“Fully Aware of the Power of Words”: Morality, Politics
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The FCO's Human Rights Work in 2012
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee The FCO’s human rights work in 2012 Fourth Report of Session 2013–14 Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/facom Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 8 October 2013 HC 267 Published on 17 October 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £15.50 The Foreign Affairs Committee The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies. Current membership Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair) Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay) Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, North East Fife) Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley) Mike Gapes (Labour/Co-op, Ilford South) Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op, Preston) Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford) Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border) The following Members were also members of the Committee during the parliament: Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East) Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East) Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. -
Citizens' Band (CB) Radio
Citizens’ Band (CB) radio – Authorising Amplitude Modulation (AM) modes of operation Permitting AM double and single side band CB radio in the UK Statement Publication date: 10 December 2013 Contents Section Page 1 Executive Summary 1 2 Introduction and background 2 3 Consultation Responses 5 4 Conclusions and next steps 10 Annex Page 1 List of non-confidential respondents 11 Citizens’ Band (CB) radio – Authorising Amplitude Modulation (AM) modes of operation Section 1 1 Executive Summary 1.1 This Statement sets out Ofcom’s decision to proceed with proposals made in our Consultation “Citizens’ Band (CB) radio – Authorising Amplitude Modulation (AM) modes of operation”1 (the ‘Consultation') which was published on 7 October 2013 and closed on 8 November 2013. 1.2 The Consultation proposed to amend current arrangements for Citizens’ Band (CB) Radio in the UK to allow the use of Amplitude Modulation (AM) Double-sideband (DSB) and Single-sideband (SSB) transmission on CB radio. 1.3 Ofcom specifically proposed to: • Authorise the use of AM emissions on European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) harmonised channels in line with European Communication Committee (ECC) Decision (11)032; and • Authorise such use on a licence exempt basis (in line with our authorisation approach for other modes of operation for CB). 1.4 These proposals followed on from work carried out in Europe. In June 2011 the ECC, part of CEPT, published a Decision, ECC/DEC/ (11)03 (the ‘Decision’) on the harmonised use of frequencies for CB radio equipment. The Decision sought to harmonise the technical standards and usage conditions relating to the use of frequencies for CB radio equipment in CEPT administrations. -
) 1 W~ Mathias Marcuss~
;) 1 W~ MATHIAS MARCUSS~ INTERNATIOI\AL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RvVANDA ;.'- CASE NC J.:TR 19"; THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIB UNAL l~.·~'--'~l~C:-T ~~ AGAINST RECEIVED HASSAN NGEZE ,'; ;-, ~", 1" ~ 7 _, .....',~! V v ACTION :e..e",=,~~ COpy ~ ~ Il\DICTMENT I. The do;;eCcor ufthe International Criminal Tribun,j for Rwanda, pursuant to the authority stipulated in Article 17 of the Statute of the TribllfJaI 01' the L'lternational Crim: al Tribunal for Rwanda (the Statute oEthe Tribunal) charges Hi SSAN {GEZE with GENOCIDE, DIRECT ANi) PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT CENOCll ~, and CRIM.!!:S AGAINST HUMANITY, all offenses stip:llated in Articles 2.ud 3 0 the Statut.: of the fribunal as set forth belo N: 2, THE ACCUSED HASSAN NGEZE was born in 1961 in the Commune of Rubavu, Prefecture of Gisenyi, ,he Republic of 'Zwand At the tim.: of the eV~:lts referred to in this indictment, HASSAN NGEZE was Editor-in-Chief of the .i' 'lirna: knewn :.IS, and published under tbe name ot~ KANGURA. PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/085c26/ 3. CONCISE STATENIENT OF THE ACTS 3.1. The crimes inthislnd';tmentr)l\! plse in Rwsnda, between January 1 and December :3 1 of 1994. 3.2. During the events n:rerred to III this indictment, Tutsis and Hutus were identified as ethnic or racial group<;. 3.3. DLL inlS the events referre, in thi' indi . (ment, there were in Rwanda \\idespre.d or sy ~ematic ,ttacL '1gain-t a civilian population, including Tutsis and certa:n 1{utus, Oil poliucal, etl lie or l'acial grounds. -
Jamming Attacks and Anti-Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks
1 Jamming Attacks and Anti-Jamming Strategies in Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey Hossein Pirayesh and Huacheng Zeng Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI USA Abstract—Wireless networks are a key component of the will become ubiquitously available for massive devices to telecommunications infrastructure in our society, and wireless realize the vision of Internet of Everything (IoE) in the near services become increasingly important as the applications of future [18]. wireless devices have penetrated every aspect of our lives. Although wireless technologies have significantly advanced in As we are increasingly reliant on wireless services, security the past decades, most wireless networks are still vulnerable to threats have become a big concern about the confidentiality, radio jamming attacks due to the openness nature of wireless integrity, and availability of wireless communications. Com- channels, and the progress in the design of jamming-resistant pared to other security threats such as eavesdropping and wireless networking systems remains limited. This stagnation can data fabrication, wireless networks are particularly vulnerable be attributed to the lack of practical physical-layer wireless tech- nologies that can efficiently decode data packets in the presence to radio jamming attacks for the following reasons. First, of jamming attacks. This article surveys existing jamming attacks jamming attacks are easy to launch. With the advances in and anti-jamming strategies in wireless local area networks software-defined radio, one can easily program a small $10 (WLANs), cellular networks, cognitive radio networks (CRNs), USB dongle device to a jammer that covers 20 MHz bandwidth ZigBee networks, Bluetooth networks, vehicular networks, LoRa below 6 GHz and up to 100 mW transmission power [34]. -
Jamming the Stations: Is There an International Free Flow of Info
Schenone: Jamming The Stations: Is There an International Free Flow of Info JAMMING THE STATIONS: IS THERE AN INTERNATIONAL FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION? In September 1983, Korean Airlines flight 7 was shot down by a Soviet interceptor.' All 269 passengers perished.2 Within an hour, news of the incident was broadcast to citizens of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union 3 over Radio Free Europe (RFE)4 and Radio Liberty (RL).5 The Soviet news services, how- ever, failed to mention the incident.6 The Soviet government delib- erately attempted to block reception of the RFE and RL broadcast through radio jamming.' Radio jamming is a significant international problem because radio broadcasting is an essential and powerful means of dissemi- nating information among nations.8 Radio jamming is generally defined as "deliberate radio interference to prevent reception of a foreign broadcast."9 A more technical definition is "intentional harmful interference" '0 which results in intentional non-conformity 1. THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TENTH ANNUAL REPORT]. 2. Id. 3. Id. 4.' See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 6. TENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supranote I, at 11. The Soviet Union at first denied that the plane was shot down. When the Soviet news services later admitted it had in fact been shot down by one of their pilots, they claimed the Korean plane had no lights identifying it as non-agressive. However, RFE and RL broadcasts of the tapes of the interceptor's pilot revealed that he claimed he could see the Korean jet's strobe lights. -
Journalism Is Not a Crime” Violations of Media Freedom in Ethiopia WATCH
HUMAN RIGHTS “Journalism Is Not a Crime” Violations of Media Freedom in Ethiopia WATCH “Journalism Is Not a Crime” Violations of Media Freedom in Ethiopia Copyright © 2015 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-32279 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org 2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | JANUARY 2015 JANUARY 2015 978-1-6231-32279 “Journalism Is Not a Crime” Violations of Media Freedoms in Ethiopia Glossary of Abbreviations ................................................................................................... i Map of Ethiopia .................................................................................................................. ii Summary .......................................................................................................................... -
The Rwandan Genocide: Combating Stereotypes And
The Rwandan Genocide: Combating Stereotypes and Understanding the Origins Nicola Skakel Senior Honors Thesis Department of History April 9th 2018 Defense Committee: Dr. Susan K. Kent, Department of History, Primary Advisor Dr. Matthew Gerber, Department of History, Honors Council Representative Dr. Paul Shankman, Department of Anthropology, Advisor 1 Introduction On the 7th of April 1994, the small east African country of Rwanda erupted into one of the most deadly and intimate genocides the modern world had ever witnessed. Whilst the western world stood by and watched in just 100 days over 800,000 Rwandans out of a total population of 7 million, were systematically murdered in the most brutal and violent of ways. Those who were targeted made up the country’s minority ethnic group the Tutsis, and moderates from the majority group, the Hutus. For many, the legacy of Rwanda is a monstrous example of extreme pent up ethnic tensions that has its roots in European colonialism. In contrast, I will argue that the events not just of 1994 but also the unrest that proceeded it, arose from a highly complex culmination of long-standing historical tensions between ethnic groups that long pre-dated colonialism. In conjunction, a set of short-term triggers including foreign intervention, civil war, famine, state terrorism and ultimately the assassination of President Habyarimana also contributed to the outburst of genocide in 1994. Whilst it would be easy to place sole responsibility on European colonists for implementing a policy of divide and rule and therefore exacerbating ethnic tensions, it seems to me that genocide is never that cut and dried: it can never be explained by one factor. -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. -
“The Law of Incitement” (PDF)
THE LAW OF INCITEMENT United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Symposium "Speech, Power and Violence" ∗ by Gregory S. Gordon I. INTRODUCTION This essay will explore the origins and development of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. It will begin with an historical analysis of the epochal Nuremberg decisions regarding Nazi hate-mongers Julius Streicher, Hans Fritzsche and Otto Dietrich. Although these decisions did not deal explicitly with incitement as a separate crime, they laid the groundwork for future development of incitement as a crime in its own right. The essay will then examine the official birth of the incitement crime with the adoption of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide ("Genocide Convention"). From that point through the next forty-five years, the crime was not actually applied. But that changed with the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which vigorously prosecuted incitement to genocide. Through a series of cases that progressively fleshed out elements of the crime, the ICTR jurisprudence set out the materials necessary to construct a legal framework necessary to analyze incitement. That framework was put to good use in the Canadian immigration context in the case of Rwandan politician Leon Mugesera, who delivered an infamous pre-1994 speech calling for genocide through a series of violent and macabre metaphors. The essay will conclude with an analysis of the most recent ICTR case to apply and develop the incitement framework -- Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi. Bikindi, a popular songwriter, composed music and lyrics that provoked ethnic hatred toward Tutsis. -
Rwandan Journalists Who Were Living in Uganda Went Back Home and Resumed Working
Because of this history, the media are no longer trusted by the public and government, and most people are suspicious of the journalism profession generally. Under the new government, a few journalists who had survived the genocide and other Rwandan journalists who were living in Uganda went back home and resumed working. RWANDA 268 MEDIA SUSTAINABILITY INDEX 2006–2007 INTRODUCTION OVERALL SCORE: 2.29 RWANDA Rwanda lost almost all its journalists during the 1994 genocide; they were among the roughly one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans who were killed by extremist armed militia known by the name Interehemwa. The genocide came after the death of then-President Juvenile Habyarimana in a plane crash Rsuspected to have been caused by rebels hiding out in Uganda. During this genocide, which lasted for a period of about 100 days, the media stood accused of acting as a tool of hate. Some local radio stations and print media encouraged neighbors to turn against each other. Hutu extremists used the radio to mobilize the Hutu majority, coordinate killings, and try to ensure that the Tutsi were systematically eliminated. Rwandans are still bitter that it occurred with little intervention from Western governments, and it finally ended when the rebel group Rwanda Patriotic Front and the Ugandan Army wrested power away from the perpetrators and stopped the massacres. Some journalists who are believed to have actively participated in the genocide were investigated by international human-rights groups and were arrested and charged by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Other journalists chose to go into exile. -
Report on the Rwanda Media Experience After The
IMS assessment mission: The Rwanda media experience from the genocide International Media Support • Report • March 2003 Monique Alexis, IMS Consultant Ines Mpambara, Co-director of Rwanda’s School of Journalism Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................. 3 1.1 Background for the mission .............................................................................3 1.2 Mission Objectives..........................................................................................3 1.3 Method and Scope of work ..............................................................................3 1.4 Structure of the report....................................................................................4 2 The Rwandan Context............................................................... 5 2.1 Political background .......................................................................................5 3 The media and the genocide ................................................... 10 3.1 Historical development of the Rwandan media before the genocide .................... 10 3.2 The media during the genocide: the hate media............................................... 14 4 The media after the genocide ................................................. 19 4.1 Reconstruction of a destroyed media sector (1994 - 2003)................................ 19 4.2 Today: Absence of pluralism and constant threats and pressures ....................... 20 4.3 The new Press Law and the High Press Council -
The Prosecutor V Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan
TheProsecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunalp~nal international pour le Rwanda OR: ENG TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: JudgeNavanethem Pillay, presiding JudgeErik Mose JudgeAsoka de ZoysaGunawardana Registrar: Adama Dieng Date: 9 May 2003 THE PROSECUTOR V. FERDINAND NAHIMANA JEAN-BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA HASSAN NGEZE Case No. ICTR-99-52-T DECISION ON THE PROSECUTOR’S APPLICATION FOR REBUTTAL WITNESSES Officeof the Prosecutor: Mr StephenRapp Ms SimoneMonasebian Ms CharityKagwi Mr WilliamEgbe Counselfor FerdinandNahimana: r,,,,+.,Ib Jean-MarieBiju-Duval DianaEllis, Q.C. ! Counselfor HassanNReze: -O Mr JohnFloyd, III Mr Ren6 Martel 73 r.~ Counselfor Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza: N CO Mr GiacomoBarletta-Caldarera TheProsecutor v Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA ("the Tribunal") SITTINGas TrialChamber I, composedof JudgeNavanethem Pillay, presiding, Judge ErikMose, and JudgeAsoka de ZoysaGunawardana ("the Chamber"); CONSIDERING: 1. The Prosecutor’sApplication for RebuttalWitnesses, filed on 24 April2003 (the "Motion")in whichthe Prosecutor requests ten witnesses in rebuttal; 2. The Prosecutor’sSupplementary Application for additionalrebuttal witnesses on HassanNgeze’s alibi defence filed on 28 April2003 (the "Supplementary Motion"), requestingone further witness in rebuttal; 3.The Replyof the Defencefor HassanNgeze, filed on 1 May 2003; 4.TheReply of the Defencefor Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza,