recognising the justice gap, not being able to close it and handing it back to the bureaucracies? For the victims, it is a weak consolation, and, as far as one knows from public sources, this suggestion by the Court has not produced any consequence.

72 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 2), para. 99. 73 Ibid., para. 104. Remedies of Victims of War Crimes & Crimes against Humanities 115

To come back to the beginning: what about the “the rights we are born with”? For the sake of the legitimacy of the international legal order, they deserve more respect than the Court has been willing to pay to them, despite some allusion to regrets. CHAPTER 9 L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes du droit et de la justice

Jerzy Kranz

1 Introduction

La Deuxième guerre mondiale est-elle définitivement terminée ? Si l’on consi- dère ses conséquences et notamment l’arrêt du 3 février 20121 de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Allemagne contre Italie la réponse n’est pas facile. Quelle en est la raison ? Pourquoi l’Allemagne reste toujours confrontée à son passé ? Pourquoi l’Italie a mis en cause l’immunité de l’État allemand ? L’arrêt de la Cour est-il décevant ? Peut-on résoudre tous les problèmes ayant uniquement recours au droit ?

2 Approche allemande des réparations et indemnisations

Pour comprendre les origines et les raisons du différend germano-italien, il est indispensable d’esquisser l’approche allemande du problème des réparations et des indemnisations. La responsabilité de l’agresseur se concrétise normalement sous forme d’un traité de paix. Or ce traité n’a jamais été (et ne sera pas)2 conclu. Il a été remplacé par une série d’accords dont la phase finale et mul- tilatérale fut le Traité portant règlement définitif concernant l’Allemagne du 12 septembre 1990 (Traité 2 + 4).

1 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce Intervenant), Arrêt du 3 février 2012, cij Recueil 2012, p. 99. 2 Procès-verbal de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de la France, de la Pologne, de l’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques, des États-Unis d’Amérique, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne et de la République Démocratique Allemande (17 juillet 1990) : « [L]a rfa s’associe à la déclaration des Quatre puissances alliées et souligne que les événements ou circonstances auxquels cette déclaration fait référence ne se produiront pas, à savoir qu’un Traité de paix ou un règlement de paix ne sont pas envisa- gés. La rda souscrit à la déclaration faite par la rfa ».

La question des réparations allemandes n’a pas été résolue de manière précise et complète.3 Plusieurs facteurs ont contribué à cet état de choses : la situation économique et financière de l’Allemagne vaincue ainsi que la guerre froide, le climat politique interne peu favorable dû notamment au sentiment d’injustice éprouvé à l’égard de certaines mesures adoptées par les alliés (par exemple les décisions de Potsdam en 1945), et, finalement, les lacunes de la réglementation juridique. Si les principales dispositions relatives aux réparations ont figuré dans un chapitre particulier de l’accord de Potsdam (1945),4 certains autres traités mul- tilatéraux avaient différé ce problème jusqu’au règlement de paix (peace settlement), par exemple l’Accord de Londres sur les dettes extérieures allemandes (1953) ou la Convention sur le règlement de questions issues de la guerre et de l’occupation (1954). En acceptant le vœu explicite de l’Allemagne, les autres parties du Traité 2 + 4 ont décidé de fermer ce chapitre sans discussion. La division de l’Allemagne en deux États constituait un bon prétexte pour repousser certaines réclamations. Plus cette situation se prolongeait, plus le gouvernement allemand était d’avis que – compte tenu de l’écoulement du temps, de la bonne coopération avec ses anciens adversaires et de l’intégration de la rfa dans les principales structures occidentales – la question des répara- tions avait perdu son importance.5 Si la notion de réparations n’est pas et n’a pas été définie une fois pour toutes, on s’accorde généralement à dire qu’elle englobe les réclamations formulées au niveau étatique. Cependant, compte tenu des crimes massifs envers les populations civiles, il s’agissait de savoir si et sous quelle forme les victimes individuelles des persécutions national-socialistes avaient droit à une indemnisation séparée. Relevons que la Convention sur le règlement de questions issues de la guerre et de l’occupation distinguait expressément entre « indemnisation des victimes de la persécution nazie » (chapitre quatrième)

3 Voir pour les détails C. Goschler, (Hrsg.), Die Entschädigung von ns-Zwangsarbeit am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen, Wallstein, 2012 ; B. Simma et H.-P. Folz, Restitution und Entschädigung im Völkerrecht. Die Verpflichtungen der Republik Österreich nach 1945 im Lichte ihrer außenpolitischen Praxis, Wien, Oldenbourg, 2004, 497 p. 4 Accord de Potsdam (1945) – Communiqué : « German Reparations. In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations, and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility » – cette formule étant développée dans le texte de l’Accord. 5 Voir par exemple Allemagne, Diète fédérale allemande (Deutscher Bundestag), Bundestags drucksache 16/11307, 4 décembre 2008 ; Bundestagsdrucksache 16/9955, 8 juillet 2008 ; Bundestagsdrucksache 16/2422, 21 août 2006 ; Bundestagsdrucksache 16/2423, 21 août 2006 ; Bundestagsdrucksache 16/1634, 30 mai 2006 ; Bundestagsdrucksache 13/3538, 22 janvier 1996. 118 Kranz et « réparations » (chapitre sixième). A regarder la pratique allemande on peut estimer que la Wiedergutmachung (indemnisation individuelle) fut séparée de la question des réparations (niveau étatique). Le problème s’est compliquée dans le contexte de la renonciation par certains pays « en leur nom » et « au nom de leurs ressortissants » à « toutes récla- mations » contre l’Allemagne et ses ressortissants (par exemple articles 76–77 du Traité de paix avec l’Italie ou deux traités de 1961).6 Notons en marge que certains pays n’ont jamais renoncé à des réparations allemandes (par exemple la Tchécoslovaquie) et certains autres (par exemple la Pologne en 1953) y ont renoncé, mais en omettant la formule précitée (au nom de leurs ressortissants, toutes réclamations).7 Les controverses concernant la notion de réparations et le droit à une indemnisation individuelle ont dominé les relations avec l’Allemagne pendant plusieurs décennies. L’arrêt de la cij ne résout pas ce problème.8 Les controverses juridiques favorisaient la politique sélective de l’Allemagne en la matière. Elle a consisté à repousser dans le temps et à réduire l’étendue des réclamations juridiques, ce qui n’a pas empêché plusieurs pays et leurs ressortissants de faire pression politique sur la rfa, même après la conclusion du Traité 2 + 4. Sur le plan interne, la rfa a adopté (1953, 1956, 1965) une loi relative à l’indemnisation des victimes de la persécution national-socialiste. L’obligation d’adopter une telle législation résultait notamment du chapitre quatrième de la Convention sur le règlement de questions issues de la guerre et de

6 Voir pour les détails cij, Allemagne c. Italie (n. 1), par. 21 et 24. 7 Voir J. Kranz, « Zwangsarbeit – 50 Jahre danach: Bemerkungen aus polnischer Sicht », in K. Barwig, G. Saathof, N. Weyde (Hrsg.), Entschädigung für ns-Zwangsarbeit. Rechtliche, historische und politische Aspekte, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998, 344 p., p. 111-134 ; États-Unis, Cour de District du New Jersey, Alice Burger-Fischer, et al. v. Degussa ag 1999 – Brief of the Republic of Poland as amicus curiae, http://www.academia.edu/1789862/Alice_Burger- Fischer_et_al._v._Degussa_ag_1999_-_Brief_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_as_amicus_curiae (page consultée le 2 mai 2014). 8 cij, Allemagne c. Italie (n. 1), par. 108 : « [E]n particulier, point n’est besoin pour celle-ci de trancher la question de savoir si, comme l’affirme l’Italie, le droit international confère aux victimes de violations du droit des conflits armés un droit individuel à réparation directement opposable. Point n’est besoin non plus pour elle de se prononcer sur la question de savoir si, comme l’affirme l’Allemagne, le paragraphe 4 de l’article 77 du traité de paix ou les dispositions des accords de 1961 emportaient renonciation automatique aux réclamations qui font l’objet des procédures intentées devant la justice italienne. Non qu’il s’agisse là, bien évidemment, de questions sans importance ; elles n’appellent simplement aucune décision dans le cadre de la présente affaire. » L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes 119 l’occupation. La loi en question s’est caractérisée par une approche restrictive en exigeant que les victimes soient persécutées en raison de leur race ou croyance et répondent à un certain nombre de conditions de nationalité et de résidence, les moyens de preuve étant très complexes et bureaucratiques. Bref, cette loi excluait la plupart des victimes étrangères. Devant cette situation et sous la pression de plusieurs pays occidentaux, la rfa a conclu (1960–1964) une douzaine d’accords internationaux relatifs à l’indemnisation des victimes de la persécution national-socialiste (Globalabkommen). Les pays d’Europe centrale en ont été exclus. Dans certains de ces accords, il était question d’« indemnisation », dans d’autres de paiement d’une « prestation ». Parfois, il s’agissait des victimes de la « persécution national-socialiste », parfois de la persécution à cause « de leur hostilité politique au national-socialisme ou en raison de leur race, de leur religion ou de leurs conceptions idéologiques ». Dans certains accords ultérieurs (notamment avec les pays d’Europe centrale), la rfa tint à souligner le caractère ex gratia de ses paiements aux victimes. En ce qui concerne le travail forcé, il n’a pas été considéré par la rfa (et par l’industrie allemande) comme un crime. Selon certains accords, seul le travail forcé effectué dans un camp de concentration autorisait à une indemnisation. Si, de l’avis des autorités allemandes, le Traité 2 + 4 avait mis fin à toutes pré- tentions envers l’Allemagne, celle-ci a tout de même accepté, dans le cadre de l’accord germano-américain de 1995,9 de payer des « indemnisations » (et non prestations ex gratia) aux victimes américaines de la persécution national- socialiste. Ceci nous amène à penser que le Traité 2 + 4 n’a pas exclu toutes les prétentions individuelles.10 L’accord de 1995 faisait suite au procès intenté contre l’État allemand par Hugo Princz (victime de la persécution national-socialiste) dans lequel les

9 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern ment of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution, 19 septembre 1995, Treaty and Other International Agreements 13019. 10 President George Bush, « Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty on the Reunification of Germany », 25 September 1990, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6- 900925.htm (page consultée le 2 mai 2014), par. 8 : « [I]n his letter of September 18 to Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Genscher also makes clear that the Government of a united Germany accepts responsibility for the resolution of unresolved claims against the German Democratic Republic, both of American citizens, and of Jewish victims of the Nazi regime. » 120 Kranz tribunaux américains ont reconnu l’immunité juridictionnelle de l’Allemagne.11 Dans un autre procès aux États-Unis (en 1999, contre un groupe d’entreprises allemandes), les tribunaux se sont déclarés incompétents en raison de political question.12 Ce dernier arrêt a été rendu parallèlement à la négociation multi- latérale qui se déroulait en rapport avec les poursuites aux États-Unis (class actions) contre certaines entreprises allemandes (à l’instar des procès contre les banques suisses). Cette négociation s’est terminée en 2000 à Berlin par un compromis politique dans lequel l’Allemagne s’est déclarée prête à payer ex gratia 10 milliards dm aux victimes de la persécution national-socialiste et notamment aux victimes du travail forcé.13 Il faut estimer qu’en l’absence de pression externe les accords en question n’auraient jamais été conclus. Si les paiements de l’Allemagne à titre de persécution national-socialiste se sont avérés importants, leur niveau élevé est dû notamment à des indemnisations des victimes juives (y compris des rentes mensuelles).14 En cherchant les raisons de la tension entre l’Allemagne et les victimes de la persécution, il faut surtout mettre l’accent sur le caractère sélectif et tardif de la politique allemande en la matière. Le vrai problème se ramenait à un traitement inégal des victimes. Cette attitude de l’Allemagne l’avait longtemps placée sous une pression politique à laquelle elle céda par étapes. Cela étant, les paiements et programmes allemands aux victimes en question se distinguent tout de même positivement en comparaison avec les autres cas (l’exemple négatif est certainement celui de la Russie).15

11 États-Unis, Cour d’appel pour le circuit du district de Columbia, Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Décision du 1er juillet 1994, 26 F.3d 1166 (dcc 1994). 12 États-Unis, Cour de District du New Jersey, Burger-Fischer v. Degussa ag, Décision du 13 September 1999, 65 F.Supp.2d 248 (dnj 1999), conclusion : « [T]o state the ultimate conclusion, the questions whether the reparation agreements made adequate provision for the victims of Nazi oppression and whether Germany has adequately implemented the reparation agreements are political questions which a court must decline to determine. » 13 Ambassade des États-Unis en Allemagne, « Joint Statement on Occasion of the Final Plenary Meeting Concluding International Talks on the Preparation of the Founda- tion “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” », http://germany.usembassy.gov/ germany/img/assets/8497/jointstatement.pdf (page consultée le 3 mai 2014). 14 Le premier pas vers l’indemnisation des victimes juives fut l’accord israélo-allemand de 1952 (Luxemburger Abkommen) suivi de plusieurs autres mesures d’indemnisation. 15 Voir, par exemple, l’affaire du massacre de Katyn : cedh, Janowiec et autres c. Russie, Arrêt du 16 avril 2012, Requêtes n° 55508/07 et 29520/09, « Written Observations of Amnesty International », http://www.amnesty.org/pt-br/library/asset/IOR61/001/2013/en/2f7e3df1- 7280-46e7-802a-008885788722/ior610012013en.pdf (page consultée le 3 mai 2014). L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes 121

3 Le contexte politique et financier

L’affaire Allemagne c. Italie et les arrêts antérieurs des tribunaux italiens ou grecs témoignent d’une sorte d’exaspération politique et, d’autre part, d’une volonté d’affaiblir le rôle de l’immunité de l’État en vue de mieux protéger les victimes de guerre. Indépendamment de l’appréciation de l’approche italienne ou de l’arrêt de la cij, il reste que le problème de la protection juridique de l’État aux dépens des victimes des violations par celui-ci du droit international humanitaire ou des droits de l’homme constitue un défi au droit des gens contemporain. Les poursuites judiciaires pénales ainsi que le concept de juridiction universelle prouvent une évolution incontestable, même si les résultats sont parfois limités. Par contre, l’immunité de l’État, considérée comme une règle du droit coutumier, constitue (sauf pour les actes de iure gestionis) une barrière toujours insurmontable, ce que confirme la jurisprudence des tribunaux nationaux et internationaux (avec quelques exceptions aux États-Unis). Sans vouloir trancher si et dans quelle mesure les renonciations italiennes à certaines prétentions envers l’Allemagne ont été complètes et définitives,16 la question des internés militaires italiens (l’une des principales raisons du dif- férend germano-italien) incite à la réflexion. Vu l’accord germano-italien du 2 juin 1961,17 les prestations (Leistungen) allemandes étaient destinées aux victimes de la persécution à cause de leur « race, religion ou idéologie ».

16 Voir E. Kaufmann, Autorität und Freiheit, Göttingen, Verlag Otto Schwartz, 1960, 630 p. (citation d’après D. Blumenwitz, Das Offenhalten der Vermögensfrage in den deutsch- polnischen Beziehungen, Bonn, Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1992, 158 p., pp. 152-153) : « [A]ls sich die Reichsregierung entschloß, im Vertrage von Rapallo auf gewisse Ansprüche gegenüber der Sowjetregierung zu verzichten, legte sie besonderen Wert darauf, in der dem Reichstag vorgelegten Denkschrift besonders zu betonen: ‘Wenn Deutschland auf die Ansprüche verzichtet, die sich aus der bisherigen Anwendung der russischen Gesetze und Maßnahmen auf deutsche Rechte ergeben, so heißt das, daß Deutschland darauf verzichtet, in dieser Hinsicht völkerrechtliche Entschädigungsansprüche geltend zu machen’. [. . .] Das Deutsche Reich kann daher nur auf diesen völkerrechtlichen Anspruch, niemals dagegen auf private Ansprüche verzichten. Das ergibt sich schon aus der Tatsache, daß private Rechte und Ansprüche nicht Rechte und Ansprüche des Staates sind, der Staat also nicht über sie Dritten gegenüber verfügen kann. » 17 Allemagne, Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 2. Juni 1961 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik über Leistungen zugunsten italienischer Staatsangehöriger, die von nationalsozialistischen Verfolgungsmaßnahmen betroffen worden sind, 28 juin 1963, bgbl. ii 791, p. 793. 122 Kranz

En tout cas, aux termes du paragraphe 11(3) des statuts de la fondation allemande « Mémoire, responsabilité et avenir » les prisonniers de guerre ont été exclus du cercle de ses bénéficiaires.18 Cette disposition visait surtout les prisonniers de guerre russes19 et italiens (mais pas polonais). Selon le gouvernement allemand, les « internés militaires » italiens persécu- tés (et notamment astreints au travail forcé) n’ont pas pu perdre leur statut de prisonniers de guerre par suite d’une décision unilatérale et illégale des autori- tés allemandes, même s’ils en ont été privés de facto. Par conséquent, seuls les internés militaires déportés dans un camp de concentration (un groupe très restreint) ont pu bénéficier des prestations de la fondation allemande. En vérité, malgré cette justification juridique formelle, la raison de l’exclusion fut de caractère politique et financier. Le paragraphe 11 était le fruit des difficultés concernant le montant global des paiements allemands (au cours de la très difficile négociation multilatérale, terminée en 2000) et des incertitudes relatives au nombre de victimes potentielles dans cette catégorie. Le moins qu’on puisse dire est que l’argumentation allemande fut très formaliste. Il semble qu’une telle approche n’était pas contraignante et que l’inclusion du groupe en question n’aurait pas abouti à saper les résultats de la négocia- tion. Cela parait encore plus plausible si l’on tient compte des paiements allemands actuels accrus à certains autres groupes de victimes de la persécution national-socialiste.

4 Hiérarchisation et individualisation

Les tentatives d’obtenir indemnisation ayant échoué, les tribunaux italiens ont refusé de reconnaître l’immunité juridictionnelle de l’Allemagne. Leur raisonnement consistait à souligner la gravité des violations du droit international par l’Allemagne et à recourir dans ce contexte à la construction des normes du ius cogens. Ces normes indérogeables se fondent sur les valeurs fondamentales de l’hu- manité et prévalent sur toute règle contraire du droit international. Toutefois, on ne doit pas oublier qu’il n’existe pas un catalogue précis et universellement

18 Allemagne, Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”, 11 août 2000, Bundesgesetzblatt, i, 1263 ; Allemagne, Fünftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft”, 8 septembre 2008, Bundesgesetzblatt, i, 1797. 19 Notons que quelques trois millions de prisonniers de guerre soviétiques ont perdu leur vie dans les camps allemands. L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes 123 admis de ces normes. En plus, on observe la tendance à qualifier unilatérale- ment de ius cogens plusieurs normes relatives aux des droits de l’homme, ce qui doit inciter à la prudence. Notons aussi que si les tribunaux internationaux font parfois référence à cette notion, ils ne considèrent pas que la violation de telles normes produit des effets automatiques et particuliers en ce qui concerne la responsabilité internationale ou l’accès aux tribunaux internationaux. Autrement dit, le rôle du ius cogens ne doit pas être surestimé. Le ius cogens fait partie de la conception constitutionnaliste du droit international. Sans contester certains mérites de ce processus, il convient d’observer qu’il s’agit d’une lente évolution qui, pouvant apporter des résultats réels, n’aboutira jamais à une situation identique à celle du constitutionnalisme éta- tique. De même, la démocratie dans les rapports internationaux ne peut pas copier le modèle étatique.20 Par conséquent, devant l’évolution du droit international, il vaut mieux parler de l’apparition d’une hiérarchisation (au lieu de constitutionnalisation) et de la diversification naturelle du droit international (et pas forcément de sa fragmentation). Relevons aussi que le problème de l’immunité de l’État conduit à opposer l’État à l’individu. Si, par le passé, la position de l’État a été centrale et domi- nante par rapport à l’individu, on observe actuellement la tendance inverse qui consiste à fonder le droit international sur la position unique de l’individu. L’opposition en question est réelle, mais en même temps artificielle, comme c’est également le cas de la relation entre les notions de droit et de souveraineté.21 Certains tribunaux internationaux poussent parfois à l’extrême la protection de l’individu contre l’État. Alain Pellet utilise dans ce contexte, à juste titre, le terme de « droit de l’hommisme ». C’est, par exemple, le cas de certains arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que l’individu et l’État ont besoin l’un de l’autre. On doit en tout cas évi- ter l’impression que l’objectif primordial de la constitutionnalisation consiste à affaiblir l’État. En analysant la jurisprudence internationale, celle-ci tient constamment à l’institution de l’immunité de l’État. Il est cependant inutile de placer cette immunité dans le cadre d’une dérogation au principe de l’égalité souveraine.22 Tout d’abord ce n’est pas l’égalité des États qui est souveraine, mais à l’inverse –

20 C’est ainsi que le prétendu déficit démocratique au sein de l’Union européenne repose en grande partie sur un malentendu. 21 J. Kranz, « The European Union – Understanding the Need and the Need to Understand », The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2006, pp. 5-36. 22 cij, Allemagne c. Italie (n. 1), par. 57 : « [L]es exceptions à l’immunité de l’État constituent une dérogation au principe de l’égalité souveraine. L’immunité peut constituer une 124 Kranz c’est la souveraineté des États qui est égale (les États sont égaux quant à leur souveraineté considérée comme un élément qualitatif, et non quantitatif). En outre, la soumission de l’État au droit international n’équivaut pas à une limitation de sa souveraineté (interne ou externe). Il est donc préférable de distinguer entre les limitations (légales) de la compétence de l’État et les atteintes à la souveraineté résultant des violations (illégales) des normes du droit international.

5 Le raisonnement de la Cour

La cij a rejeté l’argumentation italienne en affirmant que le conflit entre une norme du ius cogens et l’immunité de l’État n’existe pas, car ce sont deux choses distinctes.23 Par conséquent, l’immunité de l’État ne se trouve pas affec- tée pour la seule raison de violations du ius cogens. Cette conclusion semble pertinente dans la mesure où elle est largement confirmée par les juridictions nationales et internationales. Quelles en sont les raisons ? Indépendamment de la logique juridique, fon- dée sur l’état actuel de la pratique internationale, il faut prendre en compte des considérations extra-juridiques importantes qui ne sont pas ouvertement exprimées par les organes juridictionnels. Or, si l’immunité de l’État devait subir de nouvelles exceptions progressives (ce qui est possible) et compte tenu de l’absence d’un catalogue formel et contraignant des normes du ius cogens,

dérogation au principe de la souveraineté territoriale et au pouvoir de juridiction qui en découle. » 23 Ibid., par. 91 : « [L]a Cour conclut que, en l’état actuel du droit international coutumier, un État n’est pas privé de l’immunité pour la seule raison qu’il est accusé de violations graves du droit international des droits de l’homme ou du droit international des conflits armés. [. . .] 93. [. . .] A supposer [. . .] que les règles du droit des conflits armés qui interdisent de tuer des civils en territoire occupé ou de déporter des civils ou des prisonniers de guerre pour les astreindre au travail forcé soient des normes de jus cogens, ces règles n’entrent pas en conflit avec celles qui régissent l’immunité de l’État. Ces deux catégories de règles se rapportent en effet à des questions différentes. Celles qui régissent l’immunité de l’État sont de nature procédurale et se bornent à déterminer si les tribunaux d’un État sont fondés à exercer leur juridiction à l’égard d’un autre. Elles sont sans incidence sur la question de savoir si le comportement à l’égard duquel les actions ont été engagées était licite ou illicite. [. . .] 100. [. . .] La Cour souligne que la question de savoir si un État peut jouir de l’immunité devant les juridictions d’un autre État est entièrement distincte de celle de savoir si la responsabilité internationale de cet État est engagée et si une obligation de réparation lui incombe. » L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes 125 il faudrait s’attendre à une vague de procès devant les juridictions nationales et internationales, ce qui pourrait entrainer des conséquences imprévisibles. Notons également que si l’immunité de l’État devait être supprimée ou limi- tée dans le cas des victimes des violations des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire, les procès ne concerneraient plus l’immunité, mais le fond même de chaque violation. Dans la plupart de tels cas, les poursuites judiciaires contre les États étrangers risqueraient un échec en raison des moyens de preuve insuf- fisants ou impossibles à obtenir. D’ailleurs, même si l’on acceptait le refus par les tribunaux italiens de l’immunité juridictionnelle de l’Allemagne, l’immu- nité d’exécution constituerait une seconde barrière. La suppression de l’immunité de l’État contient donc un risque d’ouvrir la boîte de Pandore. Le concept de juridiction pénale universelle fournit quelques exemples d’une telle situation. Dans ce contexte, ni les États, ni la cij ne sont prêts à créer des précédents.24 Même si l’on trouve cet état de choses peu satisfaisant, il ne faut pas entrete- nir l’illusion que des limitations nouvelles de l’immunité de l’État conduisent directement au règne de la justice universelle. Le problème de la justice dans les relations internationales reste central, mais celle-ci est parfois imparfaite. Dans le contexte des conséquences de la guerre, la solution qui s’offre souvent consiste à choisir entre une indemnisation modérément satisfaisante (adé- quate) et modérément insatisfaisante (inadéquate).

6 Voies alternatives

S’il n’est point une surprise, l’arrêt de la Cour dans le différend germano-italien provoque chez certains un sentiment de perplexité. Notons cependant que c’est en quelque sorte par hasard que la cij a pu connaître de cette affaire, parce que les deux États sont parties de la Convention européenne pour le règlement pacifique des différends (1957). On sait bien que la juridiction des organes internationaux est limitée. L’immunité de l’État est donc souvent une

24 Dans une optique pareille l’arrêt de la cij du 1er avril 2011 dans l’affaire relative à l’application de la Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (cij, Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), Exceptions préliminaires, Arrêt du 1ier avril 2011, cij Recueil 2011, p. 70) se fonde en bonne partie sur une conviction inavouée qui consiste à ne pas ouvrir la porte à de nouveaux procès qui, concernant en fait l’usage illégal de la force armée, seraient intentés sur la base de la Convention précitée. 126 Kranz question de faits et non seulement de droit, ce qui ne peut que renforcer les sentiments d’incertitude ou d’injustice. Face à cette situation, il faut chercher d’autres méthodes et solutions pouvant apporter les effets espérés.25 En ce qui concerne les droits de l’homme dans la période de paix, on doit penser au renforcement des mécanismes démocratiques internes – une tâche ardue compte tenu de la situation de la démocratie dans la plupart des États. Une autre solution consiste à développer et renforcer des mécanismes (tribunaux) régionaux de protection des droits de l’homme. Pour ce qui est des violations du droit international humanitaire, il faut penser à la conclusion rapide d’un traité de paix, car son absence retarde la réparation et/ou l’indemnisation.26 Toutefois, un tel traité ne garantit pas toujours les résultats escomptés, surtout dans le cas des pays pauvres, ruinés économiquement et financièrement à l’issue d’un conflit (plusieurs pays en développement). Une solution supplémentaire consiste à établir un organe international chargé des réparations et indemnisations ou mesures de satisfaction (par exemple United Nations Compensation Commission à l’issue du conflit entre l’Irak et le Koweït en 1991, Iran-us Claims Tribunal, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission). Le droit national reste dans ce contexte un instrument souvent peu efficace car son action dépend de la réglementation et de la volonté internes. Cette opinion peut s’appliquer aussi bien à l’Italie qu’à l’Allemagne. En outre, le juge

25 Voir par exemple agnu, Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le droit à un recours et à réparation des victimes de violations flagrantes du droit international des droits de l’homme et de violations graves du droit international humanitaire, a/ res/60/147, 21 mars 2006 ; onu, Étude concernant le droit à restitution, à indemnisation et à réadaptation des victimes de violations flagrantes des droits de l’homme et des liber- tés fondamentales – Rapport final présenté par M. Theo van Boven, Rapporteur spécial, e/cn.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 juillet 1993 ; onu, Ensemble révisé de principes fondamentaux et de directives concernant le droit à réparation des victimes de violations flagrantes des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire, établi par M. Theo van Boven en application de la décision 1995/117 de la Sous-Commission, e/cn.4/Sub.2/1996/17, 24 mai 1996. 26 R. Dolzer, « The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International Law Recognize a Victim’s Private Right or Action », Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2002, pp. 340-341 : « [A] specific, central aspect of peacemaking concerns the nexus between the amount of reparations, their domestic distribution in the recipient country, and the timing of payment by the defeated state. [. . .] Moreover, [. . .] any significant delay of reparations-related elements will necessarily stand in the way of an early normalization of the political atmosphere and of reconciliation. [. . .] Thus the central lesson from the long-belated end of the World War ii peacemaking process is that governments must more effectively, promptly and carefully incorporate the legitimate concerns of groups and individuals particularly affected by a war into the inter-governmental process of making peace. » L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes 127 national est incapable de trancher des centaines ou milliers de plaintes, tout en étant soumis à des pressions internes. La conclusion en est que face aux lacunes ou insuffisances du droit, il faut songer à des moyens extra-juridiques. Nous avons à l’esprit toutes sortes de pressions et sanctions politiques ou de mesures de satisfaction. Les nécessi- tés de la coopération internationale ou de bon voisinage peuvent encourager cette orientation. Le cas de l’Allemagne (y compris de certaines entreprises allemandes) témoigne que ce genre de mesures peut s’avérer efficace. Parmi les autres exemples, on peut songer à la création de fondations nationales portant assistance aux victimes. Dans ce contexte, l’arrêt de la cij relatif au différend germano-italien contient un obiter dictum intéressant (il reste à voir s’il est efficace). En effet, la Cour « considère qu’il est surprenant – et regrettable – que l’Allemagne ait refusé d’accorder réparation à un groupe de victimes au motif que celles-ci auraient eu droit à un statut que, à l’époque pertinente, elle a refusé de leur reconnaître, particulièrement parce que ces victimes se sont vues, de ce fait, privées de la protection juridique à laquelle ce statut leur donnait droit » (paragraphe 99). Elle précise « que les demandes résultant du traitement des internés militaires italiens [. . .], ainsi que d’autres réclamations de nationaux italiens qui resteraient à régler – qui ont été à l’origine des procédures italiennes – pourraient faire l’objet de nouvelles négociations impliquant les deux États en vue de parvenir à une solution » (paragraphe 104). Autrement dit, la porte à une solution n’est jamais fermée. Y a-t-il une solution miracle pour récompenser la mort, l’humiliation et les souffrances des victimes de conflits armés ? La question semble rhétorique. Le règlement a pour la plupart un caractère forfaitaire et tient compte des pos- sibilités politiques et économiques. Pour être juste, la solution doit combiner les éléments de sagesse (reasonableness), de modération, de proportionnalité et de pression politique. Si l’on ne doit pas exclure une limitation progressive future de l’immunité de l’État, il ne s’agit pas de l’unique outil pour promouvoir la justice.

Part 3 Commercial Activities and State Immunity

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CHAPTER 10 Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution

Anne van Aaken*

1 Introduction

Whereas in the 1980s many developed countries privatised their state-owned enterprises (soes), followed by developing countries after the end of the cold war in 1990, this trend has reversed in the last ten years. First, ever more countries create Sovereign Wealth Funds (swfs)1 which engage in all sorts of

* I would like to thank the participants of the French-German-Swiss International Law Meeting in Basel 2012 for helpful comments as well as Victorino Tejera, Ph.D. Candidate at The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (heid, Geneva) in dissettle (Dispute Settlement in Trade: Training in Law and Economics) research project and training programme, funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme as a Marie Curie Initial Training Network (www.dissettle.org), a programme I am affiliated with. 1 The first ever swf was the Kuwait Investment Authority, created in 1953 from oil revenues before Kuwait even gained independence from the United Kingdom; that fund is now worth nearly $300 billion. Over the last decade, the size and number of swfs have increased dra- matically. In 2012, swfs were estimated to have $5.3 trillion worth of assets under management, 80% of which were in the hands of developing economies. In 2012, there were seventy-three recognised swfs globally, 60% of which were established in the past decade. During the period 2003–2012, cross-border M&As accounted for 89% of swf Foreign Direct Investment (fdi), in contrast to the bulk of global fdi, which is invested through greenfield projects. Strategically, the majority of swf investment through fdi targets the services sector (70%), and in particular finance, real estate, construction and utilities, cf. un, unctad, World Investment Report—Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, unctad/wir/2010 (Geneva: unctad 2013), 11. “As of 2012, swfs in the world collectively manage around $5 trillion which corresponds to an annual growth of 10% since 2007,” the European Commisssion and European Investment Bank, “Mobilizing the potential of gcc Sovereign Wealth Funds for Mediterranean Partner Countries,” accessed 4 March 2013, http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/femip-study-potential-of-gcc-sovereign-

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_011 132 van Aaken economic investments and activities. Second, soes are again in fashion, partially due to the financial and economic crises in developed countries which led to (partial) nationalisation of some failing enterprises. Their share in foreign direct investment is considerable.2 In short: ever more states engage in business activities in one way or another and the boundaries between state activities and commercial activities become blurred. This raises several legal problems, inter alia how to deal with the principle of state immunity. State immunity has a long tradition, being traced back to Jean Bodin’s maxim that “par in parem non habet imperium,” a consequence of his idea of sovereign equality.3 But does a state always act as a public person and is thus immune in foreign courts? From the midst of the 20th century on, this question was negated in many countries. Nowadays, a distinction is made between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestiones; restricted immunity of states being the dominant doctrine. Immunity is mostly enjoyed for sovereign, public or governmental acts (acta iure imperii) but not for commercial, private or non- governmental acts (acta iure gestiones). Given the many facets of state activities as well as the changes in their activities, including the missing consensus on what a state act, task or a public function is, the problem only starts with the distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestiones. Large legal and factual grey zones exist: a non-commercial activity can or cannot have a public function; the activity does not necessarily use sovereign authority as a legal instrument. The importance of the legal instrument used (private or public law instruments) has, e.g., been neglected in the literature. Lending art work or owning houses for cultural purposes, e.g., might be classified as non- commercial, although it might not necessarily be qualified being public purpose and it can certainly not be qualified as using sovereign authority. Legal

wealth-funds.htm?lang=en. Renowned swfs are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Norway Government Pension, China safe Investment Company, Saudi Arabia sama Foreign Holdings, China Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (gic), Singapore Temasek Holdings. They range in size from under us$1 billion to possibly us$900 billion. The biggest are owned by Abu Dhabi, Norway, China and Singapore. 2 The number of soes increased from 659 in 2010 to 845 in 2012, and they account for one tenth of global fdi outflows. Their investments abroad are of strategic nature (they seek to acquire technology, intellectual property or brand names, as well as natural resources). Cf. unctad (n. 1), 12 et seq. 3 For an elaboration on the history of state immunity, see Ernest K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controversy. Private Suits against Sovereign States in Domestic Courts (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 1–31, on Bodin 1 et seq. See also Xiaodong Yang, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: cup, 2012), 6–32. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 133 insecurity surrounding those questions is, in spite of the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (uncsi)4 of 2004 still high. Moreover, international as well as national law distinguishes between immunity from jurisdiction or adjudication/suit on the one hand and immunity from attachment5 or execution on the other hand. Different criteria are used to distinguish commercial activity from public activity of states in those two phases of a legal process. Predominantly, for the former, the nature of the activity is relevant whereas for the latter, the purpose criterion of the property to be attached is used. But often, nature, purpose and sometimes overall context are altogether assessed by courts for both phases of legal conflict with different emphasis. For the growing business activities of states, there are two pressing and rather unsolved questions: first, are soe and swfs immune in a regulatory context (competition law, tax law)? This question addresses jurisdictional immunity not vis-à-vis private persons suing sovereigns in foreign courts, but is concerned with immunity vis-à-vis the host states regulatory bodies and courts.6 Second, can a creditor of a state attach assets of a state in the form of soes or swfs? The relevance of this question of immunity of execution rises

4 Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, 44 ilm 803 (hereinafter uncsi). The convention, which requires thirty states parties in order for it to enter into force, has twenty-eight signatories and sixteen states parties: Austria, Finland, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The United Kingdom has signed but not ratified. Finland was the last member to ratify on 23 April 2014, bringing the number of state parties to sixteen. 5 This usually also encompasses not only post-judgment attachment but also other constraint measures such as pre-judgment measures of constraint, often treated differently in the law or by courts. In contrast to the ilc Draft Articles (Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property and Commentaries thereto (“ilc Draft Articles”; “ilc Commentaries”), Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-third session, in 1991, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/46/10, para. 28)), the uncsi makes a distinction in view of the stage of proceedings. “Pre-judgment measures of constraint” are regulated in art. 18 unsci and “post-judgment measures of constraint” in art. 19 uncsi. I will concentrate on the latter only since the arguments are, mutatis mutandis, similar. Furthermore, I will use the terms attachment and execution interchangeably, although they are two separate processes: attachment refers to a pre-execution injunction where the property is subject to limited use only, while execution refers to the actual seizure and transfer of the property to the creditor. 6 This immunity can be achieved by denying “adjudicative jurisdiction” which is is generally regarded as the authority of courts to entertain suits (the classical jurisdictional immunity) or by “prescriptive jurisdiction,” which is the authority to make and apply law to persons or 134 van Aaken simultaneously with the growing importance of swfs and soes operating in foreign states since they could well be the only property attachable of the debtor state. Can, e.g., a creditor of a claim against Russia attach property of Gazprom or vice versa? The legal literature is still void of a theoretical analysis in what circumstances immunity should be granted and, more importantly, why. Sovereign equality is not a sufficiently fine-grained argument and inadequate for the current developments. In this chapter, I would like to suggest some criteria for the determination where immunity should be granted (and where not) by taking a functional approach. “Functional” means many things to many people, here the focus lies on the exigencies of immunity (or exceptions thereof) and the incentives which are set for states as well as the potential trade-offs which might arise when immunity is granted.7 While the chapter does not give defi- nite answers, it might help to consider some of the issues and find answers for both of the described problems. Only if we dig deeper into the rationales of immunity, can legal harmonisation and clarity been strived for. I proceed as follows: The phenomenon of business activities of states and their structure is briefly described in the first part from a factual point of view (2.). The article then gives an overview on the law on state immunity relevant for dealing with soes and swfs. Here, the question is whether swfs or soes can be subject to regulatory measures in the host states’ courts by denying them jurisdictional immunity or by not exempting them from substantive regulation. Additionally, the “last bastion of sovereign immunity,”8 namely immunity of execution, will be analysed (3.). In principle, immunity from suit and immunity from execution should be treated separately. But since both use the distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestiones by drawing on the criteria of nature, purpose and context (albeit if with different emphasis), it makes sense to treat them together from a functional point of view. The article tries to find a common ground, based on a functional view using economic theory, as a basis for distinction (4.). The last part concludes the argument (5.).

things. The latter would target substantive law and create exceptions for swfs or soes e.g. in the field of tax or competition law. 7 This is not to be confounded with functionalism in sociology. 8 Jeremy Ostrander, “The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution of Judgments,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2004): 541. See also ilc Commentaries (n. 5), para. 56. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 135

2 The Phenomenon of Business Activities of States

Transnational investments of sovereigns are growing: they are new investors on the global market.9 Sovereigns manage their international investments using a continuum of institutional mechanisms and organisational forms:10 “sovereign investment vehicles embrace a large and protean class of organs, entities, and actions, whose principal point of commonality is the ownership, control, or management by a sovereign.”11 Those entities can be distinguished by their legal structure, by their purpose, where the earnings go, where the earnings come from as well as the degree of governmental control. At one end we find traditional international reserves managed by central banks and/or finance ministries, where considerations of liquidity and low risk normally are paramount. Further along the continuum, we find so called stabilisation funds accumulated from “excess” revenues from commodity exports in particular. Stabilisation funds may invest in a slightly wider range of assets, but considerations of liquidity and low risk still predominate because, by design, stabilisation funds are supposed to be drawn upon when commodity prices decline. Their objective is primarily to achieve medium-term macro- economic stabilisation, including the sterilisation of the domestic economic and financial effects of surges in export earnings as, e.g., in commodity booms. Stabilisation funds are supposed to smooth out government spending by

9 A lot has been written about the concerns those activities raise. See for an overview Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs, and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (Oxford: oup, 2012). See on governance structures also Myriam Senn, “Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Challenge for Institutional Governance,” Jusletter 19th April 2010, accessed 23 July 2013, http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/_564?lang=de . 10 See for this continuum, Edwin M. Truman, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability,” Policy Brief Number pb07-6, Peterson Institute of International Economics (2007), accessed 4 March 2013, http://www.fashionjun.iie .com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf. On further distinctions, see Adrien Blundell-Wignall and Gert Wehinger, “Open Capital Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Pension Funds and State-Owned Enterprises,” in Renee A. Fry et al., eds., Sovereign Wealth: The Role of State Capital in the New Financial Order (London: Imperial College Press, 2011), 106. See also the website of the Institute of Sovereign Wealth Funds, accessed 2 February 2013, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/. For details, see also un, unctad, World Investment Report—Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, unctad/wir/2008, 24 September 2008, accessed 10 February 2013, http:// unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf, 20–26. 11 Larry Catá Backer, “Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 19 (2010): 59–144. 136 van Aaken transferring excess revenues to the fund when commodity prices are high and then transferring them back for government spending when prices are low. Toward the other end of the spectrum are swfs.12 They are sometimes structured and managed independently from the state, sometimes they are administered through a ministry, the central bank, or a separate statutory agency.13 A swf can serve as the single investment entity, organised as a corporation or similar enterprise under the general law of its sovereign owner, or more typically, organised pursuant to special legislation. A swf can also serve as the holding company for any number of vertically or horizontally organised sub-funds that affect entities through their actual operations.14 The control of government over swfs varies from state to state. swfs generally have longer-term investment objectives and, therefore, may hold an even broader array of assets, including sometimes majority shareholdings in foreign firms (and domestic industries). Their objective is more the return on assets than liquidity. Objectives and activities of some swf do not necessarily differ significantly from those of pension funds found in the private or public sector or investments by firms that manage private portfolios of assets that serve comparable purposes. So-called natural resources funds, drawing on earnings from natural resource income of the state, can be used as “stabilisation funds” or “saving funds” or a combination of both. Saving funds in contrast “act as a kind

12 There is no consented definition of swfs. See for an overview, Fabio Bassan, The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 17 et seq. A short one is supplied by Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, “The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow,” University of Chicago Law Review 76 (2009): 111–134 (114): “swfs (are) state-controlled investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets but managed separately from official reserves.” A longer definition of swf is as follows: “a state owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatisations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting for resource exports” see Catá Backer, “Sovereign Investing” (n. 11). Excluded by this definition are foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, soes in the traditional sense, government employee pension funds (funded by employer/employee contributions, e.g., calpers). The largest 300 pension funds collectively hold about $6 trillion in assets, see Catá Backer, “Sovereign Investing” (n. 11). 13 swfs with a separate legal personality: Qatar, uae, Australia, Singapore (Temasek, gic) and France (fsi); swfs as pooled resources without a separate legal personality: Chile, Canada (Alberta), Mexico, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela. 14 Catá Backer, “Sovereign Investing” (n. 11), 60. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 137 of ‘rainy day’ fund, storing up wealth for future generations.”15 Both can have similar investment strategies. Several common objectives of swfs are named: to protect and stabilise the budget and the economy from excess volatility in revenues and exports; diversification from non-renewable commodity exports; earning greater returns than from foreign exchange reserves; dissipate unwanted liquidity; increase savings for future generations; fund social and economic development; sustain long-term capital growth for target countries and last but not least, political strategy. Most of those purposes can easily be qualified also as being of private nature (since privates also save and diversify their assets) and the assets held by swfs are just as property held by privates. The act of investing or sustaining growth is surely not sovereign in nature. In addition, there are soes16 by means of which many governments own, manage, or sponsor domestic entities such as banks or corporations or groups of such entities through holding companies that have investments in other countries, including direct, controlling ownership interests. soes have by definition a separate legal personality and are separate from public administration. Here, the objectives can range from return on assets, similar to swfs, industrial/regional policy and/or the supply of public goods (often in utilities and infrastructures—such as energy, transport and telecommunications). soes can include any form of economic enterprise, from investment to operating entities. soes usually exercise a commercial activity, regardless of whether they are listed on the stock exchange or not. soes are not pools of investable capital as such, but they may finance investments via their earnings, fiscal appropriations from the government, or from debt markets at a (possibly) dis- torted low cost of capital.17 Moreover, they usually do not only take portfolio investments (as swfs do) but may build up strategic positions, e.g. in order to integrate vertically by securing resource input.18 The difference between swfs and soes has often been discussed,19 yet a consensus of how to distinguish between the two remains to be reached. A

15 uk, High Court of Justice, aig Capital Partners, Inc and cjsc Tema Real Estate Company Limited v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Decision of 20 October 2005, [2005] ewhc 2239 (Comm), Case No: 2004/536, para 11. 16 Classical soes are Chinalco, Vattenfall or Gazprom. 17 Blundell-Wignall and Wehinger, “Open Capital Markets and Sovereign Wealth Funds,” (n. 10), 107. 18 Ibid., 112. 19 unctad, World Investment Report 2012 (Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2012). un, unctad, World Investment Report—Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, 138 van Aaken possible basis for such a consensus is the source of their funding. This would suggest that swfs and soes could engage in the same business, but their relationship to their owner and the owner’s funding source would be different. Others favour a distinction based on organisation and legal structure. For example, some suggest swfs are asset pools owned by governments and operated to meet national policy objectives, while soes are separate legal persons established to engage in commercial activities.20 Their legal structure is highly relevant for their immunity but the possibility of diversity of the legal structure also opens the doors to moral hazard on the part of the owning state in order to keep or achieve immunity before foreign courts. The problem is that although swfs and soes can be very different vehicles, they can also be very similar in their functions: “swfs are creatures whose ordinary course of business is investment. The soes are not necessarily constituted to engage in the ordinary course of investment. Yet, soes can invest, and swfs can acquire controlling interests in operating entities, and thus become, at least indirectly, soes.”21 Other criteria for distinction are the nature and the purpose of the activity, also used in legal assessment. In practice, the motivation and purpose of these asset holdings can be very similar, no matter how the legal structure is designed. Thus, the activities of soes nonetheless present immunity issues similar to those of the typical swf, at least from a functional perspective which is partially reflected in law.22 There is also no uniform legal answer concerning

unctad/wir/2012, 5 July 2008, accessed 20 February 2013, http://unctad.org/en/pages/ PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=171, 99 et seq. 20 Catá Backer, “Sovereign Investing” (n. 11), 64 et seq. 21 Ibid., 66. 22 Ibid., 66: “From a functional perspective, centred on the state as ultimate owner, there may be little difference between a state-owned hotel corporation purchasing another large hotel corporation with principle offices in Chicago and incorporated in Delaware, and a swf purchasing a controlling interest in the same firm. In both cases, the target company is controlled by an enterprise whose ultimate owner is a state. In both cases, the state as ultimate shareholder can assert a power of control over the entity that may or may not reflect the sort of values a private shareholder might be expected to assert. Thus, states might be tempted to use their ownership for a political purpose, to maximise their national interests through their ownership of foreign entities, even if those entities suffer financially as a result. For example, if the state-owned hotel corporation of State A wanted to ruin the competing hotel business of State B, it might cause State A Hotel Corp. to purchase State B Hotel Corp. for the purpose of either shutting it down or causing State B to make concessions that would preserve the business of State A hotels, or it might cause State A’s swf to acquire a controlling interest in State B Hotel Corp., and then cause that entity to sell its business to State A Hotel Corp. There are, of course, other ways of achieving the same result.” Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 139 how to deal with swfs and soes from the point of view of immunity. Rather, detailed criteria need to be established which focus on the diverse functions rather than ownership and control which are used now. This would also help to deter opportunistic immunity-searching legal structures by states.

3 State Immunity de lege lata

Three questions arise in the context of swfs and soes in regard to the treatment of business activities of states: first, whether and under what circumstances separate entities are considered distinct (no immunity) or assimilated into the state (immunity), second, whether and under what circumstances a distinct entity enjoys immunity in its own right (either by fulfilling public functions or by acting through sovereign authority23) and, thirdly, under what circumstances the separate personality of such an entity should be disregarded, so that the entity and the state can be held mutually liable for each other’s debt (or not). The latter is mainly a sub-problem of immunity of execution. To describe the legal variety of how to treat state immunity in different national courts would clearly exceed the scope of this chapter.24 After a short introduction (3.1), the frame of jurisdictional immunity will be discussed, with an emphasis on regulatory immunity of swfs and soes. This includes the two first mentioned questions (3.2). We will then turn to immunity of execution of the assets of swfs and soes dealing with the third question (3.3).

3.1 The Legal Framework for Immunity of States State immunity is—especially when business activities of states are at issue— an ambiguous subject providing little legal security for the actors concerned (potential claimants and defendants). The international law of state immunity is a result of confluence of domestic codification and juridical practice to an extraordinary extent: “international law delegates to domestic courts an unparalleled discretion, to such an extent that the rules and principles of

23 Note this distinction: public functions (assuming for a moment that a consensus about what those are would exist) are not necessarily carried out by using sovereign authority (the legal form in which measures are taken). 24 See for details, Christoph Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Cambridge: Grotius Publication, 1988); Jeremy Ostrander, “The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity” (n. 8), 541; Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 3rd edn. 2013); Ernest K. Bankas, State Immunity Controversy (n. 3); Xiaodong Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3). 140 van Aaken international law on State immunity would not and could not meaningfully exist without reference to domestic laws and judicial practice.”25 International law nevertheless sets the frame within which the national courts act and it will therefore serve here to pinpoint the legal frame and the problems there- with. Furthermore, there have been recent decisions also by international courts (International Court of Justice and International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea)26 on questions of immunity. The European Court of Human Rights reversed its previous case-law that immunity is a legitimate restriction of Art. 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in 2010 and now weighs state immunity against human rights.27 But once balancing is on the plate, one needs to know against what immunity is balanced and why; this will be taken up in part 4. In spite of those developments, the preeminence of domestic legislation and national jurisprudence and their influence on international law28 impede a detailed description of the national legal orders and their diverse approaches but we will necessarily draw on national court decisions in order to highlight the different arguments used. Certain principles of immunity are well recognised in international law. States enjoy immunity before foreign national courts as a matter of customary international law. There are only two international treaties concerning immunity in general;29 the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional

25 Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3), 33; Jasper Finke, “Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?,” European Journal of International Law 21 (2010): 874, 881. 26 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, 99 and itlos, The “ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v Ghana), Order of 15 December 2012, Case No. 20. 27 Latest: ECtHR, Oleynikov v. Russia, Judgment of 14 March 2013, Application no. 36703/04. Only in 2010 the Court held that grants of immunity in excess of the requirements of international law would be held to violate Article 6 ECtHR: In ECtHR, Cudak v. Lithuania, Grand Chamber Judgment of 23 March 2010, Application no. 15869/02, para. 74, the Court found that the Lithuanian courts had failed “to preserve a reasonable relationship of proportionality” and “impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court” by the grant of immunity to Poland in a labour dispute where international law did allow the exercise of jurisdiction. 28 For a general theory on “comparative international law” meaning the interaction of national courts and international law, see Anthea E. Roberts, “Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 60 (2011): 57–92. 29 Separate regimes of immunities are covered by other treaties (e.g. diplomatic immunities, state vessels, aircraft or art works). For details, see James Crawford, “Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity,” American Journal of International Law 75 (1981): 820–869. For art works, see Craig Forrest, “Art on Loan: The Role of Immunity in Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 141

Immunities of States and their Property (uncsi)30 as well as the Council of Europe Convention on State Immunity (ecsi) from 1972.31 Both treaties are not very successful as measured by ratification: the ecsi has only eight members and the uncsi still awaits its entry into force. Nevertheless, especially the uncsi clarified important notions and was helped by the systematic ilc Commentaries on the draft underline this text as a reference on how to understand immunity.32 The uncsi is considered to properly reflect the state of customary international law in its article 2(1)(b) which is most relevant for our purpose.33 Some states have their own national laws on state immunity,34 others do not, but apply, even if not party to an international treaty, customary international law. Although uncsi adopts a restrictive approach to state immunity, the degree to which the restrictive approach is recognised by all states today remains subject of some debate. Most states have a “commercial activity” exception as the uncsi.35 Some Eastern European states such as Czech Republic,

Dispute Resolution,” Transnational Dispute Management 10 (2013), accessed 27 February 2013, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/welcome.asp. 30 See n. 4. 31 The European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, cets No. 074, 11 ilm (1972) 470. Entry into Force: 11 June 1976 (Condition: Three Ratifications). It has 8 State Parties as of 7 February 2013 (inter alia uk, Switzerland, Germany), accessed 15 March 2013, http:// conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?nt=074&cm=0&df=&cl=eng. An Additional Protocol was added which primarily establishes a “European Tribunal in Matters of State Immunity” and which, to date, has six contracting parties. 32 Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property and Commentaries thereto (n. 5). 33 Peter-Tobias Stoll, “State Immunity,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 4 March 2013, see also uk House of Lords, Jones v Minister of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Decision of 14 June 2006, [2006] ukhl 26; [2006] 2 wlr 70. 34 E.g. the United States, the uk, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, and Singapore. Most prominent are the us Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–583, 90 Stat. 289l, 28 u.s.c. Sec. l330, l332(a), l39l(f) and l60l-l6ll (us fsia) and the uk State Immunity Act of 1978 (uk sia). Most European civil law countries rely on customary international law. The us Supreme Court was the first to recognise a general immunity in its 1812 decision in us Supreme Court, The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon 11 u.s. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) but turned to restrictive immunity with the Tate Letter although this did not extend to immunity from execution. 35 See also ilc Commentaries (n. 5), para. 20, fn. 51 citing the different national codes. For a survey of civil and common law countries, see Fox and Webb, “The Law of State Immunity,” (n. 24), 146 et seq. as well as Gerhard Hafner et al., eds., State Practice Regarding State 142 van Aaken

Bulgaria, Poland and Romania have been more reluctant to accept the commercial exception, Russia has now a clarified legal position.36 Nevertheless, in the former communist and socialist countries, in cases where a separate legal entity was created for an activity by the state, this gave rise to the presumption that the entity is effectively separate from the state, wherefore any claim to immunity is denied in a first step.37 It seems safe to say that most African and Asian states adopted restrictive immunity early on when faced with national trading companies of foreign states. Both Japan and China until recently adhered to the concept of absolute immunity and China continues to do so,38 in spite of signing uncsi. The latest case concerning China, fg Hemisphere Associates llc39 v. Democratic Republic of the Congo,40 involved an attempt by a private creditor to register an arbitral award in Hong Kong and execute against property of the Democratic Republic of Congo (drc). The Hong Kong Court applied the doctrine of absolute immunity of the People’s Republic of China to deny enforcement, since the laws of Hong Kong (restricted immunity) could not extend to matters of foreign affairs.

3.2 Immunity from Jurisdiction A recent concern raised in the oecd has been whether the enhanced business activities of states create regulatory enforcement gaps for host countries.

Immunities / La Pratique des États Concernant les Immunités des Etats (Leiden: M. Nijhoff and Council of Europe, 2006). 36 Fox and Webb, “The Law of State Immunity,” (n. 24), 159 et seq., although it has signed (but not ratified) uncsi (n. 4) in 2006, it hitherto failed to pass a federal law. See ECtHR, Oleynikov v. Russia, Judgment of 14 March 2013, Application no. 36703/04, para. 67, stating that Russia has accepted restrictive immunity. 37 Munir A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, “Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against State Entities: Recent Trends in Practice,” in Amercican Arbitration Association, ed., Handbook on International Arbitration Practice (New York: Juris Net, 2010), 338 et seq. 38 The position of China is now that a state and its property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity. See Fox and Webb, “The Law of State Immunity,” (n. 24), 162. 39 fg Hemisphere Associates llc (fg Hemisphere), a fund investing in distressed sovereign debt purchased the assignment of two arbitration awards against the Democratic Republic of Congo (drc) handed down the previous year by a tribunal under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce. The awards are purchased at a discount with the intention to make a profit upon enforcement. It commenced litigation against the drc in a variety of jurisdictions, where drc-related assets were located, including the us, Hong Kong, South Africa and Australia as well as Congolese soes. 40 Hong Kong Final Court of Appeal, Democratic Republic of the Congo and others v. fg Hemisphere Associates llc, Decision of 8 June 2011, facv5/2010. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 143

“National and international efforts to codify the law of foreign state immunity in statutes or treaties, including the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States, have generally skirted the issue of regulation. Regulators have rarely tested the law in court.”41 This matters from a functional point of view since immunities may distort the competitive equality between business activities of states and private actors. Regulatory immunity can be analysed paradigmatically by drawing on two cases: tax and application of competition disciplines to business activities. In principle, exclusion of a foreign state from taxes or from competition discipline can be achieved either as a substantive exemption from tax or regulation (prescriptive jurisdiction) or as a jurisdictional or procedural immunity from suits to collect tax or apply regulations, e.g. competition disciplines (or both). The outcome may well be the same and thus, from a functional point of view, it does not matter how the exemption (or not) of tax or competition disciplines is achieved. It is not covered by the traditional international law term of immunity but jurisdictional immunity may result in regulatory immunity. We will thus deal with jurisdictional immunity generally first, before turning those questions more specifically. Immunity from jurisdiction as covered by uncsi and ecsi provides some guidance. The question of whether swfs (and to a smaller extent soes) have to be treated legally as part of the state (potentially profiting from its immunity) is of major importance. Therefore, in a first step, this question will be answered (3.2.1). In a second step, the commercial exception will be addressed (3.2.2). In a last step, regulatory immunity in tax and competition law are treated as paradigmatic cases (3.2.3).

3.2.1 swfs and soes as Part of the State The question under what circumstances soes or swfs are treated as part of the state (participating in its immunity) is treated differently in different jurisdictions or the international conventions. uncsi is quite encompassing in that it includes in its protection not only the state as such42 but also sub-structures

41 David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors,” oecd Working Papers on International Investment, 2010/2, oecd Publishing, accessed 5 March 2013, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/45036449.pdf, 12 et seq. 42 Art. 2(1)(b)(iii) uncsi (n. 4): 1. For the purposes of the present Convention: “ ‘State’ means: (iii) agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent that they are entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of the sovereign authority of the State.” 144 van Aaken

(constituent units of a federal state or political subdivisions), organs, entities, instrumentalities and agencies.43 Thus, swfs without legal personality are surely included. Other entities and state agencies are included only as far as they perform acts in the “exercise of sovereign authority”,44 that is, in principle soes are not included in the definition of the state unless they are entitled to exercise and are actually exercising sovereign authority. Under the uncsi, soes’ activities are not affected by the immunity of the state. Any proceedings against an soe out of their commercial transactions is confined to the soe which holds an independent legal personality, is capable of suing or being sued, and which is capable of any transaction in property, including property which the state at hand has authorised the state enterprise to operate or manage (article 10(3) uncsi).45 The reference to “other entities” in article 2 uncsi has been added only later in the negotiations intending to cover non-governmental (including private) entities when in exceptional cases endowed with governmental authority. Immunity is thus granted if governmental functions are fulfilled, independently from the legal form. The ilc cites as an example the practice of certain commercial banks which are entrusted by a government to deal also with import and export licensing which is exclusively within governmental powers.

43 ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 17, para. 16: “There is in practice no hard-and-fast line to be drawn between agencies or instrumentalities of a State and departments of government. The expression ‘agencies or instrumentalities’ indicates the interchangeability of the two terms.” 44 ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 17, para. 12: “The corresponding term for ‘sovereign authority’ used in the French text is prerogatives de la puissance publique. The Commission discussed at length whether in the English text ‘sovereign authority’ or ‘governmental authority’ should be used and has come to the conclusion that ‘sovereign authority’ seems to be, in this case, the nearest equivalent to prerogatives de la puissance publique (. . .) [I]t was held that ‘governmental authority’ was a better English translation of the French expression la puissance publique.” 45 See also ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 35, para. 9: “Paragraph 3 sets out a legal distinction between a State and certain of its entities in the matter of State immunity from foreign jurisdiction. In the economic system of some States, commercial transactions as defined in article 2, para. 1 (c), are normally conducted by State enterprises, or other entities established by a State, which have independent legal personality. The manner under which State enterprises or other entities are established by a State may differ according to the legal system of the State. Under some legal systems, they are established by a law or decree of the Government. Under some other systems, they may be regarded as having been established when the parent State has acquired majority shares or other ownership interests. As a rule, they engage in commercial transactions on their own behalf as separate entities from the parent State, and not on behalf of that State.” Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 145

It states that when private entities perform such governmental functions, to that extent, they should be considered a “state”.46 Thus, if soes or swfs perform governmental functions, they are considered a state instrumentality and therefore covered by the presumption of immunity from jurisdiction. uncsi thereby puts function over form. The ecsi covers separate entities separately in Art. 2747 and is less encompassing than uncsi, since it excludes entities even if they exercise a public function but not if they perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority. ecsi thus looks at first, the legal structure, second the public purpose which it deems irrelevant and third the way an act is carried out (legal instrument using sovereign authority) which is relevant. The CoE Commentaries48 hold that “for the purpose of defining these entities, the criterion of legal personality alone is not adequate, for even a state authority may have legal personality without constituting an entity distinct from the State.”49 Rather, as with the uncsi, a dual test for the legal form is used: (1) distinct existence separate and apart from the executive organs of the state and (2) capacity to sue or be sued. Thus, central banks or railway administrations would be separate entities. Again, the ecsi immunises such an entity if it is exercising sovereign authority (not railways e.g.), but an entity may not enjoy more favorable treatment than a Contracting State. The overall effect and intention of article 27 ecsi is to deny to entities, when they are not exercising sovereign authority, any right to treatment different from that accorded to a private person.50 Under the us fsia in contrast, the key question is whether the entity forms part of a foreign state: if they are, they are immune, unless the commercial exception applies. An soe will be an “agency or instrumentality” if 1) it has

46 ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 17, para. 15. 47 Article 27 ecsi: “1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the expression ‘Contracting State’ shall not include any legal entity of a Contracting State which is distinct therefrom and is capable of suing or being sued, even if that entity has been entrusted with public functions. 2. Proceedings may be instituted against any entity referred to in paragraph 1 before the courts of another Contracting State in the same manner as against a private person; however, the courts may not entertain proceedings in respect of acts performed by the entity in the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii). 3. Proceedings may in any event be instituted against any such entity before those courts if, in corresponding circumstances, the courts would have had jurisdiction if the proceedings had been instituted against a Contracting State.” 48 Commentary on the Council of Europe Convention (ecsi) “CoE Commentaries”. 49 Ibid., para. 108. 50 Ibid., para. 109. 146 van Aaken separate legal personality, 2) the foreign state directly51 holds a majority interest or the entity qualifies as an organ, and 3) the company is incorporated in the foreign state.52 Thus, in the us, privileges of immunity may in principle be invoked for instrumentalities directly owned by the state and majority ownership of the state (form over function). Nevertheless, if the entity does not qualify for the direct ownership test, it may still be “organ” of the state. The majority of courts then follow a multifactor balancing test that focuses on the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation, purpose, financial relationship with the state, employment practices and the privileges and immunities under local law.53 Few others apply the so-called “public activity” test, asking whether an entity performs some public function for the foreign state, since Congress mandated that “the sovereign immunity of foreign states should be restricted to cases involving acts of a foreign state which are sovereign or governmental in nature, as opposed to acts with are either commercial in nature or those which private persons normally perform.”54 We may thus assume that, although the exact meaning of the terms “public activity” and “sovereign or governmental nature” remains unclear that basically the public function or public task is meant, not the legal form the entity uses to carry out its tasks (i.e. sovereign authority). Those different approaches are representative of other jurisdictions as well.55 Although the legal form of sovereign or public authority is the first test to be treated like a state, the second test is always whether a public function is exercised. Although a strict understanding of the legal instrument used could

51 I.e., the shares must be directly held by the government, not indirectly. 52 us fsia § 1603 (a), (b); us Supreme Court, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, Decision of 18 April 2003, 538 us 468 (2003) indirectly held entities are thus excluded from the definition of the state. For details, see Christopher F. Dugan and James E. Berger, “Enforcement against Assets of State-owned Companies,” in R. Doak Bishop, ed., Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (New York: Juris Net, 2009), 188 et seq. 53 Dugan and Berger, “Enforcement against Assets of State-owned Companies,” (n. 52), 189. 54 us Court of Appeals, Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, Decision of 8 September, 580 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1487, at 14 (1976)). 55 See e.g. the reasoning of Lord Denning M.R. in uk Court of Appeal, Trendtex Trading Corporation. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Decision of 13 January, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 560: “I confess that I can think of no satisfactory test except that of looking to the functions and control of the organisation. I do not think that it should depend on the foreign law alone. I would look to all the evidence to see whether the organisation was under government control and exercised governmental functions.” See also M.A. Granne, “Defining ‘Organ of a Foreign State’ under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,” accessed 5 March 2013, http://works.bepress.com/michael_granne/1. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 147 clarify the law (sovereign authority would enjoy immunity, whereas all other forms would be treated as not enjoying immunity (as in ecsi), mostly this was not used, rather the public functions were decisive. This of course opens a Pandora’s box to an even bigger question, namely what public functions are.56 No consensus is in sight. Nevertheless, some core functions have been confirmed by courts, such as transactions relating to foreign affairs and military authority, the legislature, the exercise of police authority, the administration of justice,57 regulation of external trade, decreeing measures for the protection of the currency, concluding trade or payments agreements with foreign countries, ordering of forbidding transfer of currency,58 acts concerning armed forces or diplomatic activity or nationalisation.59 Those are usually carried out with the legal instrument of sovereign authority, thus is would be more legally secure to use this criterion. Also, as we will see, there are functional rationales for those examples.

3.2.2 swfs and soes and the Commercial Exception If a soe or a swf is considered part of a state, for purposes of immunity from jurisdiction, the next step is to check for exceptions. The relevant one for business activities of states is the so-called commercial activity exception (acta iure gestionis).60 Here, we find a definition of what a “commercial transaction” is in article 2 uncsi.61 In so far as the definition uses the term “commercial”

56 Or in the words of the German Constitutional Court: “the essential sphere of State authority,” German Federal Constitutional Court, Empire of Iran Case, (1963) 45 ilr 57, 81. 57 Ibid., 81. 58 Brussels Cour de cassation, S.A. Dhellemea et Masurel v. Banque Centrale de Turquie (1963) 45 ilr 85, 87. 59 us Court of Appeals, Victory Transport Incoroporated v. Comisaria General de Abas tecimientos y Transportes, Decision of 9 September 1664, 336, F.2d 354, 360 (2nd Cir.1964), ilr 110, 116. 60 See for details, Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3), 75–108. 61 Art. 2(1)(c) uncsi (n. 4): ‘commercial transaction’ means: (i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or supply of services; (ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in respect of any such loan or transaction; (iii) any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or professional nature, but not including a contract of employment of persons.” Art. 2(2) uncsi then provides: “In determining whether a contract or transaction is a ‘commercial transaction’ under paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant to determining the non- commercial character of the contract or transaction.” 148 van Aaken it has been rightly characterised as circular.62 As most other national legal instruments,63 the uncsi gives precedence of the nature of the transaction over the purpose of the activity if immunity of jurisdiction is in question (vice versa for execution). Contracts for the sale or supply of goods and services or contracts for loans or other transactions for the provision of finance including obligations of guarantees or indemnities in respect of those transactions are deemed to be commercial activity since no governmental power is involved in those transactions. This does in principle allow to use the legal instrument as a decisive criterion. But already the nature is far from settled and is mainly left to courts and decided case-by-case.64 Although courts have asked whether it is an industrial, commercial or financial activity which is exercised “in the same manner by private persons,”65 that is, they look at the sovereign authority involved (the legal

62 Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3), 77 with further references to court decisions. 63 us fsia, 28 u.s.c. § 1603 (d) prescribes that the commercial character of an activity shall be determined by the “nature of the course of conduct (. . .), rather than by reference to its purpose.” 64 For examples of national jurisprudence, see Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3), 77 et seq., held as commercial activities were: public relations and engagement of marketing agents, operation of an airline, ownership of patents, construction of oil platforms, implementing rice farm projects, supply and installation of electric materials, privatisation of government companies such as the conversion of a former soe into free market enterprise, sales of shares of soes, purchase of medical material, testing of medical equipment, operation of a hotel, management of an expropriated business. Less obvious are the following examples: Loaning of pieces for an art exhibition, solicitation of bids to build electricity generation facilities (could be judged as public procurement as well), contracts of concession of a barber on a military base, operation, management, maintenance of the Panama Canal by the Panama Canal Commission (although commercial activity, the Commission was held to be part of the us executive branch), contracting with a company to manage a health benefits plan and agreeing to indemnify the company, tv news broadcasting, signing of a standard form for the salvage of a warship, construction and operation of a nuclear power plant, construction of nuclear reactors and enrichment of uranium, detention of aircraft and collection of outstanding parking and landing fees. See in contrast to Canada in the same case (Supreme Court of Canada, Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Republic of Iraq, et al., Released 21 October 2010, 2010 scc 40), the uk House of Lords, Kuwait Airways Corp v. Iraqi Airways Co., Decision of 24 July 1995, [1995] 3 All er 694, held that the Iraqi Airways Co. was entitled to state immunity only in relation to the acts of taking the aircraft and removing them from Kuwait to Iraq, which were exercises of governmental power by the Republic of Iraq. 65 Art. 7(1) ecsi and prominently the us Supreme Court in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc, Decision of 12 June 1992, 504 U.S. 606 (1992), 614. The court concluded that “when Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 149 instrument), other courts also refer to profit-making activities when judging the commercial character of a transaction,66 whereas again other voices deem profit-making irrelevant. Exemplary are art loans by state museums. Those can be commercial (with profit) or non-commercial (without profit), there is surely no sovereign authority involved, and it might not even involve a public purpose (but see other reasons for why those should be immune below in 4.). Problematically, states often use means of commercial transactions to achieve public goals and here the purpose of the activity comes to the fore. The purpose of a transaction can be taken into account where the parties to the transaction so agreed or where in practice the purpose is relevant for determining the (non-)commercial character of a transaction. A two-pronged approach is usually taken,67 although, if a non liquet remains, then the context may also be taken into account.68 This is, e.g., relevant for the question of whether asset transfers by a swf (commercial nature) have a public purpose (stabilising public pensions or servicing governmental tasks by investing in a national soe of public services). The ilc further stresses the purpose- test in immunity of jurisdiction in order to “provide an adequate safeguard and protection for developing countries, especially in their endeavours to promote national economic development,”69 citing the procurement of food supplies to feed a population, relieve a famine situation or revitalise a vulnerable area, or supply drugs to combat a spreading epidemic. In the view of the ilc, the defendant state should then be given an opportunity to prove that, in their practice, a given contract or transaction should be treated as non- commercial (and thus immune) “because its purpose is clearly public and supported by raison d’Etat.”70 This of course could also mean that swfs or soes

a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the fsia.” 66 E.g. in the Panama Canal Commission case (Canada Federal Court, Ferguson v. Arctic Transportation Ltd. (T.D.), Decision of 7 December 1995, [1995] 3 F.C., 656: “The Commission is responsible for the operation, management and maintenance of the Panama Canal. The Commission provides for the movement of vessels through the canal. It is paid significant amounts of money for this service. The Commission did not seriously dispute that it was engaged, at least, in part, in commercial activities. The burden is on the Commission to demonstrate its entitlement to immunity, if it wishes to rely on such.” 67 ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 20, para. 26. 68 Yang, State Immunity in International Law, (n. 3), 103 et seq. therefore adds the “context” approach of many courts to the two-pronged approach suggested by the ilc. 69 ilc Commentaries (n. 5), 20, para. 26. 70 Ibid., para. 26. 150 van Aaken are potentially covered by this “development carve-out” suggestion of the ilc; the point that their activities may serve national economic development is rather easy to make. This implies also that commercial activities serving a public purpose should thus be exempt. This discussion shows that the binary distinction between acta iure gestionis and acta iure imperii is insufficient: commercial, non-commercial, public purpose and sovereign authority are four different things. In other words, the distinction is fourfold, not binary as often presumed and conflated. Depending on what is taken, the immunity is broader or less so. If sovereign authority is relevant, immunity tends to be narrower, if commercial activity is taken and everything else counts as acta iure imperii, e.g. the public purpose, immunity tends to be broad.

3.2.3 Regulatory Immunity in National Jurisdiction Regulatory immunity has a grave impact on first, competitive equality between soes/swfs and privates and second is influenced by the competition for capital between host states of swfs and soes. Taxes and competition disciplines are two prominent examples which will shortly be described. In dealing with those issues, I follow closely the work of the oecd.71 Regulation may involve an administrative act by a public agency including fines against an entity which potentially needs to be enforced in courts. Can soes or swfs ask for immunity, given that foreign states are not supposed to be judged in foreign courts? Tax law is paradigmatic for regulatory immunity. Neither the ecsi72 nor the uncsi73 deal with it, the reason being that those conventions deal with relations between states and private parties, not inter-state relations. Rather a treatment therein would violate sovereign equality. Art. 4(1) the oecd Model Tax Convention provides that “for purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ (. . .) also includes that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof”.74 It does not deal with other entities of the

71 David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41). See also Fabio Bassan, “The Law of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (n. 13), 106 et seq. in connection with taxes, 109 et seq. in connection with competition. 72 Art. 29 ecsi expressly excludes proceedings for taxes. 73 See ilc Commentaries (n. 5), art. 10 (Commercial transactions), para 12. The former article 16 on fiscal matters was removed since it would violate the principle of sovereign equality of states by allowing a state to institute proceedings against another state before the courts of the former state. The Draft was meant to deal only with state-private issues. 74 Paragraph 8(1) of the Commentary on art. 4 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (“oecd Model treaty”) states that “[i]t has been the general understanding of most Member countries that the government of each State, as well as any political subdivision or local authority thereof, Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 151 state such as soes explicitly but treats them as private parties and leaves the rest to the host state’s tax codes.75 In case national tax laws refer to the home state tax code, this leads mostly to tax free activities, since most home states do not tax their own state entities even if operating in foreign countries. For those countries that recognise some limitations on foreign state liability for tax, it appears that most, if not all, have established substantive exemptions from (income) taxes and do not take the way of jurisdictional or procedural immunity from suits to collect tax.76 Three positions can be found: (1) treatment like private investors, (2) an exemption limited to non-commercial investments and, (3) a broad exemption applicable to all investments.77 At first glance one would expect that business activities of states are taxed in foreign jurisdictions like everybody else. This is not the case though; some jurisdictions have special tax regimes for swfs and soes.78 The approaches of countries are very different,79 hinting at different attitudes towards tax exemption as investment incentives. The main question is whether taxes on passive income (e.g. dividends) of swfs and soes are tax exempt in the host country. Countries with no exemption for foreign governments from taxation of passive income include Germany, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland. Germany taxes foreign governments, including swfs, in the same manner as foreign

is a resident of that State for purposes of the Convention. Before 1995, the Model did not explicitly state this; in 1995, art. 4 was amended to conform the test of the Model to this understanding.” 75 Treatment in double taxation treaties are not dealt with here. 76 David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 32. 77 Ibid., 33. 78 See 26 u.s.c. § 892. Treasury regulations accompanying section 892 define non- commercial activity broadly, encompassing both traditional portfolio investing and more aggressive, strategic equity investments, see Victor Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,” New York Unviversity Law Review 84 (2009): 440–513, 456 et seq. for the history of the tax code in that respect. See also Michael S. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?,” California Law Review 82 (2009): 703768 and Spencer J.W. Willig, “Sovereign Wealth Fund and u.s. Law: Strategies for Navigating the Regulatory and Legal Landscape,” (Pennsylvania: The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania 2010), accessed 5 March 2013, http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/ other/Willig.pdf. 79 See for the following information “Economic and u.s. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United States,” available at http://www .house.gov/jct/x-49-08.pdf and David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 32. 152 van Aaken corporations.80 Also the domestic tax laws of Norway, Poland and Switzerland similarly do not appear to include any special provision for foreign governments with regard to tax on passive income.81 Australia, Canada and the United States generally exempt only “non-commercial investments,” but as discussed, all depends how this is understood. The United States, most prominently, currently treats swfs or soes as sovereigns82 for tax purposes as long as they do not engage in commercial activity other than portfolio investments.83 They are taxed as in their home countries where they will—most likely—not be taxed. This changes though, once the swf engages in other activities or holds controlling investments.84 Nevertheless, an soe or an swf might therefore be advan- taged in comparison with a private investor, depending how the investment is structured.85 In the uk, swfs are exempt if they form “integral part” of the government. The issue arose under a dispute where it was unclear whether the Kuwait Investment Office kio (swf) or Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (soe) had purchased bp shares. The latter would be taxable whereas the former would not. Delicately, this investment was also subject to competition disciplines; the uk Mergers and Monopolies Commission office (mmc)—the antitrust authority—prohibited a 22% stake of kio in bp, forcing it to reduce it to 10%.86 This can lead to restructuring of investment by states. In countries

80 Ibid., 33. 81 Ibid., 34. 82 The definition of “foreign government” is very broad, encompassing not only the “integral parts” of a sovereign like governmental departments or agencies but also separate legal entities controlled by the foreign sovereign that may or may not have counterparts in the United States, that is, e.g. also Gazprom. See for details, Victor Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth” (n. 78). 83 Those are defined as the acquisition of non-controlling stakes. swfs can thus avoid both u.s. income and withholding taxes on their u.s. investments, see Spencer J.W. Willig, “Sovereign Wealth Fund and u.s. Law: Strategies for Navigating the Regulatory and Legal Landscape,” (n. 78), 28 et seq. 84 us Internal Revenue Code (irc) § 892 (a)(2), see Michael S. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (n. 78), 712. 85 Like here, Victor Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth” (n. 78), more critical by Michael S. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (n. 78) as well as Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., Economic and u.s. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United States 1–2 (Comm. Print 2008) (“jct Report”), accessed 5 March 2013, www.house.gov/jct/x-49-08.pdf. 86 “Kuwait Ordered to Reduce Holdings in bp to 10 Percent,” International Petroleum Finance, vol. 11, no. 19 October 1988. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 153 with tax exceptions, the same definitorial and functional problems as in the commercial exception for jurisdictional immunity arises.87 Another example relevant to regulatory immunity of states concerning their business activities is competition law. There, the application of the commercial exception can vary from case to case and from country to country. For soes, the question is easier to answer and there are also more cases than for swfs. Again, the United States gives ample examples. The us Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (fisa) does not expressly address its application to antitrust laws as such but excludes punitive damages, common in competition law, against foreign states, but not against state instrumentalities (including soes). The Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations88 briefly address state immunity: “As a practical matter, most activities of foreign government-owned corporations operating in the commercial market- place will be subject to u.s. antitrust laws to the same extent as the activities of foreign privately-owned firms.” Within the us, in a number of civil cases the antitrust laws were applied to soes or foreign trading organisations by finding that the activity at issue was commercial but some courts have found differently; the arguments are similar to the discussion of jurisdictional immunity, that is, the ownership and control test is dominant. The argumentation in one of the cases, Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. et al., will be picked out for illustration of the commercial exception criteria. The state of California brought a case against Powerex, an energy-trading firm owned by a Canadian state power firm alleging that the company had taken part in a price-fixing conspiracy.89 The majority of the court found that it is foreign governmental entity that acts in a commercial capacity and consequently is subject to suit.90 Justice Breyer dissented.91 According to him, the commercial exception had to be rejected, since “a well-run nationalized firm should make a reasonable profit; nor should it have to borrow from the government itself. The relevant question is not whether Powerex earns a profit but where does that profit go? Here it does not go to private shareholders; it goes to the benefit of the public in payments to the province and reduced electricity prices.” Justice Breyer thus

87 For details, see David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 35 et seq. 88 Issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 1995, § 3.31. 89 us Court of Appeals, Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. et al., Decision of 18 June 2007, 551 u.s. 224, 391 F. 3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2007), 226–227. 90 According to 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(2). 91 us Court of Appeals, Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services (n. 89), 245 et seq. References removed but emphasis in original. 154 van Aaken ultimately took the purpose of the entity rather than the nature of the activity as a criterion for judging immunity, similar to the ilc’s development carve-out. Another case briefly to be discussed is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec) case,92 since alleged price-fixing by opec and opec member states has been the most prominent context for the consideration of state immunity relating to antitrust in the United States. In International Association of Machinists (iam) v. opec, a union brought a price- fixing suit against opec and its thirteen member states seeking injunctive relief and damages. Whereas the district court held that opec and its members were protected by immunity because their actions in collectively setting pricing targets and implementing their decisions through national control of production were not commercial activity, the Court of Appeals relied on the act of state doctrine rather than sovereign immunity, but with the same result.93 In the eu, the other major enforcer of competition disciplines, the crucial criterion is whether a swf or soe is an “undertaking” (prescriptive jurisdiction). Here, not ownership but function is decisive.94 Articles 101 and 102 tfeu95 apply directly to prohibit anti-competitive practices by “undertakings”. The notion of undertaking generally includes every entity engaged in an “economic activity,” regardless of how it is financed or whether it forms part of the state administration or is a body on which the state has conferred special or exclusive rights.96 In contrast, any entity, public or private, which performs tasks of a public nature, connected with the exercise of public powers or in the exercise of official authority, is not an “undertaking” and thus not subject to

92 us District Court for the Central District of California, International Association of Machinists (iam) v. opec, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), 63 ilr 284; us Court of Appeals, International Association of Machinists (iam) v. opec, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), 66 ilr 413, cert. denied, 454 u.s. 1163 (1982). 93 David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 40. Another case came up only against opec, but not its member states and will therefore not be treated here: us Court of Appeals, Prewitt Enterprises v. opec, 353 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 u.s. 814 (2004). 94 ag Cosmas in ecj, Ferlini v. chl, Case C-411/98, [2000] ecr i-8081, I-8084, paras. 110–116 took the view “in each case, the term ‘undertaking’ must be understood in a functional sense, having regard to the activity’ in question.” 95 eu, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 9 May 2008, oj c 115/47. 96 ECJ, Commission of the European Communities v. Italy, Judgment of 18 June 1998, Case C-35/96, [1987] ecr i-3851 and David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 42. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 155 competition disciplines.97 Although it would be possible to solely look at the legal instrument (sovereign authority), this is not what is done when the case law is considered. Rather, the purpose is quite relevant. Here again an unsolved problem arises, as in many other areas of national and international law, what a task of a public nature is (even if the exercise of sovereign authority can be more clearly defined). The European Court of Justice (ecj) relies on the purpose of a transaction, not the nature of the transaction itself—which may considerably narrow down the application of competition disciplines to swfs and soes,98 since about everything what a state does may be attributed a public purpose (including tasks fulfilled by privates). The European Commission took enforcement action against entities owned by non-eu states in one case, dating back to the era of communist state

97 ECJ, Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servizi ecologici porto de Genova SpA (sepg), Judgement of 18 March 1997, Case C-343/95, [1997] ecr i-1547, para. 16. In ecj, Commission v. Italy (n. 96), para. 7 the Court held that a private company engaged in anti-pollution surveillance in Genoa harbour would not be acting as an undertaking when discharging that particular responsibility, since this was a task in the public interest, forming part of one of the essential functions of the state in protecting the maritime environment: this judgment is of particular interest as the public duty was being carried out by a private body. In ecj, Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortune sul lavoro (inail), Judgement of 22 January 2002, Case C-218/00, [2002] ecr i-691, [2002] 4 cmlr 833, the ecj held that inail, entrusted by law with management of a scheme providing insurance against accidents at work, was not an undertaking for the purposes of the competition rules because it fulfilled an exclusively social function based on the principle of solidarity. In ecj, cfi Federación Nacional de Empresas de Instrumentación Científica, Médica, Técnica y Dental (fenin) v. Commission of the European Communities, Judgement of 4 March 2003, Case T-319/99, [2003] ecr ii-00357, confirmed by the ecj, fenin v. Commission of the Communities, Judgement of 11 July 2006, Case C-205/03 P, [2006] ecr i-06295, the cfi held that bodies or organisations responsible for the operation of the Spanish national health system were not acting as undertakings when purchasing medical goods and equipment, since those goods were used not for the purpose of conducting an economic activity but rather for the social purpose of providing health care; the Court acknowledged that the purchaser in such a case might wield considerable economic power, and might even be a monopsonist, but still concluded that it would not be acting as an undertaking for the purpose of the competition rules. 98 ecj, cfi fenin v. Commission (n. 97), para. 37: “Whilst an entity may wield very considerable economic power, even giving rise to a monopsony, it nevertheless remains the case that, if the activity for which that entity purchases goods is not an economic activity, it is not acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law and is therefore not subject to the prohibitions laid down in Articles 81(1) ec and 82 ec.” 156 van Aaken trading companies. It rejected a claim of immunity.99 Another eu case concerns an international organisation, Eurocontrol, which is of special interest since it is partially active in a field which is (organisationally or substantively) privatised in ever more member states (although it used to be seen as police power):100 namely the field of air traffic management.101 The ecj held that Eurocontrol was not an undertaking, but that Eurocontrol carried out, on behalf of its member states, tasks in the public interest aimed at contribut- ing to the maintenance and improvement of air navigation safety. Although some activities may not be of sovereign nature, taken as a whole, Eurocontrol’s activities were typically those of sovereign authority and were not of a commercial nature.102 Nevertheless, the Advocate General held that “it is apparent that the essential factor in classifying a body as an undertaking is the pursuit of an economic activity capable of being carried on, at least in principle, by a private undertaking with a view to profit.”103 It is difficult to attempt to draw general conclusions about the impact of foreign state immunity on host state regulation. The eu takes the way of prescriptive jurisdiction in competition disciplines since the question is whether soes or swfs can be classified as undertakings. In case there is no substantive exception for soes or swfs in tax or competition law to determine whether an entity is immune from jurisdiction (and thus also from anti-trust or tax suits), one may either take the ownership structure (Powerex majority) as a criterion or the purpose of the funds generated by the activity (ilc and the dissent opinion of Justice Breyer in Powerex) or the exercise of governmental authority for

99 European Commission, Aluminium imports from eastern Europe, Decision of 19 December 1984, case iv/26.870, oj 30 March 1985 L 92/1.: “Entities which engage in the activity of trade are to be regarded as undertakings for the purposes of Article [81], whatever their precise status may be under the domestic law of their country of origin, and even where they are given no separate status from the State.” 100 For details, see Anne van Aaken, “Principles and Structures of European Risk Governance, or: How (not) to Play a Trust Game,” European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013): 159, 174. 101 ecj, sat Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol., Judgement of 19 January 1994, Case C-364/92, [1994] ecr i-43. 102 This was later followed by the eu Commission in another case against Eurocontrol, ecj, selex Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Commission of the European Communities and Organisation européenne pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne (Eurocontrol), Case C-113/07 P. ecr i-2207; and Decision of European Commission, Pratica No F-1/36.751 Alenia/Eurocontrol (12 February 2004) (Selex was the successor of Alenia), accessed 5 March 2013, http:// ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36751/36751_11_3.pdf (available only in Italian). 103 Cited from David Gaukrodger, “Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 46. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 157 a public purpose (eu). Which argument passes a functional test will be discussed below in part 4.

3.3 Execution into the Assets of soes or swfs We will turn to the third question, namely when property of a soe or swf can be attached by the creditors of the state. (A loss of) immunity of jurisdiction does not automatically lead to (a loss of) immunity of execution and vice versa.104 Execution in sovereign assets is a relatively recent phenomenon.105 State immunity also protects the property of a state against enforcement measures in another state, barring a state from taking coercive measures against another state’s assets for the purpose of enforcing a judgement. It is part of the larger concept of state immunity, being based on the same doctrinal structures and sources as jurisdictional immunity and is equally rooted in custom. Although the commercial exception applies also to immunity from execution, the emphasis of the above mentioned criteria of nature, purpose and context is applied differently. The ecsi,106 the uncsi107 as well as the ilc Draft Articles address execution separately, just as the national laws of the uk and the us108

104 See for those principles Yang, State Immunity in International Law (n. 3), 34; Stoll, “State Immunity” (n. 33). 105 David W. Rivkin and Christopher K. Tahbaz, “Attachment and Execution on Commercial Assets,” in R. Doak Bishop, ed., Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (New York: JurisNet, 2009), 139. 106 Although that was subject to discussion, see CoE Commentaries (n. 49, art. 23: “No measures of execution or preventive measures against the property of a Contracting State may be taken in the territory of another Contracting State except where and to the extent that the State has expressly consented thereto in writing in any particular case.” Art. 24 lets Contracting States opt-out of the Convention’s regime in this regard, and if they do, art. 26 introduces an exception to the rule in art. 23 (which forbids the levying of execution against the property of a foreign State): execution may be levied in the state of the forum against any property of a foreign state used exclusively in connection with an industrial or commercial activity, provided that the proceedings relate exclusively to such an activity of the state, and that both the states have made the declaration provided for in art. 24. See CoE Commentaries (n. 49), para. 104 et seq.: art. 26 only applies to proceedings concerning industrial or commercial activities in which the state engages “in the same manner as a private person.” The proposition is thus based on the principle that a state should, in respect of its activities iure gestionis in the industrial and commercial field, be placed so far as possible on the same footing as a private person, a thought we will take up again below. 107 Arts. 18–21 uncsi (n. 4). 108 The us fsia codified restrictive immunity for state assets in 28 u.s.c. § 1610 (a). See for details concerning the us case law, Christopher F. Dugan and James E. Berger, 158 van Aaken on foreign state immunity do.109 For creditors, the main question is, first, whether cross-execution between the assets of a state and its owned entities like soes or swfs are possible and, second, in which kind of property execution can take place. Creditors may find that assets held by the state itself are immune from execution (unless commercial activity applies), whereas commercial assets of an swf or soe are not within their reach because they are held by separate legal entities.110 Thus, several situations can be identified. They are characterised by three variables relevant for the legal assessment: first, is the entity whose property is meant to be attached part of the state (and covered by its immunity) or rather a separate entity needing separate assessment? Second, if the property is found to be state owned, does a commercial exception apply? Third, is a link between the property item to be attached and the underlying claim necessary?111 Let’s turn to the first question: which property forms part of state property. If the property is held directly by the state or its organs, there is no further problem. In principle, Art. 10 uncsi holds that an soe is separate and the state as well as the soe are shielded from each other’s claims. But the potential for abuse of this rule by shielding the state against claims has been expressed in an understanding in the Annex to the uncsi which clarifies that this rule does not prejudge the question of “piercing the corporate veil”. Latest, in La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) v. F.G. Hemisphere Associates llc,112 the Privy Council ruled on the circumstances in which assets

“Enforcement against Assets of State-owned Companies” (n. 52), 198 et seq. For an overview on European practice, see August Reinisch, “European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures,” European Journal of International Law 17 (2006): 803–838. 109 New York, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”), 10 June 1958, 330 u.n.t.s. 3, does not address the issue but relies in art. iii on national procedures for enforcement but is silent on substantive issues. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (icsid) 18 March 1965, 575 u.n.t.s. 159, explicitly requires the application of domestic sovereign immunity protection in its art. 55. 110 See also Anne-Catherine Hahn, “State Immunity and Veil Piercing in the Age of Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktrecht (2012): 103, 118. 111 As Art. 19(c) uncsi (n. 4) demands. 112 See latest uk Privy Council Appeal, La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) v. F.G. Hemisphere Associates llc, Decision of 17 July 2012, [2012] ukpc 27, Privy Council Appeal No. 0061 of 2011 (attempt to attach assets of Gécamines, a soe of the Democratic Republic of Congo). The uk sia interpretation in this case held that it is only in “quite extreme” circumstances an soe can be liable for the claims against a state. The Privy Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 159 of soes may be available to meet state debts, clarifying the relevant test for what constitutes a separate entity from the state. This judgement can be considered the leading statement of uk law on this issue. The Privy Council considered the common law test derived from the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria113 and the provisions of the uk State Immunity Act (sia), reversing the Jersey Courts’ decisions. It established a two-step approach in order for the assets of an soe to be attachable for the debts of states:114 first, it has to be established that the soe is distinct from the executive organs of the government of the state and capable of suing or being sued (that is, as separate entity), such entity being one which would not benefit from sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 14(1) of the uk sia. Second, if by reference to the entity’s constitution, control and functions it can be determined that the entity is in reality part of the state and even if it exercises sovereign authority, it could still carry out private or commercial activity in respect of which no such immunity would be available. Even when constitutional and factual control and the exercise of governmental authority were established as regards a state-owned organisation, this would not without more render the entity an organ of the state and thus its assets may not be attached for the debts of the state. The Privy Council thereby rejected

Council refused to “pierce the corporate veil” and held that “merely because a State’s conduct makes it appropriate to lift the corporate veil to enable a third party or creditor of a State-owned corporation to look to the State does not automatically entitle a creditor of the State to look to the State-owned corporation.” Rather, piercing the corporate veil must be a “tailored remedy,” see per Lord Mance at paras. 30 and 77. For a short overview, see James Barratt and Margarita Michael, “Degrees of Immunity: A Lesson from the Privy Council,” The European, Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review (2013), accessed 5 March 2013, http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/50/sections/172/chap ters/1925/degrees-immunity-lesson-privy-council/. 113 uk Court of Appeal, Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Decision of 13 January 1977, [1977] 1 qb 529. In Trendtex, the existence of governmental control over, and the exercise of governmental functions by, a soe were held to be capable of founding an exception to the circumstances in which courts respect the separate legal personality of state-owned corporations. That is, soes may then be regarded as a part of the State. As a second step, it has to be determined whether it then falls under the commercial activity exception, thus not being immune. 114 According to section 14(1) of the uk sia, a “separate entity” is defined as being distinct from the executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued. Section 14(2) of the sia provides that such a separate entity is immune if it is: 1) acting “in the exercise of sovereign authority;” and 2) if the separate entity were a State, it would not have lost its immunity due to one of the exceptions contained in the uk sia. 160 van Aaken tests used in many other jurisdictions: namely that the existence of governmental control and application of governmental functions is enough to attribute the soe to the state. Rather, it held that these qualities can be considered characteristic of most soes: “governmental control is an ever present aspect of state-controlled enterprises which are not part of the State.”115 Moreover, “assisting, promoting and advancing development, prosperity and economic welfare, and carrying out government policy in that respect are again of the essence of many state-controlled corporations’ functions.”116 Thus, in the uk, the courts will not allow a creditor to recover debts owed by a state from its soe unless the state is in constitutional and factual control of the entity and the entity can be shown to have no separate existence from the state.117 In contrast to the state and its organs, a separate entity is not ordinarily entitled to immunities and privileges associated with the exercise of sovereign authority. Thus, although a soe may not enjoy sovereign immunity, execution in the assets of a soe for the debts of the state are thus impossible since the soe and the state are two different entities and the former is not liable for the latter. State practice has so far been inconclusive and rather scarce concerning swfs. There is only one decision as of yet on the attachment of assets of swfs without a separate legal personality for the debt of its home states: aig et al. v. Kazakhstan. 118 Here, the creditors tried to attach cash and securities held by banks pursuant to a Global Custody Agreement for the National Bank of Kazakhstan (nbk), the central bank, pursuant to a successful International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (icsid) award. The nbk in turn held these assets for the National Fund of Kazakhstan, the swf of the state. Its funds are managed by nbk, and it does not have a separate legal personality. The court had to decide whether the swf could be considered a separate entity under section 14 uk sia (which are excluded from immunity in principle) and could invoke any exception under that section. It viewed the swf as part of the nbk119 and thus only considered the immunity of central

115 Per Lord Mance (n. 112), para. 43. 116 Per Lord Mance (n. 112, para. 44. 117 Per Lord Mance (n. 112), para. 29: “a separate juridical entity is formed by the State for what are on the face of it commercial or industrial purposes, with its own management and budget, the strong presumption is that its separate corporate status should be respected, and that it and the State forming it should not have to bear each other’s liabilities. It will in the Board’s view take quite extreme circumstances to displace this presumption.” 118 uk, High Court of Justice, aig v. Kazakhstan (n. 15). 119 Ibid., para. 57: “It does not matter whether the central bank is a department of the State or a separate entity. In all cases the central bank’s property “shall not be” regarded as in use or intended for use for commercial purposes “for the purposes of (section 13(4)).” (3) Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 161 bank assets.120 The swf was established with the purpose “[to ensure] stable social and economic development of the country, accumulation of financial resources for future generations, [and] reduction of the vulnerability of the economy to the influence of unfavourable external factors.”121 On the question of commercial use or intended use, the judge thus held: “The London Assets formed part of the National Fund. That Fund was, in my opinion, created to assist in the management of the economy and government revenues of the RoK [Republic of Kazahstan], both in the short and long term. Management of a State’s economy and revenue must constitute a sovereign activity.”122 Thus, currently the state of the law, at least in the uk, is that if an swf is not an independent instrumentality from the state, its property cannot be attached due to the purpose of those funds. Most probably this would also be the case if the swf is independently structured, if the purpose argument is dominant. In Switzerland, in contrast, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that immunity was not available in a case involving assets of the Kuwait Investment Authority (kia), primarily because kia was legally separate from the state of Kuwait and had not been shown to exercise sovereign activities. It also pointed out that the relevant assets had not been clearly earmarked for sovereign purposes.123 In order to answer the second relevant question, namely which state property is attachable, the crucial question is whether a commercial exception applies. Enforcement immunity protects the property of a state in a very broad sense. It covers all sorts of assets, including immovable, land, premises, movable property, and all sorts of rights, including intellectual property rights and bank accounts. Property is to be judged differently from activity (as in jurisdictional immunity): property as such is neutral as opposed to how it is used. A bank account is a bank account. Therefore, the purpose of its owner is crucial

Given the wording of section 14(4), then the property of a State’s central bank (or other monetary authority) must enjoy complete immunity from the enforcement process in the uk courts.” 120 Ibid., para. 90: “In my view that conclusion is not affected by the fact that, as the experts on Kazakhstan law agree, the nbk holds those assets as part of the National Fund of Kazakhstan under the Trust Management Agreement with the RoK, by which the government of the RoK is the beneficiary.” 121 Ibid., para. 12. 122 Ibid., para. 92. 123 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Kuwait v. X. S.A., Decision of 24 January 1994, Revue Suisse de Droit International Européen (1995): 593, 600, 595. 162 van Aaken and the first criterion to look at. The purpose approach is applied in the ilc Draft Articles,124 the uncsi as well as in national legislation on the issue. Article 21 uncsi addresses a number of those categories of property which are non-commercial, that is, immune.125 Article 21(1)(a) uncsi secures the immunity of state property used or intended for diplomatic or consular functions. Those include any embassy premises which are also protected under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) (vcdr) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) (vccr). It explicitly includes “bank accounts,” which is used or intended for use in the performance of the functions of the diplomatic mission of the state or its consular post. Note here that accounts in their neutrality open the door to moral hazard on part of the defending states which may create so-called mixed accounts.126 Therefore, a number of national courts have taken a restrictive approach in view of the immunity of such accounts and funds. They have required precise information as to the designated purpose of bank accounts and, even more specifically, of particular funds.127 However, most courts are less strict: “the fact that an account is held in the name of the embassy, the post, or a diplomatic note confirms its dedication to sovereign purpose, is deemed to constitute a rebut-

124 The respective art. 18(1)(c) of the ilc Draft Articles (n. 5) reads: “the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum and has a connection with the claim which is the object of the proceeding or with the agency or instrumentality against which the proceeding was directed.” 125 This is almost equivalent to art. 19 ilc Draft Articles (n. 5). 126 Accounts of diplomatic missions or consular posts enjoy immunity in view of the public purposes they serve. However, it has been the subject of considerable discussion and conflicting judgements as to whether limitations should be made in regard to possible commercial purposes of those accounts or particular funds, so-called “mixed accounts” and how those should be made with whom bearing the burden of proof. Art. 30(2) vcdr is of little help. It provides for protection of property without any limitation regarding its location, but is confined to the property of the diplomatic agent himself. Likewise, the 1963 vccr is inconclusive. Art. 31(4) vccr states that “the property of the consular post (. . .) shall be immune for purposes of national defence or public utility” only. 127 An early landmark case in this regard was the 1977 Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case of the German Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 46, 342 2 BvM 1/76, 65 ilr 146 (1977). In uk House of Lords, Alcom Ltd v. Republic of Colombia, Decision of 12 April 1984, (1984) (1987) 74 ilr 171, the United Kingdom House of Lords took a similar view. The same holds true for the 1986 decision of the Dutch Council of State, mk v. State Secretary for Justice, Decision of 24 November 1986, (1994) 94 ilr 357, and the Brussels Cour d’Appel in Leica ag v. Central Bank of Iraq et Etat irakien, Judgement of 15 February 2000, jt 2000, 6, ca (Brussels). Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 163 table presumption for its non-commercial character.”128 A request for more detailed information regarding particular funds is considered an undue interference with the sovereign functions and purposes of such account transactions. Mixed accounts are thus usually held to be immune.129 Article 21(1)(c) uncsi expressly mentions the “property of the central bank and other monetary authority of the state” as being immune from execution.130 Thus, also swf assets held by central banks and not structured as separate entities are immune from execution.131 Since a central bank is equally an instrumentality of a state fulfilling governmental functions, the protection of their accounts has scarcely been put into question.132 Nevertheless, there was a recent attempt to execute into Argentinean central bank accounts held at the Bank of International Settlements (bis), although in the end unsuccessful, but mainly based on the immunity of the bis itself.133

128 Stoll, “State Immunity,” (n. 33), para. 65. 129 us Southern District Court of New York, Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, Decision of 12 December 1986, 650 F.Supp.73 (s.d.n.y. 1986) where lecto attempted to execute an icsid award against tax collection revenues in New York (mixed embassy account) but the court held that tax collection is a sovereign activity. Another us Court found differently, see us District Court District of Columbia, Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, Decision of 18 November 1980, 507 F.Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980), 312. For details and calling for a more creditor friendly approach in the burden of proof, Cedric Ryngaert, “Embassy Bank Accounts and State Immunity from Execution: Doing Justice to the Financial Interests of Creditors,” Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (2013): 73, 88. 130 The suggestion of the Special Rapporteur of the ilc to add the words “and used for monetary purposes” to “property of the central bank and other monetary authority of the state was not incorporated in the final text, due to a lack of consensus. The us fsia contains that carve out in 28 u.s.c § 1611 (b)(1). 131 uk, High Court of Justice, aig v. Kazakhstan (n. 15). 132 us Court of Appeals, em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision of 5 January 2007, wl 29978 (2d. Cir. 2007) the Court allowed execution in the central bank accounts held in New York due to an Argentinian presidential decree permitting the use of those funds to repay Argentina’s debt to the International Monetary Fund. See also F.A. Mann, “The State Immunity Act 1978,” British Yearbook of International Law 50 (1980): 43–62, 62, criticizing the possibility that property of the central bank or other monetary authority of the State is granted immunity from enforcement. Mann qualifies granting immunity to central banks as a “mercenary attitude” of states. 133 Many awards against Argentina have not been paid. Some of the claims are held by so called “vulture funds” or “investors in distressed debt”. In very creative attempts, lawyers try to enforce debts against military boats, airport facilities and assets of Argentina held by international organisations. On 5 November 2009, nml Capital requested Basel’s Debt Enforcement Office to freeze Argentina’s assets, chf 290’564’577 including interest 164 van Aaken

Additionally, military property is immune from enforcement. Article 21(1) (b) uncsi reflects the purpose-driven criterion encompassing property of a military character (e.g. weapons) or property used or intended for use in the performance of military functions, even if fuel or foodstuff.134 It is also quite extensive, since not only a current use or purpose is decisive but even the future use—again a door-opener to moral hazard on part of the state. Furthermore, special immunity is not only granted to warships (even if not in use) but to all ships of governmental use,135 even yachts. Probably this also applies mutatis mutandis to military aircraft or space objects.136 The abstract definition of uncsi allows the attachment of property “specifically in use or intended for use by the state for other than government non-commercial purposes” (article 19(c) uncsi) is unfortunate. Due to the negative formulation it remains unclear which situations are included. Only commercial purposes (for profit; a narrow understanding of immunity), also those which do not have an immediate governmental purpose (intermediate understanding) or those which have an ultimate public or sovereign purpose (broad understanding of immunity, like sovereign saving in a swf)? A

(Arrestbefehl Nr. 2009/217), at the Bank of International Settlement (bis) based in Basel, as an interim measure. This was based on two verdicts of the District Court of the Southern District of New York (us Court of Southern District of New York, Verdict No. 03 Civ 8854 and us Court of sdny, em Ltd. And nml Capital v. The Republic of Argentina, Verdict filed 18 November 2009, No. 03 Civ 2507). The Basel’s Debt Enforcement Office ordered the freezing of all assets related to the Argentine Republic aiming to recover nml Capital’s debt, against the immunity guaranteed by art. 55(2) of the Statute of the bis and art. 4 of the Headquarters Agreement. After three years, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decided (July 12, 2010) and Switzerland’s Department of Foreign Affairs endorsed the decision, that the immunity of the bis as well as that of the states’ accounts held therein, was not lifted. 134 In spite of this rare clarity of immunity, the Ghanaian Superior Court of Judicature in the High Court of Justice (Commercial Division) in Accra attached an Argentinean military ship. It was released due to an order of itlos (itlos, Argentina v. Ghana (n. 26), since Ghana was violating its international obligations of respecting Argentina’s immunity. 135 Brussels, The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, of 10 April 1926 176 lnts 199, art. 3 and its Additional Protocol to the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, signed on 24 May 1934 and entered into force on 8 January 1937, 176 lnts 214. 136 However, in contrast to the issue of state-owned ships or ships operated by states, the issue has not been ruled upon by the 2004 uncsi (n. 4). Instead, art. 3(3) uncsi simply refers to immunities enjoyed by a state under international law with respect to aircraft or space objects, see Peter-Tobias Stoll, “State Immunity,” (n. 33), para. 73. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 165

number of civil law jurisdictions have adopted the principle that a state enjoys immunity from execution for property in use for sovereign purposes, but not for property in use for commercial purposes. This rather binary approach was also adopted in the German Constitutional Court’s 1977 decision in the Philippine Embassy Case137 and in subsequent cases in Italy and Spain138 as well as France,139 lately confirmed by the International Court of Justice.140 “Governmental non-commercial purposes” thus shield the state, e.g. when cultural property is in question as in the icj case. But what if the state makes a profit with cultural property or e.g. art loans? Furthermore, the sovereign or public purpose criterion is highly problematic and legally insecure since it remains unclear whether the ultimate purpose (e.g. economic development) or an immediate purpose (accumulating wealth) is meant; a question which is especially relevant for soes and swfs. The Australian, Canadian, South African, us and uk statutes on immunity generally allow for execution against foreign state property in use or intended

137 German Federal Constitutional Court, The Philippine Embassy (n. 127). 138 Italian Constitutional Court, Condor and Filvem v. Minister of Justice, Case No. 329, Decision of 15 July 1992, 101 ilr 394 (1992); Spanish Constitutional Court, Diana Gayle Abbott v. South Africa, Decision of 1 July 1992, Decision No. 107, 113 ilr 411 (1992). 139 French Cour de Cassation, République démocratique du Congo v. syndicat des propriétaires de l’immeuble Résidence Antony Châtenay, Decision of 25 January 2005, 1ère ch. Civ., 95 Revue critique de droit international privé (2006): 123 (immunity can only be excluded “lorsque le bien saisi se rattache . . . à une opération économique, commerciale ou civile relevant du droit privé qui donne lieu à la demande en justice”); French Cour de Cassation, Iran v. Société Eurodif, Decision of 14 March 1984, 1re Ch., jcp ii, 2205, 77 ilr 513. See also David Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (n. 41), 21 and Dana H. Freyer, “Attachments of Debts Owed to Sovereigns,” in Doad Bishop, ed., Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (New York: JurisNet, 2009), 178–183. 140 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n. 26), where the icj stated: “Indeed, it suffices for the Court to find that there is at least one condition that has to be satisfied before any measure of constraint may be taken against property belonging to a foreign State: that the property in question must be in use for an activity not pursuing government non- commercial purposes, or that the State which owns the property has expressly consented to the taking of a measure of constraint, or that that State has allocated the property in question for the satisfaction of a judicial claim (. . .)” (para. 118, emphasis by author). See Teresa Russo, “Protection of Cultural Heritage and Immunity from Execution: What is the Relationship?,” Transnational Dispute Management 10 (2013), accessed 5 March 2013, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/welcome.asp. 166 van Aaken for use in commercial purposes.141 The uk courts clarified recently how the phrase “property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes” in section 13(4) of the State Immunity Act 1978 is to be understood.142 This matters indeed for the test of whether soes and swfs may enjoy immunity from execution if their purpose is a sovereign one, even if the money earned is derived by commercial transactions. The Court held: “The essential distinction is between the origin of the funds on the one hand and the use of them on the other.”143 It draws in its judgement on several foreign jurisdictions, such as the leading case in the us, Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo,144 where the claimant sought to attach various debts owed by a group of Texas oil companies to the Congo. The debts constituted, inter alia, royalty obligations by the oil companies for activities connected with the exploration for and the sale of the Congo’s oil. The judge in that decision held that “[w]hat matters under the statute is not how the Congo made its money, but how it spends it. The amenability of these royalties and taxes to garnish-

141 See Australia fsia § 32 (1) (immunity generally excluded for commercial property); Canadian sia § 11 (execution against foreign State property allowed where the property is used or is intended for commercial activity); South African fsia Act No. 87 of 1981, Art. 14(1)(b): “the property of a foreign state shall not be subject to any process (. . .) (ii) for the enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award (. . .), 14(3) Subsection (1)(b) shall not prevent the issue of any process in respect of property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes.” uk sia section 13(4) (property in use or intended for use in commercial purposes is subject to attachment), us fsia, § 1610 (a)(2). 142 uk Supreme Court, SerVaas Incorporated v. Rafidian Bank and others, Judgement of 17 August 2012, [2012] uksc 40. For an overview on the uk law on those issues, see Freyer, “Attachments of Debts Owed to Sovereigns” (n. 139), 167–172. The burden of proof that a state property is used or intended to be used for commercial purposes lies with the creditor in the uk. 143 Ibid., para. 19. 144 us Court of Appeals, Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, Decision of 17 July 2002, 309 F3d 240 (5th Cir, 2002). This decision was followed by us Court of Appeals, Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron-Overseas (Congo) Ltd., Decision of 25 January 2007, 475 F.3rd 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), 1091, where it held it is not enough that the judgment creditor demonstrates that the money is derived from commercial activity but needs to show that it would be reinvested in commercial activity instead of being used for public purposes. A debt is considered as being used for commercial activity only if it is “put into action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial activity” but not if this merely used “in connection with a commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.” (191, emphasis in the original). See for details Freyer, “Attachments of Debts Owed to Sovereigns” (n. 139), 159–167. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 167 ment depends on what they are ‘used for’, not on how they were raised.”145 The burden of proof what the property is used for is typically borne by the creditor, who has to establish that they serve commercial purposes.146 The last important, but not finally settled, issue relates to the question as to whether, and if so what kind of, a link is required between the property item sought for enforcement and the underlying claim or proceedings, since if a strict link is required, any “cross-execution” would be impermissible. Such a nexus is required by some treaty law, legislation, and courts. In other countries, this kind of link has been severely disputed. As a result of these disputes, Article 19(c) uncsi only incorporated this second condition, namely that “measures of constraint may only be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed.” This shields states and separate entities, such as soes from “cross-execution”. The main purpose was to prevent execution measures being taken against the property of a foreign state where the judgement debtor was in fact a soe. But the requirement cuts both ways, namely if the judgement creditor is the state, execution in the ever more present soe or swf assets in foreign jurisdiction is not possible. That gives less leeway to creditors for seeking attachments. Thus, in case the claim is against an soe and the creditor executes the property of that very same soe, no special problem arises. But in case a creditor holds a claim against the state which is difficult to enforce and wants to attach its assets in form of the property of a swf or soe, it is getting complicated. § 1610(a)(2) of the us Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (fsia), e.g., requires that “the property [sought for enforcement action] is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”147 French law requires this nexus as well. In Sonatrach,148 the Cour de Cassation expressly distinguished

145 Ibid., 251. It was followed in us Court of Appeals, Af-Cap Inc. v. Republic of Congo (n. 144) and us Court of Appeals, Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems Inc., 495 F3d 1024, (9th Cir. 2007). 146 Cf. Art. 19(c) uncsi (n. 4). 147 This applies only to the property of the state as such. The same limitation does not apply to state instrumentalities. As long as the instrumentality engages in commercial activity, all its property (irrespective of its connection to the claim) can be attached, thus leading to the same treatment as with private persons. See for details Edward G. Kehoe, “The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Foreign Sovereigns the United States,” in R. Doak Bishop, ed., Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns (New York: JurisNet, 2009), 267. 148 French Cour de Cassation, Société Sonatrach v. Migeon, Decision of 1 October 1985, 77 ilr 525: “Les biens des organismes publics, personnalisés ou non, distincts de l’Etat étranger, lorsqu’ils font partie d’un patrimoine que celui-ci a affecté à une activité principale 168 van Aaken between foreign state and state agencies, finding that “the assets of public entities, distinct from the foreign state, whether or not enjoying legal personality, which are part of a group of assets (patrimoine) which has been dedicated to activities in the private law sector, may be seized by all creditors of the public entity” (e contrario, not by those who are not creditors of that entity but of the owning state). The uk sia never provided for any such requirement— attachment can be sought against any property of the state, e.g. when enforcement of icsid claims are at issue. However the latest Privy Council decision in Gécamine puts this into question.149 In sum: much depends on how the sovereign investment is structured and which kind of weight is given to the public purpose argument (and how the public purpose is understood) for determining immunity from execution. Furthermore, state practice is diverse concerning the required link between the claim and the assets to be attached.

4 A Functional View on Business Activities of States

The traditional legal rationales given for immunity of states are the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention.150 A more fine-grained theoretical discussion on the rationale of immunity as well as exceptions thereto is missing. This is already from a legal theoretical point of view unsatisfactory. It is also highly insufficient in times of growing business activities. Do states lose their “sovereign dignity” and privileges once they enter the commercial sphere and why? And how should that commercial sphere be defined? Once immunity is subject to balancing, the question needs to be asked against what criteria balancing is permitted and what are the functions behind immunity. This is the purpose of this part. From a legal perspective, Emmanuel Gaillard151 described three incompatible principles which are involved in the question of immunity (from execution): first, the effectiveness of arbitral awards (but that stands for any award

relevant du droit privé, peuvent être saisis par tous les créanciers, quels qu’ils soient, de cet organisme.” 149 See n. 112. 150 See e.g. German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 2 BvR 2495/08 of 15 December 2008, para 17. 151 Emmanuel Gaillard, “State Entities in International Arbitration,” in Emmanuel Gaillard and Jennifer Younan, eds., iai Series on International Arbitration No. 4, (New York: Juris Publishing, 2008), 179. He focuses only on immunity from execution but the argument can be extended mutatis mutandis for jurisdictional immunity. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 169 against a state, arbitral or not and mutatis mutandis for the effectiveness of a contract), second, the recognition of state immunity from execution, third, the autonomy of state legal entities (this is relevant for both kinds of immunities). All three principles152 lend themselves to functional analysis. Since the question of this chapter is in what situations immunity should be given and foremost why, immunity will not be in itself a principle in the balancing act Gaillard describes but rather the outcome of a balancing process based on other principles subject to functional analysis. The balancing act will thus draw on the background rationale for sovereign immunity, putting into question the legal principle as such. The two main approaches to sovereign immunity, absolute and restrictive immunity, are identified with the so-called structuralist approach (rati one personae: everything what a state does is per definition public and thus immune) and the functionalist approach (ratione materiae: it depends on the subject matter, that is the conduct of the party).153 The functionalist approach, since it allows for balancing, lends itself to additional economic arguments. While the selection of criteria for distinction between immunity/no immunity inevitably involves some normative choices, not least the choice of economic theory, my primary aim is to expose the assumptions and background meta- principles underlying these principles and use those as a more differentiated way of distinction. Firstly, I will draw on economic theory in order to discuss rationales for immunity granted (or not) of swfs and soes in regulatory matters and execution (4.1). Secondly, an attempt is made to draw meaningful distinctions between the different situations and rationales for immunity (or not) which may be helpful for adjudication (4.2).

4.1 The Background Principles of Immunity: An Economic Perspective The functionalist approach to immunity is based on considerations rationae materiae, that is, immunity is not granted per se but depends on what kind of activity or purpose is pursued by a state. It thus lends itself to considerations of incentives and consequences. Economic theory takes a functionalist approach when analysing issues and looks exactly at those consequences and incentives created by legal norms: the main characteristic of the law and economics approach is that it analyses incentives set by different legal constellations and

152 Jasper Finke, “Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?” (n. 25), arguing that immunity is a principle rather than a rule. On the question of rules and principles, see Robert Alexy, “On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison,” Ratio Juris 16 (2003): 433–449. 153 See Schreuer, “State Immunity: Some Recent Developments” (n. 24), 93 et seq. as well as Maniruzzaman, “Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral” (n. 37), 337 et seq. 170 van Aaken their behavioural consequences.154 Rational behavior of the actors is assumed,155 that is, states pursue their preferences156 rationally within constraints, including legal constraints. Under this assumption, immunity creates a prisoners’ dilemma for host states since immunity granted to foreign soes or SWFs are a location advantage to attract investment, and there is surely a competition for capital going on. Thus, states have an incentive to grant more immunities than others although all would be better off when granting no immunity to the foreign SOEs and SWFs. Keeping this in mind, we will go through different economic arguments related to state immunity.

4.1.1 The Incentive Structure Set by Immunity From a strictly economic point of view any kind of immunity is questionable: immunity takes away the strongest incentives set by extrinsic motivation for the immune actor to behave as promised to its transaction partners. The cred- ibility of the commitment of a state is considerably weakened due to the moral hazard danger inherent in immunity. From an economic point of view, contractual agreements are expected to be fulfilled only if they are enforceable, that is, sanctions must be possible. Otherwise, they would stay “cheap talk,”157 that is nothing more than a promise. As Blackstone has held early on from a legal perspective, “the sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless that court had power to command the execution of it.”158 Put more bluntly: a judgment is not worth the paper it is written on if it cannot be enforced. In international law, the behaviour of states is subject not only to enforceable sanctions, such as retaliation, but also to reputational sanctions and

154 For theoretical details, see Anne van Aaken, Rational-Choice in der Rechtswissenschaft. Zum Stellenwert der ökonomischen Theorie im Recht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), for an overview on the literature taking this approach in international law, see Anne van Aaken, “International Law: Rational Choice,” in Oxford Bibliographies Online (bibli- ography with extensive annotated sources), accessed 5 March 2013, doi: 10.1093/obo/ 9780199796953-0051. 155 For the question of whether and under what circumstances that assumption, widely held also in International Relations theory, should be relaxed, see Anne van Aaken, “Behavioral International Law and Economics,” Harvard International Law Journal 55 (2014): 421–481. 156 What those preferences are is subject to debate, not taken up here. 157 In game theory, cheap talk is communication between players which does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. For details, see Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1996): 103–118. 158 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book i (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), 235. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 171 reciprocal measures by other states.159 Since international law is less easily enforceable than national law, reputation and reciprocity are becoming more important for the effectuation of the law. But here the question is whether the behaviour of states is subject to national law (in jurisdiction and enforcement), not international law. Immunity before national courts (since national law enforcement mechanisms are rendered void) brings us back to the international law incentive problem of enforcement. Reputational sanctions work only quite indirectly, namely by other states or firms not entering into treaties or contracts with the unreliable state anymore. Reciprocity and retaliation do not work between private actors and the state. Thus, the enforcement of contracts of those states engaging in business activities in national courts is still the strongest way of influencing state behavior. Nevertheless, reputational sanctions can play a role.160 If a contract partner knows that she will not be able to execute against the state, she will enter in less transactions with states or their entities. Non-execution of a judgment in case of conflict is priced in the transaction—and the transaction might thus become too expensive and will not be entered into. Economic theory would predict that less business transactions with states take place on the margin and therefore efficient allocation of resources would not take place to the same extent as in a situation with no immunity, that is, a situation where contracts can be enforced in national legal orders. This, in turn, might give an incentive to states to waive their immunity (from jurisdiction and execution), as they indeed sometimes do, e.g. when issuing bonds on the market. As has been outlined above, the legal structure of the investment vehicle is highly important for the treatment concerning immunity of jurisdiction and execution. From an economic point of view, this opens the door to moral hazard on part of the states in that they might want to escape scrutiny and enforcement by structuring their investments to make sure that they are immune. Thus, from an economic point of view, the legal structure of an investment

159 Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford: oup, 2008), who posits retaliation, reputation and reciprocity as reasons why states adhere to international law. For further ways of effectuation of international law, see Anne van Aaken, “Die vielen Wege zur Effektuierung des Völkerrechts,” Rechtswissenschaft (2013): 227–262. 160 Reputational sanctions can be taken by other states or by private individuals. See for details on the reputational mechanism Rachel Brewster, “Reputation in International Relations and International Law,” in Jeffrey L. Dunhoff et al., eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations. The State of the Art (Cambridge: cup, 2013), 524 as well as Anne van Aaken, “Behavorial International Law” (n. 155) on behavioural critiques of the rational choice framework on reputation. 172 van Aaken should not matter in order to eliminate that incentive. For the criterion of control and direct majority ownership for judging whether an entity is part of the state, as, e.g., under the us fsia,161 the moral hazard problem is clear, since investments can be structured in different ways in order to be an entity of the state shielded by immunity. Under one way (direct ownership and control), immunity applies, under the other not. When form is more important than function, states have huge incentives to structure their entities with which they operate their business activities accordingly. An swf might be treated differently depending on whether it forms part of the central bank or a ministry or whether it is structured independently. Equally, a state might conduct business activities with its account in foreign countries and at the same time pay the embassy accounts out of it instead of keeping them separately. The problem with the criterion on separation (legally or factually) from an economic point of view is the moral hazard of restructuring business activities by states. Opportunistic immunity-searching structures by states come as no surprise to economists—the question is just how the law deals with it. From an economic point of view, the purpose and function of the investment is the criterion by which judges should decide also on immunity, rather than the structure and the legal form by which business activities are carried out. Yet, if, e.g. attachment of the property of the soe/swf is in question and the claim was against that very same entity, there is no further problem. Thus, those legal orders which demand a link (us, France) between the property to be attached and the claim create legal security. At the same time though, the moral hazard problem is not solved since states can structure their activities and assets in a way so that creditors may not attach any other assets and are thus quite restricted. A problem arises equally where piercing of the corporate veil is asked for by the creditor who has a claim against the state and wants to execute the judgement in the property of a soe/swf. Piercing the veil brings considerable legal uncertainty to the soe/swf but also to its business partners since the potential debts of the company are not known (and one usually likes to know something about the potential debt of ones’ business partners). The problem is aggravated if there are more actors than just the state and the creditor involved in the transaction. This is namely the case if an soe is only majority-owned by the state. Then, private shareholders would be indirectly liable for the debts of the majority owner, the state. Nevertheless, if (and only if) predicted by the stock market that should again not pose a problem, since the share price of those entities would then be lower than otherwise.

161 See n. 52 and accompanying text for the definition of an “instrumentality” which could claim immunity. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 173

In sum, from an incentive point of view, immunity should be regarded with caution.

4.1.2 Competitive Equality Here, the question is the status of competitive equality between soes and swfs vis-à-vis private parties, that is, the equality between sovereigns exercising commercial activities and private entities, being active in the same market. A competition perspective would require a level playing field for all market participants. Under the current rules, private parties may be disadvantaged twice (depending on the jurisdiction): either because of regulatory and tax privileges of the soe or swf or because they cannot attach and execute awards against their state-owned business partners (and states being privileged because their assets cannot be attached). The competitive equality argument applies mainly and directly to activities, that is, regulatory (jurisdictional) immunity, since here the activities are crucial, not property: competition is foremost about competing activities. Immunity of execution impacts competitive equality as well, albeit more indirectly. The moral hazard problem applies to regulatory issues as well—if competition disciplines are not applied against states or their entities, the incentive to engage in anti-competitive behavior might be strong. Smart tax planning might avoid the thresholds for investments to be taxed in those countries where tax advantages are given. The crucial question from an economic point of view is whether there is any rationale for giving a competitive advantage in tax issues on the one hand and exception from competition disciplines on the other. Competitive equality can be named a principle of international economic law enshrined in the principles of non-discrimination as the most-favored nation clause as well as national treatment clauses. Both are widely found in the wto agreements, regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. They were also part of the formerly concluded Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.162 For soes, playing on the market as private players as well as for swfs holding majority ownership of companies, no tax exemptions should be given from an economic point of view. Taxes represent a substantial cost for enterprises and any tax advantages will give them a competitive edge over their private rivals, distorting efficient allocation of resources. The competition for capital by states or regions, also for capital from swfs and soes, are well known.

162 Andreas Paulus, “Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 4 March 2013. 174 van Aaken

But from a host state’s point of view, tax immunity is a very blunt investment incentive instrument. Investment incentives should, from an economic point of view only be paid if positive externalities of the foreign investment exists. Those may be, as with private foreign investment, technological spill-overs, managerial spill-overs or any other kind of positive externality. In order to be provided, these should be subsidised, whereas all other activities should not.163 The latter represent nothing else than a donation paid out of tax payers’ money. Since positive externalities are very difficult to calculate, tax incentives are too blunt an instrument.164 This is even more true if competition disciplines are in question: if the activity can also be exercised by private entities, any exemption for state entities would disadvantage the private competitors. Furthermore, any immunity in competition discipline allows anti-competitive behavior by state entities, thus distorting the market and efficient resource allocation. If we look at the different criteria which are used by courts in order to determine the nature of an activity, we find several: profit making, non- governmental function, etc. Profit making, as has been rightly held by Justice Breyer in Powerex,165 is also a purpose of a well governed soe or swf and can thus not be used as a criterion for distinction. From an economic point of view, the correct criterion is whether the activity is exercised “in the same manner by private persons.”166 If the same legal instruments are used by states, that is, they act without sovereign authority, there is no reason to privilege states. As was held by a Law Lord: “it is neither a threat to the dignity of the state, nor any interference with its sovereign functions to require a state to answer a claim based upon such [commercial] transactions”.167 But still the question arises whether the public function can serve as an immunity-saving device, to which we will turn now.

163 See only Theodore Moran, “Introduction and Overview,” in Theodore Moran et al., ed., Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? (Washington dc: Institute for International Economics, 2005), 1. 164 For similar reasoning concerning tax exemptions in the us concerning swfs, see Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth,” (n. 78). 165 See n. 91. 166 Art. 7(1) ecsi. 167 Per Lord Wilberforce in Marble Islands v. I Congreso del Partido [1983] ac 244 at 263, cited from Barratt and Michael, “Degrees of Immunity” (n. 112), 18. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 175

4.1.3 Public Good Arguments for Immunity There are also economic arguments for state immunity, and they are twofold. First, inter-state relationships have a public good character. Second, the argument of public purpose, governmental function and authority can be analysed from a public good perspective. Here, the public goods in question are not inter-state public goods but public goods provided by the state for its nationals. Although public good arguments can apply to immunity from jurisdiction (when, in a second step, the purpose of the activity is in question), it is more important for immunity of execution (where the purpose is the most important criterion to decide on immunity). Let turn to the inter-state relationship first. State immunity is not subject to reciprocity in legal doctrine168 and rightly so. Immunity from execution is usually stricter than immunity from jurisdiction since it may impact the state and inter-state affairs more severely, according to the legal doctrine.169 This argument is confirmed by the economic perspective. This concerns especially the question of property used for diplomatic purposes. Legally speaking, there is a consensus that no general rule of international law exists that blanket consent to execution encompasses also the consent to attach such assets which are necessary to continue diplomatic missions of the defendant state. Equally, consent to arbitration is not consent to execution.170 This is a consequence of the highest protection granted to the diplomatic relationship between states. Although explicit consent of the debtor state is one exception to immunity of execution,171 this is interpreted narrowly by national courts.172 Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction therefore does not imply consent to the taking of measures of constraint (article 20 uncsi). Even if a broad consent to measures of constraint has been given by the defendant state, this has not always

168 Stoll, “State Immunity” (n. 33), para. 18. 169 Anne-Catherine Hahn, “Veil Piercing in the Age of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (n. 110), 103. 170 See e.g. German Federal Supreme Court held in Sedelmayer v. Russia, vii zb 08/05 and vii zb 09/05 of 4 October 2005 where it held that the arbitration agreement in the investment protection Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union (13 June 1989) did not constitute a waiver by Russia of its immunity in enforcement proceedings. Similarly, in France, now concerning nml Capital’s efforts to enforce awards made in its favour against Argentina, a cautious judgment from the French Court of Cassation was given, nml Capital Ltd v. Argentina (France (CoC), 28 March 2013). See also Gaillard, “State Entities in International Arbitration” (n. 151), 184 et seq. 171 Art. 23 ecsi (n. 31); 19(a) uncsi (n. 4). 172 See e.g. German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 2 BvM 9/03 of 6 December 2006, para. 23 et seq. 176 van Aaken been accepted by the forum state, especially if diplomatic immunity was in question. The rationale from an economic point of view is that diplomatic relationships have public good characteristics,173 securing friendly international relations by communication and therefore also peace. It is important to note that, if, e.g., an embassy building, or the accounts used for the service of the embassy were attached, this would concern not only the host state but also other states, since state relations are not only bilateral, but network-like.174 Consent to execution of an embassy of the debtor state can therefore be understood as consent to the detriment of third parties as well as a non-contribution to a public good. Thus, execution in any assets held for diplomatic relations should, from an economic perspective, be regarded with caution and only be granted with utmost reluctance since it might not only concern the state in question but create externalities for other states as well. The second question concerns the national public good provision, that is, the non-commercial nature of an activity of the state (for immunity of jurisdiction) or the public purpose of an asset (for immunity of execution). In questions of immunity from execution, courts have taken profit-making as one criterion to judge immunity. Whereas some courts found that profit-making justifies applying the commercial exception, others found, following also the ilc, that profits used for a public purpose immunise the state (or its entities). Thus, it is important what the money is used for, the usage must have a public function. Also, if immunity of jurisdiction is in question, the purpose argument comes to the fore in case the nature of the activity is unclear. Generations of philosophers of state and law have discussed the question what a state or a public function is, as economists have done too. Lawyers tend to refer to the constitution of a state. Economists seek extralegal arguments. Those might be blunt and sometimes do not lead to a satisfying solution but they are a first step. Economists cannot deliver a catalogue of activities which need to be delivered by the state. Rather, there are economic arguments why an activity should be delivered by the state or would not be equally well delivered or not at all by private persons. In those instances, from an economic point of view, immunity is justifiable. But this leads to the rejection of the public purpose

173 Public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Given that some states are almost outside any diplomatic relations (e.g. North Korea), one may argue that these are a club good (non-rivalrous but excludable). 174 Although written for governmental networks, Slaughter’s argument can easily be transferred also for diplomatic relations nowadays, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 177 argument and rather leads to using the criterion of the legal instrument used, that is, the exercise of sovereign authority. If this is not used, no immunity should be given. Does, from the economic point of view, the development argument as elaborated by the ilc counter this argument? What if the purpose is, as e.g. with some swfs, just the return on assets even if later public purpose activities are paid by the return on those assets? That boils down to the question of whether the purpose of generating state income should be shielded by immunity. This seems problematic since the state as a debtor cannot in its totality be shielded from claims without that the above mentioned incentives are set. Thus, from an economic perspective, swfs and soes with the purpose of return on assets for the general account of the state should not be immune—neither in jurisdiction nor the assets from execution. If the purpose is return on assets and if this would be accepted to grant immunity, we would be back with absolute immunity in most cases. Rather, the argument has to be more fine-grained. Economists accept every state function which deals with market imperfections or market failures. There are several ones but the most important for our purposes here is the provision of public goods (including meritorious goods such as education175), otherwise not provided by the market and externalities which cannot be solved by the market.176 Furthermore, they acknowledge the task of redistribution of income, stabilising the economic cycle (that would nevertheless not immunise stabilisation funds since execution into their assets would not endanger that task). The typical text-book public good is national defense,177 thus all military purposes would be accepted. Others are dikes, as some other infrastructure buildings. More difficult are those activities which may also be provided by private persons, e.g. hospitals, schools, energy, water, thus typical activities of soes or even administered organs of the state. What happens to soes which have, by definition, a separate legal personality and are separate from public

175 Richard A. Musgrave, “Merit Goods,” in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn. 2008), online, accessed 06 March 2013 doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1089. 176 Seminal Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 5th edn. 1989) and the earlier works of Richard Musgrave. 177 Nobody in the country can be excluded by military protection and the consumption of the good “security” is non-rivalrous. Nobody would provide dikes since everybody else can free-ride: a market can thus not come into existence. 178 van Aaken administration? Or with property that serves those functions? As stated above, the objectives of an soe can range from return on assets, similar to swfs, industrial/regional policy and/or the supply of public services (often in utilities and infrastructure—such as energy, transport and telecommunications). If they provide public goods, this would be a classical state task.178 Furthermore, if it can be shown that without state activity, those goods would be underprovided or provided only for a small percentage of the population due to higher market prices, the public purpose of the activity can be justified. This applies equally to activities which have been privatised. If there is no public function attached to the activity, they should without doubt be treated as a private enterprise. More difficult are those privatised entities which still perform public functions mandated by the state (in German: Beliehene). Air Traffic Control (atc) is, e.g., partially privatised. Some do not even view it as a public police function but rather as a private service, especially after the eu directives on the Single European Sky allowing and even fostering privatisation and transnational service provision.179 This problem is not only relevant for jurisdictional immunity of privatised atcs operating in a foreign country, it is also relevant to immunity from execution, e.g. when debt owed to Air Traffic Controllers is meant to be attached by a creditor of the state.180 From an economic point of view, immunity from execution should be granted and also immunity from competition

178 Erich Becker, “Wissenschaftliche Erörterung der Staatsaufgaben,” in Gerhard Leibholz et al., eds., Menschenwürde und freiheitliche Rechtsordnung. Festschrift für Willi Geiger zum 65. Geburtstag, (Tübingen: Siebeck Mohr, 1974), 755; Dieter Grimm, ed., Staatsaufgaben (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994); Michael W. Hebeisen, Staatszweck, Staatsziele, Staat saufgaben. Leistungen und Grenzen einer juristischen Behandlung von Leitideen der Staatstätigkeit (Chur, Zürich: Rüegger, 1996); Christof Gramm, Privatisierung und not wendige Staatsaufgaben (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); Alexander Oliver Kees, Privatisierung im Völkerrecht. Zur Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten bei der Privatisierung von Staatsaufgaben (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008). 179 For details, see Anne van Aaken, “Principles and Structures of European Risk Governance” (n. 100). 180 As the German Federal Supreme Court held in Sedelmayer v. Russia (n. 170): Administrative fees charged by Russia to Lufthansa for overflight of its territory and landing rights are not subject to the jurisdiction of German courts and beyond reach for the purpose of German enforcement measures. See also us District Court, eal (Delaware) Corpn Electra Aviation In et al. v. Eurocontrol, Decision of 2 August 1994, (us dc Del. 1994), 107 ilr 318 (330), holding that the imposition of navigation charges for flights through national and international airspace were sovereign activities which were not among the powers exercised by private parties. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 179 disciplines as long as production of this service is outsourced to a private monopoly (as with atc) delegating police powers.

4.2 Guiding Principles for State Immunity Gaillard has cited three principles present in the decision of whether to grant immunity from execution to a state or not: enforcement of the award, state immunity and the respect for legal personality of an entity. Looking at them from an incentive point of view, enforcement of an award can be equated, mutatis mutandis for jurisdictional immunity with jurisdictional immunity for a contract dispute. The respect for the legal personality is also relevant for jurisdictional immunity. As stated above, the principle of state immunity is—from a functional point of view the answer, not a principle in the equa- tion for weighing of whether immunity should be granted or not. Enforcement of an award in execution is, from an incentive point of view necessary unless there are strong countervailing arguments, such as the public good constellations described above either for assets used for diplomatic services (inter- state public good) or for assets necessary to provide a (national) public good. The purpose of filling the general state coffers should not be protected under immunity, thus e.g. aig v. Kazakhstan181 has been wrongly decided from an economic point of view. For regulatory immunity, since it concerns activity of the state, not their assets, there is no reason to give any immunity at all if the activity is exercised in the same manner by privates. Against the economic background of when state entities should be subject to the same competitive disciplines as privates, the legal answer has been expressly written down in article I(3)(c) General Agreement on Tariffs in Services (gats)182—subjecting states to the non- discrimination principles of gats, once state entities enter into the market and therefore in competitive relationships with private players. Courts looked for many criteria, of which an important one was the exercise of governmental functions. Whereas in the United States, this is only a secondary criterion to

181 See n. 15. 182 gats art. i(3): “In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, each Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their observance by regional and local governments and authorities and non-governmental bodies within its territory; (b) ‘services’ includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority; (c) ‘a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.” 180 van Aaken immunise state entities from competition disciplines, it is the dominant one in the eu. Correctly, courts have also asked whether the activity is an industrial, commercial or financial activity which is exercised “in the same manner by private persons.” gats defines “a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority as any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers”. Those criteria have to be fulfilled cumulatively in order for the service to be exempt from the gats disciplines.183 In short: only if a state acts without profit intentions and as a monopolist, would it be shielded from non-discrimination disciplines. But this is usually not the case with business activities of states: they are acting on the market in competition and they are usually for profit. Thus, the only reason shielding them could be found in the sovereign authority they use. In comparison with the very different notions used in the moment in order to understand immunity, this criterion is comparatively clear. It can be understood to mean the legal instruments used by the state. If it uses public law instruments, it uses its sovereign authority. This is clearer than public or sovereign purposes. It is also correct from an economic point of view and it also disregards the immunity-seeking restructuring of activities with the accompanying moral hazard problems.

5 Conclusion

Although state immunity is a field of international law which has been codified, the last ten years after uncsi have not brought the hoped for harmonisation and legal security.184 The legal situation is in flux and heavily influenced by national courts. Although this kind of legal flexibility and adaptability has

183 For details of the discussion on how to interpret this article, see Rudolf Adlung, “Public Services and the gats,” Journal of International Economic Law 9 (2006): 455–485 (462); Markus Krajewski, “Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Framework,” Journal of International Economic Law 6 (2003): 341, 367, 351. 184 The uncsi (n. 4) itself states in it preamble that: it should “enhance the rule of law and legal certainty, particularly in dealings between states and natural and juridical persons, and would contribute to the codification and development of international law and the harmonisation of practice in this area.” See for a discussion on how uncsi influenced national and international courts, Joanne Foakes, “State Immunity: Recent Developments and Prospects,” (Chatham House Briefing Paper ilbp 2013/02, December 2013), accessed 6 August 2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/home/chatham/public_ html/sites/default/files/bpStateImmunity1213.pdf. Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts 181 some advantages, it also has several disadvantages, the important one being the legal insecurity created for states and their contracting partners alike in times of growing global investment flows and contracting by states and their entities. Different jurisdictions use different criteria to judge whether a state or its entities are immune concerning their activities or their assets. This problem becomes more pressing since business activities of states are growing in developed as well as developing countries. Since there is no consensus on how to apply in detail immunity of jurisdiction or immunity from execution, it makes sense to draw on a functional approach looking at extra-legal principles in order to bring some order into the legal jungle. In the case of this article, economic theory is used. This is certainly not exhaustive and open to debate but it might also help to clarify the rationales of some arguments in the legal discourse. Certainly, it informs on the gravity of different principles used in the balancing act of whether to grant immunity or not. Thus, when taking into account the economic incentives of the actors, enforcement of judgments should get more important whereas the legal structure of the business entity loses importance since it may be subject to moral hazard behavior on the part of states. On other issues, economic theory can also inform when there should be immunity granted and confirm the legal reading, as in immunity of execution in state assets which are held for the provision of public goods. CHAPTER 11 State Immunity and Sovereign Bonds

Jürgen Bröhmer

1 Introduction

The title of this chapter, State Immunity and Sovereign Bonds, requires some clarification. When speaking of “sovereign” bonds, the attribute does not suggest that the bonds in question are privileged in any way as sovereign. In fact, the opposite is true as such bonds, more precisely the placing of such bonds on the capital markets, from the perspective of international immunity law, are regarded as private or commercial acts, i.e. as acta iure gestionis for which the state does not enjoy immunity. The attribute sovereign refers to the state as one of the parties in the commercial transactions that underlie the issuance of bonds. Secondly, the chapter cannot just concern itself with state immunity. As will be shown below this question is well settled. When states issue bonds to finance their debt, they act commercially because it is the nature of the act rather than its purpose which determines whether states are protected from legal action in foreign fora. Whereas the purpose of such transactions will usually be a public one because the states are trying to obtain funds to exercise their public functions, the transactions to obtain these funds are no different from those engaged in by a commercial enterprise seeking to raise finance. In other words states are only engaging in a type of transaction in which any individual could also engage in. It is therefore necessary to assume a broader perspective and ask how the international community deals with disputes that arise from states engaging in commercial transactions to secure financing. The issues of interest here are not the technical details of the financial instruments and any disputes arising, for example, from conflicting interpretations of contractual terms in the narrow sense. The issue here is that states sometimes default on their debt thus leaving those investors that have given them money in the lurch. There are several possibilities of addressing this problem legally. Protecting states from law suits in foreign fora brought by creditors is only one such potential option. This option comes in two guises. The first one is the question of whether states enjoy immunity from adjudication, which, as already indicated, has to

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_012 State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 183 be answered in the negative. The second one is whether states enjoy immunity from execution, i.e. whether states can protect all or at least some of their assets from the grasp of creditors who were successful with their law suits. Other ways to address these issues could be through classical international law pathways such as diplomatic protection, where a state takes up concerns of its citizen creditors, or international negotiations through international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (imf) to alleviate the situation. The imf, the European Central Bank and the European Commission, with indirect involvement of states (not only member states of the European Union) are currently engaged in this type of negotiation in an attempt to control the sovereign debt crises that has engulfed a number of member states of the European Union. The result of these negotiations can be informal, ad hoc and tailored debt restructuring, for example by prescribing what has become known as “haircuts”. All of this must be seen against the background of a lack of rules governing sovereign bankruptcy. Bankruptcy norms are the ultimate resort for addressing financial problems of private legal entities, but all efforts for the creation of a general and formal sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (sdrm) for states have so far been unsuccessful.1 Finally there are recent attempts to invoke investment arbitration as a means for creditors to retrieve outstanding monies.

1.1 Historical Excursion Sovereign debt is nothing new as was shown impressively by Reinhart and Rogoff in 2009.2 Two events are particularly interesting because they reflect fundamental change in international law and show that it is not always such countries as Greece, Portugal or South American countries that have difficulties with their debt.3

1 See Anne O. Krueger, Struggling with Success: Challenges Facing the International Economy (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), 165 et seq. 2 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: cup, 2011), 123–24. 3 See ibid., 99–100 for a table listing the cumulative tally of default and rescheduling around the world between the year of independence (where applicable) or the year 1800 and 2008. Spain (13), Germany (8) and Austria (7) are among the countries with most defaults. A number of South American countries look back at 8–10 defaults. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the uk, Canada, usa, Australia, and New Zealand are the countries without defaults in that list. 184 Bröhmer

1.1.1 The Venezuela Crises of 1902/1903 This crisis evolved out of Venezuela’s unwillingness or inability to pay back about 62 million Bolivars to a consortium headed by Great Britain and Germany.4 A military blockade and bombardment of ports was imposed by British, German and Italian naval forces to impress on Venezuelan President, General Cipriano Castro the need to repay the money, after having convinced the usa under President Theodore Roosevelt that the military action would not violate the Monroe Doctrine5 and not serve to gain a foothold on the American continent.6 The blockade ended when diplomatic efforts led to Germany submitting its claims to arbitration in The Hague. The incident led to the so-called Drago-Doctrine which argues the illegality of the use of force for the collection of public debts. In 1907, this doctrine was developed into the Drago-Porter Convention which limits the use of force in such instances to situations where the debtor state refuses to engage in arbitration or submit to arbitration awards.7 Today it is—thankfully—very difficult to even believe that states would think to resort to the use of force to enforce debts owed to their citizens, or to themselves for that matter. It should be noted that there is a human rights

4 Edmund Morris, “ ‘A Matter of Extreme Urgency’: Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm ii and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902,” Naval War College Review 55 (2002): 73–85, 74–75. 5 The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe’s seventh annual message to Congress on 2 December 1823, accessed 10 December 2013, http://avalon.law.yale .edu/19th_century/monroe.asp and declared that the usa would “consider any attempt on their [European powers’] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” and “as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”. 6 President Roosevelt has been cited as advising a German diplomat that “if any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it” but that “the punishment should not take the form of acquisition of territory by any non-American power”. Cited after Morris, “A Matter of Extreme Urgency” (n. 4), 75. 7 The formal name of the Convention is: Hague Convention ii Respecting the Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts, 18 October 1907, 205 cts 250. Art. 1 of the Convention provides: “The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another country as being due to its nationals. This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award”. Text of the Convention is available at http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/hague072.asp (accessed 10 December 2013). See also Wolfgang Benedek, “Drago-Porter Convention (1907),” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 10 December 2013. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 185 equivalent to what broadly amounts to an obvious iteration of the principle of proportionality and that is the prohibition to deprive an individual “of his liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation”.8 Military and non-military intervention for debt-enforcement purposes was not an isolated measure in the first three decades of the twentieth century. us interventions in several countries reached from assuming customs collec- tions in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Nicaragua and Haiti between 1905 and 1915, to exclusively selling stamps through a New York bank as payment for a dedicated three percent export tax to secure Honduran debt. Military interventions were undertaken more generally to avoid unstable conditions leading to a default and led to more or less complete takeovers of various countries for periods of time, such as Cuba, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic.9

1.1.2 German Pre-World War ii Bond Cases Recently there have been—unsuccessful—attempts to enforce bonds issued by German provincial banks or by Germany (the German Reich) itself around 1930. In the Mortimer case10 the plaintiff owned and sought payment on 351 bearer bonds entitled “German Provincial & Communal Bank Consolidated Agricultural Loan Secured Sinking Fund Gold Bonds Series A” (“Agricultural Bonds”) with a face amount of usd 25 million and an alleged value of usd 400 million that had been issued in 1928 with a due date of 1958 by a consortium of fourteen provincial banks within the state of Prussia for the purpose of improving agricultural conditions there. West Germany had assumed liability for these and other bonds and other liabilities of the German Reich. However, many of these bonds had been returned to Germany before the end of World War ii and had subsequently been looted by Russian forces and rein- troduced into circulation again. Any payment on these bonds was therefore conditional on a validation procedure prescribed in the Securities Validation Act11 which plaintiffs had not engaged with. The case also involved complex

8 As stipulated in art. 1 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than those already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto as Amended by Protocol No. 11, 16 September 1963, ets No. 046. 9 Faisal Z. Ahmed, Laura Alfaro and Noel Maurer, “Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America,” Law and Contemporary Problems 73 (2010): 39–46, 40–42 with further references. 10 us Court of Appeals, Mortimer Off Shore Services, Ltd v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 26 July 2010, 615 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 2010). 11 Germany, Gesetz zur Bereinigung von deutschen Schuldverschreibungen, die auf aus- ländische Währung lauten (Bereinigungsgesetz für deutsche Auslandsbonds–AuslWBG) 186 Bröhmer questions around the London Debt Agreement12 which were relevant because the Agreement treats West German debt differently from East German debt.13 State immunity, specifically the commercial activity exception to state immunity of section 1605(a)(2) fsia, provided only the framework in the context of which the issues mentioned above and other questions were inciden- tally analysed. Under that clause immunity will not be granted, inter alia, if the action is based upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and when that act causes a direct effect in the United States. The us Court of Appeals14 identified as the relevant “act” the assumption of liability by Germany. However, it found that the assumption of liability was restricted to those bonds that had been issued in West Germany and not to those issued in what was East Germany. Relying on the Weltover decision by the us Supreme Court,15 the Court had no difficulty qualifying the assumption of liability as a commercial act that had an effect within the usa. However, as the requirements of the Securities Validation Act had not been fulfilled by the plaintiff (Mortimer) the Court dismissed Mortimer’s claims on the merits.16

[Validation Law for German Foreign Currency Bonds], 25 August 1952, BGBl. i 553, translated in BGBl. ii 305 (1953). The statute applies to all bonds listed in annex 1. 12 Agreement on German External Debts, 27 February 1953, Australian Treaty Series No. 17. 13 See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (“bghz”) 164, 361 mn 41. 14 See (n. 10) The us Court of Appeals, Second Circuit in New York. New York City as one of the major financial centres is also a centre for legal disputes concerning financial instruments. 15 us Supreme Court, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., et al., Decision of 12 June 1992, 504 us 607 (1992). 16 See also the decision by the us Court of Appeals, World Holdings llv v. The Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 9 August 2010, No. 09-14359 dc Docket No. 08-20198-cv-cma (11th Cir. 2010) (with jurisdiction over federal cases originating in the states of Alabama, Florida and Georgia). This case was about so-called “Dawes Bonds” and “Young Bonds” issued by Germany in 1924 and 1930 for usd 110 and 98.25 million respectively. The Court also applied the commercial activity exception to immunity and specifically dismissed Germany’s argument that immunity flows from the application of the treaty exception of 28 usc § 1604 which stipulates that any prior treaty obligation of the us which affords the foreign state immunity prevails over the application of the fsia. Germany had argued that the London Debt Agreement is such a treaty which in its art. ii limits the “enforceability” of certain financial instruments, see (n. 12). The Court did not interpret the term “enforceability” as referring to the ability to bring legal action in a us court, but made it equally clear that this decision is strictly limited to the jurisdictional immunity question and, referring to the Mortimer decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, expressly State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 187

1.2 The State of International Immunity Law with Regard to the Financing of Sovereign Debt The international—and largely customary—law of state immunity has developed considerably in the past decades. In a broader context, this development is an impressive illustration of how customary law can evolve over decades as the underlying state practice and opinio iuris change. Absolute immunity, i.e. the general prohibition of the exercise of adjudicatory territorial jurisdiction of the forum state over a foreign state absent a waiver of immunity by the foreign state, has given way to a restrictive, relative understanding of immunity, which asks whether the state is acting in its sovereign capacity (de iure imperii) or whether a state acts just like any other private individual (de iure gestionis). International immunity law requires that the immunity privilege is to be afforded only to the former, but need not be granted when a state acts commercially.17 With regard to sovereign bonds, the main question is whether the commercial quality of the act is to be determined by the nature of the act or whether the purpose of the act is to be considered as well. The purpose of issuing bonds is to collect money on the capital markets to fill financing needs. If a state engages in such transactions, the purpose will be sovereign—the state needs money to fulfil policy goals the government of the day has set. A purposive approach might therefore lead to the characterisation of an otherwise commercial activity as a sovereign and there immunity protected activity because of the public purpose of the transaction. If, however, the nature of the act is the decisive criterion then the purpose of the activity is irrelevant and the only question is whether a private individual could have engaged in the same type of activity. Obviously private individuals, usually as corporations, are able to and actually are engaged on the capital markets issuing bonds to finance their activities. Other examples are purchasing contracts entered into by states. There is no reason to afford states the immunity privilege if they buy or sell computer equipment or office furniture. When they buy or sell fighter planes or tanks one might be inclined to think differently because private individuals can and do buy and sell computers or furniture, but not fighter planes and battle tanks. However, the underlying transaction is a purchasing contract and the fact that

left it to the lower District Court to speak to the enforceability of the bonds in light of the validation problem. 17 For more details on that development see Hazel Fox and Philippe Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: oup, 3rd edn 2013), 131 et seq.; see also Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), 14 et seq. 188 Bröhmer a certain product might not be a tradable commodity for private individuals does not affect the private nature of the underlying generic purchasing contract.18 The principal immunity exception applying to commercial activities and transactions has been broadly recognised by state practice and in various instruments dealing with state immunity.19

1.2.1 The Leading Case: Argentina v. Weltover The us Supreme Court’s decision in Weltover20 is the leading decision21 concerning the immunity of states in the courts of another country in the context of the issuance of bonds. The decision was rendered in application of the us Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (fsia).22 A number of common law jurisdictions, among them the United Kingdom,23 Australia,24 and the usa, have adopted statutes dealing with immunity, mainly because of their more pro- nounced dualistic structure which makes it more difficult for courts to apply international law requirements in domestic law without any prior incorporation by statute. State immunity is obviously a matter of international law and can therefore be influenced by national legislation only insofar as this national legislation is part of state practice which is a constituent part of customary international law. Domestic statutes therefore do not constitute an alternative source for immunity law but illuminate the respective state’s understanding of

18 For more detail see Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity (n. 17), 395 et seq. 19 See, for example, the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38, annex, which deals with “commercial transactions” in art. 10. Comprehensive overview of the sources and the various projects for codification Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity (n. 17), 99 et seq. 20 us Supreme Court, Argentina v. Weltover (n. 15). 21 As of 13 August 2013, the case was cited 2471 times in other court decisions in the Westlaw database. From the literature see, for example, Joseph F. Morrissey, “Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: If a Sovereign Acts like a Private Party, Treat It like One,” Chicago Journal of International Law 5 (2005): 675–704; Georges R. Delaume, “The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later,” American Journal of International Law 88 (1994): 257–79; Mark B. Baker, “Whither Weltover: Has the us Supreme Court Clarified or Confused the Exceptions Enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?,” Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 9 (1995): 1–26; Avi Lew, “Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s Commercial Activity Exception to Jurisdictional Immunity,” Fordham International Law Journal 17 (1993): 725–75. 22 us, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (fsia), 21 October 1976, Public Law 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891; 28 usc § 1330, § 1391(f), § 1441(d), § 1602–11. 23 uk, State Immunity Act 1978, 20 July 1978, 1978 c. 33. 24 Australia, Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, Act No. 196 of 1985. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 189 the amount of protection foreign states must be afforded with regard to exercising adjudicatory and enforcement jurisdiction vis-à-vis foreign states. Section 1603(d) fsia defines the term “commercial activity” as commercial conduct, transactions, or activities and stipulates that the “commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose”. This definition became relevant in the Weltover case which dealt with government bonds issued by Argentina and not honoured upon maturity. The weakness of the Argentinean currency, the fact that it was not con- vertible and subject to devaluation made it difficult for business to obtain us dollars to participate in international transactions. In 1981, Argentina reacted by instituting a foreign exchange insurance contract program (feic), under which Argentina effectively agreed to sell to domestic borrowers, in exchange for a contractually predetermined amount of local currency, the us dollars to repay their foreign debts. This arrangement, which was to apply irrespective of intervening devaluations, in effect shifted the devaluation risk from the business to the government. However, Argentina subsequently was unable to cover the feic contracts when they became due in 1982. The Argentine government subsequently refinanced the feic-backed debts by issuing to the creditors government bonds. These “Bonds”, provided for payment of interest and principal in us dollars through transfer on the London, Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York markets beginning in 1986. Argentina could not honour these bonds either, unilaterally rescheduled payments and offered replacement bonds. Two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank did not want to accept that and sued in New York.25 The Supreme Court examined the extent of the commercial activity exception and reiterated that the purpose or motive of the activity is irrelevant. It is not whether the government acts to make a profit or whether it acts to fulfil some sovereign purpose. Rather the test is whether the activity undertaken is one in which private individuals can also engage. The Court noted in this regard that the Bonds were “in almost all respects garden-variety debt instruments: because they could be held by private parties; were negotiable, they were traded on the international market (except in Argentina) and they promised a future stream of cash income”.26 The qualification of state activities on the capital markets as acta iure gestionis was confirmed impressively by the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in 2011. Those proceedings were actually about the recognition of a foreign

25 us Supreme Court, Argentina v. Weltover (n. 15). 26 Ibid., 615. 190 Bröhmer judgment27 for enforcement of that judgment in the United Kingdom (uk). Such enforcement in the uk was contingent on the state not having been entitled to state immunity in the proceedings which led to the decision to be recognised for enforcement. The Supreme Court unanimously held that Argentina had not been entitled to immunity in the underlying us case and that therefore recognition of that judgment in the uk was not barred.28

1.2.2 Setting a Different Tone: Borri v. Argentina The Italian Court of Cassation in its 2005 decision29 on similar facts concerning Argentinean debt came to a different result by distinguishing the issuance of bonds from subsequent default decisions. Luca Borri, an Italian citizen, had purchased eur 183 000 worth of “global bonds” issued by Argentina in New York in 1998. Argentina unilaterally decided through national legislation to extend the term of interest payment as a result of major economic crisis. Mr Borri objected and requested and obtained injunctions requiring Argentina to pay a part of the total amount due pursuant article 1186 of the Italian Civil Code which is applicable to insolvency of debtors. The Court of Cassation did not take issue with the qualification of the issuance of bonds as a commercial act. The Court, however, added a separate layer by qualifying Argentina’s unilateral decision by way of legislation not to honour these commitments as a distinguishable and sovereign act. The Court held that “4.2. These laws are clear manifestations of the sovereign power of the State— it would be absurd to hold that the provisions affecting the functional timing of the binding relationship between the parties are limited only to interest (as stated by the applicant) they must instead be considered as extending also to the destiny of the capital, in relation to the purposes pursued. This is both because they are budgetary laws [to which under our Constitution an abroga- tive referendum cannot apply] and, above all, because of their purposes which have already been highlighted and which are manifestly public and pursued

27 us, Southern District of New York District Court, nml Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 10 May 2006, No. 05 Civ. 2434, 2006 wl 1294853. 28 uk Supreme Court, nml Capital Limited v. Republic of Argentina, Judgment of 6 July 2011, [2011] uksc 31. 29 Italian Court of Cassation, Borri v. Argentina, Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction of 27 May 2005, Case No. 11225, ildc 296 (it 2005), Rivista di diritto internazionale 88 (2005): 856 et seq. (in Italian); English summary and analyses by Carlo Focarelli and Italian full text available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/rulac/pdf_state/Borri-v-Argentina.pdf (accessed 16 December 2013). The document is also available, with partial English translation, under oup reference ildc 296 (it 2005) from the Oxford Reports of International Law. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 191 to regulate finances for the protection of the primary needs of the economic survival of the population in the context of a serious national emergency.”30 This approach is not very convincing. It makes no sense to treat the issuance of bonds as a commercial act only to turn around and qualify the decision not to honour these bonds as a sovereign act. The separate act of making a decision in the context of an underlying commercial transaction could be applied to any commercial act. For example, the conclusion of a purchasing contract would equally have to be qualified as a commercial act and the subsequent decision by the state not to pay the supplier could also be separated and distinguished from the underlying transaction and qualified as a sovereign activity. The decision not to honour a contractual obligation, to pay the purchasing price for purchased products or interest due on financial instruments, are both private or commercial in nature because private individuals can both engage in this type of decision. The only element that distinguishes these two decisions is the potential public purpose of the state’s decision not to pay. The Italian court’s decision is therefore just a poorly disguised attempt to revive the purpose test.31 It should also be noted that the sovereign interests of the foreign state are not completely unprotected by asserting adjudicatory jurisdiction because the enforcement of any such claim is subject to the more narrow rules of enforcement immunity. That said, it must be kept in mind that the international rules of state immunity define a minimum standard of protection from the exercise of domestic jurisdiction to be awarded to a foreign state. International immunity law does not preclude a state from going beyond that minimum standard, for example by allowing the purpose of the act as one important criterion for the qualification of an act sovereign or commercial,32 and thereby restricting the exercise of territorial jurisdiction even more than prescribed by customary international law. Limitations of the forum state’s scope to provide additional immunity

30 Translation from oup, ildc 296 (itc 2005), see (n. 29). 31 See also Beatrice I. Bonafè, “State Immunity and the Protection of Private Investors: The Argentine Bonds Case Before Italian Courts,” Italian Yearbook of International Law 16 (2006): 165–85, 169 et seq. with a detailed analysis of the mixed activity issue, i.e. which acts in a series of acts determines the commercial or sovereign nature of the act. 32 The Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, 2004 (n. 19), art. 2(2) does not totally disregard the purpose of the act either: “In determining whether a contract or transaction is a ‘commercial transaction’ under paragraph 1(c), reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction”. 192 Bröhmer protection could, however, flow from other international and/or domestic legal obligations. Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, for example, gives individuals a right of access to courts to settle their civil rights and obligations. Failure to grant this access by resorting to immunity and therefore denying a merit review of the commercial claim brought by a plaintiff could constitute a violation of that treaty obligation, especially if the granting of immunity is not warranted by general public international law.33

2 Sovereign Debt Litigation—A Brief Overview

2.1 The Business Case of the Notorious Vulture Funds So-called vulture funds, vulture creditors, or distressed debt creditors invest in distressed debt instruments issued and defaulted on by states by purchasing such papers in secondary markets for steep discounts in comparison to their nominal value in the hope to collect a profit margin from the creditors either through litigation or by way of out of court settlement.34 The context of such activity is provided by states defaulting on their debt. In such situations creditors have limited options. They can participate in debt restructuring negotiations and accept the outcome.35 Or, absent mandatory restructuring regimes for sovereign debt comparable to insolvency or bankruptcy procedures available for corporations or even individuals in domestic fora, they can attempt to pursue their claims individually. There are several conceivable reasons for a creditor to pursue this avenue. The purpose could be to leverage pressure in the context of ongoing debt restructuring negotiations. Another reason could be disagreement of individual creditors with the outcome of such negotiations combined with an expectation to be able to secure better outcomes either by way of individual pursuit of claims or by selling the debt instrument on the secondary market (“hold-out” creditors). It is also possible that a creditor is either financially exposed in such a way that

33 See, for example, ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application no. 35763/97, paras. 48 and 54 et seq. 34 imf, “A Survey of Experiences with Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Restructurings, Prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets Department,” accessed 16 December 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/060512.pdf. 35 A detailed analysis of the various interests and difficulties of such restructuring efforts and the close relationship between the debtor state, private creditors and regulators and other officials of the state of the creditors is provided by Jill E. Fisch and Caroline M. Gentile, “Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” Emory Law Journal 53 (2004): 1043–113, 1054 et seq. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 193 participation in restructuring is not a viable alternative. If the creditor is a bank, that can also be a consequence of domestic regulatory regimes which might force a creditor to hold out. Finally there could also just be a profit expectation based on the low cost for respective debt instruments on the secondary market in relation to the potentially high yield if a case can be settled—the “nuisance value” of such law suits and the resulting incentive for debtor states to settle quietly out of court is an important incentive for distressed debt litiga- tion36—or otherwise brought to successful conclusion.37 This last alternative, actions brought by buyers—as opposed to original creditors—of distressed debt instruments with a mere debt collection interest has given rise to the use of the pejorative attribute “vulture”, and because the entities engaging in such debt-collection are usually funds, the term “vulture fund” has been created. These funds have gained a degree of notoriety in recent years and have drawn substantial criticism. Already back in May 2002, the then uk Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown spoke before the un General Assembly’s Special Session on Children and stated: “Finally, we must do more to support hipc [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries] and other low-income countries who face legal challenges from creditors—both commercial and official—who are unwilling to give debt relief. We particularly condemn the perversity where Vulture Funds purchase debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount owed—a morally outrageous

36 Jonathan I. Blackman and Rahul Mukhi, “The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna,” Law and Contemporary Problems 73 (2010): 47–61, 50. 37 Jonathan C. Lippert, “Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,” New York International Law Review 21 (2008): 1–38 reports on a more indirect strategy whereby vulture funds use distressed debt instruments of resource rich countries acquired on the secondary markets by suing foreign corporations involved in exploiting those resources for attachment of the royalties owed by these corporations to the indebted state. There have also been attempts in using distressed debt instruments for debt-to-equity conversion schemes whereby the debt would be swapped for ownership interests in state enterprises to be privatised, Jonathan Goren, “State-To-State Debts: Sovereign Immunity and the ‘Vulture’ Hunt,” George Washington International Law Review 41 (2010): 681–708, 695–96 referring to the Donegal/ Zambia matter. The investment fund Donegal International had acquired distressed debt of Zambia from Romania and over years through negotiation, and legal action finally secured a settlement payment of usd 15 million on a nominal debt of usd 55 million for which Donegal had paid usd 3.28 million. See Thomas Laryea, “Donegal v. Zambia and the Persistent Debt Problems of Low-Income Countries,” Law and Contemporary Problems 73 (2010): 193–200, 194–95. See also Goren, “State-To-State Debts” (n. 37), 694 et seq. 194 Bröhmer outcome. The international community should consider giving technical assistance to any hipc country being sued by a Vulture Fund and provide them with expert financial advice on debt restructuring to prevent future legal claims. Whenever a country has to defend a legal case it has to divert considerable time, attention and resources away from focusing on poverty reduction, health and education and we must do everything we can to stop this shameful practice.”38 In the United Kingdom, this criticism eventually led to the Debt Relief Act39 which, according to the explanatory memorandum,40 aims to prevent creditors of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (hipcs) from recovering an amount of debt in excess of that consistent with the enhanced hipc Initiative because full repayment of these creditors would divert the resources provided through debt relief, resources which are intended to support development and poverty reduction. In a recent development, the Cayman Island based investment firm (“vulture fund”) nml Capital Limited, a subsidiary of Elliot Management Corporation with a history in the distressed sovereign debt business, had suc- cessfully impounded the Argentinean war vessel ara Libertad in the Ghanaian port Tema and requested payment of usd 20 million for the release of the ship in the context of claims that Argentina owed usd 370 million to the fund from its 2001 default. Argentina took the case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas (itlos) and secured the unconditional release of the vessel on grounds of the immunity of warships in 2012.41

2.2 Act-of-State Doctrine The pursuit of distressed debt against states in various national forums began with the first Latin American debt crises in the early 1980s. Originally involved were mostly creditors who did not want to accept the results of negotiated

38 Government News, “Gordon Brown Speech at the un General Assembly Session,” accessed 16 December 2013, http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/gordon_brown_speech_at_ the_un_general_assembly/90676.html. 39 uk, Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, 8 April 2010, 2010 c. 22. See also the uk, Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 (Permanent Effect) Order 2011, accessed 16 December 2013, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1336/contents/made. 40 uk, Explanatory Memorandum to the Debt Relief Developing Countries Act 2010 Permanent Effect Order 2011, accessed 16 December 2013, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukdsi/2011/9780111509838/pdfs/ukdsiem_9780111509838_en.pdf. 41 itlos, The “ara Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Order of 15 December 2012, Case No. 20. See also the case-note by James Kraska, “The ‘ara Libertad’ (Argentina v. Ghana),” American Journal of International Law 107 (2013): 404–10. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 195 restructuring for any of the reasons indicated above. It follows that not only vulture funds engaged in such litigation. One leading case in that “first round” of litigation was Allied Bank International,42 which concerned Costa Rica’s default and the resulting interference with the repayment of debt by state owned banks to a number of creditors on behalf of which Allied Bank brought the suit.43 As a consequence of the—as defined by the fsia—commercial nature of the activities in question the main issue of these decisions was not state immunity but the act of state doctrine. This doctrine, which exists quite prominently in the Anglo- Saxon legal sphere but is as such unknown in the legal orders of continental Europe44 purports that “[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”45 The act of state doctrine is in essence based on similar considerations of sovereign equality that permeate the state immunity doctrine, however, in a different case constellation where the act of state is not relevant in a case brought against a foreign state but where the validity of an act of that foreign state constitutes an incidental question in a law suit between a plaintiff and a non-state defendant. The act of state doctrine is therefore not a jurisdictional doctrine but one that is relevant in the merits stage of a case. The doctrine is also based on the thought that the judiciary should not interfere in the foreign relations and foreign policy of the state, which fall within the purview of the

42 us Court of Appeals, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Decision of 18 March 1985, 757 F.2d 516 (2nd Cir. 1985). 43 For more detail see Monroe Leigh, “Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.Supp. 1440,” American Journal of International Law 78 (1984): 441–43. 44 Where these issues are often treated as mere conflict of law issues with the ordre public as a fall-back safety if the application of foreign law to an issue, for example in the determination of ownership, leads to unacceptable results. See BVerfG, Decision of 10 June 1997, BvR 1516/96 (= BVerfGE 96, 68), para. 67; see also the comprehensive study of Maria Berentelg, Die Act of State-Doktrin als Zukunftsmodell für Deutschland?: Zur Nachprüfung fremder Hoheitsakte durch staatliche Gerichte (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 135 et seq. 45 us Supreme Court, Underhill v. Hernandez, Decision of 29 November 1897, 168 us 250 (1897). See also us Supreme Court, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Decision of 23 March 1964, 376 us 398 (1964). 196 Bröhmer executive branch.46 Referring to that purpose, the court in Allied Bank looked at the nexus and impact the underlying financial activities had on and with the state of Costa Rica and stated that “[t]he Costa Rican banks conceded jurisdiction in New York and they agreed to pay the debt in New York City in United States dollars. Allied, the designated syndicate agent, is located in the United States, specifically in New York; some of the negotiations between the parties took place in the United States. The United States has an interest in maintaining New York’s status as one of the foremost commercial centers in the world. Further, New York is the international clearing center for United States dollars. In addition to other international activities, United States banks lend billions of dollars to foreign debtors each year. The United States has an interest in ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts may assume that, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined in accordance with recognized principles of contract law.” Because of these strong ties to the us, the court concluded that Costa Rica only had limited control over the debt which the court therefore located in the us and hence held the act of state doctrine to be inapplicable,47 and Allied Bank prevailed.48

2.3 Champerty and Maintenance The doctrines of champerty and maintenance go back many centuries in common law49 where they developed to fend off what was regarded as an abuse of the judicial process. The abuse was seen in third parties with no prior interest in a dispute entering the stage and negotiating with the one of the parties involved to help or even carry on the lawsuit for a share of the outcome of the lawsuit.50 This abuse of process has found its way into section 489 of the New York Judiciary Act which makes unlawful the purchase of debt “with the intent

46 Fausto de Quadros and John H.D. Stone, “Act of State Doctrine,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 16 December 2013. 47 us Court of Appeals, Allied Bank International (n. 42), paras. 22–24. 48 See also Waibel, Sovereign Defaults (n. 2). 49 George R. Barker, “Third-Party Litigation Funding in Australia and Europe,” Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 8 (2012): 451–524, 458 et seq. 50 See, for example Brown v. Bigne, 21 Or. 260, 28 P. 11, 12 (1891) “So great was the evil of rich and powerful barons buying up claims, and, by means of their exalted and influential positions, overawing the courts, and thus securing unjust and unmerited judgments, and oppressing those against whom their anger was directed, that it became necessary, in an early day in England, to enact statutes to prevent such practices.” Cited from us, Southern State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 197 and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon”.51 That provision was used as a defence by the defendant in distressed debt litigation involving Peru.52 It is evident that the broad application of the champerty idea could have seriously hampered any attempts to profit from distressed sovereign debt instruments by threatening court action to get a judgment or to either force settlement. However, the District Court did not adopt a broad interpretation of what constitutes a champertous act. Instead the Court found that intent to sue is as such not sufficient to assert the champerty defence. Over and above the intent to sue, the purchase of debt must have been made “for the very purpose of bringing such suit, and this implies an exclusion of any other purpose”.53 In other words, the likeliness or even high probability of taking the claims to court is not sufficient. Going to court must be the driving purpose, and that is arguably not the case because the distressed debt creditor would, of course, accept payment if offered and even settlement if the terms were sufficiently favourable. Thus the champerty defence cannot protect a sovereign creditor against litigation and consequently the champerty defence cannot effectively stop speculation in distressed debt.54

2.4 Pari-Passu Clauses So-called pari-passu clauses in debt instruments seek to obligate the debtor not to incur obligations to other creditors that could take precedence on the debt instrument safeguarded by a pari-passu clause.55 The alleged and

District of New York District Court, Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 6 August 1998, 12 F.Supp 2d 328. 51 us, New York Code, Judiciary, art. 15 section 489, available at http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/ nycode/jud/15/489 (accessed 16 February 2014). 52 Champerty and maintenance are interesting concepts the development of which reflects the changing perception of access to justice in general and litigation in particular. Originally it was regarded as necessary to keep influential interests out of judicial disputes that had nothing to do with them. Today, it is regarded as more of a problem to enable access to an expensive justice system and arrangements that help in achieving this goal, from contingency fees to third party financing of litigation as a for-profit business venture. See Jason Lyon, “Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation,” ucla Law Review 58 (2010): 571–609; see also “Barratry, Maintenance and Champerty,” New South Wales Law Reform Commission—Discussion Paper 36 (1994). 53 us, Southern District of New York District Court, Elliott Associates v. Peru (n. 50), 345. 54 Jonathan I. Blackman and Rahul Mukhi, “The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna,” Law and Contemporary Problems 73 (2010): 47–61, 54. 55 Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, “The Pari-Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,” Emory Law Journal 53 (2004): 869–922, 872. 198 Bröhmer practical consequence of such clauses could be that a debtor can make no payment to a creditor without making equal, pro-rata payment to all creditors.56 Such clauses could therefore work in favour of debt speculation as they would reduce the risk of hold-out creditors, i.e. creditors unwilling to join in a contractual debt restructure, to become left-out creditors altogether. Conversely, there is a concern that the upholding of such pari-passu clauses would make it more difficult to come to a restructuring agreement because of a lack of incentive to come to an agreement. The Elliot–Peru constellation which had led to the chamberty decision reported above57 continued to develop into a test of the pari-passu clause when Elliot took this view of the clause to the Brussels Court of Appeals and was successful in blocking a payment which was to be made to creditors who had taken part in a restructuring agreement. The pressures resulting from this led Peru to settle with the “vulture fund”. This led to further attempts involving Nicaragua. Again payment on certain bonds to be made by Euroclear were initially stopped by a Brussels court. However, after intervention by the Belgian legislator, the Belgian courts began to change their position.58 Euroclear, a service corporation providing all kinds of “post-trade services”,59 against whom a payment stop was sought, was neither regarded to be bound by pari-passu arrangements that might have been part of the debt instrument nor to have a duty to check the contractual arrangements between the parties of a contract in the context of which Euroclear would then render services.60 It then became quiet around the pari-passu argument,61 until the us Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in New York rendered two decisions in 2012 and 2013 in the same matter between the Vulture fund nml Capital and Argentina, largely upholding the lower court’s decision that Argentina must obey the pari-passu clauses in the debt instruments at issue and treat all creditors equally.62

56 Ibid., 878 points to an affidavit provided by Andreas Lowenfeld pointing to this effect. 57 See (n. 50). 58 For these early developments see Buchheit, Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation, (n. 54), paras. 55–57. 59 See https://www.euroclear.com/en/about.html (accessed 6 January 2014). 60 Philip R. Wood, International Loans, Bonds, Guarantees, Legal Opinions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn 2007), paras. 5–28. 61 Buchheit, Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation, (n. 54), paras. 55–57. 62 us Court of Appeals, nml Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision of 26 October 2012, 699 F.3d 246 (2nd Cir. 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/uscourts- ca2-12-00105/pdf/uscourts-ca2-12-00105-0.pdf (accessed 6 January 2014); and us Court of Appeals, nml Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision of 23 August 2013, State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 199

Both decisions of the appellate court are in regard to injunctions sought and granted by the us District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Thomas P. Griesa) to remedy Argentina’s failure to pay bondholders after a default in 2001 on its sovereign debt. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment and enjoined Argentina from making payments on debt issued pursuant to its 2005 and 2010 restructurings without making comparable payments on the defaulted debt.63 The appellate court affirmed the lower courts findings and held that the equal treatment provision in the bonds64 bars Argentina from discriminating against plaintiffs’ bonds in favour of bonds issued in connection with the restructurings, and that Argentina violated that provision by ranking its payment obligations on the defaulted debt below its obligations to the holders of its restructured debt. The 2012 decision remanded the case to the lower court for some technical issues to do with the payment formula used in the injunction. The lower court issued amended injunctions,65 which were again challenged by nml, which then led to the 2013 decision. Both decisions are unequivocal in their support for the pari-passu notion that Argentina should not be allowed to discriminate against particular creditors (in this case nml). Despite the court’s steadfast opposition to Argentina’s hard- line approach towards its creditors the court left a final door open by declaring in the 2013 decision that “in view of the nature of the issues presented, we will stay enforcement of the injunctions pending resolution of a timely petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.”66

Case 12-105(L) (2nd Cir. 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/uscourts- ca2-12-00105/pdf/uscourts-ca2-12-00105-1.pdf (accessed 6 January 2014). 63 us Court of Appeals, nml Capital v. Argentina 2012 (n. 62), 3 of the pdf-document. 64 The provision pertaining to the relevant bonds was worded as follows: “(. . .) [t]he Securities will constitute (. . .) direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness (. . .)”, us Court of Appeals, nml Capital v. Argentina 2012 (n. 62), 4 and 5 of the pdf-document. The Court placed special emphasis on the second sentence of that phrase. 65 us, Southern District of New York District Court, nml Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 21 November 2012, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (tpg), 2012 wl 5895786. 66 Argentina had already filed such a writ of certiorari with regard to the 2012 decision on 24 June 2013, us Supreme Court Docket No. 12-1494. On 15 April 2013 the Solicitor General was invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the us, see Order 12-842, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/041513zor_p86b.pdf (accessed 16 February 2014). On 28 August 2013, counsel for nml filed a Brief in Opposition to 200 Bröhmer

The Supreme Court might therefore assert the last word in this matter. The appellate court made it quite clear that it saw this case as a special case with limited effect for the interpretation of obligations under pari-passu clauses in the future. The appellate court emphasised especially that it does not share the concern that demanding equal treatment of creditors under pari-passu clauses would make it more difficult or impossible to reach agreement for debt restructuring clause and justifies this assumption by pointing to the preva- lence of collective action clauses: “(. . .) Collective action clauses—which effectively eliminate the possibility of ‘holdout’ litigation—have been included in 99% of the aggregate value of New York-law bonds issued since January 2005, including Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 Exchange Bonds. Only 5 of 211 issuances under New York law during that period did not include collective action clauses, and all of those issuances came from a single nation, Jamaica.”67 Overall the appellate court wanted to make and made a statement for the rule of law and the validity of contractual obligations. Argentina had agreed to the strong wording of the equal treatment clause and Argentina had not sought to include collective action clauses into the bond contract. The court’s approach is persuasive because nobody forced Argentina to go to the capital markets in such a manner, and even if one were to say that Argentina could not otherwise have secured the necessary financing, one could not conclude that to achieve that goal the country should be allowed to sign on to clauses with no intention of ever complying with them. Be that as it may, the focus has now shifted to so-called collective action clauses, i.e. to a design of bond contracts that includes procedural restructuring rules.

2.5 Contractual Approach: Collective Action Clauses (cacs) The failure of attempts to institute formal sovereign insolvency regimes has prompted the rise of so-called collective action clauses (cacs), which are now included in “almost all new international bond issues”.68 The idea is to include

the petition for a writ of certiorari, http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/ Argentine-Sovereign-Debt/2013/Arg31082883nmlBriefinOpposition.pdf. 67 us Court of Appeals, nml Capital v. Argentina 2012 (n. 62), 27 of the pdf-document. 68 Eric Helleiner, “Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds., The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 89–120, 90. cacs go back to the 1920s, were originally more commonly used in bonds issued in the London market but, since 2003, are now also common for bonds issued in New York, see Zeenat State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 201 certain procedural rules into the contractual framework of the issued bond itself and thereby binding the creditors to those rules. These cacs pivot around the notion of collective representation whereby a supermajority of the bondholders—often 75%69—can agree to restructuring terms with binding effect on all bondholders. This is complemented by the requirement of a minority threshold—often 25%—of creditors who must consent to any litigation arising from the bonds.70 Apart from the lack of formal insolvency regimes for states (Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (sdrms)) the rise of cacs is also due to changes in the numbers and composition of the creditors. Rather than just a few big banks who can coordinate their approach and negotiate more easily with the debtor state, creditors have become much more diverse and numerous making it much more difficult to organise common interests effectively and thus making it more appealing to contractually require collaborative behaviour.71 That said, the heterogeneous nature of bondholders coupled with the fact that these bonds are traded on secondary markets makes it difficult to actually execute the cacs. Such clauses must fail if a debtor manages to gain control over sufficient bonds. There are also difficulties when multiple bond issues are restructured because the contractual obligations can only pertain to the individual bond in which they reside.72 Notwithstanding these difficulties

M. Masoodi, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Legal Aspects Involved,” Contemporary Legal and Economic Issues 3 (2011): 166–200, 184. On 28 November 2010, euro area finance ministers announced a number of policy measures intended to safeguard financial stability in the euro area, among them the mandatory inclusion of standardised cacs in all new euro area government securities. This led to an amendment of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 2 February 2012, http://www.european-council.europa .eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf (accessed 16 February 2014) and the insertion of art. 12.3 which states: “Collective action clauses shall be included, as of 1 January 2013, in all new Euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that their legal impact is identical.” In Germany, this led to the introduction of CACs by amendment of the Federal Debt Administration Act (Gesetz zur Regelung des Schuldenwesens des Bundes—Bundesschuldenwesengesetz, BSchuWG), BGBl. i 2006, 1466 in 2012 and the introduction of paras. 4a et seq., BGBl. i 2012, 1914. 69 There is a broad bandwidth and in practice the required threshold can range up to 85%, Michael Bradley and Gaurang M. Gulati, “Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis,” 28 March 2013, accessed 16 February 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1948534. 70 Kevin P. Gallagher, “The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade and Investment Treaties,” The IDEAs Working Paper Series No. 2 (2011), 11 et seq. 71 Helleiner, “Hole in Global Financial Governance” (n. 68), 105 et seq. 72 Gallagher, “New Vulture Culture” (n. 70), 12. 202 Bröhmer and in the absence of a formal sdrm, cacs can be an effective instrument to derail holdout creditor strategies and prevent vulture-fund activities.

3 Immunity from Execution

The above illustrates that defaulting state debtors do not enjoy any legal privileges to fend off creditors in the adjudicatory stages of debt recovery actions brought against them. Because the underlying debt instruments are commercial instruments and because adjudicatory immunity is determined by the nature of the activity and not by the purpose that this activity might have, such contractually incurred debts73 are correctly classified as commercial activities—acta iure gestionis—and are therefore not protected by immunity. The old common law defence of champerty which could have protected states from suits brought by buyers of distressed debt proved to be unsuccessful because the creditors’ primary intention is not to go to court but to receive payment of monies owed, and the fact that there might be a high probability to have to go to court to achieve this goal is not sufficient for the champerty defence to be applicable. What is more, courts in the us have actually strengthened the position of the creditors by reemphasising the contractual foundation of the underlying debt instruments. On that basis, distressed debt plaintiffs have been successful recently in demanding that equal treatment provisions in the contractual debt instruments, so-called pari-passu clauses, must be observed. Such clauses obligate the debtor to treat all creditors equally when performing on debt and therefore disallow to pay creditors that have consented to a restructure of the debt and at the same time refuse payment to hold-out creditors who stayed out of restructuring negotiations and agreements. These findings relegate debtor states to a last line of defence, namely to seek protection from the execution of judgments won against them by asserting sovereign immunity from execution. Immunity from execution must be distin-

73 The Second Circuit Court of Appeal expressed this rather succinctly: “In New York, a bond is a contract (. . .)”, referring to us Court of Appeals, Arch Ins. Co. v. Precision Stone, Inc., Decision of 1 October 2009, 584 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir. 2009), 39 fn. 4 and then added: “Thus, the parties’ dispute over the meaning of the Equal Treatment Provision presents a ‘simple question of contract interpretation’, referring to em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 382 F.3d 291, 292 (2d Cir. 2004) (interpreting Acceleration Clause in faa)”, see us Court of Appeals, nml Capital v. Argentina 2012 (n. 62), 16 of the pdf-document. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 203 guished from adjudicatory immunity,74 because the impact on a state’s sovereignty is much more intense and direct with regard to execution as compared to a mere declaratory adjudicatory act. The legal development with regard to immunity from execution can be summed up by referring—insofar similar to adjudicatory immunity—to the nature and purpose test, only that in the context of execution, it is the purpose of the commercial asset that determines availability for execution and not its nature.75 In other words, assets that states keep in other states, such as bank accounts, movable or immovable property, are subject to execution if they were to be used for transactions with a commercial purpose as opposed to commercial transactions for a public purpose.76 There are a number of reasons for distinguishing between the two levels of immunity and to protect states more from measures of execution. States keep assets in foreign states to run their diplomatic missions and otherwise engage in interstate relations. If connected assets became available for execution this could seriously jeopardise the conduct of international relations. It must also be kept in mind that states, unlike private corporations, cannot—legally—go bankrupt and are therefore more vulnerable.77 The fact that states often act through independent agencies can be a complicating factor. Third party debts owed to the distressed state have also been targeted for enforcement action. Especially central banks of states keep assets in foreign countries for a variety of reasons not least when the central bank is involved in payments to or by third parties to the parent state.78 The

74 See, for example, August Reinisch, “European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures,” European Journal of International Law 17 (2006): 803–36, 803 with further references; see also Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, 2004 (n. 19), art. 10 (no adjudicatory immunity for commercial transactions) on the one hand and, on the other hand, arts. 18 and 19. 75 See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 12 October 2011, 2 BvR 2984/09, 2 BvR 3057/09, 2 BvR 1842/10, para. 33: “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat durch die Formulierung ‘soweit’ (vgl. BVerfGE 46, 342 <392>; 64, 1 <40>) bereits eine Feststellung dazu getroffen, dass die Reichweite der Vollstreckungsimmunität eines fremden Staates sich auf den Umfang der hoheitlichen Zwecksetzung beschränkt, das allgemeine Völkerrecht bei gemischt genutzten Gegenständen mit anderen Worten einer Vollstreckung in die nicht hoheitlich genutzten Teile von Gegenständen grundsätzlich nicht entgegensteht.” The previous decisions referred to by the Court are the Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case, Decision of 13 December 1977, BVerfGE 46, 342 (392) and the National Iranian Oil Company Case, Decision of 12 April 1983, BVerfGE 64, 1 (40). 76 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (n. 17), 482 et seq. 77 Bröhmer, State Immunity (n. 17), 22–23. 78 Central banks are afforded special immunity protection by art. 21 of the un Convention, and, for example, section 1611(b)(1) fsia and section 14(4) uk State Immunity Act. In the 204 Bröhmer battle between nml and Argentina has been illustrative in this regard as well. nml—and affiliated funds—attempted to cash in on the initial court victory over Argentina in New York, however with little success. In New York an attempt to attach funds to be paid by the Argentinean Central Bank (bcra) to the imf failed because the Second Circuit held that bcra was separate from the Republic of Argentina itself and the funds were to be used for sovereign and not commercial purposes.79 The language of the relevant immunity from execution clause in section 1610(a) fsia, which provides that the targeted property must be “used for” a commercial activity in the United States, has also proved to be a potent safeguard against enforcement measures, as it removes

us, the Supreme Court held in a 1982 landmark decision that “government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such” with the consequence that they cannot ordinarily be held liable for the debts of the parent country. The Supreme Court, drawing from general principles and applying them to the state-separate entity problem in the context of state immunity, also said that this could be different only “where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created”. The Court also stated that “the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice” could be the basis of a counter-exception. See us Supreme Court, First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), Decision of 17 June 1983, 462 us 611 (1983), 629 et seq. us Court of Appeals, nml Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Decision of 5 July 2011, 652 F.3d 172 (2nd Cir. 2011) further clarified the immunity of central banks by de-linking the independence requirement of the Supreme Court’s Bancec decision from the special protection afforded to central banks by the fsia: “(. . .) We hold that the plain language, history, and structure of § 1611[b][1] immunizes property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account without regard to whether the bank or authority is independent from its parent state pursuant to Bancec. If foreign central bank property is immune from attachment under § 1611(b)(1), the fact that ‘a relationship of principal and agent [has been] created’ between the foreign state and its central bank under Bancec is irrelevant, see Bancec, 462 us at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591. As discussed below, foreign central banks are not treated as generic ‘agencies and instrumentalities’ of a foreign state under the fsia; they are given ‘special protections’ befitting the particular sovereign interest in preventing the attachment and execution of central bank property.” 79 us Court of Appeals, em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision of 5 January 2007, 473 F.3d 463 (2nd Cir. 2007); similarly for attempts to execute against Argentinean social security funds in the us Court of Appeals, us, Aurelius Capital Partners, L.P. v. Republic of Argentina, Decision of 15 October 2009, 584 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2009). See also Reagan Reynolds, “nml Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina: The Second Circuit Reinforces Immunity Protection over Foreign Central Banks,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 20 (2012): 519–32. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 205 from the scope of execution even those commercial assets that are used for purposes outside of the usa.80 Proceedings were brought in Switzerland against the Bank for International Settlement (bis) after nml had obtained attachment orders against assets held with the bis in the name of the Argentine Republic and its Central Bank. The third party bis, however, is an international organisation. As such it enjoys absolute immunity, was thus protected from action against it thereby indirectly protecting Argentina, whose assets with the bank were the reason for targeting the bis.81 nml also took its efforts to France where it attempted to attach monies owed to Argentina by private corporations as taxes, social security contributions and oil royalties.82 The main argument brought forward by nml in these cases was the extensive waiver of immunity included in the underlying debt instruments which, on the face of it, could have included the monies nml sought to attach. However, the French Court upheld Argentina’s claim to immunity from execution by demanding that a respective waiver must be express and specific with regard to the assets or category of assets open for execution and that this requirement had not been met.83

80 us Court of Appeals, Walker International Holdings Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, Decision of 22 December 2004, 395 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2010), text under iii. C. See also us Court of Appeals, AF-Cap Inc. v. Republic of Congo, Decision of 17 September 2004, 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004). The latter had a different outcome because the Court held that the property at issue was commercial and ‘used for’ commercial activities in the us. 81 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, nml Capital Ltd and em Limited, Judgment of 12 July 2010, bge 136 iii 379. See also Anne Peters, “Die funktionale Immunität internationaler Organisationen und die Rechtsweggarantie,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht 21 (2011): 397–428; Sandrine Giroud, “Enforcement Against State Assets and Execution of icsid Awards in Switzerland: How Swiss Courts Deal with Immunity Defences,” asa Bulletin 30 (2012): 758–66, 762–64. 82 France, Cour de cassation (civ. 1ère), La société nml Capital v. La République Argentine, Judgment of 28 March 2013, Judgment No. 395 (11–10.450); France, Cour de cassation (civ. 1ère), La société nml Capital v. La République Argentine, Judgment of 28 March 2013, Judgment No. 396 (11-13.323) (Air France); France, Cour de cassation (civ. 1ère), La société nml Capital v. La République Argentine, Judgment of 28 March 2013, Judgment No. 394 (10-25.938). 83 See, for example, the relevant passage in the Air France decision, supra (n. 82 (the other two are similarly worded): “Et attendu qu’ayant relevé, d’une part, que les saisies litigieuses portaient sur des créances fiscales et sociales de l’Etat argentin, c’est-à-dire sur des ressources se rattachant nécessairement à l’exercice par cet Etat des prérogatives liées à sa souveraineté et, d’autre part, que les contrats d’émission d’obligations ne prévoyaient aucune renonciation expresse de la République argentine à son immunité d’exécution sur 206 Bröhmer

4 Sovereign Debt and Arbitration

Given the difficulties in enforcing court judgments against distressed state debtors holders of debt have resorted to try the avenue of investment arbitration on the basis of bilateral investment treaties (bits). The bits open up the avenue to arbitration governed by the icsid Convention.84 Under article 54(1)(1) icsid Convention “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” This means that states are under an obligation to adhere to findings arrived at in the arbitration process. Whereas that appears to be favourable for distressed debt creditors if disputes arising from that debt could be subjected to arbitration, there are some important caveats, most notably the provision in article 55 icsid Convention: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.” There are currently three cases concerning claims of bondholders pending before icsid tribunals. In the Abaclat arbitration, about 60 000 holders of Argentine debt joined to bring a mass claim arbitration before an icsid tribunal. In a highly controversial decision the tribunal has assumed jurisdiction over these claims.85 A differently composed tribunal also assumed jurisdiction in a mass claims arbitration similar to Abaclat.86 In the third case the tribunal has not yet reached a decision on jurisdiction.87 At issue in these cases is the question of the tribunals’ jurisdiction under the icsid Convention in conjunction with the underlying bit. There are two main issues with little impact on the questions relevant in this chapter and which therefore require no further analyses. The first issue is the admissibility

ses ressources de nature fiscale ou sociale, la cour d’appel en a exactement déduit que les saisies litigieuses étaient nulles ; que le moyen n’est fondé en aucune de ses branches”. 84 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (icsid) Convention, 18 March 1965, accessed 9 January 2014, https://icsid.worldbank.org/icsid/StaticFiles/ basicdoc/partA.htm. 85 icsid, Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, Decision of 4 August 2011, icsid Case No. arb/07/5. 86 icsid, Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and Others v. Argentine Republic, Decision of 8 February 2013, icsid Case No. arb/08/9. 87 As of 9 January 2014, see icsid, Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. Argentine Republic, icsid Case No. arb/07/8. State Immunity And Sovereign Bonds 207 of bringing a mass claim before icsid tribunals, as the Convention contains no rules for dealing with such mass claims. Argentina took the position that only a single investor could bring a claim. As a consequence, this could potentially lead to 60 000 individual arbitrations, all with very similar if not identical backgrounds and very similar considerations applying. The second question is whether the purchasing of these bonds constitutes an investment in the sense of the underlying bit and the icsid Convention or whether the matter is merely a contractual dispute for which there would be no jurisdiction under the icsid Convention. Both the Abaclat and the Ambiente Ufficio tribunals decided the jurisdictional questions in the affirmative.88 It is questionable whether these arbitrations will lead to any tangible benefits for the claimants. Argentina does not accept the jurisdictional rulings and thus regards the decisions as ultra vires. It is highly unlikely that Argentina will pay if the tribunals were to decide in favour of the claimants in the merits stage as well. If claimants attempted to execute, they would still have to overcome the immunity from execution threshold as described above in the context of regular court proceedings. In the context of article 55 of the icsid Convention one can hardly argue that submission under icsid arbitration is tantamount to a waiver of immunity. To argue otherwise would render article 55 devoid of any meaning. It is therefore not obvious what these arbitrations might achieve for the creditors.

5 Conclusion

The result can be summarised rather clearly. Distressed sovereign debt holders can pursue their claims against debtor states in foreign fora and, at least for now, in icsid mass claim arbitrations as well. There is no immunity from jurisdiction in sovereign bond constellations as the contractual dealings around these financial instruments must be qualified as commercial activities. However, if the debtor state refuses to comply with court or arbitration decisions rendered against it, the creditors will find it very hard to enforce any judgment or decision by way of execution unless creditors are able to find non-immunity protected assets, i.e. assets clearly and demonstrably used by the debtor state for commercial purposes. This should reduce the pressure on debtor states to settle with creditors to avoid proceedings. It is therefore to be

88 See Jessica Beess und Chrostin, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the icsid: The Abaclat Case,” Harvard International Law Journal 53 (2012): 505–17. 208 Bröhmer expected that such debt litigation will run out, because the economic benefit/ risk ratio for plaintiffs is becoming increasingly unfavourable. This outcome is also an adequate outcome despite the often blatant contractual violations of states in the context of bond transactions. State property must be protected in the interest of the efficient conduct of international relations and in the interest of states being able to fulfil their core functions. Given that the questionable behaviour of (at least some) states with regard to their debt repayment obligations is well known, private participants in the capital markets must be and can be expected to exercise care in their investment decisions. CHAPTER 12 Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution

Jean-Marc Thouvenin

1 Introduction

Un des thèmes qui méritent d’être abordés lorsqu’il est question d’immunités est sans doute celui du gel, par un État, des fonds relevant de la banque centrale d’un autre État. Cette pratique est-elle licite en droit international ? C’est une question qu’il faut poser puisque l’actualité est porteuse d’une série de cas dans lesquels ont été gelés, en Europe et aux États-Unis notamment, les biens de banques centrales d’États tiers. Le cas syrien vient immédiatement à l’esprit. Des sanctions ont progressivement été étendues à l’encontre de cet État depuis que le Conseil de l’Union européenne a adopté le 9 mai 2011 la décision 2011/273/pesc concernant des mesures restrictives à l’encontre de la Syrie.1 Dès le 19 janvier 2012, l’ue adoptait un nouveau règlement, n° 36/2012,2 posant de nouvelles sanctions contre la Syrie, y compris des mesures de gel de fonds d’un certain nombre de personnes et d’entités inscrites en annexes. Un mois plus tard, le 27 février 2012, un nouveau règlement du Conseil ue3 élargissait la liste des entités dont les fonds devaient être gelés, en visant cette fois expressément la banque centrale de Syrie, dénoncée comme apportant un soutien financier au régime syrien. Le cas iranien est tout à fait comparable, les avoirs de la banque centrale iranienne ayant également été gelés dans l’Union européenne (ainsi qu’aux États-Unis)4 selon une procédure identique.5

1 ue, Décision 2011/273/pesc du Conseil du 9 mai 2011 concernant des mesures restrictives à l’encontre de la Syrie, joue 2011 L 121/11. 2 ue, Règlement (ue) n° 36/2012 du Conseil du 18 janvier 2012 concernant des mesures restrictives en raison de la situation en Syrie et abrogeant le règlement (ue) n° 442/2011, joue 2012 L 16/1. 3 ue, Règlement (ue) n° 168/2012 du Conseil du 27 février 2012 modifiant le règlement (ue) n° 36/2012 concernant des mesures restrictives en raison de la situation en Syrie, joue 2012 L 54/1. 4 États-Unis, Executive Order 13599 of 5 February 2012: Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions, 77 fr 6659, 6 février 2012. 5 ue, Décision 2012/35/pesc du Conseil du 23 janvier 2012 concernant des mesures restrictives à l’encontre de l’Iran, joue 2012 L 19/22, et ue, Règlement (ue) n° 267/2012 du Conseil du 23

Sauf erreur, ce sont les deux seuls cas de gel de fonds de banques centrales qui aient été décidés par l’Union européenne sans faire suite à une décision expresse du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies appelant à mettre en œuvre une telle mesure. On relève ainsi par exemple que les avoirs de la banque centrale de Corée du Nord n’ont pas été gelés par l’ue, alors même que ce qui est reproché à cet État est assez comparable aux critiques adressées à l’Iran. Ceci semble montrer ou bien que le gel des avoirs d’une banque centrale est une sanction à laquelle il ne peut être recouru que de manière très exceptionnelle, ou bien qu’elle n’apparaît comme pertinente en tant que mesure restrictive que depuis très récemment, comme si les États avaient soudain pris conscience qu’ils pouvaient y recourir. Mais sont-ils en droit de le faire ? C’est justement cette question que l’on sou- haite aborder dans cette contribution : au regard du droit international, dans le cadre duquel les États et leurs biens sont en principe protégés des mesures que d’autres États pourraient prendre à leur encontre par des immunités, le gel des avoirs d’une banque centrale se qualifie-t-il comme un acte illicite ? Pour aborder les différentes difficultés que soulève cette question, il convient d’abord de vérifier si le droit international des immunités des États s’oppose à ce type de pratique (2.). Ensuite, on posera la question de savoir si, en dépit de l’illicéité de principe d’une mesure de gel de fonds d’une banque centrale étrangère, si tant est que l’on arrive à cette conclusion, des circonstances excluant l’illicéité seraient susceptibles de la rendre conforme au droit international (3.).

2 L’immunité d’exécution s’oppose-t-elle, en principe, à une mesure administrative de gel des fonds d’un État étranger ?

Deux questions se posent et doivent être abordées successivement. Premièrement, l’immunité d’exécution joue-t-elle alors même qu’une mesure de gel des fonds est une mesure administrative, et non juridictionnelle ? (2.1.). Deuxièmement, à supposer que les fonds d’une banque centrale soient couverts par l’immunité d’exécution, le gel de ces fonds est-il constitutif d’une violation de cette immunité ? (2.2.).

mars 2012 concernant l’adoption de mesures restrictives à l’encontre de l’Iran et abrogeant le règlement (ue) n° 961/2010, joue 2012 L 88/1. Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 211

2.1 Immunité d’exécution et actes de l’administration Le gel des fonds d’une banque centrale est une mesure administrative et non juridictionnelle, ce qui explique que l’on s’interroge rarement sur sa compati- bilité avec le droit des immunités. Cela tient sans doute au fait que l’immunité d’exécution n’intéresse les juristes qu’en tant qu’elle prolonge l’immunité de juridiction. Certes, la doctrine des immunités des États est généralement présentée d’une part comme empêchant les juridictions d’un État d’en juger un autre – c’est l’immunité de juridiction, et d’autre part, comme protégeant l’État étranger de la mise en œuvre des voies d’exécution prévues par le droit interne – c’est l’immunité d’exécution. Et il est également vrai que, selon cette approche tout à fait classique, l’immunité d’exécution est distincte de l’immunité de juridiction. L’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice (la Cour) dans l’affaire Allemagne c. Italie insiste du reste sur cette distinction des deux immunités en faisant observer : « que l’immunité d’exécution dont jouissent les États en ce qui concerne leurs biens situés en territoire étranger va au-delà de l’immunité de juridiction dont bénéficient ces mêmes États devant les tribunaux étran- gers [. . .]. Les règles du droit international coutumier relatives à l’immunité d’exécution et celles qui gouvernent l’immunité de juridiction (entendue stricto sensu comme le droit pour un État de ne pas être soumis à une procé- dure judiciaire devant les tribunaux d’un autre État) sont distinctes et doivent faire l’objet d’une application séparée ».6 La distinction ne fait donc pas débat, et on considère d’ailleurs que ne pas respecter l’immunité d’exécution serait plus grave que ne pas respecter l’immunité de juridiction, puisque l’exécution d’un jugement suppose le recours à la contrainte, voire à la force publique.7 Pour autant, les deux immunités ne sont en général jamais traitées autrement que comme posant des limites à l’exercice par les États de leurs com- pétences juridictionnelles. Par exemple, la Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens de 2004 ne traite de l’immunité d’exécution que sous couvert de l’immunité juridictionnelle, en posant à l’article 19 que « [a]ucune mesure de contrainte postérieure au jugement, telle que saisie, saisie-arrêt ou saisie-exécution, ne peut être prise contre des biens d’un État en relation avec une procédure intentée devant un tribunal d’un autre État [. . .] ». Dans son rapport de 1979, le rapporteur spécial de la Commission du droit international (cdi) sur les immunités juridictionnelles

6 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie : Grèce Intervenant), Arrêt du 3 février 2012, cij Recueil 2012, par. 113. 7 S. El-Sawah, Les immunités des États et des organisations internationales : Immunités et procès équitable, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011, 878 p., p. 165. 212 Thouvenin des États indiquait d’ailleurs : « [l]’immunité de saisie et d’exécution dont un État jouit relativement à ses biens publics ou affectés à un service public fait partie intégrante de la doctrine composite de l’immunité juridictionnelle des États ».8 Il faut cependant observer que même s’ils ne s’intéressent qu’à l’immunité d’exécution comme sous-produit de l’immunité juridictionnelle, les observa- teurs laissent parfois entendre qu’elle ne s’y limite pas. On relève par exemple que la cdi, dans le commentaire final de l’article 18 de son projet d’Articles sur les immunités juridictionnelles de l’État et de ses biens, avait indiqué que « [l]’article 18 ne concerne l’immunité à l’égard des mesures de contrainte que pour autant qu’elles sont liées à une procédure devant un tribunal », ce qui semble indiquer que l’immunité d’exécution pourrait jouer au-delà des mesures liées à une procédure judiciaire.9 Le même raisonnement a contrario s’impose à la lecture du rapport sur la Convention européenne sur les immu- nités de l’État, dont le paragraphe 12 indique : « [l]a Convention ne traite pas du problème de l’immunité dans des procédures qui se déroulent devant les autorités administratives d’un autre État. ».10 L’idée d’une immunité d’exécution jouant en dehors de toute procédure juridictionnelle n’est donc pas considérée comme inepte. Mais elle n’est presque jamais évoquée sous cet angle. La raison de cet « angle mort » s’explique très probablement par le fait qu’il est fort rare que des États s’en prennent aux biens d’autres États en dehors du cadre juridictionnel. Les organes exécutifs et légis- latifs des États sont en principe soucieux de respecter la souveraineté des États tiers, de sorte que la question de l’immunité d’exécution face à leurs mesures ne se pose pratiquement jamais. On trouvera donc avec peine une confirmation de cette immunité dans la pratique habituelle des États.11 Les lois nationales sur l’immunité des États ne visent évidemment pas l’immunité à l’égard de la loi elle-même, et même s’il est possible de les interpréter comme interdisant au pouvoir exécutif d’adopter des mesures de contrainte à l’encontre des États étrangers, ces lois demeurent des lois, qui peuvent donc parfaitement être con- tredites par des lois postérieures. Dès lors, les seuls signes de l’existence d’une

8 onu, « Rapport préliminaire sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, par M. Sompong Sucharitkul, rapporteur spécial », Annuaire cdi, 1979, vol. ii, p. 260, par. 82, italiques ajoutés. 9 onu, « Projet d’articles sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens et commentaires y relatifs », Annuaire cdi, 1991, vol. ii, p. 58. 10 Conseil de l’Europe, Convention européenne sur l’immunité des États, 16 mai 1972, ste n° 074, rapport explicatif. 11 Voir sur ce point D. Gaukrodger, « Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors », oecd Working Papers on International Investment, oecd Publishing, 2010, 56 p. Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 213 pratique en faveur d’une telle immunité se trouvent dans l’abstention des États qui, habituellement, font spontanément en sorte de ne pas porter atteinte aux biens des États tiers par des mesures législatives ou administratives. Il n’est cependant pas nécessaire d’entrer plus avant dans la recherche de la pratique et de l’opinio iuris en la matière, tant il fait peu de doutes que le droit international le mieux établi interdit à un État d’exercer une contrainte sur un autre État en se saisissant de ses biens qui se trouvent sur son territoire. Il n’est pas contestable, en effet, que l’immunité « procède du principe de l’égalité souveraine des États qui, ainsi que cela ressort clairement du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies, est l’un des principes fondamentaux de l’ordre juridique international ».12 Or, cette affirmation suggère clairement que les immunités ne peuvent être envisagées comme ne jouant que face au pouvoir judiciaire : dès lors que c’est le principe d’égalité souveraine qui interdit à un État d’exercer sa juridiction sur un autre, cette interdiction doit jouer non seulement à l’encontre de l’État qui se fait juge, mais également à l’encontre de l’État législateur et de l’État exécutif. En d’autres termes, ce qui vaut pour le judiciaire doit nécessairement valoir aussi pour le législateur et pour l’administration. La doctrine francophone a d’ailleurs perçu depuis longtemps la portée large qu’il convient de reconnaître à l’immunité d’exécution. Dans un article remar- qué et qui fait autorité, Geneviève Burdeau relevait dès 1997 que l’immunité d’exécution « consiste à interdire aux autorités étatiques toute opération maté- rielle sur les biens de l’État ou de l’organisation. Les auteurs ou destinataires de l’interdiction ne sont évidemment pas cantonnés au monde des juges, mais comprennent l’ensemble des organes d’application du droit, et l’on peut à nouveau estimer qu’il s’agit d’une interdiction d’autoriser comme d’une interdiction de réaliser l’opération matérielle. Ainsi entendue, l’immunité d’exécution devient l’interdiction posée par le droit international pour tous les organes internes d’exercer toute mesure de contrainte sur les biens du sujet international. Sont alors visés, outre les mesures d’exécution d’un jugement, les gels d’avoirs ou les embargos sans lien avec l’exécution d’une décision de justice ».13 Il semble donc acquis que l’immunité d’exécution, en tant que règle de droit international, joue à l’encontre des règlements ou lois qu’un État – ou un groupe d’États agissant sous couvert d’une organisation internationale – prend à l’encontre des biens d’un État qui se trouvent sur son – ou leur – territoire.

12 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles (n. 6), par. 57. 13 G. Burdeau, « Le gel d’avoirs étrangers », Journal du Droit International, 1997, pp. 5-57, pp. 39-40. 214 Thouvenin

2.2 Le gel des fonds comme mesure contraire à l’immunité d’exécution En général, les États accordent le bénéfice des immunités d’exécution aux banques centrales en reconnaissant que leurs biens ne peuvent pas être saisis. L’article L 153-1 du Code monétaire et financier français consacre expressément ce principe en indiquant : « ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature, notamment les avoirs de réserve de change, que les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères détiennent ou gèrent pour leur compte ou celui de l’État ou des États étrangers dont elles relèvent ».14 Mais une autre question est de savoir si le gel des fonds d’une banque centrale est contraire à l’immunité d’exécution. Il a été soutenu que tel ne serait pas le cas car le gel des fonds est une mesure conservatoire et non confiscatoire, et ne porte donc pas atteinte au patrimoine de l’État visé puisque ce dernier en retrouvera la jouissance lors de la levée du gel des fonds. Cet argument ne tient cependant pas. Ce que l’immunité d’exécution établit, c’est le droit pour un État de ne pas être soumis à une mesure de contrainte mise en œuvre par un autre État. Or, à l’évidence, une mesure de gel des fonds est une mesure de contrainte. Mais, pourrait-on également objecter, ladite mesure de contrainte n’est rien d’autre qu’une banale sanction économique. Or, le droit international n’interdit généralement pas les sanctions économiques, comme cela ressort par exemple de l’arrêt rendu par la cij dans l’affaire Nicaragua, où la Cour a refusé de considérer que l’interruption d’une aide économique, la réduction de 90 % du quota de sucre importé aux États-Unis en provenance du Nicaragua, et un embargo commercial étaient contraires au droit international,15 alors même que ces mesures avaient pour objet de faire pression sur le gouvernement nicaraguayen afin qu’il change de politique. L’argument ne tient pourtant pas davantage que le précédent, car toutes les sanctions économiques ne se valent pas. Celles dont la Cour a traité en 1986 ne portaient pas directement atteinte à la souveraineté du Nicaragua, même si elles affectaient ses intérêts en lui faisant perdre des opportunités. À l’inverse, le gel des fonds d’un État étranger porte directement atteinte à sa souveraineté en l’empêchant d’exercer sa compétence sur ses biens. Or, c’est précisément ce que son immunité lui garantit. En effet, pour reprendre les termes de la Cour dans les affaires du Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 et Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en 2008, qui concernaient l’immunité d’un chef d’État mais qu’il est possible de transposer à un État, l’immunité a vocation à protéger

14 Code monétaire et financier français, art. L 153-1. 15 cij, Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États- Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du 27 juin 1986, cij Recueil 1986, par. 244-45. Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 215 l’État « contre tout acte d’autorité de la part d’un autre État qui ferait obstacle à l’exercice de [sa souveraineté] » [. . .] « pour apprécier s’il y a eu atteinte ou non à l’immunité [. . .], il faut vérifier si [l’État] a été soumis à un acte d’autorité contraignant ; c’est là l’élément déterminant ».16 Or, à l’évidence, les mesures de gel des fonds des banques centrales sont bel et bien des actes d’autorité visant à faire obstacle, et qui font effectivement obstacle, à l’exercice par les États cibles de leur souveraineté. C’est d’autant plus avéré s’agissant des mesures de gel des fonds des banques centrales actuellement en vigueur qu’elles ont expres- sément pour objet de priver les États cibles des moyens financiers de mettre en œuvre certaines des politiques publiques (contestables, cela ne fait aucun doute, mais c’est une autre question) qu’ils décident. On peut donc conclure que le gel des fonds d’une banque centrale par un État est une violation du droit international de l’immunité d’exécution. La même conclusion vaut s’agissant du gel des fonds d’une banque centrale déci- dée et mise en œuvre par l’Union européenne car on ne voit pas très bien ce qui permettrait de traiter l’Union différemment des États au regard du droit international qu’au demeurant son traité constitutif l’engage à respecter (art. 3 tue).

3 Le gel des fonds des banques centrales comme contre-mesure

Il est difficile d’en rester à ce constat, qui conduirait à conclure, sans autre procès, que l’Union européenne, ses États membres, les États-Unis et d’autres, mettent en œuvre des pratiques parfaitement contraires au droit international. Il semble en effet que les mesures de gel des fonds des banques centrales aient été adoptées à titre de contre-mesures, ce qui aurait pour effet d’exclure l’illicéité du non-respect de l’immunité d’exécution des États cibles. L’argument est-il convaincant ? On rappellera que la circonstance qu’un acte soit qualifiable de contre- mesure permet d’en écarter l’illicéité si plusieurs conditions sont remplies. Selon l’arrêt de la Cour dans l’affaire Gabcikovo-Nagymaros : « [p]our pouvoir être justifiée, une contre-mesure doit satisfaire à certaines conditions [. . .]. En premier lieu, elle doit être prise pour riposter à un fait internationalement illicite d’un autre État et doit être dirigée contre ledit État. En second lieu, l’État

16 cij, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), Arrêt du 14 février 2002, cij Recueil 2002, p. 22, par. 54 ; cij, Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale (Djibouti c. France), Arrêt du 4 juin 2008, cij Recueil 2008, par. 170. 216 Thouvenin lésé doit avoir invité l’État auteur du fait illicite à mettre fin à son comportement illicite ou à en fournir réparation. [. . .] les effets d’une contre-mesure doivent être proportionnés aux dommages subis compte tenu des droits en cause. Une autre condition dont dépend la licéité d’une contre-mesure, à savoir que celle-ci doit avoir pour but d’inciter l’État auteur du fait illicite à exécuter les obligations qui lui incombent en droit international, et que la mesure doit partant être réversible ».17 La cdi a repris les mêmes conditions à l’article 49 de ses Articles sur la responsabilité des États pour fait illicite. Si l’on s’en tient aux décisions de l’ue gelant les fonds des banques centrales iranienne et syrienne, il apparaît qu’en effet l’ue prétend, au moins implicitement, répondre à une ou des violations du droit international : s’agissant de l’Iran, il s’agirait de répondre à la violation par l’Iran de ses engagements pris dans le cadre du Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire (tnp),18 à quoi l’on peut ajouter la violation des décisions du Conseil de sécurité qui lui enjoignent de respecter les décisions du Conseil des gouverneurs de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomatique (aiea).19 S’agissant de la Syrie, la décision 2012/122/ pesc du Conseil a été prise en raison de « la poursuite des actes brutaux de répression et de violation des droits de l’homme commis par le gouvernement syrien ».20 A priori, les mesures en cause ont donc bien pour objet de répondre à ce que leurs auteurs considèrent comme étant des violations du droit international. Elles n’ont pas été adoptées sans que les États cibles (l’Iran et la Syrie) aient été préalablement invités à respecter leurs obligations. Ces mesures sont

17 cij, Affaire relative au projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie c. Slovaquie), Arrêt du 25 septembre 1997, cij Recueil 1997, par. 83-85. 18 Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire, 1er juillet 1968, 729 unts 175. Ceci est suggéré par ue, Décision 2012/35/pesc du Conseil du 23 janvier 2012 modifiant la décision 2010/413/ pesc concernant des mesures restrictives à l’encontre de l’Iran, joue 2012 L 19/22, par. 5 du préambule. 19 ue, Conseil européen, Conclusions, 23 octobre 2011, euco 52/11, par. 18. On notera que les motivations de l’Executive Order du Président des États-Unis bloquant les fonds de la banque centrale iranienne sont différentes, et s’inscrivent plutôt dans une perspective de lutte contre le terrorisme et son financement. L’Executive Order 13599 du 5 février 2012 indique ainsi qu’il est adopté « in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995, particularly in light of the deceptive practices of the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks to conceal transactions of sanctioned parties, the deficiencies in Iran’s anti-money laundering regime and the weaknesses in its implementation, and the continuing and unacceptable risk posed to the international financial system by Iran’s activities ». 20 ue, Règlement (ue) n° 168/2012 modifiant le règlement (ue) n° 36/2012 (n. 3), préambule. Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 217 en outre réversibles, puisqu’il s’agit de mesures conservatoires – c’est ici que l’argument de la réversibilité du gel des fonds évoqué plus haut joue – qui seront théoriquement levées dès lors que les États cibles auront satisfait à leurs obligations internationales. Mais il existe une autre condition pour que l’on puisse parler de contre- mesures, puisque les États qui en sont les auteurs doivent en principe, pour être en droit de bénéficier du régime des contre-mesures, se qualifier comme étant des « États lésés » tels que définis à l’article 42 des Articles sur la respon- sabilité des États pour fait illicite.21 Selon cette disposition, un État est dit lésé par la violation du droit international commise par un autre État si l’obligation est due à cet État individuelle- ment ; ou si elle est due à un groupe d’États dont il fait partie ou à la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, et si la violation de l’obligation : i) Atteint spécialement cet État;22 ou ii) Est de nature à modifier radicalement la situation de tous les autres États auxquels l’obligation est due quant à l’exécution ultérieure de cette obligation. Dans le cas de l’Iran, il pourrait être soutenu que tout État partie au Traité de non-prolifération23 peut se dire lésé par son comportement, s’il était démon- tré que ce dernier est une violation du tnp – ce que l’Iran conteste. Dit briè- vement, il peut être allégué que le fait qu’un État ne respecte pas les règles de non-prolifération posées par le tnp est de nature à affecter l’ensemble du régime de non-prolifération. Une telle conclusion est d’autant plus convain- cante que la cdi a évoqué un traité de désarmement pour exemple de traité dont la violation par une partie donne droit à tous les autres de réagir en tant qu’États lésés. En sens inverse, il pourrait cependant être opposé que le comportement iranien, qui ne consiste pas à contester l’existence de ses obligations mais à prétendre qu’elles ont effectivement été respectées, n’est pas de nature à modifier radicalement la situation de tous les autres États quant à l’exécution de leurs propres obligations.24 Mais peu importe, l’essentiel ici est de constater que les États ou groupes d’États qui décident de geler les fonds de la banque

21 onu, « Projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite », Annuaire cdi, 2001, vol. ii, p. 316. 22 Selon le Commentaire de l’article 42 fourni par la cdi, pour qu’un État puisse être consi- déré comme lésé, « il doit être atteint par la violation d’une manière qui le distingue des autres États auxquels l’obligation est due » ; onu, « Projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite », Annuaire cdi, 2001, vol. ii, p. 322. 23 Voir (n. 18). 24 S. Singh, « Iran, The Nuclear Issue & Countermeasures », ejil: Talk! – Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 10 janvier 2012, http://www.ejiltalk.org/iran-the-nuclear- issue-countermeasures (page consultée le 20 mai 2014). 218 Thouvenin centrale d’Iran peuvent au moins prétendre être des « États lésés » par le comportement iranien, et justifier, à ce titre, l’adoption de contre-mesures. La question est plus complexe s’agissant du cas syrien, dans lequel ce qui est en cause est le comportement du régime en matière de droits de l’homme. Ici, il est plus difficile de soutenir que les États tiers sont lésés, du moins si l’on s’en tient à la définition de l’État lésé telle que donnée par les Articles sur la responsabilité des États pour fait illicite. Peuvent-ils, cependant, prendre des contre-mesures en tant qu’États non lésés ? La cdi avait conclu le commentaire de ses Articles en 2001 en mentionnant des cas montrant la « volonté apparente de la part de certains États de répon- dre à des violations d’obligations présentant un intérêt général », alors que ces États ne pouvaient pas être considérés comme des États lésés au sens de l’article 42.25 Elle avait cependant conclu que « en l’état actuel du droit international, l’incertitude plane en ce qui concerne les contre-mesures prises dans l’intérêt général ou collectif. La pratique des États est peu abondante et seul un nombre limité d’États sont concernés. À l’heure actuelle, il semble que rien n’autorise clairement les États visés à l’article 48 à prendre des contre-mesures dans l’intérêt collectif ».26 Onze ans ont passé depuis lors. Doit-on penser que la pratique récente de gel des avoirs des banques centrales témoigne d’une évolution du droit international coutumier, en particulier de l’opinio iuris, permettant désormais aux États non lésés d’adopter des contre-mesures contre des États non respectueux des droits de l’homme ? On peut avoir de sérieux doutes. Le 30 septembre 2004, le Groupe des 77 et la Chine avaient fermement rappelé : « [n]ous rejetons énergiquement les lois et règlements ayant des effets extraterritoriaux et toutes les autres formes de mesures de contrainte à caractère économique, y compris l’application unila- térale de sanctions contre des pays en développement, et réitérons la néces- sité urgente de les éliminer immédiatement. Nous soulignons que [. . .] ces mesures bafouent les principes consacrés par la Charte des Nations Unies et le droit international [. . .]. Nous constatons avec préoccupation l’application unilatérale de sanctions contre la Syrie par le Gouvernement des États-Unis et considérons que la loi sur la responsabilité syrienne (Syrian Accountability

25 onu, « Projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite », Annuaire cdi, 2001, vol. ii, p. 149. 26 Ibid. Gel des fonds des banques centrales et immunité d’exécution 219

Act) va à l’encontre du droit international et constitue une violation des buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies ».27 Par ailleurs, il me semble qu’à l’égard tant de l’Iran que de la Syrie, la Russie et la Chine ont tendance à dénoncer les sanctions unilatérales adoptées par les Occidentaux. D’ailleurs, en s’opposant à ce que le Conseil de sécurité autorise de telles sanctions, et donc en prenant clairement position contre de telles mesures, ils ne sauraient être vus comme les reconnaissant comme licites lorsqu’elles sont adoptées sans l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité. Par suite, il n’est pas plus certain en 2013 qu’en 2001 que le droit international autorise les mesures en cause.

4 Conclusion

Il paraît clair que le droit international des immunités s’oppose aux mesures unilatérales de gel des fonds des banques centrales étrangères, lorsque lesdites mesures ne peuvent être vues comme des contre-mesures. Or, tout porte à croire qu’elles sauraient difficilement se qualifier comme telles lorsqu’elles sont adoptées en réaction à des violations des droits de l’homme. Faut-il alors assouplir le droit international des immunités ? Ou bien faut-il à l’inverse assouplir le régime des contre-mesures ? Vu l’inefficacité du gel des fonds des banques centrales lorsqu’il n’est mis en œuvre que par quelques États, on en vient à penser qu’il serait bien dommage de s’aventurer sur l’un ou l’autre terrain, au risque de fragiliser les fondements même du droit international.

27 agnu, « Annexe à la lettre datée du 15 octobre 2004, adressé au Secrétaire général par le Représentant permanent du Qatar auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies : Déclaration ministérielle », 21 octobre 2004, A/59/450, par. 55 et 57.

Part 4 Immunity and Impunity

∵

CHAPTER 13 Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État

Andrea Gattini

1 Introduction

La question du fondement de l’immunité des États étrangers de la juridiction civile ne cesse d’interpeller la doctrine depuis des siècles. La Cour internationale de Justice avait l’occasion d’éclaircir ce sujet dans son arrêt récent sur les Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État.1 Au début, elle semble s’y engager avec entrain. Tout d’abord, elle affirme que l’immunité de l’État « procède du principe de l’égalité souveraine des États qui, ainsi que cela ressort clairement du paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies, est l’un des principes fondamentaux de l’ordre juridique international ».2 Cependant, dans le même paragraphe, elle ajoute que ce principe doit être lu conjointement avec celui d’après lequel « chaque État détient la souveraineté sur son propre territoire, souveraineté dont découle pour lui un pouvoir de juridiction à l’égard des faits qui se produisent sur son sol et des personnes qui y sont présentes ». Et la Cour conclut que « [l]es exceptions à l’immunité de l’État constituent une déroga- tion au principe de l’égalité souveraine. L’immunité peut constituer une déro- gation au principe de la souveraineté territoriale et au pouvoir de juridiction qui en découle ». Le choix de résoudre le conflit potentiel entre les principes de l’immunité et de la souveraineté par une double exception se présente à première vue comme une solution brillante, avec presque l’allure d’un calembour. Mais, comme toutes les formules brillantes, qui voudraient trop simplifier les don- nées d’un problème complexe, cette solution cache plus qu’elle n’explique.

1 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce intervenant), Arrêt du 3 février 2012, cij Recueil 2012. 2 Ibid., par. 57.

2 Les dits de la Cour

On peut être d’accord avec la Cour sur la première partie de son discours : les exceptions à l’immunité sont une dérogation au principe de l’égalité souveraine. Cette simple phrase entraîne au moins trois conséquences. Premièrement, la Cour reconnaît que l’immunité est bien un droit des États, comme il résulte aussi de plusieurs paragraphes de l’arrêt.3 En deuxième lieu, la Cour confirme que l’immunité est la règle, et que son absence constitue bien l’exception. Il s’agit d’un passage fondamental, étant donné que le rapport entre règle et exception n’a pas été exprimé de façon très précise ni par la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur les immunités des États de 1972,4 ni par la Conventions des Nations Unies sur les immuni- tés juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens de 2004,5 dans laquelle le rapport demeure quelque peu implicite. En effet, d’un côté, l’article 5 de la Convention des Nations Unies, qui énonce la règle de l’immunité, est contenu dans la Deuxième Partie, intitulée « Principes généraux », et le commentaire de la Commission du droit international (cdi), tout en faisant mention des positions théoriques divergentes, conclut en rappelant que le principe de l’immunité « est à la base du présent projet ».6 À l’inverse, dans le commentaire de la Troisième Partie, qui concerne les « [p]rocédures dans lesquelles les États ne peuvent pas invoquer l’immunité », la cdi souligne que cette formulation neutre a été préférée à celles plus claires, mais controversées, de « limitations » de l’immunité ou « exceptions » à l’immunité, qui dans le texte provisoirement adopté en première lecture figuraient entre crochets.7 La troisième conséquence est que l’absence d’immunité, en tant qu’exception, doit être prouvée par l’État (c’est-à-dire par le juge) qui veut exercer sa juridiction. Mais qu’en est-il de la deuxième partie du discours ? Rappelons-le : l’immunité « peut constituer une dérogation au principe de la souveraineté territoriale ». Là un problème d’envergure se pose. Pourquoi entendre l’immunité comme une « dérogation » à un principe ? Un droit ne peut pas être considéré

3 Ibid., par. 54, 55 et 56. 4 Conseil de l’Europe, Convention européenne sur l’immunité des États, 16 mai 1972, ste n° 074. 5 Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, 2 décembre 2004, a/res/59/38, annexe. 6 Voir onu, « Projet d’Articles sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leur biens et commentaires y relatifs », Annuaire cdi, 1991, vol. ii, p. 23, par. 3. 7 Ibid., p. 34, par. 1. Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 225 comme une dérogation à quoi que ce soit. On est confronté à une alternative claire et simple : soit le principe de la souveraineté territoriale est la règle, mais si ceci est le cas, on ne peut pas parler d’un « droit » à l’immunité, mais tout simplement d’une volonté d’autolimitation de la part de l’État du for ; soit, bien à l’envers, c’est le principe de l’égalité souveraine qui doit prévaloir, mais dans ce cas il n’est pas question de le lire « conjointement » avec le principe de la souveraineté territoriale, parce que celle-ci est justement limitée par défini- tion par l’autre principe dont découle le droit à l’immunité.8 Tertium non datur. On peut essayer d’expliquer l’affirmation de la Cour de deux manières différ- entes. On pourrait la soupçonner d’être le fruit d’un compromis malencontreux parmi les juges de la Cour. On peut bien supposer que la majorité des juges entendent l’immunité comme un véritable droit ancré dans l’ADN du droit international. Il pourrait néanmoins y en avoir quelques-uns, ou quelques- unes, qui sont plus à l’aise dans un système de common law, qui restent dans une certaine façon attachés à l’idée, exprimée par le Juge Marshall dans le célèbre arrêt de la Cour suprême des États-Unis dans l’affaire du Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon de 1812,9 selon laquelle dans les règles sur l’immunité, c’est l’État territorial qui finalement renonce à se prévaloir d’un droit.10 Mais il y a aussi une deuxième interprétation possible de ce passage. Un indice est fourni par le verbe modal « peut constituer ». On peut penser que, déjà dans ses observations liminaires, la Cour a voulu se référer à l’immunité, dont tout État étranger jouit, même si ses organes ont commis des actes illicites dans le territoire de l’État du for. C’est exactement ce cas d’immunité, qui marque le plus la tension entre le principe de l’égalité souveraine et celui de la souveraineté territoriale, qui constituait le vrai cœur juridique de toute

8 Voir M. Sarzo, « The Dark Side of Immunity: Is There Any Individual Right for Activities Jure Imperii », Leiden Journal of International Law, 2013, pp. 105-25, p. 106. 9 États-Unis, Cour suprême des États-Unis, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 us (7 Cranch)116 (1812). 10 Cette tradition culturelle, qui trouva dans Lauterpacht un de ses plus célèbres représent- ants (voir H. Lauterpacht, « Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States », British Yearbook of International Law, 1951, pp. 220-72, pp. 228-229) maintient une certaine emprise dans la littérature juridique des pays de common law, qui conçoit l’immunité comme une expression de « comity » de la part de l’État du for, voir L.M. Caplan, « State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory », American Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 741-781, notamment p. 754. Même des auteurs qui con- çoivent l’immunité en tant que règle de droit, comme R. Higgins, « Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity », Netherlands International Law Review, 1982, pp. 265-276, cèdent à la conceptualisation de l’immunité comme « exception » à la juridiction de l’État du for. 226 Gattini l’affaire entre l’Allemagne et l’Italie, au-delà des débordantes stratégies de la défense italienne. C’est seulement en retenant l’attention sur ce cas spécifique d’immunité que s’explique la raison pour laquelle la Cour a pu parler, pourtant en termes juridiques imprécis, de l’immunité en tant que « dérogation ». Cela étant, il reste que, lorsque la Cour s’est penchée de plus près sur la soi- disant « territorial tort exception », elle n’a pas cherché à pénétrer les raisons profondes qui, dans ces situations, militent pour le maintien de l’immunité, ou les arguments qui, au contraire, sont soulevés contre un tel maintien. La Cour se borne à constater que, dans la pratique et l’opinio juris des États, on continue à reconnaître l’immunité à un État étranger pour la conduite jure imperii de ses forces armées sur le sol d’un autre État dans une situation de conflit armé.11 Par ces moyens, la Cour se débarrasse du problème de savoir dans quelle mesure la territorial tort exception, visée dans l’article 11 de la Convention européenne ainsi que dans l’article 12 de la Convention des Nations Unies, correspond à la coutume internationale, dans la mesure où elle ne distingue pas entre activités jure gestionis et activités jure imperii. Ici encore, la Cour se borne à signaler que le manque de distinction avait été un choix délibéré de la Commission du droit international (cdi), tout en admettant que plusieurs États, comme les États-Unis et la Chine, avaient soulevé des doutes sur la nature coutumière du texte de l’article 12.12 Il est évident que, dans un souci de coopération inter-organique onusien, la Cour n’a pas voulu démentir le travail de la cdi au sujet d’une convention de « codification », qui d’ailleurs n’a pas encore atteint le nombre de ratifications nécessaires à son entrée en vigueur. Néanmoins, la question centrale de l’affaire demeure celle d’établir la conception juridique à la base de la pratique et de l’opinio juris des États, qui fait prévaloir le principe de l’immunité sur le principe de la souveraineté territoriale. On l’a vu, la Cour s’y dérobe, et ne donne pas de véritable réponse. Il semble qu’une réponse puisse être cherchée dans une interprétation sys- tématique des exceptions à l’immunité. Si la ratio de l’absence d’immunité dans le cas de l’exception commerciale est due au fait que l’État étranger se conduit comme n’importe quel sujet de droit privé en stipulant des obligations avec des personnes physiques ou juridiques de droit privé, la même ratio peut bien aussi valoir pour toutes les conduites qui constituent un acte illicite de droit civil, comme un accident de la route,13 ou même de droit pénal, comme un

11 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles (n. 1), par. 65 et 78. 12 Ibid., par. 64. 13 Voir le célèbre arrêt de la Cour suprême autrichienne dans l’affaire de 1962, Holubek c. Gouvernement des États-Unis, cité par la cdi dans le commentaire à l’art. 12 du projet de la Convention des Nations Unies. Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 227 assaut ou meurtre, qui, même dans la situation limite d’un assassinat politique, pourrait être commis par n’importe quel individu.14 Cela n’est plus vrai pour les actes illicites commis par les troupes étrangères pendant un conflit armé, ici ce n’est plus le droit interne qui qualifie et régit les faits, mais directement le droit international.15 Les organes militaires d’un État belligérant, même quand ils commettent des crimes de guerre, ne sont pas assimilables à des bandits de droit commun. On peut justifier ou critiquer le silence de la Cour, selon les différentes conceptions que chacun peut avoir de sa fonction, arbitrale ou constitutionnelle, et du temps raisonnable pour régler une affaire, celui dicté par une stricte écon- omie du procès ou celui épanoui de la narration du droit international. Mais il s’agirait là d’une réaction quelque peu superficielle. Le judicial self restraint, dont la Cour a fait preuve, peut mieux se comprendre en tenant compte du fait qu’elle n’a pas pu, ou voulu, juger du bien-fondé des plaintes civiles sous-jacen- tes à l’affaire entre les deux pays. Comme j’ai essayé de le démontrer ailleurs, la règle de l’immunité pour activités jure imperii qui ont été menées à l’occasion d’un conflit armé est un moyen parfois facile dans les mains des juges internes pour déclarer irrecevables des griefs, à l’égard desquels l’acteur n’a pas, comme on dirait en anglais, une cause of action, c’est-à-dire n’a pas des droits fondés en droit international, soit au niveau de la norme primaire soit au niveau de

14 Voir le célèbre arrêt États-Unis, Cour du District de Columbia, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, Arrêt du 11 mars 1980, 488 F. Supp. 665. Je me permets de renvoyer à ma plaidoirie devant la cij : cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce intervenant), Procédure orale du 12 septembre 2011, cr 17/2011, pp. 36-48, par. 8. Dans le même sens voir A. Dickinson, « Germany v. Italy and the Territorial Tort Exception: Walking the Tightrope », Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2013, pp. 147-166, p. 151 ; en termes dubitatifs voir aussi X. Yang, State Immunity in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 944 p., p. 210, pour lequel, cependant, « that is not the decisive factor ». 15 Parmi les juges de la Cour, c’est le Juge Keith, qui a le mieux su focaliser son attention sur ce point, voir son opinion individuelle, par. 15 : « [t]hose acts are not acts to be assessed primarily by reference to local law ». Par ailleurs une argumentation similaire se trouvait déjà dans le troisième rapport du rapporteur spécial Sucharitkul en 1983 : « the question of State immunity should not be raised, or indeed need not to be raised, when the causes of action are outside the jurisdiction of the courts, or when the courts before which proceedings have been brought have no jurisdiction, because of the subject-matter », Annuaire cdi, 1983, vol. i, p. 40, par. 66. Dans le commentaire de la cdi (onu, Projet d’Articles sur les immu- nités juridictionnelles (n. 6), p. 46, par. 3), le fondement de la tort exception est rendu dans des termes ambigus, mais qui vont dans la même direction : « [p]uisque l’action ou l’omission dommageables se sont produits sur le territoire de l’État du for, la loi applicable est manifestement la lex loci delicti commissi ». 228 Gattini la norme secondaire.16 Pour sa part, la Cour, ayant décidé un an auparavant qu’elle n’était pas compétente ratione temporis par rapport à la demande reconventionnelle italienne,17 a fait attention à ne pas tomber dans le piège de la défense italienne, qui proposait à nouveau les mêmes arguments à titre d’exception défensive, basée sur le prétendu bien fondé des actions civiles italiennes. Néanmoins, il me semble que la Cour a été trop prudente sur ce point. D’un côté, il est évident que la Cour ne s’est pas prononcée sur la renonciation de l’Italie contenue dans l’article 77(4) du Traité de paix de 194718 à faire valoir toute réparation envers l’Allemagne, parce qu’elle avait déjà décidé, comme on vient de le dire, que cette question était hors sa compétence ratione temporis. D’un autre côté, elle aurait bien pu dire d’une façon plus nette que, au moins au lendemain de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, sinon encore aujourd’hui, les individus n’ont aucun droit individuel à une réparation pour dommages de guerre, fussent-ils la conséquence des crimes.19 La « surprise » et le « regret » exprimés par la Cour dans un obiter20 à la tournure pleurnicharde (au demeurant, une première surprenante et regrettable dans la galerie des obiter dicta de la Cour), par rapport à la décision de l’Allemagne de ne pas admettre les internés militaires italiens dans le programme d’indemnité du Fond « Mémoire, Responsabilité, Futur », ne change rien aux données juridiques.

3 Les non-dits de la Cour

À un deuxième degré d’analyse, il peut être soutenu que le silence de la Cour à l’égard de la « territorial tort exception » a une raison plus profonde. Il s’insère dans une tradition, qui remonte à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, de ne pas se prononcer sur le fondement de la juridiction interne d’un État.21 On pense tout naturellement à la célèbre décision dans l’affaire du ss

16 Voir A. Gattini, « To What Extent Are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’ Claims for War Damages? », Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2003, pp. 348-367 ; Sarzo, The Dark Side of Immunity (n. 8), p. 109. 17 Voir cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce intervenant), Ordonnance du 6 juillet 2010, cij Recueil 2010, p. 310. 18 Traité de paix avec l’Italie, 10 février 1947, 49 rtnu 3. 19 Voir cij, Immunités juridictionnelles (n. 1), par. 94 et 102. 20 Ibid., par. 99. 21 Cette remarque n’est pas nécessairement en contradiction avec la célèbre thèse de M. Virally, « Le champ opératoire du règlement judiciaire international », Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1983, pp. 281-314, pour lequel l’entier contentieux devant la cpji et la cij porte sur « l’existence, l’étendue (spatiale ou juridique) ou les limites de ces droits Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 229

Lotus de 1927. En absence de normes prohibitives du droit international, un État est censé être libre d’exercer sa juridiction comme il le juge bon, et surtout si, comme dans le cas d’espèce, l’infraction reprochée avait produit ses effets dans le territoire de l’État du for et que en conséquence les poursuites pénales pouvaient « être justifiées [. . .] au point de vue du principe dit de la territorialité ».22 En effet, l’Italie a bâti son entière défense au regard de la soi-disant territorial tort exception, en se référant à l’affaire Lotus, tout en se gardant, bien sûr, de la citer directement. La stratégie italienne était la seule praticable, du fait de la totale absence des précédents internationaux conformes à la jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation italienne. En même temps, la stratégie italienne présen- tait un atout formidable, celui de renverser la charge de la preuve. D’après les avocats de l’Italie, c’était à l’Allemagne de prouver l’existence d’une norme qui empêchait à l’Italie d’exercer sa juridiction pour des faits s’étant déroulés sur son territoire, tandis que, normalement, la charge de la preuve d’une exception à la règle de l’immunité reviendrait à la partie défenderesse. La Cour ici encore une fois n’est pas tombée dans le piège astucieux. Sans mentionner Lotus non plus, la Cour s’est adonnée à vérifier la consistance et la cohérence de la jurisprudence des différents tribunaux internes ayant affirmé l’immunité, tout en la confrontant aux incertitudes interprétatives des rares législations nationales qui n’excluent pas une telle juridiction, aussi qu’au manque total de jurisprudence contraire (à l’exception bien sûr de la jurisprudence italienne qui faisait l’objet de l’affaire).23 On sait que le principe Lotus n’a pas bonne presse aujourd’hui. Parfois, il est évoqué d’une façon tout à fait discutable, comme cela a été récemment le cas de l’opinion individuelle du Juge Simma dans l’avis consultatif de la cij sur la déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo.24 Jochen Frowein a déjà très bien

de juridiction » (p. 308). Comme il résulte clairement des argumentations de Virally, il retenait surtout une conception spatiale de la juridiction en termes d’exercice de pouvoir. 22 Voir cpji, Lotus (France c. Turquie), Arrêt du 7 septembre 1927, cpji Série A/No. 10, p. 23. 23 cij, Immunités juridictionnelles (n. 1), par. 70-78. 24 Le Juge Simma déplorait le « réflexe Lotus » dans le choix de la Cour de ne se pas prononcer sur la légitimité de la déclaration d’indépendance du Kosovo (cij, Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo, Avis consultatif du 22 juillet 2010, cij Recueil 2010, Déclaration de M. le Juge Simma, p. 478, par. 2), tandis que la Cour avait plutôt adopté une position agnostique, en soulignant l’absence d’une règle de droit international en la matière, ce qui est exactement à l’opposé d’une attitude « à la Lotus ». Sur ce point voir A. Gattini, « You say you’ll change the constitution – The icj and Non-State Entities in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion », in P. Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo 230 Gattini dissipé le brouillard sur ce point ; il n’est pas nécessaire de s’y attarder.25 En général, on reproche au soi-disant « principe Lotus » de représenter une vision du droit international dépassée, remontant à une époque dans laquelle le droit international vivait dans les ténèbres, dépourvu de la lumière rédemptrice du jus cogens, et dans laquelle la norme de clôture du système était celle de la liberté. Comme l’a bien démontré Alain Pellet, déjà au temps de l’arrêt Lotus, il n’en était rien. Ce que la Cour permanente de justice internationale avait voulu exprimer était tout simplement sa retenue envers la question de l’ampleur de la juridiction interne en tant que principe primordial de la souveraineté.26 Loin de s’abstenir de se prononcer, elle avait bien isolé une règle prohibitive en matière de juridiction, celle qui défend à un État d’exercer sa juridiction d’une façon extraterritoriale,27 ce qui n’était pas, comme nous venons de le dire, le cas de la Turquie. La retenue de la Cour de juger sur l’étendue de la juridiction interne d’un État, si ceci n’est pas strictement nécessaire pour trancher une affaire soumise à son examen, se repère dans d’autres différends récents. On pense évidem- ment à l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt du 2002. La Cour a écarté la question de la compétence pénale universelle, sur le fondement de laquelle par ailleurs le juge belge avait édicté le mandat d’arrêt, du fait que dans ses conclusions la République démocratique du Congo (rdc) avait renoncé à demander à la Cour de se prononcer sur sa légitimité, en se limitant à la deuxième question portant sur l’immunité personnelle de M. Yerodia.28 Tout d’abord, la Cour reconnaît que « d’un point de vue logique, le second moyen ne devrait pouvoir

and International Law – The icj Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, 245 p., pp. 233-254, p. 236. 25 Voir J.A. Frowein, « Kosovo and Lotus », in U. Fastenrath et al. (ed.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 1346 p., pp. 923-931. 26 Voir A. Pellet, « Lotus que de sottises on profère en ton nom ! Remarques sur le concept de souveraineté dans la jurisprudence de la Cour mondiale », in E. Belliard et al., (dir.), Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Pierre Puissochet – L’État souverain dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, Paris, Pedone, 2008, 331 p., pp. 215-230. Voir aussi H. Handeyside, « The Lotus Principle in the icj Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat », Michigan Journal of International Law, 2007, pp. 71-94, qui démontre que dans la jurisprudence de la cij, la formule Lotus joue au mieux le rôle d’un principe résiduel, mais certainement pas celui d′une présomption. 27 cpji, Lotus (n. 22), pp. 18-19. 28 cij, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), Arrêt du 14 février 2002, cij Recueil 2002, p. 19, par. 46. Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 231

être invoqué qu’après un examen du premier ».29 Cependant, compte tenu des requêtes finales de la rdc, la Cour décida d’examiner d’emblée la question de l’immunité « à supposer que la Belgique ait été compétente, au plan du droit international, pour émettre et diffuser le mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 ». On peut toutefois se demander dans quelle mesure les doutes, sinon car- rément l’opinion négative, de la majorité des membres de la Cour sur le bien- fondé de la base de juridiction belge, ont entraîné la condamnation de la Belgique de mettre à néant le mandat d’arrêt, nonobstant le fait qu’entretemps M. Yerodia n’était plus ministre des affaires étrangères.30 Ce volet du dispositif a été approuvé par dix voix contre six. Les juges minoritaires observaient que le constat de l’illicéité de la conduite belge ne justifiait pas une conséquence aussi radicale, même au titre de restitutio in integrum, mais il est intéressant d’observer que quatre des six juges minoritaires s’étaient aussi exprimés en faveur de la juridiction pénale universelle. Il n’est pas surprenant que le principe Lotus ait fait son apparition dans les plaidoiries, ainsi que dans les opinions individuelles et dissidentes jointes à l’arrêt. On assiste toutefois à un phénomène quelque peu paradoxal. Ce sont les avocats et les juges les plus favorables à la juridiction pénale universelle, vu comme facteur de développement du droit international, à l’instar du juge ad hoc belge Van Wyngaert, qui adoptent l’interprétation la plus libérale du principe Lotus. Dans l’absence d’une prohibition conventionnelle, chaque État serait pleinement libre d’établir sa propre juridiction sur son propre territoire jusqu’à la juridiction universelle in abstentia.31 Ce regain de popularité du principe dans sa formulation la plus extrême se justifierait, nous dit-on, par la nouvelle conception verticale de la communauté internationale, qui autorise les États à amplifier tous azimuts leur juridiction dans le but de combattre

29 Ibid., par. 46. 30 Sur ce point voir G. Gaja, « La discutibile revoca del mandato d’arresto di un ex ministro degli Esteri », Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2002, pp. 370-372. 31 Voir cij, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), cij Recueil 2002, Contre-mémoire Royaume de Belgique du 28 septembre 2001, pp. 89 et s., par. 3.3.29-3.3.31 ; la plaidoirie de Mme Chemillier-Gendreau : cij, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), Procédure orale du 16 octobre 2001, cr 2001/6, pp. 22-35 ; et la plaidoirie de M. David : cij, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), Procédure orale du 18 octobre 2001, cr 2001/9, pp. 6-30, notamment pp. 10-11), ainsi que l’Opinion dissidente de Mme Van den Wyngaert, juge ad hoc, cij Recueil 2002, notamment pp. 167-175, par. 48-62. En doctrine, on a aussi saisi le principe Lotus pour affirmer une juridiction civile universelle, voir C. Ryngaert, « Universal Tort Jurisdiction over Gross Human Rights Violations », Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2007, pp. 3-60. 232 Gattini l’impunité de responsables de graves violations des droits de l’homme. A notre avis, il y a dans ces arguments une contradiction évidente entre leur aspira- tions universalistes (à savoir, la lutte à l’échelle mondiale contre une préten- due impunité) et l’instrument finalement assez « parochial » (l’exercice de la juridiction domestique selon ses propres procédures) utilisé pour leur mise en œuvre, qui de quelque manière trahit le concept de dédoublement fonctionnel duquel ses partisans apparemment s’inspirent. On peut évoquer aussi une autre récente décision de la Cour, celle du 20 juillet 2012 sur l’affaire des Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader qui a opposé la Belgique au Sénégal. Même si l’affaire ne concer- nait pas l’immunité de la juridiction, elle donne un appui ultérieur à notre propos. La Cour a soigneusement évité de se prononcer sur la demande de la Belgique d’extradition de M. Habré, soit dans la perspective du droit coutumier soit, dans la perspective de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture,32 bien que la partie demanderesse eût formulé ce grief dans ses conclusions. L’argument d’ordre procédural avancé par la Cour pour se soustraire à un examen du droit coutumier a été justement critiqué par quelques juges, y compris le Juge Abraham, avec des observations très pertinentes.33 On peut encore comprendre que la Cour n’ait pas voulu se prononcer sur le bien-fondé de la demande au sens du droit coutumier, vu que la question est à l’étude de la Commission du droit international depuis huit ans.34 D’ailleurs, bien plus étonnant est le fait que la Cour ait évité de se prononcer sur le bien- fondé de la demande de la Belgique au sens de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la torture. En effet, l’article 5(1) de la Convention prévoit différ- entes bases de juridiction, qui pourraient fonder une demande d’extradition, comme, par exemple, la personnalité passive. Dans ses mémoires et ses plaidoiries, la Belgique s’était qualifiée comme partie particulièrement lésée à cause du refus du Sénégal d’extrader Hissène Habré, du fait qu’il y avait des citoyens belges parmi les victimes qui avaient porté plainte contre Habré en Belgique. En revanche, le Sénégal s’était opposé à la demande belge puisque, après la réforme de la loi belge du 1993 sur la juridiction pénale, les victimes doivent posséder la nationalité belge au moment de la commission des crimes.

32 Nations Unies, Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhu- mains ou dégradants, 10 décembre 1984, 1465 rtnu 85. 33 cij, Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal), cij Recueil 2012, Arrêt du 12 juillet 2012, Opinion individuelle du M. le Juge Abraham, p. 4, par. 18. 34 Voir onu, Rapport de la Commission du droit international – Cinquante-septième session, 2 mai–3 juin et 11 juillet–5 août 2005, A/60/10(supp), par. 500. Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 233

La Cour s’est bornée à dire que le Sénégal avait violé les articles 6(2) et 7(1) de la Convention contre la torture, portant respectivement sur l’obligation d’instruire une enquête et sur l’obligation de poursuivre. Cependant, elle n’a rien dit sur une éventuelle obligation d’extrader, en la « déclassant », pour ainsi dire, d’une véritable obligation à une simple option ouverte à l’État pour s’acquitter d’une façon alternative de son obligation de poursuivre. Confronté à cette curieuse décision de la Cour, on peut douter si, en se refusant de dire que la Belgique n’avait aucun droit de demander l’extradition, la Cour a bien rempli sa fonction judiciaire. Ce qui est certain, c’est que, en laissant cette question dans le flou, la Cour a de nouveau écarté une occasion de se prononcer sur l’existence des règles, qu’elles soient prohibitives ou permissives, portant sur la juridiction des États. On sait que, similairement à la question de l’immunité, la question de l’existence ou non des règles internationales sur l’étendue de la juridiction interne occupe aussi la doctrine depuis des siècles.35 Mutatis mutandis elle présente une analogie avec une autre cause célèbre, celle de savoir si et dans quelle mesure le droit international peut décréter l’illégalité d’une norme interne avant qu’elle ne soit appliquée.36 À mon avis, ce n’est pas par hasard que la Cour qui s’est plus avancée dans ce terrain est la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (cedh). De plus en plus souvent, dans ses arrêts, la Cour se penche sur les violations ou risques de violations systémiques de la cedh dues à l’existence même d’une certaine disposition législative interne, en dehors de

35 Voir entre tous F.A. Mann, « The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law », Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 111, 1964, pp. 1-162 et F.A. Mann, « The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years », Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 186, 1984, pp. 9-116. 36 Pour la solution positive voir parmi d’autres G. Fitzmaurice, « The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law », Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, vol. 92, 1957, pp. 1-227, pp. 89-90, qui distingue entre « representations » et « claims ». Pour la solution négative, parmi d’autres, voir G. Scelle, Manuel de droit international public, Paris, Domat-Montchrestien, 1948, 1008 p., p. 922. Pour une autre doctrine, la responsabilité pour acte législatif imaginable dans le cas où le droit international imposerait à l’État une obligation de comportement déter- miné et consistant spécifiquement dans l’adoption d’une certaine loi ou dans la prohibition d’une telle adoption, voir onu, « Sixième rapport sur la responsabilité des États, par M. Roberto Ago, rapporteur spécial », Annuaire cdi, 1977, vol. ii, par. 5 et s. Il reste que cette dernière hypothèse, qui est la seule qui serait pertinente ici, se produit rarement, parce que dans la plupart des cas d’obligations négatives ce que le droit international vise à empêcher est la réalisation d’une certaine activité matérielle. 234 Gattini toute application dans le cas d’espèce.37 Ceci trouve de multiples explications. On peut déceler la ratio de cette jurisprudence dans la structure de la norme interne, qui, en ne laissant aucune marge d’appréciation à l’interprète dans son application, peut être considérée comme constituant ipso facto une violation de l’obligation internationale, ou dans la conception que la Cour a de sa fonction de garante « effective » des libertés individuelles fondamentales, ou encore dans le souci d’éviter d’être submergée par des milliers de requêtes portant sur une même violation. Encore, ce n’est pas par hasard que cette tendance a été suivie par le tpiy sous la houlette activiste de Cassese dans le célèbre obiter dictum de l’arrêt Furundzjia, dans lequel l’illégalité d’une norme interne permettant la torture a été déduite directement du caractère de jus cogens de la prohibition de la torture.38

4 Conclusions

Cela étant, on peut bien comprendre la réticence de la Cour internationale de justice à se mêler, sans nécessité, de questions, qui touchent au cœur de l’exercice du pouvoir étatique. Même si tout aspect de l’ordre juridique interne, et fût-il d’importance fondamentale comme l’œuvre du pouvoir lég- islatif ou judiciaire, n’est qu’ un fait sous l’angle visuel du droit international, la Cour internationale ne prouve jamais l’exigence de sonder en profondeur sa structure. Cela à son tour s’explique aisément. Le caractère encore excep- tionnel de son contentieux, la raréfaction des temps et des procédures de son procès ne font pas de la cij l’instance la plus indiquée pour intervenir dans

37 Bien connue est la jurisprudence de la Cour relative aux poursuites pénales pour des comportements homosexuels, qui à maintes reprises ont été considérées en violation de l’art. 8 cedh, même si les requérants n’avaient fait l’objet d’aucune poursuite, voir cedh, Dudgeon c. Royaume-Uni, Arrêt de formation plénière du 22 octobre 1981, Requête n° 7525/76, par. 40 et 71 ; cedh, Norris c. Irlande, Arrêt de formation plénière du 26 octobre 1988, Requête n° 8225/78, par. 33 ; cedh, Modinos c. Chypre, Arrêt du 22 avril 1993, Requête n° 1507/89, par. 23. 38 Voir tpiy, Le Procureur c. Anto Furundžija, Arrêt du 10 décembre 1998, it-95-17/1-T, par. 155 : « [i]l serait absurde d’affirmer d’une part que, vu la valeur de jus cogens de l’interdiction de la torture, les traités ou règles coutumières prévoyant la torture sont nuls et non avenus ab initio et de laisser faire, d’autre part, les États qui, par exemple, prennent des mesures nationales autorisant ou tolérant la pratique de la torture ou amnistiant les tortion- naires ». Dans le même sens, en littérature voir E. De Wet, « The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and its Implications for National and Customary Law », European Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 97-121, p. 100. Immunité et souveraineté dans l’arrêt 235 un débat inter-judiciaire à différent niveaux. En outre, sa vocation n’est pas de garantir les droits individuels, même si récemment elle en a reconnu l’existence abstraite. Enfin, elle conçoit sa fonction judiciaire contentieuse d’ une façon qui la rapproche d’un tribunal arbitral plus que d’une cour constitutionnelle. Autant des raisons qui expliquent pourquoi la Cour a décidé l’affaire sur les Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État, qui pourtant présentait maints aspects de plus en plus débattus en doctrine, dans la manière la plus sobre et la plus fiable dans le sillon du respect de la souveraineté des États, soit celle de l’État en droit d’invoquer l’immunité, soit celle de l’État du for. CHAPTER 14 Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions to Immunity: Conceptual Challenges

Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack

1 Introduction

Possible exceptions to state immunity in cases of serious violations of human rights have been discussed for twenty years now.1 In 2004, the French and the German Societies of International Law met in Berlin in order to discuss ius cogens and obligations erga omnes.2 Isabelle Pingel and Thomas Giegerich presented excellent papers on possible exceptions to state immunity in case of ius cogens violations.3 Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice (icj) in Jurisdictional Immunities4 has confirmed the analysis given by Thomas Giegerich in 2004. In this volume, Michael Bothe and Christian Tomuschat comment on the Jurisdictional Immunities Case.5 Whilst Christian Tomuschat is in line with the icj, Michael Bothe argues in favour of another solution as Isabelle Pingel did in 2004. This shall not be repeated here. Rather, the present chapter shall consider the debate from a meta-level. The question is not, who is right, but why scholars and courts reach divergent results. Therefore, section 2 will distinguish three different approaches to the

1 See e.g. Andrea Bianchi, “Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights,” Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 46 (1994): 195–229. 2 Published in Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin, eds., The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 3 Isabelle Pingel, “L’immunité des États,” in Tomuschat and Thouvenin, Fundamental Rules (n. 2), 239–48; Thomas Giegerich, “Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?,” in Tomuschat and Thouvenin, Fundamental Rules (n. 2), 203–38. 4 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012, paras. 52 et seq. 5 Christian Tomuschat, “The Case of Germany v. Italy before the icj,” chapter 7 in this volume; Michael Bothe, “Remedies of Victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanities: Some Critical Remarks on the icj’s Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States,” chapter 8 in this volume.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_015 Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions 237 problem. Section 3 will then directly address the ethical foundation of international law.

2 Three Different Approaches

2.1 The Civilist Approach: Construing Legal Rules A series of scholars try to determine the limits of sovereign immunity by way of legal construction. They rely on accepted rules of international law which they apply to cases where a state has committed serious breaches of international human rights norms. This may be called a civilist approach. Some authors, for instance, contend that a state that violates fundamental human rights norms implicitly waives its immunity.6 Others apply the concept of forfeiture,7 or they contend that a breach of ius cogens may not be qualified as an actus iure imperii for which immunity is granted under contemporary international law.8 In this volume, Thomas Giegerich illustrates how the latter approach was applied by a us court, which relied on the commercial activity exception of the us Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in order to discard immunity in a human rights case.9 It has also been tried to justify an exception to jurisdictional immunity by way of reprisal.10 Some of these constructions seem hardly convincing. Construing an implicit waiver by the state that violates fundamental norms, for instance, appears to be pure fiction. Other arguments have been put forward with much more emphasis. The most prominent example of a civilist approach to state immunity in case of serious violations of human rights is the argument based

6 See e.g. Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Implied Waiver under the fsia: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law,” California Law Review 77 (1989): 365–415; see also us Court of Appeals, Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 1 July 1994, 26 F.3d 1166 (dc Cir. 1994), dissenting opinion of Judge Wald, para. 68; but see Georg Karl, Völkerrechtliche Immunität im Bereich der Strafverfolgung schwerster Menschenrechtsverletzungen (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2003), 133–34. 7 Juliane Kokott, “Mißbrauch und Verwirkung von Souveränitätsrechten bei gravierenden Völkerrechtsverstößen,” in Ulrich Beyerlin et al., eds., Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung (Berlin: Springer, 1995), 135–51, 148–49. 8 But see icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 4), para. 60, where the icj rebuts this argument. 9 Thomas Giegerich, “The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated Pissarro Painting: Recent us Case Law on Foreign State Immunity,” chapter 4 in this volume. 10 For a cautious use of this argument see Giegerich, “Damages Claims” (n. 3), 232–35. 238 Uerpmann-Wittzack on a conflict of norms and on hierarchy. According to this approach, granting immunity would enter into conflict with the duty to protect human rights. Since fundamental human right norms form part of ius cogens, they must take precedence over state immunity which does not have such a higher rank. This argument has been invoked by six dissenting judges of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Al-Adsani case.11 The argument is a civilist one of construing and applying accepted rules of international law: If the obligation to grant immunity conflicts with a higher norm of international law, the latter will automatically prevail. Although there are fundamental values of the international community underlying the concept of ius cogens, the argument of giving ius cogens precedence in case of conflict with ordinary norms of international law is a formalistic one.

2.2 The Constitutional Approach: Sovereignty v. Human Rights The constitutional approach goes beyond the formalist approach of applying given rules to a case. Rather, it relies on fundamental principles of the international order. If such principles enter into conflict in a given case, they must be weighed and balanced in order to develop a new rule of international law which realises all principles as far as possible.12 So it becomes necessary to balance the principles underlying sovereign immunity on the one hand and human rights on the other hand, and to seek a solution which is proportional to the aim pursued. Such an approach is familiar to human rights scholars and judges. So when the ECtHR is called upon to decide whether and to what extent the German yellow press may publish pictures showing Caroline von Hannover, then the court has to weigh and balance the right to respect for Caroline von Hannover’s private life and freedom of the press, and it does so in a proportionality test.13

11 ECtHR, Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 35763/97, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić. 12 This theory has been explained by Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, trans. Julian Rivers (Oxford: oup, 2002), 47 et seq.; with regard to domestic constitutional law; see also Martin Borowski, “The Structure of Formal Principles—Robert Alexy’s ‘Law of Combination’,” in Martin Borowski, ed., On the Nature of Legal Principles (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 19–36, 20–22; Robert Uerpmann, “La primauté des droits de l’homme : licéité ou illicéité de l’intervention humanitaire,” in Christian Tomuschat, ed., Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), 65–86, 66 and 71–72. 13 ECtHR (Third Section), Case of von Hannover v. Germany, Judgment of 24 June 2004, Application No. 59320/00, paras. 57 et seq.; see also ECtHR, Case of von Hannover v. Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions 239

Isabelle Pingel in her contribution to the 2004 meeting of the French and the German Societies of International Law also applied this constitutional method.14 According to the icj, however, this approach cannot be transposed to questions of state immunity. As the court held in Jurisdictional Immunities, “[s]uch an approach would disregard the very nature of State immunity.”15 At the Basel Conference on Immunities in the Age of Global Constitution- alism which gave rise to this volume, Theodor Schilling observed that the Al-Adsani judgment was not based on a constitutional reasoning. This is true. The majority of nine judges supporting the judgment essentially relied on state practice.16 According to the Court, immunities which have been “accepted by the community of nations” cannot in principle be regarded as a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court.17 So the proportionality test was discarded. Even the main dissenting opinion supported by six judges did not opt for a constitutional approach. Rather, these judges adopted a civilist reasoning based on conflict of norms and hierarchy.18 In fact, Judge Loucaides was the only to underline the importance of balancing competing interests in his dissenting opinion.19 The point is that judges of the ECtHR are acquainted with a constitutional method and that they are used to a human rights perspective. This might explain the narrow majority of nine to eight judges in Al-Adsani whereas the Jurisdictional Immunities judgment of the icj was supported by a much larger majority of twelve to three.20

2.3 The State-Centred Approach: State Practice and Opinio Iuris In Jurisdictional Immunities the icj firmly sticks to a state-centred approach. According to this approach, the extent and the limits of state immunity must be established under international customary law which is made by states. In order to do so, the court analyses state practice and opinio iuris.21 The court also

Germany (No. 2), Grand Chamber Judgment of 7 February 2012, Applications Nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, paras. 99 and 108 et seq. 14 Pingel, “L’immunité des États” (n. 3), 243, 245 and 247; see also Paul Ch. Bornkamm, “State Immunity against Claims Arising from War Crimes: The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,” German Law Journal 13 (2012): 773–82, 781. 15 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 4), para. 106. 16 ECtHR, Case of Al-Adsani (n. 11), para. 61 and passim. 17 Ibid., para. 56. 18 See above (n. 11). 19 This was approved by Pingel, “L’immunité des États” (n. 3), 245. 20 For the majority see icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 4), para. 139. 21 Ibid. (n. 4), paras. 54–55. 240 Uerpmann-Wittzack takes care to rebut some civilist arguments such as that of a conflict of norms.22 In essence, however, it relies on state practice throughout the judgment.

3 Ethics in International Law

3.1 Ethic of Principled Conviction v. Ethic of Responsibility Before the influence of ethics on international law can be addressed, it appears to be useful to distinguish two different kinds of ethics. Max Weber proposed such a distinction in his short treatise on “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” (Politik als Beruf ) which first appeared in 1919.23 According to Weber, an “ethic of principled conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) must be distinguished from an “ethic of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik).24 Those who follow an ethic of conviction only consider the value of the deed as such. Under such an ethic, it seems quite clear that courts must give justice to the victims of serious human rights violations regardless of state immunity: “fiat iustitia et”—as a critic may add—“pereat mundus”. By contrast, those who follow an ethic of responsibility will consider the consequences: “quidquid agis, prudenter agas et respice finem”. Judge Pellonpää applied this in his concurring opinion to the Al-Adsani judgment.25 He highlighted the need for international co-operation which required a legal framework, and he pointed to the fact that state immunity formed part of this framework. Ambassador Ney argued similarly at the Basel conference which led to the present volume. Judge Pellonpää even went so far as to state that granting Mr. Al-Adsani access to court regardless of state immunity might have become a “Phyrric victory” for human rights.26 At the Basel conference, Christian Tomuschat argued similarly with regard to the Jurisdictional Immunities Case: accepting the Italian claim would have meant chaos.

22 Ibid. (n. 4), paras. 92–93. 23 Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (München: Duncker und Humblot, 1919); English translation: Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Max Weber, Political Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: cup, 1994), 309–69. 24 Weber, “Profession and Vocation” (n. 23), 359 et seq.; Weber, Politik als Beruf (n. 23), 56 et seq. 25 ECtHR, Case of Al-Adsani (n. 11), concurring opinion of Judge Pellonpää joined by Judge Bratza. 26 In a more sober way, Matthias Kloth and Manuel Brunner, “Staatenimmunität im Zivilprozess bei gravierenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 50 (2012): 218–44, 238, allude to the political consequences of such a decision. Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions 241

3.2 The Pretended Value-Neutrality of Legal Construction The civilist, constitutional and state-centred approaches analysed in section 2 each take a different attitude towards ethics. The civilist approach seems to be value-free. When scholars analyse the question of immunities in terms of conflict of norms and hierarchy, they choose a formalistic reasoning. It is true that the very concept of ius cogens implies the idea of fundamental values of the international community which, in a constitutional order, take the form of principles.27 However, the inherent value judgments are not made explicit when a possible exception to immunities in cases of serious violations of human rights is technically analysed in terms of conflict of norms and hierarchy.

3.3 Making Values Explicit: The Constitutional Approach The constitutional approach makes value judgments explicit. It requires an operation of weighing different principles and of balancing them. When it comes to immunities, it is quite easy to evaluate the interest of realising human rights which is opposed to granting immunities. It is more difficult to analyse the principles underlying sovereign immunity. Here it becomes crucial to analyse the importance of sovereign immunity for international relations as Judge Pellonpää did in Al-Adsani.28 In a reply to this presentation, Anne Peters argued that state immunity was “purely instrumental”, the state having “no intrinsic value”. This is true at least from a German point of view, where the concept of a state having a dignity of its own has been discredited in the first half of the twentieth century.29 Rather, the underlying values of state immunity are crucial. To the extent that immunities serve the functioning of international relations they may promote peace and by that even save human lives.

3.4 The Realism of a State-Centred Approach When international judges and scholars rely on state practice and opinio iuris as the icj did in Jurisdictional Immunities and the ecthr majority had done before in Al-Adsani, they are discharged from making own value judgments. Therefore, their approach may be called a realistic one.30 This does not mean that ethic loses its importance for international law. However, it is not up to

27 For an analysis of the relationship between principles and values see Alexy, Theory (n. 12), 86 et seq. 28 See above (n. 25). 29 In the discussion, President Guillaume explained that the French state, which had pre- ceded the French nation, is still conceived as a value. Pierre-Marie Dupuy agreed. 30 See also Bornkamm, “State Immunity” (n. 14), 778. 242 Uerpmann-Wittzack international judges to introduce value judgments in their decisions. Rather, ethics remain important to the extent that state practice is motivated by ethical considerations and that states rely on ethics in their reasoning which leads to the establishment of opinio iuris.

4 Conclusion

Legal arguments with regard to immunities in cases of serious human rights violations may be classified into three different approaches: a civilist, a constitutional and a state-centred one. The state-centred approach is that of traditional international law. It is followed by the icj and it draws its legitimacy from state consent. The civilist approach is equally recognised in international law. So the icj accepted the concept that a norm of ius cogens would take precedence over another norm of international law in case of conflict, whereas it took care to explain that there was no such conflict of norms.31 However, a civilist method becomes problematic where it is used in order to implement certain value judgments without making them explicit. The constitutional approach is a matter of fact in constitutional systems like that of the echr. Weighing and balancing competing principles is an essential element of ECtHR case law. However, it seems that this method requires a constitutional court which can authoritatively decide on the right balance to be struck in a given case.32 While the ECtHR is such a constitutional court with compulsory jurisdiction, general international law does not show the same degree of constitutionalisation, and the jurisdiction of the icj still depends on state consent according to article 36 of the Statute of the icj. Therefore, autonomous constitutional reasoning is highly problematic within the context of general international law. This does not mean that there is no space for constitutional reasoning in general international law. First of all, a reasoning based on principles may be used in order to test legal constructions and in order to make inherent value judgments explicit. Moreover, states do not behave in an ethical vacuum. A reasoning based on legal principles may guide state action and it may help

31 See above (n. 22). 32 See Uerpmann, “Primauté des droits de l’homme” (n. 12), 79–85; Christian Tomuschat, “The International Law of State Immunity and its Development by National Institutions,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011): 1105–40, 1140, calls for the “guiding hand of an international organization (. . .)”. Serious Human Rights Violations as Potential Exceptions 243 to explain why states behave in a certain way. Applied to the question of immunities and their limits this means that due regard should be paid to the requirements of international co-operation within a world without central authority.33 This may be hard to accept under an ethic of conviction, but it corresponds to an ethic of responsibility as understood by Max Weber.

33 See also Kloth and Brunner, “Staatenimmunität im Zivilprozess” (n. 26), 242. CHAPTER 15 Immunity of State Officials and the Obligation to Prosecute

Pierre d’Argent

1 Introduction

Despite its hardly surprising outcome, the Germany v. Italy judgment of the International Court of Justice1 has been felt by many human rights activists as an astonishing and worrying setback. It is feared that it not only shuts the door to many civil claims instituted abroad against states in relation to past or on-going atrocities, but also that it will prevent any criminal proceedings directed at foreign state officials involved in such crimes. In light of such fear, this chapter intends to revisit the interplay between international criminal law and sovereign immunity from the perspective of the obligation to prosecute. After summing up the lex lata on the ratione personae and ratione materiae immunities of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction (section 2), this chapter explores the interplay between those immunities and the obligation to prosecute international crimes in order to assess whether such an obligation could provide a better rationale for an “exception” to immunity ratione materiae of state officials prosecuted abroad (section 3). The merits and difficulties of the argument against immunity ratione materiae on the basis of the obligation to prosecute are assessed, together with its normative foundation.

2 The Law as it Stands: Immunity ratione personae and Immunity ratione materiae

For the last two decades—basically from the Pinochet case2 and the Arrest Warrant case3 up to the Germany v. Italy 4 and Belgium v. Senegal 5 icj

1 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, icj Reports 2012. 2 uk, House of Lords, Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), Judgment of 24 March 1999, International Law Reports 119 (2002): 136. 3 icj, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, icj Reports 2002, 3.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_016 Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 245 judgments—practice has evolved and developed, so that the overall picture on the interplay between the immunity rules and international criminal law is now much clearer than before. In other words, a few basic points relating to the international lex lata can, as such, be assumed with a high degree of certainty. The first of those basic points—which is actually a starting point—is that the conceptual distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae seems now6 to be very widely accepted.7

2.1 Immunity ratione personae It is now settled that under international customary law, acting heads of state, heads of government and foreign affairs ministers enjoy total immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal prosecution, be it for acts performed privately or officially, and indistinctively of whether those acts have been performed before or during their term of office.8 The same is true for diplomats and members of special missions, but only in relation to possible criminal proceedings in the states where they are accredited or on mission.9 It is questionable whether other persons than the “triad/troika” referred to above also enjoy personal immunity by the sheer fact of the nature of their official functions (i.e. regardless of the fact that they are posted or on official

4 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1). 5 icj, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, icj Reports 2012. 6 This distinction was not used by the icj in the Arrest Warrant judgment of 14 February 2002 (n. 3). Six years later, it appears in icj, Certain Questions of Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, icj Reports 2008, 177. On the general acceptance of the distinction between those two types of immunity, see ilc, Report of the 60th Session, 5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2008, A/63/10, 333, para. 287. The distinction is also reflected in the case-law of the ECtHR, Jones and others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 January 2014. 7 On this distinction, see unga, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: By Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, a/ cn.4/601, 29 May 2008, paras. 78–83. 8 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), paras. 51–61, especially paras. 54–55. See also the resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law, Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law, Rapporteur J. Verhoeven, Vancouver Session 2001. 9 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 unts 95, art. 31(1); Convention on Special Missions, 8 December 1969, 1400 unts 231, art. 31(1) (considered to be of customary nature: see Michael Wood, “The Immunity of Official Visitors,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 16 [2012]: 35–98). 246 d’Argent visit abroad). The question arises because the enumeration by the icj in the Arrest Warrant judgment was clearly not exhaustive.10 This being said, there does not seem to be sufficient practice to support a generous extension of the beneficiaries of such personal immunity. In order to assess the benefit of immunity ratione personae to other persons under customary international law, one crucial element has to be taken into account: if indeed, as the icj ruled, such immunity is to be reserved to “holders of high-ranking office”,11 it is because only those persons “by virtue of their office”12 embody or personify the state. Without always explicitly referring to such condition, domestic courts13 have recognised that vice-presidents,14 but also defence and commerce ministers15 are to be protected by a personal immunity, while the Arrest Warrant and the Djibouti v. France16 cases respectively suggest that the Education minister or the Procureur de la République do not enjoy such immunity. The High Court in London ruled that the Head of the Office of National Security of Mongolia could be arrested for extradition purposes because he was not on an official visit in the uk and, moreover, because he lacked immunity ratione personae, as he was “an administrator far removed from the narrow circle of those who hold the high-ranking office to be equated with the State they personify”.17 The High Court rejected as being “too restrictive”18 the view held by the District Judge according to which the foreign official had to be “engaged

10 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), para. 51: “(. . .) certain holders of high-ranking office, such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs (. . .)”. 11 Ibid. 12 Wood, “Official Visitors” (n. 9), 11. 13 On the various domestic case-law, see unga, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum by the Secretariat, a/cn.4/596, 31 March 2008, 86–88, paras. 134–36. 14 Notably in Belgium as far as the drc vice-presidents under the transitional constitution were concerned, see Pierre d’Argent, “Jurisprudence belge relative au droit international public (2004–2007),” Revue Belge de Droit International 51 (2007): 149–91, 185. 15 Wood, “Official Visitors” (n. 9), 11 (fn. 27) refers to English cases where immunity ratione personae was extended to defence and trade ministers: Re Mofaz, International Law Reports 128 (2006): 709, and in Re Bo Xilai, International Law Reports 129 (2007): 713. 16 icj, Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (n. 6), paras. 185–86 and 194. 17 uk High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Khurts Bat v. The Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court, Judgment of 29 July 2011, International Law Reports 147 (2012): 633, per Lord Justice Moses, 653, para. 61. 18 Ibid., per Judge Foskett, 665, para. 107 and also per Lord Justice Moses, 653, para. 62. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 247 on foreign affairs” in order to benefit from immunity ratione personae. It would indeed be too restrictive to consider that the holder of the high-ranking office must be in charge, within the constitutional meaning of the term, of actually representing the interests of the state in international relations, including the capacity to legally bind and commit it. If it were the case, most constitutional monarchs would have to be excluded from the ratione personae scope of the ratione personae immunity, while it is clear that, according to the very words of the Arrest Warrant judgment, they benefit from it.19 Immunity ratione personae ceases to exist when the high officials protected by it leave office or, earlier, if their state waives it. Such renunciation by the state to the immunity of its high-ranking official does not entail any renunciation by the state to its sovereign immunity as such if the act concerned was iure imperii. So defined, immunity ratione personae protects from “any act of authority of another State which would hinder [the high official] in the performance of his or her duties”,20 even those relating to the prosecution of the gravest breaches of international criminal law. However, having no peremptory character, such immunity can be set aside between contracting parties by a specific treaty rule. For instance, it does not apply between states parties to the icc Statute for the purpose of the icc jurisdiction21 and cooperation with it. Due to the relative effect of treaties, it must nevertheless be respected when a non-party high representative is concerned,22 even, it has been argued, when the icc jurisdiction is triggered by a Security Council referral.23

19 Even if all heads of states benefit from a material presumption of competence for the purpose of contracting treaties, so that art. 7(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331) does not relate to the way their function is established but rather to the extent of their powers, this means only that constitutional limitations on their capacity in that regard must be “properly publicized” in order to come within the provisions of art. 46(2) of the same Convention: see icj, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, icj Reports 2002, 303, 430, para. 265. 20 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), 22, para. 54. 21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (icc Statute), 17 July 1998, 2187 unts 3, art. 27. 22 icc Statute, 1998 (n. 21), art. 98(1). 23 Paola Gaeta, “Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2009): 315–32. 248 d’Argent

2.2 Immunity ratione materiae All “representatives of the State acting in that capacity”24 enjoy immunity ratione materiae (also called “official acts immunity”) for the acts so performed, even if they have acted ultra vires.25 ‘Representatives’ of states include of course the triad referred to above and diplomats. However, in contrast with what is required for triggering immunity ratione personae, the concept of “representatives of the state” for the purpose of immunity ratione materiae is not limited to persons specifically embodying or personifying it. Rather, that concept encompasses all state organs within the meaning of article 4 of the ilc Articles on state responsibility, together with “all the natural persons who are authorised to represent the State in all its manifestations” to use the ilc comments on the 2004 un Convention.26 As stated in the study prepared by the Secretariat for the ilc work on the subject of immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, “if immunity ratione materiae is viewed as an implication of the principle that conduct adopted by a State organ in the discharge of his or her functions is to be attributed to the State, there appear to be strong reasons for aligning the immunity regime with the rules on attribution of conduct for purposes of State responsibility”—or at least, “the criteria for attribution of conduct in the context of State responsibility might (. . .) be a relevant source of inspiration in determining whether an act is to be considered as ‘official’ or ‘private’ for purposes of that immunity.”27 The idea according to which the attribution of a conduct to the state by application of the rules of international responsibility serves in determining whether immunity ratione materiae protects abroad the person who acted has been accepted by special rapporteur Kolodkin.28

24 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38, annex, art. 2(1)(b)(iv). ECtHR, Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n. 6), para. 205: “individuals only benefit from State immunity ratione materiae where the impugned acts were carried out in the course of their official duties”. 25 unga, Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum, 2008 (n. 13), 104–5, paras. 159–60; see also unga, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: By Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, a/cn.4/631, 10 June 2010, 16–18, paras. 29–31. 26 ilc, Report of the 43rd Session, 29 April–19 July 1991, A/46/10, 18, para. 17. 27 unga, Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum, 2008 (n. 13), 102, para. 156. 28 unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25), 14, para. 24. See also, in relation to civil claims, the argument presented by the government in Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n. 6), para. 175. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 249

Immunity ratione materiae extends to acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis,29 provided that they were not performed in a private capacity. It continues to exist after the end of the official functions of the representative, article 39(2) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations30 specifically providing that diplomats continue to benefit from criminal immunity after the end of their accreditation regarding all acts performed in the exercise of their diplomatic functions. Immunity ratione materiae is controlled by the foreign state, not only in the sense that it can be waived by it like immunity ratione personae, but also in the sense that it must be claimed by it.31 As the icj ruled in the Djibouti case: “The State which seeks to claim immunity for one of its State organs is expected to notify the authorities of the other State concerned. This would allow the court of the forum State to ensure that it does not fail to respect any entitlement to immunity and might thereby engage the responsibility of that State. Further, the State notifying a foreign court that judicial process should not proceed, for reasons of immunity, against its State organs, is assuming responsibility for any internationally wrongful act in issue committed by such organs.”32 The link established by the Court between the claim made by the state in favour of the immunity ratione materiae of its representative and its international responsibility does not exist with the same strict necessity as far as immunity ratione personae is concerned, as the latter immunity may relate to private acts for which no international responsibility of the state may exist.33 Like immunity ratione personae, immunity ratione materiae does not apply for the purpose of the icc jurisdiction between state parties.

29 unga, Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum, 2008 (n. 13), 107, para. 161; see also unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25), 16, para. 28. 30 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 unts 95. 31 Such claim should be made in limine litis, but a later invocation of functional immunity may nevertheless still be operative, as it is not clear that not raising the matter in limine litis would entail any implied renunciation: see Wood, “Official Visitors” (n. 9), 14–15, fn. 45, and also unga, Third Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: By Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, a/cn.4/646, 24 May 2011. As the ECtHR ruled in Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n. 6), para. 200, in relation to civil claims: “the immunity which is applied in a case against State officials remains ‘State’ immunity”. 32 icj, Certain Questions (Djibouti v. France) (n. 16), 244, para. 196. 33 See also on the relationship between the invocation of immunity and State responsibility: ilc, Report of the 63rd Session, 26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011, A/66/10, 234, paras. 183–85. 250 d’Argent

3 The Law as it could be Understood: The Interplay between the Obligation to Prosecute and Immunity of State Officials

To what extent does immunity apply when international crimes are prosecuted by foreign domestic courts? This question is well known and has fuelled controversy for nearly two decades. Many arguments have been presented in that regard and the question has divided the Institut de droit international,34 but also the International Law Commission. Since the Arrest Warrant judgment, the question seems to be limited to immunity ratione materiae, as the icj found the immunity of serving high officials—i.e. immunity ratione personae—to be “full”,35 i.e. absolute.

3.1 Two Views The “progressive” (or “activist”) view affirms that international crimes cannot attract any immunity. Taking stock of the Arrest Warrant, the less extreme version of such view is ready to concede that immunity ratione personae stands as a matter of lex lata during the term of office of the high-ranking officials making up the “troika”, but firmly argues that immunity ratione materiae does not stand when grave international crimes have been committed. The rationales for such “exception” to the immunity ratione materiae remain varied. In order to circumvent the obstacle resulting from paragraph 61 of the Arrest Warrant judgment—where the Court ruled that former foreign affairs ministers could be prosecuted by domestic courts having jurisdiction under international law for crimes that occurred during their term of office if those crimes have been committed in their private capacity36—, some have argued that such crimes have to be considered as private acts rather than sovereign acts committed in an official capacity because, presumably, it would not be in the function of a state to perform them. Others have considered that those crimes were so gravely illegal that the state was not entitled to such immunity, either because the hierarchy of norms based on the ius cogens nature of the rules prohibiting

34 See Institute of International Law, Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in Case of International Crimes, Rapporteur: Lady Fox, Naples Session 2009. 35 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), 22, para. 54. 36 Ibid., 26, para. 61: “Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.” Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 251 them would require so, or because the commission of such crimes would entail a necessary, albeit tacit, renunciation to immunity by the responsible state. Some have also considered that the right of victims to judicial redress was so fundamental that such immunity had to be set aside. All those arguments are well-known, and some of them have found their way in domestic37 or international case-law.38 There is however no need to rehearse them at length here, as they have already been thoroughly reported.39 The “conservative” (or “orthodox”) view holds that there is no exception to immunity ratione materiae. The argument is largely based on the construction according to which such immunity has developed as a customary rule without any “exception”, except perhaps “where criminal jurisdiction is exercised by a State in whose territory an alleged crime has taken place, and this State has not given its consent to the performance in its territory of the activity which led to the crime and to the presence in its territory of the foreign official who committed this alleged crime”.40 However, whether crimes committed during an armed conflict are included in that territorial exception, so as to allow their prosecution by the forum state, does not seem to be a settled issue even among those who are ready to concede such territorial exception.41 For the rest, the doctrine upholding immunity ratione materiae even when the gravest crimes have been committed by a foreign official consider that the arguments developed by the “activist” doctrine lacks sound logical-legal foundation and that it is difficult to consider that the Pinochet case has actually given rise to

37 One of the latest case to set aside immunity ratione materiae in case of grave crimes, pos- terior to the un Secretariat memorandum mentioned in footnote 13, is the Swiss Federal Criminal Court, A. v. Office of the Attorney General, Penal Chamber Decision of 25 July 2012, bb.2011.140. Even if—with all due respect—this ruling is far from being crystal clear or fully convincing, it follows a clear contemporary trend which seems more and more inescapable and supported by strong doctrinal and civil society movements. 38 icty, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 29 October 1997 on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber ii of 18 July 1997, it-95-14, reprinted in International Law Reports 110 (1999): 688, 710, para. 41. 39 On those various arguments and the authors or case-law supporting them, see the thorough presentation prepared by the un Secretariat, unga, Immunity of State Officials, Memorandum, 2008 (n. 13). 40 unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25), 56, para. 90, and 59, para. 94(p); see also paras. 81–86. See also uk High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Khurts Bat (n. 17), per Lord Justice Moses, paras. 63–101 and per Judge Foskett, para. 104–5. 41 unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25), 54, para. 86; ilc, Report of the 63rd Session, 2011 (n. 33), 226, para. 138. 252 d’Argent a consistent practice amounting to the existence of a new customary “exception” to the official acts immunity when grave international crimes have been perpetrated.42 I must confess that, together with the “orthodox” doctrine, I have never found the arguments developed by the “activist” doctrine to be fully convincing.43 The reasons to reject them are well-known:44 First, crimes are most usually committed in an official and sovereign capacity,45 precisely in order to remain in control of the state apparatus—when they are not simply required to be committed by state organs in order to exist under the law, as it is the case with torture as defined under Article 1 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (cat). Second, the hierarchy of norms argument based on the ius cogens nature of the prohibition of such crimes simply cannot hold46 as it sees a conflict between two norms that actually have two different objects and do not contradict each other, as the icj rightly stressed in the Germany v. Italy judgment.47 Third, no implicit waiver of immunity by the state concerned can reasonably be derived from the commission of a wrongful act. Fourth, the right of victims to a judge is never absolute and peremptory.

3.2 Obligation to Prosecute v. Immunity This being said, as far as substantive values are concerned, there is no doubt that the quest for greater accountability and the fight against impunity are

42 See Ingrid Wuerth, “Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed,” American Journal of International Law 106 (2012): 731–68. 43 See already my pleadings on behalf of the drc in the Arrest Warrant case (n. 3), available on the icj web site (cr 2001/5, cr/2001/6 and cr 2001/10). 44 See unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25); Joe Verhoeven, “Les immunités propres aux organes ou autres agents des sujets du droit international,” in Joe Verhoeven, ed., Le droit international des immunités: contestation ou consolidation? (Brussels: Larcier, 2004), 61–146. 45 The view according to which grave crimes can only be committed in a private capacity should logically lead to consider that the State of the official who acted cannot bear any international responsibility for his or her crimes, as they would not be attributable to it. Needless to say, such result is not in the interest of the victims and it is strange to see part of the “activist” doctrine supporting this argument. 46 See on the normative hierarchy theory Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 741–81. See also Theodor Schillings chapter “The Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Immunity of States,” in this volume. 47 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1), para. 93. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 253 worthy and legitimate political objectives. Neither is there any doubt that there is a clear contemporary aspiration to try to limit immunity ratione materiae if justice is not done at home. If this is so, and in light of the flaws of the usual arguments put forward by the “activist” doctrine, one should perhaps design a more convincing way to argue in favour of such limitation when state officials are prosecuted abroad for having allegedly committed grave crimes, usually in their home country. As announced in the short introduction of this chapter, the argument here explored is whether the fact that the forum state has an international obligation to prosecute the foreign state official could be the legal way to justify a limitation to immunity ratione materiae. The fundamental argument is simple and straightforward: it would be contradictory to require prosecution and at the same time to confer immunity from criminal prosecution. A few explanations are needed here in order to circumscribe this argument more precisely. As the icj recalled in Belgium v. Senegal,48 an obligation to prosecute entails the duty to submit the case to competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, those competent authorities having to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings. This is not the place to list the various treaties such as the 1984 Torture Convention (article 7(1))49 which was at stake in the above mentioned case that incorporate such obligation. Neither is it the place to enquire about the possible customary nature of such obligation. As this latter issue is much debated and doubtful,50 this enquiry shall be limited to treaty obligations, knowing that if those can serve to restrict immunity ratione materiae, any similar customary obligation should have the same effect. However, by limiting this exploration to treaty obligations, two things must be made clear. First, an international obligation to prosecute must exist. Thus, it is not because international law criminalises an act through a ius cogens norm that such act cannot attract immunity ratione materiae. This would not be sufficient and conclusive. Neither is it because international law allows, or even requires, states to have a rule conferring universal jurisdiction to their courts in relation to those crimes, or to make an inquiry into the facts, that immunity ratione materiae does not stand. According to the argument put forward, immunity does not stand for such crimes only if and because an international obligation to prosecute them exists, such obligation being a fourth and

48 Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (n. 5), para. 90. 49 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 unts 85. 50 See icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 12), Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham, paras. 31–41. 254 d’Argent not automatic step after the duty to make those acts illegal under domestic law, the duty to confer universal jurisdiction to domestic courts and the duty to inquire. Why is it not sufficient that states are allowed, either by treaty or by application of the Lotus principle, to prosecute? Why is it not sufficient that an obligation to criminalise domestically exists, or that an obligation to establish universal jurisdiction or to make an inquiry exists? If the obligation to prosecute is enunciated without any exception, irrespectively of the quality of the suspected author of the crime, the answer is simple: because limiting immunity ratione materiae cannot be considered to depend on the good will or the choice of the state exercising criminal jurisdiction vis-à-vis certain state officials and not vis-à-vis the officials of other states, nor on the choice of the victims. Thus, there is actually no need to establish that the crime is of ius cogens nature, nor that the obligation to prosecute is similarly peremptory. What is of paramount importance is that, in the very circumstances of the case, the state concerned has an international obligation to prosecute the person having allegedly committed the crime, and not simply the right or the discretion to do so. Second, in order for the immunity ratione materiae to be set aside, the international obligation to prosecute must exist between the prosecuting state and the state whose official is being prosecuted. If the obligation to prosecute cannot be based on general international law but on a treaty, then it is only if the state whose official is prosecuted is party to that treaty that one can consider that the immunity ratione materiae of its representative does not exist for such crime. The argument is that the state cannot claim the benefit of such immunity nor complain about the prosecution abroad of its official because it has consented that the prosecuting state has an obligation to do so. So, according to this argument, the fundamental question appears to be whether an international obligation to prosecute (as opposed to the right or the discretion to prosecute) the crime exists, in the very precise circumstances of the case, and whether that obligation can legally be opposed to the state whose official is being prosecuted. Only when those conditions are met, immunity ratione materiae would not apply. There is nothing really new in this argument.51 It was on that basis,52 together with the ius cogens nature of the prohibition of torture, that the House of Lords

51 See also Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts,” European Journal of International Law 21 (2011): 815–52. 52 uk, House of Lords, Regina v. Bow Street (n. 2): Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (at 156), con- sidering that the “whole elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction over torture com- Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 255 ruled in the Pinochet iii case. It is true that the 1984 cat only applies to acts of torture committed “at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of

mitted by officials is rendered abortive and one of the main objectives of the Torture Convention—to provide a system under which there is no safe haven for torturers—will have been frustrated” if immunity ratione materiae were to be recognised to State officials in respect of torture. Per Lord Hope of Craighead (at 200) appears to place some reliance on the development of compulsory jurisdiction regime established by the torture Convention regime: “[i]n my opinion, once the machinery which it provides was put in place to enable jurisdiction over such crimes to be exercised in the courts of a foreign state, it was no longer open to any state which was a signatory to the Convention to invoke the immunity ratione materiae in the event of allegations of systematic or widespread torture committed after that date being made in the courts of that state against its officials or any other person acting in an official capacity.” Per Lord Hutton (at 215), after quoting art. 7(1), of the torture Convention: “I do not accept the argument advanced by counsel on behalf of Senator Pinochet that the provision of the Convention were designed to give one state jurisdiction to prosecute a public official of another state in the event of that state deciding to waive state immunity. I consider that the clear intent of the provisions is that an official of one state who has committed torture should be prosecuted if he is present in another state”. Per Lord Saville of Newdigate (at 219–20): “The Torture Convention set up a scheme under which each state becoming party was in effect obliged either to extradite alleged torturers found within its jurisdiction or to refer the case to its appropriate authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Thus as between the states who are parties to the Convention, there is now an agreement that each state party will establish and have jurisdiction over alleged torturers from other state parties. (. . .) So far as the states that are parties to the Convention are concerned, I cannot see how, so far as torture is concerned, this immunity can exist consistently with the terms of that Convention. Each state party has agreed that the other state parties can exercise jurisdiction over alleged official torturers found within their territories, by extraditing them or referring them to their own appropriate authorities for prosecution; and thus to my mind can hardly simultaneously claim an immunity from extradition or prosecution that is necessarily based on the official nature of the alleged torture”. Per Lord Millet (at 231–32): “My Lords, the Republic of Chile was a party to the Torture Convention, and must be taken to have assented to the imposition of an obligation on foreign national courts to take and exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of the official use of torture. I do not regard it as having thereby waived its immunity. In my opinion there was no immunity to be waived.” Per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (at 244): “International crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are both new arrivals in the field of public international law. I do not believe that state immunity ratione materiae can co-exist with them. The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the principle that one state will not intervene in the internal affairs of another. It does so because, where international crime is concerned, that principle cannot prevail.” 256 d’Argent a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” (article 1(1)) and that this definitional element was crucial in many of the Lords reasoning. As the obligation to prosecute specifically applied in that context to such “official” crime, the claim to immunity ratione materiae was rendered all the more difficult to accept. This being said, it does not seem that the effect of the obligation to prosecute on immunity should be limited to international crimes that must be committed by state authorities in order to exist under the law. The argument based on the obligation to prosecute can also be traced in Jones v. Saudi Arabia,53 which related to civil suits, rather than criminal proceedings. The difference between the existence of an international obligation to prosecute torture under the 1984 cat and the lack of a comparable international obligation to offer judicial civil redress to victims54 was indeed at the very core of the reasoning of the Law Lords in 2006. Hence, from a method- ological point of view, all civil suits against states or state officials involving issues of immunity must be strictly distinguished from criminal cases where foreign state officials are accused55—and among those cases, only those triggered by an obligation to prosecute bearing on the forum state and opposable to the state of the official are relevant. In Belgium v. Senegal, it is quite telling that the icj found a breach of the obligation to prosecute disregarding, and even without mentioning, a possible problem relating to the immunity of the former Chadian president. It is true

53 uk, House of Lords, Jones v. Saudi Arabia, Judgment of 14 June 2006, International Law Reports 129 (2007): 713, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill (at 723, para. 19): “[b]ut the [Pinochet] case was categorically different from the present, since it concerned criminal proceedings falling squarely within the universal criminal jurisdiction mandated by the Torture Convention (. . .). The essential ratio of the decision, as I understand it, was that international law could not without absurdity require criminal jurisdiction to be assumed and exercised where the Torture Convention conditions were satisfied and, at the same time, require immunity to be granted to those properly charged” (emphasis added). See also at p. 729 para. 32, on the fundamental difference between mandatory criminal proceedings and civil proceedings and its impact on the issue of immunity. Upholding the House of Lords’ judgment, the ECtHR stressed at several occasions that the case related to civil claims, rather than criminal jurisdiction ( Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n. 6), paras. 208–215). 54 Other than the one where torture took place, as provided by art. 14 of the cat. In Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n.6), the ECtHR was not convinced that the obligation to offer judicial civil redress under art. 14 of the cat extended beyond the territorial State: “The question whether the Torture Convention has given rise to universal civil jurisdiction is therefore far from settled” (para. 208). 55 See very explicitly: icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1), para. 87. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 257 that the Court had been informed of the fact that Chad was not claiming any immunity for its former president as “the Sovereign National Conference, held in N’Djamena from 15 January to 7 April 1993, had officially lifted from the former President all immunity from legal process”.56 Such lifting seems to have been done in favour of all states, even if it might actually refer to domestic immunities in Chadian law,57 and well in advance of any foreign legal proceedings. Had Chad not lifted “all immunity” of its former president, a strict “orthodox” analysis of this dispute should have led to consider that the Court would have had to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it, by application of the Monetary Gold principle.58 It is submitted that such result would however be at odds with the unequivocal and general findings of the Court relating to the erga omnes nature of the torture Convention obligations59 and that the Court would probably not have failed to qualify them by reference to the issue of immunity, if such issue could have otherwise been a matter of principle.

56 icj, Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (n. 5), para. 20, where the response by Chadian Justice Minister to a request on that subject by the Belgian investigating judge is recalled. 57 See Paola Gaeta, “Ratione Materiae Immunities of Former Heads of State and International Crimes: The Hissène Habré Case,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003): 186–96, 195. 58 icj, Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Preliminary Question), Judgment of 15 June 1954, icj Reports 1954, 3; icj, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 26 June 1992, icj Reports 1992, 240. 59 icj, Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (n. 5), paras. 68–69: “68. (. . .) All the other States parties have a common interest in compliance with these obligations by the State in whose territory the alleged offender is present. That common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties to the Convention. All the States parties “have a legal interest” in the protection of the rights involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, i.c.j. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33). These obligations may be defined as “obligations erga omnes partes” in the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case. (. . .) 69. The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim. It follows that any State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an end.” 258 d’Argent

The fact that the Court did not feel the need to include an immunity proviso in those paragraphs, nor elsewhere in its reasoning, should perhaps be understood as an indication that immunity ratione materiae does not apply when an obligation to prosecute exists.

3.3 Merits of the Argument However daring in the eyes of the “orthodox” doctrine, the argument based on the obligation to prosecute presented above might actually sound fairly restrictive for the “activist” doctrine. It has however the advantage of departing from ontological considerations relating to the “nature” of crimes and, so, possibly extend to a large array of criminal behaviour, thus limiting immunity ratione materiae much more than it seems at first glance. Immunity ratione materiae has been usually analysed through the same lens as the one, based on the “nature” of the act performed, which is used for the purpose of determining whether state immunity exists in civil claims. But there is actually no logical necessity to do so, especially since there does not exist an obligation to offer civil redress, whereas there may exist an international obligation to prosecute specific crimes. The argument might sound unsatisfactory as it leads to a certain form of relativity of the immunity ratione materiae, depending on whether the obligation to prosecute can be invoked against the state of the prosecuted official. But immunity is a “normal” rule of international law and such rules are intrin- sically relative. Except in order to satisfy some principled position or some requirement of (esthetic) harmony within international law, there is actually no logical or legal necessity to solve this matter irrespectively of the positive obligations at stake. Moreover, relativity of immunity ratione materiae (but also ratione personae) in criminal matters results from the icc Statute itself, as it is binding on state parties only. One of the advantages of this argument is that, by departing from a rationale found in the ius cogens nature of crimes, it survives the Germany v. Italy judgment on state immunity, especially paragraph 82 of that judgment where the Court presents the intrinsic “logical problem” of the normative hierarchy theory.60 One could of course be tempted to argue that the argument based

60 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1): “82. At the outset, however, the Court must observe that the proposition that the availability of immunity will be to some extent dependent upon the gravity of the unlawful act presents a logical problem. Immunity from jurisdiction is an immunity not merely from being subjected to an adverse judgment but from being subjected to the trial process. It is, therefore, necessarily preliminary in nature. Consequently, a national court is required to determine whether or not a foreign State is Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 259 on the obligation to prosecute faces the same “logical problem” because the absence of immunity depends again not on the nature of the act (iure gestionis or iure imperii), but on its illegality. However, the obligation to prosecute does not require that the crime be established: it is triggered when a person alleged to have committed the crime is found. What matters is that the conditions of the obligation to prosecute are met, and it is a false logical construction to think that if the foreign official accused is finally declared innocent, it would retroactively mean that the prosecuting state has breached the immunity ratione materiae by instituting criminal proceedings. The argument developed on the basis of the obligation to prosecute affirms that there is no such immunity if the obligation to prosecute exists and applies. Hence, even if the implementation of such obligation does not result in a criminal conviction, no breach of immunity could be retroactively found. The “logical problem” to which the Court has pointed in the Germany v. Italy judgment only arises in civil claims, where the forum state is under no obligation to initiate proceedings. Of course, the prosecuting state could be responsible for having breached the immunity ratione materiae if it acted lightly, i.e. if there were no solid grounds for initiat- ing criminal proceedings. But this conduct would mean that the conditions to trigger the application of the obligation to prosecute were not met, so that immunity actually existed. Finally, the argument developed on the basis of the obligation to prosecute allows keeping distinct the issues of sovereign, i.e. state, immunity and of immunity ratione materiae, the first one having no bearing on the second, and vice versa. It was true already of acts iure gestionis, which do not attract sovereign (state) immunity but are covered by immunity ratione materiae, but it is true also for ius cogens crimes that are the object of an obligation to prosecute, not so much because of this nature but because their suppression is governed by such a specific obligation. Conversely, the absence of immunity ratione materiae flowing from an obligation to prosecute enshrined in international criminal law has no bearing on sovereign immunity within the traditional meaning of the word, i.e. on

entitled to immunity as a matter of international law before it can hear the merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have been established. If immunity were to be dependent upon the State actually having committed a serious violation of international human rights law or the law of armed conflict, then it would become necessary for the national court to hold an enquiry into the merits in order to determine whether it had jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the mere allegation that the State had committed such wrongful acts were to be sufficient to deprive the State of its entitlement to immunity, immunity could, in effect be negated simply by skilful construction of the claim.” 260 d’Argent jurisdictional immunity of states that are served abroad with a civil claim. The fundamental reason is that there is no obligation to exercise civil suit against foreign states responsible for any breach of international law and that the right of victims to a judge is never absolute. The result of such discrepancy is that the state will be immune from foreign civil claims relating to core crimes while its organs or agents might be exposed abroad to criminal liability. This may sound morally problematic, but one has to keep in mind that the immunity of the state is without prejudice to its international responsibility and that the conviction by a foreign criminal court of those who were its organs or agents at the time of the commission of the crime might constitute a crucial element in establishing the international responsibility of the state. Furthermore, as stated by the Nuremberg Tribunal, crimes are not committed by abstract entities but by human beings. Beyond immunity lies responsibility, and there is no doubt that, from a moral (but also legal) point of view, responsibility is a very different thing when it is incurred by the abstract entity called “state” or by individuals. It is therefore no surprise that the interplay between sovereign immunity and international criminal law might produce such result.

3.4 Normative Foundation of the Argument: Jurisdiction and Immunity After having reviewed the merits of the argument based on the obligation to prosecute, but before addressing its pitfalls, it is important to say a few words on its normative foundation. There seems to be indeed something inadequate in conceiving the lack of immunity ratione materiae in certain circumstances as an “exception” to the immunity rule. Strangely enough, this misconception is usually shared both by the “orthodox” and “activist” doctrines—besides being used by the icj.61 One can understand the common language reference to the notion of an “exception” to a rule, but it seems to be flawed in the sense that exceptions to a rule are always part of it and developed within it. This does not seem to be the adequate way of understanding the interplay between the obligation to prosecute crimes and the regime of state officials’ immunity ratione materiae. Like other immunity regimes, immunity ratione materiae is an “immunity from jurisdiction” and it cannot be understood as severed from jurisdiction.62 But this is not the starting point of the reports of Special Rapporteur Kolodkin who considers that “[d]espite the interrelationship of immunity and jurisdic-

61 See n. 64. 62 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 64, paras. 3–4. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 261 tion and the fact that the development of the institution of exterritorial and, in particular, universal jurisdiction has had a significant influence on thinking on immunity, the issue of immunity may be considered and studied without consideration of the substance of the question of jurisdiction as such, and vice versa”.63 However, as the icj has since then stressed, immunity “derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States” and represents a “departure from (. . .) the jurisdiction” of the state based on the principle of territorial sovereignty according to which each state possesses “jurisdiction (. . .) over events and persons within that territory”.64 Hence, if immunity, as an obligation under international law, entails derogation to the jurisdictional power65 of the state stemming from its territorial sovereignty, any “exception” to immunity is actually a return to normality, i.e. to the power to adjudicate over events or persons present within the state territory. In other words, what is at stake in the definition of the immunity regime is just its precise scope and limits in light of the territorial power of jurisdiction of states, rather than so-called “exceptions” since the situations supposedly falling within those are simply submitted to the normal jurisdictional power of the state. If the exercise of the state’s jurisdictional power is, on the one hand, commanded by an international obligation—like the obligation to prosecute as defined above—and is thus not at the discretion of the state, it seems difficult to consider simultaneously that a “departure” from the same power could, on the other hand, result from the immunity rules. In other words: if there is immunity, no power of jurisdiction can be legally exercised under international law and hence, strictly speaking, no power to prosecute can lawfully exist;66

63 unga, Preliminary Report on Immunity, 2008 (n. 7), para. 61. 64 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1), para. 57: “The Court considers that the rule of State immunity occupies an important place in international law and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations makes clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order. This principle has to be viewed together with the principle that each State possesses sovereignty over its own territory and that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the State over events and persons within that territory. Exceptions to the immunity of the State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality. Immunity may represent a departure from the principle of territorial sovereignty and the jurisdiction which flows from it.” 65 The French version of the paragraph quoted in the preceding footnote uses the words “dérogation au (. . .) pouvoir de jurisdiction”. 66 When a domestic Court upholds an immunity rule, it should conclude in the operative part of its ruling that it has no power to entertain the dispute, rather than that the claim is 262 d’Argent but, conversely, there must be jurisdiction—and hence no immunity—if there is an obligation to prosecute. This may sound extremely (and unnecessarily) complicated and removed from the usual understanding of the relationship between jurisdiction and immunity, according to which “it is only where a state has jurisdiction under international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question of immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction”.67 The normative foundation of the argument here explored requires to consider that, conceptually speaking, a state does not (cannot) have “jurisdiction under international law” if the exercise of that jurisdictional power entails a breach of international law. Hence, the argument is that if the exercise of jurisdictional power is commanded by a valid international obligation, it can only be because such power of jurisdiction is legal (i.e. exists) under international law. Once this is accepted, the question is of course to know whether the obligation to prosecute applies (is binding) in situations presumably covered by immunity. The “orthodox” doctrine will answer that it does not, so that upholding immunity cannot result in a breach of the obligation to prosecute, precisely because such obligation can only exist where there is jurisdiction. The argument is to say that there is none (or rather, no lawful jurisdiction) since there is immunity. But this answer seems circular and does not take the obligation to prosecute seriously enough in what it means for jurisdictional power. In other words, the perspective should be the opposite, so as to ask whether the immunity rule applies (is binding, or simply, exists) in situations where the obligation to prosecute exists. The argument here explored maintains that a negative answer to that question is sustainable for the reason that

inadmissible or that it lacks jurisdiction. See Belgium, Court of Cassation, Ligue des Etats arabes, Judgment of 12 March 2001, Revue critique de jurisprudence belge (2002): 377. In Jones and others v. United Kingdom (n. 6, para. 162), the government argued that article 6 of the echr “could not require a State to arrogate to itself powers of adjudication which, under international law, it did not possess” as a result of a customary international law obligation to grant immunity to other States. Although the ECtHR found article 6 to be applicable because “the grant of immunity did not qualify the substantive right but acted as a procedural bar on the national courts’ power to determine the right” (para. 164), it is quite interesting that States themselves, like the United Kingdom, envisage the interplay between jurisdiction and immunity in the same way as here presented. As to the answer provided by the ecthr, it should be recalled (see n. 53) that the case related to civil claims, to which article 6 applies. 67 icj, Arrest Warrant (n. 3), 20, para. 46. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 263 the obligation to prosecute, being unqualified, compels to exercise a power of jurisdiction which could not legally exist under international law if immunity applied.

3.5 Difficulties The main obstacle to such construction is to be found in paragraph 59 of the Arrest Warrant judgment of 2002: “It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions”.68 This statement of the Court must probably be understood in light of the issue at stake in the Arrest Warrant case, i.e. immunity ratione personae. However, it is true that the distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae is not reflected in the 2002 judgment, and that this paragraph is embracing “immunities under customary international law” in general. How, then, to circumvent this statement of principle which seems to be a radical obstacle to the argument explored? One could question the fact that treaty obligations to prosecute have, as the Court writes, the effect of requiring contracting states “to extend their criminal jurisdiction” and consider that those obligations rather impose on state parties that they exercise their usual criminal jurisdiction flowing from their territorial sovereignty over events and persons within their territory. One could also consider that, despite the fact that “jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity” and that “absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction”, it nevertheless remains that immunity is “une dérogation (. . .) au pouvoir de juridiction”, as recalled in the Germany v. Italy69 judgment and explained above. Finally, one could recall that it was undisputed that Belgium did not issue the arrest warrant in order to comply with any conventional obligation to prosecute, so that this paragraph, introduced as a “further” development by the

68 Ibid., 25–26, para. 59. 69 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities (n. 1). 264 d’Argent

Court itself, should be understood as an obiter dictum. However, none of those considerations really help to get over the Court’s position of principle. That position reflects a certain understanding of “various international conventions”. It is thus an interpretation of those conventions. But one cannot fail to be struck by the rather undetailed character of this interpretative exercise by the Court: instead of applying the usual rules of treaty interpretation, the above mentioned paragraph is based on the undemonstrated premise according to which “rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities”. It is certainly true that those two sets of rules must not be confused—hence, that they must be distinguished. But it seems rather abstract and artificial to consider that rules governing jurisdiction cannot have any bearing on the rules governing jurisdictional immunities, especially when the former contain an obligation to exercise jurisdictional power. It is true that those conventions do not contain any provision explicitly precluding immunity and that their travaux prépara- toires are silent on that matter.70 Therefore, it is probably difficult to consider that contracting parties had the implied intention71 to set aside or waive any immunity. This being said, if one reconsiders the interplay between the international obligation to prosecute and the rules governing immunities in light of the above normative developments relating to jurisdiction, the issue does not boil down to trying to construe treaty provisions as providing for an implied waiver of immunity. Rather, more radically, taking due account of the object and purpose of treaties imposing an obligation to prosecute means conceiving such erga omnes inter partes obligation72 as being necessarily grounded on a

70 Verhoeven, “Les immunités propres aux organes ou autres agents des sujets du droit international” (n. 44) 123 and 125–26. 71 This being said, retracing the common intention of the negotiating parties is not the paramount rule of multilateral treaty interpretation, let alone because not all contracting parties necessarily took part in the negotiation: see Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré Eveno, “Article 31,” in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, eds., The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, vol. 1 (Oxford: oup, 2011), 804–37, 829, para. 48 et seq. Moreover, state parties may have profoundly diverging views on the issue of the effect of the obligation to prosecute on immunity ratione materiae and it is not necessarily the case that all contracting states would claim such immunity. See e.g. the position of Belgium, which understands the effect of the obligation to prosecute as being the absence of immunity ratione materiae: Comments of the Kingdom of Belgium on the report of the ilc on the work of its 63rd and 64th sessions, 67th session of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (2012), Agenda item n°79, A/C.6/67/sr.22 at para. 44. 72 See n. 59. Immunity Of State Officials And The Obligation To Prosecute 265 lawful power of jurisdiction that contracting states recognise and require, and which could not stand if immunity existed. In other words, one party could not, lawfully and in good faith, dispense another one (vis-à-vis all other contracting parties) with the performance of the obligation to prosecute by the invocation73 of the immunity ratione materiae of its official, as it agreed that prosecution was required. One could object that such interpretation would deter states from contracting new treaties enshrining obligations to prosecute, or from acceding to existing treaties which provide for such obligation. This utilitarian argument must not be underestimated but it might also just be rhetorical, since it might actually very well be the case that, in this age of world public opinion, states would not like to be seen to refuse to adhere to treaties regulating international cooperation in the fight against grave crimes for the sake of allowing their officials to escape justice abroad, while claiming that they do not perpetrate such crimes. Finally, one could object that if the obligation to prosecute has such effect on immunity ratione materiae, why would immunity ratione personae stand?74 Since that immunity exists under customary law, as recalled in the Arrest Warrant, does it not mean that the whole argument based on the obligation to prosecute is flawed? In order to address this apparent contradiction, it has to be recalled that immunity ratione materiae has no limit in time, while immunity ratione personae is temporally limited to the duration of the exercise of the high-ranking office which attracts such immunity. Hence, it could be reasonably inferred from this difference, and also from the specific purpose and rationale of immunity ratione personae, that states bound by an obligation to prosecute understand that it does not apply to persons enjoying immunity ratione personae or that its non-performance might be temporarily excused.

4 Conclusions

This brief exploration of the interplay between the obligation to prosecute and immunity ratione materiae of state officials cannot be fully conclusive as a matter of lex lata. Nevertheless, overall, the argument based on the obligation to prosecute might offer a reasonable legal ground in order to limit the

73 The moment of such invocation is a matter of debate: see n. 31. 74 See unga, Second Report on Immunity, 2010 (n. 25), 50, para. 77. 266 d’Argent immunity ratione materiae of state officials who have allegedly committed grave crimes to which such an obligation applies. However, such result requires that the relationship between immunity and jurisdiction be reconsidered from a normative point of view, with the “constitutional” perspective of arriving at an orderly allocation of jurisdiction between states based on a logic of validity instead of responsibility. In other words, a Copernican revolution. CHAPTER 16 The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Immunity of States

Theodor Schilling

1 Introduction

Invoking state immunity in court proceedings is a way for a state to prevent judicial scrutiny of its responsibility for its actions. Such scrutiny, however, is the main raison d’être at least of those human rights regimes that provide for a supervision of states’ compliance with human rights. It would therefore come as no surprise if human rights jurisprudence, especially the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Strasbourg Court”) would prove to be a challenge to state immunity. As we shall see, it is not, or, at most, indirectly. Every invocation of sovereign immunity before a domestic forum involves two states: the state invoking immunity and the forum state. States in both positions have been made respondents in proceedings before the Strasbourg Court under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention” or echr).1

2 Applications Brought against a State Invoking Immunity

Applications brought against a state for having invoked immunity before the courts of the forum state have been given short shrift by the Court. On the one hand, the duty, undertaken by the contracting states in article 1 echr, to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the Convention rights, as a rule does not translate into a duty to waive defence positions those states enjoy under general international law, among them prominently the invocation to sovereign immunity. On the other hand, invoking immunity is not an exercise of jurisdiction and therefore does not open the way to protection of individuals against the invoking state by the European Convention under its

1 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ets No. 5.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_017 268 Schilling article 1.2 Rather, a respondent state in civil proceedings “could be likened to a private individual against whom proceedings are instituted”.3 In any case, “the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial,” and the impugned judicial proceedings never take place within the state invoking immunity.4 Thus, for the Court, there are several reasons not to entertain an application against such a state. This case-law obviously does not pose any challenge to state immunity.

3 Applications Brought against a Forum State Extending Immunity to Another State

Applications brought against a forum state for having extended immunity to another state regularly plead an infringement of article 6 echr which guarantees the right to a fair trial. From early on, the Court has construed that right as presupposing a right of access to court.5 The Court accepts that the latter right is not absolute but may be subject to limitations. Extending immunity to a respondent state obviously is a limitation of the plaintiff’s right of access to a court. In concordance with its general pattern for dealing with such limitations, the Court grants the contracting states a certain margin of appreciation, but reserves the last word for itself; in particular, such limitations must not impair the very essence of the protected right. The limitation must also have a legitimate aim, and it must be proportionate to that aim.6 The Court generally accepts that compliance with international law is a legitimate aim for restricting Convention rights.7 Indeed, according to its established case-law, the European Convention must be interpreted as part of general international

2 ECtHR, McElhinney v. Ireland and the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Decision of 9 February 2000, Application no. 31253/96, The Law, 2(b). 3 ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany, First Section Decision of 12 December 2002, Application no. 59021/00, The Law, 1(D)(2). 4 Ibid. 5 ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, Plenary Judgment of 21 February 1975, Application no. 4451/70, paras. 28–36. 6 Cf. e.g. ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Grand Chamber Judgment of 18 February 1999, Application no. 26083/94; ECtHR, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application no. 35763/97, para. 53. 7 Cf. e.g. ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 54; ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yillari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 June 2005, Application no. 45036/98, para. 150. Interestingly, the European Commission, in Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights: Commission Memorandum, com (79) 210 final, The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 269 law, not as a self-contained regime. That means that it must be construed as far as possible in conformity with the principles of international law.8 The Court will respect such principles even if they prevent a maximum protection of human rights; Convention rights do not necessarily have priority over other rules of international law. In our context, extending immunity to another state regularly pursues the legitimate aim of complying with the relevant principles of international law. At the same time, the fact that immunity is extended to another state in conformity with those principles has, for the Court, the further consequence that measures taken by the contracting states which reflect generally recognized rules of public international law cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction.9 Hence, a state cannot be required to override against its will the rule of state immunity.10 The decisive question in proceedings before the Court therefore generally is whether the forum state’s position on state immunity reflects rules of international law. In the Court’s relevant case-law, the authoritative source of those rules has become, within its scope of application, first the International Law Commission’s 1991 Draft Articles11 and then the un Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States and their Property (the “un Convention”).12 While that Convention is not yet in force, the Court takes it to reflect customary international law applicable to any state that has not objected to the Convention’s adoption,13 or to the adoption of a specific rule thereof in the draft articles.14 To quote the Court, on the basis of a state’s participation in the negotiation and/or the adoption of the Convention “it is possible to affirm that [one of the draft articles] applies to the respondent State under

2 May 1979, 10, assumed that in such a case “the Member State would certainly be unable to rely on the defence that it was merely fulfilling an obligation under Community law”. 8 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 55. 9 ECtHR, McElhinney (n. 2), para. 37. 10 ECtHR, Sedelmayer v. Germany, Fifth Section Decision of 10 November 2009, Application nos. 30190/06 and 30216/06, The Law, 1. 11 un, “Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with Commentaries,” Yearbook ilc 1991 ii(2) 12 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 2 December 2004, a/res/59/38, annex, not yet in force. 13 Cf. ECtHR, Cudak v. Lithuania, Grand Chamber Judgment 23 March 2010, Application no. 15869/02, paras. 66–67. 14 ECtHR, Wallishauser v. Austria, First Section Judgment of 17 July 2012, Application no. 156/04, para. 69. 270 Schilling customary international law”.15 Thus, the Court considers such participation as proof of the development of customary law applicable to that state. The Court does not look at the state the law of state immunity was in before the ilc started its work on the un Convention, and it never asks whether specific provisions of the un Convention reflect pre-existing, or emerging, rules of customary international law or whether, to the contrary, they lack any customary law character.16 While the Court’s approach appears to remain within the mainstream of judicial pronouncements on the impact the codification process has on customary law,17 it effectively challenges traditional concepts of state immunity by relying on a text more restrictive of that immunity and which is not (yet) binding on states as a treaty.

4 Groups of Cases

The Court’s case-law dealing with article 6 applications in immunity cases can be divided in five groups each of which has distinctive features. Most of those groups reflect exceptions from the principle of state immunity provided for in the un Convention. The first group covers the invocation of immunity in proceedings relating to damages for grievous bodily harm caused within the forum state.18 A second group covers the invocation of immunity in proceedings which relate to questions of employment.19 A third group covers the invocation of immunity in enforcement proceedings.20 A fourth group covers the

15 ECtHR, Cudak (n. 13), para. 67. 16 Cf. Tullio Treves, “Customary International Law,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: oup, online edition), accessed 15 October 2013, para. 75; ECtHR, Cudak (n. 13), Concurring Opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto, Joined by Judge Popovic. 17 Cf. Treves, “Customary International Law” (n. 16), paras. 65–67. 18 ECtHR, McElhinney v. Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application no. 31253/96. 19 ECtHR, Fogarty v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application no. 37112/97; ECtHR, Cudak (n. 13); ECtHR, Sabeh El Leil v. France, Grand Chamber Judgment of 29 June 2011, Application no. 34869/05; ECtHR, Wallishauser (n. 14). 20 ECtHR, Kalogeroupoulou (n. 3); ECtHR, Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia, Third Section Decision of 3 March 2005, Application no. 60861/00; ECtHR, Treska v. Albania and Italy, Third Section Decision of 29 June 2006, Application no. 26937/04; ECtHR, Sedelmayer (n. 10). The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 271 immunity of international organizations.21 A fifth and final group covers the invocation of immunity in proceedings relating to damages for gross human rights violations, especially torture and war crimes.22 Apart from the international organizations group the latter is the only group which does not reflect an exception provided for in the un Convention and therefore is the most con- tentious one.

4.1 The Invocation of Immunity in Proceedings Relating to Damages for Grievous Bodily Harm Caused within the Forum State This group of cases consists to date to my knowledge of just one item. McElhinney, the applicant in that case, was an Irish policeman attacked, as the result of rather farcical events for which he himself was largely to blame, by a British soldier within Ireland. He alleged that he had feared for his life and suffered severe post-traumatic shock from that attack, and lodged an action in the Irish High Court against the soldier and the uk government, claiming damages. The United Kingdom raised the defence of sovereign immunity; the Irish courts granted it. Before the Strasbourg Court, the case turned mostly on the question of the proportionality of the restriction of access to a court by the extension of immunity. The Court referred to a wealth of legal material—legislation on state immunity of various states,23 article 12 of the draft articles of what is now the un Convention, and article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity (Basle Convention)24—to recognize “a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State”. However, it found “that this practice is by no means universal”. Therefore, Irish law which provided for the extension of immunity in such a case did not conflict with the general principles of

21 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy (n. 6); ECtHR, Beer and Regan v. Germany, Grand Chamber Judgment of 18 February 1999, Application no. 28934/95; and cf. Swiss Federal Court, nml Capital Ltd and em Ltd v. Bank of International Settlement (bis) and Debt Enforcement Office Basel-Stadt, Judgment of 12 July 2010, bge 136 iii 379; Netherlands Supreme Court, Mothers of Srebrenica Association and Others v. The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, Judgment of 13 April 2012, ildc 1760 (nl 2012), English translation accessed 21 October 2013, http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad/Supreme-court/ Summaries-of-some-important-rulings-of-the-Supreme-Court/Pages/Ruling-Dutch- Supreme-Court-Mothers-of-Srebrenica.aspx. 22 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6). 23 I.e. of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and Australia. 24 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, cets No. 074. 272 Schilling international law.25 In any case, granting sovereign immunity was not disproportionate because the applicant could pursue an action in the United Kingdom. The dissenters basically claimed that the majority had misrepresented the state of international law; according to them, article 12 of the un Convention reflected the law as it was at the time of the facts and covered them so that the Court should have held article 6(1) echr to apply in the case under consideration. Put differently, majority and minority of the Court agreed on the dispositive role of international law in the decision of the case, but disagreed on the contents of that law.

4.2 The Invocation of Immunity in Cases which Relate to Questions of Employment Claims from employment especially by employees of diplomatic and consular representations of states are countered rather often by the invocation of sovereign immunity. Cases on employment contracts with an international organization, are best dealt with under the heading of the immunity of such organizations. When an employment contract is with a diplomatic agent rather than with his sending state, the question of immunity is governed by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations26 rather than by customary international law and will not be dealt with here.27 Four remaining cases were decided by the Strasbourg Court. The judgments demonstrate perfectly the Court’s close adherence to what it sees as the customary international law of sovereign immunity. Indeed, whether the denial of access to court because of the invocation of sovereign immunity in proceedings related to employment questions is compatible with article 6(1) echr is

25 ECtHR, McElhinney (n. 18), para. 38. 26 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 unts 95. 27 An example is Regional Labour Court Berlin-Brandenburg, Judgment of 9 November 2011, 17 Sa 1468/11, accessed 21 October 2013, http://www.gerichtsentscheidungen .berlin-brandenburg.de/jportal/?quelle=jlink&docid=JURE110021446&psml=sammlung. psml&max=true&bs=10. According to that judgment, a diplomatic agent’s immunity from civil jurisdiction is not dependent on the gravity of his alleged or real infringement of the law. The case dealt with a diplomatic agent having allegedly held a domestic employee as a slave. According to the German Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 22 August 2012, 5 azr 949/11, accessed 30 July 2014, http://juris.bundesarbeitsgericht.de/cgi-bin/rechtspre chung/document.py?Gericht=bag&Art=en&nr=16236, deciding on the plaintiff’s revision against the lower judgment, the agent’s immunity from jurisdiction ended with his subsequent return to his home country. The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 273 decided by the Court on the basis of article 11 of the un Convention or, before the latter’s adoption, on the basis of its draft articles. On this basis, the Court in Fogarty did not find a violation of article 6(1) echr because, under article 11(2)(c) of the un Convention, a state can still invoke immunity from jurisdiction if the subject matter of the proceeding is, as it was in that case, the recruitment of an individual.28 In Cudak and Sabeh El Leil the Court found a violation because the subject matter of those proceedings—the dismissal of an employee—did not fit any of the exceptions of article 11(2) and therefore was to be judged under article 11(1) of the un Convention according to which a state cannot invoke immunity in proceedings which relate to employment.29 In Wallishauser, the Court, referring to Cudak and Sabeh El Leil, found a violation (a) because the foreign state, under article 11(1) of the un Convention, could not invoke immunity and (b) because, contrary to the view of the respondent forum state, service of process on the foreign ministry of the employer state was sufficient under article 22(1)(c)(i) of the un Convention so that the latter’s refusal to serve summonses on its ministry of justice was immaterial.30 In the latter three cases, the Court considered the forum to have impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right to access to court.31

4.3 The Invocation of Immunity From Execution or Other Post-Judgment Measures of Constraint Four decisions of the Strasbourg Court deal with a state’s immunity from execution. The Court’s jurisprudence in the matter is unequivocal in its results but appears inconsistent in its reasoning. While the Court does here, too, closely adhere to what it perceives as the current state of customary international law, the rules it invokes are those on the immunity from execution in some cases and those on jurisdictional immunity in others. When the Court invokes the rules on immunity from execution, its starting point is the judgment creditor’s right to see a final judgment, or a final decision of another appropriate body, enforced.32 This is another right developed by the Court on the basis of

28 ECtHR, Fogarty (n. 19), para. 38. 29 ECtHR, Cudak (n. 13), paras. 65–72; ECtHR, Sabeh El Leil (n. 19), paras. 57–66. 30 ECtHR, Wallishauser (n. 14), paras. 68–71. 31 ECtHR, Cudak (n. 13), para. 74; ECtHR, Sabeh El Leil (n. 19), paras. 67; ECtHR, Wallishauser (n. 14), para. 72. 32 ECtHR, Manoilescu (n. 20), para. 67. 274 Schilling article 6(1) echr33 as part of the right to a court but which may be subject to limitations. Accordingly, the Court rejected an application based on the non- enforcement of a final administrative decision restituting to the applicants property actually used by a foreign state for the housing of diplomatic staff, remarking that it was “not aware of any trend in international law towards a relaxation of the rule that foreign States are immune from execution in respect of their property serving as the premises of (. . .) missions in the forum State,”34 even if that property had been acquired illegally.35 In another relevant case, the Court summarised its previous case-law holding that “international legal instruments governing state immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly limited exceptions, foreign states enjoy immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State,”36 switching thereby, without explanation, from customary international law to undefined “international legal instruments”. When the Court invoked the rules on jurisdictional immunity, it held in one case that “the decision in which the national courts refused to order the administrative authorities to take measures of constraint (. . .) can be regarded as a justified restriction on the applicants’ right of access to a court”.37 In another case, the Court rejected, again without any reference to an international law rule concerning immunity from execution, an application based on the non- enforcement of a final court judgment which, after having expressly denied the immunity invoked by the respondent state, awarded damages for crimes against humanity against that state. Here, the Strasbourg Court did not find it established “that there is yet acceptance in international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages brought against them in another State from crimes against humanity,”38 thereby criticising, at least implicitly, the final domestic judgment. Therefore, in the Court’s opinion, that judgment did not oblige the forum state under the Convention to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in the forum state.

33 Cf. e.g. ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia, First Section Judgment of 7 May 2002, Application no. 59498/00, para. 34, with further references. 34 ECtHR, Manoilescu (n. 20), para. 81; cf. also ECtHR, Treska (n. 20), The Law, 2(a)(ii). 35 ECtHR, Manoilescu (n. 20), para. 77. 36 ECtHR, Sedelmayer (n. 10), The Law, 1. 37 ECtHR, Treska (n. 20), The Law, 2(a)(ii). 38 ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou (n. 3), The Law, 1(D)(1)(a), referring to ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 66. The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 275

4.4 The Immunity of International Organizations There are only two—parallel—cases in which the Court had to decide on the immunity of an international organization. Those cases concerned labour court proceedings against the European Space Agency.39 The Court considered the article 6(1) echr right protected in those cases as the right to a court which was not necessarily satisfied by the mere access to a court if the action was immediately barred by operation of law because of the invocation of immunity by the international organization.40 It also considered that the immunity from jurisdiction commonly accorded by states to international organizations is a long standing practice established in the interest of the good working of these organizations and therefore has a legitimate objective.41 As to proportionality, the Court considered it a material factor whether the applicants had available to them “reasonable alternative means to protect effectively” their Convention rights.42 It found that such alternative means existed in fact and concluded therefore that the labour courts had not exceeded their margin of appreciation, as the applicants’ limitation of access to these courts did not impair the essence of their right to a court.43

4.5 The Invocation of Immunity in Proceedings Relating to Damages for Gross Human Rights Violations This group consists to date to my knowledge of just one item. Al-Adsani, the applicant in that case, made allegations of severe torture on Kuwaiti soil in a suit brought before English courts against the state of Kuwait. In England, the case turned on the interpretation of the English State Immunity Act 1978. The applicant’s argument was that the Act which actually read: “A State is immune (. . .)” should be construed as if it read: “A State acting within the Law of Nations is immune (. . .)” although no words to this effect were included in the Act. The English courts disagreed.44 Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicant claimed a violation of article 3 (prohibition of torture) and article 6 (fair trial) of the European Convention. Concerning article 3, he submitted that the Convention required a contracting state to assist one of its citizens in obtaining an effective remedy for

39 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy (n. 6); ECtHR, Beer and Regan (n. 21). 40 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy (n. 6), para. 51. 41 Ibid., para. 63. 42 Ibid., para. 68. 43 Ibid., para. 73. 44 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 18. 276 Schilling torture against another state.45 The Court unanimously rejected that argument. It held that a contracting state’s engagement under article 1 of the European Convention was confined to securing Convention rights to persons within its jurisdiction, and any positive obligation which might flow from those rights was likewise limited to the contracting state’s territory.46 The central point of the case rather was article 6 of the European Convention (fair trial). The applicant alleged that he was denied access to a court in the determination of his claims against the state of Kuwait.47 The extension of immunity by the English courts to that state indubitably restricted that access. The dispute between the parties was about whether that restriction pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate to that aim.48 This was also the dispute over which the Grand Chamber of the Court split nine to eight. As in McElhinney, which was decided on the same day, the Court referred to a wealth of legal material.49 The Court’s majority, in accordance with the Court’s general approach to that question, held that the legitimate aim was compliance with international law. Similarly, it held that measures taken by the contracting states which reflected generally recognized rules of public international law could not in principle be regarded as disproportionate.50 It noted that the applicant accepted, “except insofar as it affects claims for damages for torture,” that state immunity is still preserved in respect of civil proceedings for damage for personal injuries not caused in the territory of the forum state.51 So all boiled down to the question whether there was a special international law rule for torture claims. The Court’s majority recognized the special stigma torture has52 and went on to accept, on the basis of various judicial authorities,53 that the prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm of international

45 Ibid., para. 35. 46 Ibid., paras. 37–41. 47 Ibid., para. 42. 48 Ibid., paras. 50–51. 49 Cf. text at n. 22 et seq. 50 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 56. 51 Ibid., para. 57. 52 Ibid., para. 59. 53 Especially icty, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment of 10 December 1998, it-95-17/1, paras. 144 et seq., quoted in ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 30; the Pinochet case, uk, House of Lords, Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), Judgment of 24 March 1999 [2000] Appeal Cases 147, quoted in ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 34. The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 277 law.54 However, while noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of torture,55 it was unable to discern, in the materials before it, “any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged”.56 In a later case, Kalogeropoulou, the Court held that where a judgment denied, under similar circumstances, sovereign immunity and awarded damages against the respondent state, its enforcement was not required under the European Convention.57 The leading dissenting opinion by six judges58 with which a seventh expressly agreed59 argued that the prohibition of torture was a peremptory rule of international law, as indeed the majority accepted. State immunity, on the other hand, was not ius cogens. Ergo the peremptory rule must prevail. The dissenting opinion also alleged an inconsistency in the majority opinion in that the latter maintained that “the standard applicable in civil cases differs from those applying in criminal matters when a conflict arises between the peremptory norm of international law on the prohibition of torture and the rules of State immunity”.60 As it stands, it is submitted, the dissenters’ main argument is not very convincing. An argument apt seriously to challenge the majority opinion would at a minimum have to spell out those rules of the core and the penumbra of the prohibition of torture which it considers as ius cogens, and to explain why it did so. Indeed, even if one accepts that the prohibition itself, stricto sensu, is ius cogens, it is still necessary to make the argument that the same applies to derivative propositions61 i.e. that there is a ius cogens norm overriding the immunity from criminal jurisdiction of a former head of state if that person is being accused of torture,62 or that the forum has a ius cogens obligation to entertain a suit for damages for torture against a foreign state63 or again that it has a ius cogens obligation to permit the enforcement of a judgment for

54 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), para. 60. 55 Ibid., para. 66. 56 Ibid., para. 61. 57 See (n. 38) and upper text. 58 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), Joint Dissenting Opinion by Judges Rozakis and Caflish, joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić. 59 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides. 60 ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou (n. 3), Joint Dissenting Opinion, before para. 1. 61 Cf. e.g. Séverine Knuchel, “State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens,” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 9 (2011): 149–83, 160. 62 Cf. the facts of Pinochet case (n. 53). 63 Cf. the facts of ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6). 278 Schilling damages for torture into the public or diplomatic property of the torture state.64 There is nothing in the dissenting opinion which comes even close to such an argument. How could such an argument run? The way to demonstrate the existence of a ius cogens rule identified by article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties65 is its recognition as such by the international community of states. It is submitted that there is no such state consensus even on the prohibition of torture stricto sensu as a general rule, much less on any of the three derivative propositions mentioned above. Concerning the prohibition of torture itself, article 1(1) second sentence of the un Convention Against Torture (uncat)66 excepts from that prohibition torture inflicted as a lawful sanction.67 The fact that it may very well be “that this exception exempts even the cruellest treatment from classification as ‘torture’ if such treatment is authorised by domestic law”68 clearly shows that there is no consensus of the international community on a general prohibition of torture, much less on the ius cogens status of such a prohibition.69 For the extradition of a torturer, the lack of such

64 Question raised by ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), concurrent opinion of Judge Pellonpää joined by Judge Sir Nicholas Bratza, and also by ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou (n. 3). 65 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331. 66 un Convention against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 unts 85. 67 Therefore, it appears that the re-introduction by law of a death sentence “by breaking on the wheel” (cf. e.g. Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 70–72), would not contravene the uncat. However, the apparently clear meaning of the exception appears to be by no means clear. Indeed, according to United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture (unvfvt), “Interpretation of Torture in the Light of the Practice and Jurisprudence of International Bodies,” accessed 21 October 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Interpretation_torture_2011_en.pdf, 26, “[t]he uncat explicitly states in article 1 that lawful sanctions do not fall within the scope of this Convention. However, the fact that a sanction is considered as lawful under national or even constitutional law does not mean that it would fall outside the scope of article 1 or 16 of the uncat”. But what else is it supposed to mean? In any case, the jurisprudence quoted by the unvfvt to buttress its contention does not refer to the uncat but to the prohibitions of torture in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, respectively. 68 “However the issue is not resolved, and it may be that this exception exempts even the cruellest treatment from classification as ‘torture’ if such treatment is authorised by domestic law”. Sarah Joseph et al., Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A Handbook on the Individual Complaints Procedures of the un Treaty Bodies (Geneva: World Organisation against Torture, 2006), 214. 69 icty, Furundzija (n. 53), paras. 144 et seq., completely ignores this rather evident point. The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 279 consensus is shown by the ultimate outcome of the Pinochet case; as is well known, in spite of the House of Lords’ judgment permitting his extradition to Spain, Pinochet was not extradited but allowed to return to his home country, and all the governments involved appear to have been greatly relieved by that outcome.70 For the remaining two propositions, there is nothing coming even close to such a consensus. Certainly, there is nothing in the un Convention, which is applicable only to those two propositions, that could be interpreted in this sense, and, before the finalization of the Convention, the relevant report of the ilc’s working group had been inconclusive.71 But beyond article 53 of the Vienna Convention, ius cogens, it appears, can also be created by judicial decisions,72 as article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the icj indicates. Such a decision will rarely create a rule ex nihilo but rather be value-based. In general, of course, a value-based approach to whatever question may lead to results which, while convincing to some persons, are not read- ily acceptable to others.73 Still, convincingly argued values are the main if not the only reason for the international community to elevate a norm to the position of ius cogens. A court decision accepting a value proposition may create such a rule in the individual case; if it does so, it will have a certain persuasive authority beyond that case. Put differently, it takes a “courageous judgment”74 to transform a value-based ius cogens proposition into a—still debatable—ius cogens rule. Such “courageous judgments” exist in respect of the prohibition of torture stricto sensu75 and on the extradition of a torturer otherwise protected by

70 Cf. the excellent picture drawn by Richard Tyler, “Pinochet Returns to Chile after Britain Halts Extradition Proceedings,” World Socialist Web Site, 3 March 2000, accessed 21 October 2013, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/mar2000/pino-m03.shtml. 71 Cf. ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), paras. 62 et seq. 72 Cf. Theodor Schilling, “On the Constitutionalization of General International Law,” Jean Monnet Working Paper 6 (2005), 43 et seq. 73 A telling example in the present context is the discussion whether there is a peremptory norm completely prohibiting commercial whaling “because of the special characteristics of whales as intelligent creatures” or whether “what has emerged as a new peremptory norm is not prohibition, but sustainability”; cf. Douglas M. Johnston, reported in “Chairman’s Report, Legal Workshop on Assessment of Actions of the International Whaling Commission under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (icrw, 1996),” accessed 23 October 2013, http://luna.pos.to/whale/icr_legal_chair.html, section ii, Role of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, who, however, concludes that “[t]he argument for either position is too vague to be considered definitive”. 74 Cf. ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferrari Bravo. 75 Especially icty, Furundzija (n. 53), para. 153. 280 Schilling immunity in criminal matters,76 but not for the other two propositions. It is this difference which apparently was decisive for the Court’s majority in rejecting Al-Adsani’s application. Contrary to the minority’s view, it is difficult to see an inconsistency in the majority’s reliance on this difference.77 To be persuasive, therefore, an argument challenging the majority’s opinion in Al-Adsani, instead of simply referring to a supposed hierarchy of norms, would have to balance the different values at play, including the pros and cons of the different possible outcomes. The dissenters failed to deliver such an argument. Interestingly, a persuasive, value based counter-argument has been made in the concurring opinion of Judge Pellonpää.78

5 Conclusion

In ascertaining the content of the international law of state immunity, the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court looks for a consensus of the international community of states. It finds such consensus especially in the un Convention which it considers as an expression of customary law. It accepts state immunity in the form it has found by state consensus as an inherent limitation of rights guaranteed by the European Convention, especially its article 6 right of access to court.79 By elevating the un Convention, which appears not only to codify existing customary law but to develop it by restricting state immunity in vari-

76 uk, House of Lords, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (n. 53). 77 In any case, the minority itself is inconsistent in its views in a similar way: if the prohibition of torture is ius cogens, if also art. 3 echr shares this peremptory nature, as they claim, based on a 1983 judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Sener v. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland and the Federal Department of Justice and Police, Judgment of 22 march 1983, bge 109 Ib 64, 72: zwingende Regel des Völkerrechts), and if, as the dissenters insist, the prohibition of torture includes the duty of contracting states to permit suits for damages for torture against the torture state, then it is difficult to see how the dissenters could join the majority in the Court’s unanimous decision denying, for territorial reasons, that there was, in Al-Adsani (n. 6), a violation of art. 3, and not just of art. 6 echr by the fact that the uk granted immunity to the State of Kuwait. The denial of a suit for damages for torture clearly was an intraterritorial matter for the uk. 78 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), Concurring Opinion of Judge Pellonpää. 79 In ECtHR, Zylkov v. Russia, First Section Judgment of 21 June 2011, Application no. 5613/04, the Court raised the question of State immunity on its own motion to reproach the respondent State for its courts’ decisions not to entertain a civil claim against Russia, referring the applicant instead to the Lithuanian courts which, in the Court’s opinion, would have no substantive jurisdiction in the matter because of Russia’s immunity. The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 281 ous ways, but which is not (yet) in force, to customary law binding also upon states which have not even signed it, the Court at least marginally challenges the traditional meaning of state immunity indirectly. A more direct challenge, however, especially in cases of alleged grave violations of human rights, cannot be found in its case-law. As the leading dissenting opinion in Al-Adsani shows, challenges to state immunity beyond what has been just stated may come from criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence. Further important criticism has been raised from within the Court. The dissenting opinion of Judge Ferrari Bravo in Al-Adsani calls for “a courageous judgment” in the matter of state immunity in proceedings relating to damages for crimes against humanity or for acts of torture. There appears to be an inherent logic in the claim that the Strasbourg Court, as a human rights court, must not necessarily wait for some other judicial authority to accept a value-based human rights norm as ius cogens but may sometimes lead the way. The least which could be expected of such a court is to discuss the underlying value questions, as has indeed been done in the concurring opinion of Judge Pellonpää,80 instead of simply referring to a lacking state consensus. More generally, Judge Loucaides claims in a whole series of dissenting opinions81 that article 6 echr is violated every time a contracting state’s court has no discretion to examine the competing interests before it because the immunity invoked by the respondent state is a blanket immunity which automatically blocks access to court. Indeed, the Strasbourg Court’s frequent acceptance of the proposition that such an extension of immunity is proportionate as long as it respects general international law is somewhat disconcert- ing as on the face of it the respect for international law has nothing to do with the proportionality of the restriction of the right to access to court. This acceptance is also difficult to reconcile with the Strasbourg Court’s other approach for assessing proportionality in which it considers whether there are alternative possibilities of access to a court.82 With regard to constellations in which a Contracting Party of the European Convention invokes state immunity, Judge Ress, in an unrelated case, has opined that the starting point for the Court’s interpretation of article 6 echr should have been to ask whether the contracting States, by concluding the European Convention, had waived their right to invoke state immunity in

80 ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6), Concurring Opinion of Judge Pellonpää. 81 ECtHR, McElhinney (n. 18); ECtHR, Al-Adsani (n. 6); ECtHR, Fogarty (n. 19). 82 Cf. especially ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy (n. 6), paras. 68–70; ECtHR, McElhinney (n. 18), para. 39. 282 Schilling

Convention cases.83 If so, article 6 could have been construed as overriding, in such cases, the state immunity rule which however would have remained untouched as a rule of general international law. All this criticism, as well as the dissenters’ position in Al-Adsani, would more or less severely restrict the immunity of states. But they all are roads not taken by the Strasbourg Court. Rather, the latter’s relevant case-law as presented here does not offer any challenge to state immunity beyond what the states themselves have accepted by negotiating and/or concluding the un Convention.

83 ECtHR, Bosphorus (n. 7), Dissenting Opinion of judge Ress, para. 5. part 5 Immunities of International Organisations

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CHAPTER 17 Immunités, responsabilisation des organisations internationales et protection des droits individuels

Laurence Boisson de Chazournes

1 Introduction

Les organisations internationales jouissent, en principe, d’immunités de juridiction et d’exécution devant les juridictions étatiques. La question des immunités de juridiction des organisations internationales se pose uniquement dans le cas où elles sont parties à un litige relevant de la compétence d’un juge interne. L’immunité d’exécution des organisations internationales, à l’instar de l’immunité de juridiction, n’entre en ligne de compte que dans le cadre de litiges opposant une organisation internationale à un acteur non étatique. S’agissant des organisations internationales, les immunités de juridiction sont le plus souvent vues comme « fonctionnellement nécessaires » pour celles-ci. Elles bénéficient d’immunités dans la mesure où ces privilèges sont nécessaires à l’exercice de leurs fonctions.1 Les immunités préservent les organisations internationales d’interférences de la part des autorités et juridictions nationales. Là est le rôle crucial joué par les immunités, en tant que « protection nécessaire afin d’assurer le caractère multilatéral des organisations internationales. Les actions de ces organisations doivent refléter la volo- nté collective de leurs membres [. . .], et non pas la volonté de l’un de leurs membres agissant unilatéralement ».2 L’immunité d’exécution forcée protège l’organisation contre les mesures de contrainte de toute sorte pouvant être exercées sur ses biens pour obtenir l’exécution d’une sentence ou d’un jugement, ou à d’autres fins. Dans la pratique, il est difficile de trouver une organisation internationale qui ne bénéficie pas de l’immunité d’exécution en vertu d’un accord international ou d’une loi interne.

1 Voir par exemple la Charte des Nations Unies, art. 105(1). Pour une approche critique de la nécessité fonctionnelle, voir J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 360 p., p. 132. 2 I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, 510 p., p. 243 (notre traduction).

Les immunités de juridiction font office de mécanisme idoine lorsqu’il s’agit de protéger les organisations internationales et leur personnel de poursuites dans les ordres juridiques nationaux et pour garantir l’indépendance et l’efficacité de leur travail. Elles contribuent à préserver l’intégrité de leurs fonctions. L’importance de ce principe a été réaffirmée par la Cour internationale de Justice en l’affaire du Différend relatif à l’immunité de juridiction d’un rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme.3 En l’espèce, la Cour estima que le rapporteur spécial, M. Cumaraswamy, en tant qu’expert en mission, jouissait de l’immunité de juridiction, et qu’ainsi le Gouvernement de la Malaisie était tenu de communiquer son avis consultatif aux tribunaux malai siens compétents, afin qu’il soit donné effet aux obligations internationales de la Malaisie et que soit respectée l’immunité de M. Cumaraswamy.4 Ces différents principes retiennent l’attention dans un contexte où les activités d’organisations internationales ont de plus en plus tendance à avoir des incidences et impacts sur les droits reconnus à des particuliers ou à d’autres acteurs non étatiques. Cette situation amène à repenser les notions classiques du droit international public et parmi celles-ci figurent les immu- nités des organisations internationales. Si celles-ci remplissent leur rôle de garanties d’indépendance et d’efficacité, on doit se demander quel doit être leur régime face aux doléances de respect du droit formulées par des individus dont les intérêts seraient lésés. Dans le cadre de la présente contribution, la discussion sur le point de savoir quels sont les droits et obligations qui lient les organisations internationales ne sera pas abordée. Le présupposé sera celui transcrit dans la récente Déclaration de la Réunion de haut niveau de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur l’État de droit aux niveaux national et international qui précise que les États membres considèrent que « l’État de droit vaut aussi bien pour tous les États que pour les organisations internationales, y compris l’Organisation des Nations Unies et ses organes principaux, et que le respect et la promotion de l’État de droit et de la justice devraient guider toutes leurs activités et conférer certitude et légitimité à leurs actions ».5 Les organisations internationales liées par des normes de droit international peuvent voir engagée leur responsabilité internationale dans des situations d’atteinte aux droits de particuliers. Elles peuvent être prises à partie

3 cij, Différend relatif à l’immunité de juridiction d’un rapporteur spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme, Avis consultatif du 29 avril 1999, cij Recueil 1999, p. 62. 4 Ibid., p. 88, par. 65. 5 agnu, Projet de résolution déposé par le Président de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies : « Déclaration de la Réunion de haut niveau de l’Assemblée générale sur l’État de droit aux niveaux national et international », A/67/L.1, 19 septembre 2012, par. 2. Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 287 pour ne pas avoir mis en place des procédures permettant une correction des activités engagées. Dans de telles situations, le droit d’accès à la justice peut être susceptible de justifier la levée des immunités dont est bénéficiaire une organisation. Il peut également conduire à ce qu’une organisation crée en son sein une procédure qui satisfasse à cet objectif. La pratique de la Banque mondiale nous permettra d’évoquer ces différents aspects, en soulignant les interfaces possibles entre immunités et responsabilisation.

2 Quelques interactions entre immunités et accès à la justice

On s’intéressera aux interactions qui peuvent apparaître entre immunités et accès à la justice, montrant par là que les premières peuvent être soumises au test de la levée d’immunité du fait d’un besoin d’accès à la justice. En premier lieu, lorsque l’immunité de juridiction dont jouit une organisation internationale entre en conflit avec le droit d’accès à la justice, la levée peut être volontaire. L’organisation en cause lève alors elle-même cette immu- nité et consent à la juridiction d’une cour interne.6 Ce cas est cependant extrêmement rare dans la pratique des organisations internationales.7 On peut se demander si, en certaines circonstances, on ne pourrait considérer qu’il y a obligation pour l’organisation d’y procéder. Sinon, il faudrait s’interroger sur la manière d’inciter une organisation à le faire. Certaines organisations, par exemple l’Agence spatiale européenne, ont suivi cette voie en prévoyant une obligation de levée d’immunité dans les cas où maintenir cette immunité amènerait irrémédiablement à empêcher le cours de la justice.8 Les Nations Unies sont également liées par cette obligation.9

6 Voir par exemple la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies du 13 février 1946, 1 rtnu 15, art. ii section 2, selon laquelle : « L’Organisation des Nations Unies, ses biens et avoirs, quels que soient leur siège et leur détenteur, jouissent de l’immunité de juridiction, sauf dans la mesure où l’Organisation y a expressément renoncé, dans un cas particulier. Il est toutefois entendu que la renonciation ne peut s’étendre à des mesures d’exécution ». 7 J. Duffar, Contribution à l’étude des privilèges et immunités des organisations internationales, Paris, lgdj, 1982, pp. 247-249. 8 Voir ase, Convention de l’Agence Spatiale Européenne, 2005, art. iv(1) (a), selon lequel : « L’agence bénéficie de l’immunité de juridiction et d’exécution sauf [. . .] dans la mesure où, par décision du Conseil, elle y renonce expressément dans un cas particulier ; le Conseil a le devoir de lever cette immunité dans tous les cas où son maintien est susceptible d’entraver l’action de la justice et où elle peut être levée sans porter atteinte aux intérêts de l’Agence ». 9 Voir la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946 (n. 6), art. V section 20 selon lequel : « [l]es privilèges et immunités sont accordés aux fonctionnaires uniquement dans l’intérêt des Nations Unies et non à leur avantage personnel. Le Secrétaire général pourra et devra 288 BOISSON de Chazournes

En deuxième lieu, l’immunité peut être levée de manière non volontaire. C’est alors la juridiction interne qui lève cette immunité. Un des exemples en ce sens a été le recours exercé devant les juridictions du Bangladesh par Ismet Zerin Khan, ancienne employée de la Banque mondiale, contre la décision de l’organisation de ne pas renouveler son contrat sur la base en particulier, du non-respect des règles du personnel.10 En parallèle de l’action au niveau interne, le Tribunal administratif de la Banque mondiale fut saisi de cette même question. Celui-ci donna raison à Ismet Zerin Khan sans pour autant donner droit à sa demande de réintégration, en lui accordant une indemnité à hauteur d’un an de salaire.11 La Haute Cour de Dhaka décida de lever l’immunité de la Banque en raison, notamment, de l’absence d’un accord d’établissement (Establishment Agreement) entre la Banque et le Bangladesh et demanda la réintégration de l’employée. L’exemple de l’affaire Khan conduit à formuler deux conclusions quelque peu divergentes. D’une part, la pression exercée par les tribunaux internes peut se matérialiser au travers de la levée effective de l’immunité. Il en ressort, néan- moins, que les tribunaux internes ne sont pas les plus à même de juger de la légalité des décisions des organisations internationales.12 En l’espèce, la Haute Cour a consciemment décidé d’ignorer la décision du tribunal administratif de la Banque mondiale et d’ordonner à la Banque mondiale de réintégrer Ismet Zerin Khan. La Banque mondiale interjeta alors appel de la décision.13 Une troisième forme d’interaction à envisager est celle d’une limitation de l’étendue des immunités. Une des voies en ce sens serait de se référer à la distinction entre actes jure imperii et actes jure gestionis.14 La famille des organisations internationales se diversifie et l’on assiste notamment à une privatisation

lever l’immunité accordée à un fonctionnaire dans tous les cas où, à son avis, cette immu- nité empêcherait que justice soit faite et pourra être levée sans porter préjudice aux inté- rêts de l’Organisation. A l’égard du Secrétaire général, le Conseil de sécurité a qualité pour prononcer la levée des immunités ». 10 Bengladesh, Haute Cour de Dhaka, Ismet Zerin Khan c. Banque Mondiale et autres, 28 avril 2010, affaire n° 48. 11 tabm, Ismet Zerin Khan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Décision du 20 mai 2003, Décision n° 293. 12 En ce sens, voir R.S.J. Martha, « International Financial Institutions and Claims of Private Parties – Immunity Obliges », The World Bank Legal Review, 2011, pp. 93-131, p. 113. 13 Voir « Attorney General Represents World Bank in High Court. », New Age – The Outspoken Daily, 24 mars 2012, http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2012-03-24&nid=4921 (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 14 Sur cette distinction, par exemple, A. Van Aaken, « Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commerial Activities », chapitre 9 dans ce volume. Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 289 des structures et modes de fonctionnement de certaines de ses composantes. On peut à cet effet évoquer les partenariats public-privé (ppp).15 Il est suggéré que la distinction entre actes jure imperii et actes jure gestionis puisse, dans ce contexte, être envisagée. Dans le cas d’un acte jure gestionis, il serait alors possible de lever les immunités et permettre un accès au juge interne. Il est permis de penser que l’indépendance des organisations internationales ne serait pas mise en danger par cela.16 Il reste à définir ce que l’on entend par acte jure gestionis dans le cadre des organisations internationales. Il a été observé à cet effet que : « the mandate of international organizations is functional and all activities they undertake, within the limits of its express or implied powers, represent official activities – what would be the equivalent of acta iure imperii. When an organization buys chairs, it is for its offices or conference rooms; when it does construction work, it is to host its bodies and operations; when it has a dispute arising from employment with one of its staff members, the organization is exercising its mandate ».17 En quatrième lieu, certains mécanismes peuvent être mis en place pour apporter justice à des individus lésés par les activités d’une organisation. On pense ici particulièrement au traitement du personnel de ces organisations. La question est de savoir si les mécanismes mis en place satisfont aux exigences découlant des droits fondamentaux des personnes concernées. Dans ce contexte, l’accès de ces individus à une juridiction externe à l’organisation, comme ce fut le cas en l’affaire Waite and Kennedy18 devant la Cour europé enne des droits de l’homme, viendra tester en pratique les conditions d’accès à un recours effectif des fonctionnaires aux juridictions internes à l’organisation. Dans cette affaire, la Cour avait à juger de la conformité des conditions du non-renouvellement par l’Agence spatiale européenne de contrats de certains membres de son personnel au regard de l’article 6(1) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. La Cour affirma à cet égard qu’« un facteur matériel pour déterminer s’il y a lieu de faire jouer une immunité de juridiction est de voir si les personnes concernées avaient ou non des moyens alternatifs

15 G.L. Burci, « Public/Private Partnerships in the Public Health Sector », International Organizations Law Review, 2009, pp. 359-382. 16 Voir, en ce sens, E. Gaillard et I. Pingel-Lenuzza, « International Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: To Restrict or to Bypass », International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002, pp. 1-15, p. 5. 17 D. Petrovic, « Privileges and Immunities of un Specialized Agencies in Field Activity », (contribution présentée lors de la Geneva Global Administrative Law Conference, 20-21 mars 2009), p. 6. 18 cedh, Waite et Kennedy c. Allemagne, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 18 février 1999, Requête n° 26083/94, p. 13, par. 68. 290 BOISSON de Chazournes de recours disponibles pour protéger effectivement leurs droits en vertu de la Convention »19. Au regard des nombreux contacts et relations qui se nouent entre organisations internationales, individus et acteurs non étatiques, il reste à déterminer si un tel test pourrait être étendu aux personnes non liées par un contrat de travail, extérieures à l’organisation, mais lésées par les activités de celle-ci. En dernier lieu, il est permis de réfléchir à la mise en place de modes alternatifs de recours pour ces individus et acteurs non étatiques au sein d’une organisation internationale avec, en toile de fond, la possibilité de lever les immunités de cette dernière. L’on fait face ici à l’interaction entre immu- nité de juridiction et mécanismes de responsabilisation – aussi dénommés mécanismes d’accountability – des organisations internationales.

3 La Banque mondiale et sa pratique : immunités et responsabilisation L’immunité de juridiction de la Banque mondiale a pu être perçue comme plus flexible, en comparaison avec d’autres organisations internationales20, en ce que sa Charte constitutive prévoit une « présomption d’absence d’immunité »21 de l’Organisation.22 Cette limitation des immunités de la Banque s’explique par la nécessité, perçue par les pères fondateurs de la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement (bird), de prévoir des mécanismes permettant aux investisseurs privés de pouvoir poursuivre en justice la Banque devant des juridictions internes, et cela dans le but de permettre à l’institution finan-

19 Ibid. 20 En ce sens, voir G. Thallinger, « Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity: The Possible Role of Domestic Courts in Enhancing World Bank Accountability », Vienna Online Journal of International Constitutional Law, 2008, pp. 4-35, p. 9, http://www.icl-journal.com (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 21 C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 535 p., p. 361. Cité par Thallinger, « Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity » (n. 20), p. 10. 22 Selon l’article vii section 3 des Statuts de la bird, « La Banque ne peut être poursuivie que devant un tribunal ayant juridiction sur les territoires d’un État membre où elle possède un bureau, a désigné un agent chargé de recevoir les significations ou notifica- tions de sommations ou a émis ou garanti des titres. Aucune action judiciaire ne pourra cependant être intentée par des États membres ou par des personnes agissant pour le compte desdits États, ou faisant valoir des droits cédés par ceux-ci. Les biens et avoirs de la Banque où qu’ils soient situés et quel qu’en soit le détenteur, seront à l’abri de toute forme de saisie, d’opposition ou d’exécution tant qu’un jugement définitif n’aura pas été prononcé contre la Banque ». Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 291 cière d’avoir accès aux capitaux privés au travers de l’émission d’obligations.23 Lorsque la Banque emprunte sur les marchés financiers, elle procède à des transactions commerciales soumises au droit national. Si un différend émer- geait, il devrait être porté devant les juridictions nationales. Toutefois, si un dif- férend devait émerger du fait d’activités autres que les activités commerciales et financières précédemment évoquées, la Banque mondiale devait pouvoir invoquer de manière systématique son immunité de juridiction.24 En pratique, le juge interne a reconnu pour l’heure à la Banque mondiale une pleine immu- nité fonctionnelle.25 Il est vrai que les différends n’ont jusqu’alors porté que sur des questions relatives au statut du personnel. Comme d’autres organisations, la Banque mondiale a été conduite à mettre en place des mécanismes qui répondent au vocable anglais d’accountability, ou responsabilisation, à savoir des mécanismes qui permettent à l’organisation de répondre de ses actes. Le concept de l’accountability s’est progressivement transformé en « un appel venant de plusieurs côtés, et spécialement de ceux se trouvant en dehors des organisations internationales, afin de développer des processus [. . .] permettant que les missions des organisations internationales [. . .] s’améliorent et puissent être vérifiées depuis l’extérieur ».26 Il est important dans ce contexte de différencier la responsabilisation interne d’une organisation de sa responsabilisation externe. La première signifie que le personnel ou un organe d’une organisation internationale doit rendre des comptes au personnel ou à un organe de la même organisation. Le système d’accountability interne est souvent prévu dans les chartes constitutives de ces organisations. À l’inverse, l’accountability externe signifie que le personnel ou un organe de l’organisation devra rendre des comptes à des acteurs situés en dehors de celle-ci. Ces acteurs peuvent être des acteurs non étatiques dont les intérêts seraient lésés, le grand public (public at large) ou encore une ong

23 A. Rigo Sureda, « The Law Applicable to the Activities of International Development Banks », Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, Vol. 308, 2004, pp. 9-251, pp. 45-46. 24 À l’exception d’arbitrages internationaux dans le cas de différends dans le cadre de ses accords de prêt et de garantie ou en vertu de contrats d’approvisionnement ou de construction. Voir Shihata, World Bank Inspection Panel (n. 2), p. 249. 25 Voir, par exemple, États-Unis, Cour d’appel de Washington, Mendaro c. Banque Mondiale, Décision du 27 septembre 1983, 717 F.2d 610 (dc Cir. 1983), ou encore l’affaire États-Unis, Cour du District de Columbia, Morgan c. bird, Décision du 13 Septembre 1990, 752 F.Supp. 492. ; Shihata, World Bank Inspection Panel (n. 2), pp. 247-251. 26 S. Schlemmer-Schulte, « Panel on the Accountability of International Organizations to Non-State Actors », Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, pp. 359-373, p. 361 (notre traduction). 292 BOISSON de Chazournes invoquant la représentation d’un intérêt public.27 Il peut notamment s’agir de situations où des dommages sont subis par des personnes extérieures à l’organisation dans le cadre d’opérations menées par cette dernière.28 Différents moyens peuvent être utilisés aux fins de promouvoir à la fois la responsabilisation interne et la responsabilisation externe de l’organisation.29 Cela passe notamment par la mise en place de mécanismes favorisant la participation d’acteurs de statuts divers dans les processus de décision. La transparence est promue pour ce qui est de l’accès à l’information et des modes de prise de décision. Cela passe également par la mise en place d’évaluations par des institutions compétentes ainsi que par l’instauration d’une culture d’auto- évaluation au sein de l’organisation.30 À la différence des modes de responsabilisation interne, la responsabilisation externe n’est, dans la majorité des cas, pas prévue dans les instruments constitutifs de l’organisation.31 Sa mise en œuvre dépend alors de la volonté de l’organisation de répondre de ses actions envers des acteurs externes. Cela dépend aussi, de plus en plus, de pressions exercées par les tribunaux natio naux à l’égard des organisations. En d’autres mots, les appels et prises de position venant de l’extérieur de l’organisation peuvent entraîner des réponses au sein de l’institution. Deux procédures établies au sein de la Banque mondiale feront l’objet de notre attention. L’institution faisant place à des demandes en termes d’accountability, divers visages de la responsabilisation ont émergé au travers de mécanismes variés tels que le Panel d’inspection (4.) et la procédure de sanction en cas de fraude et de corruption (5.).

27 Shihata, World Bank Inspection Panel (n. 2), p. 237. 28 Voir, par exemple, J.C.N. Paul, « Law and Development into the ’90s: Using International Law to Impose Accountability to People on International Development Actors », Third World Legal Studies, 1992, pp. 1-16. 29 S. Burall et C. Neligan, « The Accountability of International Organizations », Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper Series N° 2, http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/ io_Acct_Burall_05012005.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 30 Ibid. 31 Voir W.E. Holder, « International Organizations: Accountability and Responsibility », Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Vol. 97, 2003, pp. 231-236, p. 233. Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 293

4 Le Panel d’inspection de la banque mondiale

Créé en septembre 1993, le Panel d’inspection est une institution unique en ce qu’elle offre une voie de contrôle direct des opérations menées par la Banque, permettant de mettre en cause le bien-fondé des actions entreprises par cette dernière. Le Panel constitue à ce titre un des premiers, sinon le pre- mier32 exemple de mécanisme d’accountability externe dans le monde des organisations internationales. Ce mécanisme fut d’ailleurs institué à la suite de critiques quant à l’impact de certains projets financés par la Banque dans les années 1980 et 1990, causant dans certains cas de sérieux dommages, parfois irréversibles, à l’environnement et aux populations locales. Cette procédure permet à des groupes de personnes affectées par un projet financé par la Banque mondiale de saisir un Panel, composé de trois membres, pour demander à l’Organisation d’évaluer, voire d’ajuster son propre comportement. Après avoir décidé de la recevabilité de la plainte, le Panel juge de l’opportunité de demander ou non aux Administrateurs l’autorisation de conduire une enquête portant sur les agissements de la Banque au regard de ses politiques opérationnelles.33 La Banque mondiale peut alors être amenée à mettre en œuvre un plan d’action pour remédier aux situations litigieuses. Des demandes en termes d’accountability, venant aussi bien de l’organisation que du monde extérieur, sont à l’origine de la création du Panel : « the internal factor relates to management concern with performance as to the realization of the Bank’s projects and the second was an external factor demanding accountability from the World Bank on her actions and omissions. ».34 Il s’agissait alors d’une « avancée majeure dans le but d’améliorer la responsabilisation des institutions multilatérales ».35 Le Panel fait figure de « mécanisme additionnel d’accountability »36 permettant de recevoir les plaintes des parties tierces et vient jouer en complément de mécanismes permettant l’accountability au niveau interne à l’institution. Il donne droit d’accès à un « forum indépendant d’établissement des faits et

32 S. Schlemmer-Schulte, « The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Record of the First International Accountability Mechanism and Its Role for Human Rights », Human Rights Brief, 1999, p. 8 ; S. Schlemmer-Schulte, « The World Bank’s Experience With Its Inspection Panel », Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1998, pp. 353-386. 33 Sur cette procédure voir L. Boisson de Chazournes, « Le Panel d’inspection de la Banque mondiale : À propos de la complexification de l’espace public », Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 2001, pp. 145–162. 34 Shihata, World Bank Inspection Panel (n. 2), p. 2. 35 Thallinger, « Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity » (n. 20), p. 23 (notre traduction). 36 Ibid., p. 239 (notre traduction). 294 BOISSON de Chazournes n’équivaut pas à un contrôle juridictionnel ».37 Les recommandations et déci- sions du Panel peuvent conduire la Banque mondiale à arrêter sa participation dans des projets qui font l’objet d’une requête (voir par exemple le cas du barrage d’Arun au Népal).38 Cette procédure a fait des émules, avec certaines adaptations, au sein d’autres institutions financières internationales. Toutefois, certaines critiques ont pu être émises au regard du principe de l’accès à la justice. L’un des problèmes concerne la participation des plaignants à la procédure. Présents au début de la procédure, les demandeurs ayant vu leurs requêtes jugées recevables sont ensuite absents. Doit-on aller plus loin et demander que la procédure soit assortie de paramètres judiciaires pour répondre au primat du droit d’accès à la justice compris notamment au sens de l’article 6(1) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?39 Certains ont demandé que le Panel soit transformé en « quasi-judicial supervisory body »,40 ce qui impliquerait une indépendance plus marquée vis-à-vis du Conseil d’administration de la Banque et la création de direct remedial powers. Cette discussion a trait à la problématique soulevée dans l’affaire Kadi, laquelle était de savoir si la procédure de l’ombudsperson des Nations Unies en matière de sanctions ciblées apportait suffisamment de garanties d’accès à la justice.41

37 Ibid., p. 240 (notre traduction). 38 Panel d’inspection de la Banque Mondiale, « Nepal: Arun iii Proproposed Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of ida Credit », 1994, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/ Pages/ViewCase.aspx?CaseId=20#, (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 39 L’article 6 (1) se lit comme suit : « Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue équitablement, publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable, par un tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi par la loi, qui décidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractère civil, soit du bien-fondé de toute accusation en matière pénale dirigée contre elle. Le jugement doit être rendu publiquement, mais l’accès de la salle d’audience peut être interdit à la presse et au public pendant la totalité ou une partie du procès dans l’intérêt de la moralité, de l’ordre public ou de la sécurité nationale dans une société démocratique, lorsque les intérêts des mineurs ou la protection de la vie privée des parties au procès l’exigent, ou dans la mesure jugée strictement nécessaire par le tribunal, lorsque dans des circonstances spéciales la publicité serait de nature à porter atteinte aux intérêts de la justice ». 40 D.D. Bradlow, « International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel », Virginia Journal of International Law, 1994, pp. 553-602 ; G.J. Klein, « The Emergence of Independent Advisory Panels », Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 2005, pp. 257-258. 41 L. Boisson de Chazournes et P.J. Kuijper, « Mr Kadi and Mrs Prost: Is The un Ombudsperson Going to Find Herself Between a Rock and a Hard Place », in E. Rieter et H. de Waele (ed.), Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 295

Quel type de juridiction devrait être compétent si l’on considère ce méca- nisme non suffisant ? Le système décentralisé de contrôle par le juge interne est-il le mécanisme par défaut pour le genre de questions dont est saisi le Panel d’inspection ? Une plainte de syndicats coréens portée devant une juridiction nationale contre le Fonds monétaire international (fmi) est illustrative des problèmes qui pourraient alors être rencontrés.42 Dans cette affaire, une juridiction sud-coréenne avait rejeté un recours formé par plusieurs syndicats contre le fmi. Ceux-ci demandaient à l’institution une compensation financière à la suite de pertes d’emplois dues, selon les syndicats, aux mau- vais conseils prodigués par le fmi quant aux mesures d’austérité à adopter. Les juges sud-coréens penchèrent en faveur du fmi en énonçant qu’aucun État membre ne peut faire jouer la responsabilité civile ou pénale de l’institution sur la base de la mise en œuvre de ses décisions. Les mécanismes non judiciaires de résolution des litiges (problem solving) doivent-ils être transformés à l’aune du principe de l’accès à une juridiction ? Ne pourrait-on pas envisager un système de déférence prenant appui non pas sur des critères stricts ou formels, mais sur des objectifs de justice substan- tielle, intégrant la gestion des intérêts collectifs et d’autres types de garanties, comme la transparence et l’accès à l’information. Les mécanismes non judiciaires seraient considérés comme des voies alternatives de justice si ces objectifs étaient satisfaits.

5 La procédure de sanction en matière de lutte contre la corruption

Le besoin de mettre en place un mécanisme efficace de sanction des entreprises et individus reconnus coupables de fraudes ou de corruption fut res- senti par la Banque à la fin des années 1990 et entraîna l’établissement d’un mécanisme de sanction.43 Il consiste à exclure « à tout moment une entreprise ou un individu [. . .], y compris en déclarant publiquement cette entreprise ou cet individu exclu indéfiniment ou pour une période déterminée de toute

Evolving Principles of International Law – Studies in Honour of Karel C. Wellens, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 71-90. 42 Bretton Woods Project, « Korean Workers Lawsuit against imf Thrown Out », 15 avril 2000, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-15638 (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 43 Voir L. Boisson de Chazournes et E. Fromageau, « Le mécanisme de sanction de la Banque mondiale contre la fraude et la corruption : le droit administratif global comme outil d’élaboration et de consolidation d’une procédure », in C. Bories, Un droit administratif global? / A Global Administrative Law?, Paris, Pedone, 2012, pp. 255-269. 296 BOISSON de Chazournes attribution de marché financé par la Banque et de la possibilité d’être retenu comme sous-traitant, consultant, fournisseur, ou prestataire de service au profit d’une entreprise par ailleurs susceptible de se voir attribuer un contrat financé par la Banque ».44 Cinq types de sanctions peuvent être décidés : la lettre publique de réprimande, l’exclusion, la non-exclusion conditionnelle,45 l’exclusion avec levée conditionnelle et/ou la réparation. Ces sanctions sont décidées en application d’une procédure spécifique. Les enquêtes sont menées par la Vice-présidence chargée des questions de Déontologie institutionnelle (Institutional Integrity, int), au moyen d’auditions de témoins, de collecte de documents, de visites sur un site, etc. Les enquêtes ne portent que sur les activités d’entreprises et d’individus. Une fois les preuves collectées, l’int transmet le dossier, au travers d’un avis d’accusation et de preuve (statement of accusations and evidence), au Responsable de l’évaluation et de la suspension.46 Ce Responsable doit alors déterminer si les preuves collectées sont suffisantes pour conclure qu’une infraction a été commise. Si c’est le cas, il notifie à l’entreprise ou au particulier les sanctions qu’il recom- mande. Il a également compétence pour décider si une suspension doit entrer en vigueur de manière temporaire en attendant l’aboutissement de la procé- dure, ce qui en pratique a toujours été le cas. Si l’entreprise ou le particulier visé ne conteste pas les allégations de fraude ou de corruption, la sanction recommandée par le Responsable de l’évaluation et de la suspension sera

44 bird, « Directives Passation des Marchés de fournitures, de travaux et de services (autres que les services de consultants) par les Emprunteurs de la Banque mondiale dans le cadre des Prêts de la bird et des Crédits et Dons de l’aid », janvier 2011, http://siteresources .worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/278019-1308067833011/Procurement_ gls_French_Final_Jan2011.pdf, (page consultée le 24 mai 2014), par. 1.16 d). 45 Cette sanction a été introduite en 2004. En septembre 2010 a été créé au sein de l’int le poste d’Integrity Compliance Officer (ico). Celui-ci a pour mission de suivre le respect d’un code de conduite par une entreprise ou un individu sanctionné d’exclusion conditionnelle. Il décide de même du fait de savoir si ces conditions ont été respectées. Pour plus d’information, voir : http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intdoii/Resources/Integrity_ Compliance_Guidelines.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). La décision d’inclure ce nouveau poste au sein de l’int fit néanmoins l’objet de controverses. En effet, étant donné le rôle de procureur que joue l’int dans la procédure de sanction, certains voyaient la pos- sibilité d’un conflit d’intérêts. Des garde-fous ont été mis en place par la Banque comme l’adoption d’un code de conduite et de certains arrangements institutionnels. Voir A.-M. Leroy et F. Fariello, « The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms », 2011, http://works.bepress.com/frank_fariello/1/ (page consultée le 24 mai 2014), p. 47. 46 Le Groupe de la Banque mondiale compte quatre Responsables pour : i) la bird/ida (Banque mondiale), ii) l’ifc, iii) la miga et iv) les garanties partielles des risques souverains (prg). Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 297 appliquée.47 Dans le cas contraire, le dossier sera envoyé au Conseil des sanctions. Celui-ci examine de novo l’affaire avant de rendre sa décision finale. Il peut organiser une audience dans le cadre de ses délibérations. Si le Conseil établit qu’une ou plusieurs infractions ont été commises, il impose une sanction à la partie défenderesse et, si besoin, à ses filiales. L’existence d’un tel mécanisme de contrôle, à condition que celui-ci respecte un certain nombre de conditions en termes de due process notamment, est sans aucun doute un mécanisme qui permet une responsabilisation externe de la Banque à l’égard du public. Celle-ci passe notamment par la décision de l’institution de rendre publiques à partir de 2011 les décisions non contestées du Responsable de l’évaluation et de la suspension48 ainsi que toutes les décisions du Conseil.49 Le fait de tendre vers une autonomisation des organes de décision, notamment avec la nomination de personnes exté rieures à la Banque au sein du Conseil des sanctions, va dans ce même sens. Au travers d’un tel contrôle, la Banque reconnaît qu’elle ne peut pas se satisfaire de mécanismes internes d’accountability et doit les compléter. Le mécanisme de sanction offre indubitablement des garanties judiciaires plus fournies que le Panel d’inspection. La procédure de sanction mise en place à partir de 2001 comprend les éléments d’accès à la justice que sont notamment la notification des charges pesant sur l’individu ou l’entreprise, le droit d’être défendu, ou encore l’opportunité de présenter des preuves durant une audience.50 Ce processus de « judiciarisation »51 est-il la voie unique ? Le mécanisme en l’état présente-t-il suffisamment de garanties judiciaires ? Le faut-il ? L’immunité sert alors de levier aux mains de juridictions extérieures pour contrôler l’application de cette responsabilisation. Le test du « recours

47 Banque mondiale, « Procédure de sanctions de la Banque mondiale », décembre 2010, http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010 .pdf?resourceurlname=OESFactSheetFrenchDec2010.pdf (consultée le 24 mai 2014). 48 Les décisions sont disponibles sur http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTA BOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:22911816~menu PK:7926949~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html (page consul- tée le 24 mai 2014). 49 P.H. Dubois et A.E. Nowlan, « Global Administrative Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law », The Yale Journal of International Law Online, 2010, pp. 15-25, p. 24. 50 Boisson de Chazournes et Fromageau, « Le mécanisme de sanction » (n. 43), p. 264. 51 L. Boisson de Chazournes et E. Fromageau, « Balancing the Scales: The World Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies », The European Journal of International Law, 2012, pp. 963-989. 298 BOISSON de Chazournes alternatif raisonnable »52 pourrait en soi être appliqué à la Banque mondiale. En l’état actuel, quatre des sept membres du Conseil des sanctions sont extérieurs à la Banque et sont nommés sur la base d’une liste dressée par le Président de la Banque.53 Trois autres membres sont choisis par le Président de la Banque parmi le personnel de l’institution (senior Bank staff ),54 et ceci pour une durée de trois ans renouvelable.55 Aucune audience n’est prévue devant le Responsable de l’évaluation et de la suspension. En outre, les audiences devant le Conseil des sanctions « doivent rester confidentielles et ne sont pas ouvertes au public ».56 Ces éléments conduisent à considérer qu’il peut y avoir un risque de voir l’immunité de juridiction de la Banque mondiale levée par des juridictions nationales dans le cas où ces dernières considéreraient la procédure comme non conforme au standard d’accès à la justice tel qu’interprété en droit international des droits de l’homme.57 Une des différences fondamentales d’avec le Panel d’inspection est le fait que la Banque mondiale sanctionne directement des individus et entreprises, ce qui n’est pas le cas pour le Panel d’inspection. Cette différence doit-elle avoir une incidence ? Cette interrogation conduit à se demander si la question de la spécificité et de la nature des mécanismes de sanction peut avoir une incidence sur l’appréciation du caractère de mécanisme alternatif de justice d’une procédure. La voie judiciaire est-elle la voie idoine ? On pourra avoir à l’esprit, à cet égard, la pratique du Fonds international de développement agricole (fida) qui permet un recours à l’arbitrage aux opérateurs privés qui considéreraient que leurs intérêts auraient été lésés dans le cadre d’une procédure de marchés publics.58 Référence est faite aux règles d’arbitrage de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage sur les différends entre organi sations internationales et personnes privées. Cette pratique pourrait être

52 cedh, Waite et Kennedy (n. 18), par. 68. 53 Banque mondiale, « Statut du Conseil des sanctions », http://siteresources.worldbank .org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/SanctionsBoardStatute_9_15_2010.pdf (consultée le 24 mai 2014), art. V(2). 54 Ibid., art. V(4). 55 Ibid., art. V(5). 56 Banque mondiale, « World Bank Sanction Procedures », http://siteresources.worldbank .org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/WBGSanctions_Procedures_April2012_Final.pdf (consul- tée le 24 mai 2014), art. vi section 6.03 (a). 57 Pour une analyse en ce sens, quoique dans d’autres contextes, voir J. Wouters, C. Ryngaert et P. Schmitt, « Western European Union v. Siedler; General Secretariat of the acp Group v. Lutchmaya; General Secretariat of the acp Group v. B.D. », American Journal of International Law, juillet 2011, pp. 560-567. 58 Martha « International Financial Institutions » (n. 12), p. 125. Immunités, Responsabilisation des Organisations Internationales 299

étendue dans d’autres contextes. Il est vrai toutefois que le volume d’affaires n’est pas le même dans le cas du fida et dans celui de la Banque mondiale.

6 Conclusion

Le besoin d’accès à la justice se fait de plus en plus prégnant. L’accountability interne, dans certains cas, ne suffit pas pour répondre à cette demande. Elle doit être complétée par des mécanismes ou procédures d’accountability externe. Cela vaut notamment dans le cas où les organisations internationales sanctionnent des individus et des entreprises – car il y a une dimension d’extranéité de la sanction – c’est-à-dire que l’activité de l’organisation a un impact sur des entités qui lui sont extérieures. Les cas du Panel et de la procédure de sanction en matière de lutte contre la corruption diffèrent sur ce point. L’extranéité dans le cas du Panel emporte des conséquences particulières. Même s’il y a un lien évident entre le financement par la Banque et le projet créant un dommage, la Banque n’est pas directement responsable de celui-ci. Dans le cas des sanctions, l’extranéité est directe. La Banque sanctionne elle-même des individus et des entreprises qui lui sont extérieurs. La levée (ou la menace de levée) des immunités d’une organisation internationale peut servir de mécanisme permettant un contrôle du respect de l’accountability. C’est en quelque sorte un mécanisme de contrôle externe pour renforcer l’accountability de l’organisation. Il est dans ce contexte nécessaire de repenser les immunités. Il faut trouver un juste milieu entre la nécessité de protéger les organisations des influences extérieures et garder ce moyen de contrôle sur elles lorsque leurs activités comportent un élément d’extranéité tel que précédemment évoqué. Il fait peu de doute que les pressions exercées sur le régime des immunités des organisations internationales par les juridictions internes contribuent à renforcer leur responsabilisation envers l’extérieur.59 Dans les cas où aucun mécanisme de contrôle n’est prévu au sein d’une organisation, un « contrôle décentralisé » peut prévenir les insuffisances en termes d’accountability.60

59 E. de Wet, « Holding International Institutions Accountable: The Complementary Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review », in A. Von Bogdandy et al., (ed.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions, Heidelberg, Springer, 2010, 1008 p., pp. 855-882. 60 A. Reinisch, « Conclusion », in A. Reinisch (ed.), Challenging Acts of International Organizations before National Courts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 258-274, p. 273. 300 BOISSON de Chazournes

Un niveau suffisant de protection des droits et intérêts des individus ne peut cependant pas être uniquement atteint au travers de ces mécanismes externes.61 Celui-ci passe irrémédiablement par l’établissement par les institutions concernées de mécanismes de recours (adequate remedy mechanisms) en leur sein. Ces mécanismes de recours, pour être adéquats, se doivent de respecter un « seuil minimum » incluant les garanties d’équité dans la conduite d’une procédure et de transparence. Ces réflexions nous placent à l’intersection entre plusieurs choix, celui d’un système de justice externe à une organisation et décentralisé, ou celui d’un système interne à l’organisation et imbriqué institutionnellement à cette dernière ; celui de la prévalence de procédures judiciaires pour répondre à la doléance de plus de justice ou celui du choix de procédures non judiciaires mais qui devraient, à tout le moins, présenter des caractéristiques d’accès à la justice liées au respect de la règle de droit.

61 E. de Wet, « Holding International Institutions Accountable » (n. 59), p. 881. CHAPTER 18 Les immunités de l’Union européenne

Isabelle Pingel

1 Introduction

Toutes les organisations internationales bénéficient de privilèges et immuni- tés. L’Union européenne ne fait pas exception à la règle. Apparues tardivement dans les textes applicables,1 les prérogatives accordées sont généralement présentées comme un palliatif à l’absence de territoire, visant à garantir l’indépendance des institutions,2 ou, pour les considérer sous un autre angle, comme un moyen de respecter le principe d’égalité entre États.3 Elles ont longtemps revêtu une portée pratiquement absolue, conception sans doute admissible dans une société d’après-guerre où les organisations internationales n’étaient encore que des acteurs en devenir. Une telle pratique n’est plus en phase toutefois avec les exigences d’une justice moderne, et la règle d’immunité, objet central de la présente étude, tend de plus en plus à céder devant les droits et intérêts des personnes privées. L’évolution est comparable dans l’Union européenne, même si le contournement de l’obstacle immuni- taire se fait souvent par des voies différentes. Particulièrement cursif, l’article 343 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (tfue)4 se contente de prévoir que « l’Union jouit sur le territoire des États membres des privilèges et immunités nécessaires à l’accomplissement de sa mission », de même, pose-t-il, que la Banque centrale

1 Le développement se fait pour l’essentiel avec la Charte des Nations Unies ; pour une étude exhaustive, voir A.J. Miller, « The Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations », International Organizations Law Review, 2009, vol. 6, pp. 7-115, pp. 9 et s. 2 Voir par exemple Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (dc Cir. 1983). La Cour de justice adopte la même analyse, voir par exemple cjce (ord.) 13 juillet 1990 Zwartveld et al., C-2/88, Rec. I-3365, point 19. 3 En particulier, celui sur le territoire duquel est située l’organisation ne doit pas pouvoir lui appliquer, comme il le ferait à un individu, sa législation ou encore lui imposer sa juridiction ; l’admettre reviendrait à placer cet État dans une situation privilégiée par rapport aux autres membres, l’autorisant, le cas échéant, à exercer des pressions. 4 tfue, version consolidée, joue C 326/47 du 26 octobre 2012.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_019 302 Pingel européenne et la Banque européenne d’investissement. La principale source du droit applicable est donc le protocole du 8 avril 1965, sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne, auquel l’article 343 renvoie expressément. Devenu, avec la réforme de Lisbonne, protocole n° 7, et renuméroté à cette occasion, du fait de la suppression d’une disposition obsolète concernant la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (ceca), le texte a une valeur contraignante identique à celle des traités auxquels il est annexé. Il est lui-même complété par des textes aussi variés que le règlement intérieur du Parlement européen ou les accords conclus par les délégations de l’Union européenne dans les États tiers, par exemple, dont l’étude est également indispensable pour rendre compte de la richesse, et de la complexité, de la matière. Ce chapitre conduira à montrer que c’est en termes de convergences et de nuances, plutôt que d’opposition (et surtout pas radicale), que la situation de l’Union européenne peut être comparée en ce domaine à celle existant dans les autres organisations internationales, tant en ce qui concerne les préroga- tives accordées à l’Union européenne elle-même (2.) qu’aux personnes qui concourent à son fonctionnement (3.).

2 Les règles applicables à l’Union européenne

Les points de convergence sont nombreux entre le droit international général et le droit de l’Union, en matière d’immunité, tant en ce qui concerne les règles applicables au sein de l’organisation (2.1.) que celles qui régissent ses relations avec les États tiers (2.2.).

2.1 Les règles applicables sur le territoire des États membres Tant les règles de fond que les règles de mise en oeuvre illustrent la convergence des solutions entre le droit de l’Union et le droit international général s’agissant des privilèges et immunités que l’organisation peut revendiquer.

2.1.1 Les règles de fond L’immunité de juridiction Le protocole n° 7, source fondamentale du droit de l’Union en matière de privilèges et immunités, ne contient, solution originale, aucune disposition sur l’immunité de juridiction, laquelle empêche de pouvoir attraire une orga nisation en justice. La matière est donc réglée par le seul article 274 du tfue qui précise que les litiges auxquels l’Union européenne est partie ne sont pas soustraits « de ce fait » à la compétence des juridictions nationales. La position est a priori remarquable. Les organisations internationales sont en effet Les immunités de l’Union européenne 303 très rares qui ont opéré le même choix que l’Union européenne et de taille plus modeste.5 Tout au contraire, l’écrasante majorité d’entre elles revendique expressément le bénéfice de l’immunité de juridiction, n’hésitant pas le cas échéant à l’invoquer en justice ; il est très fréquent que les tribunaux fassent droit à leur demande.6 Le décalage semble donc net avec le traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne. La réalité est plus nuancée. L’article 274 tfue spécifie en effet qu’il ne s’applique que « sous réserve des compétences attribuées à la Cour de justice ». La précision est importante, car le traité investit la Cour du pouvoir de connaître de la presque totalité des contentieux soulevés par l’activité de l’Union européenne, légalité,7 responsabilité non contractuelle8 et même contractuelle, si les parties en sont convenues ainsi par clause compromissoire.9 La compétence des tribunaux nationaux est en conséquence marginale, limitée pour l’essentiel aux (très rares) litiges en matière de responsabilité contractuelle, et seulement à condition que le contrat n’en dispose pas autrement et ait été conclu par l’Union européenne ou pour son compte. Le jeu de l’immunité de juridiction est donc loin d’être indispensable au bon fonctionnement de l’organisation, qui n’hésite pourtant pas à en revendiquer le bénéfice, le cas échéant,10 ou, pour le dire autrement, l’Union européenne bénéficie d’une « quasi-immunité de fait ».11 Sa protection est donc assurée, comme peut l’être celle des autres organisations, bien que par des voies différentes, et il n’existe pas d’opposition, et certainement pas définitive, avec la pratique suivie dans l’ordre international ; dans les deux cas, l’objectif central est atteint : protéger l’organisation contre les risques indus

5 Voir par exemple Accord entre le gouvernement de la République française et l’Office international des épizooties relatif au siège de l’Office international des épizooties et à ses privilèges et immunités sur le territoire français, 21 février 1977, http://www.oie.int/ fr/a-propos/principaux-textes/textes-fondamentaux/ (page consultée le 20 mai 2014), qui ne prévoit aucune immunité de juridiction au profit de l’organisation. 6 Sur l’ensemble de la question, voir par exemple A. Reinisch (ed.), Challenging Acts of International Organizations before National Courts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 302 7 Voir art. 263-266 tfue. 8 Voir art. 268 et 340 tfue. 9 Voir art. 272 tfue. 10 Voir notamment, concernant la responsabilité pénale d’Euratom, Cour Suprême des Pays-Bas, Stichting Greenpeace Nederland v. Euratom, 13 november 2007, International Law Reports, 2009, p. 429, accordant l’immunité à l’organisation. 11 S. Barbier et M. Cuq, « Les immunités de l’Union européenne », dans M. Benlolo-Carabot, U. Candas et E. Cujo, (dir.), Union européenne et droit international. En l’honneur de Patrick Daillier, Paris, Pedone, 2012, pp. 407-427, p. 413. 304 Pingel de pression. Cela ne signifie pas, et la nuance est évidemment d’importance, que les systèmes soient équivalents. Dans l’Union européenne, les plaignants ont un for, fût-il presque systématiquement la Cour de Luxembourg, pour faire valoir leurs prétentions, garantissant le respect du droit au juge. Dans les autres organisations, le conflit avec l’immunité peut demeurer vif, s’il n’est pas prévu de procédure de règlement des différends ou lorsque cette dernière n’est pas adéquate.12 Sans être idéale, la solution du droit européen est donc (à tout le moins) préférable.

L’immunité d’exécution L’immunité d’exécution des organisations internationales s’oppose à la saisie de leurs biens et avoirs. Comme l’immunité de juridiction, elle fait l’objet, dans l’Union européenne, d’un traitement a priori original.13 À la dif- férence de la solution généralement admise,14 l’immunité d’exécution n’est en effet pas ici posée comme absolue, l’article premier du protocole n° 7 se contentant de prévoir que « les biens et avoirs de l’Union ne peuvent faire l’objet d’aucune mesure de contrainte administrative ou judiciaire sans une autorisation de la Cour de justice ». La jurisprudence fournit deux préci- sions sur ce point. Tout d’abord, la Cour admet qu’il n’y a pas lieu pour elle à statuer lorsque l’institution en cause déclare ne pas avoir d’objection à la mesure de contrainte dont elle fait l’objet.15 Elle admet ensuite qu’une telle mesure peut être autorisée lorsqu’elle ne risque pas d’entraver le bon fonctionnement de l’organisation ou son indépendance.16 La pratique européenne semble donc très éloignée de celle qui vaut pour la plupart des organisations

12 Voir par exemple, mettant en évidence les faiblesses du Panel d’inspection de la Banque mondiale, G. Thallinger, « Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity: The Possible Role of Domestic Courts in Enhancing World Bank Accountability », Vienna Online Journal of International Constitutional Law 2008, vol. 2/1, p. 4, spécialement pp. 19 et s, http://www. icl-journal.com (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 13 Pour une vue d’ensemble, voir par exemple C. Cheneviere et C. Verdure, « Saisie-arrêt et immunité d’exécution de la Communauté européenne », Journal des tribunaux. Droit européen, novembre 2006, pp. 257-262, pp. 260 et s. 14 Voir par exemple la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies, 13 février 1946, 1 rtnu 15, art. ii, section 2 aux termes duquel : « L’Organisation des Nations Unies, ses biens et avoirs, quels que soient leur siège et leur détenteur, jouissent de l’immunité de juridiction, sauf dans la mesure où l’Organisation y a expressément renoncé, dans un cas particulier. Il est toutefois entendu que la renonciation ne peut s’étendre à des mesures d’exécution ». 15 Voir par exemple cjce (ord.) 11 mai 1971 sa, 1/71, Rec. 363. 16 Ibid. Les immunités de l’Union européenne 305 internationales. La réalité est beaucoup plus nuancée. En effet, les autorisa- tions de saisie sont très rares, car le risque d’entrave est interprété largement. C’est ainsi par exemple qu’une demande, introduite par une société suisse, d’autorisation de saisie-arrêt entre les mains de la Commission, sur les sommes dues par la Communauté à la République de Djibouti au titre d’un programme d’aide, a été refusée, par un arrêt de la Cour du 29 mai 2001 Cotecna c. Commission, au motif qu’elle serait susceptible d’affecter le fonctionnement de la politique de coopération au développement.17 De même, une demande d’autorisation de saisie, sur des sommes dues à la Guinée-Bissau en application d’un accord concernant la pêche au large de cet État, présentée par une société portugaise, a été refusée en raison du fait qu’elle pourrait affecter le fonctionnement de la politique commune de la pêche.18 Si l’on suit ce raisonnement, toute mesure de saisie d’une quelconque importance est susceptible d’avoir, au moins potentiellement, un effet sur l’une des politiques conduites par l’organisation et ne pourra donc être autorisée que très excep- tionnellement. En d’autres termes, la situation de l’Union européenne, dont les biens et avoirs font l’objet d’une très forte protection, n’est pas si différente, s’agissant de l’immunité d’exécution, de celle des autres organisations internationales, contrairement à ce que les seuls textes auraient pu laisser supposer.

Les privilèges Tous les textes accordent des privilèges aux organisations internationales, sys- tématiquement étudiés avec les immunités et parfois confondus avec elles.19 On trouve, au premier rang de ceux-ci, l’inviolabilité des locaux20 et celle des

17 cjce (ord.) 29 mai 2001 Cotecna Inspection sa c. Commission des Communautés europée- nnes, C-1/00 sa, Rec. I-4219, points 12 et s. 18 cjce (ord.) 14 déc. 2004 Tertir-Terminais c. Commission, C-1/04 sa, Rec. I-11931. 19 Voir cependant la proposition tendant, même si la différence est ténue, à réserver le terme privilège aux cas dans lesquels l’organisation est soustraite, en tout ou partie, à l’application de la loi locale, l’immunité ne visant, quant à elle, que l’impossibilité d’attraire l’institution devant les tribunaux nationaux (immunité de juridiction) et de saisir ses biens (immu- nité d’exécution), H.G. Schermers et N.M. Blokker (ed.), International Institutional Law, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, 1273 p., par. 323. 20 Voir par exemple Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946, (n. 14), art. ii section 3, qui prévoit également l’exemption de « toute perquisition, réquisition, confiscation, expropriation ou de toute autre forme de contrainte administrative, exécutive, judiciaire ou législative », et, dans des termes pratiquement identiques, l’Accord général sur les privilèges et immunités du Conseil de l’Europe, 2 septembre 1949, Traités du Conseil de l’Europe (stce) n° 002, art. 4, plusieurs fois modifié. 306 Pingel archives,21 qui visent à protéger la liberté des discussions et la confidentialité des échanges. Le protocole n° 7 ne fait pas exception à la règle.22 Toutefois, et la nuance n’est pas que de pure forme, la Cour de Luxembourg a-t-elle fermement inscrit ces principes dans la logique communautaire. Elle a ainsi rappelé, dans une décision du 13 juillet 1990, que les privilèges et immunités reconnus à la Communauté (devenue Union) européenne, comme la règle d’inviolabilité, « ne revêtent qu’un caractère fonctionnel en ce qu’ils visent à éviter qu’une entrave soit apportée au fonctionnement et à l’indépendance [de l’organisation] » ; en d’autres termes, leur portée n’est pas absolue et ils ne sauraient en aucun cas permettre aux institutions de s’abstraire de leurs autres obligations, ici l’obligation fondamentale de coopération loyale avec les auto- rités nationales.23 L’analyse, qui met en lumière « l’ordre juridique propre » créé par l’Union, doit être fermement approuvée. Dès lors, en effet, que les privilèges et immunités des organisations internationales ne sont pas une fin en soi, mais un moyen au service de leur meilleur fonctionnement, il n’est pas de raison qu’ils priment sur toute autre règle, comme celle en cause dans la présente affaire, dont la Cour de justice a à maintes reprise souligné le carac- tère fondamental dans l’Union.

2.1.2 La mise en oeuvre De même qu’ils leur accordent des immunités, les textes prévoient très généralement que les organisations internationales peuvent y renoncer.24 Il est admis que cette renonciation doit être expresse, pour être valide, et que la renonciation à l’immunité de juridiction ne vaut pas renonciation à l’immunité

21 Voir par exemple Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946, (n. 14), art. ii section 4 ; Protocole relatif aux privilèges et immunités de l’Union Benelux, 17 juin 2008, www .benelux.int/pdf/pdf_fr/rgm/ProtocolePrivilegesImmunites_2008.pdf (page consultée le 23 mai 2014), art. 2. 22 Voir protocole n° 7, art. 1 et art. 3. 23 cjce (ord.) Zwartveld et al., (n. 2), points 19–21 ; cjce (ord.) 17 décembre 2008, Ufficio di Consumo di Ispra c. Commission des Communautés européennes, 2/68, Rec. p. 636, qui estime que les délégués d’une administration nationale peuvent pénétrer dans les locaux d’une institution (ici la Commission) en vue d’y accomplir un acte de contrainte (ici la phase préliminaire de l’établissement d’un impôt local), dès lors qu’ils en ont obtenu l’autorisation de la Cour. 24 Voir par exemple l’Accord de siège entre l’Organisation européenne de télécommunica- tions par satellite (Eutelsat) et la France, 15 mai 2001, www.eutelsatigo.int/docs/Accord_ de_siege.pdf (page consultée le 23 mai 2014), art. 5(1) (a). Les immunités de l’Union européenne 307 d’exécution.25 Le protocole n° 7 ne contient aucune disposition sur ce point, sans que cette originalité ait une réelle portée. La Cour de justice admet en effet qu’une telle renonciation soit possible.26 Elle en a ainsi décidé, par exemple dans une affaire jugée le 29 avril 1993, à l’occasion d’un recours en annulation, introduit par une société burkinabé, contre une décision de la Commission qui refusait de donner suite à une saisie-arrêt pratiquée entre ses mains.27 Elle a précisé que cette renonciation devait être expresse, soulignant que ne pouvait être considérée comme telle ni le simple accusé de réception de l’exploit de saisie-arrêt, ni le délai pris par la Commission pour prendre position en l’espèce. La solution est rigoureuse et n’y change rien le fait que la Cour ait pris soin de déplorer la « regrettable [ . . . ] lenteur avec laquelle la Commission a réagi à un exploit qui lui avait été dûment communiqué par le ministère des Affaires étrangères du pays d’accueil ».28 La solution est égale- ment, point de convergence notable, identique à celle qui vaut pour les autres organisations internationales. Tout en la matière est en effet affaire d’inter- prétation, une fois le principe admis que la renonciation est possible, et tant en droit international qu’en droit de l’Union, l’exigence centrale est que cette renonciation soit claire et non simplement présumée.

2.2 Les règles applicables dans les relations extérieures Acteur central de la scène internationale, l’Union européenne entretient des relations tant avec des États tiers qu’avec d’autres organisations internationales. Le protocole n° 7 prend en compte cette réalité puisqu’il prévoit que « l’État membre sur le territoire duquel est situé le siège de l’Union accorde aux missions des États tiers accréditées auprès de l’Union les immunités et pri- vilèges diplomatiques d’usage ».29 Symétriquement, l’organisation se voit très généralement reconnaître, dans les États tiers dans lesquels elle est représen- tée, des privilèges et immunités. Leur fondement est avant tout conventionnel, que soient concernées les délégations permanentes de l’Union européenne ou des missions et opérations plus ponctuelles, civiles ou militaires, destinées en

25 Pour une formulation très explicite (ce qui n’est pas le cas dans tous les textes), voir l’Accord général du Conseil de l’Europe, 1949 (n. 20), art. 3. 26 L’immunité de juridiction n’étant pas non plus prévue par le protocole (voir supra 2.1.1.), la renonciation n’y est pas davantage envisagée. Elle doit néanmoins, le cas échéant, être considérée comme possible, ne serait-ce qu’au motif que la règle est unanimement admise dans les organisations internationales. 27 cjce 29 avril 1993, Forafrique Burkinabe c. Commission des Communautés européennes, C-182/91, Rec. I-2161, point 14. 28 Ibid., point 18. 29 Voir art. 16. 308 Pingel particulier à répondre à des situations de crise.30 Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, et même si les modalités sont différentes, les prérogatives accordées sont extrêmement étendues. C’est ainsi par exemple que la délégation de l’Union européenne à Washington bénéficie d’un statut analogue à celui d’un État en vertu de l’Executive Order n° 11689 du 5 décembre 1972.31 Les raisons en sont tant la réciprocité, accordée à la mission des États-Unis à Bruxelles, que les attributs de souveraineté de ce qui était alors la Communauté, dont les autori- tés américaines soulignaient déjà, au moment de l’adoption du texte, le carac- tère « unique » en son genre.32 De même, les missions extérieures conduites par l’Union jouissent d’une protection très étendue, souvent supérieure à celle accordée aux missions de l’onu.33 Les statuts qui les fondent, désormais négo- ciés sur la base de l’article 37 ue, prévoient en particulier des mécanismes très restrictifs de règlement des différends rendant difficile toute réparation en cas de préjudice.34 Il n’est donc guère étonnant que la Commission n’hésite pas à affirmer qu’il n’existe, à sa connaissance, pas de cas dans lequel un tribunal d’un État tiers aurait refusé d’accorder l’immunité de juridiction à l’Union et à postuler l’existence, en la matière, d’une règle coutumière de droit international au profit de l’organisation.35 La position est critiquable au motif notamment que le renforcement des compétences des délégations exté- rieures, comme la multiplication des opérations de gestion des crises, risquent d’accroitre également le nombre de litiges (non résolus).36 Elle est embléma- tique de la profonde « dualité » de nature du droit européen, dont le dévelop- pement est essentiellement différent sur le territoire des États membres et hors de celui-ci, « changement de registre profondément déstabilisant pour l’observateur ».37 La question reste ouverte de la révision de la pratique de

30 Pour plus de détails, voir S. Barbier et M. Cuq, « Les immunités de l’Union européenne », (n. 11), p. 416. 31 États-Unis (us), 3 cfr 1971-1975 Compilation, 732. 32 Voir États-Unis (us), Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities to the Mission of the European Communities, House of Representatives Report n° 92-1521 (1972), 2-3. 33 Pour des exemples voir S. Barbier et M. Cuq, « Les immunités de l’Union européenne » (n. 11), pp. 419-421. 34 Ibid., p. 426. 35 Contribution à la base de données établie par le Comité des Conseillers juridiques sur le Droit International Public (cahdi), mars 2010, disponible sur http://www.coe.int/fr/web/ cahdi/databases (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 36 M. Benlolo-Carabot, « Les immunités de l’Union européenne dans les États tiers », Annuaire Français de Droit International, 2009, pp. 783-818. 37 Dans le même sens, M. Forteau, « La contribution de l’Union européenne au développe- ment du droit international général : Les limites du particularisme ? », Journal du Droit International, 2010, pp. 888-900, p. 893, par. 11. Les immunités de l’Union européenne 309 l’organisation sur ce point, qui n’est pas à l’ordre du jour, mais mériterait que les institutions concernées s’en saisissent. Le caractère fondamental du droit au juge ne devrait pas connaître de frontière.

3 Les règles applicables aux personnes physiques

Comme les organisations elles-mêmes, les personnes qui concourent à leur fonctionnement bénéficient de privilèges et immunités.38 Tel est également le cas dans l’Union européenne, les règles applicables ayant tant le même contenu que la même finalité que celles qui valent dans l’ordre international, soulignant une nouvelle fois la convergence des solutions.

3.1 Le contenu Dans toutes les organisations internationales, et l’Union européenne ne fait pas exception à la règle, les différents personnels, comme les participants aux travaux des institutions, bénéficient de privilèges et immunités dont il est très généralement acquis qu’ils varient en fonction du niveau et de la nature des tâches accomplies.

3.1.1 Les représentants des États membres L’article 10 du protocole n° 7, particulièrement cursif, se contente de prévoir que les représentants des États membres, comme leurs conseillers et experts techniques, jouissent, dans l’Union européenne, des « privilèges, immuni- tés ou facilités d’usage ». La question reste ouverte de savoir comment serait interprété le texte, s’il devait donner lieu à contentieux, ce qui n’a jamais été le cas, semble-t-il, ni devant la Cour de justice, ni devant aucune juridiction nationale. Sans doute le juge saisi pourrait-il s’inspirer des dispositions plus précises de la Convention de 1946 sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies, qui non seulement détaille les prérogatives accordées, mais souligne expressément que celles-ci le sont non à « l’avantage personnel » des représent- ants des Membres « mais dans le but d’assurer en toute indépendance l’exercice de leurs fonctions en rapport avec l’Organisation. Par conséquent, un Membre a non seulement le droit, mais le devoir de lever l’immunité de son représent- ant dans tous les cas où, à son avis, l’immunité empêcherait que justice soit

38 Sur la distinction, désormais classique, des titulaires et des bénéficiaires des immuni- tés, voir M. Cosnard, La soumission des États aux tribunaux internes : Face à la théorie des immunités des États, Paris, Pedone, 1996, pp. 79 et s. 310 Pingel faite et où elle peut être levée sans nuire au but pour lequel l’immunité est accordée ».39

3.1.2 Les représentants élus Seule organisation internationale à abriter un Parlement élu, l’Union europée- nne détaille les privilèges et immunités reconnus aux membres qui le composent aux articles 7 et suivants du protocole n° 7. Ils sont très semblables à ceux dont jouissent les parlementaires nationaux.40 L’article 7 reconnaît aux membres du Parlement européen la liberté de déplacement lorsqu’ils se rendent à une réunion de l’institution ou en reviennent et leur accorde des facilités en matière de droit de douane et de contrôle des changes. L’article 8 prévoit qu’ils ne peuvent être recherchés, détenus ou poursuivis, en raison des opinions émises dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions (irresponsabilité). Il assure ainsi, conformément à la tradition, leur liberté de parole. Comme la Cour a eu l’occasion de le souligner, cette immunité est « absolue », fait donc systématiquement obstacle à toute procédure judiciaire41 et postule une définition large de la notion d’opinion, qui couvre « les propos ou les déclarations qui, par leur contenu, correspondent à des assertions constitutives d’appréciations subjectives ».42 L’article 943 complète le dispositif et doit être lu « ensemble » avec l’article 8.44 Il prévoit que, pendant la durée des

39 Voir Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946 (n. 14), art. iv, section 14. 40 La raison de ce mimétisme tient sans doute au fait qu’à la différence de celles du droit international, justifiées par l’égalité souveraine des États, les immunités des parlementaires, y compris européens peut-on penser, sont le reflet de la répartition interne des pouvoirs ; sur ce point, voir O. Beaud, « L’immunité du chef de l’État en droit constitu- tionnel et en droit comparé », in Le droit international des immunités : Consolidation ou contestation ?, J. Verhoeven (dir.), Larcier, lgdj, 2004, 283, pp. 149 et s., pp. 166-167. 41 Voir cjce 21 octobre 2008 Alfonso Luigi Marra c. Eduardo De Gregorio (C-200/07) et Antonio Clemente (C-201/07), Rec. I-7929, point 27. Comme l’a Cour l’a également précisé, les juridictions nationales sont seules compétentes pour mettre en œuvre l’art. 8 (ex-art. 9) du protocole. Pour autant, cette disposition ne faisant aucun renvoi aux droits nationaux, l’étendue de l’immunité doit être établie sur la seule base du droit de l’Union, Ibid., points 33 et 26. 42 cj 6 septembre 2011 Aldo Patriciello, C-163/10, Rec. I-7565, point 32. 43 Sur la distinction de la portée des art. 7 et 9 (ex-art. 8 et 10) du protocole, voir tpice 15 octobre 2008 Ashley Neil Mote c. Parlement européen, T-345/05, points 47 et s., sur celle des art. 8 et 9 (ex-art. 9 et 10), voir cjce, Marra (n. 41), points 24 et s. 44 En ce sens, voir notamment les conclusions de l’avocat général Poiares Maduro du 26 juin 2008, dans l’affaire Marra (n. 41), point 10. Les immunités de l’Union européenne 311 sessions,45 les parlementaires, dont le statut peut donc ici varier, bénéficient sur le territoire national des immunités reconnues aux parlementaires de leur pays (art. 9[a]) et sur celui des autres États membres de l’exemption de toute mesure de détention et de poursuite (art. 9[b]) (inviolabilité).46 Cette immu- nité ne peut, comme le précise l’article 9 in fine, être invoquée en cas de fla- grant délit, ni faire obstacle au droit reconnu au Parlement de la lever (ce qui n’est pas le cas pour l’article 8).47 Classiques, ces dispositions n’ont guère, à ce jour, été touchées par les évolutions du droit des immunités. La situation pourrait se modifier dans le futur, sous l’influence notamment des conclusions des avocats généraux. Pour le jeu de l’immunité, la jurisprudence (qui concerne en particulier l’article 8 du protocole) admet que ce n’est pas le lieu où les opinions sont expri- mées qui importe, mais les opinions elles-mêmes, dès lors qu’à l’ère moderne, une partie non négligeable du débat politique a lieu en dehors de l’enceinte parlementaire.48 Écarter l’emploi d’un critère spatial ne résout pas toutefois la question de savoir comment différencier les propos émis « dans l’exercice des fonctions » de ceux qui ne le sont pas. Il a été proposé, par l’avocat général Maduro dans l’affaire Marra, de prendre en compte la nature des opinions exprimées.49 On préférera à ce critère dit fonctionnel celui que suggère de lui substituer l’avocat général Jääskinen, dans l’affaire Patriciello, c’est-à-dire un critère « organique » qui lie l’immunité, non au contenu des propos d’un député, « mais au rapport entre le contexte dans lequel ces propos sont expri- més et les travaux parlementaires du Parlement ».50 M. Jääskinen propose de distinguer, sur cette base, « le noyau dur » de l’immunité (couvrant les activi- tés constituant par excellence la fonction de membre du Parlement comme les opinions ou votes exprimés dans l’enceinte de l’institution ou la participation à des conférences en tant qualité de membre du Parlement européen) de « la sphère l’entourant » (actes qui ne sont pas constitutifs de la fonction de

45 Sur la notion de session, voir cjce 12 mai 1964 Albert Wagner c. Jean Fohrmann et Antoine Krier, 101/63, Rec. 381 ; cjce 10 juillet 1986 Roger Wybot c. Edgar Faure et autres, 149/85, Rec. 2391. 46 Cette immunité s’applique également lorsqu’ils se rendent au Parlement ou en reviennent, ce qui couvre l’hypothèse, objet de fréquentes controverses, des accidents de voi- ture, voir art. 9 (2). 47 Pour un exemple de la procédure applicable à la levée d’immunité et des principes sur lesquels elle se fonde, voir Trib. ue 17 janvier 2013, Bruno Gollnisch c. Parlement européen, aff. jointes T-346/11 et T-347/11, non encore publié. 48 cj, Patriciello (n. 42), point 28. 49 Conclusions dans l’affaire Marra (n. 44), points 35 et s. 50 Conclusions, 9 juin 2011, dans l’affaire Patriciello (n. 42), point 89. 312 Pingel parlementaire européen et pour lesquels les motifs qui justifient l’irrespon- sabilité doivent être « impérieux »).51 Il en conclut en l’espèce que les propos de l’élu concerné ne devraient pas être couverts, car généralement considérés comme se situant « en dehors de l’activité politique d’un député ».52 L’évolution proposée n’est certes pas radicale. Elle n’en témoigne pas moins d’une conception plus exigeante de la justice, aux termes de laquelle, si elle emporte des droits, l’immunité parlementaire comporte « également des responsabilités ».53 En d’autres termes, et comme l’avocat général l’exprime avec insistance, l’objectif de l’article 8 (ex-article 9) ne saurait être d’étendre l’immunité à toutes les déclarations des membres du Parlement, une telle interprétation entrant en conflit avec les droits fondamentaux que sont l’égalité devant la loi et l’accès à la justice.54 Bien que formulé en termes beaucoup plus prudents, l’arrêt de la Cour de justice, dans l’affaire Patriciello, va dans le même sens ; il souligne notamment à la fois l’importance, pour les particuliers, de l’accès à la justice et le fait qu’en l’espèce, les propos du député (tenus en Italie sur un parking à l’occasion d’une altercation avec la police municipale) « apparaissent relativement éloignés des fonctions d’un membre du Parlement européen et, par conséquent ( . . . ) difficilement susceptibles de présenter un lien direct avec un intérêt général préoccupant les citoyens ».55 C’est une tendance très comparable que l’on retrouve dans un arrêt du 17 janvier 2013, Gollnisch c. Parlement européen. Outre qu’il fait très exactement sienne l’interprétation retenue par la Cour de l’article 8 du protocole, le Tribunal refuse de considérer en l’espèce, contrairement à l’affirmation du requérant, que l’article 9 concernerait tous les actes accomplis en dehors de l’exercice de l’activité parlementaire stricto sensu, qui seraient donc tous couverts par l’immunité (ici des propos tenus en tant que président du groupe Front national et membre du Conseil régio- nal Rhônes-Alpes, portés devant la justice française par la Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme, licra).56 Le Tribunal rejette en consé- quence la demande d’annulation d’une décision de lever l’immunité prise par le Parlement de Strasbourg.57 Sans être audacieuse, cette jurisprudence

51 Ibid., points 96-100. 52 Ibid., point 109. 53 Ibid., point 57. 54 Ibid., point 72. 55 cj, Patriciello (n. 42), points 34 et 36. Dans le même sens, Trib. ue, Gollnisch (n. 47), point 40. 56 Trib. UE Gollnisch (n. 47), points 81 et s. 57 Il rejette dans le même temps une demande d’annulation d’une décision de ne pas défen- dre l’immunité du requérant, adoptée par le Parlement le 10 mai 2011. Les immunités de l’Union européenne 313 témoigne du souci des juges de l’Union de trouver une (meilleure) balance entre la liberté d’expression, garantie par le privilège de juridiction, et le droit d’accès à la justice, y compris, le cas échéant, en vue d’obtenir la réparation d’un préjudice.

3.1.3 Les fonctionnaires et agents Dans l’Union européenne, ce sont, en application de l’article 15 du protocole n° 7,58 le Parlement et le Conseil qui, après consultation des autres institutions intéressées, déterminent, par voie de règlement et selon la procédure lég- islative ordinaire, les catégories de fonctionnaires et agents qui bénéficient de privilèges et immunités et dans quelle mesure.59 Le texte de base a été adopté en 1969 et plusieurs fois modifié depuis lors.60 Il prévoit tout d’abord, conformément à la tendance dans l’ordre international,61 que les agents les plus subalternes (agents locaux engagés « dans des lieux situés en dehors de l’Union européenne conformément aux usages locaux en vue d’exécuter des tâches manuelles ou de service ») ne bénéficient que d’une immunité réduite.62 Il n’opère en revanche, à l’inverse d’autres textes, comme la Convention de 1946 sur les privilèges et immu- nités des Nations Unies par exemple,63 aucune différence entre les plus hauts fonctionnaires et le reste du personnel ; tous se voient reconnaître des

58 Sur l’art. 15 (ex-art. 16), ensemble avec l’art. 12 (ex-art. 13), voir cjce 8 septembre 2005 ab c. Finanzamt, C-288/04, Rec. I-7837, point 38, qui précise que la règle d’exemption du paiement d’impôt sur le revenu ne joue pas au profit des agents locaux. 59 Les dispositions prévues s’étendent au Président du Conseil européen, aux membres de la Commission, de la Cour de justice, de la Banque européenne d’investissement et de la Banque centrale européenne, voir les art. 19-22 du protocole. 60 Voir, Règlement (Euratom, ceca, cee) n° 549/69 du Conseil, du 25 mars 1969, détermi- nant les catégories des fonctionnaires et agents des Communautés européennes auxquels s’appliquent les dispositions des articles 12, 13 deuxième alinéa et 14 du protocole sur les privilèges et immunités des Communautés, joce l 74/1 du 27 mars 1969. 61 Voir par exemple agnu, Résolution 76(I), 7 décembre 1946, qui exclut du bénéfice des privilèges et immunités les fonctionnaires recrutés sur place et payés à l’heure, et pour un exemple de mise en œuvre en France, Conseil d’État, 8 octobre 2010, Leb. 369. 62 Voir, Règlement (Euratom, ceca, cee) n° 549/69 du Conseil (n. 60), art. 1(b) (1). 63 Voir Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946 (n. 14), art. v, section 19, qui prévoit qu’« outre les privilèges et immunités prévus à la Section 18, le Secrétaire général et tous les Sous-Secrétaires généraux, tant en ce qui les concerne qu’en ce qui concerne leurs conjoints et enfants mineurs, jouiront des privilèges, immunités, exemptions et facilités, accordés, conformément au droit international, aux envoyés diplomatiques ». 314 Pingel prérogatives identiques, qui valent, en outre, « quelle que soit [la] nationalité » de l’intéressé.64 Parmi ces prérogatives, on relèvera, la règle est classique, l’immunité de juridiction pour les actes accomplis en qualité officielle,65 y compris les paroles et écrits.66 Les fonctionnaires et agents bénéficient également d’une exonéra- tion d’impôt, limitée par une imposition au profit de l’Union européenne.67 Comme la Cour a eu l’occasion de le souligner dans l’affaire Humblet, dès 1960, la règle a deux justifications. La première est qu’elle est la seule à permettre à l’organisation de fixer le salaire net de ses fonctionnaires.68 La seconde, que la Cour qualifie de « raison péremptoire », est quelle est « indispensable pour garantir l’égalité de traitement des fonctionnaires de nationalités différentes ».69 Les personnels de l’Union européenne jouissent enfin de facilités en matière d’immigration, de change ou d’importation de biens en franchise.70 Le statut qui leur est accordé est donc très proche de celui qui

64 Règlement (Euratom. CECA, CEE) no 549/69 (n. 60), art. 12. La même règle (d’indifférence de la nationalité) vaut aux Nations Unies ; sur ce point, voir onu, « Pratique suivie par l’Organisation des Nations Unies, les institutions spécialisées et l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique en ce qui concerne leur statut juridique, leurs privilèges et leurs immunités : étude complémentaire du Secrétariat », Annuaire cdi 1985 ii (1), 179, par. 52. 65 Voir par exemple Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946 (n. 14), art. v, section 18a). L’immunité des fonctionnaires est donc plus limitée que celle des diplomates qui est pratiquement absolue (voir art. 31, Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques du 18 avril 1961, RTNU 500, p. 95). Sur les motifs de cette limitation qui tiendrait notamment à ce que « les États de l’ère atomique » sont opposés à des concessions exces- sives, étant donné le nombre croissant de fonctionnaires internationaux, voir M. Miele, Privilèges et immunités des fonctionnaires internationaux, Milan, Giuffre, 1958, 201 p., p. 20. 66 Protocole n° 7, art. 11a). Cette immunité continue de jouer même après la cessation des fonctions, comme le précise l’art. 11a) in fine. 67 Voir protocole n° 7, art. 12 (et pour un exemple d’application, dans un litige concernant l’isf, cj 5 juillet 2012 Michel Bourges-Maunoury et Marie-Louise Heintz c. Direction des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir, C-558/10). L’article 12 est complété par une série de dispositions relatives au domicile fiscal (voir art. 13). Pour un exposé détaillé, et souvent critique, de la matière, qui met en lumière les enjeux juridiques et politiques, voir M. Giuliano, « Immunités et privilèges des fonctionnaires européens », in Colloque sur la fonction publique européenne, Bruxelles, Institut international des sciences administratives, 1960, pp. 13–23, p. 19. 68 cjce 16 décembre 1960 Jean-E. Humblet c. État belge, 6/60, Rec. 1125. 69 Ibid., points 1156–57 ; et pour un exposé complet de la matière, voir R.S.J. Martha, Tax Treatment of International Civil Servants, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, 333 p. 70 Voir protocole n° 7, art. 11 b)–e). Là encore, la règle est classique ; rapprocher par exemple : Convention sur les privilèges et immunités, 1946 (n. 14), art. 18 d)–g) ou Accord portant Les immunités de l’Union européenne 315 vaut dans l’ordre international, soulignant une nouvelle fois la convergence des solutions. Cette convergence est encore accrue par le fait que, comme tous les textes pris en la matière, le protocole n° 7 affirme que les privilèges, immunités et facilités octroyés aux fonctionnaires et agents de l’Union le sont « exclusivement dans l’intérêt de cette dernière ».71 La jurisprudence le rappelle égale- ment avec beaucoup de fermeté.72 L’organisation a donc l’obligation de lever l’immunité « dans tous les cas » où elle estime que cela n’est pas contraire à ses intérêts.73 En d’autres termes, les règles posées ne sont pas destinées à créer une catégorie d’individus privilégiés, mais à assurer l’égalité de traitement à l’intérieur de l’organisation et à assurer son bon fonctionnement. Il n’en demeure pas moins, comme la Cour prend soin de le rappeler itérative- ment, que le fait que les privilèges et immunités soient prévus dans l’intérêt de l’Union, s’il justifie le pouvoir donné aux institutions de lever, le cas échéant, l’immunité, « ne signifie pas que ces privilèges et immunités soient accordés à la Communauté exclusivement et non pas également à ses fonctionnaires, à ses autres agents et aux membres du Parlement. Le protocole crée donc un droit subjectif au profit des personnes visées, dont le respect est garanti par le système des voies de recours établi par le traité ».74 Une interprétation étroite s’impose ici pour qu’immunité ne devienne pas impunité et que l’équilibre demeure ou, mieux, se renforce entre les prérogatives de certains et les droits de tous les autres.

création de la Banque européenne pour la reconstruction et le développement, signé le 29 mai 1990, joce L 372/1, du 31 décembre 1990, art. 52. 71 Voir art. 17. 72 Voir par exemple cjce, Humblet (n. 68), pp. 1156 et s. 73 Protocole n° 7, art. 17 (2). C’est ainsi que l’immunité de Madame Édith Cresson, ancien membre de la Commission, a été levée par l’institution en février 2000, à la suite de la demande de la justice belge, voir Le Soir du 16 février 2000, p. 5. 74 Voir par exemple Trib. ue 19 mars 2010 Bruno Gollnisch c. Parlement européen, T-42/06, point 94 (renvoyant aux arrêts du Tribunal de première instance, Mote (n. 43), point 28 ; et, par analogie, cjce, Humblet (n. 68), p. 1148). CHAPTER 19 Immunités des organisations internationales : développements récents à la Banque des Règlements Internationaux

Pierre Panchaud et Jean Abboud*

1 Introduction

Créée en 1930, la Banque des Règlements Internationaux (bri) est la plus ancienne institution financière internationale. Son siège se trouve à Bâle (Suisse). Les fondateurs de la bri avaient prévu, dès sa création, que l’objet principal de la Banque consisterait à favoriser la coopération des banques centrales et à fournir des facilités additionnelles pour les opérations financières internationales. En outre, à l’époque, les Statuts prévoyaient un rôle additionnel de la Banque qui consistait à gérer, à titre de mandataire (trustee), les emprunts internationaux (Plans Dawes et Young) liés aux réparations de guerre de l’Allemagne suite à la Première Guerre mondiale ; ce second aspect perdit néanmoins rapidement de son importance. Ainsi, la mission de la bri est aujourd’hui résolument axée sur la promotion de la coopération monétaire internationale entre banques centrales et sur son rôle de banque des banques centrales. Limitée, dans un premier temps, à un cercle relativement restreint de banques centrales – celles des pays financièrement les plus développés de l’époque – la bri a vu sa base s’élargir, à partir des années quatre-vingt-dix, à un groupe plus large de banques centrales.1 La bri s’acquitte de ses missions de coopération monétaire internationale, notamment, en offrant un forum international de discussion et de coopéra- tion aux banques centrales et autorités de surveillance, facilitant ainsi les

* Les opinions exprimées dans cet article sont celles des auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessaire- ment celles de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux. 1 Soixante banques centrales et autorités monétaires sont actuellement membres de la bri. Pour une présentation générale sur l’historique, le cadre institutionnel et juridique et les activités de la bri, voir D. Lefort, « Bank for International Settlements (bis) », in J. Wouters (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Intergovernmental Organisations, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009, pp. 1-146.

échanges de vues et les processus de prise de décision dans le domaine moné- taire et de la stabilité financière. La bri assure ou accueille aussi les secrétari- ats de plusieurs groupes internationaux d’autorités publiques – parfois dotés d’une personnalité juridique distincte – qui ont pour objet de promouvoir la stabilité financière et de développer, sous forme de standards internationaux, les principes fondamentaux de la réglementation financière, dont les plus connus sont le Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire et le Conseil de stabilité financière.2 En tant que banque des banques centrales, la bri propose une gamme éten- due de services financiers spécifiquement conçus pour les banques centrales, tant celles membres que celles non-membres de la bri. Elle aide ainsi les banques centrales, par exemple, à gérer et investir leurs réserves internationales et agit comme mandataire (trustee) dans certaines transactions financières d’intérêt public.3 La liquidité des avoirs qui lui sont confiés revêt, à cet égard, et ce, depuis sa création, une importance fondamentale dans le cadre de ses services, comme en atteste par ailleurs le texte de l’article 25 de ses Statuts.4 Les banques centrales déposent leurs réserves auprès de la bri en fonction de leurs besoins qui peuvent évoluer rapidement. Certaines banques centrales peuvent être amenées à placer tout ou partie de leurs réserves auprès de la bri, alors que d’autres préféreront diversifier leurs placements auprès, par exemple, d’autres banques centrales ou des banques commerciales. En maintenant leurs réserves

2 Plus connus sous leurs appellations anglaises, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision et Financial Stability Board. Pour un aperçu du rôle de la bri dans le renforcement de l’architecture financière internationale, voir M. Giovanoli, « The Reform of the International Financial Architecture after the Global Crisis », Journal of International Law and Politics, 2009, pp. 81–123 ; voir aussi P. Panchaud, « Le rôle de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux dans la crise et le système de régulation international », in V. Dujardin, Y. De Cordt, R. Costa et V. Moriamé (dir.), La crise économique et financière de 2008–2009, Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 327–339. 3 Par exemple, la bri a agi en qualité d’agent de séquestre (escrow agent), détenant des fonds et les libérant sous certaines conditions, en relation avec le règlement d’une action judiciaire intentée aux États-Unis à l’encontre des divers défendeurs libyens par les familles des personnes tuées dans la catastrophe du vol Pan Am 103 au-dessus de Lockerbie, Écosse, le 21 décembre 1988. Voir à cet effet bri, 74e Rapport annuel, 1er avril 2003–31 mars 2004, 28 juin 2004. 4 bri, « Statuts de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux », http://www.bis.org/about/ statutes-f.pdf (page consultée le 20 mai 2014). L’art. 25 des Statuts de la bri précise que la « Banque doit être administrée en tenant particulièrement compte de la nécessité de maintenir sa liquidité. A cet effet, elle doit conserver des actifs répondant aux conditions d’échéances et au caractère de ses engagements [. . .] ». 318 Panchaud et Abboud auprès de la bri, les banques centrales peuvent effectuer efficacement de nombreuses transactions internationales essentielles. C’est en rapport avec son rôle de banque des banques centrales que la bri fit face, entre 2009 et 2012, à une procédure judiciaire instituée en Suisse par des créanciers de la République d’Argentine qui visaient les dépôts détenus par la Banque centrale de la République d’Argentine (bcra) dans les livres de la bri. Soulevant d’importantes questions de droit international public – en particulier relativement aux immunités des organisations internationales sises en Suisse – cette procédure, désormais close, donna lieu à plusieurs décisions des autorités suisses.5 Il semble dès lors utile d’en présenter les points saillants dans un ouvrage portant sur les immunités dans « l’âge du constitutionalisme global » ; il convient toutefois, à titre préalable, d’examiner de manière plus approfondie certains aspects du statut juridique et des immunités de la bri en Suisse.

2 Le statut juridique et les immunités de la bri en Suisse La bri est une organisation internationale au bénéfice d’un accord de siège avec la Suisse.6 Afin de permettre à la bri de s’acquitter pleinement de ses fonctions et de préserver, en particulier, l’indépendance et la liberté d’action qui lui appartiennent en sa qualité de banque des banques centrales, ainsi que la continuité des opérations financières qu’elle effectue, ses opérations et activités doivent être à l’abri de toute interférence politique ou pression extéri- eure, tant des pays représentés dans l’organisation par leurs banques centrales, que du pays hôte. Les spécificités institutionnelles de la bri et l’inclusion dans ses instruments constitutifs de certaines dispositions particulières démon- trent la volonté de ses fondateurs de garantir, dès sa création en 1930, son

5 À savoir : Autorité de surveillance de l’office des poursuites du canton de Bâle-Ville, Jugement du 23 avril 2010, ab 2009/102, publié dans le Basler Juristische Mitteilungen 6 (2010), pp. 285– 295 et disponible en ligne à l’adresse suivante : http://www.gerichte.bs.ch/ab_2009_102_biz- ba.pdf (page consultée le 26 mai 2014) ; Tribunal fédéral, Jugement du 12 juillet 2010, atf 136 iii 379 ; les principaux considérants se trouvent en traduction française au Journal des Tribunaux ii (2011), p. 263 ; Département fédéral des affaires étrangères, Décision du 24 décembre 2010, non publiée ; Tribunal administratif fédéral, Décision du 16 août 2011, C719/2011 ; Tribunal fédéral, Arrêt du 22 novembre 2011, atf 137 i 371 ; Conseil fédéral, Décision du 17 octobre 2012, non publiée. 6 Voir Accord entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et la Banque des Règlements Internationaux en vue de déterminer le statut juridique de la Banque en Suisse, 10 février 1987, Recueil systéma- tique du droit fédéral suisse 0.192.122.971.3 (Accord de siège). Immunités des Organisations Internationales 319 indépendance.7 Il convient de rappeler à cet égard que seules les banques centrales – et non les États – sont membres de la bri, et que la bri est dotée d’un important capital social, ce qui renforce son indépendance en lui permettant de financer librement ses activités.8 Les dispositions des Statuts de la bri prévalent par ailleurs, selon l’article 5 de sa Charte constitutive, sur toute disposition contraire, présente ou future, du droit suisse.9 Ce souci d’assurer l’indépendance de la bri est également reflété dans son Accord de siège dans lequel la Suisse garantit explicitement « l’indépendance et la lib- erté d’action qui [. . .] appartiennent [à la Banque] en sa qualité d’organisation internationale ».10 Un large éventail d’immunités a aussi été accordé à la bri dans ses instruments constitutifs, venant ainsi renforcer cette liberté d’action voulue par ses fondateurs. Initialement prévues dans l’Accord concernant le règlement complet et définitif de la question des réparations, signé à La Haye le 20 janvier 1930 (Accord avec l’Allemagne),11 ainsi que dans sa Charte constitutive,12 les

7 Les instruments constitutifs de la bri comprennent la Convention concernant la Banque des Règlements Internationaux (avec la Charte constitutive de la Banque), 20 janvier 1930, Recueil systématique du droit fédéral suisse 0.192.122.971 ; et les Statuts de la bri (n. 4). Les instruments constitutifs de la bri sont disponibles en ligne à l’adresse suivante : http://www.bis.org/about/legal.htm (page consultée le 20 mai 2014). 8 Le capital social de la bri s’élève à trois milliards de droits de tirage spéciaux (dts). 9 Charte constitutive de la bri (n. 7), art. 5. Il s’agit là d’une formulation inédite à l’époque. 10 Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 2. L’Accord de siège contient d’autres dispositions importantes découlant de la personnalité juridique internationale de la bri, notamment, l’inviolabilité des locaux et des archives de l’organisation (art. 3), l’immunité de juridiction et d’exécution de la bri (art. 4), des exonérations fiscales (art. 7), des facilités accor- dées en matière de séjours des agents (art. 20), etc. 11 L’Accord avec l’Allemagne, 20 janvier 1930, 104 lnts 243, art. x(2) prévoit que « [S]ur les territoires relevant de l’autorité des Parties contractantes, la Banque, ses biens et avoirs ainsi que les dépôts et autres fonds qui lui auraient été remis ne feront l’objet d’aucune disposition établissant une incapacité quelconque ou d’aucune mesure restrictive telle que censure, réquisition, enlèvement ou confiscation en temps de paix ou de guerre, représailles, interdictions ou restrictions à l’exportation de l’or ou de devises ou de toute autre mesure analogue ». 12 Charte constitutive de la bri (n. 7), art. 10, prévoit que « [L]a Banque, ses biens et avoirs, ainsi que les dépôts ou autres fonds qui lui seront confiés, ne pourront faire, ni en temps de paix, ni en temps de guerre, l’objet d’aucune mesure telle que expropriation, réquisi- tion, saisie, confiscation, défense ou restriction d’exporter ou d’importer de l’or ou des devises ou de toute autre mesure analogue ». 320 Panchaud et Abboud immunités de la bri ont été confirmées en 1936 dans le Protocole de Bruxelles13 et clarifiées, en 1987, dans l’Accord de siège conclu entre la Banque et le Conseil fédéral suisse.14 Outre l’immunité qui vise à protéger la bri – ainsi que ses biens et les biens qui lui sont confiés – contre des mesures gouvernementales et administratives de blocage, de saisie ou de réquisition ou toute autre mesure analogue, la bri bénéficie, en sa qualité d’organisation internationale, notamment de l’immunité de juridiction devant les tribunaux nationaux et de l’immunité d’exécution. Ces immunités, typiques du statut des organisations internationales, sont octroyées afin de garantir aux organisations l’indépendance néces- saire à l’exercice de leurs fonctions sans entraves et à l’abri de toute intervention unilatérale des organes étatiques. Vu leur importance, quelques remarques sur l’immunité de juridiction et l’immunité d’exécution de la bri s’imposent à ce stade. L’immunité de juridiction de la bri devant les tribunaux suisses est con- sacrée à l’article 4(1) de l’Accord de siège.15 Cet article prévoit trois exceptions à l’immunité de juridiction de la bri, dont la plus importante concerne les actions civiles ou commerciales intentées par des cocontractants de la Banque dans des transactions bancaires ou financières. Cette exception, que l’on retrouve dans le cas d’autres organisations financières internationales, est destinée à permettre à la bri d’opérer sur les marchés financiers sur un pied d’égalité avec les autres opérateurs. L’immunité de juridiction de la Banque ne s’applique pas non plus dans le cas d’actions en responsabilité civile intentées

13 Le Protocole relatif aux immunités de la Banque des Règlements internationaux, 30 juillet 1936, Recueil systématique du droit fédéral suisse 0.192.122.971.1, confirme les immunités dont bénéficient les avoirs de la bri ainsi que les avoirs qui lui sont confiés dans les États qui ont signé ou adhéré au protocole (28 à ce jour), et clarifie que les avoirs redéposés par la bri auprès de tiers bénéficieront des mêmes immunités. 14 Voir également Statuts de la bri (n. 4), art. 55. Des immunités comparables furent accor- dées à la bri dans les conventions d’établissement (host country agreements) avec la République Populaire de Chine et le Mexique qui sont disponibles (en anglais) en ligne à l’adresse suivante : http://www.bis.org/about/legal.htm (page consultée le 20 mai 2014). Dans un souci de simplification, cet article se limite à l’Accord de siège (n. 6). 15 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 4(1) se lit comme suit : « [L]a Banque bénéficie de l’immunité de juridiction, sauf : a) dans la mesure où cette immunité a été formellement levée pour des cas déterminés par le Président, le Directeur Général ou par leurs représentants dûment autorisés ; b) dans le cas d’actions civiles ou commerciales découlant de transactions bancaires ou financières, intentées par des cocontractants de la Banque, sous réserve des cas pour lesquels des dispositions d’arbitrage ont ou auront été prises ; c) dans le cas d’actions en responsabilité civile intentées contre la Banque pour dommage causé par tout véhicule lui appartenant ou circulant pour son propre compte ». Immunités des Organisations Internationales 321 contre la Banque pour dommage causé par ses véhicules. Enfin, la Banque peut renoncer à son immunité de juridiction soit en incluant d’emblée dans ses contrats une clause prévoyant la compétence des tribunaux locaux, ou une clause d’arbitrage, soit en la levant au cas par cas. Le but de l’immunité d’exécution est de protéger aussi bien (i) la Banque et ses avoirs (article 4(3) de l’Accord de siège)16 que (ii) les biens et avoirs qui sont déposés auprès d’elle (article 4(4) de l’Accord de siège) de toute saisie, tout séquestre ou toute autre mesure d’exécution forcée, préalable ou postéri- eure à un jugement définitif.17 L’exécution forcée contre les avoirs propres de la Banque est toutefois autorisée dans les cas où la Banque n’a pas d’immunités de juridiction (donc essentiellement dans le cas d’actions intentées par des cocontractants de la Banque dans des transactions bancaires ou finan- cières, ou les cas où la Banque y a renoncé).18 Dans ces cas, les créanciers de la Banque auraient la possibilité de demander l’exécution forcée de leur jugement contre les avoirs propres de la bri. Par contraste, la protection des avoirs de clients déposés auprès de la bri est plus générale : ces avoirs sont spécifiquement protégés contre toute mesure d’exécution forcée sauf accord exprès préalable de la Banque. L’immunité des biens des banques centrales est reconnue tant au niveau national qu’au niveau international, notamment dans la Convention universelle sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, adoptée le 2 décembre 2004 par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies19. Bénéficiant d’un niveau important d’immunités – en particulier en ce qui a trait à l’immunité de juridiction et

16 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 4(3) prévoit que : « [L]a Banque bénéficie sur ses biens et avoirs, où qu’ils se trouvent et quels qu’en soient les détenteurs, de l’immunité d’exécution (notamment à l’égard de toute mesure de saisie, séquestre, blocage ou d’autres mesures d’exécution forcée ou de sûreté et, en particulier, de séquestre au sens du droit suisse), sauf : a) dans le cas où l’exécution est demandée sur la base d’un jugement ayant force de chose jugée rendu contre la Banque par un tribunal compétent conformément à l’alinéa 1, lettre a), b) ou c) ci-dessus ; b) en cas d’exécution d’une sentence arbitrale rendue en application de l’article 27 du présent accord ». 17 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 4(4) prévoit que « [L]es dépôts confiés à la Banque, toute créance sur la Banque, ainsi que les actions émises par la Banque, où qu’ils se trouvent et quels qu’en soient les détenteurs, ne pourront faire l’objet, sauf accord exprès préalable de la Banque, d’aucune mesure d’exécution (notamment de saisie, séquestre, blocage ou d’autres mesures d’exécution forcée ou de sûreté et, en particulier, de séquestre au sens du droit suisse) ». 18 Voir (n. 15) et (n. 16). 19 Voir Convention des Nations Unies sur les immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens, 2 décembre 2004, a/res/59/38, annexe. La Convention n’est pas encore entrée en vigueur. 322 Panchaud et Abboud d’exécution – dans de nombreuses juridictions, les biens et avoirs des banques centrales ne doivent pas perdre leurs immunités lorsqu’ils sont déposés auprès de la bri puisqu’ils seraient autrement exposés à des procédures judiciaires pouvant compromettre leur liquidité et disponibilité en cas de besoin pour l’exécution de la politique des changes d’un État donné. Cette possibilité découragerait nombre de banques centrales de déposer leurs avoirs auprès de la bri ; cette dernière perdrait alors, dans une large mesure, sa raison d’être en tant que « plaque tournante » entre les banques centrales puisqu’elle ne serait plus en mesure d’assurer certains de ses services, qui reposent précisément sur le fait que la plupart des banques centrales ont un compte dans ses livres. En examinant les immunités dont jouit la bri en Suisse, il faut également prendre en compte certaines autres dispositions stipulées dans l’Accord de siège et qui s’y rapportent. Tout d’abord, l’article 22 de l’Accord de siège impose à la bri et aux autorités suisses l’obligation de coopérer en tout temps en vue d’empêcher tout abus des privilèges et immunités prévus dans l’Accord de siège.20 En pratique, cette coopération fonctionne par le biais du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (dfae) à Berne et de la Mission Permanente de la Suisse auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies et des autres organisations internationales à Genève, qui, comme pour toutes les organisations internationales en Suisse, sont les interlocuteurs de la bri en matière de privilèges et immuni- tés. La bri adopte une attitude pragmatique et renonce, en règle générale, aux immunités lorsqu’elle considère que celles-ci peuvent être levées sans entraver son bon fonctionnement. Ainsi, par exemple, la bri a-t-elle la pratique de lever l’immunité d’un agent pour permettre l’exécution forcée d’un jugement en matière matrimoniale par le biais d’une saisie sur salaire. De plus, l’article 27 de l’Accord de siège prévoit que toute divergence de vues entre la bri et la Suisse concernant l’application de l’Accord de siège doit faire l’objet de pour- parlers directs entre les deux parties, qui peuvent recourir, en cas d’échec, à un tribunal arbitral pour résoudre le différend.21 La bri et les autorités suisses n’ont jamais eu recours à cette procédure.

20 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 22 prévoit que : « [L]a Banque et les autorités suisses coopér- eront en tout temps en vue de faciliter une bonne administration de la justice, d’assurer l’observation des règlements de police et d’empêcher tout abus des privilèges et immuni- tés, facilités et exemptions prévus dans le présent accord ». 21 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 27(1) prévoit que : « [T]oute divergence de vues concernant l’application ou l’interprétation du présent accord, qui n’a pas pu être réglée par des pour- parlers directs entre les parties, peut être soumise, par l’une ou l’autre partie, au Tribunal arbitral prévu par l’Accord de La Haye du 20 janvier 1930 et visé au paragraphe 11 de la Charte constitutive de la Banque ». Immunités des Organisations Internationales 323

Il convient aussi de relever que si l’immunité de juridiction exclut l’intervention des tribunaux de l’État du siège, elle ne signifie pas pour autant absence de mécanisme de résolution de certains différends. En effet, l’article 23 de l’Accord de siège prévoit que la bri doit prendre, dans la mesure où elle bénéficie de l’immunité de juridiction, des dispositions appropriées en vue du règlement satisfaisant de différends avec des contreparties contractuelles, ou de litiges avec des tiers portant sur un point de droit privé les opposant à la Banque (par exemple un litige de voisinage).22 Par ailleurs, deux tribunaux permanents sont compétents pour connaître de certains types spécifiques de litiges impliquant la bri. Le Tribunal administratif de la bri a, en vertu de l’article 4(2) de l’Accord de siège, la compé- tence exclusive et se prononce en dernier ressort dans tout litige opposant, en matière de rapports de service, la Banque à ses fonctionnaires, anciens fonctionnaires ou à leurs ayants droit. Le même article précise que la notion de « rapports de service » comprend en particulier toute question ayant trait à l’interprétation ou à l’application : (i) des conventions intervenues entre la Banque et ses fonctionnaires concernant leur service, (ii) des règlements auxquels lesdites conventions se réfèrent (par exemple le Règlement du personnel) et (iii) des dispositions régissant le régime de prévoyance ainsi que les autres avantages sociaux offerts par la Banque.23 À ce jour, le Tribunal administratif de la bri a exercé sa compétence, et rendu des jugements définitifs, dans six recours qui concernaient, entre autres, l’exemption fiscale, l’assurance maladie et le régime de retraite des agents de la Banque.24 Le Tribunal arbitral de La Haye, établi conformément à l’Accord avec l’Allemagne, est, quant à lui, seul compétent pour connaître des différends entre

22 L’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 23 se lit comme suit : « [L]a Banque prendra des dispositions appropriées en vue du règlement satisfaisant : a) de différends résultant de contrats auxquels la Banque serait partie et d’autres différends portant sur un point de droit privé, dans la mesure où la Banque bénéficie de l’immunité de juridiction conformément à l’article 4, alinéa 1, ci-dessus ; b) de différends dans lesquels serait impliqué un fonctionnaire de la Banque qui, aux termes des articles 13 et 14 jouit de l’immunité, si cette dernière n’a pas été levée conformément aux dispositions de l’article 19 ». 23 bri, « Statut du Tribunal administratif de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux », 13 janvier 2014, http://www.bis.org/about/atbis/s14_fr.pdf (page consultée le 20 mai 2014) ; et bri, « Règlement de procédure du Tribunal administratif de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux », 13 janvier 2014, http://www.bis.org/about/atbis/rop14_fr.pdf (page con- sultée le 20 mai 2014). 24 En coordination avec la Banque, le Tribunal administratif publie ses jugements sur le site web de la bri à l’adresse suivante : http://www.bis.org/about/atbis_decisions.htm (page consultée le 20 mai 2014). 324 Panchaud et Abboud la Banque et ses actionnaires portant sur ses Statuts.25 Après une longue péri- ode d’inactivité, ce tribunal a été appelé à examiner la décision de l’Assemblée générale extraordinaire de la bri, tenue le 8 janvier 2001, d’introduire une disposition dans les Statuts de la bri prévoyant que seules les banques centrales pouvaient dorénavant détenir des actions bri, et de rayer du registre des actions de la bri tous les actionnaires particuliers moyennant le versement par la Banque d’une indemnité de chf 16’000. Le rachat obligatoire de ces actions visait notamment à renforcer la gouvernance de la bri au vu de sa mission d’intérêt public (favoriser la coopération entre banques centrales et contribuer à la stabilisation du système financier mondial) avec laquelle l’intérêt financier particulier d’un petit nombre de personnes privées détenant des actions de la bri devenait de plus en plus incompatible.26 Certains anciens actionnaires privés ont néanmoins contesté la licéité de l’opération et le montant de l’indemnité offerte par la bri et porté leur requête devant le Tribunal arbitral. Dans une sentence partielle, rendue le 22 novembre 2002, le Tribunal arbitral a confirmé la légalité, sous l’angle du droit international public, du rachat obligatoire des actions. Le Tribunal arbitral a néanmoins décidé que les anciens actionnaires privés avaient droit à une part plus importante de la valeur de l’actif net de la Banque. Ainsi, dans sa sentence définitive rendue le 19 septembre 2003, le Tribunal arbitral a fixé le montant exact dû par la bri par action et, en exécution de cette sentence, la Banque a versé à chaque demandeur une indemnité supplémentaire s’élevant, intérêts compris, à chf 9’052.90 par action.27 C’est à la lumière de l’ensemble des considérations précédentes qu’il convient, à présent, de revenir sur la récente tentative de contestation des immu- nités de la bri en Suisse.

25 Voir Statuts de la bri (n. 4), art. 54. 26 Statuts de la bri (n. 4), art. 6, 12 et 15 à 18 furent ainsi modifiés à cette occasion de façon à réserver exclusivement aux banques centrales le droit de détenir des actions de la bri. En outre, une disposition transitoire fut insérée dans les Statuts, art. 18bis, pour opérer la radiation des actionnaires privés inscrits sur les registres de la Banque et le paiement à ces actionnaires d’une indemnité de chf 16’000 par action. 27 Cour permanente d’arbitrage, Actionnaires de la Banque c. Banque des Règlements Internationaux (bri), Sentence partielle du 22 novembre 2002 et Sentence définitive du 19 septembre 2003, disponibles sur le site web de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage à l’adresse suivante : http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1222 (page consultée le 26 mai 2014). Pour un commentaire sur la sentence partielle du Tribunal arbitral, voir D.J. Bederman, « The Unique Legal Status of the Bank for International Settlements Comes into Focus », Leiden Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 787–794. Immunités des Organisations Internationales 325

3 Contestation des immunités de la bri

Le 17 octobre 2012, le Conseil fédéral suisse rejeta le recours de deux fonds collectifs privés d’investissements domiciliés aux îles Caïmans – nml Capital Ltd. et em Limited – qui tentaient d’obtenir l’exécution forcée en Suisse de jugements prononcés aux États-Unis d’Amérique contre la République d’Argentine.28 Cette décision du Conseil fédéral mettait ainsi un terme à une longue procédure, instituée trois ans auparavant par les fonds, qui avait donné lieu à une série de décisions des autorités judiciaires suisses.29 Les fonds en question – qui se spécialisent dans le rachat à bas prix de titres de dette souveraine impayés suite à une restructuration de la dette extérieure – détenaient en l’espèce des titres de la dette argentine et cherchaient à en obtenir le recouvrement intégral en puisant directement sur les réserves déposées par la bcra auprès de la bri.30 Tout au long de la procédure, le principal argument soulevé par les fonds était que l’Argentine avait abusé des immunités de la bri en y transférant la totalité de ses réserves internationales ; et ce, dans le seul but de les protéger de l’emprise de ses créanciers suite à la crise de la dette argentine de 2001.31 Selon les fonds, il revenait aux tribunaux suisses de trancher la question de l’abus des immunités et, le cas échéant, de lever les immunités de la bri, permettant ainsi aux fonds de satisfaire leur créance directement sur les avoirs de la bcra.32

28 En l’espèce, des jugements définitifs et exécutoires rendus par un tribunal de New York, en 2003 et 2006, condamnant la République d’Argentine à leur verser les sommes en capital plus intérêts de respectivement usd 284 millions et usd 724 millions. 29 Voir (n. 5). 30 Il convient à cet effet de rappeler que les titres émis en 1995 par la République d’Argentine étaient restés impayés suite à la crise de la dette de l’Argentine en 2001. Pour plus de détails sur les actions intentées par les « fonds vautours » contre les États défaillants, notamment dans le contexte des programmes de restructuration de la dette souveraine, voir inter alia D. Devos, « Special Immunities : Bank for International Settlements », in R.M. Lastra et L. Buchheit (ed.), Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 127-137. 31 Les fonds avaient en effet avancé, à tort, que les avoirs déposés par la bcra auprès de la bri correspondaient à 99 % des réserves en monnaies étrangères de l’Argentine, ce qui représentait, selon les fonds, quelque usd 40 milliards. Interrogée directement par le Financial Times après une série de rumeurs sur cette question, la bri avait rappelé que les montants des dépôts des banques centrales qui lui sont confiés étaient confidentiels mais qu’en toute hypothèse, les chiffres cités par les médias à propos de la bcra étaient grossièrement exagérés (Financial Times, article du 19 février 2010). 32 Il importe de rappeler que les fonds avaient une créance contre la République d’Argentine – et non contre la bcra, une entité juridique distincte de l’État argentin – et que la bri ne 326 Panchaud et Abboud

Les fonds s’étaient dans ce but adressés à l’origine au juge civil du canton de Bâle-Ville, lequel – agissant seul et sans avoir entendu la bri – avait octroyé deux ordonnances de séquestre visant un montant total d’environ chf 1 mil- liard, plus intérêts, déposés par la bcra dans les livres de la bri. Ces ordonnances avaient été transmises par fax le 5 novembre 2009 directement à la bri par l’autorité d’exécution compétente en la matière – en l’espèce, l’office des poursuites du canton de Bâle-Ville – et ce, sans aucune considération pour les immunités ou l’inviolabilité de la bri en la matière.33 La question de la validité des ordonnances de séquestre se posait non seulement sur le plan du droit international public, en raison des immunités de la bri, mais aussi sur le plan du droit interne suisse. De fait, l’article 22 de la Loi fédérale sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite (lp) consacre la nullité des mesures « contraires à des dispositions édictées dans l’intérêt public ou dans l’intérêt de personnes qui ne sont pas parties à la procédure ». Le même article impose aussi aux autorités de surveillances l’obligation de constater la nul- lité de telles mesures « indépendamment de toute plainte ». L’article 30a lp réserve, quant à lui, expressément les traités internationaux. En l’espèce, les ordonnances de séquestre étaient contraires aux dispositions d’intérêt public relatives aux immunités de la bri et contrevenaient aux obligations internationales et aux garanties accordées par la Suisse à la bri dans son Accord de siège. Les ordonnances de séquestre étaient, par conséquent, manifestement nulles en vertu du droit interne suisse. Mais comment la bri pouvait-elle faire valoir son point de vue dans la procé- dure ? La bri devait-elle faire opposition selon l’article 278 lp comme l’aurait sans doute fait tout tiers-saisi classique en Suisse ?34 Une réponse négative s’imposait puisque, dans le cas contraire, la bri se serait constituée partie dans une procédure qui – vu sa qualité d’organisation internationale au bénéfice de l’immunité de juridiction et d’exécution, et vu l’absence d’un accord préalable

détenait pas des avoirs au nom de la République d’Argentine, mais seulement des avoirs au nom de la bcra. Pour plus de détails sur ce point, voir Devos, « Special Immunities: Bank for International Settlements » (n. 30). 33 En réalité, seule une notification par la voie diplomatique, i.e. une transmission par l’intermédiaire du dfae, est valable. En effet, selon l’art. 3(1) de l’Accord de siège (n. 6), « Les bâtiments ou parties de bâtiments et le terrain attenant qui, quel qu’en soit le pro- priétaire, sont utilisés aux fins de la Banque, sont inviolables. Nul agent de l’autorité publique suisse ne peut y pénétrer sans le consentement exprès de la Banque [. . .]. ». Cette disposition interdit aux autorités suisses tout exercice de leur autorité à l’intérieur de la Banque sauf avec le consentement exprès de la bri. 34 L’art. 278 lp prévoit que celui dont les droits sont touchés par un séquestre peut former opposition auprès du juge dans les dix jours à compter de celui où il en a eu connaissance. Immunités des Organisations Internationales 327 de la bri à la mesure de séquestre – n’aurait jamais dû avoir lieu. Estimant ainsi qu’elle n’avait pas à se constituer partie pour défendre son statut, la Banque se limita à dénoncer, comme aurait pu le faire n’importe quel tiers – par lettres datées du 6 et 13 novembre 2009, et envoyées respectivement à l’office des poursuites du canton de Bâle-Ville et à l’autorité cantonale de surveillance de l’office des poursuites – la nullité des ordonnances de séquestre sur la base de ses immunités.35 La bri fut soutenue dans ses démarches par le dfae. Au vu des immunités accordées à la bri dans son Accord de siège – et comme la bri n’avait à aucun moment donné son accord préalable selon l’article 4(4) de son Accord de siège à l’exécution de telles ordonnances –, l’autorité de surveillance de l’office des poursuites du canton de Bâle-Ville, composée de trois juges du tribunal cantonal bâlois, annula, à juste titre, les ordonnances de séquestre dans une décision rendue le 23 avril 2010.36 Les fonds firent alors appel de cette décision auprès du Tribunal fédéral suisse (la cour suprême de la Suisse). Dans une décision fondamentale, rendue le 12 juillet 2010, le Tribunal fédéral, ayant minutieusement examiné la nature et l’étendue des immunités de la bri en Suisse, rejeta le recours formulé par les fonds, confirmant ainsi la nullité des ordonnances de séquestre initialement émises par le juge civil du canton de Bâle-Ville.37 Selon les fonds, l’utilisation abusive des immunités de la bri par la République d’Argentine justifiait, en l’espèce, l’application de la théorie de

35 Cette approche fut validée par le Tribunal fédéral dans sa décision du 12 Juillet 2010 (n. 5) ; voir considérant 4.2.2 de la décision. Selon le Tribunal fédéral, la bri ne pouvait en effet pas être « contrainte de former opposition à l’ordonnance de séquestre et de faire valoir dans une procédure judiciaire que le séquestre constitue une atteinte à ses droits et immunités ». Ainsi, et contrairement aux allégations des fonds, le fait que la bri n’ait pas formé opposition ne pouvait pas être retenu contre la Banque. Il semble toutefois quelque peu surprenant que le Tribunal fédéral ait néanmoins lui-même assimilé la Banque, dans sa décision du 12 juillet 2010, à une partie. Voir également la note du professeur Edgar Philippin, in Journal des Tribunaux, 2011, p. 263 qui partage cette observation. 36 Voir (n. 5). 37 Voir (n. 5). La décision du Tribunal fédéral du 12 juillet 2010 (n. 5) a déjà fait couler beaucoup d’encre ; voir notamment : Devos, « Special Immunities: Bank for International Settlements » (n. 30) ; A. Peters, « Die funktionale Immunität internationaler Organisationen und die Rechtsweggarantie », Revue Suisse de Droit International et Européen, 2011, pp. 397-437 ; note du Professeur Edgard Philippin (n. 35) ; M. Hottelier et V. Martenet, « La pratique suisse relative aux droits de l’homme 2010 », Revue Suisse de Droit International et Européen, 2011, pp. 460-461 ; et F. Vischer, « Zur Stellung der Anleihensgläubiger bei Zahlungsunfähigkeit des Schuldnerstaates », Revue Suisse de Droit International et Européen, 2011, pp. 243–271, en particulier pp. 264–265. 328 Panchaud et Abboud la limitation fonctionnelle des immunités, selon laquelle les immunités ne sont accordées à une organisation internationale que pour des actes qui sont « inherent or essential for its institutional purposes ».38 Or, argumentaient les fonds, le dépôt par l’Argentine de ses réserves auprès de la bri – effectué selon eux dans le seul but de mettre ces réserves hors de portée de ses créanciers – ne saurait faire partie des fonctions de la bri.39 Le Tribunal fédéral rejeta cet argument et confirma la position traditionnelle adoptée en Suisse selon laquelle les immunités des organisations internationales sont absolues, c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent être levées sans l’accord explicite de l’organisation.40 Le Tribunal fédéral rappela à cet effet que, contrairement aux États, pour qui la distinction entre acta iure imperii et acta iure gestionis s’applique, les organisations internationales bénéficient de l’immunité pour toutes leurs activités, comme ces dernières sont étroitement liées à leur but. En l’espèce, la détention dans ses livres et la gestion par la bri des réserves de change d’une banque centrale

38 Selon la formule de l’International Law Association (ila). 39 Voir le jugement de l’Autorité de surveillance de Bâle-Ville du 23 avril 2010 (n. 5). 40 Voir considérant 4.3 de la décision du Tribunal fédéral (n. 5). Sur la position constante de la Suisse sur la nature absolue des immunités accordées aux organisations internationales, voir avis de droit de la Direction du droit international public, Créances de droit d’auteur envers des missions diplomatiques et permanentes, des postes consulaires et des organisations internationales. Immunité des États. Limites en matière de juridiction et d’exécution forcée, jaac 59.157, 28 février 1994, publié en traduction française dans Revue Suisse de Droit International et de Droit Européen 5 (1995) et Pratique suisse (1994), n° 3.2, 596. La Loi fédérale sur les privilèges, les immunités et les facilités, ainsi que les aides financières accordés par la Suisse en tant qu’État hôte du 22 juin 2007 reflète aussi l’attitude générale de la Suisse vis-à-vis des organisations internationales. C’est la position adoptée aussi par le Tribunal fédéral en l’affaire Groupement d’entreprises Fougerolle c. Organisation européenne pour la recherche nucléaire (cern), Arrêt du 21 décembre 1992, atf 118 Ib 562. Dans cet arrêt, le Tribunal fédéral a rappelé que les « organisations internationales bénéficient d’une immunité absolue et complète », contrairement à l’immunité relative dont jouissent les États et qui repose sur l’idée de soustraire à l’immunité les « transactions commerciales ». Dans le cadre d’une procédure de séquestre sur les biens d’une organisation internationale basée à Genève (ompi), l’Autorité de surveillance en matière de poursuites et de faillites de Genève a réitéré le caractère absolu de l’immunité d’exécution de l’organisation internationale (Autorité de surveillance de Genève, 9 avril 1997, Bulletin des poursuites et faillites, 62e année, 1998, pp. 220-222 ; voir aussi la décision du Conseil fédéral, Protection diplomatique. Interdiction de l’arbitraire. Responsabilité des organisations internationales, jaac 61.75, 30 octobre 1996, suite à un recours introduit par un créancier privé contre la décision de maintenir l’immunité d’exécution de l’unhcr dans Revue Suisse de Droit International et de Droit Européen 7 (1997) et Pratique suisse (1996), n° 4.4, 668). Immunités des Organisations Internationales 329 sont prévues expressis verbis dans ses Statuts, et font dès lors indubitablement partie des missions d’intérêt public protégées par les immunités de la bri.41 Le Tribunal fédéral reconnut, à juste titre, que la bri serait « atteinte dans ce que l’exécution de ses fonctions a de plus caractéristique, si les avoirs d’une banque centrale pouvaient être séquestrés pour des montants se comptant en milliards de francs ou si les valeurs et dépôts qui lui sont confiés pouvaient faire l’objet d’un avis d’autorité portant interdiction d’en disposer ou de s’exécuter en mains du créancier ».42 Ces considérations amenèrent le Tribunal à conclure que « la théorie de la limitation fonctionnelle des immunités ne remet pas en question l’immunité absolue clairement garantie à la bri par l’accord de siège, mais en confirme au contraire la nécessité ».43 Le Tribunal fédéral rejeta également l’argument des fonds selon lesquels le prétendu abus des immunités de la bri par la République argentine pouvait servir à fonder la compétence des tribunaux de l’État hôte, et confirma que les tribunaux étatiques ne sont pas compétents pour trancher la question d’un éventuel abus des immunités de la bri.44 L’indépendance et l’impartialité des tribunaux étatiques seraient mises en cause s’ils devaient être appelés à évaluer si les activités d’une organisation sont absolument nécessaires à son fonctionnement, ou au contraire abusives. Le refus d’une organisation internationale de lever ses immunités est, par conséquent, opposable au juge étatique.45 C’est encore à juste titre que le Tribunal fédéral arriva à cette conclusion puisqu’un tel examen judiciaire introduirait une part d’incertitude dans un domaine où la plus absolue des certitudes est requise : les réserves moné- taires et de change d’une banque centrale doivent être liquides et disponibles à tout moment, pour répondre aux besoins de sa politique monétaire. Elles ne peuvent pas être sujettes à examen judiciaire pour déterminer si une mesure de blocage serait éventuellement justifiée dans un cas particulier.46 C’est là une des grandes faiblesses de la théorie de la nécessité fonctionnelle des immuni- tés que d’introduire une incertitude juridique, contrairement au concept clair

41 Voir considérant 4.3.1 de la décision du Tribunal fédéral (n. 5). Recevoir des dépôts effec- tués par des banques centrales correspond à une des fonctions statutaires de la bri (voir Statuts de la bri, art. 3 et 21 alinéa J)). 42 Voir considérant 4.3.3 de la décision du Tribunal fédéral (n. 5). 43 Ibid. 44 Voir ibid., considérant 4.4.2 et considérant 4.4.3, ajoutons que les tribunaux étatiques ne pourraient pas non plus se pencher sur la politique de placement des réserves d’une banque centrale étrangère. 45 Voir ibid., considérant 4.4.2. 46 Une ordonnance de séquestre entraine le blocage des avoirs avec effet immédiat. 330 Panchaud et Abboud de l’immunité absolue.47 Une telle incertitude serait certainement de nature à compromettre le fonctionnement de la bri en tant que banque des banques centrales. Le Tribunal fédéral estima enfin que l’inexistence, dans l’Accord de siège de la bri, d’un droit propre des fonds à faire examiner par une autorité indépen- dante le refus de la bri de lever son immunité – contrairement à d’autres types de litiges impliquant la bri comme partie pour lesquels l’Accord de siège prévoit des mécanismes de règlements spécifiques – ne constituait pas une violation de l’article 6(1) de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme. Cette restriction poursuit un but légitime et est conforme au principe de la proportionnalité, parce qu’un examen des immunités de la bri par un tribunal étatique mettrait en péril la capacité de la bri d’accomplir ses fonctions d’une manière adéquate, en particulier quant à la gestion des réserves de change d’un grand nombre de banques centrales.48 La décision du Tribunal fédéral laissait aux fonds la possibilité de s’adresser aux autorités politiques suisses afin que la Confédération remette en question, le cas échéant, le refus de la bri de lever son immunité.49 Les fonds demandèrent ainsi, en octobre 2010, au dfae de constater formellement l’existence d’un abus des immunités de la bri au sens de l’article 22 de l’Accord de siège et de prendre des mesures pour que la bri consente aux ordonnances de séquestre. Les fonds demandèrent aussi la mise en place d’un mécanisme de règlement des différends en application de l’article 23 de l’Accord de siège, et/ou d’une procédure arbitrale selon l’article 27 de l’Accord de siège. Dans une décision rendue le 24 décembre 2010, le dfae rejeta les requêtes des fonds dans leur totalité.50 Dans une décision rendue le 17 octobre

47 Voir Peters, « Funktionale Immunität » (n. 37), p. 409, qui reconnaît cet inconvénient. A. Peters, tout en approuvant dans son résultat le jugement du Tribunal fédéral, regrette que celui-ci n’ait pas au moins procédé à un examen, ne serait-ce que sommaire, de la question d’un éventuel abus des immunités de la bri. Or, ceci n’aurait pas été possible sans blocage, dans les livres de la bri, des avoirs de la banque centrale en question. 48 Voir considérant 4.5 de la décision du Tribunal fédéral (n. 5). 49 Voir ibid., considérant 4.5.2. Rappelons qu’en vertu de l’Accord de siège (n. 6), art. 22 la bri et les autorités suisses doivent se concerter et coopérer pour éviter tout abus des immu- nités. Toute divergence de vues concernant l’application ou l’interprétation de l’Accord de siège, et donc les immunités de la bri, doit faire l’objet de concertations directes entre la bri et les autorités suisses et être résolue entre ces parties, et, éventuellement, par un tribunal arbitral prévu à cet effet dans la Convention concernant la bri ou un tribunal arbitral ad hoc. 50 Les fonds firent appel en janvier 2011 de la décision du dfae auprès du Tribunal administratif fédéral, mais par arrêt du 16 août 2011 (n. 5), le Tribunal administratif déclara Immunités des Organisations Internationales 331

2012 en vertu de son pouvoir discrétionnaire en matière de protection diplomatique et de politique extérieure de la Suisse, le Conseil fédéral confirma les conclusions du dfae et mit ainsi définitivement un terme à cette procédure.51 Le Conseil fédéral convint qu’il n’y avait aucun élément qui permettait de conclure à un abus des immunités accordées à la bri, et ce, que ce soit par la bri elle-même, ou par la République d’Argentine et/ou par la bcra ; que la bri n’avait pas à mettre en place un système de règlement des différends au sens de l’article 23 de l’Accord de siège puisque la bri était étrangère au différend opposant les fonds à la République d’Argentine (et qu’il n’y avait dès lors pas de litige de droit privé entre les fonds et la bri) ; et qu’il n’existait aucune divergence de vue concernant l’Accord de siège qui justifiait la mise en place de la procédure de règlement des différends prévue à l’article 27 de l’Accord de siège.

4 Conclusions

En sa qualité d’organisation internationale et de banque au service de l’ensemble de la communauté des banques centrales, la bri bénéficie d’immunités de juridiction et d’exécution. Ces immunités garantissent l’indépendance et la liberté d’action de la bri et lui permettent ainsi d’assurer son bon fonctionnement et de réaliser ses fonctions statutaires. C’est donc à juste titre que le Tribunal fédéral a confirmé les immunités pro- tégeant les avoirs déposés auprès de la bri contre toute mesure d’exécution forcée en Suisse. Les autorités judiciaires suisses ne sauraient statuer sur des questions portant sur ces avoirs qui se situent hors de portée de toute mesure d’exécution en droit suisse. Cette protection de droit international public accordée aux avoirs déposés auprès de la bri serait remise en cause si les autorités judiciaires étatiques pouvaient décider de l’application des immu- nités qui s’y rapportent dans chaque cas d’espèce. Bloqués dans les livres de la bri pendant la durée de l’examen, ces avoirs ne seraient plus disponibles pour

irrecevable le recours des fonds estimant qu’il n’était pas compétent dans ce dossier qui relevait de la politique étrangère de la Suisse avec une organisation internationale et transmit ainsi la cause au Conseil fédéral suisse, après confirmation de son jugement par le Tribunal fédéral Suisse, voir aussi (n. 5). 51 Selon l’art. 72 alinéa A) de la Loi fédérale sur la procédure administrative, la voie de recours contre une décision du dfae concernant la protection diplomatique conduit au Conseil fédéral et non au Tribunal fédéral. Voir Conseil fédéral suisse, « Communiqué de presse du 17 Octobre 2012 », https://www.news.admin.ch/dokumentation/00002/00015/index .html?lang=fr&msg-id=46343 (page consultée le 26 mai 2014). Le jugement lui-même n’a pas été publié. 332 Panchaud et Abboud l’exécution des tâches d’intérêt public de la banque centrale concernée et de la bri. Les immunités portant sur ces avoirs perdraient, dans une telle hypothèse, tout leur sens. En contrepartie de l’octroi d’immunités à la bri, l’Accord de siège et les Statuts de la bri contiennent des dispositions qui encadrent leur application (par exemple, l’obligation de concertation entre l’État hôte et l’organisation dans le but d’éviter tout abus, avec la possibilité de recourir à un tribunal international en cas de divergence), mais aussi des mécanismes pour la réso- lution de certains types de différends spécifiques concernant l’interprétation et l’application des Statuts de la Banque, les contrats conclus par la Banque et autres litiges de droit privé avec la Banque, et les litiges entre la Banque et son personnel. La contestation des immunités portant sur les avoirs des banques centrales déposés auprès de la bri se situait néanmoins hors du champ d’application de ces dispositions. C’est dans cette optique que la décision du Tribunal fédéral en faveur d’une immunité absolue non susceptible d’un examen par le juge national se justifie pleinement comme la seule solution qui garantisse la certitude juridique qui est nécessaire au fonctionnement, en Suisse, de la banque des banques centrales. CHAPTER 20 Quelques réflexions sur les immunités des organisations internationales

Rémi Cèbe

1 Introduction

Ces réflexions1 sont celles d’un praticien et ont seulement pour objet d’apporter un éclairage sur les enjeux de la reconnaissance des immunités des organisations internationales (ci-après « organisations ») à la lumière de son expérience de ces questions. La question qui est souvent posée aux conseillers juridiques des organisations en la matière est la suivante : les immunités des organisations leur assurent-elles une protection légitime ou sont-elles constitutives d’un déni de justice ? Dans les trente dernières années, la doctrine a été prompte à analyser les jugements des juridictions nationales et internationales à ce titre, ainsi que la portée qu’ils pourraient avoir sur l’érosion de la reconnaissance de ces immunités.2 Comme souvent, le tableau est plus nuancé quand on y regarde de près. Il est en effet difficile de comparer les jurisprudences de juridictions aux compétences différentes et portant sur des affaires concernant des organisations qui ont des instruments constitutifs, des mécanismes de règlement des différends et des accords de privilèges et immunités distincts. Les immu- nités des organisations font l’objet d’une contestation régulière qui porte sur leur justification même, mais également sur l’impartialité des arbitres ou juges qui sont appelés à rendre des sentences ou des jugements. Il a notamment été soutenu que les juridictions administratives internationales, compétentes pour juger des différends des fonctionnaires avec leur organisation-employeur, ne passaient pas avec succès l’examen sur le droit à un procès équi- table que suppose l’article 6(1) de la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés fondamentales (csdh).3 De même, l’immunité

1 Ces réflexions ne reflètent pas nécessairement les opinions de l’ocde. 2 Les quelques articles cités dans ces réflexions suffiront à s’en convaincre. 3 Conseil de l’Europe, Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, 4 novembre 1950, http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/fr/treaties/html/005.htm (page consultée le 29 mai 2014).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_021 334 Cèbe fonctionnelle des fonctionnaires internationaux fait régulièrement l’objet de contestations devant des juridictions nationales. Après avoir très brièvement rappelé les fondements et contours des immu- nités, je dresserai un tableau général, nécessairement incomplet, des cas de remise en cause de l’immunité de juridiction des agents des organisations (1) et des organisations elles-mêmes (2), en examinant plus précisément la jurisprudence des juridictions nationales. C’est un truisme qui mérite pourtant d’être rappelé : une organisation internationale est un sujet de droit international créé par des États pour réaliser la mission qu’ils lui ont confiée. Elle a la personnalité juridique internationale4 et, le plus souvent, la personnalité juridique interne en vertu de son instrument constitutif ou de son accord de siège avec le pays hôte, ainsi que la capac- ité de conclure des contrats avec des personnes privées et publiques.5 Comme les États, les organisations jouissent d’immunités mais leur fondement est dif- férent. Jean Salmon, dans son dictionnaire de droit international public,6 les définit comme suit : « protection accordée à une organisation internationale qui lui permet d’échapper totalement ou partiellement à l’action des tribunaux étatiques, notamment ceux de l’État du siège ». Les immunités reconnues à une organisation sont principalement destinées à lui permettre de remplir sa mission en toute indépendance et donc à pleinement servir la collectivité des États qui la composent. Une organisation doit pouvoir s’exprimer et agir sans crainte d’être indûment influencée par l’un de ses États membres. Il ne faut donc pas qu’un État ou n’importe quel démembrement de ce dernier, ou encore quelque personne privée ou publique que ce soit, puisse la faire condamner par des juridictions nationales au titre de ses actions.7 De nombreuses autres justifications de l’immunité des organisations peuvent être avancées, notamment la volonté d’éviter que l’organisation soit attraite par un État devant une juridiction ne connaissant pas une séparation des pouvoirs efficace et rendant donc des jugements partiaux en sa défaveur, mais on retient généralement le fondement exposé ci-dessus.

4 Voir cij, Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies, Avis consultatif du 11 avril 1949, cij Recueil 1949, pp. 178-179. 5 Ibid., p. 174. 6 J. Salmon (dir.), Dictionnaire de droit international public, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, 1198 p. 7 C’est une autre question que celle de la responsabilité des organisations internationales et ces réflexions ne porteront pas sur le débat qui entoure le projet de la Commission du droit international à ce sujet. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 335

La distinction classique entre jure gestionis (actes de gestion) et jure imperii (actes de la puissance publique) opérée en ce qui concerne les immunités des États8 n’a pas réellement cours en ce qui concerne les organisations, dont les immunités sont absolues, en vertu du droit international. Cette affirmation est vivement contestée par certains, mais la confusion des immunités des États et des organisations est discutable, sur un plan théorique comme pratique. Il ne peut être contesté cependant que cette distinction influe sur l’analyse que font aujourd’hui les praticiens des conditions de reconnaissance de l’immunité de juridiction des organisations, comme le révèle l’examen des cas où les immuni- tés des organisations et de leurs agents sont remises en cause.

2 Contestation de l’immunité de juridiction fonctionnelle des agents des organisations internationales

L’immunité de juridiction n’a pas pour objet de soustraire tous les actes des personnes par qui une organisation agit – ses agents, fonctionnaires, experts, etc. – à tout contrôle par un tiers impartial. En effet, l’immunité des agents est fonctionnelle, comme cela a été rappelé dès 1949 par la cij,9 c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne concerne que les actes accomplis pour remplir la mission de l’organisation.10 À cet égard, l’on peut distinguer les réponses apportées par les organisations lorsque l’acte ne peut être rattaché aux fonctions, et lorsqu’il peut l’être.

2.1 Actes ne pouvant pas être rattachés aux fonctions Lorsque l’immunité est invoquée à tort par un agent car l’acte concerné n’a pas été accompli en qualité officielle, les organisations indiquent aux autorités de police ou aux juridictions que l’agent ne jouit d’aucune immunité à cet égard.

8 La cij dans son arrêt cij, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État (Allemagne c. Italie ; Grèce intervenant), Arrêt du 3 février 2012, cij Recueil 2012, p. 99, a décidé que les actes incri minés de l’Allemagne constituaient des actes jure imperii, pour lesquels elle jouissait de l’immunité de juridiction. 9 Voir cij, Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies (n. 54). 10 Voir, notamment, J. Wouters et P. Schmitt, « Challenging Acts of other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary Organs and Officials », in A. Reinisch (ed.), Challenging Acts of International Organizations before National Courts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 302 p. ; G. Thallinger, « Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity: The Possible Role of Domestic Courts in Enhancing World Bank Accountability », Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law, 2008, p. 4. 336 Cèbe

Les organisations ne prennent pas dans ce cas position sur le fond de l’affaire, mais se bornent à examiner les allégations pour déterminer si l’acte incriminé a été commis à l’occasion ou pour l’exercice des fonctions. Il arrive cependant que les organisations aillent au-delà en transmettant les éléments en leur pos- session aux juridictions, comme l’a fait l’Office européen de lutte antifraude de la Commission européenne en adressant un rapport d’enquête au Procureur de Malte à propos d’une affaire de corruption concernant un Commissaire européen.11 Quelques exemples concrets peuvent ici être cités. Un employé d’une organisation avait, alors qu’il était ivre sur la voie publique, refusé de déférer à l’injonction d’un policier de quitter le milieu de la route. Il y avait résisté par la force et avait causé au policier une incapacité de travail de dix jours. L’organisation avait confirmé aux juridictions saisies qu’aucune immunité ne pouvait être invoquée et rappelé à cet employé qu’invoquer à tort une immu- nité pour échapper à une action judiciaire était, en soi, constitutif d’une faute disciplinaire. Un autre cas a défrayé la chronique, c’est celui de l’invocation de l’immunité dans le cadre d’une affaire concernant le Directeur général du Fonds monétaire international (fmi). Sans examiner la véracité des faits allé- gués, aucune immunité fonctionnelle ne pouvait être reconnue à raison de ces faits. Ils étaient en effet relatifs à l’agression d’une femme de chambre dans un hôtel et ne pouvaient en conséquence être rattachés à l’exercice des fonctions ou à la mission du fmi. Je passe sous silence la discussion sur l’immunité dont l’intéressé aurait pu jouir en vertu de la Convention sur les privilèges et immu- nités des institutions spécialisées,12 car les faits s’étant déroulés aux États- Unis, et ces derniers n’ayant pas ratifié l’accord, l’International Organizations Immunities Act américain prévalait. Or ce dernier ne prévoit pas d’immunité autre que fonctionnelle à ce titre. Une autre affaire, objet d’une instruction, visait le même Directeur pour des faits commis en France à l’égard d’un individu français. La question de l’immunité sur le fondement de la Convention susvisée, dans la mesure où la France l’a ratifiée en 2000, aurait pu donner lieu à débats, notamment sur la portée de l’immunité dans l’espace et le temps. L’affaire s’étant conclue selon la presse par une ordonnance de non-lieu, le débat n’a cependant plus lieu d’être.

11 Voir Commission européenne, « Press statement on the Behalf of the European Commission », Bruxelles, 16 octobre 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO- 12-788_en.htm (page consultée le 20 mai 2014) et le Wall Street Journal, « eu official quits after contracts inquiry », 17 octobre 2012. 12 Voir Section 3.1. du présent chapitre. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 337

Lorsque l’acte ne peut être rattaché à l’exercice des fonctions, les organisations devraient indiquer que l’immunité fonctionnelle de leurs agents ne peut être invoquée, sans même examiner sa levée. Parfois, pourtant, compte tenu de leurs règles internes et sur la base de l’obligation13 de lever l’immunité pour ne pas nuire à la bonne administration de la justice, les organisations sont amenées à examiner si l’immunité doit être levée.14

2.2 Actes accomplis à l’occasion ou pour l’exercice des fonctions En pratique, hormis les cas extrêmes et rares d’arrestation ou de détention, les cas les plus fréquents auxquels sont confrontés les agents des organisations sont des demandes de témoignage ou leur mise en cause au titre d’actes accomplis en leur qualité officielle devant une juridiction nationale. En cas de demande de témoignage en qualité officielle, les organisations invoquent le plus souvent l’immunité, afin d’éviter que leurs agents puissent être mis en cause devant une juridiction nationale. Les organisations peuvent certes également rappeler aux parties et à la juridiction concernée que tout témoignage ne pourra être produit en justice dans d’autres instances et que les agents jouissent d’une immunité de juridiction absolue à cet égard. A titre d’exemple, on peut citer le cas de cette juridiction administrative internationale qui avait demandé à un agent de témoigner dans le cadre d’une affaire concernant une autre organisation que la sienne. Compte tenu du forum, son organisation avait autorisé la production de ce témoignage tout en rappelant l’immunité de juridiction de l’agent, pour éviter que ce témoignage puisse être mis en cause par la suite devant une juridiction nationale. Lorsque l’immunité de juridiction des agents est mise en cause pour des actes accomplis en leur qualité officielle, les organisations peuvent aussi être appelées à appuyer leurs agents dans la défense de « leur » immunité de juridiction devant des juridictions nationales. Cela a été le cas dans le cadre d’une affaire disciplinaire à l’ocde. Une enquête interne avait été lancée à l’encontre d’un agent pour examiner des allégations de faute disciplinaire. Cet agent avait assigné, devant les juridictions françaises, les enquêteurs désignés par l’organisation, ainsi qu’un agent entendu en qualité de témoin par les enquê- teurs, pour dénonciation calomnieuse, diffamation et injure non publiques.

13 Souvent incluse dans les accords de privilèges et immunités ou les accords de siège. 14 Voir à cet égard ce que la presse a rapporté à propos de quatre agents de nationalité russe de la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement (berd) et de la levée, le 21 Janvier 2011, par son organe directeur de leur immunité dans le cadre d’une affaire de corruption afin de faciliter les enquêtes criminelles diligentées par les autorités de police britanniques et par les autorités russes. 338 Cèbe

À l’issue d’une longue procédure correctionnelle, la Cour de cassation15 a con- firmé que les deux enquêteurs et le témoin avaient agi en leur qualité officielle dans le cadre d’une enquête interne sur des faits relatifs au fonctionnement des services de l’organisation et qu’il fallait donc reconnaître leur immunité de juridiction. Le Tribunal administratif de l’ocde (taocde), compétent pour juger des différends entre les employés de l’ocde et l’organisation, avait été saisi parallèlement par ce même agent. Il demandait l’annulation de la déci- sion de refus de levée de l’immunité des enquêteurs et du témoin. Dans son jugement,16 le tribunal a tout d’abord noté que cette question échappait à sa compétence, non seulement parce qu’elle relevait du pouvoir d’appréciation de l’organisation dans le cadre de ses relations avec un État membre, mais encore parce que, contrairement à la cij au titre de la Convention sur les priv- ilèges et immunités des Nations Unies de 1946, il n’avait pas de compétence en cas de divergence d’interprétation des protocoles annexes à la Convention de l’ocde sur les privilèges et immunités. Il a également rappelé que les tribunaux nationaux, avant de reconnaître l’immunité, vérifiaient qu’au moment des faits le fonctionnaire incriminé agissait en qualité officielle et que le taocde ne devait pas se déclarer compétent, en tout état de cause, pour éviter un risque de contradiction de jurisprudence. Il notait enfin, à juste titre, qu’un agent, qui estime que l’ocde a pris des décisions illégales, a accès à un tribunal, le taocde, comme le requérant avait pu s’en rendre compte dans le cadre de deux affaires précédentes le concernant (cf. jugements n° 5817 et n° 6118).

15 France, Cour de Cassation, Ch. crim., 6 septembre 2006, Pourvoi n 06–82868, Bull. crim., 2006, p. 738. 16 taocde, Jugement dans l’affaire n° 60 M. W. c/ Secrétaire général, Jugement du Tribunal administratif rendu le 7 mars 2006, http://www.oecd.org/fr/tribunaladministratif /47219343.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 17 taocde, Jugement dans l’affaire n° 58 M. W. c/ Secrétaire général, Jugement du Tribunal administratif rendu le 7 avril 2005, http://www.oecd.org/fr/tribunaladministratif/ 47219317.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 18 taocde, Jugement dans l’affaire n° 61 M. W. c/ Secrétaire général, Jugement du Tribunal administratif rendu le 7 mars 2006, http://www.oecd.org/fr/tribunaladministratif/ 47219357.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 339

3 Contestation de l’immunité de juridiction des organisations internationales

3.1 Contestation de l’immunité de juridiction des organisations internationales au titre de leurs actes, en matière extra-contractuelle et contractuelle S’il est un domaine dans lequel l’immunité de juridiction des organisations doit être reconnue, c’est bien celui des actes relevant de leurs missions mêmes. Comme cela ressort du cas suivant, l’immunité n’a jamais autant sa raison d’être que quand elle vise à éviter aux organisations d’être paralysées dans leurs actions relevant de l’exercice même de leur mission, en toute indépen- dance des États qui la composent et de toute autorité extérieure. Un rapport publié par une organisation a fait état d’un monopole de fait au profit d’une société privée ayant eu pour conséquence un manque à gagner cumulé très significatif pour les consommateurs. Cette société a menacé de lancer des actions judiciaires à l’encontre de cette organisation pour obtenir réparation du préju- dice qui lui aurait été causé par ce rapport. À l’évidence, les actions devant des juridictions nationales, ou encore la multiplication de ce type d’actions dans le monde entier, pourraient mettre à mal l’indépendance de l’organisation ou, plus simplement encore, la paralyser ; d’où la nécessité de l’en prémunir par l’immunité de juridiction. Également délicate est la question de la résolution des différends de nature extra-contractuelle, quasi délictuelle. Un exemple significatif serait celui de l’adoption par les organisations de listes, publiques ou non, prohibant la conclusion de contrats avec des sociétés s’étant rendues coupables de fraudes ou de corruption. On se trouverait alors devant un acte de l’organisation en application de ses règles internes, et l’immunité absolue de l’organisation devrait donc être reconnue par le juge, quelles que soient les conséquences sur les tiers. En théorie, l’examen du droit substantiel étant distinct de l’examen des droits processuels et de la recevabilité de l’action, le juge national devrait examiner l’immunité de juridiction in limine litis, sans examen du fond de l’affaire. Et, dès lors que l’organisation confirme au juge qu’il s’agit bien d’un acte de l’organisation, cela devrait suffire à ne pas poursuivre plus avant cet examen liminaire. En pratique cependant, le juge considère souvent néces- saire l’examen au fond, au moins pour déterminer si l’acte est bien un acte de l’organisation et n’est pas ultra vires. L’examen des droits processuels a dès lors pour conséquence d’examiner la nature de l’acte incriminé et son rattachement à la mission de l’organisation. La distinction entre jure gestionis et jure imperii est donc présente, même si elle l’est sous une forme différente. 340 Cèbe

Le juge, même s’il peut alors reconnaître l’immunité et décliner sa compé- tence, y compris d’office et sans autre forme de procès,19 examine pourtant souvent s’il existe un forum de règlement de ce différend de nature quasi délic- tuelle avant de reconnaître l’immunité. Certaines organisations ont envisagé un forum commun aux organisations pour juger des différends de nature quasi délictuelle. A notre connaissance toutefois, il n’existe que deux forums et ils ne sont pas universels. Il s’agit du Panel d’Inspection, mis en place en 1993 par la Banque mondiale dans le cadre de ses opérations de prêt et des contestations pouvant émaner des sujets de droit interne, et d’un Ombusdman mis en place en juillet 2011 par l’Agence Spatiale Européenne (ase) auquel les sociétés con- testant une procédure d’appel d’offres ou ses résultats peuvent s’adresser. Ce dernier forum a été invoqué par une juridiction nationale comme un argument plaidant en faveur de la reconnaissance de l’immunité de juridiction de l’ase.20 Ils ne mettent toutefois en place, ni l’un ni l’autre, un recours juridictionnel. Une affaire pendante en matière de responsabilité extra-contractuelle méritera une attention particulière. Un candidat externe à un emploi à l’Office européen des brevets (oeb) n’a pas été nommé à l’issue d’un concours de recrutement qu’il avait remporté, car il n’était pas, selon l’oeb, médicalement apte à l’exercice des fonctions. Saisi par l’intéressé, le Tribunal administratif de l’oit (taoit) a décliné sa compétence en s’appuyant principalement sur son Statut et sur les textes applicables de l’oeb, qui ne prévoient pas de compé- tence ratione personae pour les candidats externes, mais a estimé « très sou- haitable que l’Organisation recherche une solution qui garantisse à l’intéressé l’accès à un juge, soit en levant son immunité, soit en soumettant le différend à l’arbitrage ».21 La Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande ayant rendu une décision d’incompétence ratione materiae,22 l’intéressé a alors saisi la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (cedh). Il sera fort intéressant de lire ce que dira la Cour de cette absence d’accès à tout règlement des différends.23

19 En 1954, la Cour de cassation française, dans un arrêt concernant l’oece – l’Organisation à laquelle l’ocde a succédé –, avait reconnu son immunité de juridiction dans le cadre d’une affaire pouvant mettre en jeu sa responsabilité extra-contractuelle. Voir France, Cour de Cassation, 1ère section civ., Procureur Général près la Cour de cassation c. Société Immobilière A. Dehodencq, 6 juillet 1954, Recueil Dalloz et Sirey, 1955, 35ième cahier, p. 55. 20 À cet égard, voir Belgique, Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, 21ième chambre, S.A. Énergies Nouvelles et Environnement c. Agence Spatiale Européenne, Décision du 23 mars 2011. 21 taoit, Jugement dans l’affaire M. R. K. c. Organisation européenne des brevets, Jugement du Tribunal administratif n° 2657 rendu le 27 avril 2007. 22 Allemagne, Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, Protection juridique contre des mesures de l’Office européen des brevets (Rechtsschutz gegen Maßnahmen des Europäischen Patentamtes, notre traduction), Décision 2 BvR 2093/05 du 22 juin 2006. 23 cedh, Affaire no. 415/07, Klausecker c. Allemagne, pendante. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 341

La question de l’accès au juge se pose également en ce qui concerne les différends avec les sociétés privées ayant une relation contractuelle avec les organisations. Le plus souvent, les organisations prévoient un mécanisme de règlement des différends dans les contrats eux-mêmes. Cela peut leur être imposé par leurs accords de privilèges et immunités ou de siège. Mais, compte tenu de la jurisprudence des juridictions nationales,24 elles ont surtout intérêt, si elles ne veulent pas voir leur immunité de juridiction contestée, à offrir un mode de règlement des différends.25 Enfin, l’inclusion d’une clause compromissoire permet aux organisations, lorsqu’elles sont attraites devant des juridictions nationales malgré cette clause, d’opposer une immunité de juridiction dont le co-contractant était parfaitement conscient à la signature du contrat. En revanche, lorsqu’aucun mécanisme de règlement des différends n’est prévu, les juridictions nationales ont tendance à ne pas reconnaître l’immunité de juridiction. Le jugement rendu par une cour américaine dans une affaire oss Novalka concernant l’ase en est une illustration.26 L’ase avait accepté – par erreur, certes – la compétence des cours américaines dans le contrat avec oss Novalka. La Cour a confirmé sa compétence en se fondant exclusivement sur l’International Organizations Immunities Act, confondant les immunités des organisations et celles des États. La Cour a ainsi estimé : « nous ne voy- ons aucune raison déterminante pour que ce groupe d’États agissant par l’intermédiaire d’une organisation internationale doive jouir d’une immunité plus large que celle de ses États membres lorsqu’ils agissent seuls ».27 Ici, la Cour n’a tenu compte ni du fondement de l’immunité des organisations, ni de leur indépendance des États membres qui les composent et de leurs

24 Le 18 octobre 1982, la Cour de cassation italienne n’a pas reconnu l’immunité de juridiction de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture dans le cadre d’un différend contractuel, en considérant qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’un acte jure imperii. Voir Italie, Cour de cassation italienne, Assemblée plénière, inpdai c. fao, Décision n° 5399 du 18 octobre 1982 ; cité dans A. Cassese, « L’immunité de juridiction civile des organisations internationales dans la jurisprudence italienne », Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1984, pp. 556–566, p. 559. 25 Voir Suisse, Tribunal fédéral suisse, civ. 1ière, X c. Conseil fédéral, Arrêt n° 4A.1/2004 du 2 juillet 2004 qui relève que l’arbitrage prévu dans un contrat entre le cern et une société suisse répond pleinement aux exigences d’un procès équitable et que son immunité de juridiction doit donc être reconnue. T. Neumann et A. Peters, « Switzerland », in August Reinisch (ed.), The Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations in Domestic Courts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 400 p., pp. 241–274. 26 États-Unis, Cour d’appel pour le troisième circuit, oss nokalva inc. c. Agence Spatiale Européenne, Décision du 16 août 2010, 617 F.3d 756 (3d Cir. 2010). 27 Notre traduction. 342 Cèbe juridictions nationales. La Cour a enfin relevé d’office que si l’organisation n’était pas « fair play », elle ne pouvait s’attendre à ce que l’on veuille conclure des contrats avec elle. Cet argument d’opportunité illustre une préoccupation constante des organisations : éviter que les sociétés refusent de contracter avec elles au motif qu’elles peuvent opposer leur immunité de juridiction en cas de contentieux. Une question subséquente et d’actualité est celle des conséquences de la renonciation à l’immunité de juridiction dans un contrat sur l’immunité d’exécution, qu’illustre parfaitement un jugement de la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles.28 La Cour a reconnu l’immunité d’exécution de l’otan, alors même qu’une sentence arbitrale et exécutoire liait les parties. On notera que les dispositions applicables à certaines organisations – c’est le cas de la Convention de l’ocde – prévoient que l’organisation ne peut renoncer à son immunité d’exécution. Ne serait-ce que pour des raisons pratiques, il apparaît pourtant difficile de s’opposer à l’exécution d’une sentence arbitrale, sur le fondement de l’immunité d’exécution, alors que l’organisation a prévu contractuellement que la sentence arbitrale serait définitive et sans appel. Une même conclusion semble s’imposer en cas d’action d’une organisation et de demande reconventionnelle du défendeur accueillie par une juridiction nationale. Toutefois, l’immunité d’exécution reste valide lorsqu’une organisation a fait valoir son immunité de juridiction. Elle est d’autre part essentielle lorsqu’une organisation est appelée en garantie devant une juridiction nationale ou lorsqu’un juge lui ordonne de participer à une expertise dans un procès auquel elle n’est pas partie. Elle est enfin primordiale lorsque des tiers essay- ent de l’attraire dans le cadre de litiges privés concernant ses agents au seul motif qu’elle est solvable. On conviendra qu’une organisation peut également se défendre en s’appuyant sur les droits processuels appliqués par les juridictions nationales saisies.

3.2 Contestation de l’immunité de juridiction des organisations internationales par leurs employés La jurisprudence la plus fournie est celle relative à la contestation de l’immunité de juridiction par les employés des organisations devant des juridictions nationales ou la cedh. J’examinerai plus particulièrement cette question pour les organisations ayant leur siège en France, notamment l’ocde.

28 Belgique, Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles, 17ième chambre, État Belge, spf Affaires étrangères commerce extérieur et coopération au développement c. International Hotels Worldwide Inc., Décision du 29 juin 2012. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 343

Dès 1954, la cij29 avait clairement invité les organisations à se doter d’un mécanisme de règlement dédié aux litiges les opposant à leurs employés. Les organisations peuvent inclure dans les contrats d’emploi des clauses compromissoires mais, dans leur très grande majorité, elles reconnaissent la compétence de juridictions administratives internationales, exclusivement compétentes pour trancher les différends du travail qui opposent les organi sations à leurs employés. Ces dernières sont parfois dédiées aux litiges des organisations qui les ont établies, comme le Tribunal administratif de l’ocde, la Commission de recours de l’ase, le Tribunal administratif du fmi, le Tribunal administratif de la Banque mondiale, la Commission de recours de l’otan, ou encore le Tribunal administratif du Conseil de l’Europe, parfois plus « universelles » comme le Tribunal du contentieux administratif des Nations Unies ou encore le Tribunal administratif de l’oit, dont cinquante-neuf organisations ont reconnu la compétence. Ces juridictions administratives internationales interprètent largement leur compétence, dès lors qu’aucun autre forum n’est possible,30 s’appuyant parfois en cela sur un autre avis consultatif de la cij, celui de 1956.31 Cela tranche sans nul doute avec la situation où les organisations n’ayant pas reconnu la compétence ou n’ayant pas créé de telles juridictions, les recours des fonctionnaires étaient tranchés par leur direction juridique. Certains soutiennent qu’ils n’y perdaient pas au change, car ces directions, souhaitant qu’on ne puisse leur reprocher d’être partiales, accueillaient des requêtes partiellement fondées ou frappées de forclusion, alors qu’un tribunal n’aurait pas hésité à les rejeter. Malgré la compétence exclusive des juridictions administratives internationales, certains employés des organisations ont saisi des juridictions nationales pour qu’elles jugent de la validité des décisions prises à leur égard par leurs

29 cij, Effets de jugements du Tribunal administratif des nu accordant indemnité, Avis consultatif du 13 juillet 1954, cij Recueil 1954, p. 47. 30 Voir A. Reinich, « The Immunity of International Organisations and the Jurisdiction of their Administrative Tribunals », Institute for International Law and Justice Working Papers (Global Administrative Law Series), novembre 2007, http://www.iilj.org/oldbak/ working%20papers/documents/ReinischWP.web.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014) et taocde, Jugement dans l’affaire n° 57 M. P. c/ Secrétaire général, Jugement du Tribunal administratif rendu le 2 décembre 2004, http://www.oecd.org/fr/tribunaladministratif/ 47219305.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014), dans lequel le Tribunal considère que « la question [de la compétence du Tribunal] n’a pas été approfondie, le requérant n’ayant évidemment pas intérêt à mettre en cause la compétence du Tribunal dont il attend réparation. » 31 cij, Jugements du Tribunal administratif de l’oit sur requêtes contre l’unesco, Avis consultatif du 23 octobre 1956, cij Recueil 1956, p. 77. 344 Cèbe organisations. Si l’on examine la jurisprudence de manière chronologique, on peut distinguer trois grandes périodes : les années 1970 et 1980, les années 1990 et les années 2000. Dans les années 1970 et 1980, l’immunité de juridiction des organisations était reconnue par les juridictions nationales, même lorsque les organisations n’avaient instauré aucun mécanisme de règlement des différends avec leur personnel. La Cour de cassation française considérait ainsi que l’immunité devait leur être reconnue par application des dispositions claires de leurs accords de privilèges et immunités avec la France ou de leurs instruments constitutifs, à moins qu’elles aient décidé expressément d’y renoncer. La Cour rappelait que l’immunité était absolue, contrairement à celle des États. La question du droit à un procès équitable n’était pas même soulevée. En 1978, par exemple, dans une affaire concernant l’ase,32 la Cour a rappelé que le cas avait déjà été pleinement tranché par la Commission de recours de l’ase en mars 1969 et a considéré qu’en vertu de son accord de privilèges et immunités avec la France, l’ase jouissait d’une immunité de juridiction, à moins qu’elle y renonce dans un cas particulier. En 1988, dans un cas impliquant l’Institut International du Froid (iif),33 la Cour avait de même reconnu l’immunité de juridiction alors que l’iif ne disposait d’aucun mécanisme de règlement des différends avec son personnel. Dans la même période, les cours américaines34 reconnaissaient l’immunité de juridiction des organisations dans des litiges avec leurs employés en considérant que les relations juridiques entre ces organisations et leurs employés ne relevaient pas d’actes jure gestionis – pour lesquelles ces cours considéraient que les organisations ne disposaient pas d’immunité. Elles insistaient en outre sur le risque de contradiction de jugements si les juridictions nationales des États membres des organisations se déclaraient compétentes et sur la nécessité de préserver le fonctionnement des organisations.

32 France, Cour de Cassation, Ch. soc., 24 mai 1978, Bellaton c. Agence Spatiale Européenne, Bull. civ., 1978, v, p. 298. 33 France, Cour de Cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 8 novembre 1988, Elkaïm c. iif, Bull. Civ., 1988, i, p. 211. 34 Seuls les jugements les plus saillants sont cités ici. Voir : États-Unis, Cour d’appel pour le circuit du district de Columbia, Martin R. Broadbent et al. v. Organization of American States, Décision du 8 janvier 1980, 628 F. 2d 27 (dc Cir. 1980) ; États-Unis, Cour d’appel de Washington, Mendaro c. Banque Mondiale, Décision du 27 septembre 1983, 717 F.2d 610 (dc Cir. 1983) ; l’affaire États-Unis, Cour du District de Columbia, Morgan c. bird, Décision du 13 Septembre 1990, 752 F.Supp. 492. Voir également W.M. Berenson, « Squaring the Concept of Immunity with the Fundamental Right to a Fair Trial: the Case of oas », in H. Cissé et al. (ed.), The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance, World Bank Publications, 2011, 424 p., pp. 133–145. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 345

3.2.1 L’invocation des dispositions de la csdh Aux abords des années 1990, les agents qui saisissaient des juridictions nationales ont commencé à contester l’immunité en soutenant que leurs organisations violaient l’article 6(1) de la csdh.35 Ils considéraient que les mécanismes de règlement des différends en vigueur ne présentaient pas suffisamment de garanties en matière d’impartialité et de droits de la défense. En 1987, une cour néerlandaise36 avait reconnu l’immunité de juridiction de l’ase en se fondant sur l’existence d’un mécanisme interne de règlement des différends entre l’organisation et son personnel devant un tribunal indépendant et en notant que le « procès équitable » était garanti compte tenu de la bonne réputation de l’ase. En 1995, dans une affaire Hintermann concernant l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale (ueo),37 la Cour de cassation française a maintenu sa jurisprudence et reconnu l’immunité de juridiction, en dépit de l’absence d’accès à un tribunal. Au cours de la même période, la berd a vu son immunité de juridiction confirmée par des cours anglaises38 au motif que la gestion administrative du personnel était un acte officiel pour lequel elle jouissait d’une immunité fonctionnelle. Un même raisonnement a été conduit par les cours allemandes et autrichiennes.39 En 1999,40 la cedh a rendu deux jugements, Waite et Kennedy c. Allemagne ainsi que Beer et Regan c. Allemagne, concernant l’ase.41 Après avoir épuisé les

35 Dont le pendant américain est l’Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights « Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica » (B-32), Entrée en vigueur le 27 août 1979 (adoptée le 22 novembre 1969), http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html (page consultée le 25 mai 2014). 36 Pays-Bas, Tribunal de première instance (Kantonrechter), Leiden, Douglas c. Estec (ase), Décision n° 272/87 du 25 mars 1987. 37 France, Cour de Cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 14 novembre 1995, Hintermann c. Union de l’Europe Occidentale, Bull. civ., 1995, i, p. 288. 38 Voir Royaume-Uni, Londres, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Mukoro v. ebrd, Décision du 19 mars 1994, 107 International Law Reports 604 et Royaume-Uni, Londres, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Bertolucci v. erbd, Décision n° eat/276/97 (Transcrit Lexis) du 19 août 1997, voir Thallinger, Piercing Jurisdictional Immunity (n. 10). 39 Voir Reinisch, Challenging Acts of International Organizations (n. 10). 40 cedh, Waite et Kennedy c. Allemagne, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 18 février 1999, Requête n° 26083/94 ; cedh, Beer et Regan c. Allemagne, Arrêt de Grande Chambre du 18 février 1999, Requête n° 28934/95. 41 Voir notamment C. Cooker et G. Süss, « Immunity of International Organisations from National Jurisdiction in Staff Matters », in C. de Cooker (ed.), International Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organisations, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, 1108 p. 346 Cèbe voies de recours internes en Allemagne,42 Messieurs Waite et Kennedy ainsi que Messieurs Beer et Regan avaient introduit une action devant la Commission européenne des droits de l’homme contre l’Allemagne pour violation de leur droit à un procès équitable (article 6(1) de la csdh). La Commission a admis ces requêtes, mais a considéré qu’il n’y avait aucune violation du droit d’accès à un tribunal. La Cour, saisie par la Commission, a conclu de même. Elle a consi- déré que le droit d’accès aux tribunaux n’était pas absolu et pouvait donc con- naître des « limitations ». De telles « limitations » ne pouvaient toutefois être admises que si elles poursuivaient un but légitime.43 Après avoir rappelé que les immunités des organisations étaient essentielles à leur fonctionnement et à leur indépendance, la Cour a estimé que l’immunité de juridiction de l’ase poursuivait bien un but légitime.44 Elle a ensuite relevé que, pour reconnaître l’immunité à l’ase, il fallait examiner si les membres de son personnel avaient accès à un moyen raisonnable et alternatif de règlement des différends (que l’action devant une juridiction nationale) et a conclu positivement en mentionnant que la Convention de l’ase prévoyait de tels moyens, notamment l’accès pour les membres du personnel à un tribunal indépendant, la Commission de recours de l’ase.45

3.2.2 L’influence des jugements Waite et Kennedy et Beer et Regan c. Allemagne Ces jugements ont durablement marqué de leur empreinte les jugements des juridictions nationales européennes. Certes, en 2000, dans une affaire concernant l’ocde,46 la Cour de cassation française a maintenu sa jurisprudence constante et a reconnu l’immunité de juridiction, en rappelant que la cour inférieure avait confondu l’immunité de juridiction dont jouissait l’organisation avec celle de ses employés. Mais, en 2001, dans une affaire concernant eutelsat,47 cette même Cour a reconnu l’immunité de juridiction en rappelant qu’eutelsat avait créé un tribunal qui « a priori » offrait des

42 Messieurs Beer et Regan, bien que n’ayant pas épuisé toutes les voies de recours interne, ont considéré que c’était le cas et ont introduit une même action. 43 Voir cedh, Waite et Kennedy (n. 40), par. 59. 44 Ibid., par. 63. 45 Ibid., par. 69. 46 France, Cour de Cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 24 octobre 2000, Organisation de coopération et de développement économique (ocde) c. Zwozniak, Pourvoi n° 98.43.052. 47 France, Cour d’appel de Paris, 18ème Ch., 20 mai 1999, Mme Denis Ruperas c. Organisation européenne de télécommunications par satellite (eutelsat), note A. Moreno, Journal du Droit international, 2000, pp. 769-776, et France, Cour de Cassation, Ch. soc., 5 juin 2001, Bull., 2001, v, p. 161. Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 347 garanties d’impartialité, de respect des droits de la défense et d’indépendance. La Cour ne fait aucune mention dans son arrêt de la csdh. En 2003, dans une affaire concernant l’Union Latine,48 la Cour a suivi sa jurisprudence constante et a rappelé que la cour inférieure avait eu tort de confondre l’immunité des États et celle, absolue, des organisations. Toujours la même année, la Cour du travail de Bruxelles était saisie par Mme Siedler afin d’obtenir une indemnisation complémentaire, la Commission de recours de l’ueo ayant déjà condamné l’organisation dans cette même affaire. Elle a noté que l’immunité « absolue » de l’organisation souffrait des exceptions et qu’elle ne pouvait notamment être admise que si un mécanisme alternatif de règlement des différends, compatible avec les exigences de la csdh était accessible, ce qui n’était pas le cas en l’espèce selon la Cour.49 Ce n’est qu’en 2005, dans une affaire concernant la Banque Africaine de Développement (bad),50 et en l’absence de tout droit d’accès à un tribunal, que la Cour de cassation française a considéré qu’il ne pouvait être fait droit à son immunité. La Cour n’a pas fait référence à la csdh et a simplement noté que l’accès à un tribunal était un droit en vertu de « l’ordre public international ». Cet arrêt est donc pleinement cohérent avec l’arrêt eutelsat de 2001 mentionné ci-dessus,51 quoique a contrario. En octobre 2009, dans une affaire concernant l’oeb, la Cour suprême des Pays Bas a reconnu l’immunité de juridiction, en notant que le taoit – compétent pour connaître des requêtes des employés de l’oeb – était un tribunal qui remplissait les exigences de la csdh.52

3.2.3 L’affaire I. c. ocde Le dernier jugement analysé ici sera celui rendu le 29 septembre 2010 par la Cour de cassation française,53 dans une affaire qui opposait un membre de son personnel à l’ocde. Les faits de l’affaire étaient relativement simples. La demanderesse, une employée de l’ocde, contestait le non renouvellement

48 France, Cour de Cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 28 octobre 2003, Pourvoi n° 01-16.927, Recueil Dalloz, 2003, p. 3010. 49 Belgique, Cour du travail de Bruxelles, Siedler c. U.E.O., 17 septembre 2003, Journal des Tribunaux, 2004, n° 6145, p. 617. 50 France, Cour d’appel de Paris, 7 octobre 2003, Degboe c. bad, confirmé par l’arrêt France, Cour de Cassation, Ch. soc., 25 janvier 2005, Banque africaine de développement c. Degboe, Recueil Dalloz, 2005, p. 1542. 51 Voir, France, Cour d’appel de Paris, Mme Denis Ruperas c. eutelsat (n. 47). 52 Pays-Bas, Cour suprême des Pays-Bas, 1ère chambre, X c. Office européen des brevets, Décision du 23 octobre 2009, Affaire n° 08/00118, dv/is. 53 France, Cour de Cassation, Ch. soc., 29 septembre 2010, Mme I. c. ocde, Arrêt n° 1804 fs-d, Pourvoi n° 09-41.030. 348 Cèbe de son engagement. Au lieu de saisir le Tribunal administratif de l’ocde (taocde), elle avait préféré saisir les juridictions françaises, bien que l’ocde lui ait indiqué que le seul tribunal compétent était le taocde. On notera ici que l’ocde a choisi d’apparaître devant les juridictions nationales pour faire valoir son immunité de juridiction. Cela est en partie lié au refus des autori- tés françaises d’intervenir dans les procédures judiciaires qui impliquent des organisations, contrairement aux États-Unis, par exemple, dans des mémoires en amicus curiae, ou encore, à la Suisse, à la Belgique ou aux Pays-Bas. La demanderesse estimait que le mécanisme de règlement des différends de l’ocde pour trancher des litiges avec son personnel violait le droit à un procès équitable prévu par la csdh pour les raisons suivantes : i) les juges étaient nommés par l’organe directeur de l’ocde et, en pratique, sur proposition de son Chef de secrétariat, pour une durée limitée et renouvelable. Elle consi- dérait donc que les juges ne pouvaient rendre des jugements avec impartialité ; ii) les audiences n’étaient pas publiques, puisqu’elles pouvaient être tenues à huis clos pour les cas disciplinaires ou à la demande des parties ; iii) les justiciables ne pouvaient faire appel des jugements du tribunal, dans la mesure où ceux-ci étaient définitifs et liaient les parties. La Cour a considéré « qu’en l’état de ces constatations et énonciations, faisant apparaître que le personnel de l’ocde, qui n’a pas adhéré à la csdh, disposait, pour le règlement de ses conflits de travail, d’un recours de nature juridictionnelle comportant des garanties d’impartialité et d’équité, ce dont il se déduisait que la procédure instituée par l’organisation internationale n’était pas contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international, la cour d’appel a exactement décidé que cette organisation était fondée à revendiquer le bénéfice de son immunité de juridiction. ». En premier lieu, pour reconnaître l’immunité de juridiction de l’ocde, la Cour a insisté sur le fait que les juges du taocde ont l’obligation d’exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialité. L’ocde avait rappelé dans ses écritures que si les juges étaient effectivement nommés par le Conseil de l’ocde pour une durée limitée – trois ans – cette durée était renouvelable sans limite, et en pratique, les juges avaient de longs mandats. Le Président du tribunal, un Conseiller d’État français, avait servi la Commission de recours (ancêtre du tribunal) et le taocde lui-même pendant près de trente années. Les deux autres membres en titre comprenaient des professeurs de droit international reconnus, respectivement australien et italien, qui l’avaient servi pendant plus de 16 et 11 ans. Les trois juges suppléants étaient un ancien juge canadien à la Cour supérieure du Québec, un ancien avocat général allemand à la cjce, et un professeur grec de droit international à l’Université de Thessalonique. L’ocde avait également rappelé que les juges étaient inamovibles pendant la durée de leur mandat, ce Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 349 qui est un gage d’indépendance, auquel la cedh attache une importance toute particulière.54 La demanderesse avait également considéré, comme d’autres plaideurs avant elle, que la nomination des juges par l’organe directeur de l’organisation faisait obstacle à leur indépendance. Un juge départiteur, dans le cadre d’une procédure devant le Conseil des Prud’hommes de Paris, a de même estimé55 que la Commission de recours de l’ase ne répondait pas aux exigences de la csdh au motif que les juges qui la composent sont nommés par l’organe politique. Pourtant, ce juge départiteur, comme de nombreux juges, y compris ceux qui sont en charge de juger du contentieux de la fonction publique, dans les États membres de l’ase ou de l’ocde, sont nommés par l’État, et leur indépendance n’est pas mise en cause pour autant. À dire vrai, personne ne peut répondre à cet argument mieux que l’a fait la cij dans son avis consultatif de 1954 : « On a soutenu qu’une autorité ayant pouvoir réglementaire serait par sa nature même incapable de créer un corps subordonné compétent pour rendre des décisions qui lieraient celui qui l’a créé. [ . . . ] Mais on ne peut accepter l’allégation que l’Assemblée générale est, par sa nature même, incapable de créer un tribunal compétent pour rendre des décisions qui la lient. On ne saurait justifier cette allégation par une analogie avec des lois nationales, car il est de pratique courante pour les législatures nationales de créer des tribunaux qui ont la capacité de rendre des décisions liant le législateur qui les a créés ».56 La cedh a estimé elle aussi que cela n’était pas un argument dirimant. Dans l’affaire Campbell et Fell déjà mentionnée, elle a ainsi considéré que « les membres de ceux-ci [les comités des visiteurs de prison au Royaume-Uni] sont nommés par le ministre de l’Intérieur, responsable en personne de l’administration des prisons. Il n’en résulte pas aux yeux de la Cour qu’ils dépendent de l’exécutif : à ce compte, il faudrait en dire autant des juges désignés par décision ou sur l’avis d’un ministre doté de compétence en matière d’administration des juridictions ». L’ocde avait enfin insisté sur la meilleure garantie de l’indépendance des juges, la collégialité de la formation de jugement, en rappelant que cette dernière ne pouvait comprendre moins de trois juges. Il y a près de quinze ans lors d’un colloque, j’avais posé la question naïve de ce qu’était un bon juge au Président de la cij, M. Guillaume, et il m’avait répondu qu’un bon juge était un juge impartial et que si la qualité des

54 Voir cedh, Campbell et Fell c. Royaume-Uni, Décision du 28 juin 1984, Requête n° 7878/77, par. 80 et s. et cedh, Ettl et autres c. Autriche, Décision du 23 avril 1987, Requête n° 9273/81. 55 France, Conseil des Prud’hommes de Paris, Pottier c. ase, 6 juillet 2012. 56 cij, Effets de jugements du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies accordant indemnité (n. 29), p. 61. 350 Cèbe hommes importait, cette impartialité n’était jamais mieux assurée que par la collégialité, en citant l’adage « juge unique, juge inique ». En deuxième lieu, la Cour de cassation a considéré que le mécanisme de règlement des différends de l’ocde avec son personnel était de nature juridictionnelle et comportait des garanties d’équité. L’ocde avait rappelé que, conformément aux statut et règlement de procédure du taocde, tous les jugements étaient rendus à l’issue d’une procédure contradictoire et d’une audience publique, sauf si les parties demandaient à ce qu’il n’y en ait pas ou si elles concernaient des affaires disciplinaires, pour lesquelles le huis clos était de droit. Le taocde, bien qu’il puisse rendre des jugements sans procédure orale ou à huis clos, même d’office,57 ne s’était prévalu de cette possibilité, à la date de soumission des écritures à la Cour, que cinq fois dans des affaires disciplinaires (soit dans moins de 9 % des cas). Et il avait rendu seulement six jugements sans procédure orale, mais à la demande expresse des deux parties. Quant à l’absence d’appel, la Cour d’appel elle-même avait indiqué que : « l’absence d’un double degré de juridiction, dans la mesure où elle serait con- stituée, puisqu’il convient de relever qu’avant le recours au tribunal administratif, le requérant peut saisir un comité consultatif, ne saurait être retenue dès lors qu’une telle exigence ne figure pas au nombre des droits garantis par la csdh. »58 De fait, le double degré de juridiction n’a jamais été érigé par la cedh comme un droit fondamental en matière civile. Dès lors que le justiciable bénéficie d’un recours effectif, son droit à un procès équitable est assuré. En troisième lieu, la Cour de cassation a considéré que le mécanisme de règlement des différends de l’ocde avec son personnel n’était pas contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international. Comme les autres organisations, l’ocde ne peut être partie à la csdh, car seuls les États peuvent l’être et la Cour l’a expressément relevé. La Cour partage ici le point de vue de la cedh elle-même, selon lequel les organisations ne peuvent se voir reprocher de ne pas respecter une convention à laquelle elles ne peuvent être parties.59 La

57 Voir article 10 de la résolution du Conseil de l’ocde sur le statut et le fonctionnement du tribunal administratif, annexe iii au Statut applicable aux agents. 58 France, Cour d’Appel de Paris, 18ème Chambre C, arrêt du 15 janvier 2009, I. c. ocde, rg n° S08/10057. 59 Voir notamment cedh, Philip Boivin c. France et Belgique et 32 autres États membres du Conseil de l’Europe, Décision 9 septembre 2008, Requête n° 73250/01, confirmé dans le jugement cedh, Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A c. Pays-Bas, Décision du 20 janvier 2009, Requête n° 13645/05. Dans l’affaire Boivin, la Cour a relevé que le jugement contesté par le requérant avait été rendu par une juridiction administrative internationale qui ne pouvait être soumise aux États parties à la csdh, et dans le cadre d’un mécanisme de règlement des différends permettant de Quelques Réflexions sur les Immunités des Organisations 351

Cour ne se réfère donc pas à la csdh, mais à « la conception française de l’ordre public international ». « L’ordre public international français » est un concept de droit international privé qui semble à première vue le fruit d’une contradiction. Comment, en effet, un ordre public peut-il être à la fois international et national ? Le concept d’ordre public est difficile à circonscrire de manière objective, que ce soit au plan interne ou international, et son interprétation est nécessairement universellement subjective et singulièrement objective . . . En tout état de cause, on peut avancer que l’ordre public, tel qu’interprété par la Cour, comprend l’accès au juge et le respect des droits de la défense. À la suite de l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation, la demanderesse a, comme l’ocde l’y avait incitée tout au long de la procédure, saisi le taocde. Après avoir entendu les parties, le tribunal, dans un jugement n° 69, rendu le 24 mars 2011,60 a tout d’abord rappelé, au titre des faits, ce qui suit. La requérante « a fait le choix de saisir la justice française qui, à tous les degrés de juridiction, a reconnu et confirmé l’immunité de juridiction de l’ocde et, partant, reconnu la compétence exclusive du Tribunal administratif de l’ocde pour statuer sur l’objet du différend. À la suite de l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation du 29 septembre 2010, Mme I. s’est finalement tournée vers le Tribunal de céans en lui soumettant la présente requête, par laquelle elle demande que l’ocde soit condamnée à lui payer diverses sommes à plusieurs titres (indemnités de préavis, de licenciement et de requalification, dommages et intérêts, etc.). » Le tribunal a décidé qu’il n’avait pas à examiner au fond la requête, celle-ci étant de toute évidence irrecevable. Il relève notamment que la requérante n’avait pas contesté que l’ocde lui avait clairement rappelé en temps utile la procé- dure prévue applicable et que c’est « elle-même qui, en pleine connaissance de cause, a librement choisi de saisir la justice française et non pas le Tribunal de céans, tout en étant pleinement avertie des conséquences de son choix ». Il souligne que « comme le signale à juste titre le Secrétaire général dans ses écritures, rien n[e l’] aurait empêché[e] de tenter de suivre les deux voies en même temps ».

trancher les litiges de droit du travail intervenant entre le requérant et une organisation internationale jouissant d’une personnalité juridique distincte, et que les États parties à la convention n’étaient intervenus à aucun moment dans ce jugement. 60 taocde, Jugement dans l’affaire n° 69 Mme. I. c/ Secrétaire général, Jugement du Tribunal administratif rendu le 24 mars 2011, http://www.oecd.org/fr/tribunaladministratif/ 48758502.pdf (page consultée le 24 mai 2014). 352 Cèbe

4 Conclusion

Si ces réflexions avaient été écrites en 1950, l’immunité absolue des organisations aurait sans doute été simplement affirmée, sans que soit évoquée la moindre exception. Certes, aujourd’hui, nombreux encore sont ceux qui con- sidèrent, à juste titre, que l’immunité de juridiction des organisations doit leur permettre de ne pas être attraites devant des tribunaux étatiques, notamment ceux de l’État du siège. Mais, sous l’influence des évolutions significa- tives du droit international, notamment celui des droits de l’homme, et des décisions des juridictions internationales et nationales, de nombreux juristes d’organisations estiment que les justiciables, dans une acception très large, ne peuvent être laissés sans aucun accès au juge ou, à tout le moins, à un règle- ment des différends respectant les droits processuels essentiels, au premier rang desquels le principe du contradictoire. Sous l’influence de la distinction entre jure gestionis et jure imperii, propre pourtant aux immunités des États, comme de la jurisprudence de la cedh, les juridictions nationales ont également tendance à considérer qu’en l’absence61 d’un mécanisme de règlement des différends répondant aux exigences des conventions sur les droits de l’homme62 ou de l’ordre public international, elles ne doivent pas faire droit à l’immunité des organisations et doivent se déclarer compétentes. Espérons que cette tendance ne conduise pas à une tentative de paralysie de l’action des organisations, notamment par une mise en cause systématique et sans discernement de leur responsabilité quasi délictuelle devant des juridictions nationales. En tout état de cause, il reste aux organisations à s’assurer que leur seule réponse à cette problématique ne soit pas limitée à leur immu- nité d’exécution et que les mécanismes de règlement des différends qu’elles mettent en place permettent un accès à un règlement impartial des différends auxquels elles sont parties.

61 Voir, a contrario, le jugement de la Hague District Court du 14 mars 2012, dans l’affaire Leone et autres c. ase dans lequel la Cour rappelle que « la reconnaissance de l’immunité de l’ase ne prive pas [les demandeurs] de l’accès à une procédure juridique entourée de garanties pertinentes au sens de l’article 6 § 1 de la csdh, et [que] dans cette mesure les cours néerlandaises ne sont pas compétentes ». 62 La question des exigences minimales pour considérer qu’une juridiction puisse être con- sidérée comme telle ont été indiquées par la cedh dans sa décision cedh, A.L. c. Italie, Décision du 11 mai 2000, Requête n° 41387/98 : i) les membres du tribunal doivent être indépendants et nommés pour une durée certaine de temps ; ii) la procédure devant le tribunal doit être contradictoire et les deux parties doivent être entendues, même si l’audience peut être tenue à huis clos ; iii) la décision doit être motivée. Part 6 Conclusions

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CHAPTER 21 The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution of International Law

Stefan Oeter

1 Introduction

When the two societies, the German Society of International Law and the Société Française pour le droit international, had discussed the theme of the 2012 joint colloquium, the proposal to focus on the topic of immuneties first met with a certain reservation. Is the law of immunities not too technical for such an event, does it give room for enough debate? Even more, is the traditional concept of sovereign immunities not more and more outdated? The debates during the colloquium demonstrated that exactly the second question raised with regard to immunities makes it an extremely fascinating topic where fundamental questions on the basic structure of international law are at stake. The debates on which these concluding remarks will try to shed some additional light went far beyond technicalities of the traditional rules of state immunity (and immunities of international organisations). The discussion often ended up in explorative “sondages” of the direction the further development of international law is taking—or should take, as a result of normative requirements. These normative requirements, however, are far from being consented. To the contrary, even the way how the observer models the evolutionary path that current international law is taking depends on the subjective perspective of the observer, is a variable of the cognitive framework underlying his perspective on the past and the future of international law. The law of immunities thus functions like a mirror that allows us to espouse a different perspective on our beliefs of what international law is and should be, where it comes from and where it is going in its further development. Are states still the central actors in this system, and non-state actors a marginal phenomenon that should not detract us from the centrality of inter-state relations? Or do states play only an auxiliary role in a global legal order that finally must serve the causes of mankind, with the well-being of the individuals as the ultimate point of orientation, and yardstick? Depending on the answers one gives to these basic questions, one’s position on the role and function of sovereign immunities, and its relationship to human rights (and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��5 | doi ��.��63/9789004251632_022 356 Oeter international criminal law) will differ. Any observer of the discussions led during the two days in Basel between German, Swiss and French lawyers, but also Austrian, Polish and Belgian colleagues, could clearly see these diverging constructions—and could feel the tension that the divergence of perspectives and constructions creates.

2 The Practice of Sovereign Immunity—Shared Meanings and Grey Zones

The first panel on “Sovereign Immunity of States: Views from Practice” demonstrated with utmost clarity that state immunity still constitutes an issue of primary importance for the international legal order (see part one ‘State Immunity—National Practice’ in this volume). At first sight it seems to be an area where doctrinal questions have been sorted out a long time ago and where we can operate on solid ground. The rules on state immunity are in principle well settled in national jurisprudence—which points to a specific- ity of the law of immunities. Its roots are to be found in international law, but its practice is mainly an issue of national administrative practice and court decisions. It is one of the few institutions of international law that rests on daily exercise in national legal practice, with a settled body of jurisprudence in most national legal orders. States may have disputes on issues of immunities in their international relations, may even go to court on these issues—but the day-to-day application does not take place in a purely diplomatic context, it involves a plethora of national law enforcement agents, from policemen over administrators, prosecutors to judges. Accordingly, the concrete emanations of state immunities are often laid down explicitly in national statutory law or in restatements drafted by national bodies; in some states, like Germany, however, it may happen that the administration and courts must go back directly to international law and must find out what customary international law tells on a certain problem. Most of the daily problems of such (national) practice of dealing with immunities are well settled. But there exist some areas with a lack of clarity, areas where the solid principles of international law seem to evaporate in a shade of grey. These are not always the less important issue areas. The status of public officials in criminal proceedings before the courts of other states tends to raise problems—and the more international criminal law develops, the more these problems grow. For international criminal law proper operated by international judicial institutions, such as the International Criminal The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution 357

Court or the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, there is no real problem— immunities do not apply with regard to these institutions. But what about national criminal courts of other states? Under the growing impact of the uni- versality principle there is a tendency towards taking over the implementation of international criminal law at the level of national judiciaries. But may criminal courts of (let us say) Belgium prosecute the Israeli Prime Minister, the us Secretary of Defence or the us Joint Chief of Staff? From the perspective of human rights lawyers, this might be a wishful development; from the perspective of traditional international lawyers, giving a high priority to sovereign immunity, such development opens up a Pandora’s box. States, via their judiciaries, may intervene in the internal affairs of other states by bringing to court public officials of such third states for alleged crimes committed in their official capacity—which means: in exercising the public policy of their government. The issue goes beyond mere criminal law: analogous questions might be raised for tort action against police officers of third states—think of some of the cases under the us Alien Tort Claims Statute. Another example of unclear boundary lines and lacking security in opera- tionalizing certain basic principles may be found in the area where actions iure gestionis and actions iure imperii are not clearly distinguishable any more. The operations of monetary policy, but also of other state agencies in the economic field may provide examples for such phenomena of “grey in grey”, where a state seems to function as an economic actor, but not for commercial purposes, but in implementing public policies. The mentioned grey zones seem to produce quite some difficulties for foreign ministries, but also for courts at the national level, as we learned in listening to the speakers of the first panel. The recent icj proceedings in the case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening) provide a striking example of such difficulties. Ambassadors Lindemann, Ney and Boussaroque, as the responsible practitioners from the foreign ministries, informed us about the challenges the law of immunities creates for state practice and provided an interesting survey of national practice (see chapter one by Pierre Boussaroque and David Lemétayer as well as chapter two by Martin Ney in this volume). The challenges posed by the laws of immunity have been noticed quite a while ago by the International Law Commission (ilc), resulting in various drafting exercises on questions of immunities. The auditorium could learn about the complexities of these drafting enterprises (and its accompanying debates) first hand, from the ilc members Concepción Escobar Hernández and Mathias Audit (see chapter five in 358 Oeter this volume)—and again it became visible that immunities are just the opposite of a boring and outdated topic.

3 Conceptual Foundations of the Law of Immunities

The second panel was devoted to “Conceptual Issues of Sovereign Immunity— Perspectives from International Legal Doctrine, State Practice and Juris prudence of the icj”. This panel comprised, in its essence, a lively debate on the conceptual foundations of the international legal order. The basic conceptual dispute underlying all the fundamental debates on the scope (and the limits) of traditional sovereign immunity came to the surface here. Is international law still a body of rules governing primarily inter-state relations, and serving the purpose of creating a peaceful environment for such relations? Or has modern international law transformed itself into a value-oriented order in the service of individuals, which would mean that human rights constitute the primary point of orientation (and yardstick) of international legal practice? In listening carefully to the heated debates, the impression gained ground that such a polarised opposition of two competing visions of international law might constitute a false opposition. Why that? Public international law must serve both objectives and must balance them. It must be admitted that a traditional construction of an inter-state order with the well-being of states as the primary purpose is not always without friction to a value-oriented concept of international law based primarily on human rights. Very deeply rooted, fundamental frictions between a more liberal, individual-centred idea of social order and a more traditional, communitarian concept of social order serving a collective “common good” are observable here. But we cannot, if one tries to be sincere, sacrifice completely the one in order to optimise the other value. A collective that maims the individuals is as gruesome a deformation as an individualism incapable to develop any sustainable idea of a “common good”. Collectives of individuals still need states to provide peace and security, welfare and public goods. And the state is not an end in itself, but an institutional arrangement meant to serve its citizens. The devil lies in the detail here. Some of the presentations cogently demonstrated this, like the conceptual talk of Andrea Gattini on immunity of states and sovereignty (see chapter twelve in this volume) or the presentation of Thomas Giegerich on the us Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (see chapter four in this volume). The most enlightening part, as far as the fundamental conceptual divides are concerned, probably was the debate between The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution 359

Christian Tomuschat and Michael Bothe on the case of Germany v. Italy before the icj (see chapters six and seven in this volume). Already the pleadings of the parties had rested on opposite conceptualisations, and the assessment of the (rather traditional) position taken by the icj brought to the limelight the differences of opinion on what is—and should be—the adequate construction of international law in handling competing claims of state immunity and criminal responsibility for crimes against international law. Daniel Thürer, in a complementary move, pointed to the fact that international humanitarian law has found a peculiar balance between these opposing claims, opening up the possibility for third states to judge war criminals before national courts— despite the fact that war criminals usually exercised sovereign prerogatives in their functions as military officials of regular armed forces of a state.

4 Challenges to Sovereign Immunity—Human Rights and Collective Interests

The third panel on “Challenges to the Immunity of States” in a way continued the conceptual debate. It became obvious that a simple opposition of power interests of states, on the one hand, and moral values of the global community, oriented towards human dignity and the interests of the individual, on the other hand, would not do justice to the complexities of the underlying conceptual issues. First and foremost, the debate is about operationalization of values. It is not self-evident from the outset which direction such an operationalization should take. Collective interests and the stakes of the individual are in a complex inter-relationship, and cannot be ranked in a simple hierarchical order. Human dignity of the individual depends on an adequate structure of society that is in harmony with the cultural values of its individuals. The “common good”, as a collective value, again is not independent from individual beliefs and interests, but to a certain degree an aggregate of such beliefs and interests. As Pierre d’Argent (see chapter fourteen in this volume) reminded us, the division of labour between values, as e.g. expressed in international criminal law, and traditional state immunities is to be decided on a different level than mere creation of priority-relations between competing values and interests. There is not one side by definition expressing “pure” values, as an emanation of the “good”, and one side linked to archaic (power) interests, assumed to be an emanation of the “bad”. Things are much more ambivalent, and value-based arguments might end up in mere rhetorics masquerading power interests, while the collective good of a state may be of vital importance for 360 Oeter safeguarding the human dignity, if not the survival of its members. Revisiting the commonly voiced arguments in favour of the position that serious human rights violations should be treated as potential exceptions to immunity (Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack see chapter thirteen in this volume) made such complexity of moral arguments visible. The same job was done by the survey of the relevant case-law under the echr (Theodor Schilling see chapter fifteen in this volume), with all the ambivalences that characterise the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. The most striking issue—and the issue most loaded with moral claims—is the relationship of sovereign immunity and international criminal law that Pierre d’Argent mapped in a fascinating way.

5 Sovereign Immunity and the Role of the State in the Economy

The fourth panel shifted the focus to a completely different issue area, namely “Commercial Activities and State Immunity”, but had again to deal with very fundamental issues in the development of international law. The evolution of an explicit exception from traditional sovereign immunity in the field of commercial activities historically was the result of a fundamental change in modern statehood. The state of the twentieth century was characterized by a strong tendency towards interventionism, with the state taking over a lot of economic activities that used to be operated by market actors. The rise of the German concept of “Daseinsvorsorge” as well as of the French concept of “service public” went hand in hand with these structural changes. The result seemed clear: as long as the state and its satellites operate as a commercial actor on the markets, they cannot claim with any justification to benefit from the privilege of sovereign immunity. For the state to climb down from the traditional realm of sovereign powers and to transform itself into a market force thus has a price—immunities are not applicable any more. The boundary lines between activities iure imperii and iure gestionis seemed clear and without any problem. But the new wave of transformations of the state, its retreat from direct participation in the markets, back to a coordinating and controlling function as a regulating authority, has raised new questions. The state and its institutions are still deeply involved in the operation of the market. The role of the state today, however, is less its twentieth century role as a direct service provider and producer of certain strategic goods, but a more limited role in the backstage. The result of such change is a certain degree of confusion. If we look more in detail to the involvement of states in commercial activities, we find a huge The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution 361 grey-zone. Anne van Aaken made an impressive attempt to map these difficulties in her presentation on “Blurring Boundaries between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities” (see chapter nine in this volume). The activities of central banks are the most obvious candidate for such blurred boundaries. Central banks are involved in banking activities—but these banking activities do not serve a genuinely commercial purpose, but have a basic function in structuring financial markets and upholding the operation of these markets. But does this insight solve the problems? What about central bank accounts in foreign countries? Are they part and parcel of the banking business, and thus of commercial character, or do they constitute public resources in the service of sovereign power? There are a number of similarly complex examples where it is far from easy to apply the traditional distinction between activities iure imperii and iure gestionis. An obvious case where difficulties have grown significantly is the area of sovereign bonds. Issuing a bond at first hand is a commercial activity—commercial investors lend money with the expectation to make profits by more or less high interest payments. The purpose of these bonds, however, is not commercial, but it is a public purpose. The money is needed to finance the sovereign exercise of public power by states, to provide public goods and to support the huge bureaucratic apparatus which modern states need to fulfil their functions. No investor, however, would give his money if states would insist on sovereign immunity. Accordingly, bond contracts usually waive immunities. This opens up the possibility for investors to go to court—and in the end result to enforce the awards in various national jurisdictions, trying to seize property of the state in default. Such seizure of property is not easy—again immunity creates hurdles. In this case it is the enforcement immunity protecting state property with a sovereign purpose. The boundary lines here are far from clear, as recent cases have demonstrated. What about the privately used planes of crown princes, what about training ships of navies, accounts of public bodies with unclear purposes? The problem becomes even more complex when the exercise of sovereign power intervenes into the servicing of bonds. The bonds as such may be free from immunity objections—but is not a court of a third state obliged to respect sovereign immunity with regard to sovereign acts of public authority taken to deal with a public emergency? A number of such questions have come up with regard to recent arbitration proceedings in the context of investment protection—the Argentine Bond cases being the most notorious ones. Jürgen Bröhmer with his presentation on “Immunity and Sovereign Bonds” tried to shed some light on these intricate problems (see chapter ten in this volume). 362 Oeter

And Jean-Marc Thouvenin added a number of interesting insights into current issues of the relationship of sovereign immunity and commercial activities (see chapter eleven in this volume). Sovereign Wealth Funds are one of the most fascinating phenomena that came up in the more recent transformations of the state. These funds, often public law bodies, engage in commercial activities, but their purpose is definitely the pursuit of a public interest. But should this lead to sovereign immunity? Other hybrid actors operate in a twi- light between the market and the exercise of public power—and any such twi- light makes it difficult to sort out unambiguously whether immunities apply or not. Another issue is linked to the problems of adjudication and enforcement. Decentred adjudication in the state concerned is often fraught with difficulties and tends to lead in a dead end. Adjudication in third states often will have to grapple with issues of immunities. Adjudication at the national level thus does not really serve the purpose. Often it does not grant transaction partners of state bodies an adequate remedy, and if such remedy is granted in third state jurisdictions, it opens up a Pandora’s box of diplomatic quarrels. There is definitively a need for collective mechanisms of adjudication. But the entire sector knows only one example of such collective mechanisms—the judicial dispute settlement in the field of investment protection. Investment protection proceedings have come under severe criticism, however, and this with good reasons—they often suffer under severe imbalances and in particular a strong bias in favour of investor interests. Public interests tend to become a victim of such bias—a consequence that has led to more and more concern with states and public interest organisations.

6 Immunities of International Organisations

A last area of severe problems linked to an excessive practice of immunities was revisited in the fifth panel. This panel dealt with “Immunities of International Organizations”. Why are immunities a problem in the realm of international organisations? At first sight, immunities for international organisations seem to be an entirely positive phenomenon. They safeguard the independence of such organisations and prevent strong member states, in particular the host state, from intervening into the internal decision-making process of the organisation. But there is another side of the coin. Dealing with immunities must also mean dealing with mechanisms of accountability. Immunities are in danger of hampering the creation of a sustainable mechanism of institution- alised accountability, as Laurence Boisson de Chazournes demonstrated in her cogently argued presentation (see chapter sixteen in this volume). Immunities The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution 363 of international organisations have the purpose of securing the proper functioning of the organisation according to its own institutional arrangements and modes of procedure. But immunities may also lead to severe problems of déni de justice. There is a certain degree of excess in the ambit of immunities granted to international organisations. If such organisations made full use of their immunities, a huge grey-zone would open up where people dealing with international organisations would be stripped of any remedies. Partners in business contracts could not sue if they did not get their money, employees would be without remedies against arbitrary decisions, victims of certain haz- ardous activities would find no judge to look for redress. In reality, such an excess in the granting of immunities is cut back by enlightened practice, as Rémi Cèbe from the oecd demonstrated in his presentation (see chapter nineteen in this volume). International organisations routinely waive their immunity in ordinary disputes with transaction partners. This depends, however, on the goodwill of the organisations. Most legal departments of international organisations know that they should avoid problems of excessive reliance on immunities—and act accordingly. But we are here in an ambit of social conventions and enlightened role understanding. In most cases problems do not arise—it is not the law as such, however, that takes care of this, but social practice. And social practice is prone to the human factor; most professionals in international organisations are enlightened and well- meaning, but sometimes things may go wrong. Accordingly, there is a need to revisit the legal rules, and to take care of the problems of accountability in a more systematic manner. There is definitely no “one size fits all solution” to these problems. We must find differentiated solutions, adapted to the specific circumstances of different types of international organisations, their different types of activities, and their specific accountability problems. A very specific case is to be found with the European Union, a case Isabelle Pingel dealt with in her presentation (see chapter seventeen in this volume). In light of the dynamic steps towards a federal arrangement of Europe, it is astonishing that the European Union still enjoys the whole range of immunities that usually characterise international organisations. With a view to the supranational character and the intensity with which the eu is exercising executive powers with direct consequences for individuals and firms, this might seem strange. The potential “dark side” of such immunities finds a certain counter-balance in the mechanisms of judicial accountability of the European institutions in the eu system. Any person or firm concerned may directly take action against a decision that interferes with his rights before the courts of the eu in Luxemburg. Accordingly, there is no great danger of déni de justice. But immunities still play an important role in certain segments of the 364 Oeter relationship between member state authorities and the eu organs. There is no criminal accountability of eu officials for their acts in official capacity as long as the eu does not waive its immunity. But this is part of a bigger problem. Actors at the national level must have no fear of criminal sanctions as long as their states are not willing to prosecute criminal acts to the detriment of the European Union—and such willingness is not always present. In the long run, it is open to question whether the European Union still needs the full range of immunities traditionally granted to international organisations. The more the Union resembles a federal arrangement, the more these immunities appear to be outdated.

7 Sovereign Immunity and the Progressive Development of International Law

The final ‘Round Table’ gave a synthesis of the complex discussions that had arisen during these two days. There was no consensus on whether the traditional concepts of sovereign immunity were outdated to a certain degree. But at least one point of consensus emerged. The law of immunities is far from being a mere technical issue from the machine room of international law. Just to the contrary, it is a complex of rules of fundamental importance—and a set of norms that give rise to very fundamental questions on the structure and the development of international law. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Georg Nolte, Jerzy Kranz and Gilbert Guillaume developed their personal accounts of what immunity means today for international law, what role immunities should play—and where they should retreat in order to give room for new modes of accountability under international law (see chapter 8 in this volume). Like in a burning glass, the recent debates on immunities shed some concentrated light on fundamental changes in the structure of international law. What these changes mean and how far they go (or should go) is still open to fierce debate. Beyond debate, however, is the insight that such change is happen- ing with growing pace. We are far from reaching an agreement on whether international law doctrine should shift its focus from states towards individuals and civil society. States still play an enormous role in the global realm, and in a huge number of issue areas there is no surrogate for the role states are expected to play. Admittedly, the legitimacy of state institutions is often open to doubt. It is open to challenge whether they really represent the interests of their populations. But who should replace them as institutional representatives of peoples? ngos cannot really claim to fill that void. They play an ever The Law of Immunities as a Focal Point of the Evolution 365 more important supplementary role in voicing the concerns of civil society, and they operate as checks and balances to state institutions haunted by regulatory capture, by pursuit of particular interests of small elites, and by oppres- sive ignorance. States, however, will remain for quite some time the only form of social organisation with a potential for inclusive representation. The round table demonstrated a strong dose of scepticism towards “progressive” attempts to brush aside immunities systematically. Sovereign immunity still plays a vital role in the coordination of sovereign powers. States and societies are more and more interdependent—a result of the notorious trends of globalisation. As a consequence, state administrations and courts must deal more and more with implications of acts of public authority of third states. Most of these acts happen not in a legal void but are to be measured against the yardsticks of international law. Just because globalisation leads to ever growing interdependence, international law is also growing—in order to deliver legal standards that help states to coordinate their activities. But who is going to judge the legality of sovereign acts with strong repercussions in other jurisdictions? The organs of the other states concerned? If we went that way without any bounds, international relations would become extremely con- flictuous, with states claiming jurisdiction over sovereign acts of other states, these states taking revenge by seizing jurisdiction over the first state, and so on. Immunities thus play a pacifying and stabilising role. We cannot relinquish the instrument as long as we have no functional surrogate that could deal adequately with the problem. In a certain way, immunities are on the retreat anyway. There are no immunities in the realm of international judicial dispute settlement. As soon as states subject themselves to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, they relinquish their immunities in relation to these judicial bodies. With the growth of international institutions of judicial settlement of disputes, immunities thus cede to the background. This is not an easy process, as the recent history of international criminal jurisdiction tells us with utmost clarity. Some important powers in the world do not like the whole idea of international criminal jurisdiction just because it brushes aside their immunities. It is not the idea that heinous war criminals and ruthless dictators somewhere in the world are now in danger of being prosecuted before an international criminal court that worries the us administration, but it is the concern that us military officials might end up before such a court without any immunity, an immunity usually insisted upon by the us when sending troops to third states. Even heads of states are now subject to criminal prosecution before such international criminal courts. 366 Oeter

But does that necessarily mean that also national courts should enter the arena and take over the role of international courts and tribunals in a more decentralised way, by seizing jurisdiction as long as the icc is barred from exercising jurisdiction in a particular case? A large number of international lawyers still feel a strong unease when being confronted with such ideas. Such practice would give up the idea of sovereign equality and would grant the powerful actors the option to become the judge of the powerless. Is such an asymmet- ric implementation of law really a moral progress? Opinions on that central question are still very divided. But when listening to the Basel Colloquium on “Immunities in the Age of Constitutionalism”, one could get an understanding why certain core issues of the operation of immunities remain so disputed. We are in a time of change, and we still do not agree where such change should go. The debate on immunities sheds an extremely interesting light on these conceptual divergences.